RIGHT

TO
BE
INFORMED
OF
THE
NATURE
AND CAUSE OF
ACCUSATION

Held:
The court presented the objectives of
the right of the accused to be
informed of the nature and cause of
the crime he is charged with as
follows:

Pecho v People 262 SCRA 518

(1996)

To furnish the accused with such a

description of the charge against him
as will enable him to make his
defense;

Facts:

To avail himself of his conviction or

acquittal for protection against a
further prosecution for the same
cause;

The decision of the Supreme Court for

convicting the accused for the
complex crime of attempted estafa
thru falsification of official and
commercial document was assailed
with the contention of the defense
that the accused may not be convicted
of the crime for double jeopardy. The
charge against the accused was on
violation of RA 3019 of which he was
acquitted because it only penalizes
consummated crime. In the absence of
evidence that shows that the crime
was consummated the accused was
acquitted but the court held judgment
of prosecuting his conviction for
attempted estafa thru falsification of
official and commercial document
which is necessarily included in the
crime charged. Accused invokes the
defense of double jeopardy since his
acquittal from the charge involving RA
3019 is a bar for prosecution on the
crime of attempted estafa thru
falsification of official and commercial
document and that the accused was
not informed of this charge against
him in the filing of the information.

Issue: Whether or not the accused

was informed of the nature and cause
of the crime to which he is convicted

To inform the court of the facts

alleged, so that it may decide whether
they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction, if one should be had.

In order that this requirement may be

satisfied facts must be stated: not
conclusions of law. The complaint
must contain a specific allegation of
every
fact
and
circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime.
What determines the real nature and
cause of accusation against an
accused is the actual recital of facts
stated in the information or complaint
and not the caption or preamble of the
information or complaint nor the
specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law. It follows
then that an accused may be
convicted of a crime which although
not the one charged, is necessarily
included in the latter. It has been
shown that the information filed in
court is considered as charging for two
offenses which the counsel of the
accused failed to object therefore he

can be convicted for both or either of

the charges.

However by reviewing the case at bar

the SC finds lack of sufficient evidence
that would establish the guilt of the
accused as conspirator to the crime of
estafa beyond reasonable doubt, the
prior decision of the SC was deemed
to be based merely on circumstantial
evidence, thus the accused was
acquitted.

accusation against him. Wrong. A

reading of the information which has
been reproduced herein clearly makes
out a case of bribery so that the
petitioner cannot claim deprivation of
the right to be informed.

SORIANO VS. SANDIGANBAYAN

[131 SCRA 184; G.R. NO.L-65952;
31 JUL 1984]

Facts:
Tan was accused of qualified theft. The
petitioner, who was an Asst. Fiscal,
was assigned to investigate. In the
course of the investigation, petitioner
demanded Php.4000 from Tan as price
for dismissing the case. Tan reported it
to the NBI which set up an
entrapment.
Tan
was
given
a
Php.2000, marked bill, and he had
supplied
the
other
half.
The
entrapment
succeeded
and
an
information
was filed with the
Sandiganbayan.
After
trial,
the
Sandiganbayan rendered a decision
finding the petitioner guilty as a
principal in violating the Anti Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act (R.A.3019). A
motion for reconsideration was denied
by the Sandiganbayan, hence this
instant petition.

HELD:
The petitioner also claims that he
cannot be convicted of bribery under
the Revised Penal Code because to do
so
would
be
violative
of
as
constitutional right to be informed of
the nature and cause of the

BORJA v MENDOZA
[SUPRA, PAGE 78]
PEOPLE
v
PRESIDING
OFURDANETA

JUDGE

125 SCRA 269RELOVA; October 26,

1983
NATURE
Petition for certiorari
FACTS
- Private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr.
is chargedwith murder before the RTC
of Pangasinan, inUrdaneta. He is out
on
a
P30,000.00
bail
bond
whichcontains
the
following
conditions:
The
aforenamed,
as
bondsmen, hereby jointly andseverally
undertake that
the above-mentioned defendant, as
principal therein will appear and
answer the charge above-mentioned
in whatever Court it may be tried, and
will at all times hold himself amenable
to the orders and processes of the
Court,

and if convicted, will appear for

judgment, and render himself to the
executionthereof; or that if he fails to
perform any of theseconditions will
pay to the Republic of thePhilippines
the
sum
of
Thirty
Thousand
Pesos(P30,000.00)
...After
his
arraignment,
Valdez,
thru
his
counsel,manifested orally in open
court that he was waivinghis right to
be
present
during
the
trial.
Theprosecuting fiscal moved that
Valdez be compelled toappear and be
present at the trial so that he could
beidentified
by
prosecution
witnesses.Respondent judge sustained
the position of privaterespondent who
cited the majority opinion in Aquino, Jr.
vs. Military Commission No. 2 and held
that "hecannot be validly compelled to
appear and bepresent during the trial
of this case."- Petitioner prays that the
order of respondent judgebe annulled
and
set
aside
and
that
privaterespondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr.
be compelled toappear during the trial
of the criminal case wheneverrequired
to do so by the trial court.- Private
respondent claims that Sec 19, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution grants him
absolute right toabsent himself from
the trial of the case filed againsthim
despite the condition of his bail bond
that he"will at all times hold himself
amenable to the ordersand processes
of the Court."
ISSUE
WON the judge erred in granting
privaterespondents manifestation to
waive his right to bepresent during
trial

be heard byhimself and counsel, to be

informed of the natureand cause of
the accusation against him, to have
aspeedy, impartial, and public trial, to
meet thewitnesses face to face, and to
have compulsoryprocess to secure the
attendance
of
witnesses
andthe
production of evidence in his behalf.
However,after arraignment, trial may
proceednotwithstanding the absence
of the accusedprovided that he has
been duly notified and hisfailure to
appear is unjustified.- The 1973
Constitution
now
unqualifiedly
permitstrial
in absentia
even of capital offenses, providedthat
after
arraignment
he
may
be
compelled toappear for the purpose of
Identification by thewitnesses of the
prosecution,
or
provided
heunqualifiedly admits in open court
after hisarraignment that he is the
person named as thedefendant in the
case on trial.- The reason for requiring
the presence of theaccused, despite
his waiver, is, if allowed to beabsent in
all the stages of the proceedings
withoutgiving the People's witnesses
the opportunity toIdentify him in court,
he may in his defense say thathe was
never Identified as the person charged
in theinformation and, therefore, is
entitled to an acquittal.- Furthermore,
it is possible that a witness may
notknow the name of the culprit but
can Identify him if he sees him again,
in which case the latter'spresence in
court is necessary.
Dispositive

HELD
YES- Article IV of the 1973
Constitution,
Section
19thereof
provides:SEC. 19. In all criminal
prosecutions, the accusedshall be
presumed innocent until the contrary
isproved, and shall enjoy the right to

petition granted and the assailed

orderof respondent judge is ANNULLED
and SET ASID

RIGHT
TO
SPEEDY,
IMPARTIAL, AND
PUBLIC TRIAL
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee, vs. MODESTO
TEE a.k.a. ESTOY TEE, accusedappellant.

Facts
The case involves an automatic review
of judgment made against Tee who
was convicted for illegal possession of
marijuana and sentenced to death.
The defense assailed the decision of
the court for taking admissible as
evidence the marijuana seized from
the accused by virtue of allegedly
general search warrant. They further
contend that the accused was
deprived of his right to speedy trial by
failure of the prosecution to produce
their witness who failed to appear
during the 20 hearing dates thereby
slowing down the trial procedure.

Issue
Whether or not the substantive right
of the accused for a speedy trial
prejudiced during the hearing of the
case.

Held
The court ruled that the substantive
right of the accused for a fair and
speedy trial was not violated. It held
that the Speedy Trial Act of 1998
provides that the trial period for the

criminal cases should be in general

180 days. However, in determining the
right of an accused to speedy trial,
courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the
number of postponements of the
scheduled hearings of the case.The
right to a speedy trial is deemed
violated
only
when:
(1)
the
proceedings
are
attended
by
vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays; or (2) when unjustified
postponements are asked for and
secured; or (3) when without cause or
justifiable motive a long period of time
is allowed to elapse without the party
having his case tried.

It was shown by the records that the

prosecution
exerted
efforts
in
obtaining a warrant to compel the
witness to testify. The concept of
speedy trial is necessarily relative
where several factors are weighed
such as the length of time of delay,
the reason of such delay, and conduct
of prosecution and the accused and
the prejudice and damaged caused to
the accused of such delay. The court
did not find the 20 days of delayed
hearing unreasonable length of time
as to constitute deprivation of the
constitutional rights of the accused for
a speedy trial in addition to the fact
that court trial may be always
subjected
to
postponement
for
reasonable cause of delay. In the
absence of showing that the reason for
delay was capricious or oppressive,
the State must not be deprived of
reasonable opportunity in prosecuting
the accused.

CASE NO. 7 A.M. No. 01-4-03-S.C.

June 29, 2001 SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE
HERNANDO
PEREZ,
KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER
NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO,
RENATO CAYETANO and ATTY.
RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners, vs.
JOSEPH
E.
ESTRADA
and
INTEGRATED
BAR
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositors.
RE: REQUEST RADIO-TV COVERAGE
OF
THE
TRIAL
OF
IN
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN
OF
THE
PLUNDER CASES AGAINST THE
FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E.
ESTRADA.
PONENTE:
JUSTICE
VITUG
FACTS:
The travails of a deposed President
continue. The Sandiganbayan reels to
start hearing the criminal charges
against Mr. Joseph E. Estrada. Media
seeks to cover the event via live
television and live radio broadcast and
endeavors this Court to allow it that
kind of access to the proceedings. On
13 March 2001, the Kapisanan ng mga
BroadKaster ng Pilipinas (KBP), an
association
representing
duly
franchised and authorized television
and radio networks throughout the
country, sent a letter requesting this
Court to allow live media coverage of
the anticipated trial of the plunder and
other criminal cases filed against
former President Joseph E. Estrada
before the Sandiganbayan in order "to
assure the public of full transparency
in
the
proceedings
of
an
unprecedented case in our history."
The request was seconded by Mr.
Cesar N. Sarino in his letter of 05 April
2001 to the Chief Justice and, still
later, by Senator Renato Cayetano and
Attorney Ricardo Romulo. On 17 April
2001, the Honorable Secretary of
Justice Hernando Perez formally filed
the instant petition,3 submitting the

following exegesis: "The foregoing

criminal cases involve the previous
acts of the former highest official of
the land, members of his family, his
cohorts and, therefore, it cannot be
over emphasized that the prosecution
thereof, definitely involves a matter of
public concern and interest, or a
matter over which the entire citizenry
has the right to know, be informed and
made aware of. "There is no
gainsaying that the constitutional right
of the people to be informed on
matters of public concern, as in the
instant cases, can best be recognized,
served and satisfied by allowing the
live radio and television coverage of
the concomitant court proceedings.
"Moreover,
the
live
radio
and
television coverage of the proceedings
will also serve the dual purpose of
ensuring the desired transparency in
the administration of justice in order to
disabuse the minds of the supporters
of the past regime of any and all
unfounded notions, or ill-perceived
attempts on the part of the present
dispensation, to railroad the instant
criminal cases against the Former
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada."
Public interest, the petition further
averred, should be evident bearing in
mind the right of the public to vital
information affecting the nation.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not to grant the

request for Radio-TV coverage of the
trial of in the Sandiganbayan of the
plunder cases against the former
president Joseph E. Estrada.

