LOCAL POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

1. HEIRS

OF

ALBERTO

SUGUITAN, petitioner, vs.

CITY

OF

MANDALUYONG, respondent
The basis for the exercise of the power of eminent domain by local government units is
section 19 of RA 7160 which provides that:
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an
ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, purpose, or welfare
for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws; Provided,
however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and
definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not
accepted; Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately take
possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and
upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of
the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the
property to be expropriated; Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair
market value at the time of the taking of the property.
Eminent domain is the right or power of a sovereign state to appropriate private
property to particular uses to promote public welfare. It is an indispensable attribute of
sovereignty; a power grounded in the primary duty of government to serve the common
need and advance the general welfare. Thus, the right of eminent domain appertains to
every independent government without the necessity for constitutional recognition. The
provisions found in modern constitutions of civilized countries relating to the taking of
property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to the government, but
limit a power which would otherwise be without limit. Thus, our own Constitution provides
that "[p]rivate property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation.".
Furthermore, the due process and equal protection clause act as additional safeguards
against the arbitrary exercise of this governmental power.
Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain affects an individual's right to private
property, a constitutionally-protected right necessary for the preservation and
enhancement of personal dignity and intimately connected with the rights to life and
liberty.
The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case
is that the authority must be strictly construed.

The power of eminent domain is essentially legislative in nature. It is firmly settled,

however, that such power may be validly delegated to local government units, other public
entities and public utilities, although the scope of this delegated legislative power is
necessarily narrower than that of the delegating authority and may only be exercised in
strict compliance with the terms of the delegating law.
The courts have the obligation to determine whether the following requisites have
been complied with by the local government unit concerned:
O 1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the local government unit, to exercise the power of eminent domain
or pursue expropriation proceedings over a particular private property .
P 2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
P 3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of
the Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
O 4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property
sought to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
Distinction between ordinance and resolution
A municipal ordinance is different from a resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution
is merely a declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent character, but a resolution is
temporary in nature. Additionally, the two are enacted differently -a third reading is
necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless decided otherwise by a
majority of all the Sanggunian members.
Rule 67 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court reveals that expropriation proceedings
are comprised of two stages:
(1) the first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context
of the facts involved in the suit; it ends with an order, if not in a dismissal of the action,
of condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought
to be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the
complaint;

(2) the second phase is concerned with the determination by the court of the just
compensation for the property sought to be taken; this is done by the court with the
assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners
> as soon as the complaint is filed the plaintiff shall already have the right to enter upon
the possession of the real property involved upon depositing with the court at least
fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax
declaration of the property to be expropriated. Therefore, an ordinance promulgated by
the local legislative body authorizing its local chief executive to exercise the power of
eminent domain is necessary prior to the filing by the latter of the complaint with the
proper court, and not only after the court has determined the amount of just
compensation to which the defendant is entitled
> Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing Rules, which requires only a
resolution to authorize an LGU to exercise eminent domain. This is clearly misplaced,
because Section 19 of RA 7160, the law itself, surely prevails over said rule which merely
seeks to implement it. It is axiomatic that the clear letter of the law is controlling and
cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued for its implementation. Besides,
what the discrepancy seems to indicate is a mere oversight in the wording of the
implementing rules, since Article 32, Rule VI thereof, also requires that, in exercising the
power of eminent domain, the chief executive of the LGU must act pursuant to an
ordinance.
2. AIR TRANSPORTATION OFFICE (ATO) and MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL
AIRPORT AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioners, vs. APOLONIO GOPUCO,
JR., respondent.

