A. LIBERTY OF ABODE AND TRAVEL (SEC. 7, ART.

III)
I.
Limitations
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro
FACTS: Rubi and various other Manguianes (Mangyans) in the
province of Mindoro were ordered by the provincial governor
of Mindoro to remove their residence from their native habitat
and to established themselves on a reservation in Tigbao, still
in the province of Mindoro, and to remain there, or be punished
by imprisonment if they escaped. Manguianes had been
ordered to live in a reservation made to that end and for
purposes of cultivation under certain plans. The Manguianes
are a Non-Christian tribe who were considered to be of very
low culture.
One of the Manguianes, a certain Dabalos, escaped
from the reservation but was later caught and was placed in
prison at Calapan, solely because he escaped from the
reservation. An application for habeas corpus was made on
behalf by Rubi and other Manguianes of the province, alleging
that by virtue of the resolution of the provincial board of
Mindoro creating the reservation, they had been illegally
deprived of their liberty. In this case, the validity of Section
2145 of the Administrative Code, which provides:
With the prior approval of the Department Head, the
provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is
deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct
such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on
unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved
by the provincial board.

"With the prior approval of the Department Head, the

provincial governor of any province in which nonChristian inhabitants are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of
law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up
their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial
board."
was challenged.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2145 of the Administrative

Code constitutes undue delegation. Whether or not the
Manguianes are being deprived of their liberty.

HELD:

I. No. By a vote of five to four, the Supreme Court sustained

the constitutionality of this section of the Administrative Code.
Under the doctrine of necessity, who else was in a better
position to determine whether or not to execute the law but
the provincial governor. It is optional for the provincial
governor to execute the law as circumstances may arise. It is
necessary to give discretion to the provincial governor. The
Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the
execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact.

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II. No. Among other things, the term non-Christian should not
be given a literal meaning or a religious signification, but that
it was intended to relate to degrees of civilization. The term
non-Christian it was said, refers not to religious belief, but in
a way to geographical area, and more directly to natives of the
Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization. In this case, the
Manguianes were being reconcentrated in the reservation to
promote peace and to arrest their seminomadic lifestyle. This
will ultimately settle them down where they can adapt to the
changing times.
The Supreme Court held that the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro was neither discriminatory nor
class legislation, and stated among other things: . . . one
cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered
with when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is
considered. They are restrained for their own good and the
general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due
process of law has not been followed. To go back to our
definition of due process of law and equal protection of the
laws, there exists a law; the law seems to be reasonable; it is
enforced according to the regular methods of procedure
prescribed; and it applies alike to all of a class.

ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL v. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET

AL

women at the night of October 25, 1918 beyond the womens

consent and knowledge. Said women are inmates of the
houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the
district of Sampaloc, Manila. Thereafter the women were
shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were
signed as laborers.
The purpose of sending this women to davao is to
exterminate vice, ordered the segregated district for women of
ill repute, which had been permitted for a number of years.
That when the women, its relative and lawyers filed for
habeas corpus, the City of Manila Mayor and police moved to
dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of
their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of
Davao instead.

ISSUE /S:
1. Whether or not mayor lukban who is an officer of the state,
to eradicate vices in its city have the right to deport said
women of ill-repute?
2. Whether or not the city of manila does not have a
jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus to davao city to
produce the body of the women since it is out of their
jurisdiction and thus, disobeying the writ issued by the court to
produce the body of the women?
HELD:

FACTS:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton
Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170

The petition was granted. Respondent Lukban is found

in contempt of court for not following the order of the court to

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produce the body of the women and shall pay into the office of
the clerk of the Supreme Court within five days the sum of one
hundred pesos (P100)
RATIO:

permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing

her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity
in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of
liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may
not thus be easily evaded.

1.
On the first issue, the courts decision is based on the
principle of Republicanism wherein Ours is a government of
laws and not of men

NOTE:

Law defines power. Centuries ago Magna Charta

decreed thatNo freeman shall be taken, or imprisoned, or be
disseized of his freehold, or liberties, or free customs, or be
outlawed, or exiled, or any other wise destroyed; nor will we
pass upon him nor condemn him, but by lawful judgment of his
peers or by the law of the land. No official, no matter how high,
is above the law. The courts are the forum which functionate to
safeguard individual liberty and to punish official transgressors

Literally means- That you have the body

2.
On the second issue, the court believed that the true
principle should be that, if the respondent (Mayor Lukban) is
within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to
obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he
has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. The writ of
habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint,
and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal
freedom. Any further rights of the parties are left untouched by
decision on the writ, whose principal purpose is to set the
individual at liberty.
3.
In other words, If the mayor and the chief of police, acting
under no authority of law, could deport these women from the
city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily
have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila.
The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be

HABEAS CORPUS as defined by the Black Law Dictionary

It is a writ employed to bring a person before a court,

most frequently to ensure that the partys imprisonment or
detention is not illegal.
In addition to being used to test the legality of the arrest
or commitment, the writ maybe used to obtain review of (1)
the regularity of the extradition process (2) the right to or
amount of bail or (3) the jurisdiction of a court that has
imposed a criminal sentence.
In other words, it is a writ which compel someone to
produce the body of the person under the name of the law.

Manotoc vs. CA | May 30, 1986

FACTS:
Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal
stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the
Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US
for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for
appointment of a management committee for both businesses.
Such was granted. However, pending disposition of a case

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filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of

Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a
memorandum to this effect was issued.
There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by
Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6 of
its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the
petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was
charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for
permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US
relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such
was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the
judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul
the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying
his leave to travel abroad.

he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient

reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.
Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and
CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well as
consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able
to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated
that no other person in his behalf could undertake such
business transaction.
Article 3 Sec6: The liberty of abode and of changing
the same shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. According to SC, the order of trial
court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful
order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to

bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him
bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could
prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: WON petitioners constitutional right to travel was

violated.
HELD: NO.
The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail
from leaving the country because this is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The
condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at
all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as
a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel. In case

PHIL. ASS. OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. vs. RUBEN D.

TORRES, ET AL. G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992
Facts:
Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for
short), is the largest national organization of private
employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and
authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of
obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers,
including
domestic
helpers.
On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories
regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids

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employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres

issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily
suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies
of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong".
Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued
Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10,
1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing
and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and
the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending
to hire Filipino domestic helpers.
On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued
Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the
processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for
Hong Kong. All Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from
the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which
requires prior accreditation which the POEA.
On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this
petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and
POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation

Overseas Employment Development Board, the National

Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the
Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging.
The assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from
engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino land
based workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of
the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the
same fall within the "administrative and policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the
respondents.
Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and
unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the
Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and
Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative
Code of 1987. The administrative circulars in question may not
be enforced and implemented.

Issue:
WON the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion
and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said
circulars.
Ruling:
No. Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the
power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement
activities. On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory
authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order
No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the

Ferdinand Marcos, et. al. vs. Honorable Raul Manglapus

FACTS:
After President Marcos was deposed from presidency via the
People Power Revolution, he and his family was forced into
exile. Now in his deathbed, the former President has signified
his wish to return to the Philippines to die. But President
Aquino, considering the dire consequences on the nation on
the return at a time when the stability of the government is

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threatened from various directions, stood firmly on the decision

to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family.

ISSUE:
Whether, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines insofar as the powers enumerated
under scope of the Executive are concerned.

RULING:
Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitation on
the exercise of the specific powers of the President, it
maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the
scope of the executive power. Corollarily, the powers of the
President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific
powers enumerated in the Constitution. Having sword to
defend and uphold the Constitution, the President has the
obligation under the Constitution to protect the people,
promote their welfare and advance the national interest. It
must be borne in mind that the Constitution, aside from being
an allocation of power is also a social contract whereby the
people have surrendered their sovereign powers to the State
for common good. The State, through the Government, is not
precluded from taking pre-emptive action against threats to its
existence if, though still nascent, they are perceived as apt to
become serious and direct.
Separate Opinions

Nothing important has happened to change my vote for

granting the petition. The death of Marcos has not plunged the
nation into paroxysms of grief as the so-called "loyalists" had
hoped. By and large, it has been met with only passing interest
if not outright indifference from the people. Clearly, the
discredited dictator is in death no El Cid. Marcos dead is only
an unpleasant memory, not a bolt of lightning to whip the
blood.
This only shows that if he was at all a threat to the
national security when he was already moribund that feeble
threat has died with him. As the government stresses, he has
been reduced to a non-person (which makes me wonder why it
is still afraid of him). His cadaver is not even regarded as a
symbol of this or that or whatever except by his fanatical
followers. It is only a dead body waiting to be interred in this
country.
This is a tempest in a teapot. We have more important
things to do than debating over a corpse that deserves no
kinder fate than dissolution and oblivion. I say let it be brought
home and buried deep and let us be done with it forever.

PARAS, J., dissenting on the Motion for Reconsideration:

I find no reason to deviate from the dissenting opinion I have
already expressed.

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

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Firstly, the former President, although already dead, is

still entitled to certain rights. It is not correct to say that a dead
man, since he is no longer a human being, has ceased to have
rights. For instance, our Revised Penal Code prohibits the
commission of libel against a deceased individual. And even if
we were to assume the non- existence anymore of his human
rights what about the human rights of his widow and the other
members of his family?

