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HINGSTMAN 12

UTILITARIANISM GOOD; DEONTOLOGY ANSWERS


INDEX

Utilitarianism is a good standard for evaluating action 1-2


Moral absolutes are bad - they ignore the greater good 3-4
Answers to: We cannot predict consequences of actions 5
Answers to: Utilitarianism produces injustice 6-8
Rights bad 9-10
Answer to: Moral relativism makes utilitarianism impossible 11-12
Answers to: Kant 13-16
Answers to: Badiou 17

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Utilitarianism Good

Utilitarianism is good because it looks at the world as a whole

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen,


2004 '
[Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]

;- ~intended his work to rescue the word 'utility' from corruption,


b,/ his efforts, the words utility and utilitarian in common speech sti!,,:
mean something opposed to pleasure and only indirectly connected with
happiness. But if the terminology of philosophical utilitarianism remains
fll::
bu~'

~ <:
somewhat specialized, the doctrine itself has come to have wide appeal in 0.-'7-~
the modern world. Even a cursory glance at most of the advice columns in
contemporary, newspapers and magazines, for instance, will reveal that ~ ~
their writers assume the truth of something like the Greatest Happiness 90 '
Principle. Moreover, they clearly regard such a view as not only correct, -;- 0-
but uncontentious and incontestible. Indeed, it is not an exaggeration to ~ 1

, moral
say thatthinking.
utilitarianism
A greathas come
many to besuppose
people the mainthatelement in contemporary
there can be no serious ~
~ _~ .s
objection to the moral ideal of maximizing happiness and minimizing ~ ~
unhappiness, both in personal relationships and in the world at large. , -+-
,When actions are prescribed that appear to have no connection with pleas-
me and pain (orthodox Jewish dietary restrictions, for instance) or when
ti
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social rules are upheld which run counter to the Greatest Happiness ~ ~
Principle (Christian restrictions on divorce, for instance) it is those actions <:L- •.•

br restrictions which are most readily called


Happiness Principle itself.
,
into question, not the
.
J J'5''a -
,)
l~.)~

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Utilitarianism Good

Consequentialism is the only true ethics because it is based on the greater good /
(

Odell, Department of Philosophy The University of Maryland, 2004


S. Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics

. ~nsequentialist theories define morality iq terms of good


consequences. Whether or not I am morally obligated to do something,
.. and whether - or not I am, morally permitted to do something are
questions that are decided' on the basis of consequences. If the
CODBequencesof an action A are good or at least better than I can
expect from any other course of action, and I am an action-specific
consequentialist, then I am obliged to do A. If I am a type-specific ~
consequentialist, however, my course of action will be determined on ~ ~
•.•.....

the basis of a rule that formulates a practice that has been determined to -.0 ~
have better consequences than any of its options. But, it should be ~!
asked, what kinds of consequences are good ones?
Few thinkers dispute the claim that pleasure is good and pain is ,~ .~'
DBM bad. Some go so far as to claim that pleasure and pain are the only
things that are intrinsically good and bad, i.e., good and bad in
~
Q)
,~
-$
AD\ themselves. Pain and pleasure are, for these ethicists, who are referred
~ ~
to as hedonists, the only things that are indispuwb/y good and bad.
Jeremy Bentham argued for this view, and so did MilL but they differed
regarding the issue of whether or not pleasure and pain could differ in
quality. Both philosophers accepted without qualification the view that
~t ~
pleasures and pains could differ in quantity-they both could be more ~~
or less intense. Mill, however, thought that there were degrees of
goodness associated with pleasures and pains. The pleasures one gains
from reading philosophy were siud by Mill to be superior in quality to
~,,~ -
'J<
those that resulted from satisfyingthe appetites. The pleasure that one
~
gets from food, drink, and sex were considered by Mill to be '"
qualitatively inferior to reading Plato. It seems to me that Bentham was
right and Mill wrong on thiSscore, and I will try to convince the reader
of this when I discuss utilitarianismin Chapter V. But for now I wish to
~t
simply concede as obvious the fact that pleasure is good and pain is bad
even though one can, as commonsense recognizes, have too much of a
good thing. One can overindulge the appetites to such an extent that the
pleasure ceases, and is replaced by pain. This should not be
misconstrued to be an argument that pleasure can sometimes be
unpleasant, that would be a contradiction. The truth is simply
overindulgence in what is pleasurable can produce pain. Epicurus based
a philosophy of life on this recognition. The Epicurean is not, as he is
often misconstrued to be, someone who promotes a lifestyle associated
with excessive self-indulgence. Instead, he is the one who teaches
restraint in all joys of the appetite. The consequence of such a lifestyle
L
is, a,£cording.to Epicuru.s,.conte?tmen~ ?".. t{ .
-- .-_ ~~_--_ .. .. ..•._-
_____ ~ u_ ~ ~_ ~ ----- .-
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Utilitarianism Good