QUERY: When private land is expropriated for a particular public use, and that particular
public use is abandoned, does its former owner acquire a cause of action for recovery of
the property?
The answer to that question depends upon the character of the title acquired by the
expropriator, whether it be the State, a province, a municipality, or a corporation which
has the right to acquire property under the power of eminent domain. If, for example,
land is expropriated for a particular purpose, with the condition that when that purpose
is ended or abandoned the property shall return to its former owner, then, of course,
when the purpose is terminated or abandoned the former owner reacquires the
property so expropriated. If, for example, land is expropriated for a public street and
the expropriation is granted upon condition that the city can only use it for a public
street, then, of course, when the city abandons its use as a public street, it returns to the
former owner, unless there is some statutory provision to the contrary. . . If upon the

contrary, however, the decree of expropriation gives to the entity a fee simple title, then
of course, the land becomes the absolute property of the expropriator, whether it be the
State, a province, or municipality, and in that case the non-user does not have the effect
of defeating the title acquired by the expropriation proceedings.
When land has been acquired for public use in fee simple, unconditionally,
either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner
retains no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned or the land
may be devoted to a different use, without any impairment of the estate or
title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner .
Eminent domain is generally described as the highest and most exact idea of property
remaining in the government that may be acquired for some public purpose through a
method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. [32] Also often referred to as
expropriation and, with less frequency, as condemnation, it is, like police power and
taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty and need not be clothed with any constitutional
gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are meant more to
regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. It is a right to take
or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public
exigency and is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form
and thus inseparable from sovereignty. In fact, all separate interests of individuals in
property are held of the government under this tacit agreement or implied reservation.
Notwithstanding the grant to individuals, the eminent domain, the highest and most exact
idea of property, remains in the government, or in the aggregate body of people in their
sovereign capacity; and they have the right to resume the possession of the property
whenever the public interest so requires it.
The ubiquitous character of eminent domain is manifest in the nature of the expropriation
proceedings. Expropriation proceedings are not adversarial in the conventional sense, for
the condemning authority is not required to assert any conflicting interest in the property.
Thus, by filing the action, the condemnor in effect merely serves notice that it is taking
title and possession of the property, and the defendant asserts title or interest in the
property, not to prove a right to possession, but to prove a right to compensation for the
taking.
The only direct constitutional qualification is thus that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just compensation. This prescription is intended to
provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual
against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
3. MIGUEL

BELUSO,

NATIVIDAD

BELUSO,

PEDRO

BELUSO,

ANGELITA

BELUSO, RAMON BELUSO, and AMADA DANIEL, substituted by her heirs

represented by TERESITA ARROBANG, Petitioners, vs. THE MUNICIPALITY

OF

PANAY

(CAPIZ),

represented

by

its

Mayor,

VICENTE

B.

BERMEJO, Respondent.
Eminent domain, which is the power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to
particular uses to promote public welfare, is essentially lodged in the legislature. While
such power may be validly delegated to local government units (LGUs), other public entities
and public utilities the exercise of such power by the delegated entities is not
absolute. In fact, the scope of delegated legislative power is narrower than that of the
delegating authority and such entities may exercise the power to expropriate private
property only when authorized by Congress and subject to its control and restraints
imposed through the law conferring the power or in other legislations. Indeed, LGUs by
themselves have no inherent power of eminent domain. Thus, strictly speaking, the power
of eminent domain delegated to an LGU is in reality not eminent but "inferior" since it
must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation and thus partakes only of a share in
eminent domain. The national legislature is still the principal of the LGUs and the latter
cannot go against the principals will or modify the same.
The exercise of the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a derogation of a
fundamental right. It greatly affects a landowners right to private property which is a
constitutionally protected right necessary for the preservation and enhancement of
personal dignity and is intimately connected with the rights to life and liberty. Thus,
whether such power is exercised directly by the State or by its authorized agents, the
exercise of such power must undergo painstaking scrutiny.
Indeed, despite the existence of legislative grant in favor of local governments, it is still
the duty of the courts to determine whether the power of eminent domain is being
exercised in accordance with the delegating law.
The Court in no uncertain terms have pronounced that a local government unit cannot
authorize an expropriation of private property through a mere resolution of its lawmaking
body.

31

R.A. No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code expressly requires

an ordinance for the purpose and a resolution that merely expresses the sentiment of the
municipal council will not suffice.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent domain through a mere resolution,
it would have simply adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code. But
Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous Local Government Code, Sec. 19
of R.A. [No.] 7160 categorically requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an
ordinance.
4. BARANGAY SINDALAN, SAN FERNANDO, PAMPANGA,rep. by BARANGAY
CAPTAIN ISMAEL GUTIERREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE
MAGTOTO
III, and PATRICIA
SINDAYAN, Respondents.

