CASE SURVEY IN CIVIL LAW

Prepared by:
Zenaida N. Elepano
Court Administrator (ret.)
Faculty, PHILJA
Supreme Court
Civil Personality - Continental Steel v.Montano, 603 SCRA 621.
Secs 40-42 C CP do not define death. CCP does not explicitly state that only
those who have acquired civil personality can die.
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel filed a claim for Paternity
Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to
the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the
Union, which reads:
Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVE--The Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave
with pay to any employee in case of death of the employee's legitimate dependent
(parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters).
Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE--The Company shall grant death
and accidental insurance to the employee or his family in the following manner:
4.3 DEPENDENTS--Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case
of death of the employees legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case
the employee is single, this benefit covers the legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only
with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]
The claim was based on the death of Hortillano's unborn child. Hortillano's wife, Marife
V. Hortillano, had a premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week
of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the
female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental
insufficiency.[6]
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano's claim for paternity leave but denied
his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and
accident insurance.[7]
Hortillano argued that he was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits
pursuant to the CBA. The CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have
first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent
death could be covered by the CBA death benefits
On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did
not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed
that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2)
status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillano's case. Continental
Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with
civil personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired
juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel
reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all.
Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical
personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it
never needed any support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported. The CBA is
clear and unambiguous, so that the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied.
Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead fetus never acquired a juridical
personality.

The Supreme Court ruled that: the elements for bereavement leave under the CBA are:
(1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or
sister, of an employee; and (3) legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The
requisites for death and accident insurance under Article XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA
are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse, or
child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4)
presentation of the proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal
definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires
personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born.
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.
First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the
Civil Code on natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code,
the very first of the general provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is
inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is
the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
The civil personality of the unborn child does not need to be established because
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a person are not in issue. Whether the unborn
child acquired any rights or incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that were
passed on to or assumed by the child's parents is not at issue. The rights to bereavement
leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the
unborn child upon the latter's death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of
death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be
extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with
civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die.
Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes
the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that the State must protect equally with the
life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to
the child being delivered, qualifies as death.
Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental
Steel itself defines, a dependent is "one who relies on another for support; one not able to
exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid of someone else." Under said general
definition,[26] even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillano's child could
not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother,
Hortillano's wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in
question that the dependent may be the parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or
the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did not provide a
qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must
have acquired civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification,
then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus
in the mother's womb.
A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage.
Remove the element of lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between
parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter:

"Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate."
(Emphasis ours.)
Conversely, all children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case,
it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and that their child
was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.
Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and
if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a
loved one. It cannot be said that the parents' grief and sense of loss arising from the death
of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died
during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died
subsequently.
Paternity .
Puno v.Puno Enterp, 599 SCRA 585: Certificate of Live Birth merely identifying the
father is not competent evidence of paternity unless there is showing the putative
father had a hand in the preparation of the certificate. Baptismal Certificate is
merely evidence of the administration of the sacrament of baptism but not as to the
childs paternity.
In Fidel v. CA, #168263, 21July08, the Court ruled: Primitivo was born in1895. At that
time, only records of birth were those appearing in the parochial records. As to the nature
and character of the entries contained in the parochial books and the certificates thereof
issued by the parish priest, the same have not lost their character of being public
documents for the purpose of proving the acts referred to therein, inasmuch as from the
time of the change of sovereignty in he Philippines up to the present, no law has been
enacted abolishing the official and public character of parochial books and entries made
therein. Parish priests continue to the legal custodians of the parochial books kept during
the former sovereignty, and as such may issue certified copies of the entries contained
therein in the same manner as do keepers of archives.
Validity of Divorce Decree:
Article 26, 2nd par., FC of the Philippines
Bayot v. CA, #163979, 7Nov08
Vicente, Filipino, and Rebecca, American, got married validly in the Philippines. They
had one child, Alix. Rebecca got a divorce decree abroad, allowing each one of them to
remarry, and giving both joint custody and guardianship over their daughter. The foreign
court also settled issue of CPG based on an Agreement presented to it by the parties.
Later on, Rebecca filed a petition for nullity of marriage in RTC Muntinglupa, under Art.
36, citing Vicente as PI. She sought dissolution of CPG and asked support for Alix.
Vicente moved to dismiss citing prior divorce decree. Rebecca opposed claiming she was
a Filipino citizen accdg to the DOJ of the Philippines, so foreign divorce was void. The
case reached the Supreme Court which ruled that:
1. Rebecca was an American citizen, due to jus soli principle; her being declared
Filipino by the DOJ did not retroact to the date of her marriage to Vicente; thus,
when divorce was granted, she was not yet a Filipino citizen;
2. The alleged CPG was no longer existent as it was dissolved by the divorce court
based on the Agreement both parties presented to it.
3. No basis for declaration of nullity of marriage, as there is no more marriage to be
declared null and void.