The death of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos,

which supervened after decision in this case had been
rendered, was pre-empted and foreseen in my original
dissenting opinion. There I said that the first cogent and
decisive proposition in this case is that "Mr. Marcos is a Filipino
and, as such, entitled to return to, die and be buried in this
country." I have only to add a few statements to that dissenting
opinion.

Secondly, up to now, the alleged threats to national

security have remained unproved and consequently,
unpersuasive. Our Armed Forces can easily control any
possible uprising or political and military destabilization. In
fact, the converse appears to be nearer the truth, that is, if we
do not allow the remains to come, more trouble may be
expected.

Respondents have succeeded in denying Mr. Marcos the

first two (2) rights, i.e. to return to and die in this country, The
remaining right of this Filipino that cries out for vindication at
this late hour is the right to be buried in this country. Will the
respondents be allowed to complete the circle of denying the
constitutional and human right of Mr. Marcos to travel which,
as stated in my dissenting opinion, includes the right to return
to, die and be buried in this country? The answer should be in
the negative if the Constitution is to still prevail; the answer
should be in the negative if we are to avoid the completely
indefensible act of denying a Filipino the last right to blend his
mortal remains with a few square feet of earth in the treasured
land of his birth.

Thirdly, reconciliation can proceed at a much faster

pace if the petition for the return is granted. To refuse the
request can mean a hardening of resistance against the wellintentioned aim of the administration. Upon the other hand, to
grant the petition may well soften the hearts of the
oppositionists; paving the way for a united citizenry.
Finally, the entire world will surely applaud our
government's act of mercy. As Shakespeare once wrote "the
quality of mercy is not strained." Surely, compassion is the
better part of government. Remove mercy, and you remove
the best reason against civil strife, which if not abated can turn
our country into a mainstream of fiery dissent and in the end,
as one great man has put it, the question will no longer be
what is right, but what is left.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:

Those who would deny this Filipino the only

constitutional and human right that can be accorded him now
say that the constitutional and human right to be buried in this
country would apply to any Filipino, except Mr. Marcos,
because he was a dictator and he plundered the country. This
is the most irrelevant argument that can be raised at this time.
For, our democracy is built on the fundamental assumption (so
we believe) that the Constitution and all its guarantees apply
to all Filipinos, whether dictator or pauper, learned or ignorant,
religious or agnostic as long as he is a Filipino.

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It is said that to accord this Filipino the right to be

buried in this country would pose a serious threat to national
security and public safety. What threat? As pointed out in my
dissenting opinion, the second cogent and decisive proposition
in this case is that respondents have not presented any "hard
evidence" (factual bases) or convincing proof of such threat.
"All we have are general conclusions of national security and
public safety' in avoidance of a specific, demandable and
enforceable constitutional and basic human right to return."
Recent events have, to my mind, served to confirm the validity
of such dissenting statement.
If a live Marcos returning to this country did not pose a
serious threat to national security, the situation cannot be any
worse with a dead Marcos returning. For, a dead Marcos will
return to be buried into mother earth, where there are no
protests, "demos", or even dissents, where the rule that reigns,
in the language of Mr. Justice Jackson in Barnette is the
"unanimity of the graveyard."
It is said that, while a dead Marcos has been rendered
impotent to threaten national security, his supporters would
pose that threat to national security. This argument is
untenable as it is without merit. As I see it, Marcos' supporters
pose a greater threat to peace and order, with Marcos deprived
of his right to burial in this country. On the other hand, if the
remains of Mr. Marcos are brought to the country and allowed
the burial to which he is constitutionally and humanly entitled,
Marcos' supporters would be deprived of an otherwise potent
argumentso conducive to mass protests and even violence
that their Idol has been cruelly denied the right to be buried in
his homeland.

entirely begs the issue. In the first place, one cannot overlook
that the right of Mr. Marcos, as a Filipino, to be buried in this
country, is asserted not for the first time after his death. It was
vigorously asserted long before his death. But, more
importantly, the right of every Filipino to be buried in his
country, is part of a continuing right that starts from birth and
ends only on the day he is finally laid to rest in his country.
This dissenting opinion does not pretend to deny the
Philippine government the right to lay down conditions for the
burial of Mr. Marcos in this country, but I submit that these
conditions must, as a fundamental postulate, recognize the
right of the man, as a Filipino, to be buried in this country NOW.
The majority resolution, in effect, bans Mr. Marcos'
burial in this country now. Without in any way affecting my
respect and regard for my brethren and sisters in the majority,
I am deeply concerned and greatly disturbed that, with their
decision banning a dead Marcos from burial in this country,
they have passed an opportunity to defuse a constitutional
crisis that, in my humble assessment, threatens to ignite an
already divided nation, Regrettably, they have ignored the
constitutional dimension of the problem rooted in the ageless
and finest tradition of our people for respect and deference to
the dead. What predictably follows will be a continuing strife,
among our people, of unending hatred, recriminations and
retaliations. God save this country!
My vote is for this Court to ORDER the respondents to
allow the immediate return and burial in the Republic of the
Philippines of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, subject to
such conditions as the Philippine government may impose in
the interest of peace and order.

It is also said that Mr. Marcos, in cadaver form, has no

constitutional or human rights, to speak of. This contention

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SARMIENTO, J., Dissenting:

The case has curious trappings of a deja vu, the shoe
being on the other foot, yet, as I stated before, I cannot allow
personal emotions to soften my "hardened impartiality" and
deny, as a consequence, the rights of the ex-President's
bereaved to bury his remains in his homeland, and for them to
return from exile. As I had, then, voted to grant the petition, so
do I vote to grant reconsideration.
I have gone to lengths to locate in the four comers of
the Constitution, by direct grant or by implication, the
President's supposed "residual" power to forbid citizens from
entering the motherland reiterated in the resolution of the
majority. I have found none. I am not agreed, that:
3.
Contrary to petitioners view, it cannot be denied that
the President, upon whom executive power is vested, has
unstated residual powers which are implied from the grant of
executive power and which are necessary for her to comply
with her duties under the Constitution. The powers of the
President are not limited to what are expressly enumerated in
the article on the Executive Department and in scattered
provisions of the Constitution. This, notwithstanding the
avowed intent of the members of the Constitutional
Commission of 1986 to limit the powers of the President as a
reaction to the abuses under the regime of Mr. Marcos, for the
result was a limitation of specific powers of the President,
particularly those relating to the commander-in-chief clause,
but not a diminution of the general grant of executive power.
It is a nice word game, but it is nothing else. For, if the
Constitution has imposed limitations on specific powers of the
President, it has, a fortiori, prescribed a diminution of executive
power. The Charter says that the right may only be restricted
by: (1) a court order; or (2) by fiat of law. Had the fundamental

law intended a presidential imprimatur, it would have said so.

It would have also completed the symmetry: judicial,
congressional, and executive restraints on the right. No
amount of presumed residual executive power can amend the
Charter.
It is well to note that the Bill of Rights stands primarily,
a limitation not only against legislative encroachments on
individual liberties, but more so, against presidential intrusions.
And especially so, because the President is the caretaker of the
military establishment that has, several times over, been
unkind to part of the population it has also sworn to protect.
That "[t]he threats to the government, to which the
return of the Marcoses has been viewed to provide a catalytic
effect, have not been shown to have ceased" (Res., 3) is the
realm of conjecture, speculation, and imagination. The military
has shown no hard evidence that "the return of the Marcoses"
would indeed interpose a threat to national security. And
apparently, the majority itself is not convinced ("has been
viewed...").
That Mrs. Marcos has referred to President Corazon
Aquino as an illegitimate President, does not, so I submit,
reinforce alleged fears of a massive destabilization awaiting
the nation. The military has said over and over that Marcos
followers are not capable of successful destabilization effort.
And only this morning (October 27, 1989), media reported the
assurances given to foreign investors by no less than the
President, of the political and economic stability of the nation,
as well as the Government's capability to quell forces that
menace the gains of EDSA.
I have no eulogies to say on the passing of Mr. Marcos. My
personal impressions, however, are beside the point. I reiterate
that the President has no power to deny requests of Marcos

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relatives to bury Marcos in his homeland. As for the former, let

them get their just deserts here too. And let the matter rest.

B. FREEDOM OF RELIGION (SEC 5, ART. III)

I.
Separation of Church and State
Engel v. Vitale (the School Prayer case)
FACTS
A New York State law required public schools to open
each day with the Pledge of Allegiance and a
nondenominational prayer in which the students recognized
their dependence upon God. The law allowed students to
absent themselves from this activity if they found it
objectionable. A parent sued on behalf of his child, arguing that
the law violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment, as made applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Yes
REASONING
The majority, via Justice Black, held that schoolsponsored prayer violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. The majority stated that the provision allowing
students to absent themselves from this activity did not make
the law constitutional because the purpose of the First
Amendment was to prevent government interference with
religion. The majority noted that religion is very important to a
vast majority of the American people. Since Americans adhere
to a wide variety of beliefs, it is not appropriate for the
government to endorse any particular belief system. The
majority noted that wars, persecutions, and other destructive
measures often arose in the past when the government
involved itself in religious affairs.
CONCURRENCE

Justice Douglas

ISSUE

In his concurrence, Justice Douglas took an even broader view

of the Establishment Clause, arguing that any type of public
promotion of religion, including giving financial aid to religious
schools, violates the Establishment Clause.

Whether school-sponsored nondenominational prayer in public

schools violates the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.