Expropriation, if misused or abused, would trench on the property rights of individuals

without due process of law.
The legal question in this petition, however, is whether the taking of the land was for a
public purpose or use. In the exercise of the power of eminent domain, it is basic that the
taking of private property must be for a public purpose. A corollary issue is whether
private property can be taken by law from one person and given to another in the guise of
public purpose.
In general, eminent domain is defined as the power of the nation or a sovereign
state to take, or to authorize the taking of, private property for a public use without
the

owners

consent,

conditioned

upon

payment

of

just

compensation.

It

is

acknowledged as an inherent political right, founded on a common necessity and

interest of appropriating the property of individual members of the community to the
great necessities of the whole community.

The exercise of the power of eminent domain is constrained by two constitutional

provisions:
(1) that private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation
under Article III (Bill of Rights), Section 9;
(2) and (2) that no person shall be deprived of his/her life, liberty, or property without
due process of law under Art. III, Sec. 1.
However, there is no precise meaning of public use and the term is susceptible of myriad
meanings depending on diverse situations.
The limited meaning attached to public use is use by the public or public
employment, that a duty must devolve on the person or corporation holding property
appropriated by right of eminent domain to furnish the public with the use intended,
and that there must be a right on the part of the public, or some portion of it, or
some public or quasi-public agency on behalf of the public, to use the property after
it is condemned.

The more generally accepted view sees public use as public advantage, convenience, or
benefit, and that anything which tends to enlarge the resources, increase the industrial
energies, and promote the productive power of any considerable number of the inhabitants
of a section of the state, or which leads to the growth of towns and the creation of new
resources for the employment of capital and labor, [which] contributes to the general
welfare and the prosperity of the whole community. In this jurisdiction, public use is
defined as whatever is beneficially employed for the community.
It is settled that the public nature of the prospective exercise of expropriation
cannot depend on the numerical count of those to be served or the smallness or
largeness of the community to be benefited.
The number of people is not determinative of whether or not it constitutes public
use, provided the use is exercisable in common and is not limited to particular
individuals.
Thus, the first essential requirement for a valid exercise of eminent domain is for the
expropriator to prove that the expropriation is for a public use. In Municipality of Bian v.

Garcia, this Court explicated that expropriation ends with an order of condemnation
declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to be
condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment
of just compensation.[17]
Another vital requisite for a valid condemnation is the payment of just compensation to
the property owner.
In the recent case of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals , just
compensation has been defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator, and that the gauge for computation is not the takers gain
but the owners loss. In order for the payment to be just, it must be real, substantial,
full, and ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly determined.
Also, the Court in Estate

of

Salud

Jimenez

v.

Philippine

Export

Processing

Zone stressed that the payment should be made within a reasonable time from the
taking of the property.

It succinctly explained that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be

considered just inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the

consequences of being immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait
for a decade or more before actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with
the loss. Thus, once just compensation is finally determined, the expropriator must
immediately pay the amount to the lot owner. In Reyes v. National Housing

Authority, it was ruled that 12% interest per annum shall be imposed on the final
compensation until paid. Thus, any further delay in the payment will result in the
imposition of 12% interest per annum.
However, in the recent case of Republic v. Lim, the Court enunciated the rule that
where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall
have the right to recover possession of their property.
Since the individual stands to lose the property by compulsion of the law, the
expropriation authority should not further prejudice the owners rights by delaying
payment of just compensation. To obviate any possibility of delay in the payment, the
expropriator should already make available, at the time of the filing of the expropriation
complaint, the amount equal to the BIR zonal valuation or the fair market value of the
property per tax declaration whichever is higher.
On due process, it is likewise basic under the Constitution that the property owner
must be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard on the issues of public use
and just compensation and to present objections to and claims on them. [22] It is
settled that taking of property for a private use or without just compensation is a
deprivation of property without due process of law
Public funds can be used only for a public purpose. In this proposed condemnation,
government funds would be employed for the benefit of a private individual without
any legal mooring. In criminal law, this would constitute malversation.
The power of eminent domain can only be exercised for public use and with just
compensation. Taking an individuals private property is a deprivation which can
only be justified by a higher goodwhich is public useand can only be
counterbalanced by just compensation. Without these safeguards, the taking
of property would not only be unlawful, immoral, and null and void, but would
also constitute a gross and condemnable transgression of an individuals basic
right to property as well.

