Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
On the basis of the allegation in the complaint that the parties-litigants are all
residents of Cebu City, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss, citing as grounds
therefor, the failure of the complaint to allege prior availment by the plaintiffs of the
barangay conciliation process required by P.D. 1508, as well as the absence of a
certification by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretary that no conciliation or settlement had
been reached by the parties. The motion was opposed by private respondents.
ESCOLIN., J.:
In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the Court is called upon to determine the classes of actions which fall
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1508, 1 otherwise known as
Katarungang Pambarangay Law. This law requires the compulsory process of
arbitration at the Barangay level as a pre-condition for filing a complaint in court,
Petitioners contend that said legislation is so broad and all-embracing as to apply to
actions cognizable not only by the city and municipal courts, now known as the
metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts, but also by the courts of first
instance, now the regional trial courts. Upon the other hand, respondents would limit
its coverage only to those cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
metropolitan trial courts and municipal trial courts.
The antecedent facts are not disputed. On August 5, 1982, respondents Victor Go and
Flora D. Go filed in the defunct Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided by
respondent Judge Valeriano P. Tomol, Jr., a complaint against petitioners Julius
Morata and Ma. Luisa Morata for recovery of a sum of money plus damages
amounting to P49,400.00. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. R-22154.
[5] Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in
the interest of justice determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government.
Thus, except in the instances enumerated in sections 2 and 6 of the law, the Lupon
has the authority to settle amicably all types of disputes involving parties who
actually reside in the same city or municipality. The law, as written, makes no
distinction whatsoever with respect to the classes of civil disputes that should be
compromised at the barangay level, in contradistinction to the limitation imposed
upon the Lupon by paragraph (3), section 2 thereof as regards its authority over
criminal cases. In fact, in defining the Lupon's authority, Section 2 of said law
employed the universal and comprehensive term "all", to which usage We should
neither add nor subtract in consonance with the rudimentary precept in statutory
construction that "where the law does not distinguish, We should not
distinguish. 2 By compelling the disputants to settle their differences through the
intervention of the barangay leader and other respected members of the barangay, the
animosity generated by protracted court litigations between members of the same
political unit, a disruptive factor toward unity and cooperation, is avoided. It must be
borne in mind that the conciliation process at the barangay level is likewise designed
to discourage indiscriminate filing of cases in court in order to decongest its clogged
dockets and, in the process, enhance the quality of justice dispensed by it. Thus, to
say that the authority of the Lupon is limited to cases exclusively cognizable by the
inferior courts is to lose sight of this objective. Worse, it would make the law a selfdefeating one. For what would stop a party, say in an action for a sum of money or
damages, as in the instant case, from bloating up his claim in order to place his case
beyond the jurisdiction of the inferior court and thereby avoid the mandatory
requirement of P.D. 1508? And why, indeed, should the law seek to ease the
congestion of dockets only in inferior courts and not in the regional trial courts
where the log-jam of cases is much more serious? Indeed, the lawmakers could not
have intended such half-measure and self-defeating legislation.
The objectives of the law are set forth in its preamble thus:
WHEREAS, the perpetuation and official recognition of the timehonored tradition of amicably settling disputes among family and
barangay level without judicial resources would promote the
speedy administration of justice and implement the constitutional
mandate to preserve and develop Filipino culture and to strengthen
the family as a basic social institution;
the amount involved or the nature of the original dispute. But there is nothing in the
context of said sections to justify the thesis that the mandated conciliation process in
other types of cases applies exclusively to said inferior courts.
Any doubt on the issue before Us should be dispelled by Circular No. 22 issued by
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 6 the full text of which is quoted as follows:
There can be no question that when the law conferred upon the Lupon "the authority
to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for
amicable settlement of all disputes, ... ," its obvious intendment was to grant to the
Lupon as broad and comprehensive an authority as possible as would bring about the
optimum realization of the aforesaid objectives. These objectives would only be halfmet and easily thwarted if the Lupon's authority is exercised only in cases falling
within the exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts.
Moreover, if it is the intention of the law to restrict its coverage only to cases
cognizable by the inferior courts, then it would not have provided in Section 3
thereof the following rule on Venue, to wit:
Section 3. Venue. ... However, all disputes which involve real
property or any interest therein shall be brought in the Barangay
where the real property or and part thereof is situated.
for it should be noted that, traditionally and historically, jurisdiction over cases
involving real property or any interest therein, except forcible entry and detainer
cases, has always been vested in the courts of first instance [now regional trial court].
But it is pointed out by the respondent judge that Sections 11, 3 12, 4 and 14, 5 of the
law speak of the city and/or municipal courts as the forum for the nullification or
execution of the settlement or arbitration award issued by the Lupon. We hold that
this circumstance cannot be construed as a limitation of the scope of authority of the
Lupon. As heretofore stated, the authority of the Lupon is clearly established in
Section 2 of the law; whereas Sections 11, 12 and 14, relied upon by respondent
judge, deal with the nullification or execution of the settlement or arbitration awards
obtained at the barangay level. These sections conferred upon the city and municipal
courts the jurisdiction to pass upon and resolve petitions or actions for nullification
or enforcement of settlement/arbitration awards issued by the Lupon, regardless of
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, CJ Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana,
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ concur.
Makasiar and Teehankee, JJ., reserves his vote.
De Castro, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
(d) Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
(e) Where the dispute involves an offense punishable by
imprisonment exceeding thirty (30) days or a fine exceeding two
hundred pesos (P200.00). Thus, physical injuries requiring medical
attendance for not exceeding nine (9) days, slight slander, light
threats, unjust vexation, would be appropriate subject matters for
settlement;
(f) Offenses where there is no private offended party, for example,
littering, gambling, jaywalking, public scandal, vagrancy and
prostitution; and,
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may, in
the interest of justice, determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government and
Community Development. (Sec. 2, Rule VI, Katarungan
Pambarangay Rules).
The parties may go directly to court in the four cases specified in section 6 of the
law.
