JOSE LINO LUNA vs.

EULOGIO RODRIGUEZ
G.R. No. 13744. November 29, 1918
DOCTRINE:
The rules and regulations, for the conduct of elections, are mandatory before the
election, but when it is sought to enforce them after the election, they are held to be
directory only, if that is possible, especially where, if they are held to be mandatory,
innocent voters will be deprived of their votes without any fault on their part. The various
and numerous provisions of the Election Law were adopted to assist the voters in their
participation in the affairs of the government and not to defeat that object.
Facts: An election for the office of governor of the Province of Rizal was held on the 6th
day of June, 1916. At said election Jose Lino Luna, Eulogio Rodriguez and Servando de
los Angeles were candidates for said office. The election was closed, the votes cast
were counted, and a return was made by the inspectors of said municipalities to the
provincial board of Canvassers, who, after a canvass, proclaimed Eulogio Rodriguez,
having received a plurality of said votes, as duly elected governor of said province. Jose
Lino Luna presented a protest in the CFI and a new trial was ordered. Additional
evidence was adduced. Judge McMahon found that the inspectors in Binangonan did
not close the polls at 6 oclock p.m., and that a large number of persons voted after that
time. The judge then directed that the total vote of Rodriguez be reduced, without
ascertaining how many had been cast for Rodriguez and how many for Luna.
Issue: Whether or not the ballots cast after the hour fixed for closing were valid.
Held: The ballots were valid. The law provides that at all elections, the polls shall be
open from seven oclock in the morning until six oclock in the afternoon. The polls
should be open and closed in strict accord with said provisions. Voters who do not
appear and offer to vote within the hours designated by the law should not be permitted
to vote if the time for closing the polls has arrived. Upon the other hand, if the voter is
prevented, during the voting hours, from voting, and is not permitted to vote by reason
of the failure of the inspectors to do their duty, then, certainly, in the absence of some
fraud, neither such votes nor the entire vote of the precinct should be annulled simply
because some votes were cast after the regular hours. The ballot of the innocent voter
should not be annulled and he should not be deprived of his participation in the affairs of
his government when he was guilty of no illegal act or fraud. The election inspectors
should be held to comply strictly with the law. If they violate the law, they should be
punished and not the innocent voter.

AKBAYAN-Youth vs Commission on Election

GR Nos. 147066 & 147179; 26 March 2001)
DOCTRINE: The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right is
subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our
Constitution, statute books, and other repositories of law. As to the substantive aspect,
Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution provides for it. As to the procedural limitation,
the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural
requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Proceeding
from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the
State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safeguard and regulate the act of voters registration for the ultimate purpose of
conducting honest, orderly, and peaceful election
FACTS: Petitioners - representing the youth sector - seek to direct the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the May 14, 2001
General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four
million youth failed to register on or before the December 27, 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189.On February 8, 2001, the
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 3584 denying the petition. Aggrieved by the denial,
petitioners AKBAYAN-Youth, SCAP, UCSC, MASP, KOMPIL II(YOUTH) et al. filed
before this Court the instant Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not this Court can compel respondent COMELEC to conduct a

special registration of new voters during the period between the COMELECs
imposed December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it
denied the extension of the voters registration.
HELD:
1. The petitions are bereft of merit. As to the procedural limitation, the act of
registration is an indispensable precondition to the right of suffrage. For
registration is part and parcel of the right to vote and an indispensable element in
the election process. Thus, contrary to petitioners argument, registration cannot
and should not be denigrated to the lowly stature of a mere statutory
requirement. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary
requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent
police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful

election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from
the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times.
Considering the circumstances where the writ of mandamus lies and the
peculiarities of the present case, we are of the firm belief that petitioners failed to
establish, to the satisfaction of this Court, that they are entitled to the issuance of
this extraordinary writ so as to effectively compel respondent COMELEC to
conduct a special registration of voters. For the determination of whether or not
the conduct of a special registration of voters is feasible, possible or practical
within the remaining period before the actual date of election, involves the
exercise of discretion and thus, cannot be controlled by mandamus.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petitions for certiorari and mandamus
are hereby DENIED.
2. No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear
provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which provides that no voters registration shall
be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of suffrage is
not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a
mere statutory requirement. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police
power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters
registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly and peaceful
election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election
activities could be performed by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and
orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed from the
pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189
prevails over RA 8436 in that RA 8189s provision is explicit as to the prohibition.
Suffice it to say that it is a pre-election act that cannot be reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC
has shown in its pleadings that if it is allowed, it will substantially create a setback
in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from the special
two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters,
have to be inspected again, verified, sealed, then entered into the computerized
voters list; and then they will have to reprint the voters information sheet for the
update and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have
been overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In
short, it will cost more inconvenience than good. Further still, the allegation that
youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYAN-Youths
pleading was attached any actual complaint from an individual youth voter about
any inconvenience arising from the fact that the voters registration has ended on
December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in their pleading that
they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some

reasons, which is not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not
those who slumber on their rights.
Yra vs Abano
DOCTRINE:
A candidate who was elected to the office of municipal president and who at the time of
the election was registered as a voter of Manila and not of the municipality in which he
was a candidate, is nevertheless eligible to the office, and proceedings in the nature
of quo warranto instituted by virtue of the provisions of section 408 of the Election Law,
as amended, by the vice-president elect of the municipality, who challenged the right of
the municipal president elect, to the position to which elected on the ground that the
municipal president was ineligible, cannot be successfully maintained.
The Election Law makes use of the terms "qualified voter in this municipality" and
"qualified elector therein." To be a qualified voter does not necessarily mean that a
person must be a registered voter. It is sufficient to the candidate to posses all the
qualifications prescribed in section 431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in
section 432. The fact that a candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality
does not deprive him of the right to become a candidate and to be voted for.
One may be a qualified voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not
confer the right; it is but a condition precedent to the exercise of the right. registration
regulates the exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right.
Facts:
Respondent Maximo Abano is a native of Meycauayan, Bulacan. At the proper age, he
transferred to Manila to study. While temporarily residing in Manila, Abano registered as
a voter there. Shortly after qualifying as a member of the bar and after the death of his
father, Abano returned to Meycauayan to live there. From May 10, 1927, up to present,
Abano has considered himself a resident of Meycauayan. When the 1928 elections
were approaching, he made an application for cancellation of registration in Manila
dated April 3, 1928, but this application was rejected by the city officials for the reason
that it was not deposited in the mails on or before April 4, 1928. Nevertheless Abano
presented himself as a candidate for municipal president of Meycauayan in the 1928
elections and was elected by popular vote to that office. Petitioner Marcos Yra assails
the eligibility of Abano on the ground that he had not been a resident of Meycauayan for
at least one year previous to the election.
Issue:
Is the non-eligibility of the respondent to hold a municipal office for the reason that he
was not a qualified voter in his municipality, connoting that he was not a qualified
elector therein, sufficient to nullify his election?

Held:
No.
Ratio Decidendi:
One of the qualifications required by law of a person who announces his candidacy is
that he must be a duly qualified elector. The Executive Bureau has held that the term
"qualified" when applied to a voter does not necessarily mean that a person must be a
registered voter. To become a qualified candidate a person does not need to register as
an elector. It is sufficient that he possesses all the qualifications prescribed in section
431 and none of the disqualifications prescribed in section 432. The fact that a
candidate failed to register as an elector in the municipality does not deprive him of the
right to become a candidate to be voted for. Furthermore, the law of Kentucky provides
that "No person shall be eligible to any office who is not at time of his election a qualified
voter of the city and who has not resided therein three years preceding his election." It
was said that "The act of registering is only one step towards voting, and it is not one of
the elements that makes the citizen a qualified voter. . . . One may be a qualified
voter without exercising the right to vote. Registering does not confer the right; it is but
a condition precedent to the exercise of the right."The distinction is between a qualified
elector and the respondent is such, and a registered qualified elector and the
respondent is such although not in his home municipality. Registration regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage. It is not a qualification for such right. It should not be
forgotten that the people of Meycauayan have spoken and their choice to be their local
chief executive is the respondent. The will of the electorate should be respected

