CANGCO V.

MANILA RAILROAD CO
FACTS: On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the
train of Manila Railroad Co (MRC). He was an employee
of the latter and he was given a pass so that he could
ride the train for free. When he was nearing his
destination at about 7pm, he arose from his seat even
though the train was not at full stop.
1. When he was about to alight from the train
(which was still slightly moving) he accidentally
stepped on a sack of watermelons which he
failed to notice due to the fact that it was dim.
2. This caused him to lose his balance at the door
and he fell and his arm was crushed by the train
and he suffered other serious injuries. He was
dragged a few meters more as the train slowed
down.
3. It was established that the employees of MRC
were negligent in piling the sacks of
watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact
that Cangco was also negligent as he failed to
exercise diligence in alighting from the train as
he did not wait for it to stop.

ISSUE: WON Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.

HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is

slowing down is a common practice and a lot of people
are doing so every day without suffering injury. Cangco
has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was
by no means so risky for him to get off while the train
was yet moving as the same act would have been in
an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the
fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there
were no appropriate warnings and the place was dimly
lit.

The Court also elucidated on the distinction between

the liability of employers under Article 2180 and their
liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric;

that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extracontractual liability to such person. When such a
contractual relation exists the obligor may break the
contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual
obligation had no contract existed between the
parties.

Manresa: Whether negligence occurs

the course of the performance of
undertaking or in itself the source
contractual undertaking obligation,
characteristics are identical.

NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any

negligence whatever in the selection and direction of
the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the latter,
whatever done within the scope of his employment
or not, if the damage done by the servant does not
amount to a breach of the contract between the
master and the person injured.

The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is

always based upon a voluntary act or omission which,
without willful intent, but by mere negligence or
inattention, has caused damage to another.

an incident in
a contractual
of an extraits essential

Vinculum Juris: (def) It means an obligation of law,

or the right of the obligee to enforce a civil matter in a
court of law.

LA MALLORCA V. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Plaintiffs husband and wife (Spouses Beltran),
together with their minor children, boarded a La
Mallorca bus.
1. Upon arrival at their destination, plaintiffs and
their children alighted from the bus and the
father led them to a shaded spot about 5 meters
from the vehicle. The father returned to the bus
to get a piece of baggage which was not
unloaded.
2. He was followed by her daughter Raquel. While
the father was still on the running board
awaiting for the conductor to give his baggage,
the bus started to run so that the father had to
jump. Raquel, who was near the bus, was run
over and killed.
3. Lower court rendered judgment for the plaintiff
which was affirmed by CA, holding La Mallorca
liable for quasi-delict and ordering it to pay
P6,000 plus P400.
4. La Mallorco contended that when the child
was killed, she was no longer a passenger and
therefore the contract of carriage terminated.
ISSUE: WON the contractual obligation between the
parties ceases the moment the passenger alighted
form the vehicle

HELD: On the question whether the liability of the

carrier, as to the child who was already led a place 5
meters from the bus under the contract of carrier, still
persists, we rule in the affirmative. It is a recognized
rules that the relation between carrier and passengers
does not cease at the moment the passenger alights
from the carriers premises, to be determined from the
circumstances. In this case, there was no utmost
diligence. Firstly, the driver, although stopping the bus,
did not put off the engine. Secondly, he started to run
the bus even before the bus conductor gave him the
signal and while the latter was unloading cargo. Here,
the presence of said passenger near the bus was not
unreasonable and the duration of responsibility still
exists. Averment of quasi-delict is permissible under
the Rules of Court, although incompatible with the
contract of carriage. The Rules of Court allows the
plaintiffs to allege causes of action in the alternative,
be they compatible with each other or not (Sec. 2, Rule
1). Even assuming arguendo that the contract of
carriage has already terminated, herein petitioner can
be held liable for the negligence of its driver pursuant
to Art. 2180 of NCC. Decision MODIFIED. Only question
raised in the briefs can be passed upon, and as
plaintiffs did not appeals the award of P3,000.00 the
increase by the CA of the award to P6,000.00 cannot
be sustained.