RULING: DENIED.
HELD: The Supreme Court ruled that
the
constitutional
guarantees
of
freedom of the press and the right to
public
information
outweigh
the
fundamental rights of the accused

along with the constitutional power of

a court to control its proceedings in
ensuring a fair and impartial trial.
Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure forbids the taking
of photographs during the progress of
judicial
proceedings
or
radio
broadcasting of such proceedings from
the courtroom. A trial of any kind or in
any court is a matter of serious
importance to all concerned and
should not be treated as a means of
entertainment. To so treat it DEPRIVES
THE COURT OF THE DIGNITY which
pertains to it and departs from the
orderly and serious quest for truth for
which our judicial proceedings are
formulated. With the possibility of
losing not only the precious liberty but
also the very life of an accused, it
behooves all to make absolutely
certain that an accused receives a
verdict solely on the basis of a just
and dispassionate judgment, a verdict
that would come only after the
presentation of credible evidence
testified to by unbiased witnesses
unswayed by any kind of pressure,
whether
open
or
subtle,
in
proceedings that are devoid of
histrionics that might detract from its
basic aim to ferret veritable facts free
from improper influence,8 and decreed
by a judge with an unprejudiced mind,
unbridled by running emotions or
passions. An accused has a RIGHT TO
A PUBLIC TRIAL BUT IT IS A RIGHT
THAT BELONGS TO HIM, more than
anyone else, where his life or liberty
can be held critically in balance. A
public trial aims to ensure that he is
fairly dealt with and would not be
unjustly condemned and that his
rights are not compromised in secrete
conclaves of long ago. A public trial is
not synonymous with publicized trial;
it only implies that the court doors
must be open to those who wish to
come, sit in the available seats,
conduct themselves with decorum and

observe the trial process. In the

constitutional sense, a courtroom
should have enough facilities for a
reasonable number of the public to
observe the proceedings, not too small
as to render the openness negligible
and not too large as to distract the
trial participants from their proper
functions, who shall then be totally
free to report what they have
observed during the proceedings.

AURELIA CONDE, petitioner,

vs.
PABLO RIVERA, acting provincial
fiscal of Tayabas, and
FEDERICO M. UNSON, justice of
the peace of Lucena, Tayabas,
respondents.

Aurelia Conde, formerly a municipal

midwife in Lucena, Tayabas, has been
forced to respond to no less than five
informations for various crimes and
misdemeanors, has appeared with her
witnesses and counsel at hearings no
less than on eight different occasions
only to see the cause postponed, has
twice been required to come to the
Supreme Court for protection, and
now, after the passage of more than

one year from the time when the first

information was filed, seems as far
away from a definite resolution of her
troubles as she was when originally
charged.

Philippine organic and statutory law

expressly guarantee that in all criminal
prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right to have a speedy trial.
Aurelia Conde, like all other accused
persons, has a right to a speedy trial
in order that if innocent she may go
free, and she has been deprived of
that right in defiance of law. Dismissed
from her humble position, and
compelled to dance attendance on
courts while investigations and trials
are arbitrarily postponed without her
consent, is palpably and openly unjust
to her and a detriment to the public.
By the use of reasonable diligence, the
prosecution could have settled upon
the appropriate information, could
have
attended
to
the
formal
preliminary examination, and could
have prepared the case for a trial free
from
vexatious,
capricious,
and
oppressive delays.

Once before, as intimidated, the

petitioner had to come to us for
redress of her grievances. We thought
then we had pointed out the way for
the parties. But it seems not. Once
again therefore and finally, we hope,
we propose to do all in our power to
assist this poor woman to obtain
justice. On the one hand has been the
petitioner, of humble station, without
resources, but fortunately assisted by
a persistent lawyer, while on the other
hand has been the Government of the
Philippine Islands which should be the
last to set an example of delay and
oppression in the administration of
justice. The Court is thus under a
moral and legal obligation to see that

these proceedings come to an end and

that the accused is discharged from
the custody of the law.

We lay down the legal proposition

that, where a prosecuting officer,
without
good
cause,
secures
postponements of the trial of a
defendant against his protest beyond
a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the
accused is entitled to relief by a
proceeding in mandamus to compel a
dismissal of the information, or if he
be restrained of his liberty, by habeas
corpus to obtain his freedom. (16 C.J.,
439 et seq.; In the matter of Ford
[1911], 160 Cal., 334; U.S. vs. Fox
[1880], 3 Montana, 512. See further
our previous decision in Conde vs.
Judge of First Instance, Fourteenth
Judicial District, and the Provincial
Fiscal of Tayabas, No. 21236.1

The writ prayed for shall issue and the

Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall
abstain from further attempts to
prosecute the accused pursuant to
informations growing out of the facts
set forth in previous informations, and
the charges now pending before the
justice of the peace of Lucena,
Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with
cost against the respondent fiscal. We
append to our order the observation
that, without doubt, the AttorneyGeneral, being fully cognizant of the
facts of record, will take such
administrative action as to him seems
proper to the end that incidents of this
character may not recur. So ordered.

RIGHT
OF
CONFRONTATION
THE UNITED
appellee,

STATES,

plaintiff-

vs.
LAZARO
JAVIER,
ET
defendants-appellants.

AL.,

Facts:

Doroteo Natividad on the afternoon

1915, fastened his carabao valued at
P150 in his corral situated in
Batangas. On the following morning
when he went to look after the animal,
he found the gate to the corral open
and that the carabao had disappeared.
He reported the matter to the
Constabulary, and a patrol of the
Constabulary under the leadership of
sergeant
Presa,
now
deceased,
encountered the accused Lazaro
Javier,
Apolinario
Mendoza,
and
Placido de Chavez leading the
carabao. When the ladrones saw the
Constabulary, that scattered in all
directions.
On the following day, the Constabulary
found this carabao tied in front of the
house of one Pedro Monterola in the
barrio of Santa Clara, municipality of
San Pablo. The carabao was identified
by Doroteo Natividad as the one which
had been taken from his corral on the
night of October 22, 1915, and by the
Constabulary as the one seen in the
possession of the accused.

As corroborative of such evidence, we

have the well-known legal principle,
which as applied to cases of this
character is that, although the persons

who unlawfully took a certain carabao

are not recognized at the time, and
their
identity
remains
entirely
unknown, nevertheless, if the stolen
animal is found in the possession of
the
accused
shortly
after
the
commission of the crime and they
make no satisfactory explanation of
such possession they may be properly
convicted of the crime. In the present
instance, the attempt of the accused
to
insinuate
that
one
of
the
Constabulary soldiers testified against
them falsely because of enmity is
hardly believable.

What is wrong is exhibit B or the sworn

statement of sergeant Presa who was
deceased. The lower court erred in
admitting Exhibit B of the prosecution
as evidence. Exhibit B is the sworn
statement of sergeant Presa, now
deceased, WHOSE SIGNATURE was
identified, before the justice of the
peace.
Accused's
argument
is
predicated on the provision of the
Philippine Bill of Rights which says,
"That in all criminal prosecutions the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to
meet the witnesses face to face," and
the provision of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, section 15 (5), which says
that "In all criminal prosecutions the
defendant shall be entitled: . . . to be
confronted at the trial by and to crossexamine the witnesses against him."
With reference to the clause of the Bill
of Rights, which we have quoted,
Justice Day said in a case of the
Philippine origin (Dowdell vs. U. S.
[1911], 221 U. S., 325) that it "intends
to secure the accused in the right to
be tried, so far as facts provable by
witnesses are concerned, by only such
witnesses as meet him face to face at
the trial, who give their testimony in
his presence, and give to the accused
an opportunity of cross-examination.

RATIO: 1) It was intended to prevent

the conviction of the accused upon
deposition or ex parte affidavits, and
particularly to preserve the right of the
accused to test the recollection of the
witness in the exercise of the right of
cross-examination."
In other words, confrontation is
essential because cross-examination is
essential.
2) The tribunal may have before it the
department and appearance of the
witness while testifying. It is for us
now to determine whether the present
facts entitle the accused to the
protection of the Bill of Rights or
whether the facts fall under some
exception thereto.

ISSUE: Is
applicable?

right

of

confrontation

Although we are faced with the

alternative of being unable to utilize
the statements of the witness now
deceased, yet if there has been no
opportunity for cross-examination and
the case is not one coming within one
of the exceptions, the mere necessity
alone accepting the statement will not
suffice. In fine, Exhibit B was
improperly received in evidence in the
lower court.

With such a resolution of this question,

we could, as has been done in other
cases, further find this to be reversible
error and REMAND the case for a NEW
trial. We are convinced, however, that
this would gain the accused nothing
except delay for the testimony of the
owner of the carabao and of the two
Constabulary soldiers, rebutted by no
reasonable evidence on behalf of the
accused, is deemed sufficient to prove
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

HELD:
No.
The sworn statement of Presa was not
made by question and answer under
circumstances which gave the defense
an opportunity to cross-examine the
witness. The proviso of the Code of
Criminal Procedure as to confrontation
is therefore inapplicable. Presa's
statement again NOT THE TESTIMONY
of a WITNESS DECEASED, given in a
former action between the same
parties relating to the same matter.
Consequently, the exception provided
by section 298, No. 8, of the Code of
Civil Procedure and relied upon by the
prosecution in the lower court is also
inapplicable. NOR is the statement of
Presa A DYING DECLARATION or a
deposition in a former trial or shown to
be a part of the preliminary
examination.

The facts come under article 518, No.

3, in connection with article 520, as
amended,
of
the
Penal
Code.
Accordingly
the
defendants
and
appellants are each sentenced to four
years, two months, and one day of
presidio
correccional,
with
the
accessory penalties provided by law,
and to pay one-third part of costs of
both instances; the carabao shall be
returned to Doroteo Natividad, if this
has not already been done. So
ordered.

AGUSTIN V. TALINO, petitioner,

violates his right of confrontation as

guaranteed by the Constitution.

vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

THE

FACTS:

The petitioner, along with several

others, were charged in four separate
informations with ESTADA THROUGH
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
for having allegedly conspired to
defraud the government in the total
amount of P26,523.00, representing
the cost of repairs claimed to have
been undertaken, but actually not
needed and never made, on four
government
vehicles,
through
falsification of the supporting papers
to authorize the illegal payments.
These cases were tried jointly for all
the accused until after the prosecution
had rested, when Genaro Basilio,
Alejandro
Macadangdang
and
petitioner Talino asked for separate
trials, which were allowed.
They then presented their evidence at
such trials, while the other accused
continued defending themselves in the
original proceedings, at which one of
them, Pio Ulat gave damaging
testimony against the petitioner,
relating in detail his participation in
the questioned transactions.
In due time, the Sandiganbayan
rendered its decision in all the four
cases
finding
Talino,
Basilio,
Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes charged while absolving the
other defendants for insufficient
evidence.
This decision is now challenged by the
petitioner on the ground that it

In its decision, "the respondent court

said that it allowed separate trials for
the accused Basilio and Talino and
Macadangdang. This being the case,
the court can only consider, in
deciding these cases as against them,
the evidence for the, prosecution as
wen as their own evidence. Evidence
offered by the other accused CANNOT
BE TAKEN UP.