Asistio vs. AguirreG.R. No. 191124 April 27, 2010

DOCTRINE: Domicile is not easily lost. To successfully effect a transfer thereof, one must
demonstrate: (1) an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts
which correspond with that purpose.There must be animus manendi coupled
with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must
be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the
residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual
Facts: Private respondent Echiverri filed a Petition for Exclusion of Voter from the
p e r m a n e n t l i s t o f v o t e r s o f C a l o o c a n C i t y b e f o r e t h e Me T C p r e s i d e d b y
J u d g e Malabaguio. He alleged that Asistio is not a resident of Caloocan City and was
no longer residing in the address stated in his CoC for Mayor in the 2010
Elections. Malabaguio rendered a decision directing the Election Registration Board to remove
the name of Asistion from the list of permanent voters of Caloocan City. Echiverri then filed with
the COMELEC a Petition for Disqualification on the grounds that Asistio is not a resident
of Caloocan City and that he had been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Asistio filed his Notice of Appeal and paid the required appeal fees through postal money
orders on Feb.10,2010. Echiverri filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the RTC did not

acquire jurisdiction over the appeal on the ground of failure to file the required appeal fees.
Judge Aguirre granted the motion for failing to pay the docket fees essential for the RTC to
acquire jurisdiction over the appeal. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not Asistio should be excluded from the permanent list of voters of Caloocan City
for failure to comply with the residency required by law.
Held: The Supreme Court ruled that from the provisions of Section 117 of BP 881 and
Section 9 of RA 8189, the residency requirement of voter is at least 1 year residence in the
Philippines and at least 6 months in the place where the person proposes or intends to
vote. Residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications
fors u f fr a g e i s d o c t r i n a l l y s e t t l e d t o m e a n d o m i c i l e . D o m i c i l e d e n o t e s
a f i xe d permanent residence where, when absent for business or pleasure, one
intends to return. To successfully effect a transfer of domicile one must demonstrate: (1)
an actual removal or change of domicile; (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the
place of residence; (3) acts which correspond with that purpose. Asistio has always
been a resident of Caloocan City since birth and his family is also known to be among
t h e p r o m i n e n t p o l i t i c a l f a m i l i e s i n C a l o o c a n . H e e ve n s e r v e d a s a 2 nd
district representative in Caloocan and sought also election as City Mayor in 2007.
Taking these circumstances into consideration, it cannot be denied that Asistio has qualified and
continues to qualify as a voter of Caloocan City.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC 248 SCRA 300

DOCTRINE:
If a person retains his domicile of origin for purposes of the residence requirement, the 1
year period is irrelevant because wherever he is, he is a resident of his domicile of
origin. Second, if a person reestablishes a previously abandoned domicile, the 1 year
requirement must be satisfied.
Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.
March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos
did
not
meet
the
residency
requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the
COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was
the result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always maintained
Tacloban
City
as
her
domicile
or
residence.

April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution
that found Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos corrected
certificate
of
candidacy
void,
and
her
original
certificate
cancelled.
May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution
drafted
on
April
24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation to
the office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number
of votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would
be
suspended
even
if
she
did
win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of
the
said
Congressional
election.
Issues/
Held/Ratio:
(1)
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus
candidate,
of
the
first
district
of
Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to
be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers of the constitution)2.
The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy
can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the
entry for the number of years and months in the residence where the candidate seeks to
hold office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed to
negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in
Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify
Marcos were only actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she
was required to change residences and apply for voters registration in these cited
locations. When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost
her domicile of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further
contemplated in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer
residences to wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not
mean or intend to lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her
choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG
chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their
farm
in
Olot,
Leyte.
(2)

WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of
the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the
House of Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of
having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event,
Sections 6 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo
and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support. and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P.
881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and
decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
elections.
(3)
WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the
question
of
the
petitioners
qualifications
after
the
elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member
of
the
House
of
Representatives.
Puno,
J.
(Concurring):
All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former
dictator, her domicile became subject to change by law and the right to change it was
given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in
Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of
Leyte.
Francisco,
J.
(Concurring):
Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in Tacloban since
1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First
Congressional
District
of
Leyte.

Romero,
J.
(Separate):
Womens rights as per choosing her domicile after husbands death is evident in this
case. Marcos living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement.
Vitug,
J.
(Separate):
It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified. The
Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the
Electoral Tribunal on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly
within
their
exclusive
domain.
Voted
for
dismissal.
Mendoza,
J.
(Concurring):
The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on
the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. It has
none and the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are
elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate
forum
(not
necessarily
COMELEC,
but
the
HRET).
Padilla,
J.
(Dissenting):
Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy should not be
blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in holding the petitioner disqualified. And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes
cast
for
a
disqualified
candidate
shall
not
be
counted.
Regalado,
J.
(Dissenting):
A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of her husband
does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Such theory is not stated
in
any
of
the
provisions
of
law.
Davide,
Jr.
J.
(Dissenting):
A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELECs resolutions are within the scope
and jurisdiction of this particular agencys powers. In agreement with Regalado, re:
womans domicile.

Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 608 SCRA 733

Doctrine: The Constitution does not require congressional candidate to be a property
owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at
least a year prior to election day-to use property in the district as the determinative
indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the Court would be, in
effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property
requirement would be unconstitutional
FACTS and HELD:
July 6, 2007 Petitioner Jesus L. Vicente filed a petition for quo warranto against Danilo
Ramon S. Fernandez (HRET Case No. 07-034) on the ground that respondent lacked
the residency requirement of one year in the First District of Laguna as provided in Sec.
6, Article VI, of the Constitution.
In all of Fernandezs previous certificates of candidacy (1998, 2001 and 2004 elections),
he declared under oath that his permanent residence is Pagsanjan. However, it was
only in the 2007 elections that Fernandez claimed to have changed his residence to
Sta. Rosa City . The petitioner in the quo warranto case, Vicente, knew for a fact that
Fernandez never resided in Sta. Rosa, being a resident of that place himself.
Dec. 16, 2008 - The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) declared
Fernandez ineligible for the office of representative of the first district of Laguna for lack
of residence in the district and ordered him to vacate his office.
April 30, 2009 The HRET, in Resolution No. 09-080, denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Fernandez on Dec. 22, 2008 due to the absence of new issues
or arguments that have not been resolved in the 2008 decision. On the same day, the
HRET decision became final and executory which was entered in the book of entries of
judgment.
May 11, 2009 The HRET final decision unseating Fernandez was entered in the
bodys book of entries of judgment. The Secretary of the Tribunal furnished the House of
Representatives a copy of the decision and was received by the Office of the Secretary
General
on
the
same
day.
May 21, 2009 The HRET, in denying petitioners urgent motion for issuance of a writ of
execution, said such writ from the tribunal is not a required document for enforcement of
the Dec. 16, 2008 decision, and a notice of judgment to the House of Representatives
suffices for the House Speaker to order the Secretary General to execute the decision.
In a meeting held on May 21, the tribunal said it has already sent notice on May 11,