Nullity of Marriage
So v. Valera, 588 SCRA 319 - No requirement that the psychologically incapacitated
spouse must be personally examined by a physician; there must be evidence proving
adequately the psychological incapacity. (Najera v. Najera, 591 SCRA 541; Rumbaua
v. Rumbaua 596 SCRA 157, Azcueta v. Republic, #180668, 26May09- decree granted!).
Basis of Art. 36 is 3rd par of Canon 1095, not 2 nd which refers to grave lack of
discretion of judgment re matrimonial rights, not on psychological incapacity.
In Te v. Uy-Te, #161793, 13Feb09, courts should interpret Art. 36, FC, on a case-to-case
basis, using the totality of evidence rule. Rule is reiterated in Halili v. Halili, #165424,
09June09. In both cases, Dependent Personality disorder was proved, hence petition for
nullity was granted.
Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005, 472 SCRA 114). Existence
of citizenship requirement is not at the time of the celebrations of marriage but at the
time of the filing of the petition for divorce.
Nullity of Marriage
Tsoi v. Tsoi - Marriage null under Art. 36, husband was gay and could not comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage.
Antonio v. Reyes, #155800, 10 Mar 06-Respondent wife a pathological liar;
Ferraris v. Ferraris, #162368, 17 July 06- epilepsy not evidence of PI;
Buenaventura v. CA, # 127358 31 Mar 2005- moral damages cant be granted due to
PI; Why? Because PI is not wilful or deliberate;
Republic v. Baguio #171042, 30 JUNE 2008; Paras v. Paras, #147824, 2 Aug 2007;
psychological incapacity must be proven in court: Juridical Antecedence, Gravity;
Incurability.
Adoption - Use of Mothers Surname - Adoption of Stephanie Astorga Garcia,
#148311, 31 Mar 2005- Illegitimate Child adopted by biological father uses fathers
surname and can use mothers surname as middle name.(Court thru J. Angelina
S.Gutierrez cited CRC)
Adoption: Requirement of Joint Adoption by Spouses is mandatory. - A mere
affidavit of consent by one spouse to the adoption by the other spouse of a child is
insufficient. Petition will be denied. Both spouses must be qualified to adopt.
Foreigner spouse of a Filipino must possess all the qualifications set forth in the
Domestic Adoption Act. Residency and Certification of qualifications for adoption
cannot be waived.
Emancipation from parental authority does not terminate adoption of the child.
Emancipation of the adoptee does not affect all the rights acquired under the
adoption such as status of legitimacy, inheritance, right to use surname of the
adopting father, etc.
In re: Petition for Adoption of minors Michelle and Michael Lim, #168992-92, 21May09
Conveyance of Title of property to a child by the person paying the purchase price
does not give rise to implied trust. The law disputably presumes donation to the
child. Ty v. Ty, etc. #165696, 30Apr08.
Thus conveyance must be in the required form of donation. If the conveyance is to take
place upon death of donor, solemnities of will must be complied with.

Use of Surname of Illegitimate Father by a Child - RA #9255, 24 Feb 2004.

Briones v. Miguel et al 440 SCRA 455 18 Oct 04 - a natural child is under sole
parental authority and custody of the mother unless for compelling reasons. The
right to choose who of the parents the child wants to have custody over him exists
only when the childs parents are legally married.
Dacasin v. Dacasin, # 168785. 5Feb10
Enforcement of a post-foreign divorce child custody agreement for lack of
jurisdiction.
Petitioner Herald (American) and Sharon (Filipino), married with one daughter,
Stephanie, were divorced by an Illinois court. The court awarded to Sharon sole
custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement of decision
purposes. The ex-spouses later on executed an Agreement in Manila for the joint custody
of Stephanie, and chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes
arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an
order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts.
Later on, Herald sued Sharon RTC of Makati to enforce the Agreement because
Sharon was exercising sole, instead of joint, custody over Stephanie. Respondent moved
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because the Illinois court retained jurisdiction to
enforce the divorce decree. RTC dismissed the complaint and held that: (1) it is
precluded from taking cognizance over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention
of jurisdiction to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole custody of
Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is binding on petitioner following the
nationality rule prevailing in this jurisdiction; and (3) the Agreement is void for
contravening Article 2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibiting compromise
agreements on jurisdiction. Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument
that the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void, thus the decree does not bar the
RTC from exercising jurisdiction over the case.
The Issue: whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit
and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.
The Ruling of the Court: The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit
but not to enforce the Agreement which is void.
Jurisdiction over subject matter is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in
the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction
over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific
performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child
custody, belongs to this species of actions. Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to
the right court.
Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit was grounded not on
its lack of power to do so but on its thinking that the Illinois courts divorce decree
stripped it of jurisdiction. This conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained
was jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the various
provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution. Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement
not of the various provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement
on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the Illinois courts socalled retained jurisdiction.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the Agreement which is
contrary to law. In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate the terms

