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HegelUnsutured(AnAddendumtoBadiou)

SamGillespie
Umbr(a)1:Badiou(1996):5769
...thereisinallthiswhatiscalledabone.Thoughitispreciselywhatissuggestedhere,
namely,thatitisstructuralofthesubject,itconstitutesinitessentiallythatmarginthatall
thoughthasavoided,skippedover,circumvented,orblockedwheneveritseemstosucceedin
beingsustainedbyacircle,whetherthatcirclebedialecticalormathematical.
JacquesLacan,Thesubversionofthesubjectandthedialecticof
desire

Neverknownforhisreservedstatements,itwasLacanwhostated,inhistenth
seminar,thatifthereisanyone,Ithink,whodoesnotmistakewhatthePhenomenology
ofSpiritbringsus,itismyself.1Thisshouldhardlybesurprising:Lacanwasamanof
histimesand,ifwearetobelieveBorchJacobsen,nolessunderthescrutinyof
AlexandreKojvethananyofhiscontemporaries.YetLacandoesnot,fromthemoment
heclaimstobetheauthorityonHegel,ceasetounderlinethedifferencesbetweenHegel
andhimself.
Thisagainshouldhardlysurprise:almosteveryotherFrenchintellectualofthe
periodhassought,insomemanneroranother,tosurpassthedeadlocksofthedialectic.
Lacanshouldcomeasnoexception.Buthistacticsarenotaspredictableasonemay
think.Typically,theoverturningofHegelianismseekstoundercuttheunityofthe
sublatedwholeHegelscriticsneverstoppointingtowardsthedifference,orremaining
endproductofotherness,whicharerefusedintheHegeliansystem.Examplesabound:
theDerridiansupplment,Lyotardsdiffrend,theDeleuzianfold.Onecouldassumeas
muchfromLacanisobjeta(thatremainderoftheother)notthesameastheelement
whichdisruptsanegativeeconomy?Isitnot,strictlyspeaking,thecorrelatetoDerridas
supplement?Theanswer,unfortunately,isbothyesandno.
WhatLacandistinctlyopposesistheclassical,evenmoralisticdimensionofthe
Hegelianinfinity:therecurringcirclecompletelyclosedinuponitself,therepetitive
enfoldingoftheinfinityintheOnethepoint,inshort,atwhichtheinfiniteceasestobe
theotherofthefiniteasOne.LacanwillhavelittleofHegelsunityoftheoneandthe
multiple.ForitdoesnotsufficetosaythattherecurrenceoftheOneitsabilityto
becomeitsownotherbybecominganotherOne(whichisnothingotherthantheability
oftheOnetosublateinfinity)exhauststhefunctionoftheOther.Andsoitwouldseem
thatLacanwouldbequiteathomewithothercriticismsofHegelinhiseffortstouphold
[endpage57]theOtheragainstthissublationofinfinity.
IfImaybeforgivenforstatingtheobvious,Lacanmakesitclearthatthe
repetitionoftheOnecannotexhausttheotherwithoutgeneratinganewotherinturn.Is
thisnotwhatFreudteachesusinBeyondthePleasurePrinciple?Forthesakeofclarity,

letsassumethattheentiretyofmyconsciouslifeisgovernedbythepleasureprinciple.
EveryattemptImaketorecoveranearlierstateeverytimeIfillinwhatIammissing
throughthesequentialrecurrenceofsignifyingelementsdemandsthatIrepeatmyself.
Inrepeatingmyself,Iampushedforward,towardssomewherefarawayfromtheearlier
stateIincessantlyattempttoregain.Repetitionreplacesthefirstobject(thelackIfillin
withvariousnamesandnumbers)withasecondobject,thevoidIcircumscribewhenI
leapfromthefuture(fromwhichIamguidedbyrepetition)towardsthepast(inwhichI
amguaranteedthepossibilityofrepeatingagain).Thereare,ofcourse,manywaysin
whichIcanapprehendobjeta,butfewareeversotangibleasthis.Thefactthattherecan
benosubstantialbeyondtothepleasureprinciple(thefactthatthisbeyondcanonly
everbesupposedoutsidethepleasuremyegoconfinesmeto)canbeattributedtothebad
timinginherentinthepleasureprinciple.Togobackwardstowardsanearlierstateof
affairs,Imustmakeastepforwards.Irepeatbynecessity,creatingmyobjectanew.
Consequently,whatLacansurelymeanswhenheupholdsthefunctionofthe
otherinarepetitivesystemisthisveryinclusionofaheteronomouselement(the
interval,ifyouwill)whichanysystemaimingatcontinuitymustinvariablyinclude.
Butthisobjectdoesnotdisrupttheconsistencyofaperfectlyclosedsystem;byincluding
aheteronomouselementwithinpleasure,itiswhatprovidesthatsystemwithconsistency
itself.WecanwitnessthedistinctivenessofLacansreproachtoHegel.AsJacquesAlain
Millerrepeatedlystates,theobjetaisnotsimplyaproductofotherness.Itisalogical
object,thatwhichsustainsasystemintheabsenceoftheOther.Itreplacestheoncefull
presenceoftheOther(theplacefromwhichmeaningcanbeguaranteed)withtheOthers
functionthatwhichrepetitionstrivestowards.2AnditistowardsthisthatLacan
gestureswhendifferingfromHegel.
Ifitwereallthissimple,therewouldbenopointtothepresentdiscussion.There
aretwopurposesforwritingthispaper.One,obviously,istosortout,atavery
elementarystage,certaindifferencesbetweenLacanandHegel.Thisisnoeasytask
giventhevarietyofviewpointsonthematter.SomewillsaythatLacanisbad
philosophyperiod;thereisnopointindiscussinghimalongsideHegel.Otherswill
readLacaninlinewithcontemporary,poststructuralist,critiquesofHegel,critiques
which,asIhavealludedtoabove,forthemostpart,undercuttheunityofHegels
absolutethroughtheinterventionofotherness,ordifference,intoHegelssystem.
Finally,therearethose,mostnotablySlavojZizek,whowillattempttorescueHegel
fromhiscriticsbyproclaiminghimaLacanian.Ifnoonereadingseemssufficient
(althoughIadmitapartialitytothefinalinterpretation),itismostlikelythecasethatany
oftheaboveagendas(savingHegel,savingLacan,critiquingboth)overridesthe
difficultyonecouldevensayimpossibilityoftakingeitherHegelor[endpage58]
Lacanattheirword.
Quitesimply,itseemsthatdistinctionsneedtobemade,andifitismyintentto
dosohere,itwillbeforthepurposesofdelimitingtheaboveexampleofHegelian
infinitythatLacantakesissuewith.Hence,mysecondpurpose:whatIproposeisnot
solelyareadingofHegelavecLacan,buttoexplicateAlainBadious(Lacanian)critique
ofHegel.Badiousisnotasimplethesisbutitdoes,tobesure,discloseLacanian