Chief Justice Fernando in his Circular No. 22 dated November 9, 1979 has enjoined
all Judges of the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, Agrarian Courts, city courts, municipal courts and their
clerks of court to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings
in cases falling within the authority of the barangay Lupons effective upon
their receipt of the certification of the Minister of Local Government and
Community Development that all the barangays within their respective jurisdictions
have organized their Lupons as contemplated in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
The Minister of Justice has assumed that the Katarungang Pambarangay Law applies
to the cases in Regional Trial Courts or Courts of First Instance. Thus, he ruled that a
complaint for damages in the sum of P100,000 is a matter falling within the authority
of the Lupon under section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Opinion No. 81,
Series of 1981; Katarungang Pambarangay Opinion No. 10 Series of 198 1).
The reference in the law to proper city or municipal court contemplates situations for
the enforcement or nullification of settlement or arbitration award. If there is no
award, the city or municipal court will have no occasion to intervene.
Whether the Lupons, will be equal to the task imposed upon them and should receive
commensurate remuneration for their work is another question.
Cases between or among those persons should undergo the conciliation process,
whatever may be the amount involved or the nature of the issue involved as long as
they do not belong to the following cases:
(a) Where the parties involved reside in barangays of different
cities or municipalities unless such barangays adjoin each other;
(b) Where the dispute involves real property located in different
cities or municipalities;
(c) Where one party is the government or any sub-division or
instrumentality thereof;
(d) Where one party is a public officer or employee and the dispute
relates to the performance of his official functions;
(e) Where the dispute involves an offense punishable by
imprisonment exceeding thirty (30) days or a fine exceeding two
hundred pesos (P200.00). Thus, physical injuries requiring medical
attendance for not exceeding nine (9) days, slight slander, light
threats, unjust vexation, would be appropriate subject matters for
settlement;
(f) Offenses where there is no private offended party, for example,
littering, gambling, jaywalking, public scandal, vagrancy and
prostitution; and,
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.: concurring:
I concur. The case filed by the Go spouses in the Court of First Instance of Cebu for
the collection of P49,400 from the Morata spouses, Civil Case No. R-22154, is
covered by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, Presidential Decree No. 1508. The
impression that the law applies only to cases filed in inferior courts does not seem to
be correct. Of course, the law applies only to disputes between or among persons
actually residing in the same barangay or to those involving actual residents of
different barangays within the same city or municipality (Sec. 3).
(g) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may, in
the interest of justice, determine upon recommendation of the
Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local Government and
Community Development. (Sec. 2, Rule VI, Katarungan
Pambarangay Rules).
The parties may go directly to court in the four cases specified in section 6 of the
law.
Chief Justice Fernando in his Circular No. 22 dated November 9, 1979 has enjoined
all Judges of the Courts of First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Courts, Agrarian Courts, city courts, municipal courts and their
clerks of court to desist from receiving complaints, petitions, actions or proceedings
in cases falling within the authority of the barangay Lupons effective upon
their receipt of the certification of the Minister of Local Government and
Community Development that all the barangays within their respective jurisdictions
have organized their Lupons as contemplated in the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.
The Minister of Justice has assumed that the Katarungang Pambarangay Law applies
to the cases in Regional Trial Courts or Courts of First Instance. Thus, he ruled that a
complaint for damages in the sum of P100,000 is a matter falling within the authority
of the Lupon under section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1508 (Opinion No. 81,
Series of 1981; Katarungang Pambarangay Opinion No. 10 Series of 198 1).
The reference in the law to proper city or municipal court contemplates situations for
the enforcement or nullification of settlement or arbitration award. If there is no
award, the city or municipal court will have no occasion to intervene.
Whether the Lupons, will be equal to the task imposed upon them and should receive
commensurate remuneration for their work is another question.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 167261
March 2, 2007
ROSARIA
LUPITAN
PANG-ET, Petitioner,
vs.
CATHERINE MANACNES-DAO-AS, Heir of LEONCIO MANACNES and
FLORENTINA MANACNES,Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019,
dated 9 February 2005, which reversed and set aside the Judgment 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 36, Bontoc, Mountain Province, and reinstated the
Resolution3 of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Besao-Sagada,
Mountain Province dismissing herein petitioners action for Enforcement of
Arbitration Award and Damages.
4
The instant petition draws its origin from an Action for recovery of possession of
real property situated in Sitio Abatan, Barrio Dagdag, Sagada filed by herein
petitioner before the MCTC of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province on 9 November
1994, against the spouses Leoncio and Florentina Manacnes, the predecessors-ininterest of herein respondent.
On 23 February 1995, during the course of the pre-trial, the parties, through their
respective counsels, agreed to refer the matter to the Barangay Lupon (Lupon) of
Dagdag, Sagada for arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.5 Consequently, the proceedings before the MCTC were
suspended, and the case was remanded to the Lupon for resolution.6
Thereafter, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995 due
to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses to enter into an Agreement for Arbitration and
their insistence that the case should go to court. On 8 March 1995, the Certification,
as well as the records of the case, were forwarded to the MCTC.
An Order was issued by the MCTC on 7 April 1995, once more remanding the
matter for conciliation by the Lupon and ordering the Lupon to render an Arbitration
Award thereon. According to the MCTC, based on the records of the case, an
Agreement for Arbitration was executed by the parties concerned; however, the
Lupon failed to issue an Arbitration Award as provided under the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, so that, the case must be returned to the Lupon until an
Arbitration Award is rendered.
In compliance with the MCTC Order, the Lupon rendered an Arbitration Award on
10 May 1995 ordering herein petitioner to retrieve the land upon payment to the
spouses Manacnes of the amount of P8,000.00 for the improvements on the land.
Aggrieved, Leoncios widow,7 Florentina Manacnes, repudiated the Arbitration
Award but her repudiation was rejected by the Lupon. Thereafter, the MCTC was
furnished with copies of the Arbitration Award.
On 1 June 1995, herein petitioner filed with the Lupon a Motion for Execution of the
Arbitration Award. On the other hand, Florentina Manacnes filed a Motion with the
MCTC for the resumption of the proceedings in the original case for recovery of
possession and praying that the MCTC consider her repudiation of the Arbitration
Award issued by the Lupon.
Subsequently, the MCTC heard the Motion of Florentina Manacnes notwithstanding
the latters failure to appear before the court despite notice. The MCTC denied
Florentina Manacnes Motion to repudiate the Arbitration Award elucidating that
since the movant failed to take any action within the 10-day reglementary period
provided for under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, the arbitration award has
become final and executory. Furthermore, upon motion of herein petitioner Pang-et,
the MCTC issued an Order remanding the records of the case to the Lupon for the
execution of the Arbitration Award. On 31 August 1995, the then incumbent Punong
Barangay of Dagdag issued a Notice of Execution of the Award.