Moral absolutes are stupid. They force us to take actions contrary to the greater
good.

, 'ty fMaryland 2004


Odell, Department of Philosophy The UmverSl 0 ,
S, Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics

jl<BPC has a distinct


rule"trtilitarianism. advantage
It denies over
that moral both
rules, are literal and prima
to be taken literally.
facieIt
also denies that t~ey,are prima faci~ rules. It maintains t?at moral ~es. ~
are simply abbrevtatl0ns or summanes ?f complex pr~ctlces--practlces ().~
ti 17, l-.)..\t~
that do prescribe how we ought to act m those .very Clfcumstancesthat .,..
the prima facie interpretation misconceives .as excep ons. { Q./
Philosophers who concern themselves with explaining what they re~ard 0.. \.J1
as legitimate exceptions to moral rules do so because .they consider ~.J...~
moral rules to be categorical imperatives. Anyone who mterprets 'Do.
not lie' literally to mean 'Never under any circumst~es lie,: will have
to deal with a vast number of what appear to be valid exceptiOns to the
rule. They will have to deal with cases like lying to save a love? one:s
life, killing a terrorist to keep him from detonating a bomb .which Will
wipe out half the city, a parent's stealing of a loaf of bread m order to
feed her/his starving children, clubbing an assailant in self-defense or to
prevent rus banning innocent children, or even lying to avoid hurting
someone's feelings. But a philosopher who defends folk ethics need not
be concerned with any of these so-called "exceptions." My view,
FBPC, considers those cases that are ordinarily taken to be exceptions
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to be already covered by the practices that our abbreviations designate.
Our practice surrounding lying recognizes that it is sometimes ethically
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permissible to lie in order to save the lives of llmocent people. It also
recognizes that it is sometimes ethically obligatory to do so. A case in
point is the one I presented previously concerning the newsman on the
island about to be destroyed by an impending storm. Our practice
concerning when it is wrong to lie incorporates the idea that for the
most part, lying is wrong, while at the same time incorporating those
times when lying is permitted or obligatory. The same thing is true of
our practices concerning killing, harming, and stealing. In this way,
FBPC can be said, in Wittgensteinian fashion, to dissolve rather than
solve the issue regarding whether or not there are valid exceptions to
moral rules. The rules that FBPC defends do not have exceptions, and
so we are not forced to adopt act utilitarianism to deal with them.

~ t 1 5

------ -- -- • __ u n u_u __ --
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A ~so\u~J 5+u fl'd Cd)

r f l'
Railton's objection to rule consequentialism, which is that an
action can stem ITompractices or rules it would be best to have, and yet
be wrong, does not apply to folk based practice consequentialism.
FBPC does not deal in new and exotic sets of rules. Its rules are those
rules t~t have been time-tested throughout the course of human
history. FEPC claims that adherence to certain rules has produced
much better resu1ts than would have occurred in acting in opposition to
them. So the set that it advocates is the set that has been "most
effective." FBPC does not claim that the set it recommends should
never be modified or changed-either by adding new rules or
modifYingexisting ones-but only that there has to be good reason for
doing so, and that the adoption of the modified set will have to be
justified empirically. The modified set will have to establish itself by
proving to be an improvement over the original set. Otherwise, it would
not qualifYas the best set, nor would it garner general acceptance. The
best set, or to speak more precisely, the "expectably" best set, in my
view, will be that set which has proven itself over time, both in terms of
its positive results, and in terms of what would have been the
OBH"
•... -
consequences of acting in opposition to some or all members of it. A
new and unique set of moral principles or rules might be imagined and
...' ,;., ~
~~.~ .,'~
\i>.",.~jt.
.[
introduced by a philosopher seeking, in Platonic fashion, an ideal set of
moral principles-call it "Alpha Best." That set could even be enacted
into law by our legislature, and publicized as "the best that 'money can
buy," but such procedures would not establish this set as the best set.
Nothing short of success over time would qualify Alpha Best as
expectably best. An action cannot therefore, according to FBPC, stem .,
ftom practices or rules it would be best to have, and yet be wronu \?~
\.~t'