principles.WhatBadiouobjectstoinHegelistherejectionofthemathematicalinfavor
oftheessentialfinitudeofselfconsciousness.Ratherthanviewingthemathematicalas
anindependentfoundationoftruthfromwhichvariousotherdiscoursesarederived(asin
Plato,Descartes,orLeibniz),Hegelviewsthephilosopherstaskasbeingoneinwhich
themathematical(theinfinite)isplacedinasubordinaterelationtosubjectivereflection.
Well,itseemsclearenoughwhereaLacaniancoulddiffer;whenacknowledgingLacans
useofcyberneticsinthefifties,itisobviousthattheunconsciousprocessofcounting
alwaysexceedswhattheconscioussubjectcanthinkatanyonepoint.Asymbolicor
mathematicalfoundationofexistencecannotbesufficientlyabsorbedbytheessential
finitudeofsubjectiveselfreflection.ButtoeffectsuchanabsorptionseemstobeHegels
intent.This,crudelyput,wouldbeastartingpointforunderstandingBadiou:forthe
latter,themathematicalimposesastructurewhichcannotbegloballyenvelopedbya
conscioussubject.
ThisisonlyaverypreliminaryreadingofBadiou,areadingwhichwillbefar
fromexhaustive.LetitsufficetosaythatwhereasHegel(inhiseffortstosubordinatethe
infinitetothestatusoftherepetitiveOne)seekstoestablishthesubjectasaglobalsiteof
truth,Badioussubjectisalwaysalocalpartofalogicalstructureinwhichtruthis
present.Thissubjectisanindispensablepartofthissystem,and,tobesure,thereisno
philosophywithoutasubject.Butthissubjectisalwaysonlyafinitesubject.Thereare
fouraxioms,derivedfromBadiou,3whichcanbebrieflygiven:
a. Anyfiniteformulaexpressesasubject.Thesubjectisnotatranscendental
agencyorperceivingconsciousness,butapointexpressedbyafinitenumber
orsignifier.
b. TheSubjectisthelocalstatusoftruth.Thesubjectisapointinachainof
knowledge(inLacanianterms:S2....S3...S4...)whichislocated
somewherebetweenaneventthathasbeenpresupposed(thesupernumerary
[endpage59]namewhichinauguratestheprocessionofsignifyingelements:
S1...)andthepointtowardswhichthatchainisdirected(signification).
Thesubjectiscaughtinthechainatanyoneofthesepoints.Itisapartofthe
situationthatthesupernumerarynameoftheeventconstitutes.
c. Truthisconstitutedbyaholeinknowledge.Truthisnotqualifiedthroughan
intelligibleintuition.Atruthisindiscerniblewithinknowledge;itisthe
unnamedtowardswhichthesignifyingelementswhichcompriseknowledge
assucharedirected,butneverreach.
d. Thesubjectisnotthisvoid.Thevoidisinhumanandasubjective.Truthis
realizedthroughthemultiplicityofelementsthatthevoidgeneratesofwhich
thesubjectisapart.Thesubjectis,ineffect,afinitepartwhichiscaught
betweenaneventanditstruth.Itisthelocalstatusofthissituationastruth.
Ultimately,sayingthatthesubjectisalocalstatusoftruthisverydifferent
fromdefiningthesubjectastheholeinknowledgewhichistruth.
Thisfinalpointmaycomeasasurprisedowenotusuallyconceivethesubject
asthevoidwhichisrepresentedbyasignifier?Isthisnothowasubjectissuturedinto