5. AMOS P. FRANCIA, JR., CECILIA P. FRANCIA, and HEIRS OF BENJAMIN

P. FRANCIA, Petitioners, vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN, Respondent.
Petitioners essentially aver that the CA erred in upholding the RTC's orders that, in
expropriation cases, prior determination of the existence of a public purpose was not
necessary for the issuance of a writ of possession.
The Court denied the petition.
Before a local government unit may enter into the possession of the property sought to be
expropriated, it must (1) file a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance in the proper court and (2) deposit with the said court at least 15% of the
property's fair market value based on its current tax declaration. 11 The law does not make
the determination of a public purpose a condition precedent to the issuance of a writ of
possession.
6. SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL OF MANDALUYONG CITY, Respondents.
A resolution like Resolution No. 552 that merely expresses the sentiment of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod is not sufficient for the purpose of initiating an expropriation
proceeding. Indeed, in Municipality of Paraaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, a case in which
the Municipality of Paraaque based its complaint for expropriation on a resolution, not an
ordinance, the Court ruled so:
The power of eminent domain is lodged in the legislative branch of government,
which may delegate the exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public
utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to expropriate private property
only when authorized by Congress and subject to the latters control and restraints,
imposed "through the law conferring the power or in other legislations." In this
case, Section 19 of RA 7160, which delegates to LGUs the power of eminent domain,
also lays down the parameters for its exercise.

7. PERCIVAL
MODAY,
ZOTICO
MODAY
(deceased)
and
LEONORA
MODAY, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE EVANGELINE S.
YUIPCO OF BRANCH 6, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, AGUSAN DEL SUR AND
MUNICIPALITY OF BUNAWAN, respondents.
The Court finds no merit in the petition and affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Eminent domain, the power which the Municipality of Bunawan exercised in the instant
case, is a fundamental State power that is inseparable from sovereignty. It is
government's right to appropriate, in the nature of a compulsory sale to the State, private
property for public use or purpose. Inherently possessed by the national legislature, the
power of eminent domain may be validly delegated to local governments, other public

entities and public utilities.[16] For the taking of private property by the government to be
valid, the taking must be for public use and there must be just compensation.
The Municipality of Bunawan's power to exercise the right of eminent domain is not
disputed as it is expressly provided for in Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the Local Government
Code in force at the time expropriation proceedings were initiated. Section 9 of said law
states:
"Section 9. Eminent Domain. A local government unit may, through its head and acting
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian, exercise the right of eminent domain and
institute condemnation proceedings for public use or purpose."
What petitioners question is the lack of authority of the municipality to exercise this
right since the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disapproved Resolution No. 43-89.
Section 153 of B.P. Blg. 337 provides:
"Sec. 153.
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Review. (1) Within thirty days after receiving
copies of approved ordinances, resolutions and executive orders promulgated by the
municipal mayor, the sangguniang panlalawigan shall examine the documents or transmit
them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial fiscal, who shall
examine them promptly and inform the sangguniang panlalawigan in writing of any defect or
impropriety which he may discover therein and make such comments or recommendations
as shall appear to him proper.
(2)
If the sangguniang panlalawigan shall find that any municipal ordinance, resolution
or executive order is beyond the power conferred upon the sangguniang bayan or the
mayor, it shall declare such ordinance, resolution or executive order invalid in whole or
in part, entering its actions upon the minutes and advising the proper municipal authorities
thereof. The effect of such an action shall be to annul the ordinance, resolution or
executive order in question in whole or in part. The action of the sangguniang panlalawigan
shall be final.
"The only ground upon which a provincial board may declare any municipal resolution,
ordinance, or order invalid is when such resolution, ordinance, or order is 'beyond the
powers conferred upon the council or president making the same.' Absolutely no other
ground is recognized by the law. A strictly legal question is before the provincial board in
its consideration of a municipal resolution, ordinance, or order. The provincial (board's)
disapproval of any resolution, ordinance, or order must be premised specifically upon the
fact that such resolution, ordinance, or order is outside the scope of the legal powers
conferred by law. If a provincial board passes these limits, it usurps the legislative
functions of the municipal council or president. Such has been the consistent course of
executive authority.
Thus, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan was without the authority to disapprove Municipal
Resolution No. 43-89 for the Municipality of Bunawan clearly has the power to exercise