2009 to the Office of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall execute
the
judgment.
In the same Resolution No. 09-101, the HRET cited Rule 96 of the HRET Rules of
Procedure, it is not the tribunal but the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
through the Secretary General, who shall execute the final and executory decision
unless a temporary restraining order is issued by the Supreme Court.
June 9, 2009 - Atty. Sixto Brilliantes, on behalf of petitioner Vicente, requested the
House Speaker and Secretary General in a letter to instantly implement and enforce
the final and executory decision of the HRET by disallowing Fernandez from further
representing himself as member of the House of Representatives of the first legislative
district of Laguna, be removing and delisting his name from the Roll of Members of the
House of Representatives. In the same letter, Brilliantes informed the House that
Fernandez filed a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a TRO before
the Supreme Court. Fernandez did not furnish the House a copy of the petition.
Since no temporary restraining order, status quo or injunctive order has been issued by
the Supreme Court, the decision of the HRET remains final and executory. HRET
decisions are not appealable to the Supreme Court, the tribunal being the sole judge of
all contests relating the election, returns, and qualifications of House members. Mere
filing of a petition for certiorari and prohibition does not stay a final and executory
decision of the HRET.
The only recourse given by the judicial system is to question the HRET decision via a
special civil action of certiorari to the Supreme Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A petition for certiorari is not an
appeal and its mere filing does not prevent the HRET decision from becoming final and
executory, unless the SC issues a TRO.
June 30, 2009 - Brilliantes in his letter to the House leadership, emphasized that for
each day that Fernandez is allowed to misrepresent the people of the first district of
Laguna, injustice is being perpetrated, especially because a person who has been
declared ineligible by a tribunal continues to benefit from the position, monetary or
otherwise. Brilliantes simply asks Nograles to recognize the authority of the HRET
bestowed by law and to perform his legal duty and obligation by executing the judgment
and having Fernandez removed from the rolls.
Atty. Brilliantes has sent a total of four letters to the House Speaker and Secretary

General, reminding them of their duty and obligation to enforce the final and executory
decision of the HRET. The letters remain unheeded to date.

MARUHOM VS COMELEC
DOCTRINE:
At balance, the question really boils down to a choice of philosophy and perception of
how to interpret and apply the laws relating to elections; literal or liberal; the letter or the
spirit; the naked provision or the ultimate purpose; legal syllogism or substantial justice;
in isolation or in context of social conditions; harshly against or gently in favor of the
voters obvious choice. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of popular sovereignty than to be right in complex but little understood
legalisms.
Maruhom challenges in her Petition the jurisdiction of the COMELEC in declaring her
registration in Marantao void. She asserts that Section 2, Article IX(c) of the Constitution
prohibits the COMELEC from assuming jurisdiction or deciding issues involving the right
to vote. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 8189, or the Voters Registration Act of 1996
(VRA), confers upon the MTCs and MeTCs original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases of inclusion and exclusion of voters in their respective cities or municipalities.
ISSUE: Is the challenge on Maruhoms registration, an issue on the right to vote and
thus, beyond COMELEC jurisdiction?

HELD: The present case is not about her being denied her right to register as a voter,
but is all about her making false material representations in her COC, which would
warrant the cancellation of the same. The resolutions of the COMELEC en banc merely
defeated Maruhoms intent to run for elective office, but it did not deprive her of her right
to vote. Although Maruhoms registration in Marantao is void, her registration in Marawi
still subsists. She may be barred from voting or running for mayor in the former, but she
may still exercise her right to vote, or even run for an elective post, in the latter.
It is settled that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over a petition filed under Section 78 of
the OEC.[21] In the exercise of such jurisdiction, it is within the competence of the
COMELEC to determine whether false representation as to material facts was made in
the COC.

ANTONIO B. GUNSI, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONERS, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DATU
ISRAEL SINSUAT,Respondents.