It would really have been simpler had

there been no separate trial because
the accused Pio B. Ulat said so many
incriminatory things against the other
accused when he took the stand in his
own defense. But because Basilio,
Talino
and
Macadangdang
were
granted separate trials and they did
not cross examine Ulat because, as a
matter of fact, they were not even
required to be present when the other
accused
were
presenting
their
defenses, the latter's testimonies can
not now be considered against said
three accused.

We cannot understand why, after it

had heard the long and sordid story
related by Ulat on the stand, the
prosecution did not endeavor to call
Ulat and put him on he stand as part f
its rebuttal evidence. Had this been
done, there would have been no
impediment to the consideration of
Ulat's testimony against all the
accused."

The grant of a separate trial rests in

the sound discretion of the court and
is not a matter of right to the accused,
especially where, as in this case, it is

sought after the presentation of the

evidence of the prosecution.

While it is true that Rule 119, Section

8, of the Rules of Court does not
specify when the motion for such a
trial should be filed, we have held in
several cases that this should be done
before the prosecution commences
presenting its evidence, although, as
an exception, the motion may be
granted
later,
even
after
the
prosecution shall have rested, where
there appears to be an antagonism in
the respective defenses of the
accused. 7 In such an event, the
evidence in chief of the prosecution
shall remain on record against an the
accused, with right of rebuttal on the
part of the fiscal in the separate trial
of the other accused. 8

The rule in every case is that the trial

court should exercise the utmost
circumspection in granting a motion
for separate trial, allowing the same
only after a thorough study of the
claimed justification therefor, if only to
avoid the serious difficulties that may
arise, such as the one encountered
and regretted by the respondent court,
in according the accused the right of
confrontation.

The right of confrontation is one of the

fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution 9 to the person facing
criminal prosecution who should know,
in fairness, who his accusers are and
must be given a chance to crossexamine them on their charges. No
accusation is permitted to be made
against his back or in his absence nor
is
any
derogatory
information
accepted if it is made anonymously, as
in poison pen letters sent by persons

who cannot stand by their libels and

must shroud their spite in secrecy.
That is also the reason why ex parte
affidavits are not permitted unless the
affiant is presented in court 10 and
hearsay is barred save only in the
cases allowed by the Rules of Court,
like the dying declaration. 11

We have carefully studied the decision

under challenge and find that the
respondent court did not consider the
testimony given by Ulat in convicting
the petitioner. The part of that
decision finding Talino guilty made no
mention of Ulat at all but confined
itself to the petitioner's own acts in
approving the questioned vouchers as
proof of his complicity in the plot to
swindle the government. Thus:

If, as claimed, by Macadangdang, he

had no knowledge nor participation in
the conspiracy to defraud, he would
have
questioned
this
obvious
irregularity. He would have asked
whoever was following up the
vouchers why two biddings were
conducted, why the awards to "D"
Alfenor' were cancelled, when the
latter were cancelled, and when the
new bidding was made.

The very same case is true as regards

the accused Agustin Talino. While his
duty to initial or sign the vouchers as
regards the adequacy of funds may
have been ministerial, his failure to
observe the obvious irregularity is
clear evidence of his complicity in the
conspiracy.

Talino declared that in the morning of

May
23,
1980,
four
vouchers

(including three made out in favor of

"D" Alfenor Repair Shop') were brought
to him for his certificate as regards the
availability of funds. He had signed all
the four vouchers. In the afternoon of
the same day, three other vouchers
were also presented to him for
certification as to funds these three
were in substitution of Exhibits "A",
"B" and "C" which he had earlier
signed but which, according to Talino,
were disallowed and cancelled, Talino
claims that he had examined the
supporting documents of the last three
vouchers the RIV, the bids signed by
the repair shops and the abstract of
bids. If what Talino says is true, at
least the abstract of bids submitted in
the morning, where "D" Alfenor Motor
Shop' appears to be the lowest bidder,
must have been different from the
ones
submitted
together
with
vouchers in the afternoon. This would
have raised his suspicions as to why
these last three abstracts could be
dated as they were (May 18, May 15
and May 11, respectively) when it was
only that morning that the abstracts
containing the name of "D"; Alfenor
Motor Shop' were submitted. The fact
that
he
readily
approved
the
substitute
vouchers
with
the
substitute winning bidders is a clear
indication that he knew he was
facilitating an irregular transaction.

It is our view that the evidence on

record has established beyond doubt
the participation of both Agustin Talino
and Alejandro Macadangdang in all the
four
felonies
charged
in
the
informations. 13

The petitioner makes much of the

statement in the Comment that the
petitioner's guilt could be deduced
"from the evidence for the prosecution
and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," 14

but that was not the respondent court

speaking. That was the Solicitor
General's analysis. As far as the
Sandiganbayan was concerned, the
said testimony was inadmissible
against the petitioner because he "did
not cross examine Ulat and was not
even required to be present when the
latter was testifying. In fact, the
respondent court even expressed the
wish that Ulat had been presented as
rebuttal witness in the separate trial of
the petitioner as there would then
have been "no impediment to the use
of his testimony against the other
accused. " As it was not done, the trial
court could not and did not consider
Ulat's testimony in determining the
petitioner's part in the offenses.

The factual findings of the respondent

court being supported by substantial
evidence other than Ulat's testimony,
we see no reason to disturb them. It is
futile for the petitioner to invoke his
constitutional
presumption
of
innocence because his guilt has in the
view of the trial court been established
beyond reasonable doubt, and we
agree.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed

from is AFFIRMED, with costs against
the petitioner.

PROHIBITED
PUNISHMENT

Issue: Is confinement from 5 to 10

years cruel?

PEOPLE OF THE
plaintiff-appellee,

HELD:

PHILIPPINES,

No. EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER,

reasonable
within
the
rampant
circumstances.

vs.
ALBERTO ESTOISTA,
appellant.

defendant-

FACTS:

The firearms with which the accused

was charged with having in his
possession was a rifle and belonged to
his father, Bruno Estoista, who held a
legal permit for it. Father and son lived
in the same house, a little distance
from a 27-hectare estate belonging to
the family which was partly covered
with cogon grass, tall weeds and
second growth trees. From a spot in
the plantation 100 to 120 meters from
the house, the accused took a shot at
a WILD ROOSTER and hit DIRAGON
DIMA a laborer of the family who was
setting a trap for wild chicken and
whose presence was not perceived by
the accused.

Bruno Estoista said that his son told

him that there were wild chickens on
the plantation "scratching palay and
corn" plants and asked if he might
shoot them. Bruno told his son
(ACCUSED) to wait, got the rifle from
the house or locker, handed it over to
Alberto who is a "sharp-shooter" and
"shoots better," and walked about 20
meters behind the young man. Bruno
was that far from Alberto when the
latter fired and accidentally wounded
their servant.

It is our opinion that confinement from

5 to 10 years for possessing of
carrying firearm is not cruel or
unusual, having due regard to the
PREVALENT CONDITIONS which the
law proposes to suppress or curb. The
rampant lawlessness against property,
person, and even the very security of
the Government, directly traceable in
large
measure
to
promiscuous
carrying and use of powerful weapons,
justify imprisonment which in normal
circumstances
might
appear
excessive. If imprisonment from 5 to
10 years is out of proportion to the
present case in view of certain
circumstances, the law is not to be
declared unconstitutional for this
reason. The constitutionality of an act
of the legislature is not to be judged in
the light of exceptional cases. Small
transgressors for which the heavy net
was not spread are like small fishes,
bound to be caught, and it is to meet
such a situation as this that courts are
advised to make a recommendation to
the Chief Executive for clemency or
reduction of the penalty.

The sentence imposed by the lower

court is much below the penalty
authorized by Republic Act No. 4. The
judgment is therefore modified so as
to
sentence
the
accused
to
IMPRISONMENT OF 5 YEARS. However,
considering the degree of malice of
the defendant, application of the law
to its full extent would be too harsh
and, accordingly, it is ordered that

copy of this decision be furnished to

the President, thru the Secretary of
Justice, with the recommendation that
the imprisonment herein imposed be
reduced to six months. the appellant
will pay the costs of both instances.
The motion for
therefore denied.

reconsideration

is

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOSEFINA A.
ESPARAS and RODRIGO O. LIBED,
accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Accused Josefina A. Esparas was

charged with violation of R.A. No. 6425
for importing into the country twenty
(20) kilograms of "shabu" in Criminal
Case No. 94-5897.

After
arraignment,
the
accused
escaped from jail and was tried IN
ABSENTIA. On March 13, 1995, the
trial court found her guilty as charged
and
imposed on her the DEATH
PENALTY.

The accused remains at large up

(naka-wala) to the present time.

ISSUE: Should the court proceed

automatically to review her death
sentence?

We hold, however, that there is more

wisdom in our existing jurisprudence
mandating our review of all death
penalty cases, regardless of the wish
of the convict and regardless of the
will of the Court. Nothing less than life
is at stake and any court decision
authorizing the State to take life must
be as error-free as possible. We must
strive to realize this objective,
however elusive it may be, and our
efforts must not depend on whether
appellant has withdrawn his appeal or
has escaped. Indeed, an appellant
may withdraw his appeal not because
he is guilty but because of his wrong
perception of the law. Or because he
may want to avail of the more speedy
remedy of pardon. Or because of his
frustration and misapprehension that
he will not get justice from the
authorities. Nor should the Court be
influenced by the seeming repudiation
of its jurisdiction when a convict
escapes. Ours is not only the power
but the duty to review all death
penalty cases.
No litigant can
repudiate
this
power
which
is
bestowed by the Constitution. The
power is more of a sacred duty which
we have to discharge to assure the
People that the innocence of a citizen
is our concern not only in crimes that
slight but even more, in crimes that
shock the conscience. This concern
cannot be diluted.

HELD:

YES.

The State should not be given the

license to kill without the final
determination of this Highest Tribunal
whose collective wisdom is the last,
effective hedge against an erroneous
judgment of a one-judge trial court.

History of Death Penalty in Philippines

1910 U.S.v. Laguna: The power of this

Court to review a decision imposing
the death penalty cannot be waived
either by the accused or by the courts.

The 1935 Constitution: did not prohibit

the imposition of the death penalty.
Its section 2(4) of Article VIII provided
for review by this Court of death
penalty cases.

1953 People vs. Villanueva: The

withdrawal of an appeal by a death
convict does not deprive this Court of
its jurisdiction to review his conviction

The 1971 People vs. Cornelio: involves

the escape of a death convict; The
escape of a death convict does not
relieve this Court of its duty of
reviewing his conviction.

1973 Constitution: which likewise did

not prohibit the death penalty. Section
9, Rule 122 continued to provide the
procedure for review of death penalty
cases by this Court. Section 10, Rule
122 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure
even
reenacted
this
procedure of review. Significantly, it
expressly used the term "automatic
review and judgment" by this Court.

1987
Constitution:
prohibits
the
imposition of the death penalty unless
for compelling reasons involving
heinous crimes Congress so provides.

December
13,
1993:
Congress
reimposed the death penalty in cases
involving the commission of heinous
crimes. This revived the procedure by
which this Court reviews death penalty
cases pursuant to the Rules of Court.
It remains automatic and does not
depend on the whims of the death
convict. It continues to be mandatory,
and leaves this Court without any
option.

