CASE NO. 2 [G.R. No. 57883. March 12, 1982.

]
GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Presiding Judge, Branch II of the City Court of
Olongapo, ESTANISLAO L. CESA, JR., FIDELA Y. VARGAS, BENJAMIN C.
ESCOLANGO, JUANITO C. ATIENZA, MANUEL REYES ROSAPAPAN, JR.,
VIRGILIO E. ACIERTO, and PORFIRIO AGUILLON AGUILA, petitioners, vs. MANUEL
ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUITCO, Chairman, Commission on
Audit, and RICARDO PUNO, Minister of Justice, respondents.
FACTS: In 1981, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary,
Appropriating Funs Therefor and for Other Purposes was passed.
De La Llana, et. al. filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition, seeking
to enjoin the Minister of the Budget, the Chairman of the Commission on Audit, and the
Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing BP 129 which mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the CA to MTCs, except the occupants of the
Sandiganbayan and the CTA, unless appointed to the inferior courts established by
such act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. Petitioners assail its
validity saying that said law would contravene the constitutional provision which
provides the security of judges of the court. He averred that only Supreme Court can
remove judges and not the Congress.
ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. 129, An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, is unconstitutional,
considering it violates the security of tenure of justices and judges as provided for under
the Constitution.
HELD: NO.
Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the
competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. What is
really involved in this case is not the removal or separation of the judges and justices
from their services. What is important is the validity of the abolition of their offices.
It is a well-known rule that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor separation of
the incumbents. Of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to
have ceased to hold office. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does
not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be
valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.
Removal is to be distinguished from termination by virtue of valid abolition of the office.
There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no
occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby
lose his position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of
any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.

Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant positions created
by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly
belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial
power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude
any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing
the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present incumbents vested in this
Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free from any
unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to
view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the
basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and
another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.