dismissed the complaints holding that the

accident was exclusively due to fortuitous
events.
ISSUE: WON the carrier is liable for the manufacturing
defect of the steering knuckle, and whether the
evidence discloses that in regard thereto the carrier
exercised the diligence required by law
NECESITO V. PARAS
RELATED LAW: Civil Code: ART. 1755. A common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for the all the circumstances.
FACTS: Severina Garces and her son Precillano
Necesito boarded a passenger truck of the Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines driven by Francisco Bandonell.
1. The truck entered a wooden bridge, but the
front wheels swerved to the right.
2. The driver lost control, and after wrecking the
bridge's wooden rails, the truck fell on its right
side into a creek where water was breast deep.
Garces died due to drowning while Necesito
suffered injuries.
3. Two actions for damages and attorney's fees
totalling over P85,000 were filed with the Tarlac
CFI against the carrier. The carrier pleaded that
the accident was due to "engine or mechanical
trouble" independent or beyond the control of
the defendants or of the driver Bandonell.
4. The trial court found that the bus was
proceeding slowly due to the bad condition of
the road and that accident was due to the
fracture of the trucks right steering knuckle
which could not be known by the carrier. Thus, it

HELD: Yes. While the carrier is not an insurer of the

safety of the passengers, a passenger is entitled to
recover damages from a carrier for an injury resulting
from a defect in an appliance purchased from a
manufacturer, whenever it appears that the defect
would have been discovered by the carrier if it had
exercised the degree of care which under the
circumstances was incumbent upon it, with regard to
inspection and application of the necessary tests. In
this connection, the manufacturer of the defective
appliance is considered in law the agent of the carrier,
and the good repute of the manufacturer will not
relieve the carrier from liability. The rationale of the
carriers liability is the fact that the passenger has no
privity with the manufacturer of the defective
equipment; hence, he has no remedy against him,
while the carrier usually has. Carriers liability rests
upon negligence, his failure to exercise the "utmost"
degree of diligence that the law requires, and in case
of a passenger's death or injury the carrier bears the
burden of satisfying the court that he has duly
discharged the duty of prudence required.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES V. CA AND SAMSON

FACTS: December 1950, Samson complained to PAL
through its authorized official about the slow reaction
and
poor
judgment
of
Captain
Bustamante.
Notwithstanding said complaint, defendant allowed the
pilot to continue flying.
1. January 8, 1951: Jesus V. Samson flew as copilot on a regular flight from Manila to Legaspi
with stops at Daet, Camarines Norte and
Camarines Sur, with Captain Bustamante as
commanding pilot of a PAL C-47 plane
2. On attempting to land the plane at Daet airport,
Captain Bustamante due to his very slow
reaction and poor judgment overshot the airfield
and as a result, notwithstanding the diligent
efforts of the Samson to avert an accident, the
airplane crash landed beyond the runway; that
the jolt caused the head of the plaintiff to hit
and break through the thick front windshield of
the airplane causing him severe brain
concussion, wounds and abrasions on the
forehead with intense pain
3. instead of expert and proper medical treatment
called for by the nature and severity of his
injuries, PAL simply referred him to a
company physician,
a
general
medical
practitioner, who limited the treatment to the
exterior injuries without examining the severe
brain concussion

4. Several days after the accident, PAL called back

the Samson to active duty as co-pilot, and was
never given any examination
5. he had been having periodic dizzy spells and
had been suffering from general debility
andnervousness
6. December 21, 1953: he was discharged due to
his physical disabilityCFI: PAL to pay the Samson
a. P1988,000.00 as unearned income or
damages
b. P50,000.00 for moral damages
c. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees
d. P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation
7. CA: modified entitled to the legal rate of interest
n unearned income
ISSUE: WON PAL was negligent and was liable
HELD: YES. affirmed with slight modification in that
the correct amount of compensatory damages is
P204,000.00
Even the doctors presented by PAL admit vital facts
about the brain injury. Dr. Bernardo and Dr. Reyes
admits that due to the incident, the plaintiff
continuously complained of his fainting spells,
dizziness and headache everytime he flew as a co-pilot
and everytime he went to the clinic no less than 25
times
We also find the imputation of gross negligence by
respondent court to PAL for having allowed Capt. Delfin
Bustamante to fly on that fateful day of the accident
on January 8, 1951 to be correct

Bustamante was sick. He admittedly had tumor of the

nasopharynx (nose)

the safety of the passengers is further set forth in

articles 1755 and 1756.