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A2: Can't Predict Consequences

. We can generalize about cause and effect even it-we can't predict exact
consequences

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen,


2004
[Eight Theories of Ethics. 2004, No Editors cited, p. I] Jl
~ \ When it comes to holding people responsible, on the other hand, the:.
~ position is quite different. If we enter imaginatively into the driver's situa~\
tion, we have to decide what, as consequentialists, it would be sensible to:;
~ prescribe as his best action at the time and in the circumstances prevailing.:;
"" Pretty plainly, having made his mistake, the recommendation would be.:-
-+- that he should turn the car in order to take the Archduke back safely. He'
~ was not to know that assassins would by chance enter the same street at
7':" that moment. Therefore, because the anticipated consequences were good,
J;, even though the actual consequences were not; he chose rightly.
This distinction between deciding how to act and assessing how we have
acted is obviously of the greatest importance for consequentialism, because
we cannot know the consequences of our actions before we have taken
them. As a result, a doctrine restricted to assessment after the event would
have no practical application. But if we cannot assess actual consequences
before the event, how are we to decide what to do? The answer is that we
have to rely upon generalizations about cause and effect and follow general
rules. We estimate the likely consequences of a proposed course of action

on the
ful basisrules
general of past experience,
of conduct . and we summarize our experience in use-\
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A2: Utilitarianism Produces Injustice

Consequentialism is not necessarily unjust.

Odell, Department of Philosophy The University of Maryland, 2004


S. Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics
~ we saw in the previous chApter, itWe think:of the set of rules
that utilitarianism espouses as necessary for human happiness, it would

'( appear that one way to meet objection (H) would be to fiat a justice
principle, and argue for its acceptance on the grounds provided by the
,~ utility principle. One could argue that societies that persist in ignoring

"
-~ equity issues are not only subject to civil unrest, since they contain a
fused bomb, but often are the locus of riots and revolutions. So it is
clear that there is an empirical basis for such a rule and the practice it
QJ would initiate. This way of looking at the matter is quite misleading.
\J however. It ignores the fact that such a practice already exists and

I~
'i functions as part of the folk morality incorporated in FBPC. The only
problem that remains is that the equity rule is often applied by the
advantaged, for the advantaged. Its application is frequently restricted,
'\. .•'imd,not only to the pack. but also within it.
The fact that morality tJnds to be selectively or unjustly applied is
~ not a unique problem for FBPC. Morality and its justification is one
-/:. thing. The actual practice of morality is another. FBPC does have an
~ advantage over other theories, however. Its advantage is its empirical
roots. All that it or any theory of morality can be required to do is
demonstrate the advantages of the universal application of the justice or
~ equality precept, and this can, I venture, be easily accomplished by
empirical means. History is the empirical laboratory that illustrates
what happens when the justice principle is ignored~ I 3 'I

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A2: Utilitarianism Produces Iniustice

Utilitarianism is consistent with protection of rights and civil liberties

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen,


2004
[Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]

r .....,~ - -- ~..

+c
This amendment to the basic 'act utilitarianism' of Bentham was made bj~
Mill. Mill regarded this apparent conflict with justice, such as 'is ilIustrate~;:
by the case of the tramp,
.. to be the biggest stumbling block to utilitarianisrri~:'f
But, he claims: -:;ti

..,;~\
The moral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one another (in whkn~
we must never fQrget to include wrongful interference with eaC'
other's freedom) are more vital to human well-being than any maxirtt
however important, which only point out the best mode of managl
some department of human affairs.

It is the importance of the rules of justice for the happiness of us 'a


according to Mill, that commonly gives rise to a feeling of outrage when:'~
one of them is broken. But though we have this very strong and special fe
ing about justice and rights, upon reflection we can see ~\
"":':,~0~
I

that justice is a name for certain moral requirements, which, regart!~' i


collectively, stand higher in the scale of social utility, and are therefi!f: .
. jil

of more paramount obligation, than any others; though particular cases


may occur in which some other social duty is so important, as to over-
rule anyone of the general maxims of justice.
(Mill 1871, 1998: 106).j
. l'$6-f~

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Consequentialism can coexist with laws.