The Court is not espousing a "soft,

bended, approach" to heinous crimes
for as discussed above, we have
always reviewed the imposition of the
death penalty regardless of the will of
the convict. Our unyielding stance is
dictated by the policy that the State
should not be given the license to kill
without the final determination of this
Highest Tribunal whose collective
wisdom is the last, effective hedge
against an erroneous judgment of a
one-judge trial court. This enlightened
policy ought to continue as our beacon
light for the taking of life ends all
rights, a matter of societal value that
transcends the personal interest of a
convict.
The importance of this
societal value should not be blurred by
the escape of a convict which is a
problem of law enforcement. Neither
should this Court be moved alone by
the outrage of the public for the rise in
statistics of heinous crimes for our
decisions should not be directed by
the changing winds of the social
weather. Let us not for a moment
forget that an accused does not cease
to have rights just because of his
conviction. This principle is implicit in
our Constitution which recognizes that
an accused, to be right, while the
majority, even if overwhelming, has
no right to be wrong.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the counsel for

the accused is given a new period of
thirty (30) days from notice hereof
within which to file the Brief of the
accused Josefina A. Esparas.

LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,

vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,
respondents.

RULING
ON
RIGHT
PROHIBITED PUNISHMENTS

AGAINST

Issues: Whether or not

(1) the stay order. . . is within the
scope of judicial power
(2) the exercise by this Court of its
power
to
stay
execution
was
reasonable;
(3) the Court did not lose jurisdiction
to address incidental matters involved
or arising from the petition;
(4) the Congress
capital punishment

can

review

the

HELD:
1) Yes. The power to control the
execution of its decision is an essential
aspect of jurisdiction. It cannot be the
subject of substantial subtraction for
our Constitution vests the entirety of
judicial power in one Supreme Court
and in such lower courts as may be
established by law. The important part
of a litigation, whether civil or
criminal, is the process of execution of
decisions where supervening events
may change the circumstance of the
parties and compel courts to intervene
and adjust the rights of the litigants to
prevent unfairness. It is because of
these
unforseen,
supervening
contingencies that courts have been
conceded the inherent and necessary
power of control of its processes and
orders to make them conformable to
law and justice.

2) The suspension of such a death

sentence is undisputably an exercise
of judicial power. It is not a usurpation
of the presidential power of reprieve
though its effects is the same the
temporary suspension of the execution
of the death convict. In the same vein,
it cannot be denied that Congress can
at any time amend R.A. No. 7659 by
reducing the penalty of death to life
imprisonment. The effect of such an
amendment
is
like
that
of
commutation of sentence. But by no
stretch of the imagination can the
exercise by Congress of its plenary
power to amend laws be considered as
a violation of the power of the
President to commute final sentences
of conviction. The powers of the
Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death
convict do not exclude each other for
the simple reason that there is no
higher right than the right to life.

3) the Court's majority did not rush to

judgment but took an extremely
cautious
stance
by
temporarily
restraining the execution of petitioner.
The suspension was temporary
"until June 15, 1999, coeval with the
constitutional duration of the present
regular session of Congress, unless it
sooner becomes certain that no repeal
or modification of the law is going to
be made." The extreme caution taken
by the Court was compelled, among
others, by the fear that any error of
the Court in not stopping the
execution of the petitioner will
preclude any further relief for all rights
stop at the graveyard. As life was at,
stake,
the
Court
refused
to
constitutionalize
haste
and
the
hysteria of some partisans. The
Court's majority felt it needed the
certainty that the legislature will not

petitioner as alleged by his counsel. It

was believed that law and equitable
considerations demand no less before
allowing the State to take the life of
one its citizens.

4.) The temporary restraining order of

this Court has produced its desired
result, i.e., the crystallization of the
issue whether Congress is disposed to
review capital punishment. The public
respondents,
thru
the
Solicitor
General, cite posterior events that
negate beyond doubt the possibility
that Congress will repeal or amend the
death penalty law. He names these
supervening events as follows:

xxx

xxx

xxx

RIGHT
AGAINST
SELFINCRIMINATION
THE UNITED
appellee,

The
public
pronouncement
of
President Estrada that he will veto any
law imposing the death penalty
involving heinous crimes.

vs.

The resolution of Congressman Golez,

et al., that they are against the repeal
of the law;

FACTS:

The fact that Senator Roco's resolution

to repeal the law only bears his
signature
and
that
of
Senator
Pimentel.

STATES,

plaintiff-

TAN TENG, defendant-appellant.

Tan Teng was charged with the crime

of rape of a certain Oliva Pacomio, a
girl 7 years of age.

Oliva Pacomio, a girl seven years of

age, was, in 1910, staying in the
house of her sister, in Manila. A
number of Chinamen were gambling
and had been in the habit of visiting
the house of the sister of the offended
party
Oliva Pacomio, after having taken a
bath, returned to her room and Tan
Tengfollowed her into her room and
asked her for some face powder,
which she gave him

After using some of the face powder

upon his private parts he threw the
said Oliva upon the floor, placing his
private parts upon hers, and remained
in that position for some little time.
Several days later, perhaps a week or
two, the sister of Oliva Pacomio
discovered that the latter was
suffering from a venereal disease
known as gonorrhea.
It was at the time of this discovery
that Oliva related to her sister that she
was raped.
The sister at once put on foot an
investigation to find the Chinaman. A
number of Chinamen were collected
together. Oliva was called upon to
identify the one who had abused her.
The defendant was not present at first.
later he arrived and Oliva identified
him at once as the one who had
attempted to violate her.

Upon this information the defendant

was arrested and taken to the police
station and stripped of his clothing
and examined. The policeman who
examined the defendant swore from
the venereal disease known as
gonorrhea
(human
sexually
transmitted
infection;
The
usual
symptoms in men are burning with
urination
and
penile
discharge.
Women, on the other hand, are
asymptomatic half the time or have
vaginal discharge and pelvic pain.).
The policeman took a portion of the
substance emitting from the body of
the defendant and turned it over to
the Bureau of Science for the purpose
of having a scientific analysis made of
the
same.
The
result
of
the
examination
showed
that
the
defendant
was
suffering
from
gonorrhea.

After hearing the evidence, the

Honorable Lobingier, judge, found the
defendant guilty of the offense of
abusos deshonestos, as defined and
punished under article 439 of the
Penal Code, and sentenced him to be
imprisoned for a period of 4 years 6
months and 11 days of prision
correccional, and to pay the costs.

From that sentence, Tan Teng the

defendant appealed and said it was
wrong for the court to admit the
testimony of the physicians about
having taken a certain substance from
the body of the accused while he was
confined in jail and regarding the
chemical analysis made of the
substance to demonstrate the physical
condition
of
the
accused
with
reference to a venereal disease.

The offended party testified that the

defendant had rested his private parts
upon hers for some moments. The
defendant was found to be suffering
from gonorrhea. The medical experts
who testified agreed that this disease
could have been communicated from
him to her by the contact described.
Believing as we do the story told by
Oliva, we are forced to the conclusion
that the disease with which Oliva was
suffering was the result of the illegal
and brutal conduct of the defendant.
Proof, however, that Oliva constructed
said obnoxious disease from the
defendant is not necessary to show
that he is guilty of the crime. It is only
corroborative of the truth of Oliva's
declaration.

RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION

INVOKED: In the court below the
defendant contended that the result of

the scientific examination made by the

Bureau of Science of the substance
taken from his body, at or about the
time he was arrested, was not
admissible in evidence as proof of the
fact that he was suffering from
gonorrhea. That to admit such
evidence was to compel the defendant
to testify against himself.

Judge Lobingier, in discussing that

question in his sentence, said:
The accused was not compelled to
make any admissions or answer any
questions, and the mere fact that an
object found on his person was
examined. The substance was taken
from the body of the defendant
WITHOUT
HIS
OBJECTION,
the
examination was made by competent
medical authority and the result
showed that the defendant was
suffering from said disease.

RATIO/ANALOGY: If he is found with

stolen property upon his person, the
stolen property can be taken for the
purpose of using the same as
evidence against him. So also if the
clothing which he wore, by reason of
blood stains or otherwise, had
furnished evidence of the commission
of a crime, there certainly could have
been no objection to taking such for
the purpose of using the same as
proof.

ISSUE: Can the right against selfincrimination be invoked?

use of physical or moral compulsion,

to extort communications from him,
not AN EXCLUSION OF HIS BODY AS
EVIDENCE, when it may be material.

The prohibition contained in section 5

of the Philippine Bill that a person shall
not be compelled to be a witness
against himself, is simply a prohibition
against legal process to extract from
the defendant's own lips, against his
will, an admission of his guilt.

The main purpose of the provision of

the Philippine Bill is to prohibit
compulsory
oral
examination
of
prisoners before trial. or upon trial, for
the purpose of extorting unwilling
confessions or declarations implicating
them in the commission of a crime.

We believe that the evidence clearly

shows that the defendant was
suffering from the venereal disease, as
above stated, and that through his
brutal conduct said disease was
communicated to Oliva Pacomio. In a
case like the present it is always
difficult to secure positive and direct
proof. Such crimes as the present are
generally proved by circumstantial
evidence. In cases of rape the courts
of law require corroborative proof, for
the reason that such crimes are
generally
committed
in
secret.
Therefore let a judgment be entered
modifying the sentence of the lower
court and sentencing the defendant to
be imprisoned for a period of six years
of prision correccional, and to pay the
costs. So ordered.

HELD:
No. The prohibition of compelling a
man in a criminal court to be a witness
against himself, is a prohibition of the

EMETERIA VILLAFLOR, petitioner,

vs.

RICARDO SUMMERS, sheriff of the

City of Manila, respondent.

FACTS:
In a criminal case pending CFI Manila,
Emeteria Villaflor and Florentino
Souingco are charged with adultery.
The court ordered the defendant
Emeteria Villaflor, nor become the
petitioner herein, to submit her body
to the examination of one or two
competent doctors to determine if SHE
WAS PREGNANT OR NOT. She refused
to obey the order on the ground that
such examination of her person was a
violation of the constitutional provision
relating
to
self-incrimination.
Thereupon she was found in contempt
of court and was ordered to be
committed to Bilibid Prison until she
should
permit
the
medical
examination required by the court.

ISSUE: Can she invoke the right

against self-incrimination?

HELD:

No. Once again we lay down the rule

that the constitutional guaranty, that
no person shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against
himself, is limited to a prohibition
against compulsory testimonial selfincrimination. The corollary to the
proposition
is
that,
an
ocular
inspection of the body of the accused
is permissible.

It is a reasonable presumption that in

an examination by reputable and
disinterested physicians due care will
be taken not to use violence and not

to embarass the patient any more

than is absolutely necessary. Indeed,
no
objection
to
the
physical
examination being made by the family
doctor of the accused or by doctor of
the same sex can be seen.

Although the order of the trial judge,

acceding to the request of the
assistant fiscal for an examination of
the person of the defendant by
physicians was phrased in absolute
terms, it should, nevertheless, be
understood
as
subject
to
the
limitations herein mentioned, and
therefore legal. The writ of habeas
corpus prayed for is hereby denied.
The costs shall be taxed against the
petitioner. So ordered.

ANALOGY: Similar to that of producing

documents or chattels in one's
possession.
BELTRAN VS. SAMSON

Facts:
Beltran, as a defendant for the crime
of Falsification, refused to write a
sample of his handwriting as ordered
by
the
respondent
Judge.
The
petitioner in this case contended that
such order would be a violation of his
constitutional
right
against
selfincrimination
because
such
examination
would
give
the
prosecution evidence against him,
which the latter should have gotten in
the first place. He also argued that
such an act will make him furnish
evidence against himself.