The fact that the complaint was not in writing does not
detract anything from the seriousness thereof,
considering that a miscalculation would not only cause
the death of the crew but also of the passengers.
One month prior to the crash-landing, when the pilot
was preparing to land in Daet, plaintiff warned him
that they were not in the vicinity of Daet but above the
town of Ligao. The plane hit outside the airstrip. In
another instance, the pilot would hit the Mayon
Volcano had not Samson warned him.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the

passenger safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very
cautious persons, with a due regard for all the
circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers,
common carriers are presumed to have been at fault
or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that
they observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in
Articles 1733 and 1755.

At least, the law presumes the employer negligent

imposing upon it the burden of proving that it
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
the supervision of its employees.

Article
2205
of
the
New
Civil
Code
of
the Philippines damages may be recovered for loss or
impairment of earning capacity in cases of temporary
or permanent personal injury."

PAL would want to tie Samson to the report he signed

about the crash-landing. The report was prepared by
his pilot and because the latter pleaded that he had a
family too and would have nowhere to go if he lost his
job, Samsons compassion would not upturn the truth
about the crash-landing

Art. 1711. Owners of enterprises and other employers

are obliged to pay compensation for the death or
injuries to their laborers, workmen, mechanics or other
employees, even though the event may have been
purely accidental or entirely due to a fortuitous cause,
if the death or personal injury arose out of and in the
course of the employment. The employer is also liable
for compensation if the employee contracts any illness
or disease caused by such employment or as the result
of the nature of the employment. If the mishap was
due to the employees own notorious negligence, or
voluntary act, or drunkenness, the employer shall not
be liable for compensation. When the employees lack
of due care contributed to his death or injury, the
compensation shall be equitably reduced.
Art. 1712. If the death or injury is due to the
negligence of a fellow-worker, the latter and the

Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their

business and for reasons of public policy, are bound to
observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over
the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported
by
them,
according
to
all
the
circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in Articles 1734, and 1745,
Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for

employer shall be solidarily liable for compensation. If

a fellow-workers intentional or malicious act is the
only cause of the death or injury, the employer shall
not be answerable, unless it should be shown that the
latter did not exercise due diligence in the selection or
supervision of the plaintiffs fellow-worker.
Articles 1169, 2209 and 2212 of the Civil Code govern
when interest shall be computed.
The correct amount of compensatory damages upon
which legal interest shall accrue from the filing of the
complaint is P204,000.00 as herein computed and not
P198,000.00

BRINAS V. PEOPLE
FACTS: In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito
Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station
in Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother
Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita
Gesmundo. The two were bound for Lusacan in Tiaong,
Quezon.
1. They boarded the train of Manila Railroad
Company at about 2pm. Upon approaching
Barrio Lagalag at 8pm, the train slowed down
and the conductor, accused-appellant, Clemente
Brinas, shouted Lusacan, Lusacan!
2. The old woman walked towards the train exit
carrying the child with one hand and holding her
baggage with the other.
3.
When they were near the door, the train
suddenly picked up speed. The old woman and
the child stumbled from the train causing them
to fall down the tracks and were hit by an
oncoming train, causing their instant death.
4. A criminal information was filed against Victor
Milan, the driver, Hermogenes Buencamino, the
assistant conductor and Clemente Brinas for
Double Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. But
the
lower
court
acquitted
Milan
and
Buencamino. On appeal to the CA, respondent
CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in ruling the accusedappellant was negligent

HELD: No. There was no error in the factual findings of

the respondent court and in the conclusion drawn from
the findings.
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience
about common carriers like trains and buses that
before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down
and the conductor announces the name of the place. It
is also a matter of common experience that as the
train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers
usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to
disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This
is especially true of a train because passengers feel
that if the train resumes its run before they are able to
disembark; there is no way to stop it as a bus may be
stopped. The appellant was negligent because his
announcement was premature and erroneous, for it
took a full 3 minutes more before the next barrio of
Lusacan was reached. The premature announcement
prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the
nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims
would have been safely seated in their respective
seats when the train jerked and picked up speed. The
proximate cause of the death of the victims was the
premature and erroneous announcement of petitionerappellant.