Odell, Department of Philosophy The University of Maryland, 2004


S. Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics
\ It is unrealistic to expect most individuals to do a better job of
determining how to act under a variety of circumstances than has been
done by society over the centuries: Why not allow ourselves to be in
general guided by principles which fonnulate time-tested, much
adapted, practices? But, it is important not to ignore rules. One might
be tempted to argue that there is no.need for rules; all we need do is
-- ok condition our youth to behave in accordance with folk ethical practices.
~oJo,.
'1- We must resist this temptation, however. It fails to recognize that .
.$. verbalization is an essential part of the process we utilize to establish
~ ~ dispositions necessary. for harmonious co-existence. The rules we
~.A fonnulate to abbreviate our practices assist us in realizing our
~'--j
v-. ~
educational' goals. They also allow us to discuss our folk ethical
practices and enable us to recognize where they need to be modified,
~ ~- and thereby accelerate their modification. Moreover, the formulation of
o '-..:. folk ~hical practices also assists us in making and passing laws. Many
of our laws are nothing more than legalized fonnulations (statutes) of
folk ethical practicw I v{ 5""'

Rule utilitarianism is not unjust.

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen,


2004
[Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]
Jbshould now be evident that the distinction between act and rule utili·
,,"ianism is a very important one because it has been called upon to pro,
~;de the means of replying to two serious objections. To the objection that
j:ilitarianism too readily justifies the use of unjust means to utilitariar
_,ds, (our example was the murder of a tramp to provide others with vita!
"ansplant organs), a rule utilitarian (such as Mill) replies that the rules ane
'~e deep sense of justice which this sort of counter-example appeals to, an
':fj1emselvesto be explained in terms of the greatest happiness principle.
~"Second, to the objection that it would be a bad thing if our every actior
jt\Vasguided by the Greatest Happiness Principle, the rille utilitarian replie1
~fh.at our actions should be guided by an adherence to rules which an
ijifhemselves justified by appeal to the Greatest Happiness Principle.>
.. ----._--~--. - ,--------- ---~- ._- ---•.. --- .-_. "-- ..... ~.. , __ .- ' .• , ~_._--.. - ---.-.- ...-.'-- - --- ..

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Ri2hts Bad

The rights of the group outweigh the rights of the individual.

J. C. Lester, Professor at University of Alabama. 2000. (Escape from


Leviathan)
\Suppose that many people find one particular person a cost to
\ \p
~"r'
p~
them all by his very existence. There is something about that
o/w person which he cannot change but which others find objection-
.\~'!:>~ able in some way. Given my formula, he seems to be infringing
~p"ll) the liberty of others by his very existence. What is more, given
enough people who find him objectionable enough it would seem
to follow that the minimizing-imposed-cost policy could be that
they kill him to stop his nuisance value to them. Some might feel
that this is obviously illiberal, and so this interpretation of liber-
tarian liberty is implausible. To see what is wrong with this
criticism we have to make it more specific. It should clarify mat-
ters to take some examples for examination: a typhoid carrier, a

critic of religion. and libertarian utility monsters.J (},lI~

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Working for the greater good is compatible with liberty.

J. C. Lester, Professor at University of Alabama. 2000. (Escape from

ct~"
.I
Leviathan)
I have not yet mentioned imprisoning the carrier. That would
clearly be a restriction of his liberty in one common sense. How-
IIIf bi.,. ever, it will still not be an (initiated) imposed cost if it is done in
~'.r self-defense (or in defense of other persons than oneself, of
~ course) because of the carrier's attempts to impose his deadly
;~\\\, presence on others. And because such 'preventive restraint' does
not impose a cost, there is no libertarian requirement for a de-
tention centre 'luxurious enough to compensate soDieo-nefor the
\-..{)
disadvantages of being prohibited from living among others in
~~
the wider society', as Nozick argues (1974; 144). The imprison-
ment of those who are no serious threat to others is, of course,
utterly different: this clearly imposes a cost and there would be
.~
little need for it in a libertarian society, which would probably
aim at swift and proportional retribution or restitution (see 3.5.b
~
below 1t ..,
Now assume, however fantastic it may seem, that the carrier