DISSENT

RULING

Justice Stewart

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Justice Stewart argued in his dissent that the Establishment

Clause was only meant to prohibit the establishment of a statesponsored church, such as the Church of England, and not
prohibit all types of government insolvent with religion. In
particular, he found that the nondenominational nature of the
prayer and the "absentee" provision removed constitutional
challenges.

Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township, 330

U.S. 1 (1947)
Facts:
A New Jersey statute authorized local school districts to make
rules and contracts for the transportation of children to and
from public and private schools. The Board of Education of
Ewing Township authorized reimbursement to parents of
money spent by them for the bus transportation of their
children on regular buses operated by the public transportation
system. A taxpayer brought suit claiming that reimbursement
to the parents of parochial school students violated the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.

Issue:
Whether reimbursing parents for their childrens transportation
to and from religious schools violates the Establishment Clause
when it is part of a general transportation reimbursement
scheme.

Holding:

By a 5-4 vote, the Court held that the state does not violate
the Establishment clause when it reimburses parents, as the
money flows to the parents as part of a general secular policy
designed to keep children safe while en route to and from
school.
Reasoning:
The Court found that while the Establishment Clause requires
that the state remain neutral among religions and between
religion and non-religion, the New Jersey plan merely provided
money to parents as part of a general government service that
was not inherently religious in character, similar to providing
sewer and police services to churches.
Majority:
"The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment
means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which
aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or
disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called,
or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion.
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or
secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations
or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect
a wall of separation between church and State." (Justice Hugo
Black)

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Dissent:
Although the Court was unanimous in affirming the principle of
"neutrality" by the government toward religion, four Justices
disagreed
with
the
majoritys
view
that
allowing
reimbursement for bus transportation to parents of students in
parochial schools was not a breach of church-state separation.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Wiley B. Rutledge defined "no
establishment" this way: "The prohibition broadly forbids state
support, financial or other, of religion in any guise, form or
degree. It outlaws all use of public funds for religious
purposes."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)
Facts:
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island statutes provided state aid to
church-related elementary and secondary schools. A group of
individual taxpayers and religious liberty organizations filed
suit, challenging the constitutionality of the program. They
claimed that, since the program primarily aided parochial
schools, it violated the Establishment Clause.
Issue:
Whether states can create programs that provide financial
support to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools by
way or reimbursement for the cost of teachers salaries,
textbooks, and instructional materials in specified secular
subjects (Pennsylvania) -- or pay a salary supplement directly
to teachers of secular subjects in religious schools (Rhode
Island).
Holding:

In a unanimous decision, the Court held that both programs

violate the Establishment Clause because they create
excessive entanglement between a religious entity and the
state.
Reasoning:
The Court looked to three factors in determining the
constitutionality of the contested programs, factors that would
become known as the Lemon test. First, whether the legislature
passed the statute based on a secular legislative purpose. The
Court could find no evidence that the goal of the Pennsylvania
or Rhode Island legislatures was to advance religion. Instead
the Court relied on the stated purpose, that the bill was
designed to improve "the quality of the secular education in all
schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws." Second,
the Court questioned whether the programs had the primary
effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. It bypassed this prong
by examining the third prong and finding a violation there, thus
obviating the need for analysis of this point. The third factor,
and the point at which the Court found the constitutional
defect, was over the issue of excessive entanglement. Here,
the Court held that the states oversight and auditing
requirements and the propensity for political divisiveness
generated by this kind of aid program would entangle the state
and the religious entity in unconstitutional ways.

Majority:
"First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither
advances nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not
foster 'excessive entanglement with religion.'" (Chief Justice
Warren Burger)

12 | P a g e

Majority:
Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963)
Facts:
Pennsylvania state law required that "at least ten verses from
the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the opening
of each public school on each school day." Two families sued,
claiming this violated the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.
Issue:
Whether an official reading at the beginning of each school day
of Bible passages, without further comment, violates the
Establishment Clause.

"In addition, it might well be said that ones education is not

complete without a study of comparative religion or the history
of religion and its relationship to the advancement of
civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of
study for its literary and historic qualities. Nothing we have
said here indicates that such study of the Bible or of religion,
when presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education, may not be effected [sic] consistently with the First
Amendment. But the exercises here do not fall into those
categories. They are religious exercises, required by the States
in violation of the command of the First Amendment that the
Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor
opposing religion." (Justice Tom Clark)

Holding:
By a vote of 8-1, the Court held that state-sponsored
devotional Bible readings in public schools constitute an
impermissible religious exercise by government.
Reasoning:
The Court found that state-sponsored devotional exercises
violate the Establishment Clause. The Constitutional defects
are not corrected by allowing an opt-out provision. The
Establishment Clause constrains government from involving
itself in religious matters. Therefore, government action that
promotes or inhibits religion violates the Constitution. The
state may not draft or conduct religious prayers in schools
filled with captive audiences of children.

Zorach v. Clauson

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioners, Zorach and other

taxpayers and residents of New York City (Petitioners), brought
suit challenging the constitutionality of a released time
program, which allowed children to leave school, with parental
permission, for religious instruction.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. This case stands for the proposition

that the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution
(Constitution) does not advocate hostility toward religion and

13 | P a g e

mere acknowledgment of a religious

participation, is not unconstitutional.

program,

without

Facts. The released time program allowed children, with

parental permission, to be released from school for religious
instruction. The instructions took place away from the school
grounds and no school involvement was required, other than
acknowledging the students participation. The Petitioners
brought suit challenging the constitutionality of the program
alleging that the prohibition against any laws respecting the
establishment of any religion also prohibited this voluntary
program. The Petitioners appealed from a judgment for the
Respondents, Clauson and other member of the Board of
Education of the City of New York (Respondents) and the
Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) granted
writs.

Issue. The issue is simply whether New York, through its

acceptance of the released time program, has engaged in
the respect of an establishment of religion, within the meaning
of the First Amendment of the Constitution.

Just because the First Amendment of the Constitution prohibits

the making of a law which will respect the establishment of
religion, it does not necessarily follow that the government
should be hostile toward the exercise of religion, which would
also be an abrogation of the Free Exercise Clause of the same
amendment.

Dissent. Justices Hugo Black (J. Black) and Robert Jackson (J.
Jackson) wrote separate dissents, both standing for the
proposition that the majority had blurred the line between the
separation of church and state.
Discussion. While the establishment clause prohibits
governmental support of religion, it does not prohibit students
from exercising their religions.

BOARD OF EDUCATION v. ALLEN

Facts of the Case

Held. Affirmed.
The Supreme Court held for the Respondents, noting that
because instruction occurred away from the schools and did
not require school participation, no respect for a particular
establishment had occurred.
Additionally, the Supreme Court held that a philosophy of
hostility toward religion cannot be read into the Bill of Rights.

A 1965 amendment to New York's Education Law required

public school boards to lend textbooks to elementary and
secondary school students enrolled in private and parochial
schools. The Board of Education for New York Central School
District No. 1, contending that the law violated the
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment, filed suit against James Allen, Commissioner of
Education, requesting a declaratory injunction to prevent
enforcement of the statute. The trial court agreed with the

14 | P a g e

board and found the statute unconstitutional. The Appellate

Division reversed the ruling, finding that the boards lacked
standing. On appeal, the New York Court of Appeals ruled the
boards did have standing, but also found that, because the
law's purpose was to benefit all students regardless of the type
of school they attended, the law did not violate the First
Amendment.
Question
Do the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment forbid New York from requiring that public school
boards loan textbooks to parochial school students without
cost?
Conclusion
Decision: 6 votes for Allen, 3 vote(s) against
Legal provision: Establishment of Religion
No. In a 6-3 opinion authored by Justice Byron R. White, the
Court applied the test constructed in Abington School District
v. Schempp and found that, because the stated legislative
purpose and necessary effects of the statute did not advance
any one religion or religion in general, the law did not violate
the First Amendment. Because the books were given to the
students, rather than the parochial schools themselves, the
Court reasoned, "the financial benefit is to parents and
children, not schools."

AGLIPAY vs. RUIZ

FACTS: The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized
by the Roman Catholic Church took place sometime in 1936. In

commemoration thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz,

initiated the production of certain stamps the design of which
would have in their center a chalice, with grape and stalks of
wheat as border design. Eventually, the stamps were produced
and some were sold pursuant to Act No. 4052, which provides
for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent
Church, assailed the production and sale of such stamps.
Aglipay
contends
that
the
funding
of
said stamps
commemorative to a particular religious event is in violation of
Sec 13, Article 6 of the Philippine Constitution which prohibits
the appropriation or usage of public money for the use or
benefit of any church or denomination.
ISSUE: Whether or not the production of the said stamps
violate the Constitution.
HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the
Constitution. In fact, what was emphasized on the stamps was
not the religious event itself but rather the City of Manila as
being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand
did not appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act
No. 4052 appropriated the sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of
plates and printing of postage stamps with new designs and
other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public
Works and Communications, to dispose of the amount
appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be
deemed advantageous to the Government. The fact that the
fund is being used for such is only incidental to the function of
Director of Posts and under his discretion.
On religious freedom

15 | P a g e

The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence

of religion is recognized here as elsewhere. Evidence would be
our preamble where we implored the aid of divine providence
to establish an ideal government. If should also be further
noted that religious freedom as a constitutional mandate is not
an inhibition of profound reverence to religion.

religion and the use of public money to favor any sect or

church.