of agreement subject to the minimum ban on stipulations contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy. Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence,
deemed inexistent and void from the beginning.
At the time the parties executed the Agreement, Stephanie was under seven years old.
Also, petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws of the United
States because of the divorce decree. The relevant Philippine law on child custody for
spouses separated in fact or in law (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the
Family Code) is also undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall be separated
from the mother x x x. (This statutory awarding of sole parental custody to the mother
is mandatory, grounded on sound policy consideration, subject only to a narrow
exception.) Clearly then, the Agreements object to establish a post-divorce joint custody
regime between respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old
contravenes Philippine law. The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to
law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by
the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated
because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live
together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under
the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void.
Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2)
separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and
for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents
how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated
mother. It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code applies only to judicial custodial agreements based on its text that No child under
seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise. Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second
paragraph of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the childs seventh
year. From the eighth year until the childs emancipation, the law gives the
separated parents freedom, subject to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on
custody regimes they see fit to adopt.
Stephanie is now nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of
the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and bringing it within coverage
of the default standard on child custody proceedings the best interest of the child. This
disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine that in child custody proceedings, equity
may be invoked to serve the childs best interest. Dacasin v. Dacasin, # 168785. 5Feb10
Best Interest of the Child Rule - In Gamboa-Hirsch v. Court of Appeals (Res.), G.R.
No. 174485, 11 July 2007, 527 SCRA 320 (reversing the Court of Appeals ruling
mandating joint custody and awarding sole custody to the mother) the Court ruled that
the Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in all actions concerning
children, whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts
of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child
shall be a primary consideration (emphasis supplied). The Child and Youth Welfare
Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the care
and custody, among others, of the child, his/her welfare shall be the paramount
consideration. The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the Family
Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the mothers unfitness. The
mother is declared unsuitable to have custody of her children in one or more of the
following instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity, or affliction with a
communicable disease. Here, the mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly
incapable of caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been adduced
to wrench the child from the mothers custody.

Perez v. Court of Appeals, 325 Phil. 1014 (1996). For children over seven, custody
decisions are guided by the standard of best interest of the child.
Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto V, G.R. No. 154994, 28 June 2005, 461 SCRA 450, 471472 Article 213, FC, is enlightening. [A]rticle 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of
the Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of children, the latters welfare
shall be paramount. No mother shall be separated from
her child under seven years of age, unless the court
finds compelling reasons for such measure.
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall not be separated
from their mother finds its raison detre in the basic need of minor children for
their mothers loving care. Sole maternal custody is denied only for compelling
reasons such as neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality, habitual
drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child, insanity or affliction
with a communicable disease (Id. at 476; internal citation omitted).
Fathers may tend to argue against this by claiming unfair state intervention but this
complaint can very well be defended on the ground of patria potestas. Assuming
argumenti that it is a valid ground, it might as well be levelled against the entire field of
family law where the state injects itself on a host of areas impinging on the decisionmaking capacity and autonomy of individuals ranging from the intensely personal (e.g.
who can marry [Article 5, Family Code], where to marry [Article 5, Family Code], who
can celebrate the marriage [Article 5, Family Code], and how to relate to ones spouse
[Articles 68-72]) to proprietary (e.g. Articles 74-125, Family Code, on property relations
of spouses and Articles 194-208, Family Code, on support) to familial (e.g. Articles 209233, Family Code.
Habeas Corpus petition involving a child also involves determining who has the
rightful custody over a child. - The childs welfare is the most important consideration.
The court is not bound by any legal right of a person over the child. In Sombong v. Court
of Appeals, the Court held that: The controversy does not involve the question of
personal freedom, because an infant is presumed to be in the custody of someone until he
attains majority age. In passing on the writ in a child custody case, the court deals
with a matter of an equitable nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent
or guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the custody of the child due weight as
a claim founded on human nature and considered generally equitable and just.
Therefore, these cases are decided, not on the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved
from unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of adults, but on the courts
view of the best interests of those whose welfare requires that they be in custody of
one person or another. Hence, the court is not bound to deliver a child into the
custody of any claimant or of any person, but should, in the consideration of the
facts, leave it in such custody as its welfare at the time appears to require. In short,
the childs welfare is the supreme consideration.
The Family Code authorizes the courts to deprive the parents concerned of
parental authority over the child or adopt such measures as may be proper under
the circumstances, if the welfare of the child so demands,.
Thus, in habeas corpus proceedings involving child custody, judicial resolutions extend
beyond the custodial right of persons exercising parental authority over the child and
reach issues on custodial arrangements serving the childs best interest, remanding a
habeas corpus petition to determine the fitness of the legal custodians notwithstanding
that the question of illegal withholding of custody has been mooted by the transfer of the

childs physical custody to the habeas corpus petitioners. Bagtas v. Santos, G.R. No.
166682, 27 November 2009.