." wherever he might be. The carrier would then be bound to im-
\( ~ is so ainfectious
pose that so
cost on others people.
great could
that itcatch
wouldthebe disease
liberal tofrom
kill him
him
(f) if that is the only way to stop his being the cause of others
catching, and dying from, the disease. It is illiberal to live when
doing so can be done only at theunconsenting and uncompen-
satable expense of other people. The cost imposed on the carner
is uncompensatable now, but it is only a minute fraction of that
imposed on the others if he were to live. Though much more
drastic and unfortunate, killing him must, on balance, be the
liberal solution. So this fantasy case fits the vague account given
above, but it should not intuitively seem merely intolerantly il-
liberal (nor does it seem likely, and perhaps there are no realis-
tic analogs»~_ 0G?

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.MI1£}
A2: Moral
~ Relativism ~ U tt C( -'1VT'I..f/j:"~/~--1
!
A // p", A /7
___
Moral relativism justifies the Nazis /)j?J JJ /~ L,tf-'- .

Phillip<=!Foot, 2002, philosopher, University of California Irvine [Moral Dilemmas]

lJ:.he question is, therefore, whether we have the same reason to accept
relativism with regard to cultures with very different codes of right and
wrong as we have to accept it where there is such divergence in matters
of taste. This it seems to me that we do not. For our starting point there
was the thought that at least some very general judgements of taste could
be identified through any amount of variation in the application of the
key concepts through the relevant domain. I' myself have frequently
argued that by contrast such variation cannot be postulated in the case of
moral judgements, becaiIse the thought of moral goodness and badness
cannot be held steady through any and every change in the codes of
behaviour taught and in their grounds.7 From this it follows that not
everything that anyone might want to call 'a moral code' should pro-
perly be so described. And this shows incidentally that hypotheses about
"'~ de facto cultural relativism are not totally independent of moral theory.

1
\(
\\J
Even if an anthropologist is inclil1ed to call a certain code a moral code,
and to go on to talk about a morality radically different from our own,
it does not follow that we should accept this way of describing the phe-
nomena. An anthropologist may be as confused or prejudiced as anyone
else in applying words such as 'morality' to the teachings of an alien
~
culture.
I shall assume that even general moral terms such as 'right' or 'ought'
are restricted, to a certain degree, in their extension, at least at the level of
basic principles. It is not possible that there should be two moral codes
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the mirror images of each other, so that what was considered fundamen-
tally right in one community would be considered wrong at the same
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level in the other. It seems that some considerations simply are, and some
are not, evidence for particular moral assertions. Nevertheless it does
not look as if a correct account of what it is to have a moral thought, or a
~ moral attitude, or to teach a moral code, will suffice to dismiss relativism
throughout the moral sphere. Even if some moral judgements are per-
fectly objective, there may be others whose truth or falsity is not easily
decidable by criteria internal to the subject of morality. We may suppose,

t
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~
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CCalA-h",-~J .,. ')

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A2: Mar-oJ Re\oJ-tvi.s~~V'.~' 1.


/v14 &J U 1(1,.; (1:1- /C t:A M /-"1 I ~ f?d J.rIII vL

v v ~

I think, that it is clearly an objective moral fact that the Nazi treatment of
the Jews are morally indefensible, given the facts and their knowledge
of the facts. The Nazis' moral opinions had to be held on grounds either
false or irrelevant or both, as on considerations about Germany's 'his-
tork mission', or on the thought that genocide could be a necessary form
of self-defence. It was impossible, logically speaking, for them correctly
to argue that the killing of millions of innocent people did not need any
moral justification, or that the extension of the German Reich was in
itself a morally desirable end. Yet after such things have been said the
problem of moral relativism is still with us.8 Even if the fact that it is
morality that is in question gives us some guaranteed starting-points for
arguments about moral right or wrong, how much is this going to settle?
Are there not some moral matters on which, even within our own soci-
ety, disagreement may be irreducible? And is it not possible that some
alien moral systems cannot be faulted by us on any objective principles,
while our moral beliefs can also not be faulted by theirs? May there not
be places where societies simply confront each other, with no rational
method for settling their differences?> > {- :5)-..

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A2: Kant

Kantian ethics is impossible because we can't divorce ourselves from the


consequences of our actions.