Said Notice of Execution was never implemented. Thus, on 16 October 2001, herein
petitioner Pang-et filed with the MCTC an action for enforcement of the Arbitration
Award which was sought to be dismissed by the heir of the Manacnes spouses. 8 The
heir of the Manacnes spouses argues that the Agreement for Arbitration and the
Arbitration Award are void, the Agreement for Arbitration not having been
personally signed by the spouses Manacnes, and the Arbitration Award having been
written in English a language not understood by the parties.
In its Resolution dated 20 August 2002, the MCTC dismissed the Petition for
Enforcement of Arbitration Award in this wise:
x x x Are defendants estopped from questioning the proceedings before the Lupon
Tagapamayapa concerned?
The defendants having put in issue the validity of the proceedings before the lupon
concerned and the products thereof, they are not estopped. It is a hornbook rule that a
null and void act could always be questioned at any time as the action or defense
based upon it is imprescriptible.
The second issue: Is the agreement to Arbitrate null and void? Let us peruse the
pertinent law dealing on this matter which is Section 413 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (RA 7160), to wit:
negative. As provided for by the cited provisos of RA 7160, if ever a party is entitled
to an assistance, it shall be done only when the party concerned is a minor or
incompetent. Here, there is no showing that the spouses [Manacnis] were
incompetent. Perhaps very old but not incompetent. Likewise, what the law provides
is assistance, not signing of agreements or settlements.
Just suppose the spouses [Manacnis] executed a special power of attorney in favor of
their daughter Catherine to attend the proceedings and to sign the agreement to
arbitrate? The more that it is proscribed by the Katarungang Pambarangay Law
specifically Section 415 of RA 7160 which mandates the personal appearance of the
parties before the lupon and likewise prohibits the appearance of representatives.
In view of the foregoing, it could now be safely concluded that the questioned
agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious for being violative of the mandatory
provisions of RA 7160 particularly sections 413 and 415 thereof as it was not the
respondents-spouses [Manacnis] who signed it.
The foregoing should be taken together with Section 415 of the same code which
provides:
The third issue: Is the Arbitration Award now sought to be enforced effective? Much
to be desired, the natural flow of events must follow as a consequence. Considering
that the agreement to arbitrate is inefficacious as earlier declared, it follows that the
arbitration award which emanated from it is also inefficacious. Further, the
Arbitration Award by itself, granting arguendo that the agreement to arbitrate is
valid, will readily show that it does not also conform with the mandate of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law particularly Section 411 thereto which provides:
It is very clear from the foregoing that personal appearance of the parties in
conciliation proceedings before a Lupon Tagapamayapa is mandatory. Likewise, the
execution of the agreement to arbitrate must be done personally by the parties
themselves so that they themselves are mandated to sign the agreement.
"Section 413 (a) The parties may, at any stage of the proceedings, agree in writing
that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the lupon chairman or the pangkat. x
x x"
the parties do not speak and therefore a further violation of the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law.
IN THE LIGHT of all the foregoing considerations, the above-entitled case is hereby
dismissed.9
Petitioner Pang-ets Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, she filed an
Appeal before the RTC which reversed and set aside the Resolution of the MCTC
and remanded the case to the MCTC for further proceedings. According to the RTC:
As it appears on its face, the Agreement for Arbitration in point found on page 51 of
the expediente, dated Feb. 6, 1995, and attested by the Pangkat Chairman of the
Office of the Barangay Lupon of Dagdag, Sagada was signed by the
respondents/defendants spouses Manacnis. The representative of the Appellee in the
instant case assails such Agreement claiming that the signatures of her aforesaid
predecessors-in-interest therein were not personally affixed by the latter or are
falsified-which in effect is an attack on the validity of the document on the ground
that the consent of the defendants spouses Manacnis is vitiated by fraud. Indulging
the Appellee Heirs of Manacnis its contention that such indeed is the truth of the
matter, the fact still remains as borne out by the circumstances, that neither did said
original defendants nor did any of such heirs effectively repudiate the Agreement in
question in accordance with the procedure outlined by the law, within five (5) days
from Feb. 6, 1995, on the ground as above-stated (Secs. 413 (a), 418, RA 7160; Secs.
7, 13, KP Law; Sec. 12, Rule IV, KP Rules). As mandated, such failure is deemed a
waiver on the part of the defendants spouses Manacnis to challenge the Agreement
for Arbitration on the ground that their consent thereto is obtained and vitiated by
fraud (Sec. 12, Par. 3, KP Rules). Corollarily, the Appellee Heirs being privy to the
now deceased original defendants should have not been permitted by the court a quo
under the equitable principle of estoppel, to raise the matter in issue for the first time
in the present case (Lopez vs. Ochoa, 103 Phil. 94).
The Arbitration Award relative to Civil Case 83 (B.C. No. 07) dated May 10, 1995,
written in English, attested by the Punong Barangay of Dagdag and found on page 4
of the record is likewise assailed by the Appellee as void on the ground that the
English language is not known by the defendants spouses Manacnis who are Igorots.
Said Appellee contends that the document should have been written in Kankana-ey,
the dialect known to the party (Sec. 413 (b), RA 7160; Sec. 7, Par. 2, KP law, Sec.
11, KP Rules). On this score, the court a quo presumptuously concluded on the basis
of the self-serving mere say-so of the representative of the Appellee that her
predecessors did not speak or understand English. As a matter of judicial notice,
importantly, when the pangkat chairman asked the spouses Manacnes to sign or affix
their thumbmarks in the agreement, they refused and insisted that the case should
instead go to court. Thus, the Lupon had no other recourse but to issue a certificate to
file action. Unfortunately, the case was again remanded to the Lupon to "render an
arbitration award". This time, the Lupon heard the voice tape of the late Beket
Padonay affirming respondent Pang-ets right to the disputed property. While Pang-et
offered to pay P8,000.00 for the improvements made by the spouses Manacnes, the
latter refused to accept the same and insisted on their right to the subject property.