asymbolic;thatis,asavoidthatisnamed?Thisisusuallyhowsutureisunderstood:the
elementwhichissuturedisthevoidofthesubject.Badiousuggestssomethingdifferent,
something,infact,whichcomesmuchclosertotheactualdefinitionofsuturein
psychoanalysis.Whatissutured,strictlyspeaking,isnotthesubjecttothediscursive
chain,buttherelationbetweentheSymbolicasknowledge(or,touseBadiousterms,
situation)andbeing(theReal).Itwouldhardlyseemnecessarytoreviewtheentiretyof
theoriginaltheoryofsuturethatJacquesAlainMillerwrotethirtyyearsagoifhisthesis
hadbeensufficientlyunderstood.4Sincethecaseisotherwise,anexegesiswillprove
necessary.ToexpoundbothBadiouandhisreadingofHegelrequiresthatthereader
devotehisorherattentiontotheoriginalrelationbetweentheOneandthemultiple.
Ordinarily,sutureisreadasanImaginaryprocessthroughwhichasubjectis
includedinagivensystemwhiledisavowing,orannulling,Symbolicdifference.Butin
Millersargument,thepointisthis:forasymbolicsystemtobecomeaclosedeconomy,
itmustaccountfortheelementitexcludes(thesubject).Theagentofsuturingisthat
whichputstheSymbolicincommunicationwiththeReal,itinstallssomethinginthe
placewherethesubjectisabsent.Andwereitnotfortheinclusionofthesomething
(anabsencewhichisnotnothing)withinagivenset(orsymbolicsystem),distinctions
betweenitselementscouldnotevenbedrawn,sincethesedistinctionscannotbe
empiricallydetermined.ThiswasaprimarynecessityforFregesmathematics:the
exclusionofanempiricalthing(itssubstitutionbynumber)wasnecessarytosustaina
logicalsystem.Yetthissubstitutioncouldnotoccurwithoutmarkingthefactthatthe
subjecthasalreadybeenexcluded.Butifdistinctionsarenolongerdrawnbetween
actuallyexistingthings,thentheremust,inthatsystem,besomeothermeansof
differentiatingitselements.[endpage60]
Theanswerappearstobeeasyenough:whatissuturedisthelackingsubjecttoits
signifierorrepresentative.Wecouldimaginethatasubjectissuturedwhenitisnamedas
anindividual.Werethisnotpossible,somethingwouldbemissingfromthesetthere
wouldsimplybeaseriesofemptynumbers.Ifthereadertakesfurthernotice,however,
heorshewillrealizethatitwouldbecontradictorytosaythatthesubjectiswhat
completestheset,whatprovidesforthemissingelement,sinceitispreciselyFreges
pointthatthesubjectbeexcluded.ThegoalissomethingotherthanamerelySymbolic
rewritingofthesubject;forFrege,itistheformalstructureofthesetthatinterestshim.
Themissingelement,inotherwords,mustbelogical,notsubjective.
Inanyevent,whenturningtotheoriginalproblemthatMillerpresents,itis
admittedlytruethatoneisdealingwiththeinclusionofthesubjectwithinagivenset.For
MillerorFrege,therearetworelationsformedbetweenthesubjectandtheset:thereis
therelationbetweenthesubjectanditsgivenconcept(subsumption)andthereisalsothe
relationbetweenthesubjectandthenumberwhichcomestorepresentitintheset
(assignation).GivenahypotheticalsetconsistingofthemembersofF,neitherthe
concept(memberofF)ofthesetnortheelements(countedterms)whichcompriseit,
comesfirst.Theperfectlogicofthesystemdemandsthattheconceptexistexclusively
throughtheinclusionofthememberswhichitsubsumes.Yetthesemembers,asobjects,
areonlyinsofarastheyfallunderthegivenconcept(thatis,solongastheyarenolonger