Admissibility of DNA testing to determine paternity - Agustin v. CA # 162571, 15

June 2005
Cases on DNA testing:
Peo. v. Vallejo (May 9 02) rape/murder case. Court allowed DNA samples from
bloodstained clothes of accused as evidence.
People v. Yatar rape with homicide DNA samples from semen recovered from rape
victims vagina used to ID the accused as rapist. Yatar claimed DNA extraction
unconstitutional and violated his right against self-incrimination. The Court ruled
that the kernel or nub of the right is not against compulsion per se but against
testimonial compulsion extracting from lips of the accused an admission of guilt.
It does not extend to extraction of object evidence from the person of the accused.
It is not against the right to privacy, should not stifle scientific advancements that
enhance public service and common good.
Action for acknowledgment and support - Verceles v. Posada #159785, 27 April
2007. No damages may be awarded to petitioner mother of illegitimate child for having
been impregnated by respondent, because she was a consenting adult at the time the illicit
affair took place. Neither can damages be awarded to the parents of the petitioner
mother. Actual expenses for birth however may be claimed.

Property Regimes of unions without marriage under the Family Code are governed
by Arts. 147 and 148 thereof.
FC, Art. 147 Man and woman capacitated to marry each other live together
without benefit of marriage; or whose marriage is void: wages and salaries owned in
equal shares; property acquired by both thru work or industry is co-owned. Joint
acquisition is a disputable presumption, thus owned in equal shares. If no effort by one
partner is exerted to acquire, still, co-owned if partner took care of family and maintained
household.
Property Regimes in Unions Without Marriage. FC, Art. 148. - For marriages other
than those covered by 147, wages/salaries are exclusively owned by each. Properties
acquired by actual joint efforts are co-owned in proportion to contribution. Absent
contrary proof, presumed equal. No disputable presumption of joint acquisition.
Cases: Ugalde vs. Ysasi, #130623, 29 Feb, 2008;
Atienza vs. de Castro, #169698, 29 Nov 06
Disposition of Conjugal Property - Presence of the husband at the signing of Deed of
Sale of conjugal property by his wife, without his objection, since the wife insisted that
her signature was sufficient is substantial compliance with the requirement of consent in
writing under Art. 124 FC. ( De la Cruz v. Segovia, #149801, 26 June 2008)
Separation in fact of spouses does not affect the conjugal partnership. Sale of lot
without consent of the other spouse is void. It cannot be valid only as to the share of
the vendor spouse. (Villanueva v. Chong, #19889, 5 June 2008)
Li-Yao v. Liyao, No. 138961, 2 Mar 2002 -

Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of a husband or in

exceptional cases, his heirs, as he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and
ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces. He should be the one to decide to
conceal or expose it in view of social and economic interest involved. A child born within
a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. He cannot choose his own filiation. If the
husband does not impugn this matter, then the legitimate status of child is fixed. The
child cannot choose to be the child of his mothers paramour. Conversely, if the
presumption of legitimacy is overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the
husband who successfully defeated the presumption.
Family Home:
Art. 159 FC - The family home shall continue despite the death of one or both of the
spouses or of the unmarried head of the family for a period of ten years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same unless the court finds
compelling reasons therefor. This rule applies regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the Family Home. (Arriola v Arriola, #177703, 28 Jan 2008.)
Summary Proceedings for Declaration of Presumptive Death Decision of the court
is final and executory. No appeal, but may file petition for certiorari for grave abuse of
discretion.
Republic v. Tango, #161062, 31July09
Conjugal Partnership
Liabilities under a tort or crime cannot be charged to the CPG unless the crime or quasidelict redounded to the benefit of the CPG. Slander does not redound to the benefit of the
CPG. Buado v. CA, 586SCRA39
When a wife may bind conjugal partnership: Only when she purchases things
necessary for the support of the family, or when she borrows money for that purpose
because of failure of her husband to deliver the needed sum, when the administration of
the CPG is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the husband, or when the wife
gives moderate donations to charity. Francisco et al, v.Sps Gonzales, #177667, 17 Sept08
Illegitimate children entitled to SSS benefits as primary beneficaries. If concurring
with legitimate children, they get 50% of the share of one legitimate child. If there are no
legitimate children, and their mother is disqualified being a common law wife, proceeds
go to secondary beneficiaries, of none, to estate of deceased.
Signey v. SSS, #173582, 28Jan08
Falsity of Affidavit of Cohabitation filed in lieu of Marriage License - It is no mere
irregularity in the formal requisites for marriage, but absence of the requisite, which
renders marriage null and void ab initio.
De Castro v. de Castro #160172, 13Feb08; Republic v. Dayot, 179474, 28Mar08
Acquisition of property during marriage gives rise to presumption that property is
conjugal. It is not required to prove that the property was acquired through conjugal
funds for the presumption to attach.
Termination of the CPG does not ipso facto end the conjugal nature of the property, and
the nature continues to subsist until and after the liquidation and partition of the CPG.
Metrobank v. Nicholson Pascual, #163744, 29Feb2008