DOCTRINE: A person who has not duly accomplished an application for registration is
not a registered voter. xxx The application for registration shall contain three specimen
signatures of the applicant.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 1 of the Rules of Court filed
by petitioner Antonio B. Gunsi Sr. (Gunsi) challenging the June 9, 2005 Resolution 2 of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc which affirmed the October 11,
2004 Order3 of the COMELEC Second Division.
The undisputed facts:
On January 9, 2004, private respondent Datu Israel Sinsuat (Sinsuat) filed a petition for
the denial of due course to or cancellation of the certificate of candidacy (COC) of Gunsi
in connection with the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections.
Essentially, Sinsuat sought the disqualification of Gunsi for Mayor of South Upi,
Maguindanao, alleging, that: (a) Gunsi was not a registered voter in the Municipality of
South Upi, Maguindanao since he failed to sign his application for registration; (b)
Gunsis name was inserted illegally in the List of Applicants and Voters by Alice Lim,
Acting Election Officer of South Upi, Maguindanao; and (c) the unsigned application for
registration has no legal effect.
In refutation, Gunsi asseverated that his failure to sign his application for registration did
not affect the validity of his registration since he possesses the qualifications of a voter
set forth in Section 116 of the Omnibus Election Code as amended by Section 9 of
Republic Act 8189.
On March 12, 2004, after hearing, the Investigating Officer and Provincial Election
Supervisor III, Lintang H. Bedol, issued a resolution recommending Gunsis
disqualification to run for Municipal Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao on the ground
that he is not a registered voter of the municipality. Bedol pointed out that the signature
in the application for registration is indispensable for its validity as it is an authentication
and affirmation of the data appearing therein.
On August 2, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution, 4 to wit:

Although this case has become moot and academic since [Sinsuat] had been
proclaimed as the winning candidate for the position of Mayor of South Upi,
Maguindanao, in connection with the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local
Elections, [w]e, however, cannot allow the irregularities accompanying [Gunsis]
registration as raised by [Sinsuat] in his petition.
The absence of [Gunsis] signature in his application for registration casts serious doubt
in its preparation and execution. It also renders the authenticity of the document
questionable. In Dalumpines v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court ruled that "the
absence of the signature of the contracting parties on the deed itself casts serious doubt
in the preparation and execution of the deed."
In addition, the inclusion of [Gunsis] name in the Election Registration Boards Certified
List of Applicants for Registration appears to have been added irregularly as the last
name in a list of applicants arranged alphabetically.
WHEREFORE, considering that [Gunsi] lost in the election for the position of Mayor of
South Upi, Maguindanao and the fact that [Sinsuat] was duly proclaimed as Mayor of
South Upi, Maguindanao on May 16, 2004, there being only one respondent, the instant
petition is hereby DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
The Law Department, however, is directed to investigate the alleged irregularities herein
mentioned for possible violation of election laws and to file the necessary information as
the evidence warrants.
SO ORDERED.5
Subsequently, the same division of the COMELEC issued the herein assailed
Order6 clarifying the August 2, 2004 Resolution, thus:
In the light, however, of the pending pre-proclamation case docketed as SPC 04-247,
filed by herein respondent, and the resolution issued by the [COMELEC] (First Division)
annulling the proclamation of [Sinsuat], the possibility that a re-canvassing of the
election returns of the Municipality of South Upi, Maguindanao is becoming more
certain. Therefore, the ruling of the [COMELEC] (Second Division) dismissing the
present petition for disqualification against herein respondent for being moot and
academic becomes ineffective for the fact that, as argued by [Sinsuat] in his
manifestation and clarification, his proclamation has been annulled by the [COMELEC]
(First Division).
It is therefore, incumbent upon the [COMELEC] (Second Division) to issue a categorical
ruling based on its finding as already articulated in the August 2, 2004 resolution.
xxxx