things).Theparadox,orperformativity,ofthesetnecessitatesthatneitherassignation
norsubsumptionisprimary:asubjectissubsumedatthesametimethatitisassigneda
number.Tobeincluded,thesubjectmustbecounted.Soitisclearthatifathingis
countedasanumber,itisnolongerequaltoitselfbuttothenumberwhichassignsits
placeintheset.Whencounted,onedoesnotemergeasamemberofF,butasequalto
theconceptmemberofF.Oneisincludedthroughbeingequaltoitsrepresentative,to
thenumberwhichstandsinfortheself.
Butavolatilelossoftruthisinvokedbytheveryprincipleofexclusionwhich
foundsalogicalsystem.Thesubjectsemergenceinasetmeansthatitiscountedasone,
andthisone(1)iswhatbecomesrepeatedlyrepresentativeforallmembersintheset.We
canseeclearlywherethepotentiallossoftruthoccurs:howisitthatonethingcanbe
distinguishedfromanotheriftheyarebothcountedasone,iftheycannolongerbe
empiricallydifferentiatedasthings?Howiscountingevenpossibleifthedistinction
betweenoneandtwoisnolongerevident?Letmebeginagain:tobetrulydistinct,
anyoneelement[endpage61]mustbeequaltoitself.Oneisoneinsofarasitisequal
toitself:itcannotbeexchangedfortwowithoutalossoftruth.Andinorderforthisto
betrue,thenumberneedsasubstanceofsorts,itneedsaselftobeequalto.Butthis
selfcannotbeanempiricalthing.This,infact,istheveryproblem.
Something,Milleradds,mustbeaddedtothesetinordertomakecounting
possible,inordertoclosetheset,tomakeeachelementequaltoitself.Thissomething
istheinclusionofthatwhichisnotequaltoitselfconceptually,zero,theemptyset.We
arriveattheemptysetwhenweconceiveofasethavingnomembers,thatis,ofaset
whosemembersarenotequaltothemselves.Thisfollows(asweshallseewithregardsto
Hegel)whenweconceiveofthepossibilityofanemptyset:ofasetwhichcontainsno
elements,yethasapropertynonetheless.Letrepresentaninfinitesetofwhichxisa
memberpreciselywhenitisnotequaltoitself.Theemptysetcanbewrittenthus:
={x:xx}
Ourfirstset(membersofF)issuturedthroughtheinclusionofthisotherset
asitsmember.Giventhisreading,ourfirstimpulsewouldbetoinscribetheemptyset
betweenthenumbersintheset,asifitisthatwhichemergesbetween1and2(e.g.1=1,
(12),2=2).Wecould,inthisinstance,calltheemptysettheintervalwhichemerges
betweenthesuccessivecountingofelements.ThisisnotthepointforMiller:theempty
setisnotgeneratedby,orevenbetween,repetitionsitiswhatallowsforrepetition
itself.Therewouldnotevenbethepossibilityofgettingfromzerotooneunlessthere
weresomemeansofcountingthezerofirst.Togetfromzerotoone,thesetmuststart
withnothing,theemptyset.Inordertoreachone,anotheremptysetmustbecounted
inadditiontothisthefirstemptysetbecomescountedasone{}.Whatsuturestheset
isnotanothertoitsmembers:insofarasitsmembersarefoundedupontheabsenceof
thesubject,theycanonlybeequaltosomethingelse.Thiselementwhichisnotequalto
itselfiswhatallowsthesetsmemberstobeexchangedforotherelementswithoutaloss
oftruth.Ergo:notbeingequaltoitself,itcanalwaysequalanother.Consequently,the
differencebetweenand{}isthedifferencebetweenzeroandoneoneisthesetof

theemptyset.Itisevenmoredifficulttogettotwo:onemustaddanothersetontopof
this,thesetofthesetoftheemptyset.Bythetime2isreached,threesetshavealready
beencounted.Asfor3:
0=
1={}={0}
2={},{}}={0,1}
3={},{},{},{}}}={0,1,2}
Gettingtofourisstillmorearduoussince1isthecounting,infact,ofanothing
whichmust[endpage62]comefirst.Oneisnotprimary,itisprecededbywhat
engenderslackinthesetitaccountsfortheinclusiveelementwhichdoesnotbelong
(themissingsubject).Or,asthecountingofone(touseBadiousterms),thesubjectas
onemustseektofinditsotherhalfintheemptysetwhichitiscountedas.5This,ina
sense,iswhyLacanssubject($)cannotbewrittenwithoutanobjeta.
Now,where,inHegel,doesoneencountertheneedtoproduce,orinclude,an
externalobjecttorenderexceptionalclosure?Doesthedialecticnotinfactdependonthe
exactoppositetheexclusionofexternality?Ouranswerisunclear.Perhapsthisisnot
thequestiontobeasked;itiswellenoughtosuggestthatHegelexcludestheOther,but
thisclaimisnotsoeasilymadewhenconsideringthattheother,inHegel,isnotreally
excludedasmuchasitisrevealedinitsnullity.TheHegelianknowsverywellthatthis
nullityhasagenerativefunctionnonetheless.IntheScienceofLogic,Hegelbeginswith
themostbasicofhiscategorieswhich,ofcourse,arebeingandnothing.Theimmediate
goalistounitethetwointhemomentofbeingsemergenceoutofnothing,butmatters
areconfoundedonceHegelspeaksofdeterminatebeingabeingwhichisdistinguished
frommerebeing(wherenonbeingistakenupinasimpleunitywithbeing).As
determinate,assomething,apositedbeingnolongersimplyhasnonbeingasitsother,it
mustalsorelatetoanotherbeing,determineitselfasthenegativeofthatsomething.To
thisotherbeing,itisequallyanother.Theformerunityofthebecomingofbeinghad
beingandbecomingasitsmoments:here,dialecticalthoughtmustgrapplewith
somethingandother(somethingelse).Eachsomethingisequallyitsother:thereis
nodeterminatebeingwhichisdeterminedonlyassuch,whichisnotoutsidea
determinatebeingandthereforeisnotitselfanother.6Yetbeyondthisviciouscircleof
eachbeingothertoitsother,Hegelstatesthatadeterminatebeingisanothertoitselfon
itsownaccount:Theothersimplybyitselfistheotherinitsownself,hencetheotherof
itselfandsotheotheroftheotheritis,therefore,thatwhichisabsolutelydissimilar
withinitself,thatwhichnegatesitself,altersitself.7Notbeingasubstantialother,this
otherisabeingsownnonbeing.
Hegelhereseemsintenttounitebeingwithnonbeingtosublateothernessinto
aunityofselfandother.Inotherwords,thedissimilaritymentionedaboveapparently
introducesapositiveothernessintoHegelssystem.Beingwouldnotbeequaltoitself
sinceitmustshareequivalencewithitsotheraswell.Difference,itwouldseem,isnot
yeteradicatedfromHegelssystem.ButHegelinsiststhatthedissimilarityofbeingwith