II.

PROPERTY, OWNERSHIP and its MODIFICATIONS

Possession in good faith ceases upon knowledge of the defects of the title. Ballesteros
v. Abion, 9Feb06, #143361.
Prescription of Reconveyance of Property. - The prescriptive period for reconveyance
of fraudulently registered real property is 10 years from date of issue of the certificate, if
he is not in possession. If in possession, action is imprescriptible. The action for
reconveyance should be treated as an action for quieting of title. Heirs of Hermosilla v.
Sps. Remoquillo. #167320, 30Jan07
Remedies for one deprived of possession of real property:
1. an action for unlawful detainer
2. forcible entry
The only issue in these two remedies is to determine who between the parties has
better passion of the contested property. Filed with the first level courts.
3. accion publiciana recovery of possession to determine the better
and legal right to possess, independently of title, filed with RTC after expiration
of this one year, but within the prescriptive period.
4. accion reinvindicatoria involves not only possession but also
ownership of the property. Filed with the RTC, prove identity of the property and
the title of plaintiff to it.
Bejar v. Caluag, 15Feb07; #171277
Certificate of Title distinguished from Title - Title is the lawful cause or ground of
possessing that which is ours It is that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive
possession, the foundation of ownership of property, real or personal. Certificate of
Title is mere evidence of ownership. Under the Torrens System, it may be an Original
CT or a Transfer CT. Castillo v. Escutin, #171056, 13Mar09.
SALE
Contract to sell or of sale is perfected as soon as there is agreement of purchase price
and the manner by which the price is to be paid. Contract of Sale is subject to a
suspensive condition. If condition happens, and property is in the hands of the buyer,
ownership automatically is transferred to the buyer by operation of law, without any
further act to be done by the seller. In contract to sell, owner of property expressly
reserves ownership of property; when condition happens which is usually full payment of
money, seller executes a Deed of Sale or such other act to convey title of ownership to
seller. (Bank of Commerce v. Manalo, 9Feb06 #158149; Torrecampo v. Alindogan,
#156405, 28Feb07; United Muslim v. BRYC-V Dev. Corp. #179653, 31July09
Letter of Intent To Sell is neither a contract to sell nor conditional contract of sale
(subject to a suspensive condition). It is a mere declaration of intention to sell; not a
promise to sell.
Three Stages of a Contract: a) Preparation or negotiation; b) Perfection; c)
Consummation. Contract is not perfected if parties merely exchanged offer and counteroffer. Reservation fee is not considered earnest money in the absence of a perfected sale.
Attorneys fees may not be awarded in the absence of stipulation, except on the
following grounds:
1. when exemplary damages are awarded;
2. defendants act or omission compelled plaintiff to litigate with 3rd persons or to
incur expenses to protect his interest;
3. a clearly unfounded suit against the plaintiff;
4. a malicious prosecution against plaintiff;
5. defendant acted with gross and evident bad faith in resuding to satisfy plaintiffs
plainly just and valid claim

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6. actions for legal support;