ISAAC V. AL AMMEN TRANPORT CO

FACTS: A. L. Ammen Transportation Co., Inc. is a
corporation engaged in the business of transporting
passengers by land for compensation in the Bicol
provinces and one of the lines it operates is the one
connecting Legaspi City, Albay with Naga City,
Camarines Sur.
1. One of the buses which Ammen Transportation
was operating is Bus 31. On 31 May 1951, Cesar
L. Isaac boarded said bus as a passenger paying
the required fare from Ligao, Albay bound for
Pili, Camarines Sur, but before reaching his
destination, the bus collided with a motor
vehicle of the pick-up type coming from the
opposite direction, as a result of which Isaacs
left arm was completely severed and the
severed portion fell inside the bus.
2. Isaac was rushed to a hospital in Iriga,
Camarines Sur where he was given blood
transfusion to save his life. After 4 days, he was
transferred to another hospital in Tabaco, Albay,
where he underwent treatment for 3 months. He
was moved later to the Orthopedic Hospital
where he was operated on and stayed there for
another 2 months.
3. For these services, he incurred expenses
amounting to P623.40, excluding medical fees
which were paid by Ammen Transporation.
4. As an aftermath, Isaac brought an action against
Ammen Transportation for damages alleging
that the collision which resulted in the loss of his
left arm was mainly due to the gross
incompetence and recklessness of the driver of

the bus operated by Ammen Transportation and

that Ammen Transporation incurred in culpa
contractual arising from its non-compliance with
its obligation to transport Isaac safely to his
destination.
5. Ammen Transportation set up as special defense
that the injury suffered by Isaac was due
entirely to the fault or negligence of the driver
of the pick-up car which collided with the bus
driven by its driver and to the contributory
negligence of Isaac himself.
6. The court after trial found that the collision
occurred due to the negligence of the driver of
the pick-up car and not to that of the driver of
the bus it appearing that the latter did
everything he could to avoid the same but that
notwithstanding his efforts, he was not able to
avoid it.
7. As a consequence, the court dismissed the
complaint, with costs against Isaac. Isaac
appealed.
1. Article 1733 NCC
Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that Common
carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set
forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
2. Article 1755 NCC

Article 1755 of the Civil Code provides that A common

carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
3. Article 1756 NCC
Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that In case of
death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733
and 1755.
4.
Rationale
for
extraordinary
diligence
requirement for a common carrier
The Code Commission, in justifying this extraordinary
diligence required of a common carrier, said A
common carrier is bound to carry the passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide,
using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with due regard for all circumstances. This
extraordinary diligence required of common carriers is
calculated to protect the passengers from the tragic
mishaps that frequently occur in connection with rapid
modern transportation. This high standard of care is
imperatively demanded by the preciousness of human
life and by the consideration that every person must in
every way be safeguarded against all injury.
5. Principles governing liability of a common
carrier
From the legal provisions, the following restatement of
the principles governing the liability of a common
carrier can be made: (1) the liability of a carrier is
contractual and arises upon breach of its obligation.