itselfdoesnotresultfrom[endpage63]theimmanenceofotherness,butfromthelackof
consistencyintheothersbeing.Onecouldstatethislogicotherwise:beingisnotequal
toitselfbecauseitisnotnotequaltoitsotheritcannotposit,ordistinguishitselffrom,
itsother.Thiswouldbethetruelogicoftheemptyset:ifzerowasequaltonothing,it
wouldnolongerfunctionastheemptyset,forthatnothing,asequal,wouldthenhaveto
bemarkedassomething.Tobetrulyunequaltoitself,theemptysetmusthavenoequal.
ForHegeliannonbeingthen,somethingbecomesdissimilartoitselfwhenitsotherdoes
notpossessbeing:
Hence,beinginitselfis,first,anegativerelationtothenegative
determinatebeing,ithastheothernessoutsideitandisopposedtoit;insofaras
somethingisinitselfitiswithdrawnfromothernessandbeingforother.But
secondlyithasalsopresentinitsownbeingitself,foritisitselfthenonbeingof
thebeingforother.8
ThiscanbebetterunderstoodwhenweconsiderHegelscritiqueoftheKantian
thinginitself.Webelievewearesayingsomethingprofoundwhenwespeakofit,when
werefertosomethingoutsidetheimperfectionsinhumanconsciousness.Buttoreferto
somethinginitselfistorefertosomethingapartfromthatreference;asdivorcedfromall
beingforanother,itisstrippedofdetermination,whichofcoursemeansthatitisnothing
thatitisimpossibletoknowwhatitis.Hegelthensuggeststhatbythisveryrealization,
weknowquitewellwhatathinginitselfis:atruthlessabstraction.But,intruth,for
Hegel,thethingisknowableintheNotionwhereitsdeterminatecontentisunitedwith
thelackofbeinginitsother(i.e.itspositing,whichispurelyemptybeing).Thelimit
whichseparatesbeinginitselffrombeingforanotherissupercededoncethesplititself
becomesinternallyconstitutivefortheNotion.Whatathingisinitselfcanonlybe
externallydeterminedthroughabeingsownreflectionuponitsposition.SowhileHegel
mayrefusethelimitwhichseparateshumanconsciousnessfromthethinginitself,he
reaffirmsitintheformationoftheNotion,wherethesensibleconditionswhichaffirmthe
contentofabeingaresupplementedbythesensuouslyunfulfilled,internallimitations
oftheremainingvoidofdetermination.9
ItcouldbeassumedthatatthismomentintheLogic,asublationofsortshas
occurred:thatthisdeterminedbeing,inrevealingtheotherforthenothingthatitis,has
becomerealized,ordeterminate,initselfasNotion.Butthereisnone.Whathasactually
transpiredisthatthisbeing,inreflectinginwardsonitself,hasmovedbeyondbeing
determinedthroughanexternallimit;itnowcontainsaninternallimitation.Thatis,this
beingisnowafinitebeing.Twoconsequencesfollow:
1. Limitationdefineswhatsomethingis,asopposedtothelimitwhich
determineswhatthatbeingisnot.Thus,forHegel,thislimitationisnolonger
separatedfromafinitebeingsbeing;asaterm,limitationparadoxically
suggeststhatanybeingissomethingotherthanthelimitthat[endpage64]a
beingcouldbemorethanwhatitiswereitnotforitslimitation.This
moreisbroughttobearuponafinitebeingintheformoftheought.
Something,initself,oughttobemorethanwhatitis.Theoughtassuch
containsthelimitationandthelimitationcontainstheought.10Partofits

