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THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 157306


Petitioner,
Present:

Panganiban, J.,
Chairman,
- versus -

Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Corona,
Carpio Morales, and
Garcia, JJ

ANATALIA ACTUB TIU ESTONILO


and ANDREA ACTUB TIU PO

Promulgated:

(in Substitution of NAZARIA BOMBEO), November 25, 2005


Respondents.

_______________

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

T
o segregate portions of the public domain as reservations for the use of the Republic of the
Philippines or any of its branches, like the Armed Forces of the Philippines, all that is needed is a
presidential proclamation to that effect. A court judgment is not necessary to make the
proclamation effective or valid.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to

reverse and set aside the February 21, 2003 Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAGR CV No. 66807. The assailed CA Decision disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the ruling


of the trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.[3]

The Facts
The antecedents were summarized by the CA as follows:

This case originated from an application for registration of a


parcel of land known as Lot No. 4318 of the cadastral survey of
Cagayan de Oro consisting [of] an area of 357,866 square meters,
filed by [the] original [a]pplicant, Nazaria Bombeo with the defunct
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental on July 22, 1954. In her
application, Bombeo claimed that said parcel of land was previously
owned and possessed by a certain Rosendo Bacas since 1894 until it
was sold to her by the heirs of Rosendo Bacas, represented by their
attorney-in-fact and heir himself, Calistro Bacas by virtue of an
Absolute Sale of Realty (Exhibit A) on June 14, 1954.
After due notice and publication of said application, only the
Provincial Fiscal of Misamis Oriental, in behalf of the Chief of Staff of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines [AFP] and the Director of [the]
Bureau of Land[s] filed its opposition thereto, alleging that Lot 4318 is
not a registrable land pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 265,

which took effect on March 31, 1938, and which declared Lot 4318
reserved for the use of the Philippine Army, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL PROCLAMATION NO. 265. RESERVING
FOR THE USE OF THE PHILIPPINE ARMY THREE
PARCELS OF THE PUBLIC DOMAIN SITUATED IN THE
BARRIOS OF BULUA AND CARMEN, MUNICIPALITY OF
CAGAYAN, PROVINCE OF MISAMIS ORIENTAL, ISLAND
OF MINDANAO.
Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce and pursuant to the provision of
section eighty-three of Commonwealth Act Number One
Hundred and Forty-one, I hereby withdraw from sale of
settlement and reserve for the use of the Philippine Army,
under the administration of the Chief of Staff subject to
private rights, if any thereby, the following described parcels
of public domain, situated in the barrios of Bulua and
Carmen, Municipality of Cagayan, Province of Misamis
Oriental, Island of Mindanao, and particularly described in
Bureau of Lands SWO-15234, to wit:
Lot No. 4318. x x x.
Containing an area of 354,377 square meters.

During the initial hearing set on February 12, 1955, an Order


of General Default was issued by the lower court. On July 29, 1959,
Bombeo died and was substituted by her daughter Cipriana Actub Tiu
who eventually died on December 5, 1990. Thereafter, due to
intervening deaths of the parties, the case literally went to slumber
until it was re-raffled to the Regional Trial Court (Branch 17) of
Misamis Oriental on October 16, 1991 and was pursued anew by the
daughters of Cipriana Actub Tiu, namely, Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo
and Andrea Actub Tiu Po. On the other hand, Oppositors Bureau of
Lands and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, in
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines; were represented by the
Provincial Prosecutor Florencia Abbu and Major Raul Llacuna of
JAGO [Judge Advocate Generals Office]. On May 27, 1994, the trial
court confirmed title over Lot 4318 to Nazaria Bombeo substituted by
her heirs Anatalia Actub Tiu Estonilo and Andrea Actub Tiu Po and
ordered registration thereof under the names of the latter.
Consequently, Oppositors Bureau of Lands and Chief of Staff of

Armed Forces of the Philippines, through the Solicitor Generals


Office; filed an appeal to said decision x x x.

During the pendency of the appeal, however, Presidential


Proclamation No. 330[4] took effect on June 20, 2000, excluding Lot
4318 from the operation of Presidential Proclamation No. 265[.]
xxx

xxx

xxx

In view of the aforesaid decree, x x x [respondents urged the


CA] to finally put to rest the controversy in their favor considering that
the opposition of the Republic has no longer any basis.[5]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ruled that Presidential Proclamation No. 265 (Proc 265) failed to
segregate effectively Lot 4318 as part of the military reservation. The CA said that the
proclamation was not self-executory and self-adjudicating considering that there is a need to
determine private rights of claimants over lands sought to be reserved.