7. actions for indemnity under the workmens compensation and employers liability
laws;
8. recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
9. a separate action to recover civil liability arising from crime;
10. award of double judicial costs;
11. court deems it just and equitable to award attys fees and expenses of litigation
XYST Corp. v. DMC Urban Properties Devt. Corp., #171968, 31Jul09.
Implied trust - Purchase money resulting trust: (Ist par of Art 1448, CCP that provides
property is sold and the legal estate is granted to one party but prices is paid by
another so he can have a beneficial interest in the property) Elements are 1. actual
payment of money or services, or any valuable consideration; 2. consideration is
furnished by the beneficiary of the resulting trust. Comilang v. Burcena,13Feb06,
#146853
Bank Deposits are simple loans hence the interest rate is 12% unless otherwise
stipulated. The interest itself shall earn legal interest of 12%. Counted from legal
default.
Citibank v. Cabamongan 2 may06 #146918
Land Registration
A defective title may be the source of a completely legal and valid title in the hands of an
innocent purchaser for value.
As a general rule, where a piece of land is in the possession of a person other than the
vendor, the purchaser must go beyond the title, investigate why so; otherwise, he is in bad
faith and cannot have any right over the property. PNB v. Heirs of Militar, 30June06
#165165
Credit Card Transactions
Moral damages may be awarded in culpa contractual when defendant acted fraudulently
and in bad faith, or is guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton
disregard of his contractual obligations, e.g., unreasonable delay in processing approval
for a transaction. Bankard v.Feliciano 28 July 06 #141761
Sale of real property between common law spouses is void. The law prohibits legally
married spouses to sell or donate property to each other, subject to certain exceptions.
Similarly, the prohibitions apply to common law spouses,because otherwise, the
condition of those who incurred guilt would turn out to be better than those in legal
union.
Ching v. Goyanko, 10Nov06 #165879
Double Sale- In a double sale of immovable property, ownership thereof belongs to the
person who in good faith first recorded it in the registry of property. De la Cena v.
Briones, 24 Nov 06 #160805
Succession: A Holographic will under Art. 810, CCP, must be entirely written, dated and
signed by the hand of the testator. It is not subject to any other form, may be made
outside of the Philippines and may not be witnessed. Dy Yieng Seangio v. Judge Amor
Reyes 27Nov06, #140371-72
Ejectment; As between squatters on a parcel of public land, the one entitled to physical
possession (de facto) is he who has prior possession of the property. Respondent entered
into a lease agreement with petitioner, paid the latter rentals, and stopped doing so when
she learned that petitioner did not own the leased land.. When sought to be ejected, for
non-payment of rentals she refused to leave the premises. Ruling: regardless of the actual

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condition of the title, the party in peaceable quiet possession of the property shall not be
thrown out by a strong hand, violence or terror. Ramos v. Pabas, 30Nov06 #154565
Lease: Useful improvements made by lessee. A tenant can never be a builder in good
faith. If he makes improvements on the leased premises, at the end of the lease, the lessor
may opt to reimburse lessee of the value of improvements or, allow lessee to remove
improvements. This option belongs solely to the lessor. Parilla v. Pilar, 30Nov06, 16760
Damages: Responsibility of Surgeon under the Captain of the Ship rule. The
physician is no longer an independent contractor.
Hospitals are no longer exempt from the application of the Respondeat superior principle
as they wield significant control in hiring and firing of consultants, subject the attending
or consultant physician to periodic peer review, which points to an employer-employee
relationship. Thus for the purpose of allocating responsibility in medical negligence
cases, the Court holds that such relationship exists between hospital and attending or
visiting physician. PSI v. Sps. Agana, #127590, 31Jan07
Change of Name is an adversarial proceeding. But if no opposition exists despite
publication and notice, the case should proceed.
Republic v. Capote, #157043, 2Feb07
Contract of Sale: Earnest money in contract of sale is considered part of purchase
price and proof of perfection of contract. Earnest money in contract to sell forms part of
consideration only upon consummation of sale upon full payment of the purchase price.
Serrano v. Herrera, #139173,28Feb07
Negligence or Fault of Debtor coincides with Fortuitous Event. -Debtor cannot use
fortuitous event as shield to avoid liability for negligence. CAP v. BELFRANLT,
#155604, 22Nov07
Mortgage of non-disposable land (e.g., within a forest land) where titles thereto had
been erroneously issued, mortgagees acquire no protection under the land registration
law. The title is void. Good faith and status as an innocent purchaser for value are not
valid defenses. The nullity cannot be cured by prescription, i.e., the action for reversion
cannot be barred by prescription because prescription does not lie against the State.
The remedy of the mortgagee is to go against the mortgagors and debtors. Art. 2085 of
CCP provides that the pledgor or mortgagor should be the absolute owner of the thing
pledged or mortgaged. Nor can the defense of impairment of contract be accepted
because the action for reversion is a valid exercise of the police power of the State.
Forests are important to the nation and the States power has been wielded to regulate the
use and occupancy of forest and forest reserves. Landbank (LBP) v. Republic, #150824,
4Feb08
Sale by co-owner of the co-owned property is valid only as to his share in the
property, as he is entitled to sell his undivided share. The buyer then becomes a coowner of the property. Moreover, prescription does not lie if the land is registered.
Remedy of the co-owners is to be reimbursed for the price of the sale within one month
from notice in writing. Republic v. Heirs of Dignos-Sorono, #171571, 24Mar8.
Interest - is compensation fixed by the parties for the use or forbearance of money and
is referred to as monetary interest. If imposed by law or the courts as penalty or
indemnity for damages, this is called compensatory interest. Under Art. 1956 of the Civil
Code, monetary interest is not due unless expressly agreed upon in writing. When an
obligation is to pay a sum of money and debtor incurs delay, legal interest (12%) may be
imposed as indemnity, unless otherwise stipulated. Likewise, interest due shall earn legal