There is breach if it fails to exert extraordinary

diligence according to all the circumstances of each
case; (2) a carrier is obliged to carry its passenger with
the utmost diligence of a very cautious person, having
due regard for all the circumstances; (3) a carrier is
presumed to be at fault or to have acted negligently in
case of death of, or injury to, passengers, it being its
duty to prove that it exercised extraordinary diligence;
and (4) the carrier is not an insurer against all risks of
travel.
6. Facts; Bus running at moderate speed,
swerved to avoid reckless pick-up car
Herein, Bus 31, immediately prior to the collision, was
running at a moderate speed because it had just
stopped at the school zone of Matacong, Polangui,
Albay. The pick-up car was at full speed and was
running outside of its proper lane. The driver of the
bus, upon seeing the manner in which the pick-up was
then running, swerved the bus to the very extreme
right of the road until its front and rear wheels have
gone over the pile of stones or gravel situated on the
rampart of the road. Said driver could not move the
bus farther right and run over a greater portion of the
pile, the peak of which was about 3 feet high, without
endangering the safety of his passengers. And
notwithstanding all these efforts, the rear left side of
the bus was hit by the pick-up car.
7. Coolness and accuracy of judgment required
in ordinary circumstances cannot be expected in
sudden emergency; Acts of a prudent man in
situation done
While the position taken by Isaac, i.e. that the driver of
the bus should have stopped the bus to allow the other
vehicle to pass rather than squeezing between the

oncoming pick-up and the pile of gravel, appeals more

to the sense of caution that one should observe in a
given situation to avoid an accident or mishap, such
however cannot always be expected from one who is
placed suddenly in a predicament where he is not
given enough time to take the proper course of action
as he should under ordinary circumstances. One who is
placed in such a predicament cannot exercise such
coolness or accuracy of judgment as is required of him
under ordinary circumstances and he cannot therefore
be expected to observe the same judgment, care and
precaution as in the latter. For this reason, authorities
abound where failure to observe the same degree of
care that as ordinary prudent man would exercise
under ordinary circumstances when confronted with a
sudden emergency was held to be warranted and a
justification to exempt the carrier from liability. Thus, it
was held that where a carriers employee is
confronted with a sudden emergency, the fact that he
is obliged to act quickly and without a chance for
deliberation must be taken into account, and he is not
held to the same degree of care that he would
otherwise be required to exercise in the absence of
such emergency but must exercise only such care as
any ordinary prudent person would exercise under like
circumstances and conditions, and the failure on his
part to exercise the best judgment the case renders
possible does not establish lack of care and skill on his
part which renders the company, liable. Considering all
the circumstances, the driver of the bus has done what
a prudent man could have done to avoid the collision
and this relieves the transport company from liability
under the law.
8. Isaac guilty of contributory negligence

Herein, when Isaac boarded the bus in question, he

seated himself on the left side thereof resting his left
arm on the window sill but with his left elbow outside
the window, this being his position in the bus when the
collision took place. It is for this reason that the
collision resulted in the severance of said left arm from
the body of appellant thus doing him a great damage.
Had he not placed his left arm on the window sill with
a portion thereof protruding outside, perhaps the injury
would have been avoided as is the case with the other
passengers. It is to be noted that Isaac was the only
victim of the collision. It is apparent that Isaac is guilty
of contributory negligence.
9. No recovery due to negligence by passenger
Although contributory negligence cannot relieve the
carrier of its liability but will only entitle it to a
reduction of the amount of damage caused (Article
1762, new Civil Code), this is a circumstance which
further militates against the position taken by Isaac in
this case. It is the prevailing rule that it is negligence
per se for a passenger on a railroad voluntarily or
inadvertently to protrude his arm, hand, elbow, or any
other part of his body through the window of a moving
car beyond the outer edge of the window or outer
surface of the car, so as to come in contact with
objects or obstacles near the track, and that no
recovery can be had for an injury which but for such
negligence would not have been sustained.

BATANGAS TRANSPORT CO V. CAGUIMBAL

FACTS: Caguimbal who was a paying pasenger of
Batangas Transportation Company (BTCO) bus died
when the bus of the Bian Transportation Company
(Binan) which was coming from the opposite direction
and a calesa managed by Makahiya, which was then
ahead of the Bian bus met an accident.
1. A passenger requested the conductor of BTCO to
stop as he was going to alight, and when he
heard the signal of the conductor, the driver
slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the
right in order to stop
2. At this juncture, a calesa, then driven by
Makahiya was at a distance of several meters
facing the BTCO bus coming from the opposite
direction; that at the same time the Bian bus
was about 100 meters away likewise going
northward and following the direction of the
calesa; that upon seeing the Bian bus the
driver of the BTCO bus dimmed his light; that as
the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each
other from the opposite directions, the Bian
bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an
attempt to pass between the BTCO bus and the
calesa;
3. Without diminishing its speed of about seventy
(70) kilometers an hour, the Bian bus passed