ANDRES GARCES vs. Hon. NUMERIANO G. ESTENZO

HELD:

G.R. No. L-53487. May 25, 1981.

Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valenzuela,

Ormoc
City,
"reviving
the
traditional
socio-religious
celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of Seor
San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valenzuela", and
providing for: (I) the acquisition of the image of San Vicente
Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting shed as the
barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained
through the "selling of tickets and cash donations", does not
directly or indirectly establish any religion, nor abridge
religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any
sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with
private funds, not with tax money. The construction of the
waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The wooden image
was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio
fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for
the purpose of favoring any religion or interfering with religious
beliefs of the barrio residents. One of the highlights of the
fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron
saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was
celebrated. If there is nothing unconstitutional or illegal in
holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for the barrio, then
any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron
saint (such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot
be branded as illegal. As noted in the resolution, the barrio
fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an ingrained

FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of
Valencia, Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer
was acquired by the barangay council with funds raised by
means of solicitations and cash, duly ratified by the barangay
assembly in a plebiscite, reviving the traditional socio-religious
celebration of the feast day of the saint. As per Resolution No.
6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish church during
the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano mayor
as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however,
petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused
to return custody of the image to the council on the pretext
that it was the property of the church because church funds
were used for its acquisition until after the latter, by resolution,
filed a replevin case against the priest and posted the required
bond. Thereafter, the parish priest and his co-petitioners filed
an action for annulment of the council's resolutions relating to
the subject image contending that when they were adopted,
the barangay council was not duly constituted because the
chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was not allowed to
participate; and that they contravened the constitutional
provisions on separation of church and state, freedom of

ISSUE:
Whether the barangay council's resolution providing for
purchase of saint's image with private funds in connection with
barangay fiesta, constitutional.

16 | P a g e

tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves

monotony and drudgery of the lives of the masses.

II.

the

Intramural Religious Dispute

FONACIER VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts: Case was filed by Iglesia Filipina Independiente (IFI),
represented by its supreme bishop Gerardo Bayaca, against Bishop
Fonacier seeking to render an accounting of his administration of all
the temporal properties and to recover the same on the ground that
he ceased to be the supreme bishop of IFI. Isabelo De los Reyes Jr. had
been elected as the Supreme Bishop.
Petitioner claims that he was not properly removed as
Supreme Bishop and his legal successor was Juan Jamias. He claims
that the there was an accounting of his administration and was turned
over to bishop Jamias. Also, that Isabelo De los Reyes and Bayaca
have abandoned their faith and formally joined the Prostestant
Episcopal Church of America.
CFI rendered judgment declaring Isabelo De Los Reyes, Jr. as
the sole and legitimate Supreme Bishop of IFI and ordered Fonacier to
render an accounting of his admistration
CA affirmed the decision of the CFI

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner should still be regarded

as the legitimate supreme bishop of IFI.
Held: Supreme Court affirmed CAs decision. The legitimate
Supreme Bishop of IFI is Isabelo De los Reyes, Jr. The Supreme
Court affirms the validity of the election of Bishop Delos Reyes
as the Supreme Bishop based on their internal laws
To finally dispose of the property issue, the Court, citing
Watson v. Jones,368 declared that the rule in property
controversies
within
religious
congregations
strictly
independent of any other superior ecclesiastical association
(such as the Philippine Independent Church) is that the rules
for resolving such controversies should be those of any
voluntary association. If the congregation adopts the majority
rule then the majority should prevail; if it adopts adherence to
duly constituted authorities within the congregation, then that
should be followed.

Gonzales v. Archbishop of Manila

Petitioner wanted to collect income from certain properties
located in Calle Rosario, District of Binondo. He contended
that as having been assigned by the property owner as
chaplain, he had the right to do so.

Facts:
1. Petitioner (Angel Gonzales) wanted to collect the
income from certain properties situated in Calle Rosario,
District of Binondo. He was assigned by the property
owner (Petronila de Guzman) for the maintenance of a
collative chaplaincy founded by her. The ownership
dates back to June 20, 1901.

2. Petitioner contends that as the chaplain, incumbent and

beneficiary of the said chaplaincy, he had the right, by
virtue of a title in perpetuity, from June 20, 1901, to
receive and retain all the income and revenues of the
said property.
The property mentioned had been
producing and yielding not less than Php 650/month.

17 | P a g e

Thus, from June 20, 1901 to the time the action was
instituted, the property in question is a sum of Php
12,500.00.
3. Respondents are the Archbishop of Manila (Msgr. Harty)
and the administrator of funds of the Sagrada Mitra
(Thomas Hartigan).
4. Going back to history, by virtue of the provisions
contained in the will executed by Donya Petronila de
Guzman on March 3, 1816, a collative chaplaincy was
founded in this archdiocese.
It entailed a certain
obligation of a spiritual character and possessed a
capital of Php 1,700. It was also provided that the first
executor of the estate of the testatrix should act as
administrator of the property subject to the chaplaincy
during the minority of Esteban de Guzman, the first
chaplain appointed for the foundation. Angel Gonzales,
a descent of Petronila, was appointed chaplain on
August 21, 1901.
5. Ruling:
1. Our attention has been invited to the fact that the
property affected by the chaplaincy should have been
administered by the chaplains and not by the
administrators of the Sagrada Mitra inasmuch as clause
11 of the foundress will so provided. To refute this
assertion, it suffices to say that the provisions of the
said will set forth that the first testamentary executor of
the estate of the testatrix should act as the
administrator of the property during the minority of the
first chaplain appointed in that document.
This
provision must be understood to be mandatory, except
as otherwise provided by the canonical laws and as,
pursuant therewith, the chief ecclesiastical authority

may order for, after the latter had accepted the

foundation of the chaplaincy, the administration of its
property appertains to the authorities established by
the Church, pursuant to the latters own laws, and this
rule has been observed since 1863.
2. The defendants in this case were absolved.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

18 | P a g e

22.
III.

RELIGIOUS PROFESSION AND WORSHIP

i. Freedom to Act on Ones Belief

29. Held. Yes. Compelling a salute to the flag infringes

upon an individuals intellect and right to choose their
own
beliefs.
Dissent. This legislation is well within the states
purview to encourage good citizenship.

23.West Virginia v. Barnette

24. Brief Fact Summary. The Respondent, Barnette
(Respondent), is a Jehovahs Witness who refused to
pledge allegiance the United States flag while in public
school. According to the Petitioner, the West Virginia
State Board of Educations (Petitioner), rule, the
Respondent was expelled from school and charged with
juvenile delinquency.
25. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The right to not speak is as
equally protected under the First Amendment of the
United States Constitution (Constitution) as the right to
free speech.
26. Facts. In 1942, the Petitioner adopted a rule that forced
all teachers and pupils to pledge allegiance the nations
flag each day. If the student refused he would be found
insubordinate and expelled from school. He would not
be readmitted to school until he conformed. Meanwhile,
he was considered to be unlawfully absent and
subject to delinquency hearings. The parents could be
fined $50 per day with a jail term not to exceed 30
days. The Respondent asked for an exception for all
Jehovahs Witnesses because this pledge goes against
their religious belief. But he was denied an exception.
27.
28. Issue. Does this rule compelling a pledge violate the
First Amendment of the Constitution?

30.
Discussion. The majority focuses on the right of
persons to choose beliefs and act accordingly. As long
as the actions do not present a clear and present
danger of the kind the state is allowed to prevent, then
the Constitution encourages diversity of thought and
belief. The state has not power to mandate allegiance in
hopes that it will encourage patriotism. This is
something the citizens will choose or not.
31.Cantwell v. Connecticut
32. Brief Fact Summary. A Jehovahs Witnesses was
convicted on a charge of breach of the peace for
playing a phonograph record sharply critical of the
Catholic religion to persons he encountered on the
street.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A State may proscribe
speech if it amounts to a breach of the peace, which
encompasses not only violent acts, but also acts and
words likely to produce violence in others.
33.
Facts. Jesse
Cantwell
(Cantwell),
a
Jehovahs
Witnesses, was convicted on the charge of breach of
the peace for playing a phonograph record sharply
critical of the Catholic religion to persons he
encountered on the street. His intent was to proselytize

19 | P a g e

his listeners. Prior to his arrest, there was no evidence

that Cantwells deportment was noisy or offensive.
Moreover, although the message on the record was
offensive, it was only played to persons who voluntarily
agreed
to
listen.
Issue. Did the arrest and conviction of Cantwell for
violating the common law offense of breach of the
peace violate his constitutional rights of free speech
under the First Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution)?
34. Held. Yes.
The
lower
court
is
reversed.
Justice Owen Roberts (J. Roberts) stated that while it is
obvious that the principles of freedom of speech and
religion do not sanction incitement to riot or violence, it
is equally obvious that a State may not unduly suppress
free communication of views under the guise of
maintaining
desirable
conditions.
With
these
considerations in mind, we note that there was no
evidence of assaultive behavior or threatening of bodily
harm, no truculent bearing, no profane, abusive,
indecent remarks directed to the person of the hearer.
Thus, it cannot be said that Cantwells actions resulted
in a breach of the peace or an incitement to a breach
thereof.
35.
Discussion. By ruling that the facts of this case,
speaking to an audience hostile to ones message, does
not amount to a breach of the peace, the Supreme
Court of the United States (Supreme Court) gives
insight into the degree of public disorder it requires to
permit a government to regulate free expression on
those grounds.