Moreover, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that respondents were able to
establish with sufficient evidence their right to have the land registered under their names. It
acknowledged that possession by respondents predecessors-in-interest had ripened into an
imperfect title of ownership, subject to judicial confirmation. It added that ownership of the land
would still be deemed vested in respondents, in view of their almost half a century of open,
continuous, adverse and peaceful possession, even if possession by their predecessors-ininterest were not taken into consideration.

Hence, this Petition.[6]

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

I.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that
Presidential Proclamation No. 265 did not effectively segregate Lot
4318 from the public domain.
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding that
respondents were able to establish that they have already acquired
private right over Lot 4318 which already amounted to a title.

III.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the
passage of Presidential Proclamation No. 330 which excludes from
the operation of Presidential Proclamation No. 265 Lot 4318 negates
the claim of the AFP that the land in dispute is actively possessed
and used by it.[7]

In short, the main issue is whether respondents have duly proven their title to the subject
land and may thus register it under the Public Land Act.

The Courts Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue:
Validity of Respondents Title

The Public Land Act[8] requires applicants for confirmation of imperfect titles to prove

(1) that the land is alienable public land;[9] and (2) that their open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the property has taken place either since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed by law. When the legal conditions are complied with,
the possessor of the land -- by operation of law -- acquires a right to a government grant, without
necessitating the issuance of a certificate of title.[10]

After a meticulous review of the Decisions of both the trial and the appellate courts, as
well as of the evidence on record, the Court finds that respondents failed to satisfy the above
legal requirements.

Nature of Lot 4318

It is not disputed that Proc 265 specifically reserved Lot 4318 for the use of the
Philippine Army. Respondents maintain, though, that the land was not effectively segregated as
a military reservation by the Proclamation. Relying on Baloy v. CA,[11] they allege that a
petition for reservation or a court judgment declaring the reservation is necessary to make Proc
265 effective. They maintain that the provision in the Proclamation subjecting the reservation to
private rights presumes that notice and hearing will be afforded to all persons claiming
ownership rights over the land. Otherwise, the reservation would amount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law. They further allege that the AFP failed to observe these
requirements, thus causing the reservation to be ineffectual.

Petitioner, however, argues that the Public Land Act does not require a judicial order to
create a military reservation. It contends that the proviso requiring the reservation to be subject
to private rights means that persons claiming rights over the reserved land are not precluded from
proving their claims. It contends further that respondents were afforded due process when their
application for registration of title to Lot 4318 was heard by the lower courts.

We agree with petitioner. The segregation of land for a public purpose is governed by the
Public Land Act, the pertinent provisions of which are as follows:

SECTION 83. Upon the recommendation of the Secretary of


Agriculture and Natural Resources, the President may designate by
proclamation any tract or tracts of land of the public domain as
reservations for the use of the Republic of the Philippines or of any
of its branches, or of the inhabitants thereof, in accordance with
regulations prescribed for this purposes, or for quasi-public uses or
purposes when the public interest requires it, including reservations
for highways, rights of way for railroads, hydraulic power sites,
irrigation systems, communal pastures or leguas comunales, public
parks, public quarries, public fishponds, workingmen's village and
other improvements for the public benefit.
SECTION 86.
A certified copy of every proclamation of
the President issued under the provisions of this title shall be
forwarded to the Director of Lands for record in his office, and a copy
of this record shall be forwarded to the Register of Deeds of the
province or city where the land lies. Upon receipt of such certified
copy, the Director of Lands shall order the immediate survey of the
proposed reservation if the land has not yet been surveyed, and as
soon as the plat has been completed, he shall proceed in
accordance with the next following section.
SECTION 87.
If all the lands included in the proclamation
of the President are not registered under the Land Registration Act,
the Solicitor General, if requested to do so by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall proceed in accordance with
the provision of Section fifty-three of this Act.
SECTION 53.
It shall be lawful for the Director of Lands,
whenever in the opinion of the President the public interests shall
require it, to cause to be filed in the proper Court of First Instance,
through the Solicitor General or the officer acting in his stead, a
petition against the holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant of any
land who shall not have voluntarily come in under the provisions of
this chapter or of the Land Registration Act, stating in substance that
the title of such holder, claimant, possessor, or occupant is open to
discussion; or that the boundaries of any such land which has not
been brought into court as aforesaid are open to question; or that it
is advisable that the title to such lands be settled and adjudicated,
and praying that the title to any such land or the boundaries thereof
or the right to occupancy thereof be settled and adjudicated. The
judicial proceedings under this section shall be in accordance with
the laws on adjudication of title in cadastral proceedings.