being,whatitoughttobe,inhereselsewhere.Yetthiselsewhere,whilebeing
opposedtothelimitation,isimplantedbythatlimitation.
2. Throughitslimitation,thedeterminatebeingencountersitsought.Thereisa
viciouscirclebetweenthetwo:beyondthelimitationistheought,yetthis
oughtisexpressedbythelimitation.Limitationisdeterminedasthenegative
oftheoughtandtheoughtislikewisethenegativeofthelimitation.11There
isthusadoublenegationatworkwhenafinitebeinggoesbeyonditself:the
ought,oncerealized,isnowwhatthebeingis,yetthelimitationremains
nonetheless.Afirstnegationisnecessary,wherethefinitebecomes
determinate,andasecondnegationofthisdetermination,wherethefinite
becomesanotherfinite(hence,Hegelsfamousnegationofnegation).
Hereinliesthefirstemergenceoftheinfinite:itdependsonthenegationof
thefinite.Theinfiniteisthebeyondofthefinite.Ofcourse,thisiswhere
Hegelsreaderencountersthebadinfinity.
Inthisvoidbeyondthefinite,whatarises?Whatisthepositiveelementin
it?Owingtotheinseparabilityoftheinfiniteandthefiniteorbecausethisinfinite
remainingaloofonitsownsideisitselflimitedtherearisesalimit,theinfinite
hasvanishedanditsother,thefinite,hasentered.Butthisentranceofthefinite
appearsashappeningexternaltotheinfinite,andthenewlimitassomethingthat
doesnotarisefromtheinfiniteitselfbutislikewisefoundasgiven.Andsoweare
facedwitharelapseintothepreviousdeterminationwhichhasbeensublatedin
vain.12
Theinfinitehasnootherdeterminationthantobetheemptynegationofthefinite.
Yetwhenthefinitebeingtranscendsitslimitation,itfindsthatithasbecomeanother
finiteinturn.Thiswouldconstituteinfinityinthesecondstage,whereitbecomesthe
alternatetermbetweentwosuccessivefinites.Hegelsreaderisfacedwiththedimension
ofthetediousrepetitionofbadinfinity.Theemptyinfinite,{...},becomesnothing
lessthanthevoidofdetermination,theemptylimitofthefinite.Hegeldoeshowever
realizeathird[endpage65]momentoftheinfinite,whenitisnolongerpushedforwards
fromtheone,butisrealizedwithintheinfinitegenerationoftheonewithitself.Infinity
wouldbetherealizationoftheinfinitereturnoftheonetoanotherone.Reflectionis
requiredanditdoesofcoursecomeintoplayintheLogic.Butthereadershouldask,in
whatmanner?
ForHegel,itisimportanttorememberthateachpolarityrealizesitselfthrough
limitation.Theinfinite(emptybeyondofthefinite)isitselffinitebyvirtueofwhatit
excludes.Similarly,thefinite,whilelimited,wouldbedoomedtoperishwereitnotfor
theperennialoughtwhichpositsthefiniteoverandagainstitselfinthebeyond.The
mutualslidingintooppositionofeithertermiswhat,nodoubt,providesforthe
circularityoftheinfinitejudgment,forthegoodinfinity.Theinfiniteiswhatisdrawn
fromtherepetitionofeithertermofbetteryet,fromtheemptinessoftheotherwhich
eithertermoscillatestowards.Goingtowardsitsother,itreturnstoitself,theOneisthe
infinitethatiscoextensivewithitsotherinthereproductionofitself.ThisisHegels
thesis.

Overandagainsttheimageofalinearprogression,theHegelianinfiniteisthe
circledrawnwithinrepetition.Whatarisesisthesameasthatfromwhichthemovement
began,thatis,thefiniteisrestored;ithasthereforeunitedwithitself,hasinitsbeyond
founditselfagain.13Butevenifthisreflectivecircleiscomposedoftwoterms,itisnota
disjunctiveprocess.Thisisnounityofdifference.Inthefirstplace,itisfromthe
limitationoftheOne,whichisindifferenttodifference,thattheinfiniteisdrawn.The
veryfactthattwoopposedtermscouldbecometheiroppositesatteststotheverynullity
ofdifferences,tothefactthattheydifferonlybyvirtueoflimitation.Inotherwords,itis
notthatalimitisnecessarybecauseoftheimmanenceofotherness,sinceothernessonly
followsfromthenecessityoflimitation.AsHegellaterwritesintheLogic,itisonly
whenthelimitationbecomesconstitutivethattheNotionisachieved.
Ifanyofthisexegesisonindifference,onthebadinfinityofalterityand
externalityleavessomethingtobedesiredincontemporaryrepudiationsofHegel,Iwill
nonethelessstopshortofHegelscritics.Iwillonlydrawtwoconclusionsatthispoint:
a. ThattherepetitionoftheOne,thecontinualreemergenceofthesame,does
notsufficientlyofferaclosureontoaNotion.JacquesLacanobservedas
muchwhenhedistinguishedhimselffromHegel:thefalseinfinityislinkedto
ametonymyofrecurrence,ametonymywhichcanluckilybedrawnfromthe
functionoftherepetitiveOne.But,asLacanadds,whatexperienceshowsus,
isthatthedifferentfieldsthatareproposedinitspecifically,theneurotic,
perverse,andindeedthepsychoticisthattheOnewhichisreducedtothe
successionsofsignifyingelements,thefactthattheyaredistinctand
successivedoesnotexhaustthefunctionoftheOther.14Itisnotinsignificant
thatLacancallsitthefunctionoftheOther,foreveniftheOtheris
impossible,itstillpossessesafunctionintheobjectthatrepetitiongenerates.
ItisevenfromtherepetitionoftheOne,fromitsrecurrence,thatthequestion
fromtheotherarises:chevuoi?whatisitthatI,theOther,demandofyou?
Dontgetmewrong:thereisnotalotofbadinfinityinLacan,this[endpage
66]isnotaradicalalterityofotherness,yetthereisaremainderoftheOther
whichisbuttressedthroughjouissance.Andthetrouble,asLacansaidin
Television,isthatthislattertermcannotbeinscribedinarepetitivequantum.
Jouissancedoesnothaveanumericalconstant,itdoesnotregisterina
givenrepetition.Arepetitivequantumisnotguidedbytheenergyofa
humanconstituent:itisguidedforwardsbyademandthatmustbe
deciphered.TospeakdirectlytoHegelonthiscount,recurrencedoesnot
exhaust,muchlessexplain,thedeterminationofasingularbeingsought.
b. ForBadiou,ontheotherhand,itcannotfollowthattherepetitionofthe
repetitiveOnecanbecalledinfinite.Repetition,asaquantitativebad
infinity,mayindeedhavequalitativebeing,butonemayaskwhatitisthat
makesthisqualityinfinite(andagoodinfiniteatthat)?ForHegel,the
answerissimplybecauserepetitiontiresofthevoid,oftheinsubstantiality
andemptybeyond(ortransfinitepolarity)ofthefinite.ForHegel,thevoid
doesnotpresentanobstaclebecauseitisempty,nothing,notdeterminate.15It