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interest from judicial demand, even if the obligation is silent on this matter. Siga-an v.
Villanueva, #173227, 20Jan09.
Blanket Mortgage Clause or Dragnet Clause - is one that is specifically phrased to
subsume all debts of past and future origins. The amounts specified as consideration in
the contracts do not limit the amount for which the pledge or mortgage stands as security,
if from the contract, the intent to secure future and other indebtedness can be inferred.
Premiere Dev. Bank v. Central Surety, #176246, 13Feb09.
Source of Right must be specified or identified. - In a complaint or petition, the mere
assertion of a right and claim of an obligation is merely a conclusion of fact and law. The
pleading must state the root or source of the right or claim, otherwise, no cause of action
is stated. Thus, a person claiming ownership to land cannot merely state that he
possesses or has a right to ownership. He must allege the mode of acquisition or describe
at least a certificate of title in his name. Mkti Stock Ex v. Campos et al., #138814, 16
April09.
Registration of public land under the Property Registration decree can be done only
if the State has already declared such land to be alienable and disposable. The State has
already expressed its intention to abdicate its prerogative over the property. The
character of public land changes to patrimonial. Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic,
#179987, 29Apr09.
In an action by the State for reversion of land, a planter or builder in good faith (has
a TCT over the property, but it turned out the land was part of inalienable forest
land) has the right of reimbursement and retention of the premises until full
reimbursement. If removal Is not feasible, then he is entitled to payment of the value
of improvements. Republic v. Ballocanag, 163794, 28Nov088
Transfer of Ownership to the Vendee - Ownership of a thing sold is transferred to the
vendee upon actual or constructive delivery. Delivery means putting the thing sold under
control and possession of the vendee.
Execution of Sale through a Public Document is prima facie presumption of delivery
unless otherwise provided or inferred.
A sale based on As-is-where-is (pertains to physical condition, not its legal situation.)
does not alter the vendors responsibility to deliver property to the buyer. The refusal of a
third person to release the property is never deemed force majeure which refers to
natural occurrences or act of man such as wars, strikes or riots. APT v. TJ Enterprises,
#167195, 08May09
Credit Transactions Failure by credit card company to act with timeliness to approve
Credit Card Transaction shall give rise to damages for breach of contract.
Pantaleon v. American Express, #174269, 8May09
Contractors claim for added costs - Art. 1724 of the CCP requires a written
authorization from the owner before a contractor can claim added costs incurred by
reason of additions or changes in the original plan. Solutio indebiti will not work to
enforce the claim. Contractor took the risk of being denied payment by the owner for the
added cost by not giving the owner prior notice and securing consent thereto.
Uy v. Public Estates Authority, #147925-26, 8June09
Proximate cause of injury - Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise the higher
degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its administrators and
teachers. The proximate cause of Jaysons injury was the concurrent failure of petitioners
to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during the conduct of the science
experiment. There being contributory negligence, petitioners are liable only for the
actual damage caused by their negligence. Article 218 of the Family Code, in relation to

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Article 2180 of the Civil Code, bestows special parental authority on the school, its
administrators and teachers. St. Josephs College, et al, v. Miranda, #182353, 29June10
Venue for damage suit against carriers - Under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention, the plaintiff may bring the action for damages before: 1. the court where the
carrier is domiciled; 2. the court where the carrier has its principal place of business; 3.
the court where the carrier has an establishment by which the contract has been made; or
4. the court of the place of destination. Lhuillier v. British Airways#171092 15Mar10.
R.A. 26 governs the reconstitution of lost or destroyed Torrens certificates of title.
Its Section 2 enumerates the following sources for the reconstitution of such titles:
(a)

The owners duplicate of the certificate of title;

(b)
The co-owners, mortgagees, or lessees duplicate of the
certificate of title;
(c)
A certified copy of the certificate of title, previously
issued by the register of deeds or by a legal custodian thereof;
(d)
An authenticated copy of the decree of registration or
patent, as the case may be, pursuant to which the original certificate
of title was issued;
(e)
A document, on file in the Registry of Deeds, by which
the property, the description of which is given in said document, is
mortgaged, leased or encumbered, or an authenticated copy of said
document showing that its original had been registered; and
(f)
Any other document which, in the judgment of the
court, is sufficient and proper basis for reconstituting the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.