Clearly, under the above provisions, only a positive act of the President is needed to
segregate a piece of land for a public purpose. It must be noted that while Section 53 grants
authority to the director of lands -- through the solicitor general -- to file a petition against
claimants of the reserved land, the filing of that petition is not mandatory. The director of lands
is required to file a petition only whenever in the opinion of the President public interest
requires it.

Inapplicable is the ruling in Baloy v. CA[12] requiring, after due notice and hearing, a
judicial declaration of reservation. The subject of the application for registration in Baloy was
originally private land, as evidenced by a possessory information title issued in the applicants
favor during the Spanish era. As will be explained shortly, Lot 4318 in the present case is
unquestionably public land. The only issue is whether respondents have acquired title to the
property.

Moreover, the governing law in Baloy was Act 627.[13] Under the provisions of that
law, the private character of the land shall be respected absent any court order declaring that the
property has become public. In the case before us, Proc 265 was issued pursuant to
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141. Accordingly, only a positive act of the President is required
to create a government reservation.
Verily, the Proclamation successfully segregated Lot 4318 as a military reservation.
Consequently, respondents could not have validly occupied it in 1954, because it was considered
inalienable[14] since its reservation in 1938.

Respondents Period of Possession

Notwithstanding the reservation in 1938 of Lot 4318 for military use, respondents
maintain their entitlement to have it registered under their names. They allege that their
predecessors-in-interest were already in adverse, open, peaceful and continuous possession of the
property for over 30 years prior to 1938. Thus, they conclude that their imperfect title had
already attached long before the issuance of the Proclamation segregating the land as a military
reservation.

We are not convinced. As a rule, the factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by
the appellate court, are conclusive and binding on this Court. To this rule, however, there are
settled exceptions; for instance, when the judgment assailed is not supported by sufficient
evidence or is based on a misapprehension of facts.[15] We find that these exceptions apply
here.

Land that has not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant,
belongs to the State as part of the public domain.[16] For this reason, imperfect titles to
agricultural lands are subjected to rigorous scrutiny before judicial confirmation is granted.
[17] In the same manner, persons claiming the protection of private rights in order to
exclude their lands from military reservations must show by clear and convincing evidence that
the pieces of property in question have been acquired by a legal method of acquiring public
lands.[18]
In granting respondents judicial confirmation of their imperfect title, the trial and the
appellate courts gave much weight to the tax declarations presented by the former. However,
while the tax declarations were issued under the names of respondents predecessors-in-interest,
the earliest one presented was issued only in 1954.[19] The Director, Lands Management
Bureau v. CA[20] held thus:

x x x. Tax receipts and tax declarations are not


incontrovertible evidence of ownership. They are mere indicia of [a]
claim of ownership. In Director of Lands vs. Santiago:
x x x [I]f it is true that the original owner and
possessor, Generosa Santiago, had been in possession
since 1925, why were the subject lands declared for taxation
purposes for the first time only in 1968, and in the names of
Garcia and Obdin? For although tax receipts and
declarations of ownership for taxation purposes are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at
least proof that the holder had a claim of title over the
property.[21]

In addition, the lower courts credited the alleged prior possession by Calixto and Rosendo
Bacas, from whom respondents predecessors had purportedly bought the property. This
alleged prior possession, though, was totally devoid of any supporting evidence on record.
Respondents evidence hardly supported the conclusion that their predecessors-in-interest had
been in possession of the land since time immemorial.

Moreover, as correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the evidence on
record merely established the transfer of the property from Calixto Bacas to Nazaria Bombeo.
The evidence did not show the nature and the period of the alleged possession by Calixto and
Rosendo Bacas. It is important that applicants for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles must
present specific acts of ownership to substantiate their claims; they cannot simply offer general
statements that are mere conclusions of law rather than factual evidence of possession.[22]

It must be stressed that respondents, as applicants, have the burden of proving that they
have an imperfect title to Lot 4318. Even the absence of opposition from the government does
not relieve them of this burden.[23] Thus, it was erroneous for the trial and the appellate
courts to hold that the failure of the government to dislodge respondents, judicially or
extrajudicially, from the subject land since 1954 already amounted to a title.