Issue: Can he invoke his right against

self-incrimination?

Held:
Yes.
He
cannot
be
compelled
absolutely and forever to take down
dictation in his handwriting for the
purpose of submitting the latter for
comparison. Writing is something
more than moving the body, or the
hands, or the fingers; writing is not a
purely mechanical act, because it
requires
THE
APPLICATION
OF
INTELLIGNCE AND ATTENTION; and in
the case at bar writing means that the
petitioner herein is to furnish a means
to determine whether or not he is the
falsifier, as the petition of the
respondent fiscal clearly states.

There is a similarity between one who

is compelled to produce a document,
and one who is compelled to furnish a
specimen of his handwriting, for in
both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself. It
cannot be contended in the present
case that if permission to obtain a
specimen
of
the
petitioner's
handwriting is not granted, the crime
would go unpunished.
Considering the circumstance that the
petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it
should not be a difficult matter for the
fiscal to obtained genuine specimens
of his handwriting. But even supposing
it is impossible to obtain specimen or
specimens without resorting to the
means complained herein, that is no
reason for trampling upon a personal
right guaranteed by the constitution. It
might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the
hand of justice, but such cases are
accidental and do not constitute the
raison d' etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the
protection of innocent persons.

an ordinary witness but only a state

witness. Atty Carbon, counsel for
Chavez, objected to the move of
making Chavez a witness as it will
incriminate himself. Hence, Carbon
was given
a few minutes to
communicate with Chavez before he
can be asked on the stand.
ROGER CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES and THE WARDEN OF
THE
CITY
JAIL
OF
MANILA,
respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioner seeks to be entitled on

habeas corpus, to be freed from
imprisonment upon the ground that in
the trial which resulted in his
conviction
he
was
denied
his
constitutional
right
not
to
be
compelled to testify against himself.
He was convicted of qualified theft of a
motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird
car, Motor No. H9YH-143003, with
Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62
together with its accessories worth
P22,200.00.

Upon arraignment, all the accused,

except the three Does who have not
been identified nor apprehended,
pleaded not guilty. The trial began by
Chavez as being directly examined by
the Fiscal.

During the trial, Chavez was presented

as the first witness by the fiscal. The
fiscal made clear that Chavez was just

Carbon said that Chavez will not

testify as Carbon explained to him of
such consequences. But the Court said
what Chavez will testify doesn't
necessarily incriminate him and that
the prosecution has the right to ask
anybody as a witness including the
accused. The Court adds that the
counsel can object WHEN CHAVEZ IS
TO BE ASKED WITH INCRIMINATING
QUESTIONS, but HE CAN'T OBJECT if
CHAVEZ is called to the witness stand.
Atty Carbon submits. The Court adds
that the court will not defer the taking
of the direct examination of the
witness.

As to Roger Chavez's conviction, the

court had this to say: "Roger Chavez
does not offer any defense. As a
matter of fact, his testimony as
witness for the prosecution establishes
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt."
The trial court branded him "a selfconfessed culprit". The sum of all
these is that the trial court freed all
the accused except Roger Chavez who
was found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of qualified theft.
He was accordingly sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of not
less than ten (10) years, one (1) day,
as minimum and not more than
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months
and one (1) day as maximum,

The
foregoing
sentence
was
promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger
Chavez appealed to the Court of
Appeals.

On 1968, the Court of Appeals

resolved to dismiss the appeal. A
move to reconsider was unavailing.
For, on June 21, 1968, the Court of
Appeals, through a per curiam
resolution, disposed to maintain its
May 14 resolution dismissing the
appeal, directed the City Warden of
Manila where Chavez is confined by
virtue of the warrant of arrest issued
by the Court of Appeals, to turn him
over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons
pending execution of the judgment
below, and ordered remand of the
case to the Quezon City court for
execution of judgment.

ISSUE: Can he invoke his right

against self-incrimination?

HELD:

YES.
Petitioner is a defendant in a criminal
case. He was called by the prosecution
as the first witness in that case to
testify for the People during the first
day of trial thereof. Petitioner objected
and invoked the privilege of selfincrimination. This he broadened by
the clear cut statement that he will not
testify. But petitioner's protestations
were met with the judge's emphatic
statement that it "is the right of the
prosecution to ask anybody to act as
witness on the witness stand including
the accused," and that defense
counsel "could not object to have the
accused called on the witness stand."

Petitioner, as accused, occupies a

different tier of protection from an
ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary
witness may be compelled to take the
witness stand and claim the privilege
as each
question
requiring an
incriminating answer is shot at him,
and accused may altogether refuse to
take the witness stand and refuse to
answer any and all questions.

WHY IS A PERSON CALLED TO A

WITNESS STAND? For, in reality, the
purpose of calling an accused as a
witness for the People WOULD BE TO
INCRIMINATE. The rule positively
intends to avoid and prohibit the
certainly
inhuman
procedure
of
compelling a person "to furnish the
missing evidence necessary for his
conviction." 22 This rule may apply
even to a co-defendant in a joint trial.

And the guide in the interpretation of

the constitutional precept that the
accused shall not be compelled to
furnish evidence against himself "IS
NOT THE PROBABILITY OF EVIDENCE
but IT IS THE CAPABILITY OF ABUSE."
The record discloses that by leading
questions Chavez, the accused, was
made to affirm his statement given to
the NBI agents on July 17, 1963 at
5:00 o'clock in the afternoon.And this
statement detailed the plan and
execution
thereof
by
Sumilang
(Vasquez), Asistio and himself to
deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird
car. And he himself proceeded to
narrate the same anew in open court.
He identified the Thunderbird car
involved in the case.

The decision convicting Roger Chavez

was clearly of the view that the case

for the People was built primarily

around the admissions of Chavez
himself. The trial court described
Chavez as the "star witness for the
prosecution". Indeed, the damaging
facts forged in the decision were
drawn directly from the lips of Chavez
as a prosecution witness and of course
Ricardo Sumilang for the defense.

It cannot be said now that he has

waived his right. He did not volunteer
to take the stand and in his own
defense; he did not offer himself as a
witness; on the contrary, he claimed
the right upon being called to testify. If
petitioner nevertheless answered the
questions inspite of his fear of being
accused of perjury or being put under
contempt, this circumstance cannot be
counted against him. His testimony is
not of his own choice.

HOW WAIVER OF THIS RIGHT CAN BE

MADE? There is therefore no waiver of
the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver
must be certain and unequivocal, and
intelligently,
understandably,
and
willingly made; such waiver following
only where liberty of choice has been
fully accorded. After a claim a witness
cannot properly be held to have
waived his privilege on vague and
uncertain evidence."

ARSENIO PASCUAL, JR., petitionerappellee,

vs.
BOARD OF MEDICAL EXAMINERS,
respondent-appellant, SALVADOR
GATBONTON
and
ENRIQUETA
GATBONTON,

Facts:
Arsenio Pascual, filed on 1965 with CFI
Manila an action for prohibition
preliminary injunction against the
Board of Medical Examiners, now
respondent-appellant.
At
the
initial
hearing
of
an
administrative
case
for
alleged
immorality, counsel for complainants
announced that he would present as
his first witness herein petitioner, who
was
the
respondent
in
such
malpractice charge.
Thereupon, Pascual, through counsel,
an
objection,
relying
on
the
constitutional right to be exempt from
being a witness against himself.
Respondent, the Board of Examiners,
took note of such a plea, at the same
time stating that at the next
scheduled hearing, the petitioner
would be called upon to testify as such
witness

Petitioneralleged that in thus ruling to

compel him to take the witness stand,
the Board of Examiners was guiltyof
grave abuse of discretion for failure to
respect the constitutional right against
self-incrimination, the administrative
proceeding against him, which could
result in forfeiture or loss of a
privilege, being quasi-criminal in
character. With his assertion that he
was entitled to the relief demanded
consisting of perpetually restraining
the respondent Board from compelling
him to testify as witness for his
adversary and his readiness or his
willingness to put a bond, he prayed
for a writ of preliminary injunction and
after a hearing or trial, for a writ of
prohibition.

On February 9, 1965, the lower court

GRANTED the a writ of preliminary
injunction
issue
against
the
respondent Board commanding it to
refrain from hearing or further
proceeding
with
such
an
administrative case.

Respondent Board alleged that the

right against self-incrimination is
available only when a question calling
for an incriminating answer is asked of
a witness.

Salvador Gatbonton and Enriqueta

Gatbonton, the complainants in the
administrative case for malpractice
against petitioner-appellee, likewise
alleged that the right against selfincrimination cannot be availed of in
an administrative hearing.

The lower
petitioner.

court

sided

with

privacy. Thus according to Justice

Douglas: "The Fifth Amendment in its
Self-Incrimination clause enables the
citizen to create a zone of privacy
which government may not force to
surrender to his detriment." So also
with the observation of the late Judge
Frank who spoke of "a right to a
private enclave where he may lead a
private life. That right is the hallmark
of our democracy."
In the light of the above, it could thus
clearly appear that no possible
objection could be legitimately raised
against the correctness of the decision
now on appeal. We hold that in an
administrative hearing against a
medical
practitioner
for
alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of
Medical
Examiners
cannot,
consistently with the self-incrimination
clause, compel the person proceeded
against to take the witness stand
without his consent.

the

Issue: Can the right against selfincrimination be invoked?

Held:
Yes.
The constitutional guarantee protects
as well the right to silence.

It is likewise of interest to note that

while earlier decisions stressed the
principle of humanity on which this
right is predicated, precluding as it
does all resort to force or compulsion,
whether physical or mental, current
judicial opinion places equal emphasis
on its identification with the right to

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower

court of August 2, 1965 is affirmed.
Without pronouncement as to costs.

DOUBLE
JEOPARDY

averred "lewd designs" did not cure

the jurisdictional infirmity.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellant,
vs.WILLY
OBSANIA

The court a quo granted the motion

and ordered dismissal of the action,
ruling that "the failure of the
complaint filed by the offended party
to allege that the acts committed by
the accused were with 'lewd designs'
does not give this Court jurisdiction to
try the case."

Facts:

On 1964, barely a day after the

occurence of the alleged crime,
Erlinda Dollente, a 14-year old victim,
and her parents, filed in the municipal
court of Pangasinan a complaint for
rape with robbery, 1 alleging

That on November 1964, in the

afternoon,
Balungao, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines accused Willy
Obsania, armed with a dagger, is
charged with rape with violence on
the roadside in the ricefields at the
above-mentioned place while she was
alone on her way to barrio

The case was remanded to the Court

of First Instance of Pangasinan for
further proceedings. The assistant
provincial fiscal filed an information for
rape against the accused, embodying
the
allegations
of
the
above
complaint,
with
an
additional
averment that the offense was
committed "with lewd designs".

The accused pleaded not guilty upon

arraignment, and his counsel moved
for the dismissal of the case,
contending that the complaint was
defective for failure to allege "lewd
designs" and that the subsequent
information filed by the fiscal which

From this order, the fiscal brought the

instant appeal.

ISSUEs: 1) Are "lewd designs" an

indispensable element which should
be alleged in the complaint?,
2) Does the present appeal place the
accused in double jeopardy?

HELD:
Both
no.
HENCE
the
prosecution can be done.

second

The accused, based his double

jeopardy defense in People vs. Gilo,
defining "lewd design" is

... an indispensable element of all

crimes against chastity, such as
abduction,
seduction
and
rape,
including acts of lasciviousness ...