isbecauseofHegelsvehemenceonthispointthatBadiouwillfaulthis
exclusionofthemathematicalinrejectingthebadinfinity,Hegel,ineffect,
excludestheemptysetaswell:inthenumericalproliferation,thereisno
void,sincetheexterioroftheOneisitsinterior;thepurelawwhichinstitutes
thespreadingofthesameasOne.TheradicalabsenceoftheOther
indifferencedoesnotlegitimizedeclaringthattheessenceofthefinite
number,itsnumericality,isinfinity.Thevoid,theemptyset,,cannot
simplybereducedtonothinginrepetitionif,asinterioroftheOne,{},itis
whatisbeingrepeated.Itisonlybyaretroactivemaneuver,(whichplacesthe
emptyinfiniteasproduct,ratherthanorigin,oftheOne)thatHegelcanthen
locatethegoodinfinityelsewhere,outsidetheextimacythatthemathematical
provides.Innamingthetrueinfinity,Hegeldrawsuponabadelement,the
voidofthefinite,tomakehisclaims.ThereremainsanemptyobjectinHegel,
despitehisbestintentions.
Paradoxically,itseemsasifBadiouandLacanareatcrosspurposesintheir
critiqueofHegel.ForLacan,Hegelsgrandiosegestureexhausts,ordenies,thefunction
oftheOther;forBadiou,thereistoomuchothernessinthismeetingbetweenthefinite
andtheinfinite,inthispreservationofthedifferenceintheone.Forthelatter,the
HegelianOneisbothitself(finite)anditsother(voidasindeterminate)which(illogically
forBadiou)thinkstheinfinity[endpage67]ofnumberfromthebeingofOnenumber.
WhynametheOneinfinite,ifnotbecausetheOne(ascounted,astitle)must
erroneouslypresupposetheinfiniteasitscontent?Inhispreservationoftheotherthrough
theinteriorityoftheOne,HegelisnotHegelianenoughheisstilllocatedonthesideof
BadiousnemesisDeleuze.ForwhatdoesDeleuzedesignateashisformulaforthe
subject?PreciselytheLeibnivianformularoftheOneoveritsinfinitedenominator:
1/.16ItisOnewiththeinfinite,orrather,theinfinitefoldedintheOneasitspureinterior.
ButBadioucannot,norshouldhisreader,thinkthebeingoftheOneinglobalterms.The
Oneisnotwhatcontainstheinfinite,itiswhattheinfinitepassesthrough.
Thus,whatbothHegelandDeleuzepresuppose,inspiteofthemselves,isananti
mathematicaltheoryofthesubject.TheverypointofpunctualitywhichmarkstheOne
receivesitsconsistencythroughbeingfilledoutbyitsinfinitedenominator.Priorto
this,itmustbeaskediftherecanevenbeasubject.ForBadiou,therecanbeadifferent
sortofconsistencyforhissubject:itentailsthatanyfinitepointexpressesasubject.This
isnottosay,however,thatthereisthereforeaformulaofnumbers(aSymbolic)wholly
sufficientontoitselfwhichcanalsoexistwithoutasubject.Thereis,asMillerhasshown,
somethingmore:theemptyset,objeta.Thisdoesnotpresupposeasubstanceofthe
subject:onthecontrary,ifanything,thereistoomuchsubstanceinthisHegelianOne.
Andthus,finally,wearefacedwithachoice;ifbothHegelandLacanpresupposea
subjectwhichisthelocusatwhichphilosophycanpersevereitisHegelwhoopts
withouthesitationforamultiplesubject.Psychoanalysisproposes,incontrast,asubject
ofdivision,ofthecut.Thattheformerwouldappearasmoreappealingisperhaps
reducibletoarefusalofthesitewheretruth,inpsychoanalysis,istobesought.Truthis
producedthroughrepression,throughtheholeitproducesinknowledge.Itishere,