through the space between the BTCO bus and

the calesa hitting first the left side of the BTCO
bus with the left front corner of its body and
then bumped and struck the calesa which was
completely wrecked; that the driver was
seriously injured and the horse was killed;
4. The second and all other posts supporting the
top of the left side of the BTCO bus were
completely smashed and half of the back wall to
the left was ripped open. The BTCO bus suffered
damages for the repair of its damaged
portion.As a consequence of this occurrence,
Caguimbal and Tolentino died, apart from others
who were injured.
5. The widow and children of Caguimbal sued to
recover damages from the BTCO. The latter, in
turn, filed a third-party complaint against the
Bian and its driver, Ilagan. Subsequently, the
Caguimbals amended their complaint, to include
therein, as defendants, said Bian and Ilagan.
6. CFI dismissed the complaint insofar as the BTCO
is concerned, without prejudice to plaintiff's
right to sue Bian and Ilagan. CA reversed said
decision and rendered judgment for Caguimbal.
BTCO appealed to SC.
Issue: Whether BTCO is liable to pay damages for
failure to exercise extraordinary diligence?

Held: YES. BTCO has not proven the exercise of

extraordinary diligence on its part.
The recklessness of the driver of Binan was,
manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the
accident which resulted in the death of Pedro
Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the Bian bus, he
overtook Makahiya's horse-driven rig or calesa and
passed between the same and the BTCO bus despite
the fact that the space available was not big enough
therefor, in view of which the Bian bus hit the left
side of the BTCO bus and then the calesa.
Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides the general rule
that extraordinary diligence must be exercised by the
driver of a bus in the vigilance for the safety of his
passengers.
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them
to disembark, the BTCO bus driver drove partly to the
right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted
portion thereof. Yet, he could have and should have
seen to it had he exercised "extraordinary diligence"
that his bus was completely outside the asphalted
portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder
thereof, the width of which being more than sufficient
to accommodate the bus. When the BTCO bus driver
slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to
disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the
Bian bus would overtake the calesa at about the time

when the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on

the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted
portions of the road, and that the space between the
BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to
allow the Bian bus to go through. It is true that the
driver of the Bian bus should have slowed down or
stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but,
he had no especial obligations toward the passengers
of the BTCO unlike the BTCO bus driver whose duty
was to exercise "utmost" or "extraordinary" diligence
for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to
avoid a situation which would be hazardous for his
passengers, and, make their safety dependent upon
the diligence of the Bian driver.
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court
need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it
responsible to pay the damages sought for by the
passenger. By the contract of carriage, the carrier
assumes the express obligation to transport the
passenger to his destination safely and to observe
extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all the
circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered
by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault
or negligence of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil
Code). This is an exception to the general rule that
negligence must be proved, and it is therefore
incumbent upon the carrier to prove that it has

exercised extraordinary diligence as prescribed in

Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code.

BATACLAN V. MEDINA, 102 PHIL 181 (1957)

FACTS: Juan Bataclan rode Bus No. 30 of the Medina
Transportation, driven by Saylon, shortly after
midnight.
1. While the bus was running very fast on a
highway, one of the front tires burst. The bus fell
into a canal and turned turtle. Four passengers
could not get out, including Bataclan. It
appeared that gasoline began to leak from the
overturned bus.
2. Ten men came to help. One of them carried a
torch and when he approached the bus, a fierce
fire started, burning the four passengers
trapped inside.
3. By reason of his death, his widow, Salud
Villanueva, in her name and in behalf of her five
minor children, brought the present suit to
recover damages from Mariano Medina.
4. The trial court was of the opinion that the
proximate cause of the death of Bataclan was
not the overturning of the bus, but rather, the
fire that burned the bus, including himself and
his co-passengers who were unable to leave it;
that at the time the fire started, Bataclan,
though he must have suffered physical injuries,
perhaps serious, was still alive, and so damages
were awarded, not for his death, but for the
physical injuries suffered by him

ISSUE: What is the proximate cause of death of the

four passengers
HELD: The proximate
overturning of the bus.

cause

of

death

is

the

Proximate cause is 'that cause, which, in natural

and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have
occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate
legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately or by setting other events in
motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain
of events, each having a close causal connection with
its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain
immediately effecting the injury as a natural and
probable result of the cause which first acted, under
such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinary prudent and
intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect
at the moment of his act or default that an injury to
some person might probably result therefrom.