the right of eminent domain and its Sangguniang Bayan the capacity to promulgate said
resolution, pursuant to the earlier-quoted Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337. Perforce, it follows
that Resolution No. 43-89 is valid and binding and could be used as lawful authority to
petition for the condemnation of petitioners' property.
The limitations on the power of eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law must be observed. [22] The Supreme
Court, taking cognizance of such issues as the adequacy of compensation, necessity of the
taking and the public use character or the purpose of the taking, has ruled that the
necessity of exercising eminent domain must be genuine and of a public character.
[24]
Government may not capriciously choose what private property should be taken.
8. BARANGAY SAN ROQUE, TALISAY, CEBU, petitioner, vs. Heirs of
FRANCISCO PASTOR, namely: EUGENIO SYLIANCO, TEODORO SYLIANCO,
ISABEL SYLIANCO, EUGENIA S. ONG, LAWRENCE SYLIANCO, LAWSON
SYLIANCO, LAWINA S. NOTARIO, LEONARDO SYLIANCO JR. and
LAWFORD SYLIANCO,respondents.
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the
jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
The Facts
Petitioner filed before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Talisay, Cebu (Branch 1) [3] a
Complaint to expropriate a property of the respondents. In an Order dated April 8, 1997,
the MTC dismissed the Complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that
"[e]minent domain is an exercise of the power to take private property for public use after
payment of just compensation. In an action for eminent domain, therefore, the principal
cause of action is the exercise of such power or right. The fact that the action also
involves real property is merely incidental. An action for eminent domain is therefore
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not with this
Court."[4]
Assailed RTC Ruling
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when filed before it, holding that an action for
eminent domain affected title to real property; hence, the value of the property to be
expropriated would determine whether the case should be filed before the MTC or the
RTC. Concluding that the action should have been filed before the MTC since the value of
the subject property was less than P20,000. Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph (3), of
Republic Act No. 7691, all civil actions involving title to, or possession of, real property
with an assessed value of less than P20,000.00 are within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts. In the case at bar, it is within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Talisay, Cebu, where the property
involved is located. The instant action for eminent domain or condemnation of real

property is a real action affecting title to or possession of real property, hence, it is the
assessed value of the property involved which determines the jurisdiction of the court.
RULING: A review of the jurisprudence of this Court indicates that in determining
whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary
estimation, this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of the
principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the courts of first instance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, or where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, like in suits to have the defendant perform his part of the contract
(specific performance) and in actions for support, or for annulment of a judgment or to
foreclose a mortgage, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
courts of first instance. The rationale of the rule is plainly that the second class cases,
besides the determination of damages, demand an inquiry into other factors which the law
has deemed to be more within the competence of courts of first instance, which were the
lowest courts of record at the time that the first organic laws of the Judiciary were
enacted allocating jurisdiction.
In the present case, an expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money.
Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take
private property for public use.
In National Power Corporation v. Jocson,
proceedings have two phases:

the Court ruled that expropriation

"The first is concerned with the determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of
the facts involved in the suit. It ends with an order, if not of dismissal of the action, of
condemnation declaring that the plaintiff has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be condemned, for the public use or purpose described in the complaint, upon the payment
of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint.
"The second phase of the eminent domain action is concerned with the determination by
the court of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. This is done by
the Court with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
It should be stressed that the primary consideration in an expropriation suit is
whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the
requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the
authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and
the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation

suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable

of pecuniary estimation.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for
the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is
merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only after
the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.
To emphasize, the question in the present suit is whether the government may expropriate
private property under the given set of circumstances. The government does not dispute
respondents title to or possession of the same. Indeed, it is not a question of who has a
better title or right, for the government does not even claim that it has a title to the
property. It merely asserts its inherent sovereign power to "appropriate and control
individual property for the public benefit, as the public necessity, convenience or welfare
may demand."