Despite this, the Lupon on May 10, 1995 issued an Arbitration award which favored
respondent Pang-et.
From the time the case was first referred to the Lupon to the time the same was again
remanded to it, the Spouses Manacnes remained firm in not entering into any
compromise with respondent Pang-et. This was made clear in both the minutes of the
Arbitration Hearing on 26 February 1995 and on 9 April 1995. With the foregoing,
We find it evident that the spouses Manacnes never intended to submit the case for
arbitration.
Moreover, the award itself is riddled with flaws. First of all there is no showing that
the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo was duly constituted in accordance with Rule V of
the Katarungan Pambarangay Rules. And after constituting of the Pangkat, Rule VI,
thereof the Punong Barangay and the Pangkat must proceed to hear the case.
However, according to the minutes of the hearing before the lupon on 9 April 1995,
the pangkat Chairman and another pangkat member were absent for the hearing.
Finally, Section 13 of the same Rule requires that the Punong Barangay or the
Pangkat Chairman should attest that parties freely and voluntarily agreed to the
settlement arrived at. But how can this be possible when the minutes of the two
hearings show that the spouses Manacnes neither freely nor voluntarily agreed to
anything.
While RA 7160 and the Katarungan Pambarangay rules provide for a period to
repudiate the Arbitration Award, the same is neither applicable nor necessary since
the Agreement to Arbitrate or the Arbitration Award were never freely nor voluntarily
entered into by one of the parties to the dispute. In short, there is no agreement
validly concluded that needs to be repudiated.
With all the foregoing, estoppel may not be applied against petitioners for an action
or defense against a null and void act does not prescribe. With this, We cannot but
agree with the MCTC that the very agreement to arbitrate is null and void. Similarly,
the arbitration award which was but the off shoot of the agreement is also void.
WHEREFORE, the RTC judgment of 2 June 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE,
the MCTC Resolution DISMISSING the Civil Case No. 118 for enforcement of
Arbitration Award is REINSTATED.11
Vehemently disagreeing with the Decision of the Court of Appeals, petitioner Panget filed the instant petition. Petitioner maintains that the appellate court overlooked
material facts that resulted in reversible errors in the assailed Decision. According to
petitioner, the Court of Appeals overlooked the fact that the original parties, as
represented by their respective counsels in Civil Case No. 83, mutually agreed to
submit the case for arbitration by the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa of Barangay Dagdag.
Petitioner insists that the parties must be bound by the initial agreement by their
counsels during pre-trial to an amicable settlement as any representation made by the
lawyers are deemed made with the conformity of their clients. Furthermore,
petitioner maintains that if indeed the spouses Manacnes did not want to enter into an
amicable settlement, then they should have raised their opposition at the first
instance, which was at the pre-trial on Civil Case No. 83 when the MCTC ordered
that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa for arbitration.
We do not agree with the petitioner.
First and foremost, in order to resolve the case before us, it is pivotal to stress that,
during the initial hearing before the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, the spouses Manacnes
declined to sign the Agreement for Arbitration and were adamant that the
proceedings before the MCTC in Civil Case No. 83 must continue. As reflected in
the Minutes12 of the Arbitration Hearing held on 26 February 1995, the legality of the
signature of Catherine Manacnes, daughter of the Manacnes spouses, who signed the
Agreement for Arbitration on behalf of her parents, was assailed on the ground that it
should be the spouses Manacnes themselves who should have signed such
agreement. To resolve the issue, the Pangkat Chairman then asked the spouses
Manacnes that if they wanted the arbitration proceedings to continue, they must
signify their intention in the Agreement for Arbitration form. However, as stated
earlier, the Manacnes spouses did not want to sign such agreement and instead
insisted that the case go to court.
Consequently, the Lupon issued a Certification to File Action on 26 February 1995
due to the refusal of the Manacnes spouses. Indicated in said Certification are the
following: 1) that there was personal confrontation between the parties before the
Punong Barangay but conciliation failed and 2) that the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo
was constituted but the personal confrontation before the Pangkat failed likewise
because respondents do not want to submit this case for arbitration and insist that
said case will go to court.13Nevertheless, upon receipt of said certification and the
records of the case, the MCTC ordered that the case be remanded to the Lupon ng
Tagapamayapa and for the latter to render an arbitration award, explaining that:
Going over the documents submitted to the court by the office of the Lupon
Tagapamayapa of Dagdag, Sagada, Mountain Province, the court observed that an
"Agreement for Arbitration" was executed by the parties anent the above-entitled
case. However, said Lupon did not make any arbitration award as mandated by the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law but instead made a finding that the case may now be
brought to the court. This is violative of the KP Law, which cannot be sanctioned by
the court.14
At this juncture, it must be stressed that the object of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law is the amicable settlement of disputes through conciliation proceedings
voluntarily and freely entered into by the parties. 15Through this mechanism, the
parties are encouraged to settle their disputes without enduring the rigors of court
litigation. Nonetheless, the disputing parties are not compelled to settle their
controversy during the barangay proceedings before the Lupon or the Pangkat, as
they are free to instead find recourse in the courts 16 in the event that no true
compromise is reached.
The key in achieving the objectives of an effective amicable settlement under the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law is the free and voluntary agreement of the parties to
submit the dispute for adjudication either by the Lupon or the Pangkat, whose award
or decision shall be binding upon them with the force and effect of a final judgment
of a court.17 Absent this voluntary submission by the parties to submit their dispute to
arbitration under the Katarungang Pambarangay Law, there cannot be a binding
settlement arrived at effectively resolving the case. Hence, we fail to see why the
MCTC further remanded the case to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa and insisted that
the arbitration proceedings continue, despite the clear showing that the spouses
Manacnes refused to submit the controversy for arbitration.