36.
37.Marsh v. Alabama
38. Brief
Fact
Summary. The
Appellant,
Marsh
(Appellant), distributed religious literature on the
sidewalks of a company owned town in violation of the
towns regulations. The Appellant claimed her freedom
of religion and press were violated and brought suit
under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United
States
Constitution
(Constitution).
Synopsis of Rule of Law. A state cannot, consistently
with the freedom of religion and the press guaranteed
by the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution, impose criminal punishment on a person
for distributing religious literature on the sidewalk of a
company-owned town contrary to regulations of the
towns management, where the town and its shopping
district are freely accessible to and freely used by the
public in general.
39.
Facts. The Appellant, a Jehovahs Witness, distributed
religious literature on the sidewalk of a company owned
town despite a sign forbidding this kind of conduct. The
Appellant was warned she could not distribute the
literature without a permit and that no permit would be
issued to her. When the Appellant refused to leave, she
was arrested and charged with violating a state statute
that makes it a crime to enter or remain on the
premises of another after having been warned not to do
so. The Appellant contended that to construe the state
statute, as applicagle to her activities, would abridge
her right to free of press and religion. The Supreme

20 | P a g e

Court of the United States (Supreme Court) stated that

since the facilities that the Appellant was upon were
opened primarily to benefit the public and since their
operation was essentially s public function, they were
subject to state regulation. The fact that the town as
privately owned did not mean the liberties of people
could
be
curtailed
inconsistent
with
the
Constitution.
Issue. Can a company town deny freedom of press and
religion to people in their town?
40. Held. Reversed and remanded. The fact that the
premises where the deprivation of liberty occurred,
were held by others than the pubic, is not sufficient to
justify the States permitting a corporation to govern a
community of citizens so as to restrict their
fundamental
liberties
Dissent. We cannot say the Jehovahs Witness can
claim the privilege of a license merely because the
owner has admitted the public to them for other limited
purposes.
41.
Discussion. State action is a prerequisite to the
assertion of rights contained in the first eight
amendments of the Constitution and the Fourteenth
Amendment of the Constitution. State action will be
found when a private actor has acted if (1) the state has
delegated a traditional state function to a private entity
or (2) because the state has become entangled with a
private entity or because the state has approved,
encouraged
or
facilitated
private
conduct.
The privately owned town performs an exclusive public

function and freedom of speech and religion cannot be

totally banned in violation of the Constitution.
42. Constitutional Law
(Fourteenth Edition)

Keyed

to

Sullivan

&

Gunther

43. CHAPTER I.
44.
45.American Bible Society v. City of Manila
46.The acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila
required the payment of a particular amount
from petitioner.
Respondent claims that
petitioners Philippine agency had distributed
and
sold
bibles
and/or
gospel
portions
throughout
the
country;
thus,
conducting
business of general merchandise.
47.Facts:
1. Petitioners Philippine agency has been distributing and
selling bibles and/or gospel portions throughout the
country and translating the same into several Philippine
dialects.
2. On May 29, 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of
Manila informed petitioner that it was conducting the
business of general merchandise since November 1945
without providing itself with necessary Mayors permit
and municipal license in violation of Ordinance No.
3000, as amended, and further required petitioner to
secure the corresponding permit and license fees,
together with compromise covering the period from 4 th
quarter of 1945 to 2nd quarter of 1953, within 3 days.
Sum of said fees amounted to Php 5,821.45.

21 | P a g e

48.Ruling:
1. Article III, Section 1(7) of the Constitution guarantees
the freedom of religious profession and worship. It has
reference to ones views of his relations to His Creator
and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His
being and character, and obedience to His Will. The
constitutional guaranty of the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship carries
with it the right to disseminate religious information.
Any restraint of such right can only be justified like
other restraints of freedom of expression on the
grounds that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to
prevent.
2. It may be true that in the case at bar, the price asked
for the bibles and other religious pamphlets was in
some instances a little bit higher than the actual cost of
the same but this cannot mean that petitioner was
engaged in the business or occupation of selling said
merchandise for profit. To have the City Ordinance in
question applied would impair its free exercise and
enjoyment of its religious profession and worship as
well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
49.
50.
51.
52. Tolentino v. Sec. of Finance
registration fee in the VAT law)

(re

validity

of

53. FACTS:
Tolentino
et
al
is
questioning
the
constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the
Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino
averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively
originate from the House of Representatives as required
by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though
RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it passed the
3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
readings in Senate for after the 1 st reading it was
referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee
thereafter Senate passed its own version known as
Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its
text and substituting it w/ the text of SB 1630 in that
way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB.
Tolentino and co-petitioner Roco [however] even signed
the said Senate Bill.
54.
55. ISSUE: Whether or not EVAT originated in the HoR.
56.
57. HELD: By a 9-6 vote, the SC rejected the challenge,
holding that such consolidation was consistent with the
power of the Senate to propose or concur with
amendments to the version originated in the HoR. What
the Constitution simply means, according to the 9
justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR.
Note also that there were several instances before
where Senate passed its own version rather than having
the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills
are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition

22 | P a g e

of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no

showing that it would make a significant difference if
Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
58.Ebranilag v. Division Superintendent
59.Facts:
In 1989, DECS Regional Office in Cebu received
complaints about teachers and pupils belonging to the
Jehovahs Witness, and enrolled in various public and
private schools, which refused to sing the Phil. National
Anthem, salute the flag and recite the patriotic pledge.
Division Superintendent of schools, Susana B. Cabahug
of the Cebu Division of DECS and her Assistant issued
Division Memorandum No. 108, dated Nov. 17, 1989,
directing District Supervisors, High School Principals
and Heads of Private Educational institutions to remove
from service, after due process, teachers and school
employees, and to deprive the students and pupils from
the benefit of public education, if they do not
participate in daily flag ceremony and doesnt obey flag
salute
rule.
Members of the Jehovahs Witness sect find such
memorandum to be contrary to their religious belief and
choose not to obey. Despite a number of appropriate
persuasions made by the Cebu officials to let them obey
the directives, still they opted to follow their conviction
to their belief. As a result, an order was issued by the
district supervisor of Daan Bantayan District of Cebu,
dated July 24, 1990, ordering the dropping from the
list in the school register of all Jehovahs Witness
teachers and pupils from Grade 1 to Grade 6 who opted

to follow their belief which is against the Flag Salute

Law, however, given a chance to be re-accepted if they
change
their
mind.
Some Jehovahs Witness members appealed to the
Secretary of Education but the latter did not answer to
their
letter.
On Oct. 31, 1990, students and their parents filed
special civil actions for Mandamus, Certiorari and
prohibition, alleging that the respondents acted without
or in excess of their jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion in ordering their expulsion without prior
notice and hearing, hence, in violation of their right to
due process, their right to free public education and
their right to freedom of speech, religion and worship.
Petitioners prayed for the voiding of the order of
expulsion or dropping from the rolls issued by the
District
Supervisor;
prohibiting
and
enjoining
respondent from barring them from classes; and
compelling the respondent and all persons acting for
him to admit and order their(Petitioners) re-admission I
their
respective
schools.
On November 27, 1990, Court issued a TRO and writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, commanding the
respondents to immediately re-admit the petitioners to
their
respective
classes
until
further
orders.
On May 31, the Solicitor General filed a consolidated
comment to the petitions defending the expulsion
orders
issued
by
the
respondents.
Petitioners stressed that while they do not take part in
the compulsory flag ceremony, they do not engage in

23 | P a g e

external acts or behavior that would offend their

countrymen who believe in expressing their love of
country through observance of the flag ceremony. They
quietly stand at attention during the flag ceremony to
show their respect for the right of those who choose to
participate in the solemn proceedings. Since they do
not engage in disruptive behavior, there is no warrant
for
their
expulsion.
Issue:
Whether or not the expulsion of the members of
Jehovahs Witness from the schools violates right
receive
free
education.

60. Held:
The expulsion of the members of Jehovahs Witness
from the schools where they are enrolled will violate
their right as Philippine citizens, under the 1987
Constitution, to receive free education, for it is the duty
of the state to protect and promote the right of all
citizens to quality education, and to make such
education accessible to all (Sec. I, Art XIV).
Nevertheless, their right not to participate in the Flag
Ceremony does not give them a right to disrupt such
patriotic exercises. If they quietly stand at attention
during flag ceremony while their classmates and
teachers salute the flag, sing the national anthem and
recite the patriotic pledge, we do not see how such
conduct may possibly disturb the peace, or pose a
grave and present danger of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health or any legitimate

public interest that the state has a right and duty to

prevent.
It is appropriate to recall the Japanese occupation of our
country in 1942-1944 when every Filipino, regardless of
religious persuasion, in fear of the invader, saluted the
Japanese flag and bowed before every Japanese soldier,
perhaps if petitioners had lived through that dark period
of our history, they would not quibble now about
saluting the Philippine Flag. The petitions for certiorari
and prohibition are granted and expulsion orders are
hereby annulled and set aside.
61.German v. Barangan
62. FACTS: One afternoon in October 1984, Reli German et
al went to JP Laurel Sreet to pray and worship at the St.
Luke Chapel. But they were barred by General Santiago
Barangan from entering the church because the same is
within the vicinity of the Malacaang. And considering
that Germans group is expressively known as the
August Twenty One Movement who were wearing yellow
shirts with clench fists, Barangan deemed that they
were not really there to worship but rather they are
there to disrupt the ongoings within the Malacaang.
63. ISSUE: Whether or not the bar disallowing petitioners
to worship and pray at St. Lukes is a violation of their
freedom to worship and locomotion.
64. HELD: No. In the case at bar, German et al were not
denied or restrained of their freedom of belief or choice
of their religion, but only in the manner by which they
had attempted to translate the same into action. There
has been a clear manifestation by Barangan et al that
they allow German et al to practice their religious belief

24 | P a g e

but not in the manner that German et al impressed.