impossibly,thatthefunctionoftheOther(and,inconsequence,oftruth)isnotexhausted.
AsBadouhimselfwrites:atruthistheprincipleofasubject,bytheemptysetwhose
actionitsupports.17
WhatDescartes,Lacan,andBadiouallshareisaviewofthecompleteexteriority
ofthesubjecttoitsrepresentative.WiththeinaugurationoftheIthinkcomesthe
guaranteethatIammustresideelsewhere.Itisinthissensethatthesubjectisnotthe
void.Thenamingwhicheffectuatesthesubjectleavesitsindiscerniblereference,its
truth,inthefutureanteriorofthesituationofwhichthesubjectisadiscerniblyfinitepart.
Thesubject,asOne,namesthatwhichwillbecomethetruththatprecedesit,theholein
knowledge,S(),whichsupplementsitssituation.Itisthefinitereal,ifsuchcanbe
conceived,ofitssituation.IftherecanbeanagreementbetweenBadiouandHegel,itis
thatthesubjectisindispensableforphilosophytopersevere.Whatgetslost,however,in
thelattersinsistenceontheinteriorityofthefinite,istheveryextimateelementthatany
externalfoundationmustpresupposeasitstruth.Insubordinatingthetruetothe
interiorityofaconscioussubject,onemayaswelldispensewithitaltogether.Itisasmall
stepthatonetakeswhengoingfromapointwherethetrueissubordinatedtothe
humantowardsanotherpointwherephilosophyrealizesitsend.Badioucanevincethe
promisesthatthisendaffords,anditembodieseverythingwhichphilosophyshouldsave
usfrom.[endpage68]

ThequotecomesfromLacansunpublishedtenthseminaronanxiety.Fromalecturegiven
onNovember14,1962.
1

SeeMiller,ToInterprettheCause:FromFreudtoLacan,NewsletteroftheFreudian
Field3.12(1989):50.Inhisbook,TheLacanianSubject:BetweenLanguageandJouissance
(Princeton:PrincetonUP,1995),BruceFinknotesthatLacanattimeshassuggestedmuchthe
same:thatis,that...alltruthismathematizable.HequotesfromLacansunpublishedSeminar
XXI
2

Thereisnosuchthingasatruthwhichisnotmathematized,thatis,written,thatis,which
isnotbased,quaTruth,solelyuponaxioms.Whichistosaythatthereistruthbutofthatwhichhas
nomeaning,thatis,ofthatconcerningwhichtherearenootherconsequencestobedrawnbut
within[theregister]ofthemathematicaldeduction.Fink,121.
ThemajorityofmyinterpretationcomesfromBadiousLtreetlvnement[Beingand
theEvent](Paris:ditionsduSeuil,1988).Thepresentvolumecontainstwoarticlesintranslation
fromthisvolume.AlsoseeOnaFinallyObjectlessSubject,trans.BruceFink,WhoComesAfter
theSubject,Connor,CadevaandNancy,eds.(NewYork:Routledge,1991)2432.
3

SeeJacquelineRosestranslationofSuture(LogicoftheElementsoftheSignifier)in
Screen18.4(Winter19778).AlsoseeJoanCopjec,TheSubjectDefinedbySuffrage,Lacanian
Ink7(1993):4758.
4

WecanthusseetheprimarydistinctionbetweentheusethatGillesDeleuzemakesofthe
termsutureandtheimportthatithasforpsychoanalysis.Fortheformer,therepressionofthe
objectproceedsfromrepetition:
5

...wecannotsupposethatdisguisemaybeexplainedbyrepression.Onthecontraryitis
becauserepetitionisnecessarilydisguisedbyvirtueofthecharacteristicdisplacementofits
determinantprinciple,thatrepressionoccursintheformofaconsequenceinregardstothe
repetitionsofpresents...Wedonotrepeatbecausewerepress,werepressbecausewerepeat.
Deleuze,DifferenceandRepetition,trans.PaulPatton(NewYork:Columbia,1993)105.While
DeleuzerepeatedlydrewuponLacanianconceptsthroughouthiscareerasaphilosopher,itisclear
thatforpsychoanalysis,hisreadingisabsurd.Repetitioncouldnotevenbepossiblewithoutthe
includedelementthenullsetfollowingtheexclusion(repression)ofsomethingtheempirical
subject.
Hegel,ScienceofLogic,trans.A.V.Miller(AtlanticHighlands,NJ:Humanities,1969)

117.
Hegel,118.

Hegel,120.

SeeSlavojZizek,TarryingwiththeNegative(Durham:DukeUP,1993)39.

Hegel,136.

10

Hegel,138.

11

Hegel,141.

12

Hegel,147.

13

AnxietySeminar:November14,1962.

14

ThisseemstobeZizeksthesisaswell.SeeTheWantonIdentityinForTheyKnowNot
WhatTheyDo(London:Verso,1991)5198.
15

GillesDeleuze,TheFold:LeibnizandtheBaroque,trans.TomConley(Minneapolis:
Minnesota,1992)130.
16

SeeBadiou,GillesDeleuze:TheFoldLeibnizandtheBaroque,inGillesDeleuzeand
theTheaterofPhilosophy,BoundasandOlkowska,eds.(NewYork:Routledge,1993)69.[end
page69]
17

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