It would seem from the Order of the MCTC, which again remanded the case for
arbitration to the Lupon ng Tagapamayapa, that it is compulsory on the part of the
parties to submit the case for arbitration until an arbitration award is rendered by the
Lupon. This, to our minds, is contrary to the very nature of the proceedings under the
Manacnes to submit the case for arbitration since such arbitration award will not bind
the spouses. As reflected in Section 413 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay
Law, in order that a party may be bound by an arbitration award, said party must
have agreed in writing that they shall abide by the arbitration award of the Lupon or
the Pangkat. Like in any other contract, parties who have not signed an agreement to
arbitrate will not be bound by said agreement since it is axiomatic that a contract
cannot be binding upon and cannot be enforced against one who is not a party to
it.19 In view of the fact that upon verification by the Pangkat Chairman, in order to
settle the issue of whether or not they intend to submit the matter for arbitration, the
spouses Manacnes refused to affix their signature or thumb mark on the Agreement
for Arbitration Form, the Manacnes spouses cannot be bound by the Agreement for
Arbitration and the ensuing arbitration award since they never became privy to any
agreement submitting the case for arbitration by the Pangkat.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78019 is hereby AFFIRMED.
The Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Besao-Sagada, Mountain Province, is hereby
ORDERED to proceed with the trial of Civil Case No. 83 for Recovery of Possession
of Real Property, and the immediate resolution of the same with deliberate dispatch.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
DANTE M. PASCUAL, represented
by REYMEL R. SAGARIO,
Petitioner,
-versus-
MARILOU M. PASCUAL,
Respondent.
Present:
PANGANIBAN, Chairman,
SANDOVAL- GUTIERREZ,*
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES, and
GARCIA, JJ.
Promulgated:
November 17, 2005
x-------------------------------------------------- --------------x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the February 10, 2003
Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Branch 23 at Roxas dismissing,
on motion of herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual, the complaint filed against her
by her brother-herein petitioner Dante M. Pascual, represented by his attorney-in-fact
Reymel R. Sagario (Sagario), for non-compliance with the conciliation provision-pre
condition to filing of complaint in court under R.A. 7160 (the Local Government
Code).
Petitioner, a permanent resident of the United States of America, appointed
Sagario as his attorney-in-fact by a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) dated April 10,
2002:
1. To file a case for the cancellation of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. T-271656 issued in the name of Marilou M. Pascual as
well as the Deed of Sale of Registered Land (Dec. No. 639; Page
No. 52; Book No. XXI; Series of 1994) and/or Reconveyance at
the appropriate court;
Pursuant to the SPA, Sagario filed on October 14, 2002 before the Isabela RTC
at Roxas a complaint entitled Dante M. Pascual, plaintiff v. Marilou M. Pascual
and Register of Deeds, Defendants, docketed as Civil Case No. Br. 23-713-02, for
Annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-271657 of Isabela and Deed of
Absolute Sale of Registered Land and/or Reconveyance with Damages. [2]
To the Complaint the defendant-herein respondent Marilou M. Pascual filed a
Motion to Dismiss[3] on two grounds one of which was non-compliance with the
requirement under Section 412 of the Local Government Code,[4] she contending that
there is no showing that the dispute was referred to the barangay court before the
case was filed in court.
By the assailed Order of February 10, 2003, [5] Branch 23 of the Isabela RTC at
Roxas granted respondents Motion to Dismiss in this wise:
. . . RA 7160 repealing P.D. 1508 otherwise known as the Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay provides under Section 409 All
disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or the larger
portion thereof is situated. Hence, the reliance of the plaintiff on
Section 408 of R.A. 7160 is incorrect. When real property or any
interest therein is involved, the dispute shall be filed before the
barangay where the property is located, regardless of the
residence of the parties. Besides, it is incorrect to say that the
parties are not residents of the same place, Vira, Roxas,
Isabela. The Attorney-in-fact of the plaintiff in the person of
Reymel R. Sagario is a resident of Vira, Roxas, Isabela, and he
substitute(sic) Dante Pascual by virtue of said Special Power of
Attorney. Hence, said Attorney-in-fact should have brought the
[7]
interest therein shall be brought in the barangay where the real property is located,
hence, the use of the word shall makes it mandatory for the bringing of the dispute
before the lupon.
That attorney-in-fact Sagario is a resident of the same barangay as that of hers,
respondent argues in any event, brings the matter under the jurisdiction of the lupon,
for Sagario, following Section 3 of Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
which provides:
Sec. 3. Representative as parties. - Where the action is
allowed to be prosecuted or defended by a representative or
someone acting in a fiduciary capacity, the beneficiary shall be
included in the title of the case and shall be deemed to be the real
party in interest. A representative may be a trustee of an express
trust, a guardian, an executor or administrator, or a party authorized
by law or these Rules. An agent acting in his own name for the
benefit of an undisclosed principal may sue or be sued without
joining the principal except when the contract involves things
belonging to the principal,
xxx
Being the real party in interest, the Attorney-in-fact may
therefore bring the necessary complaint before the Lupon
Tagapayapa and appear in person as if he is the owner of the
land.[9] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Hence, the present petition questioning the palpable legal errors of the RTC.
Petitioner argues that since he, not his attorney-in-fact Sagario, is the real party
in interest, and since he actually resides abroad, the lupon would have no jurisdiction
to pass upon the dispute involving real property, he citing Agbayani v. Belen.[10]
Respondent submits, on the other hand, that Section 408, paragraph (f), of the
Local Government Code, is qualified by paragraph (c) of Section 409 of the same
Code the latter of which provides that [a]ll disputes involving real property or any
This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her
uncle, Lorenzo Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to
have the stand-off between them settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled
Sumbong,[1] to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual,
Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings
conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of
Attorney signed by Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son,
Lorenzito. Complainants objection to respondents appearance elicited the response
that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a lawyer inasmuch as complainant
is herself a lawyer. And as to complainants retort that her being a lawyer is merely
coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not as
counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.
Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
- versus -
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES and
GARCIA, JJ.
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Promulgated:
Respondent.
November 22, 2005
x----------------------------------------x
R ES OLUTION
GARCIA, J.:
In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director
for Bar Discipline, directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from
notice, her answer to the complaint, otherwise she will be considered as in default.[3]
The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner
Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, who admitted respondents answer notwithstanding her
earlier order of July 15, 2003, declaring respondent in default for failure to file an
answer in due time.[4]
In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed
with the Office of the Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong
Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead
of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known as pangkat. Prescinding from
this premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer appearing to
assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she
argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.