Such manner impresses clear and present danger to
the executive of the state hence the need to curtail it
even at the expense of curtailing ones freedom to
worship.
65. Dissenting Opinions
66. J. Fernando It would be an unwarranted departure
then from what has been unanimously held in the J.B.L.
Reyes decision if on such a basic right as religious
freedom -clearly the most fundamental and thus
entitled to the highest priority among human rights,
involving as it does the relationship of man to his
Creator -this Court will be less vigilant in upholding any
rightful claim. More than ever, in times of stress -and
much more so in times of crisis -it is that deeply-held
faith that affords solace and comfort if not for everyone
at least for the majority of mankind. Without that faith,
mans very existence is devoid of meaning, bereft of
significance.
67. J. Teehankee The right to freely exercise ones
religion is guaranteed in Section 8 of our Bill of Rights. 7
Freedom of worship, alongside with freedom of
expression and speech and peaceable assembly along
with the other intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked
in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary -even more so
than on the other departments -rests the grave and
delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and
deference to such preferred rights. No verbal formula,
no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with
what has been so felicitously termed by Justice Holmes
as
the
sovereign
prerogative
of
judgment.

Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the

weight of the scales of justice on the side of such rights,
enjoying as they do precedence and primacy.
68. J. Makasiar With the assurances aforestated given by
both petitioners and respondents, there is no clear and
present danger to public peace and order or to the
security of persons within the premises of Malacaang
and the adjacent areas, as the respondents has adopted
measures and are prepared to insure against any public
disturbance or violence.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

25 | P a g e

I.

IMPORTANCE and SCOPE

sedition, riots and as they hoped, revolution in this

country for the purpose of embarrassing and if possible
defeating the military plans of the Government in
Europe. Therefore, their speech is not protected by the
First
Amendment
of
the
Constitution.

82.ABRAMS vs. US
83. Brief Fact Summary. The defendants convictions for
distributing leaflets advocating strikes during the
Russian Revolution were upheld because their speech
was not protected by the United States Constitution
(Constitution) based on the clear and present danger
test.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Men must be held to have
intended and to be accountable for the effects, which
their acts are likely to produce.

Dissent. In this case, sentences of twenty years have

been imposed for the publishing of two leaflets that the
Defendants had as much right to publish as the
Government had to publish the Constitution.
87.
Discussion. Clear and present danger supposedly
assures special attention to the time dimension. Speech
may not be curtailed until there is an immediate risk of
an evil. Speech with a remote tendency to cause danger
may not be curtailed.

84.
Facts. The
Defendants,
Abrams
and
others
(Defendants) were Russian immigrants. The Defendant
were self-proclaimed revolutionists and anarchists who
wrote and distributed thousands of circulars advocating
a general strike and appealing to workers in
ammunitions factories to stop the production of
weapons to be used against Russian revolutionaries.
They were convicted under 1918 amendments to the
Espionage Act that prohibited the curtailment of
production of materials necessary to the prosecution of
war against Germany with intent to hinder its
prosecution.
85. Issue. Whether the Defendants speech was protected
by the First Amendment of the Constitution?
86. Held. No. Men must be held to have intended and to be
accountable for the effects which their acts are likely to
produce. The plain purpose of Defendants propaganda
was to excite, at the supreme crisis of war, disaffection,

II.

ELEMENTS
a. Freedom from Censorship

88.NEW YORK TIMES CO. V. UNITED STATES

89. Facts: In 1971, during rising tensions over the
undeclared Vietnam War, the New York Times attained
top-secret articles based on the 1968 study, History of
U.S. Decision Making Process on Viet Nam Policy. The
New York Times analyzed the articles for several
months, and on June 13, 1971, it began publication.
After the third set of articles was published, the
Department of Justice sought an injunction to halt any
further publication. The next day, the United States
obtained a restraining order prohibiting further
publication until June 19.

26 | P a g e

90.

Shortly after, the District Court denied the

governments request for a preliminary injunction, but a
Circuit Court judge prolonged the restraining order to
give the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
adequate time to consider the governments case. On
June 22, the Circuit Court remanded the case to the trial
court for determination of whether any of the future
publications posed such grave and immediate danger
to the security of the country as to warrant prior
restraint and a continued stay of publication. The New
York Times appealed the Circuit Courts decision to the
Supreme Court.

condemned the governments actions, calling it a

flagrant, indefensible, and continuing violation of the
First Amendment. Black and Douglas stated that the
language of the First Amendment is clear and supports
the view that the press must be left free to publish
news, whatever the source, without censorship,
injunctions or prior restraints. They further concluded
that to give the President the power to withhold certain
articles from the press would wipe out the First
Amendment and destroy the fundamental liberty and
security of the very people the government hopes to
make secure. Lastly, Black and Douglas discussed the
issue of governmental secrecy, calling it antidemocratic, and noted that, open debate and
discussion of public issues are vital to our nations
health.

91.
92. Issue: Is the First Amendment violated when the United
States, during wartime, prohibits a newspaper from
publishing sensitive articles which may cause security
concerns for the United States?
93. Holding: Yes. [6-3; Majority: J. Black, J. Douglas, J.
Brennan, J. Stewart, J. White, J. Marshall. Minority: C.J.
Burger, J. Harlan, J. Blackman]
94. Per Curiam Decision: The decision of the Court stated
that the government carries a heavy burden of
providing justification for restraining the freedom of
expression granted by the Constitution. The lower
courts held that the government had not met that
burden, with which the Supreme Court agreed. Thus,
the order of the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia was affirmed and the stays entered on June
25, 1971, were vacated.
95.

Majority Opinions: Justices Black and Douglas

wrote joint concurring opinions in which they

96.
97. Justices Stewart and White joined in concurring
opinions. They held that an alert, aware, and free
press most critically serves the purpose of the First
Amendment.
Further, they reasoned that in the
absence of an informed and free press, there cannot be
enlightened people. Finally, Stewart and White argued
that while a need for secrecy exists in many national
defense issues the responsibility must be where the
power is.
Since the Executive is given a large,
unshared power in foreign affairs and national security,
its duty must be to determine and preserve the degree
of internal security necessary to exercise that power
successfully.
98.

The majority clearly frowned on the actions of

the Executive. The six concurring Justices in this case

27 | P a g e

agreed that issuing an injunction, a prior restraint,

would be a harsh violation of the First Amendment
regardless of the secret nature of the proposed
publishings.
99. Dissenting Opinions: Chief Justice Burger wrote the
first dissent, stating, the First Amendment right itself is
not an absolute. He argued that the First Amendment
does not protect situations where secret, stolen articles
are published by a newspaper. He concluded that since
First Amendment absolutism had never commanded a
majority of the Supreme Court, it need not protect these
types of cases involving stolen materials.
100.
Burger continued his opinion scorning the
New York Times for its lack of responsibility in dealing
with the illegally acquired materials.
Burger
contended that it would have not been unreasonable or
inconvenient for the New York Times to consult with the
government before publishing, especially since the
newspaper could
have
easily
anticipated
the
government's reaction.
Burger found it hardly
believable that a respected newspaper would fail to
act upon one of the basic and simple duties of every
citizen in regard to the discovery of possession of
stolen property.
101.
IGLESIA NI CRISTO V. COURT OF APPEALS
102.
103.
THE FACTS
104.
105.
Several pre-taped episodes of the TV program Ang
Iglesia ni Cristo of the religious group Iglesia ni Cristo (INC)
were rated X i.e., not for public viewing by the
respondent Board of Review for Moving Pictures and
Television (now MTRCB). These TV programs allegedly

offend[ed] and constitute[d] an attack against other religions

which is expressly prohibited by law because of petitioner
INCs controversial biblical interpretations and its attacks
against contrary religious beliefs.
106.
107.
Petitioner INC went to court to question the actions of
respondent Board. The RTC ordered the respondent Board to
grant petitioner INC the necessary permit for its TV programs.
But on appeal by the respondent Board, the CA reversed the
RTC. The CA ruled that: (1) the respondent Board has
jurisdiction and power to review the TV program Ang Iglesia ni
Cristo, and (2) the respondent Board did not act with grave
abuse of discretion when it denied permit for the exhibition on
TV of the three series of Ang Iglesia ni Cristo on the ground
that the materials constitute an attack against another religion.
The CA also found the subject TV series indecent, contrary to
law and contrary to good customs. Dissatisfied with the CA
decision, petitioner INC appealed to the Supreme Court.
108.
109.
II. THE ISSUES
110.
111.
(1) Does respondent Board have the power to review
petitioners TV program?
112.
113.
(2) Assuming it has the power, did respondent Board
gravely abuse its discretion when it prohibited the airing of
petitioners religious program?
114.
115.
III. THE RULING
116.
117.
[The Court voted 13-1 to REVERSE the CA insofar as
the CA sustained the action of the respondent Boards X-rating
petitioners TV Program Series Nos. 115, 119, and 121. It also
voted 10-4 to AFFIRM the CA insofar as the CA it sustained the
jurisdiction of the respondent MTRCB to review petitioners TV
program entitled Ang Iglesia ni Cristo.]