What needs to be shown before the issuance of an order for reconstitution: (a) that
the certificate of title had been lost or destroyed and that efforts have been exerted to
locate it; (b) that the documents presented by petitioner are sufficient and proper to
warrant reconstitution of the lost or destroyed certificate of title; (c) that the petitioner is
the registered owner of the property or had an interest therein; (d) that the certificate of
title was in force at the time it was lost or destroyed; and (e) that the description, area and
boundaries of the property are substantially the same as those contained in the lost or
destroyed certificate of title.
Although the LRAs certification and its report confirmed the issuance of a
decree, these documents do not sufficiently prove that a title had in fact been issued
pursuant to such decree. Indeed, it remains uncertain what kind of decree the land
registration court issued in the case. Act 496 (the 1903 Land Registration Act) which
was then in force recognized two kinds of decrees in land registration proceedings: first, a
decree issued under Section 37 that dismisses the application and, second, a decree issued
under Section 38 confirming title of ownership and its registration.
The nature of reconstitution of a lost or destroyed certificate of title denotes a
restoration of the instrument in its original form and condition. That cannot be done
without proof that such certificate of title had once existed. The procedures laid down in
R.A. 26 for reconstituting a title have to be strictly followed considering that reconstitution, if made easy,
could be the source of anomalous titles. It could also be unscrupulously availed of by some as a convenient
substitute for the rigid proceedings involved in original registration of title. Republic v. Catarroja, et al, #
171774, 12Feb10
FAMILY RELATIONS
The continuing affinity view maintains that relationship by affinity between the surviving spouse and the
relatives of the deceased spouse continues even after the death of the deceased spouse, regardless of

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whether the marriage produced children or not. This view considers that, where the law indicates an intent to
benefit step-relatives or in-laws, the tie of affinity between these people and their relatives-by-marriage is
not to be regarded as terminated upon the death of one of the married parties.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 of the RPC is meant to address specific crimes against
property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes,
whether simple or complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the said provision.
To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes
of a complex crime such as estafa through falsification of public documents for the purpose of negating the
existence of that complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its right to hold the offender criminally
liable for the simple crimes of theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of the
juridical right to property committed by the offender against certain family members as a private matter and
therefore subject only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of the right to property is
achieved through (and therefore inseparably intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity
and presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter instance, what is involved is no longer
simply the property right of a family relation but a paramount public interest. Intestate Estate of
Gonzales vda. De Carungcong v. People and William Sato # 181409, 11 Feb10
Family Home- Under the Family Code, there is no need to constitute the family home judicially or
extrajudicially. All family homes constructed after the effectivity of the FC on 3 August 1988are
constituted as such by operation of law. Sps. Kelly v. Planters Products,172263, 9July08
Change of Sex in the Certificate of Live Birth this is a legal issue and needs a judicial determination
and order to effect a change in the entry of the COLB, under Art. 142,CCP. Applicable procedure is Rule
108, Rules of Court.
Where a person is biologically or naturally intersex, the determining factor in gender classification is what
that person upon reaching the majority age with good reason thinks of her/his sex. Republic v. Jennifer
Cagandahan #166676, 12Sept08
Donation Mortis Causa - A donation that is to become effective upon the death of the donor is one with a
resolutory term or period, and is deemed mortis causa. It partakes of a testamentary provision and shall be
governed by the rules under Arts. 805 and 806 of the CCP, and must be executed in accordance with the
requisites and solemnities of will and testaments. Otherwise, the deed is null and void. Aluad, etal., v.
Aluad, #176943, 17Oct08.
Registered owner of vehicle that has been sold to someone else primarily bears responsibility to the
public for whatever damage or injury the vehicle may cause.
The underlying principle of contributory negligence states that a
party partly responsible for his own injury must proportionately bear the consequences of his own
negligence.
Cadiente v. Macas, # 161946, 14Nov08
Damages May a municipal mayor be held solidarily liable for he negligent acts of the driver
assigned to him which resulted in the death of pedestrian?
Vicarious or imputed liability exists when:
1. employee was chosen by employer personally or through another;
2. Service to be rendered is in accordance with orders which the employer has the authority to give at
all times; nad
3. the illicit act of the employee was on the occasion or by reason of the functions entrusted to him.
In this case, the driver is not the employee of the mayor but of the municipality. Only the negligent driver, the
registered owner of the vehicle and the direct employer of the driver are liable. The municipality cannot be
sued because of the doctrine of state immunity. The general rule is that the state cannot be sued without its
consent.
Sps. Jayme v. Apostol, et al., #163609, 27Nov08

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