In her report dated October 6, 2003, [5] Commissioner Maala stated that the
charge of complainant has been established by clear preponderance of evidence
and, on that basis, recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of
her profession for a period of six (6) months. On the other hand, the Board of
Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the inculpatory
finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI2003-235,[6] a lighter penalty, to wit:
Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in
its determination that respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section
415 of the LGC. However, its recommended penalty of mere admonition must have
to be modified. Doubtless, respondents conduct tended to undermine the laudable
purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What compounded matters was
when respondent repeatedly ignored complainants protestation against her continued
appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount
of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 with WARNING that commission of similar acts of
impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila
of
the
Philippines
COURT
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14382
REMEDIOS
CUENCO
VDA.
DE
BORROMEO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and TOMAS L. BORROMEO, respondents.
M. J. Cuenco, N. R. Pacquiao
Crispin D. Baizas for respondent.
and
J.
C.
Borromeo
for
petitioner.
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by certiorari under Rule 46 from a judgement of the Court of Appeals(C.A.G.R. No 22136-R).
Remedios Cuenco Borromeo, as administratrix of the estate of the late Teofilo
Borromeo, an action against Tomas L. Borromeo in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu praying for accounting, liquidation and payment of her late husband's share in
the proceeds of the war damage claim paid to and received by the defendant as his
attorney-in-fact and of the sum of P17,100 as moral and actual damages and
attorney's fees (Civil No. R-5031, Annex A, C.A.-G.R. No. 22136-R). The defendant
answered the complaint denying the plaintiffs claim and averring that such share has
been fully paid to Teofilo Borromeo (Annex B, C.A.-G.R. No. 22136-R). Aside from
this case, they were pending in the same Court Civil No. R-3808, entitled "Estate of
Vito Borromeo vs. Tomas Borromeo," and special proceedings No. R-916, entitled
"Testate Estate of the Vito Borromeo." For the convenience of Attorney Crispin D.
Baizas, counsel for Tomas L. Borromeo in Civil No. R. 5031 and special proceedings
was set by the Court to enable attorney Baizas to be in Cebu City on consecutive
days. The hearing of Civil No. R-916 for 10, 11 and 12 July 1957. On 8 July 1957
Attorney Baizas received by mail a copy of an urgent motion dated 5 July 1957 of
the Solicitor General, who represented the Government in the special proceedings,
praying for postponement of the hearing set for 10, 11 and 12 July 1957 (Annex C,
C.A.-G.R. No. 22136-R). Attorney Baizas, who had previously made reservation
with the Philippine Air Lines to fly to Cebu City, cancelled his reservation and wired
Attorney Filberto Leonardo (who was collaborating with him in handling the cases)
in Cebu City, requesting him to ask for postponement of the hearing of Civil No. R5031, which he referred to in the telegram as the "Cuenco Case," or, should the Court
deny his request, to appear in his behalf at the trial of the case. On 9 July, Attorney
Leonardo, believing that the "Cuenco Case" referred to by Attorney Baizas in his
telegram was Civil No. R-3808, was proceeded to the Court presided over by Hon.
Edmundo Piccio but after reading the court calendar found that Civil No. R-3808
was not set for hearing on that day. So he went home. For that reason, when Civil
No. R-5031 was called for hearing at the Court presided over by Hon. Jose S.
Rodriguez, neither the defendant Tomas L. Borromeo nor his counsel appeared, and
the plaintiff Remedios Cuenco Borromeo was allowed to present her evidence. On 11
July 1957 the Court rendered judgment for the plaintiff and against the defendant,
copy of which was received by counsel for the defendant on 2 August 1957 (Annex
B, C.A.-G.R. No. 22136). On 29 August 1957 the defendant filed a verified motion
for new trial, dated 26 August 1957, on the ground of mistake or excusable neglect,
supported by affidavits of merit attached thereto (Annexes B, E-1 and E-2, C.A.-G.R.
No. 22136). On 23 September 1957. On 17 October 1957, or 24 days after receipt of
a copy of the order denying his motion for new trial, the defendant perfected his
appeal from the last mentioned order. In a motion dated 21 October 1957, copy of
which counsel for the defendant received on 26 October 1957, the plaintiff prayed
for dismissal of the appeal on the ground that it was filed beyond the reglementary
period (Annex H, C.A.-G.R. No. 22136). On 29 October 1957 the defendant filed an
objection thereto stating that he was appealing from the order dated 13 September
1957 denying his motion for new trial, and not from the judgment dated 11 July 1957
(Annex I, C.A.-G.R. No. 22136). The Court set the hearing of the plaintiff's motion
to dismiss on 26 October 1957 and thereafter on the same day entered an order as
follows:
Finding the motion of counsel for the plaintiff dated October 21, 1957, well
founded, it appearing that the appeal filed by the defendant was presented
outside of the 30 day period for appeal, it was filed after 44th day as shown
by the records, as prayed for, the appeal filed by the defendant is hereby
DISMISSED (Annex J, C.A.-G.R. No. 22136).
On 6 November 1957 the defendant moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
order, reiterating that his appeal was from the order dated 13 September 1957
denying his motion for new trial and not from the judgment dated 11 July 1957
(Annex K, C.A.-G.R. No. 22136); the plaintiff, an objection thereto(Annex L, C.A.G.R. No. 22136). On 2 December 1957 the defendant received a copy of an order
dated 25 November 1957 denying the motion for reconsideration (Annex M, C.A.G.R. No. 22136); on 23 December 1959 the defendant filed a petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Court of Appeals praying that after hearing the order dated 26
October 1957 dismissing his appeal from the denial of his motion of new trial be set
aside. (C.A.-G.R. No. 22136). He also prayed that after filing the requisite bond, a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the respondent court from issuing
a writ of execution of the judgment rendered in Civil No. R-5031. After he had
posted a bond in the sum of P1,000, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for. On 28 February 1958 the Court of Appeals
rendered judgment, the dispositive part of which is:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment rendered in Civil Case No.
5031, set aside, and the respondent judge should be, as he is hereby ordered,
to grant the NEW TRIAL prayed for and permit the petitioner to present
such evidence as may be lawfully warranted and relevant in the premises.
The injunction issued heretofore, is made permanent, without special
pronouncement as to costs.
The herein respondent, petitioner in the Court of Appeals, insists the he is appealing
from the order dated 13 September 1957, denying his motion for new trial and not
from the judgement dated 11 July 1957.