28 | P a g e

118.
119.
1. YES, respondent Board has the power to review
petitioners TV program.
120.
121.
Petitioner contends that the term television program
[in Sec. 3 of PD No. 1986 that the respondent Board has the
power to review and classify] should not include religious
programs like its program Ang Iglesia ni Cristo. A contrary
interpretation, it is urged, will contravene section 5, Article III of
the Constitution which guarantees that no law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed.
122.
123.
[The Court however] reject petitioners postulate.
Petitioners public broadcast on TV of its religious program
brings it out of the bosom of internal belief. Television is a
medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of children. The
Court iterates the rule thatthe exercise of religious freedom can
be regulated by the State when it will bring about the clear and
present danger of some substantive evil which the State is duty
bound to prevent, i.e., serious detriment to the more
overriding interest of public health, public morals, or public
welfare. A laissez faire policy on the exercise of religion can be
seductive to the liberal mind but history counsels the Court
against its blind adoption as religion is and continues to be a
volatile area of concern in our country today. . . [T]he Court]
shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free
exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not
leave its rational exercise to the irrationality of man. For when
religion divides and its exercise destroys, the State should not
stand still.
124.
125.
2. YES, respondent Board gravely abuse its
discretion when it prohibited the airing of petitioners religious
program.
126.

127.
[A]ny act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed
brows. It is the burden of the respondent Board to overthrow
this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
128.
129.
The evidence shows that the respondent Board x-rated
petitioners TV series for attacking either religions, especially
the Catholic Church. An examination of the evidence . . . will
show that the so-called attacks are mere criticisms of some
of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The
videotapes were not viewed by the respondent court as they
were not presented as evidence. Yet they were considered by
the respondent court as indecent, contrary to law and good
customs, hence, can be prohibited from public viewing under
section 3(c) of PD 1986. This ruling clearly suppresses
petitioner's freedom of speech and interferes with its right to
free exercise of religion. xxx.
130.
131.
The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms
of other religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to
interdict such criticisms, however, unclean they may be. Under
our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor
any religion by protecting it against an attack by another
religion. . . In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech
of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other
religions, even if said religion happens to be the most
numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought
to be no difference between the appearance and the reality of
freedom of religion, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of
thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace
of duelling ideas. When the luxury of time permits, the
marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by
more speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of
colliding ideas that can fan the embers of truth.
132.

29 | P a g e

133.
In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the
respondents failed to apply the clear and present danger rule.
In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, this Court held:
The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship carries with it the right to
disseminate religious information. Any restraint of such right
can be justified like other restraints on freedom of expression
on the ground that there is a clear and present danger of any
substantive evil which the State has the right to prevent.
In Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, we further ruled
that . . . it is only where it is unavoidably necessary to prevent
an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of
the community that infringement of religious freedom may be
justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary to avoid
the danger.
134.
135.
The records show that the decision of the respondent
Board, affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is
completely bereft
of
findings
of
facts to
justify
the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute
impermissible attacks against another religion. There is no
showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring
about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened
harm. Prior restraint on speech, including religious speech,
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only by the
showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken
the life of a reality already on ground.
136.
137.
PRIMICIAS V FUGOSO
138.
139.
Facts: An action was instituted by the petitioner for
the refusal of the respondent to issue a permit to them to hold
a public meeting in Plaza Miranda for redress of grievances to
the government. The reason alleged by the respondent in his
defense for refusing the permit is, "that there is a reasonable
ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon
the fact that passions, specially on the part of the losing
groups, remains bitter and high, that similar speeches will be

delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the

people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a
disruption of public order." Giving emphasis as well to the
delegated police power to local government. Stating as well
Revised Ordinances of 1927 prohibiting as an offense against
public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons in a body or
crowd for any unlawful purpose; or disturb or disquiet any
congregation engaged in any lawful assembly." Included herein
is Sec. 1119, Free use of Public Place.
140.
141.
Issue: Whether or Not the freedom of speech was
violated.
142.
143.
Held: Yes. Dealing with the ordinance, specifically,
Sec. 1119, said section provides for two constructions: (1) the
Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated
discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the holding of a
lawful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the
streets and other public places of the City of Manila; (2) The
right of the Mayor is subject to reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public places to be used
with the view to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public places by others, and
to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of
disorder. The court favored the second construction. First
construction tantamount to authorizing the Mayor to prohibit
the use of the streets. Under our democratic system of
government no such unlimited power may be validly granted
to any officer of the government, except perhaps in cases of
national emergency.
144.
The Mayors first defense is untenable. Fear of
serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech
and assembly. It is the function of speech to free men from the
bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech
there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will

30 | P a g e

result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable

ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be
prevented is a serious one. The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not
enough to justify its suppression. There must be the probability
of serious injury to the state.
145.
146.
MUTUC VS. COMELEC
147.

148.

Facts

149.
The petitioner, Amelito Mutuc was a candidate
for delegate to the Constitutional Convention (1970).
His candidacy has been given due course by the
Commission
on
Elections
(COMELEC)
but
the
commission prohibited the petitioner from using "taped
jingles" in his mobile units for campaign purposes
because according to COMELEC, such act is a clear
violation on the provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates
"to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample
ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens,
lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic
goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats,
matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic
or foreign origin." It was COMELEC's argument that the
jingle proposed to be used by the petitioner is the
recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore
a tangible propaganda material, under the phrase "and
the like". Mutuc protested and invoked his right to
freedom
of
speech.

150.

151.

Issue

152.
Whether or not the said rule which is "prohibiting
the use of taped jingles" denied petitioner of his
freedom of speech.
153.

Decision

154.
Doctrinally, courts always ruled in favor of the
freedom of expression. Moreover, any act that restrains
speech should be greeted with furrowed brows.
COMELEC shall not exercise any authority in conflict
with the law. It must also be remembered that there is
no
higher
law
than
the
Constitution.
Regarding the petitioner's invocation of his right to free
speech, the Court has constantly held that this
preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost
respect. What respondent Commission did, in effect,
was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil aginst
which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could
respondent Commission justify its action by the
assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped
jingle, would be free, either by himself or through
others, to use his mobile units (loudspeakers). Precisely,
the constitutional guarantee is not to be weakened by
confining it to a speaker having his say, but not
perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or
other mechanical contrivances. If courts were to sustain
respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly
be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That
cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what
the
Constitution
in
express
terms
assures.
COMELEC is restrained and prohibited from enforcing
such rule.
155.

31 | P a g e

156.

GROSJEAN VS AMERICAN PRESS

166.

157.

Facts:

167.

158.
-Suit brought by nine publishers of newspapers
within the State of Louisianato enjoin the enforcement
against them of the provisions of ACT No. 23.

168.
169.

JOSE BURGOS VS. CHIEF OF STAFF

159.
-ACT No. 23 requires everyone subject to the tax
to file a sworn report every three months showing the
amount and the gross receipts from the business
described in 1. The resulting tax must be paid when
the report is filed. Failure to file the report or pay the
tax as thus provided constitutes a misdemeanor and
subjects the offender to a fine not exceeding $500, or
imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both, for
each violation. Any corporation violating the act
subjects itself to the payment of $50 to be recovered by
suit.

170.

Facts:

171.
Two warrants were issued against petitioners for
the search on the premises of Metropolitan Mail and
We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items
alleged to have been used in subversive activities.
Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory
and prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the
seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against
petitioner.

161.
Issue: WON the act abridges the freedom of the
press.

172.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack
of probable cause and that the two warrants issued
indicated only one and the same address. In addition,
the items seized subject to the warrant were real
properties.

162.

173.

160.
-Appellees contend that the said Act abridges
the freedom of the press.

Held:

163.
-The tax imposed was declared invalid because it
tended to limit the circulation of any such periodical
seeking to avoid the payment of the tax.
164.
-Characterizing the tax as tax on knowledge is
an indirect attempt to restrict the dissemination of
ideas.

174.

Issue:

175.
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to
justify seizure of the items.
176.
177.

Held:

165.

32 | P a g e

178.
The defect in the indication of the same address
in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the
correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and
intent to search two distinct premises was evident in
the issuance of the two warrant.
179.
As to the issue that the items seized were real
properties, the court applied the principle in the case
of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling that machinery
which is movable by nature becomes immobilized when
placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant,
but not so when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or
any other person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the
case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the owners
of the land and/or building on which the machineries
were placed. This being the case, the machineries in
question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain
movable property susceptible to seizure under a search
warrant.
180.
However, the Court declared the two warrants
null and void.
181.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such
facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to
be searched.

182.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for
the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the
witnesses having been mere generalizations.
183.
Furthermore,
jurisprudence
tells
of
the
prohibition on the issuance of general warrants.
(Stanford vs. State of Texas). The description and
enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched
and seized did not indicate with specification the
subversive nature of the said items.
184.

ADIONG VS COMELEC

185.

Facts:

186.
- On January 13, 1992, the COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 2347 pursuant to its powers granted by the
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code, Republic Acts Nos.
6646 and 7166 and other election laws.
187.