NONETHELESS, it is not required to

SPECIFICALLY allege "lewd design" in a
complaint for rape. In a complaint for

rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd

design"
or
"unchaste
motive".
Lascivious intent IS INHERENT in rape
and the unchaste design is manifest in
the very act itself the carnal
knowledge of a woman through force
or intimidation, or when the woman is
deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious, or when the woman is
under twelve years of age.

HENCE, trial judge was wrong in

dismissing the second complaint on
grounds that the complaint was
defective for failure to allege "lewd
design". There was already sufficiency
in form and substance of complaint.

2) No. AS A RULE, the prosecution

cannot appeal in a criminal case if the
defendant would be placed in double
jeopardy.

The REQUISITE IN ISSUE IS THE

(dismissal of case WITHOUT THE
EXPRESS CONSENT OF ACCUSED)

THE FF REQUISITES are present: The

complaint filed with the municipal
court in the case at bar was valid; the
court a quo was a competent tribunal
with jurisdiction to hear the case; the
record shows that the accused
pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
Hence, the only remaining and
decisive question is whether the
dismissal of the case was without the
express consent of the accused.

The dismissal was ordered by the trial

judge upon his motion to dismiss.
HOWEVER, he contends that under the
prevailing jurisprudence, an erroneous
dismissal of a criminal action, even
upon the instigation of the accused in
a motion to quash or dismiss, he can
still raise the
defense of double
jeopardy in A SUBSEQUENT by the
Government OR in a new prosecution
for the same offense. The accused
suggests
that
the
CURRENT
JURISPRUDENCE states that when a
case is dismissed, upon motion of the
accused
personally
or
through
counsel, THE DISMISSAL shall not
constitute AS EXPRESS CONSENT of
the accused (or cannot waive his right
to raise defense of double jeopardy).

BUT THE SC HOLDS THAT THERE WAS

EXPRESS CONSENT OF ACCUSED. The
dismissal was effected not only with
the express consent of the petitioner
but even upon the urging of his
counsel. SC is inclined to uphold the
view of the Solicitor General. The
petitioner and offended party had a
conference in the office of fiscal AND
THE RESULT OF WHICH the offended
party filed a motion to dismiss. The
dismissal order by the court is merely
PROVISIONAL in character; this was
because at first no action was done by
the court on the motion for dismissal
but it was urged by the counsel to
make so.

RULE: Where a criminal case is

dismissed PROVISIONALLY not only
with the express consent of the
accused but even upon the urging of
his counsel, THERE CAN BE NO double
jeopardy.

The application of the sister doctrines

of waiver and estoppel requires two
sine qua non conditions: first, the
dismissal must be sought or induced
by the defendant personally or
through his counsel; and second, such
dismissal must not be on the merits
and must not necessarily amount to
an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at
bar falls squarely within the periphery
of the said doctrines which have been
preserved unimpaired in the corpus of
our jurisprudence.

ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed

from is set aside. This case is hereby
remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings in accordance
with law. No costs.

RAMON S. PAULIN, ANGELA F.

PAULIN
and
JOSE
BACHO,
-versus-

HON. CELSO M. GIMENEZ [In His

Capacity
as Presiding Judge of RTC, Cebu
City, Branch 5],
HON. MAMERTO Y. COLIFLORES [In
His Capacity
as Judge of the MTC of Talisay,
Branch IX, Cebu],
CASTRO BELME and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES,

FACTS:

On 1989, the jeep ridden by private

respondent and Barangay Captain
Mabuyo was overtaken by the Nissan
Patrol ridden by herein petitioners, the
Spouses Dr. Ramon and Angela Paulin,
smothering the former with dust. THe
Bargy Captain then
followed the
Nissan Patrol until it entered the back
gate of Rattan Originals in Cebu.
Later, while the Brgy Captain was
investigating some problems of his
constituents, the petitioners pointed
their guns at the brgy captain while
Jose Bacho acted as back-up. Mabuyo
instructed one of the Barangay Tanods
to call the police block the exit of the
petitioners. Sensing that they were
outnumbered, the spouses put their
guns down and upon the arrival of the
police officers, they were brought to
the police station.

On
the
same
date,
Station
Commander Palcuto filed a complaint
for "grave threats," against the
spouses Paulin and Bacho, herein
petitioners, which was later docketed
as Criminal Case No. 5204. On
November 20, 1989, the station
commander filed a complaint for,
"grave
threats
and
ORAL
DEFAMATION,"
against
private
respondent Mabuyo.

The cases were jointly tried and on

June 13, 1990, the Municipal Trial
Court of Talisay, Cebu [Branch IX],
acting on a motion of the Spouses
Paulin and Jose Bacho, dismissed
Criminal Case against them.

On July 2, 1990, Mabuyo filed a,

"Motion for Reconsideration," of the
said dismissal order which the court
granted in a resolution dated July 3,
1990.

At the hearing of Criminal Case

against Mabuyo on July 5, 1990,
petitioners sought the setting aside of
the July 3, 1990 Resolution in Criminal
Case against them, but the same was
denied in another Resolution.

Not satisfied with the Resolution of

respondent
Judge
Coliflores,
petitioners filed on July 31, 1990 a
petition for "certiorari, with relief for
preliminary
injunction
and
the
issuance of a temporary restraining
order" with the Regional Trial Court of
the Seventh Judicial Regionre-raffled to
another brance in Cebu City presided
over by respondent Judge Gimenez,
who dismissed the petition in a
decision dated December 19, 1991.
BUT THEY DISMISSED THE CASE.

Public respondent is hereby ordered to

proceed with the trial of the two Crim.
Cases

his motion) --> right against double

jeopardy can be invoked (EASIER SAID:
acquittal is not dismissal)

ISSUE: Did the MTC's dismissal of

Criminal Case against petitioners
BARS a reconsideration or reversal of
such dismissal and hence IT would
violate
petitioners'
right
against
double jeopardy?

EXCEPTIONS (where dismissal may be

held to be final, disposing of the case,
once and for all, even if the dismissal
was made on motion of the accused
himself) --> right against double
jeopardy can be invoked: (EASIER
SAID: there is an acquittal even if it is
dismissal upon accused's motion)

HELD:
No. There was no violation of right
against double jeopardy.

Petitioners argues that the June 13,

1990 decision of the Municipal Trial
Court [MTC] is an ACQUITTAL since it
was issued AFTER it had allegedly
considered
the
merits
of
the
prosecution's evidence.

SC: The MTC decision dismissing the

case is not an acquittal from the
charge CONSIDERING that no finding
was made as to the guilt or innocence
of the petitioners.

In the case at bar, the original case

was dismissed without the proper
information having been filed, it
appearing that the proper charge
should have been, "disturbance of
public performance," punishable under
Article 153 of the Revised Penal Code
instead of "grave threats," under
Article 282 of the same penal code.

AS A GENERAL RULE: Dismissal is

HELD TO BE FINAL if made without the
express consent of the accused
(READ: if the dismissal is not made on

[1] Where the dismissal is based on a

DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE filed by the
accused AFTER PROSECUTION has
rested, which has the effect of a
judgment on the merits and operates
as an acquittal.
[2] Where
motion of
DENIAL OF
which is
prosecute.

the dismissal is made on

the accused, because of
HIS RIGHT to a speedy trial
in effect a failure to

BUT IN THIS CASE, THE EXCEPTIONS

WERE NOT SEEN IN the petitioners'
motion to dismiss because when the
MTC
dismissed
the
case
upon
petitioners' motion, the prosecution
STILL HAD TO PRESENT SEVERAL
WITNESSES.

The municipal trial court thus did not

violate the rule on double jeopardy
when it set aside the order of
dismissal for the reception of further
evidence by the prosecution because
it merely corrected its error when it
prematurely terminated and dismissed
the
case
without
giving
the
prosecution the right to complete the
presentation of its evidence.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed

and the decision of the Regional Trial

Court dated December 19, 1991 is

affirmed.
SO ORDERED.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

vs. AURELIO BALISACAN,

FACTS:

On 1965, Aurelio Balisacan was

charged with homicide in the Court of
First Instance of Ilocos Norte. The
information alleged:

That on 1964, in the Municipality of

Nueva Era, province of Ilocos Norte,
Philippines, the herein accused, with
intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault and stab one, Leonicio
Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter
wounds that immediately caused his
death.

To this charge the accused, upon being

arraigned, entered a plea of guilty. In
doing so, he was assisted by counsel.
At his de oficio counsel's petition,
however, HE WAS ALLOWED TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE
MITIGATING
CIRCUMSTANCES.
Thereupon the accused testified that
he stabbed the deceased in selfdefense because the latter was
strangling him. And he further stated
that after the incident he surrendered
himself voluntarily to the police
authorities.

Subsequently, on March 6, 1965, on

the basis of the above-mentioned
testimony of the accused, the court a
quo rendered a decision ACQUITTING
the
accused.
As
stated,
the
prosecution appealed therefrom.

This appeal was first taken to the

Court of Appeals. Appellant filed its
brief on September 9, 1965. No
appellee's brief was filed. After being
submitted
for
decision
without
appellee's brief, the appeal was
certified to SC by the Court of Appeals
on July 14, 1966, as involving
questions purely of law (Sec. 17,
Republic Act 296). And on August 5,
1966, We ordered it docketed herein.

ISSUE: Did this appeal place the

accused in double jeopardy?

HELD:

No. 1) 2nd requisite absent; The plea

was absent at the time the court
rendered
judgment
of
acquittal
because at that time HE VACATED HIS
PLEA. Plea is an essential requisite to
double jeopardy. In the present case,
the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty. Subsequently, however, he
testified, in the course of being
allowed
to
prove
mitigating
circumstances, that he acted in
complete self-defense. Said testimony,
therefore as the court a quo
recognized in its decision had the
effect of VACATING HIS PLEA OF
GUILTY and the court should have
required him to plead a new on the
charge, or at least direct that a new
plea of not guilty be entered for him.
This was not done. It follows that in
effect there having been no standing
plea at the time the court a quo
rendered its judgment of acquittal,
there can be no double jeopardy with
respect to the appeal herein.

2) 4th requisite is absent; AN

ACQUITTAL NOT OBSERVING DUE

PROCESS IS NO ACQUITTAL AT ALL.

The court decided the case upon the
merits
WITHOUT
giving
the
prosecution any opportunity to present
its evidence or even to rebut the
testimony of the defendant. In doing
so, it clearly ACTED WITHOUT DUE
PROCESS OF LAW. And for lack of this
fundamental prerequisite, its action is
perforce null and void. The acquittal,
therefore, being a nullity for want of
due process, is no acquittal at all, and
thus can not constitute a proper basis
for a claim of former jeopardy.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed

from is hereby set aside and this case
is remanded to the court a quo for
further proceedings under another
judge of said court, that is, for plea by
the defendant, trial with presentation
of evidence for the prosecution and
the defense, and judgment thereafter,
No costs. So ordered.