Taking into consideration the facts set forth in the motion for new trial supported by
affidavits attached thereto and the answer filed by the herein respondent Tomas L.
Borromeo in the Court of First Instance of Cebu where he denies the claim of the
herein petitioner, plaintiff in the said Court, and avers that the claim for war damage
of the late Teofilo Borromeo, husband of the herein petitioner, has been fully paid to
him, said motion may be deemed one filed under Rule 38, of the Rules of Court. A
denial thereof is final and appealable. The period for taking an appeal from a denial
of a motion praying for the setting aside of a judgment or order rendered or entered
against a party through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence is thirty
days from the receipt of the copy of such judgment or order. Indeed, it would be
futile to appeal from the judgment sought to be set aside by a motion or relief under
Rule 38, because the aggrieved party would have no evidence upon which to rely to
secure a reversal of the judgment sought to be set aside by a motion for relief under
Rule 38, unless he would rely for its reversal on insufficiency or perhaps inherent
improbability of the evidence presented by the winning party. The appeal by the
herein respondent Tomas L. Borromeo from the order denying his motion for relief
had been taken within the reglementary period and should have been allowed.
The judgment rendered by the Court of Appeals under review granting the writ
prayed for by the herein respondent Tomas L. Borromeo should be, as it is hereby,
affirmed, with costs against the herein petitioner Remedios Cuenco Vda. de
Borromeo.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L.,
Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss on the ground that the Certification
to File Action attached by Lourdes to her opposition clearly indicates that the parties
attempted to reach a compromise but failed.
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari[1] seeks to reverse the Court of Appeals
Resolutions[2] dated 2 July 1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the Order [3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Bacoor, Cavite (RTC), denying petitioner Edwin N. Tribianas (Edwin) motion
to dismiss the petition for habeas corpus filed against him by respondent Lourdes
Tribiana (Lourdes).
The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling of the RTC and added that under
Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code, conciliation proceedings before
the barangay are not required in petitions for habeas corpus.
The Issue
Edwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:
Antecedent Facts
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together since 1996
but formalized their union only on 28 October 1997. On 30 April 1998, Lourdes filed
a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal
home with their daughter, Khriza Mae Tribiana (Khriza). Edwin has since deprived
Lourdes of lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4)
months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by Edwins mother,
Rosalina Tribiana (Rosalina). Edwin moved to dismiss Lourdes petition on the
ground that the petition failed to allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were
made before its filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss
claiming that there were prior efforts at a compromise, which failed. Lourdes
attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification to File Action from their
Barangay dated 1 May 1998.
On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and reiterated a
previous order requiring Edwin and his mother, Rosalina to bring Khriza before the
RTC. Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwins petition on 2 July 1998. The
appellate court also denied Edwins motion for reconsideration.
otherwise. In this case, the child (Khriza) was only one year and four months when
taken away from the mother.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwins contentions by citing as an additional
ground the exception in Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local Government Code (LGC)
on barangay conciliation, which states:
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. the parties may go directly to court
in the following instances:
xxx
Evidently, Lourdes has complied with the condition precedent under Article
151 of the Family Code. A dismissal under Section 1(j) of Rule 16 is warranted
only if there is a failure to comply with a condition precedent. Given that the alleged
defect is a mere failure to allege compliance with a condition precedent, the proper
solution is not an outright dismissal of the action, but an amendment under Section 1
of Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. [5] It would have been a different
matter if Edwin had asserted that no efforts to arrive at a compromise have been
made at all.
In addition, the failure of a party to comply with a condition precedent is not a
jurisdictional defect.[6] Such defect does not place the controversy beyond the courts
power to resolve. If a party fails to raise such defect in a motion to dismiss, such
defect is deemed waived.[7] Such defect is curable by amendment as a matter of right
without leave of court, if made before the filing of a responsive pleading. [8] A motion
to dismiss is not a responsive pleading. [9] More importantly, an amendment alleging
compliance with a condition precedent is not a jurisdictional matter. Neither does it
alter the cause of action of a petition for habeas corpus. We have held that in cases
where the defect consists of the failure to state compliance with a condition
precedent, the trial court should order the amendment of the complaint. [10] Courts
should be liberal in allowing amendments to pleadings to avoid multiplicity of suits
and to present the real controversies between the parties.[11]
Moreover, in a habeas corpus proceeding involving the welfare and custody of
a child of tender age, the paramount concern is to resolve immediately the issue of
who has legal custody of the child. Technicalities should not stand in the way of
giving such child of tender age full protection. [12] This rule has sound statutory basis
in Article 213 of the Family Code, which states, No child under seven years of age
shall be separated from the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
SECOND DIVISION
ESTELA L. BERBA,
- versus -
a)
Estela L. Berba, a resident of 978 Maligaya Street, Malate, Manila, was the
owner of a parcel of land located at No. 2338 M. Roxas Street, Sta. Ana, Manila
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 63726. A house was constructed
on the lot, which she leased to Josephine Pablo* and the Heirs of Carlos Palanca
sometime in 1976. The lease was covered by a lease contract. Upon its expiration,
the lessees continued leasing the house on a month-to-month basis.
b)
c)
By 1999, the monthly rental on the property was P3,450.00. The lessees
failed to pay the rentals due, and by May 1999, their arrears amounted
to P81,818.00. Berba then filed a complaint for eviction and collection of unpaid
rentals only against Pablo in the Office of the Punong Barangay. On June 5, 1999,
Berba and Pablo executed an Agreement approved by the pangkat, as follows:
d)
e)
f)
The RTC ruled that under Section 408 of the Local Government Code,
parties who reside in the same city or municipality although in
different barangays are mandated to go through conciliation proceedings in
the Lupon.[19] The court cited the rulings of this Court in Morata v. Go,[20] and Vda.
de Borromeo v. Pogoy.[21]
Berba filed a motion for the reconsideration [22] of the decision, which
the RTC denied in its Order[23] dated October 2, 2002. She then elevated the case to
the CA viapetition for review, where she averred:
a)
The raising of other affirmative defenses apart from the nonreferral to the Barangay Court by the respondents constitute a
waiver of such requirement; and
b)
Citing the ruling of this Court in Diu v. Court of Appeals,[25] Berba claimed that
Section 408 of the Local Government Code should be construed liberally together
with Section 412. She further averred that she had complied substantially with the
requisites of the law, and recalls that conciliation proceedings before
the Lupon resulted in the execution of an Agreement on June 5, 1999. Upon failure
to comply with the agreement, all chances of amicable settlement were effectively
foreclosed. Hence, Pablo and the Heirs of Palanca were estopped from claiming that
she failed to comply with the Local Government Codes requirement of prior referral
of their dispute to the Lupon.