In accordance with the above finding of the [COMELEC] (Second Division) it is [o]ur
resolve that [petitioner] Antonio B. Gunsi, Sr. is disqualified to run as Mayor of South
Upi, Maguindanao for being a non-registered resident of the same municipality.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the [COMELEC] (Second Division), hereby,
clarifies its August 2, 2004 resolution by declaring that, in accordance with the findings
of the [COMELEC] (Second Division) in the promulgated resolution, [petitioner] Antonio
B. Gunsi, Sr. is hereby DISQUALIFIED to run as Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao for
being a non-registered resident of the same.
SO ORDERED.7
Upon motion for reconsideration of Gunsi, the COMELEC En Banc issued the herein
assailed Resolution:8
A perusal of the motion for reconsideration would show that the respondent failed to
raise any new material issue. All matters raised in the Motion had already been
traversed and resolved in the Recommendation of Provincial Election Supervisor
Lintang Bedol dated March 12, 2004 and the Resolution of this Commission (Second
Division) promulgated last August 2, 2004 as clarified by its Order dated October 11,
2004.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION is
hereby DENIED. The ORDER dated October 11, 2004 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.9
Hence, this petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to the COMELEC. Gunsi posits
the following issues for our resolution:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION HAS JURISDICTION OVER
CASES INVOLVING THE RIGHT TO VOTE.
GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION
HAS JURISDICTION, WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE SECOND DIVISION
CAN CLARIFY ITS RESOLUTION AFTER SIXTY-NINE (69) DAYS FROM ITS
PROMULGATION OR AFTER IT HAS BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION
HAS JURISDICTION, WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION
COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS WHICH IS TANTAMOUNT TO GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION.
GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION
HAS JURISDICTION, WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COMMISSION IS
CORRECT WHEN IT DISQUALIFIED [GUNSI] TO RUN AS MAYOR OF SOUTH UPI,

MAGUINDANAO FOR BEING A NON REGISTERED RESIDENT OF THE SAME DUE

TO HIS INADVERTENT FAILURE TO AFFIX HIS SIGNATURE OVER HIS
HANDWRITTEN NAME IN THE SPACE PROVIDED THEREFOR IN HIS APPLICATION
FOR REGISTRATION PERSONALLY FILLED UP, SWORN TO AN ADMINISTERING
OFFICER AND DULY FILED WITH THE COMELEC.10
At the outset, we note that the term of office of Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao, for
which position Gunsi was disqualified by the COMELEC to run as a candidate had long
expired on June 30, 2007 following the last elections held on May 14 of the same year.
The expiration of term, therefore, is a supervening event which renders this case moot
and academic.
A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by
virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of no practical
value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such case, or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.11
The rule, however, admits of exceptions. Thus, courts may choose to decide cases
otherwise moot and academic if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution;
second, the exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling
principles to guide the bench, the bar and the public; or fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evasive of review.12 None of the foregoing exceptions calling for this Court
to exercise jurisdiction obtains in this instance.
In any event, upon a perusal of the merits or lack thereof, the petition is clearly
dismissible.
Gunsi insists that he possessed the qualifications to run for Mayor of South Upi,
Maguindanao; specifically, he claims that he was a registered voter at the time he filed
his COC. Gunsi is adamant that his mere failure to affix his signature to the application
for registration, which he accomplished personally before Joel Ellano, COMELEC
Administering Officer, did not necessarily invalidate his application for registration.
Consequently, Gunsi maintains that he is a registered voter, especially considering that
his name appears in the Registry List of Voters. In all, Gunsi avers that his COC should
not have been cancelled; ultimately, he should not have been disqualified from running
as Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao.
We are not convinced. Gunsis arguments are annihilated by Section 10 of Republic Act
No. 8189,13 The Voters Registration Act of 1996, which explicitly provides in pertinent
part:
SECTION 10. Registration of Voters. A qualified voter shall be registered in the
permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides to be
able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an
application form for registration as prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies

before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.
xxxx
x x x The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the
applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right thumbprints, with four
identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the
expense of the Commission.14
In stark contrast are the prevailing circumstances of Gunsis application for registration:
1. Only a photocopy15 of Gunsis application for registration was submitted in
evidence before Investigating Officer Bedol as the original thereof was
purportedly lost. The photocopy of the document clearly shows that Gunsi failed
to sign parts 2 and 3 thereof. The administering officer, Joel Ellano, likewise did
not sign part 3 of said document. These parts refer to the oath which Gunsi
should have taken to validate and swear to the veracity of the contents appearing
in the application for registration.1avvphi1
2. Joel Ellano was not presented by Gunsi to corroborate his claim that his failure
to sign the application was merely due to inadvertence. Surprisingly, Gunsi chose
to present, as witness, Alice Lim, Acting Election Officer of South Upi,
Maguindanao, who admitted that she received an unsigned letter furnishing her a
copy of Gunsis unsigned application for registration and that she did not bother
requiring Gunsi to accomplish in full the application for registration in order to
complete the List of Voters.16 Lim likewise admits to inserting Gunsis name in the
List of Voters based on the photocopy of an unsigned application for registration
which she had previously seen. Hence, the listing of the Applicants for
Registration and the Lists of Voters which are alphabetically arranged with
Gunsis name inserted thereat.17
3. The testimonies of Noraida Enero, Rowena Unson and Abdullah Mato,
Municipal Treasurer of Upi, members of the Election Registration Board of South
Upi, Maguindanao, who all categorically stated that they did not encounter
Gunsis application for registration.18
Plainly, from the foregoing, the irregularities surrounding Gunsis application for
registration eloquently proclaim that he did not comply with the minimum requirements
of RA No. 8189. This leads to only one conclusion: that Gunsi, not having demonstrated
that he duly accomplished an application for registration, is not a registered voter. In
short, the cancellation of Gunsis COC by the COMELEC and his consequent
disqualification from running as Mayor of South Upi, Maguindanao, was correct.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The

COMELEC Order and Resolution dated October 11, 2004 and June 9, 2005 are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Domino vs COMELEC
[G.R. No. 134015. July 19, 1999]
Facts:
Juan Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of the Lone Legislative
District of the Province of Sarangani in the May 1998 elections. However, private
respondents filed with the COMELEC a petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy. They alleged that the petitioner is neither a resident nor a
registered voter of the Province of Sarangani where he seeks election.
The COMELEC Second Division disqualified the petitioner as candidate and ordered
the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. The votes cast for Domino were counted
and he got the highest number of votes. So, he filed a motion for reconsideration but
denied by the COMELEC en banc.
Issues:
1.

Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction to deny or cancel the certificate of
candidacy of the petitioner.

2.

Whether or not petitioner is a resident of Sarangani Province for at least 1 year

immediately preceding the May 1998 election
Ruling:

1.

Yes, the COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Section 78 Article IX of the

Omnibus Election Code over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of
candidacy. It is within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to determine whether false
representations as to the material facts were made in the certificate of candidacy
including the residence requirement.

2.

No, the term residence as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage
and for elective office, means the same thing as domicile which gives the intention to
reside in a fixed place and personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. The petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilucos Sur
but acquired his domicile of choice at 24 Bonifacio St. Ayala Heights, Old Balara,
Quezon City.
Domino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Domino is running for representative of Province of Sarangani but is disqualified for lack
of compliance with the 1-yr. residence requirement. Before this, Domino was declared
by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in an exclusion proceedings that he was
a resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City. Domino contends that the MTC
decision is conclusive upon the COMELEC. But the Supreme Court held otherwise
because any fact established in an inclusion or exclusion proceedings only applies to
that election and not to elections thereafter held. The decision of the MTC does not
preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of the candidates qualification, to pass
upon

the

issue

of

compliance

with

the

residency

requirement.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary
in character. xxx Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass
upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the question of
citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion or
exclusion from the list of voters necessarily carries with it the power to inquire into and
settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right
to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in
relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion
proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.
In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any further action that a party may take
concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion

proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voters political status, nor bar
subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.
The petitioner contended that he already established his new domicile in Sarangani by
leasing a house and lot located therein. However, the Court is unsatisfied with it. The
lease contract may be indicative of Dominos intention to reside in Sarangani, however,
it does not produce the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of his
original domicile.