GENEROSO ESMEA and ALBERTO

ALBA, petitioners, vs.
JUDGE JULIAN B. POGOY, City
Court of Cebu City, Branch III,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
RICARDO B. TABANAO, as Special
Counsel, Office of the City Fiscal,
Cebu City, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Generoso Esmea and

Alberto Alba and their co-accused,
Genaro Alipio, Vicente Encabo and
Bernardo Villamira were charged with
GRAVE COERCION in the city court of
Cebu City for having allegedly forced
Reverend Father Tomas Tibudan of the
Jaro Cathedral, Iloilo City to withdraw
the Php5,000 from the bank and to
give that amount to the accused
because the priest lost it in a game of
cards.

The case was calendared on October

4, 1978 presumably for arraignment
and trial. Upon the telegraphic request
of Father Tibudan the case was reset 2
months after (on December 13, 1978).
Because PETITIONERS were not duly

notified of that hearing, they were not

able to appear.

fact that Father Tibudan was sick of

influenza on August 16, 1979.

The two pleaded NOT GUILTY at their

arraignment on January 23, 1979. NO
TRIAL
WAS
HELD
AFTER
THE
ARRAIGNMENT because complainant
Father Tibudan REQUESTED TRANSFER
of the hearing to another date.

The fiscal justified that the case can

be revived WITHOUT FILING A NEW
INFORMATION, due to a ruling saying
that a provisional dismissal with the
conformity of the accused lacks the
impress of finality.

In the meantime, THE FISCAL LOST his

record of the case. So, the hearing
scheduled was cancelled at his
instance. On that date, respondent
judge issued an order setting the trial
"for the last time on August 16, 1979,
at 8:30 o'clock in the morning"

Respondent judge granted it in his

order of October 8, 1979 (p. 26, Rollo).

The fiscal informed the court that the

private prosecutor received from
complainant
Father
Tibudan
a
telegram stating that he was sick. The
counsel for petitioners opposed the
cancellation of the hearing. They
invoked the right of the accused TO
HAVE A SPEEDY TRIAL.

Respondent
judge
PROVISIONALLY
DISMISSED the case as to the four
accused who were present because it
"has been dragging all along and the
accused are ready for the hearing" but
the fiscal was not ready with his
witness. The court noted that there
was no medical certificate indicating
that the complainant was really sick.
The case was continued as to the fifth
accused who did not appear at the
hearing. His arrest was ordered.

27 days later, the fiscal FILED MOTION

for the revival of the case. He
attached to his motion a medical
certificate under oath attesting to the

Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss

the case on the ground of double
jeopardy. They pointed out that THEY
DIDN'T CONSENT to the provisional
dismissal of the case. Hence, the
provisional
dismissal
AMOUNTED
ALREADY TO AN ACQUITTAL which
placed them in jeopardy. Its revival
would place them in double jeopardy.

ISSUE: Were the accused placed in

double jeopardy?

HELD:

Yes. WITHOUT CONSENT OF ACCUSED

TO THE DISMISSAL.

Section 22, Article IV Bill of Rights of

the Constitution provides that "no
person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense."

In the instant case, we the petitioners

were placed in jeopardy by the
provisional dismissal of the grave

coercion
case.
That
provisional
dismissal would not have place the
petitioners in jeopardy if respondent
judge had taken the precaution of
making sure that the dismissal was
with their consent. In this case, it is
not very clear that the petitioners
consented to the dismissal of the case.
The petitioners were insisting on a
trial. They relied on their constitutional
right to have a speedy trial. The fiscal
was not ready because his witness
was not in court. Respondent judge on
his
own
volition
provisionally
dismissed the case. The petitioners did
not
expressly
manifest
their
conformity
to
the
provisional
dismissal. Hence, the dismissal placed
them in jeopardy.

14, 1979, denying petitioners' motion

to dismiss, are reversed and set aside.
No costs.

EXCEPTIONS:
(1) (EVEN IF THEY CONSENTED, the
DISMISSAL will still put them in
jeopardy) Even if the petitioners, after
invoking their right to a speedy trial,
moved for the dismissal of the case
and, therefore, consented to it, the
dismissal would still place them in
jeopardy. The use of the word
"provisional" would not change the
legal effect of the dismissal (Esguerra
vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134;
Gandicela vs. Lutero, 88 Phil. 299).
(2) The dismissal of a criminal case
upon motion of the accused because
the prosecution was not prepared for
trial since the complainant and his
witnesses did not appear at the trial is
a dismissal equivalent to an acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of
the defendant for the same offense

PEOPLE OF
petitioner,

THE

PHILIPPINES,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA,Court
of First Instance of Rizal, and
CONSOLACION NAVAL,

FACTS:
WHEREFORE, the order of respondent
judge dated October 8, 1979, reviving
the
criminal
case
against
the
petitioners, and his order of December

Consolacion Naval sold the subject

realty on 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who
made
a
partial
payment
of

P130,850.00. About two years lateran

application for registration under the
Land Registration Act was submitted
by Consolacion wherein she stated
that she owned the same lot and that
it was unencumbered. For those
reasons, the corresponding title was
issued in her name but she allegedly
disposed of the half portion of the
property to nine other persons.

Consolacion Naval and her co-accused

Anacleto Santos, was charged with
estafa and falsification, separately:

ESTAFA: That on 1973 and soon

thereafter, in the municipality of Pasig,
province of Rizal, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping and
aiding one another, by means of
deceit and with intent to defraud,
knowing that their parcel of land
among others, situated in Taytay, Rizal
was already sold to Edilberto V. Ilano
as can be gleaned from a document
entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan Ng Lupa
Na May Pasubali O Condicion";
and the victim paid the partial
amount of P130,850.00 to the herein
accused and without informing said
Edilberto V. Ilano, the accused
executed and filed an Application for
Registration over the same parcel of
land among others, which document is
designated as LRC Case No. N-7485,
"Consolacion, Eduvigis and Apolinaria,
all surnamed Naval" of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Rizal, as a
result of which the Presiding Judge of
Branch XIII to which said case was
assigned issued Original Certificate of
Title No. 9332 in her name, which area
was reduced to 10,075 sq. meters as
appearing in item No. 2 in said OCT
and subsequently referred to in TCT
No. 370870 in favor of said accused

Naval through Rodolfo Mendoza, sold

more than one-half (1/2) of said parcel
of land in her name in favor of Maria,
Anacleto, Carmelo, Mariano, Cecilia
and Teodorica, all surnamed Santos
and Iluminada Tambalo, Pacita Alvarez
and Pedro Valesteros which sales were
registered and annotated with the
Register of Deeds of Rizal at Pasig,
Rizal; and likewise a portion of which
was partitioned to herein accused
Anacleto Santos; that despite repeated
demands the accused refused and still
refuse to return said amount and/or
fulfill their obligations under said
"Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May
Pasubali O Condicion", to the damage
and prejudice of said Edilberto V. Ilano
in the aforementioned amount of
P130,850.00.
The confluence of the foregoing
assertions disclose that Consolacion
Naval sold the subject realty on
August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who
made
a
partial
payment
of
P130,850.00. About two years later, or
on August 17, 1971, an application for
registration
under
the
Land
Registration Act was submitted by
Consolacion wherein she stated that
she owned the same lot and that it
was
unencumbered.
For
those
reasons, the corresponding title was
issued in her name but she allegedly
disposed of the half portion of the
property to nine other persons.

FALSIFICATION: That on or about the

17th day August, 1971, in the
municipality of Pasig, province of Rizal,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, being then private
individual did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a
public document by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts,

committed as follows: the said

accused on August 17, 1971, executed
a document entitled "Application For
Registration" for parcels of land
located at Taytay, Rizal, to the effect
that "She is the exclusive owner in fee
simple of a parcel of land situated in
Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal with Psu-248206 and that
she "does not know any mortgage or
encumbrance of any kind whatsoever
affecting said land or that any person
has estate or interest therein, legal or
equitable, in possession remainder,
reversion or expectancy", as a result
of which the Court in its Decision of
March 22, 1972 declared the herein
accused the true and absolute owner
of said parcel of land free from all liens
and encumbrances of any nature,
when in truth and in fact the herein
accused
has
already
sold
and
encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano
said parcel of land referred to above
as can be gleaned from a document
entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa
Na May Pasubali O Condicion" dated
August 12, 1969 and said Edilberto V.
Ilano has already paid partial amount
of P130,850.00 to the herein accused.

On
1975,
private
respondent
Consolacion Naval moved to quash the
information
for
FALSIFICATION,
premised,
among
other
things,
because she is CHARGED WITH an
identical offense. The following day,
Naval pleaded not guilty to the charge
of falsification and on December 22,
1975, the court a quo denied her
motion to quash.

ISSUE: Was she placed in jeopardy?

HELD:
No.
The charge for falsification must not
be quashed. 4th requisite lacking
(THERE WAS NO CONVICTION YET ON
THE FIRST CHARGE, NOR THE FIRST
CHARGE IS DISMISSED WITHOUT HIS
CONSENT)

The mere filing of 2 informations

charging the same offense is not an
appropriate basis for the invoking right
against double jeopardy because the
first jeopardy has not yet set in by a
previous
conviction, acquittal
or
termination of the case without the
consent of the accused.

Moreover, it appears that private

respondent herein had not yet been
arraigned in the previous case for
estafa. While We are at a loss as to the
status of the progress of the estafa
case
on
account
of
private
respondent's apathy towards Our
order for the parties herein to "MOVE
IN THE PREMISES" (p. 125, Rollo)
which information could substantially
affect the results of this case, from all
indications it appears that the estafa
case has not yet been terminated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED

and the Orders of respondent judge
dated January 23, 1976 quashing the
information for falsification, and March
23, 1976 denying the People's motion
for reconsideration therefrom are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let
the information for falsification be
reinstated and this case be remanded
to the lower court for further
proceedings and trial. No special
pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and

ASST.
PROV'L
FISCAL
F.
VISITACION, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE MIDPANTAO L. ADIL,
Court of First Instance of Iloilo,
and MARGARITO FAMA, JR.
--SUPERVENING ELEMENT---

The first criminal complaint filed

against respondent Fama Jr. on 1975
was as follows: (SLIGHT PHYSICAL
INJURIES)

That in the afternoon of 1975, at

Aquino Nobleza St., Iloilo, the accused,
while armed with a piece of stone, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, assault, attack and use
personal violence upon Miguel Viajar
by then HURLING HIM WITH A STONE,
hitting said Miguel Viajar on THE
RIGHT
CHEEL,
thereby
inflicting
PHYSICAL INJURIES which would have
required and will require medical
attendance for a period from 5 to 9
days barring complication as per
medical certificate of the physician
hereto attached.

FACTS:

...What happened here was that when

Case No. 3335 (FIRST COMPLAINT)
was filed in the inferior court, the
charge against Fama Jr. had to be for
slight physical injuries only, because
according to the certification of the
attending physician, the injuries
suffered by the offended party Viajar,
would require medical attendance
from 5 to 9 days only "baring
complications." Indeed, when the
complaint was filed on April 15, 1975,
only three days had passed since the
incident in which the injuries were
sustained took place, and there were
yet no indications of a graver injury or
consequence to be suffered by said
offended party. Evidently, it was only
later, after Case No. 3335 had already
been filed and the wound on the face
of Viajar had already healed, that the
alleged deformity became apparent...

Arraigned on July 7, 1975, the accused

entered a plea of not guilty.