After due proceedings, the CA rendered judgment dismissing the petition
and affirming the RTC decision. Berba moved for a reconsideration of the decision,
which proved futile.
In the instant petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY
ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THE DECISION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF DIU VS.
COURT OF APPEALS (251 SCRA 478) AND IN DECLARING
THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE WITH
THE MANDATE OF PD 1508 (NOW R.A. 7160) WITH
RESPECT TO PRIOR REFERRAL TO THE BARANGAY COURT,
The Court rules that the CA cannot be faulted for affirming the decision of
the RTC reversing the decision of the MTC and ordering the dismissal of the
complaint for unlawful detainer without prejudice.
The records show that petitioner and respondent Josephine Pablo executed an
Agreement on June 5, 1999, which was approved by the Lupon. Respondent
Josephine Pablo did not repudiate the agreement; hence, such agreement of the
parties settling the case had the force and effect of a final judgment. As the Court
declared in Vidal v. Escueta,[30] the settlement of the parties may be enforced by
the Lupon, through the punong barangay, within six months; and if the settlement is
not enforced after the lapse of said period, it may be enforced by an action in the
proper city or municipal court, as provided in Section 417 of the Local Government
Code:
We also agree that the Secretary of the Lupon is mandated
to transmit the settlement to the appropriate city or municipal court
within the time frame under Section 418 of the LGC and to furnish
the parties and the Lupon Chairman with copies thereof. The
amicable settlement which is not repudiated within the period
therefor may be enforced by execution by the Luponthrough
the Punong Barangay within a time line of six months, and if the
settlement is not so enforced by the Lupon after the lapse of said
period, it may be enforced only by an action in the proper city or
municipal court as provided for in Section 417 of the LGC of
1991, as amended, which reads:
SEC.
417. Execution.
The
amicable
settlement or arbitration award may be enforced by
execution by the Lupon within six (6) months from the
date of the settlement. After the lapse of such time, the
settlement may be enforced by action in the proper city
or municipal court. (Italics supplied).
Section 417 of the Local Government Code provides a
mechanism for the enforcement of a settlement of the parties
before the Lupon. It provides for a two-tiered mode of enforcement
of an amicable settlement executed by the parties before
the Lupon, namely,
(a)
by
execution
of
the Punong
Barangay which is quasi-judicial and summary in nature on mere
motion of the party/parties entitled thereto; and (b) by an action in
regular form, which remedy is judicial. Under the first remedy, the
proceedings are covered by the LGC and the Katarungang
Pambarangay Implementing Rules and Regulations. The Punong
Barangay is called upon during the hearing to determine solely the
fact of non-compliance of the terms of the settlement and to give
In the present case, respondent Josephine Pablo failed to comply with her
obligation of repaying the back rentals of P81,818.00 and the current rentals for the
house. Hence, the petitioner had the right to enforce the Agreement against her and
move for her eviction from the premises. However, instead of filing a motion before
the Lupon for the enforcement of the agreement, or (after six months), an action in
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) for the enforcement of the settlement, the
petitioner filed an action against respondent Josephine Pablo for unlawful detainer
and the collection of unpaid rentals, inclusive of those already due before the June 5,
1999 Agreement was executed. The action of the petitioner against respondent Pablo
was barred by the Agreement of June 5, 1999.
The Court notes that the petitioner even submitted with the MTC a copy of her
June 5, 1999 Agreement with respondent Josephine Pablo. Instead of dismissing the
complaint as against such respondent, the MTC rendered judgment against her and
ordered her eviction from the leased premises.
The Court thus rules that the petitioners complaint against respondent Heirs
of Carlos Palanca was premature. It bears stressing that they were not impleaded by
the petitioner as parties-respondents before the Lupon. The petitioner filed her
complaint solely against respondent Josephine Pablo. Moreover, the said respondent
heirs were not privy to the said agreement, and, as such, were not bound by it.
Section 412 of the Local Government Code, sets forth the precondition to filing of
complaints in court, to wit:
SEC. 412 Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of
complaint in court. No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding
involving any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed
or instituted directly in court or any other government office for
adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the
parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by
the lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by
the lupon chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement
has been repudiated by the parties thereto.
(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties
may go directly to court in the following instances:
(1) Where the accused is under detention;
(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;
(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies
such as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal
property, and support pendente lite; and
Under Sec. 408 of the same Code, parties actually residing in the same city
or municipality are bound to submit their disputes to the Lupon for
conciliation/amicable settlement, unless otherwise provided therein:
waiver of that defense. Moreover, no such confrontation before the Lupon occurred
with respect to the unlawful detainer suit against Josephine Pablo before the MTC.[34]
In this case, the petitioner and the respondent Heirs of Carlos Palanca
resided in the City of Manila, albeit in different barangays. The dispute between the
petitioner and the respondent heirs was thus a matter within the authority of
the Lupon. Hence, the petitioners complaint for unlawful detainer and the collection
of back rentals should have been first filed before the Lupon for mandatory
conciliation, to afford the parties an opportunity to settle the case amicably.
However, the petitioner filed her complaint against the respondent Heirs of Carlos
Palanca directly with the MTC. Clearly then, her complaint was premature. The
execution of the June 5, 1999 Agreement between petitioner and respondent
Josephine Pablo does not amount to substantial compliance to the requirements of
the Local Government Code on mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings.
Indeed, considering that the MTC had already rendered a decision on the
merits of the case, it is not without reluctance that the Court reaches this conclusion
which would require the petitioner to start again from the beginning. The facts of the
present case, however, do not leave us any choice. To grant the petition under these
circumstances would amount to refusal to give effect to the Local Government Code
and to wiping it off the statute books insofar as ejectment and other cases governed
by the Rule on Summary Procedure are concerned. This Court has no authority to do
that.[35]
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.