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen


2004 '
[Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]

So far we have seen that Kant's view of the good life as the moral life is .
marred in tWo respects. First, the emphasis he places upon moral goodness
residing in our will or intention to do our duty and not in the good or bad
consequences of our actions is mistaken since a complete divorce between
intention, action and outcome is impossible. For this reason, there can be
no question of judging an intention right or wrong without considering
the goodness or badness of at least some of the consequences of that inten-
tion. This means that the moral q~lality of a life cannot be decided purely
in terms of will and intention .. ~
Second, even if we agree that intention must form a large part of our'
moral assessment, the idea of requiring the reasons upon which we act
to be universally applicable, i.e. the requirement of universalizability,
does not supply us with an effective test for deciding which intentions
are good and whic)1 are bad. People can consistently pursue evil courses
of action, and wholly contradictory recommendations can consistently
be based upon the same reasoning. It follows that universalizability is
not an effective test at all. Any action or mode of conduct can be made
to meet it and hence no course of action can be shown to be ruled out

by it. ~1~'D.\

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A2: Kant

Adherence to a moral code does not make someone a good person, only a fanatic.

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen,


2004
[Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]

?' In the previous chapter we saw that the existentialist's 'ethics of authen-

;'ticiry' - the idea that good actions are made good by the sincerity with ~ ~
~which they are performed - has difficulty in accommodating the case of . ~ -r.. ·'0 J
Jihe sincere Nazi' This is the person who engages sincerely in behaviour
0

idely recognized to be evil. Our intuitions suggest that this sincerity, far
0-- ~ -r
('"'I

'):om making those actions good or even better than similar' actions per- 3 ~
:,6rmed in bad faith, actually makes them worse. Indeed it is arguable that ? ~
,~rely performed .• ~ ~
fj'~,•
'::oAd actions
similar objection
become trulyto the
evilKantian
when they
ethicsareoffreely,
intention
deliberately
can be found
and sin-~
in ~;- '-< ,
:":hat we might call 'the consistent Nazi'. Let us characterize Nazis as peo-
':Je who act on the maxim 'This person should be exterminated because
'.~/she is a Jew'. Now according to Kant's moral philosophy we can put
,,'is maxim to the test by appealing to the categorical imperative - 'Act
"ly according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that
'}should become a universal law' - and we might point out to Nazis that
'jrwere a universal law of nature that Jews were regularly exterminated,
)n if they themselves were Jewish, they would have to be ext.erminated.
" w as a matter of fact it was not unknown for enthusiastic Nazis to be
:bnd to have Jewish ancestry, and if such people were to engage in some
'~cial pleading, some argument which made theirs a special case, we
,Jd indeed accuse them of failing to judge in accordance with the categor-
',>imperative. We could show, in other words, that the maxim 'This person
.:'uld be exterminated because he/she is a Jew' was not being universalized.
,Ut if these people were consistent Nazis, who not only conceded but ,.
'itlvely endorsed the idea that were they to be found to be Jewish they
::must' perish, we could not find fault with them on these grounds. To

t:'iprepared to promote political ideals that taken to their logical


~
conclusion imply your own destruction may be a psychologically unlikely DB'"
attitude of mind for m?st people. But it is certainly logically possible and
displays consistency. However, if a policy of genocide is deeply mistaken ADI
,
from a moral (as well as every other) point of view, consistency in its appli-
cation is hardly any improvement. And in so far as people are prepared to

moral
sacrificerectitude but their
themselves in a fanaticism. ~ f \ ~~this reveals not their
program~ ') of\\ genocide,
page of
05 ADI Hingstman/Harrigan/Keenan Lab
Deontology Bad NEG

A2: Kant

Kantian ethics is insufficient as it fails to recognize consequences.