Under the circumstances of the case, the Court holds

that the proximate cause was the overturning of
the bus, this for the reason that when the
vehicle turned not only on its side but
completely on its back, the leaking of the
gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or

unexpected; that the coming of the men with a

lighted torch was in response to the call for
help, made not only by the passengers, but most
probably, by the driver and the conductor
themselves, and that because it was dark (about
2:30 in the morning), the rescuers had to carry a
light with them, and coming as they did from a
rural area where lanterns and flashlights were
not available; and what was more natural than that
said rescuers should innocently approach the vehicle
to extend the aid and effect the rescue requested from
them. In other words, the coming of the men with a
torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence
of the overturning of the bus, the trapping of some of
its passengers and the call for outside help. What is
more, the burning of the bus can also in part be
attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through is
driver and its conductor. According to the witness, the
driver and the conductor were on the road walking
back and forth. They, or at least, the driver should and
must have known that in the position in which the
overturned bus was, gasoline could and must have
leaked from the gasoline tank and soaked the area in
and around the bus, this aside from the fact that
gasoline when spilled, specially over a large area, can
be smelt and directed even from a distance, and yet
neither the driver nor the conductor would appear to
have cautioned or taken steps to warn the rescuers not
to bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the

goods is further expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and
1745, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while the extraordinary
diligence for the safety of the passengers is further set
forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

NOCUM V. LAGUNA TAYABAS BUS CO

FACTS: Herminio L. Nocum, a passenger in Laguna
Tayabas Bus Co.s Bus 120, which was then making a
trip
within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna,
was injured as a consequence of the explosion of
firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and
declared to its conductor as containing clothes and
miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.
1. Nocum filed a case against Laguna Tayabas Bus
for damages. The CFI of Batangas (Civil Case
834) sentenced Laguna Tayabas to pay Nocum
the sum of P1,351.00 for actual damages and
P500.00 as attorneys fees, with legal interest
from the filing of the complaint plus costs.
2. Laguna Tayabas appealed.
1. Article 1733 NCC
Article 1733 of the Civil Code provides that Common
carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods
and for the safety of the passengers transported by
them, according to all the circumstances of each case.

2. Article 1755 NCC

Article 1755 of the Civil Code provides that A common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due
regard for all the circumstances.
3. Article 1756 NCC
Article 1756 of the Civil Code provides that In case of
death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers
are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733
and 1755.
4. Article 1733 NCC not too exacting; Carrier not
mandated to require opening of baggage
Before the box containing the firecrackers were
allowed to be loaded in the bus by the conductor,
inquiry was made with the passenger carrying the
same as to what was in it, since its opening was
folded and tied with abaca. According to the judge of
the lower court, if proper and rigid inspection were
observed by the defendant, the contents of the box
could have been discovered and the accident avoided.
Refusal by the passenger to have the package opened
was no excuse because, as stated by Dispatcher
Cornista, employees should call the police if there
were packages containing articles against company
regulations. Even it that may be true, the law does
not require as much. Article 1733 is not as unbending,

for it reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence

required of common carriers for the safety of the
passengers transported by them to be according to
all the circumstances of each case. In fact, Article
1755 repeats this same qualification: A common
carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far
as human care and foresight can provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances.
5. Passengers presumed that a passenger that
will not take with him anything dangerous
While it is true the passengers of Laguna Tayabas bus
should not be made to suffer for something over which
they had no control, fairness demands that in
measuring a common carriers duty towards its
passengers, allowance must be given to the reliance
that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility
of all the passengers in regard to their common safety.
It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with
him anything dangerous to the lives and limbs of his
co-passengers, not to speak of his own.
6. Right to privacy
Not to be lightly considered be the right to privacy to
which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be
subjected to any unusual search, when he protests the
innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to
indicate the contrary, as in the case at bar. In other
words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature
of a passengers baggage when such is not outwardly
perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional boundaries
are already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a
policeman to his aid in compelling the passenger to
submit to more rigid inspection, after the passenger
had already declared that the box contained mere