-Section 15(a) of the resolution provides:

188.
Sec. 15. Lawful Election Propaganda. The following
are lawful election propaganda:
189.
(a) Pamphlets, leaflets, cards, decals, stickers,
handwritten or printed letters, or other written or printed
materials not more than eight and one-half (8-1/2) inches in
width and fourteen (14) inches in length. Provided, That
decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the
authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section
21 hereof.
190.

Section 21 (f) of the same resolution provides:

191.

Sec. 21(f). Prohibited forms of election propaganda.

192.

It is unlawful:

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193.

xxx xxx xxx

194.
(f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly
exhibit any election propaganda in any place, whether public
or private, mobile or stationary, except in the COMELEC
common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign
headquarters of the candidate or political party, organization
or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential house or
one of his residential houses, if he has more than one:
Provided, that such posters or election propaganda shall not
exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size.
195.
-Petitioner Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate
in the May 11, 1992 elections now assails the COMELEC's
Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and
stickers in "mobile" places like cars and other moving
vehicles. According to him such prohibition is violative of
Section 82 of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 11(a) of
Republic Act No. 6646. In addition, the petitioner believes that
with the ban on radio, television and print political
advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this
prohibition. The posting of decals and stickers on cars and
other moving vehicles would be his last medium to inform the
electorate that he is a senatorial candidate in the May 11,
1992 elections. Finally, the petitioner states that as of
February 22, 1992 (the date of the petition) he has not
received any notice from any of the Election Registrars in the
entire country as to the location of the supposed "Comelec
Poster Areas."
196.
Issue: WON the COMELEC may prohibit the posting of
decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and
limit their location or publication to the authorized posting
areas that it fixes.
197.

Held:

198.
-The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on
mobile places whether public or private except in authorized
areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which
cannot be justified by the Constitution.
199.
-The posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas,
tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the
consent of the owner of the vehicle. Hence, the preference of
the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election propaganda
not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the
candidate is rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more
decals and stickers or poor and without the means to spread
out the same number of decals and stickers is not as
important as the right of the owner to freely express his
choice and exercise his right of free speech. The owner can
even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on his
personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is
impermissible encroachment of his liberties.
200.
III.

FREEDOM FROM PUNISHMENT

a. Clear and Present Danger Rule

201.

SCHENCK V. US

202.
Brief Fact Summary. The distribution of
leaflets using impassioned language claiming that the
draft was a violation of the Thirteenth Amendment of
the United States Constitution (Constitution) and
encouraging people to assert your opposition to the
draft was held not to be protected speech.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. The character of every act
depends on the circumstances in which it is done. The
question in every case is whether the words are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring

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about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to

protect.
203.
Facts. This case is based on a three count indictment.
The first charge was a conspiracy to violate the
Espionage Act of 1917. The second alleges a conspiracy
to commit an offense against the United States. The
third count alleges an unlawful use of the mails for the
transmission of unlawful matter. The document in
question claims that the draft is a violation of the
Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution and
encourages people to assert your opposition to the
draft. The Defendants, Schenck and other publishers of
the leaflets (Defendants), were found guilty on all of the
counts.
Issue. Whether the words used in the leaflets are used
in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring
about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
protect?
204.
Held. Yes. Judgment of the lower court affirmed. In
many places and in ordinary times, the Defendants in saying
all that was said in the leaflets would have been within their
constitutional rights. However, the character of every act
depends on the circumstances in which it is done. The
question in every case is whether the words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear
and present danger that they will bring about the substantive
evils that Congress has a right to protect. When a nation is at
war, many things that might be said in a time of peace are
such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will not be
endured so long as men fight and that no Court could regard
them as protected by any constitutional right. Therefore, the
words used in the leaflets are used in such circumstances and

are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger

that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress
has a right to protect.
205.
Discussion. This case gave birth to the clear and present
danger test.
206.

GONZALES V. COMELEC

207.
Facts: RA 4880 which took effect on June 17, 1967,
prohibiting the too early nomination of candidates and limiting
the period of election campaign or partisan political activity
was challenged on constitutional grounds. More precisely, the
basic liberties of free speech and free press, freedom of
assembly and freedom of association are invoked to nullify the
act. Petitioner Cabigao was, at the time of the filing the
petition, an incumbent councilor in the 4th District of Manila
and the Nacionalista Party official candidate for Vice-Mayor of
Manila to which he was subsequently elected on November
11, 1967; petitioner Gonzales, on the other hand, is a
private individual, a registered voter in the City of Manila and
a political leader of his co-petitioner. There was the further
allegation that the nomination of a candidate and the fixing of
period of election campaign are matters of political
expediency and convenience which only political parties can
regulate or curtail by and among themselves through selfrestraint or mutual understanding or agreement and that the
regulation and limitation of these political matters invoking
the police power, in the absence ofclear and present danger
to the state, would render the constitutional rights of
petitioners meaningless and without effect. Senator Lorenzo
M. Taada was asked to appear as amicus curiae, and
elucidated that Act No. 4880 could indeed be looked upon as
a limitation on the preferred rights of speech and press, of
assembly and of association. He did justify its enactment
however under the clear and present danger doctrine, there
being the substantive evil of elections, whether for national or
local officials, being debased and degraded by unrestricted

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campaigning, excess of partisanship and undue concentration

in politics with the loss not only of efficiency in government
but of lives as well. The Philippine Bar Association, the Civil
Liberties Union, the U.P. Law Center and the U.P. Women
Lawyers' Circle were requested to give their opinions.
Respondents contend that the act was based on the police
power
of
the
state.

deemed by the legislative body to be part and parcel of the

necessary and appropriate response not merely to a clear and
present danger but to the actual existence of a grave and
substantive evil of excessive partisanship, dishonesty and
corruption as well as violence that of late has invariably
marred election campaigns and partisan political activities
in this
country.

Issue: Whether or Not RA 4880 unconstitutional.

The very idea of a government, republican in form, implies a

right on the part of its citizens to meet peaceably for
consultation in respect to public affairs and to petition for
redress of grievances. As in the case of freedom of expression,
this right is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil
that Congress has a right to prevent.

208.
Held: Yes. As held in Cabansag v. Fernandez there are
two tests that may supply an acceptable criterion for
permissible restriction on freedom of speech. These are the
clear and present danger rule and the 'dangerous tendency'
rule. The first, means that the evil consequence of the
comment or utterance must be extremely serious and the
degree of imminence extremely high before the utterance can
be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the
'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. It has the
advantage of establishing according to the above decision a
definite rule in constitutional law. It provides the criterion as
to what words may be publicly established. The "dangerous
tendency rule" is such that If the words uttered create a
dangerous tendency which the state has a right to prevent,
then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that
some definite or immediate acts of force, violence, or
unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be
advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary that the
language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons
to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to
bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body
seeks to prevent.
209.
The challenged statute could have been more
narrowly drawn and the practices prohibited more precisely
delineated to satisfy the constitutional requirements as to a
valid limitation under the clear and present danger doctrine.
As the author Taada clearly explained, such provisions were

210.
The prohibition of any speeches, announcements or
commentaries, or the holding of interviews for or against the
election of any party or candidate for public office and the
prohibition of the publication or distribution of campaign
literature or materials, against the solicitation of votes
whether directly or indirectly, or the undertaking of any
campaign literature or propaganda for or against
any candidate or party is repugnant to a constitutional
command.

211.

REYES V. BAGATSING

212.

Facts:

Petitioner, JBL Reyes, on behalf of the Anti-Biases

Coalition, sought a permit to hold a peaceful march and
rally for 3 hours from the City of Manila. The route of
the march would cover from Luneta Park to the gates of
the United States Embassy where they would hold a
short program. Respondent, Bagatsing, as the City
Mayor denied the petition for reasons due to police

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intelligence reports that some would enter the rally with

subversive or criminal intentions and would disrupt the
assembly where a large number of people are expected
to attend. Petitioner was given the chance to be issued
a permit if only they would hold their rally at the Rizal
Coliseum or any other enclosed area where the safety
of the participants themselves and the general public
may be ensured. Hence, this petition for mandamus
with writ of preliminary injunction to review the decision
of
the
Manila
mayor
denying
the
permit.
Issue:
Did the mayor really have justifiable reasons/grounds in
denying the permit for petitioner to hold a rally?
213.
Held:
The Supreme Court ruled in the negative on the ground
that there was no showing of a clear and present
danger of substantive evil that could justify the denial
of the permit. As a signatory of the Vienna Convention
on Diplomatic Relations adopted in 1961, the
Philippines, as the receiving State is under a special
duty to take appropriate steps to protect the premises
of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to
prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or

impairment of its dignity. The Constitution adopts the

generally accepted principles of international law as
part of the law of the land. The Vienna Convention
should be part of the law of the land since it is a
restatement of the generally accepted principles of
international law. Respondent would only be justified in
denying petitioners application if there were a clear
and present danger of any intrusion or damage, or
disturbance of the peace of the mission, or impairment
of its dignity insofar as the terminal point would be the
Embassy. Moreover, respondent Mayor relied on
Ordinance No. 7295 of the City of Manila prohibiting the
holding or staging of rallies or demonstrations within a
radius of 500 feet from any foreign mission or chancery
and for other purposes. Unless the ordinance is
nullified, or declared ultra vires, its invocation as a
defense is understandable but not decisive, in view of
the primacy accorded the constitutional rights of free
speech and peaceable assembly.
214.

The mandatory injunction prayed for is granted.

215.

216.

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