Odell, Department of Philosophy The University of Maryland, 2004


S. Jack, On Consequentialist Ethics
(V"lrtueethics, like Kantian ethics, puts the cart before the horse. A

,IJ- ~.
-S '. practices,
deceptive and
illusion is created be
this success~ by incorrectly
the empirical successto of
interpreted havecertain
been
! ~ ~ produced by virtuous persons. The actions of a person of "good
: .:s character" are the purist .examples of what must be done to insure
I '--' -L... hannonious co-existence, but it is not the accumulated actions of such
i
! :)
t~ I:S'\ people that bring about hannonious co-existence. Instead, it is the
C. accumulated actions of the majority that enables us all to enjoy
,-..Jo.,. ~ e:. harmonious co-existence and all that it entails. Were it not for the
1: ~::t
-
realization of this consequence, we would have nothing on which to
\,,;)base the idea that such and such characteristics are virtues. We would

'~.
_ c ~'"~ virtuous.
-4- have no
virtue
This point
criteria
ethics onisstand
cannot
tied to to
which Rachel's
judge
on its
previouslyorcited
own,whether
but must be
observation
an action that
notsupplemented was
by

h~'"
:E -l
some fonn of conduct ethics. If we did not consider lying to be wrong,
have to answer the question regarding why lying is wrong. My answer
j,;?
~ - to f
we Rachel's
would not consider
question is honesty to beisa better
that honesty virtue.than
But dishonesty
this means because
that we

~.t"+-!
'.:;: s:..
-
unless the majority of us are honest it is difficultto see how it would be
empirically possible to achieve hannonious co-existence. Besides, the
truly virtuous person is a person who has the wherewithal to live
according to his or her convictions. Those who would need to base their
,l~",~
62 ~ .....choices on the actions of truly virtuous persons or an idealized model
of such persons would likely not have the sameforce of character as the
truly virtuous person, and because of this deficiencywould not be able
to act as the virtuous person would.1 \ '10

DBH
ADI
,

tJ
05 AD! Hingstman/Harrigan/Keenan Lab of
page
Deontology Bad NEG
A2: Kant

Kant gives us no incentive to follow his ethics. Numerous hypotheticals can


disprove Kantian ethics.

Gordon Graham, Regius Professor of moral Philosophy at the University of Aberdeen,


2004
[Eight Theories of Ethics, 2004, No Editors cited, p. ]
i·~·r
rhe previous chapter concluded that Kant's conception of the best humartJ -""J

ife as one lived in accordance with moral duty pursued for its own sake/
:ncounters serious difficulties. Three of these are specially important. Firsr,i
t seems impossible to disregard the successfulness of our actions in decid~'1
ng how well or badly we are spending our lives. Second, Kant's categorii~
:al imperative, by means of which we are supposed to determine what oqV~
futy actually is, is purely formal, with the result that contradictory pre-i!:
;criptions can be made to square with it. Third, the divorce betweenid:~
norally virtuous life and a personally happy and fulfilling life, and thg!
:mph'asis upon deserving to be happy rather than actually being happ'Y~

eaves
ive us withif adoing
morally, problem about
so has motivation.connection
no necessary Why should
with anyone aspiretq;~
living happily~

lfo
05 ADI Hingstman/Harrigan/Keenan Lab page of
Deontology Bad NEG
A,: (SAP/(JU
Badiou's over-generalization makes his ethics useless and dangerous

Peter Hallward, Professor of Modem European Philosophy, 2001 (Ethics: An Essay into
the understanding of Evil, Introduction, translator)
~guably, however, Badiou's consequent characterization

, of all human situations, individual and collective, as immeas-


urably infinite multiplicities (and thus as bundles of pure
and immeasurable 'differences', such that 'there are as
tx-U-' many differences, say, between a Chinese peasant and a
1"\ ~:0""- young Norwegian professional as between myself and any-
body at all, including myself')72 dramatically simPlifies these
~~V? situations, leaving no space for the acknowledgement of
effectively universal structuring principles (biological, cog-
nitive, linguistic ... ) on the one hand, or of certain 'speci-
fYing' attributes (based on culture, religion, class,
gender, .. ) on the other. Instead, we are left with 'generic
human stuff' that is ontologically indistinguishable from
pur~ mathematical multiplicity and effectively endowed, in
its praxis, with a kind of indeterminate 'fundamental free-
dom'. (We might say that if the 'generic' indetermination
of the situation corresponds to some degree with Sartre's
pure freedom or praxis, then its state effectively occupies
the vast conceptual space Sartre embraced under the con-
cept of the 'practice-inert'). The potential risk, as I have
suggested elsewhere, is the effective 'despecification' (or
'singularization') of situations in general, to say nothing of
the truth-processes that 'puncture' them.73 Some readers
might prefer to settle for a slightly more 'impure' range of
possibility were it informed by a more determinate, more
specific understan.ding
-~------of .the situation as su~ ------------

I?-

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