Meanwhile,
on
June
8,
1975,
complainant Viajar filed a complaint
with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo
charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama
and herein respondent Margarito
Fama, Jr. with SERIOUS PHYSICAL
INJURIES ARISING FROM THE SAME
INCIDENT the first complaint. The
Fiscal filed in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo an information, but
only against respondent Fama Jr., for
serious physical injuries as follows:

That on or about April 12, 1975, in the

Municipality of January, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, and
without any justifiable motive, armed
with pieces of stone did then and
there
willfully,
unlawfully
and

feloniously attack, assault and throw

pieces of stone at Miguel Viajar, hitting
him on the LOWER RIGHT EYE which
would heal from five (5) to nine (9)
days
barring
complications
but
LEAVING A PERMANENT SCAR AND
DEFORMING FACE of said Miguel Viajar.

ISSUE: (1) Was the additional

allegation of deformity in the second
complaint
CONSTITUTE
AS
SUPERVENING ELEMENT?

Fama Jr. filed an urgent motion to

defer proceedings claiming that since
he was already charged and pleaded
not guilty in he would be in double
jeopardy.

HELD:

In the meantime, the Fiscal after filing

the second complaint, sought the
dismissal of the first complaint, but
the Municipal Court DIDN'T ACT ON
THE SAID MOTION FOR DISMISSAL.
Instead, THE CASE WAS SET FOR
HEARING, and in view of the
postponements asked by the Fiscal in
order to await the resolution of the
issue of double jeopardy in Case No.
5241, on September 11, 1975, the
following order was entered to
DISMISS THE SECOND COMPLAINT in
order to uphold the right of accused to
a speedy trial.

Accused Fama Jr. filed an addendum to

his memorandum in Case No. 5241
inviting attention to the above
dismissal order and reiterating his
theory
of
double
jeopardy.
On
September 22, 1975, respondent court
issued the impugned order sustaining
the contention of double jeopardy and
dismissing Case No. 5241. The
prosecution's
motion
for
reconsideration was denied in the
other assailed order of October 14,
1975.

(2) Can right against double jeopardy

be invoked?

1) YES. No finding was made in the

first examination that the injuries had
caused deformity and the loss of the
use of the right hand. Nothing was
mentioned in the first medical
certificate about the deformity and the
loss of the use of the right hand,
hence it can be presumed that such
fact was not apparent or could have
been discernible at the time the first
examination was made. The COURSE
(and not the length) of the healing of
an injury may not be determined
before hand; it can only be definitely
known AFTER THE PERIOD OF HEALING
HAS ENDED. That is the reason why
the court considered that there was a
supervening fact occuring since the
filing of the original information.

2) No. In other words, in the peculiar

circumstances of this case, the plea of
double jeopardy of private respondent
Fama Jr., cannot hold. It was,
therefore, a grave error for respondent
court to have dismissed the second
criminal complaint

ACCORDINGLY,
the
orders
of
September 22, 1975 and October 14,
1975 herein complained of are hereby
set aside and respondent court is
ordered to proceed with the trial and
judgment thereof according to law.
Costs against private respondent Fama
Jr.

Batangas
Electric
Light
System,
equipped with a search warrant issued
by a city judge of Batangas City,
searched and examined the premises
of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant and
Cold Storage owned and operated by
the
private
respondent
Manuel
Opulencia. The police discovered that
electric
wiring,
devices
and
contraptions had been installed,
without the necessary authority from
the
city
government,
and
"architecturally concealed inside the
walls of the building" owned by the
private respondent.

These
electric
devices
and
contraptions
were
"designed
purposely to lower or decrease the
readings
of
electric
current
consumption in the electric meter of
the said electric [ice and cold storage]
plant."
During the subsequent
investigation,
Manuel
Opulencia
admitted in a written statement that
he had caused the installation of the
electrical devices "in order to lower or
decrease the readings of his electric
meter.

PEOPLE OF
petitioner,

THE

PHILIPPINES,

vs.
THE
HONORABLE
BENJAMIN
RELOVA, Court of First Instance of
Batangas,
and
MANUEL
OPULENCIA, respondents.

FACTS:

On 1975, Batangas City Police

together with personnel of the

An
information
against
Manuel
Opulencia for violation of Ordinance
No. 1, Series of 1974, Batangas City. A
violation of this ordinance was, under
its terms, punishable by a fine
"ranging from Five Pesos (P5.00) to
Fifty Pesos (P50.00) or imprisonment,
which shall not exceed thirty (30)
days, or both, at the discretion of the
court." 4 This information reads as
follows:

The undersigned, Assistant City Fiscal,

accuses Manuel Opulencia y Lat of
violation of Sec. 3 (b) in relation to
Sec. 6 (d) and Sec. 10 Article II, Title IV

of ordinance No. 1, S. 1974, with

damage to the City Government of
Batangas, and penalized by the said
ordinance, committed as follows:

"...with intent to defraud the City

Government of Batangas, without
proper authorization from any lawful
and/or permit from the proper
authorities,... MAKE UNAUTHORIZED
INSTALLATIONS of electric wirings and
devices to lower or decrease the
consumption of electric fluid at the
Opulencia Ice Plant situated at
Kumintang, Ibaba, this city and as a
result of such unathorized installations
of electric wirings and devices made
by the accused, the City Government
of Batangas was damaged and
prejudiced in the total amount of
...P41,062.16."

The
accused
Manuel
Opulencia
pleaded not guilty to the above
information. On 2 February 1976, HE
FILED MOTION to DISMISS the
information upon the grounds that the
crime there charged had already
PRESCRIBED and that the civil
indemnity
there
sought
to
be
recovered was beyond the jurisdiction
of the Batangas City Court to award.

of the Revised Penal Code.

information read as follows:

This

"...TAKE, STEAL, and APPROPRIATE

electric current valued in the total
amount of P41,062.16"

BEFORE HE COULD BE ARRAIGNED ON,

Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to
Quash, alleging that he had been
PREVIOUSLY ACQUITTED of the offense
charged in the second information and
that the filing thereof was violative of
his constitutional right against double
jeopardy.

The respondent Judge granted the

accused's Motion to Quash and
ordered the case dismissed.

ISSUE: 1) Can he invoke the right

against double jeopardy?
2) Is the judge's dismissal amount to
acquittal hence placing accused in
another jeopardy?

HELD:
In an order dated 6 April 1976, the
Batangas City Court granted the
motion to dismiss on the ground of
prescription.

Days later, the Acting City Fiscal of

Batangas City filed before the Court of
First Instance of Batangas, Branch 11,
another information against Manuel
Opulencia, this time for theft of
electric power under Article 308 in
relation to Article 309, paragraph (1),

1) YES
Petitioner:
The
unauthorized
installation punished by the ordinance
[of Batangas City] is not the same as
theft of electricity [under the Revised
Penal Code]; that the second offense is
not an attempt to commit the first or a
frustration thereof and that the second
offense is not necessarily included in
the offense charged in the first
inforrnation

The offense under the City Ordinance

is the installing of electric wiring and
devices WITHOUT AUTHORITY from the
proper officials of the city government.
To constitute the offense under the
city ordinance, IT'S NOT NECESSARY
TO ESTABLISH an intent to appropriate
and steal electric fluid. While the
offense of theft Revised Penal Code
filed before the Court of First Instance
of Batangas in Criminal Case No. 266
has quite different essential elements.

SC: PETITIONER IS WRONG. RULE --> If

the offenses charged are penalized by
different statutes, the important
inquiry relates to the IDENTITY OF
OFFENSES CHARGE. (OTHER INSTANCE
WHEN THERE CAN BE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY)

The constitutional protection against

double jeopardy is available so long as
the acts which constitute or have
given rise to the first offense under a
municipal ordinance are the same acts
which constitute or have given rise to
the offense charged under a statute.

The constitutional protection against

double jeopardy is available only
where an IDENTITY is shown to exist
between
the
earlier
and
the
subsequent offenses charged.
In contrast, where one offense is
charged under a municipal ordinance
while the other is penalized by a
statute, the critical inquiry is to the
IDENTITY OF ACTS which the accused
is said to have committed and which
are alleged to have given rise to the
two offenses.
...RATIONALE: If the 2nd sentence of
the double jeopardy provision had not
been written into the Constitution,

conviction or acquittal under a

municipal ordinance would never
constitute
a
bar
to
another
prosecution for the same act under a
national statute.
...GR:An
offense
penalized
by
municipal ordinance is, by definition,
different from an offense under a
statute. The two offenses would never
constitute the same offense having
been promulgated by different rulemaking authorities though one be
subordinate to the other and the
plea of double jeopardy would never
lie. The discussions during the 19341935 Constitutional Convention show
that the second sentence was inserted
precisely for the purpose of extending
the constitutional protection against
double jeopardy to a situation which
would not otherwise be covered by the
first sentence.

HOW TO DETERMINE THE IDENTITY OF

OFFENSES?is addressed by examining
the ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS of each of
the 2 OFFENSES charged, as such
elements are set out in the respective
legislative definitions of the offenses
involved. The question of Identity of
the acts which are claimed to have
generated liability both under a
municipal ordinance and a national
statute must be addressed, in the first
instance, by examining the LOCATION
of such acts in TIME AND SPACE. When
the acts of the accused as set out in
the two informations are so related to
each other in time and space as to be
reasonably regarded as having taken
place on the same occasion and where
those acts have been moved by one
and the same, or a continuing, intent
or voluntary design or negligence,
such acts may be appropriately
characterized as an integral whole
capable of giving rise to penal liability
simultaneously under different legal

enactments (a municipal ordinance

and a national statute).

offense necessarily includes the first

offense or is necessarily included in
such first offense or where the second
offense is an attempt to commit the
first or a frustration thereof.

In the instant case, the relevant acts

took place within the same time
frame: from November 1974 to
February 1975. During this period, the
accused Manuel Opulencia installed or
permitted the installation of electrical
wiring and devices in his ice plant
without obtaining the necessary
permit or authorization from the
municipal authorities. The accused
conceded
that
he
effected
or
permitted
such
unauthorized
installation for the very purpose of
reducing electric power bill. This
corrupt intent was thus present from
the
very
moment
that
such
unauthorized installation began. The
immediate physical effect of the
unauthorized installation was the
inward flow of electric current into
Opulencia's ice plant without the
corresponding recording thereof in his
electric meter. In other words, the
"taking" of electric current was
integral
with
the
unauthorized
installation of electric wiring and
devices.

--->> Thus, for the constitutional plea

of double jeopardy to be available,
NOT ALL THE TECHNICAL ELEMENTS
constituting the first offense need be
present in the technical definition of
the second offense. The law here
seeks to prevent harrassment of an
accused
person
by
multiple
prosecutions
for
offenses
which
though different from one another are
nonetheless each constituted by a
common set or overlapping sets of
technical elements.

It is perhaps important to note that the

rule
limiting
the
constitutional
protection against double jeopardy to
a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense is not to be understood
with absolute literalness. The Identity
of offenses that must be shown need
not be absolute Identity: the first and
second offenses may be regarded as
the "same offense" where the second

2) Yes. THE DISMISSAL by the

Batangas City Court of the information
for violation of the Batangas City
Ordinance upon the ground that such
offense HAD PRESCRIBED, amounts to
an ACQUITTAL of the accused of that
offense. Under Article 89 of the
Revised Penal Code, "prescription of
the crime" is one of the grounds for
"total extinction of criminal liability."
Under the Rules of Court, an order
sustaining a motion to quash based on
prescription is a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari

and mandamus is DENIED. Let the civil
action for related civil liability be
remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Batangas City for further
proceedings as indicated above. No
pronouncement as to costs.