clothes and other miscellanies, could not have justified

invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. Police
officers acting without judicial authority secured in the
manner provided by law are not beyond the pale of
constitutional inhibitions designed to protect individual
human rights and liberties. Withal, what must be
importantly considered is not so much the
infringement of the fundamental sacred rights of the
particular passenger involved, but the constant threat
any contrary ruling would pose on the right of privacy
of all passengers of all common carriers, considering
how easily the duty to inspect can be made an excuse
for mischief and abuse.
7. Proper understanding of the service manual
issued by Laguna Tayabas
When there are sufficient indications that the
representations of the passenger regarding the nature
of
his baggage may not be true, in the interest of the
common safety of all, the assistance of the police
authorities may be solicited, not necessarily to force
the passenger to open his baggage, but to conduct the
needed investigation consistent with the rules of
propriety and, above all, the constitutional rights of the
passenger. It is in this sense that the service manual
issued by Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. to its conductors
must be understood.
8. Resort to decisions of foreign jurisdiction
similar to the present one
Decisions in other jurisdictions evidently because of
the paucity of local precedents squarely in point,
emphasize that there is need for evidence of
circumstances indicating cause or causes for
apprehension that the passengers baggage is

dangerous and that it is failure of the common carriers

employee to act in the face of such evidence that
constitutes the cornerstone of the common carriers
liability in cases similar to the present one.
9. Principle controlling servants of the carrier;
Clark vs. Louisville
The principle that must control the servants of the
carrier in a case is correctly stated in the opinion in the
case of Clarke v. Louisville & N.R. Co. (20 Ky L. Rep.
839, 49 S.W. 1120). In that case Clarke was a
passenger on the defendants train. Another passenger
took a quantity of gasoline into the same coach in
which Clarke was riding. It ignited and exploded, by
reason of which he was severely injured. The trial court
peremptorily instructed the jury to find for the
defendant. In the opinion, affirming the judgment, it is
said: It may be stated briefly, in assuming the liability
of a railroad to its passengers for injury done by
another passenger, only where the conduct of this
passenger had been such before the injury as to
induce a reasonably prudent and vigilant conductor to
believe that there was reasonable ground to
apprehend violence and danger to the other
passengers, and in that case asserting it to be the duty
of the conductor of the railroad train to use all
reasonable means to prevent such injury, and if he
neglects this reasonable duty, and injury is done, that
then the company is responsible; that otherwise the
railroad is not responsible.
10. Principle controlling servants of the carrier;
Gulf vs. Shields as cited in Clark vs. Louisville
The opinion quotes with approval from the case of
Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. vs. Shields, 9 Tex. Civ. App. 652,

29 S. W. 652, in which case the plaintiff was injured by

alcohol which had been carried upon the train by
another passenger. In the opinion in that case it is
said: It was but a short period of time after the alcohol
was spilt when it was set on fire and the accident
occurred, and it was not shown that appellants
employees knew that the jug contained alcohol. In
fact, it is not shown that the conductor or any other
employee knew that Harris had a jug with him until it
fell out of the sack, though the conductor had
collected his fare, and doubtless knew that he had the
sack on the seat with him. It cannot be successfully
denied that Harris had the right as a passenger to
carry baggage on the train, and that he had a right to
carry it in a sack if he chose to do so. We think it is
equally clear that, in the absence of some intimation
or circumstance indicating that the sack contained
something dangerous to other passengers, it was not
the duty of appellants conductor or any other
employee to open the sack and examine its contents.
[Quinn v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 8 Ky. 231, 32 S. W. 742;
Wood v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 101 Ky. 703, 42 S. W.
349; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Vincent, 29 Ky. L. Rep.
1049, 96 S. W. 898; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Renfro,
142 Ky. 590, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.)
133, 135 S. W. 266]