In this connection, the Court reiterates the following ruling in Director of Lands v.
Agustin:[24]

x x x. The petitioner is not necessarily entitled to have the land


registered under the Torrens system simply because no one appears
to oppose his title and to oppose the registration of his land. He must
show, even though there is no opposition, to the satisfaction of the
court, that he is the absolute owner, in fee simple. Courts are not
justified in registering property under the Torrens system, simply
because there is no opposition offered. Courts may, even in the
absence of any opposition, deny the registration of the land under the
Torrens system, upon the ground that the facts presented did not
show that the petitioner is the owner, in fee simple, of the land which
he is attempting to have registered.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The segregation of Lot 4318 as part of a military
reservation is declared VALID. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 41968 February 15, 1995


THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS and THE DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. JUDGE DELIA P. MEDINA and DOMINGO REYES, respondents.

ROMERO, J.:
In 1968 Damingo Reyes sought the registration of eight (8) parcels of land in the barrios of Vigo, Catidang, and Tala in San Narciso (now San
Andres), Quezon before the then Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch I, as a land registration court. The Director of Lands, through the
Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the application as did several private individuals.
In due course, the court issued a general order of default except for the Director of Lands and the private oppositors.
During the hearings of the case, the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon appeared as counsel for both the Director of Lands and the then Director of
Forestry. Although the latter did not formally enter his appearance in the case, the court allowed him, through the Provincial Fiscal, to
introduce evidence in support of the fact that 176 hectares of the area sought to be registered fell within the forest classification and,
therefore, were inalienable and unregisterable.
On July 31, 1974, Judge Delia P. Medina rendered a decision adjudicating to Domingo Reyes the four (4) parcels of land sought to be
registered and ordering their registration in his name. The Provincial Fiscal received a copy of the Decision on August 8, 1974, but the
Solicitor General received his copy only on November 13, 1974.
On December 12, 1974, within the 30-day period then required for interposing an appeal, the Solicitor General filed for the Directors of Land
and Forest Development, a notice of appeal and an urgent motion for extension of time to file a record on appeal, which the Provincial Fiscal
eventually filed on January 2, 1975.
On December 26, 1974, however, counsel for Domingo Reyes filed an opposition to the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time to
file record on appeal. He contended that since it was principally the Provincial Fiscal who represented both the Directors of Land and Forest
Development and who received the copy of the Decision on August 8, 1974, the notice of appeal and motion for extension of time filed by the
Solicitor General had been filed out of time, the Decision, having become final and executory.
The Solicitor General replied that since he was the counsel of record and principal counsel with the Provincial Fiscal appearing merely as his
representative in the case, he should have been served all pleadings and processes in the case and that receipt by the fiscal of the decision
was not equivalent to his receipt inasmuch as such representation did not divest him of control over the case as its principal counsel.
Domingo Reyes reacted to these avertments by arguing that although the Office of the Solicitor General filed for the Bureau of Lands an
opposition to his application for registration, there was no justification for the Solicitor General's claim that he was the principal counsel for
the oppositors as other lawyers had appeared for and in behalf of both the private and public oppositors. Moreover, it was the Provincial
Fiscal who "carried the brunt for the oppositor Bureau of Forestry" and not the Solicitor General who did not appear and participate during the
hearings of the case.
In his rejoinder, the Solicitor General asserted that by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 478, he was the government's representative in land
registration cases; that his authority to deputize the Provincial Fiscal in the performance of his duties did not divest him of control over the
case; and that in the land registration case at hand, he did not empower the Provincial Fiscal to receive pleadings and court processes.
On March 31, 1975, Judge Medina issued an order ruling that, as far as the Director of Lands was concerned, the period to file an appeal
should be counted from receipt of the Decision by the Solicitor General considering that the Provincial Fiscal who had appeared as counsel
of record "with personality separate and distinct from that of the Solicitor General('s)," had expressly informed the court and the adverse
1

which was issued on November 28,


1973 by the Secretary of Justice, Judge Medina opined that in cases where fiscals had been authorized
party that he was a mere representative of the Solicitor General. Citing Circular No. 41,

to appear by the Solicitor General, they appeared as special attorneys of the Office of the Solicitor
General. Judge Medina also stated:
The Fiscal, being thus a mere representative and extension of the personality of the
Solicitor General cannot be considered as a separate counsel of record for the oppositor,
Director of Lands, notice to whom is also notice to the Solicitor General, as contemplated
in the case of Palteng vs. Court of Appeals (26 SCRA 736). The Solicitor General being
the principal counsel; is entitled to service of the orders, pleadings and the decision in
this case and pursuant to Circular No. 41 of the Department of Justice, the service to him
of the decision rendered in this case shall be the basis of the finality thereof.
However, the above is true only with respect to the opposition of the Director of Lands,
since it was only the Director of Lands for whom the Solicitor General entered a formal
opposition and specifically authorized the Fiscal to appear in his behalf, in the light of
Circular No. 41 of the Department of Justice. The record shows that the Director of
Forestry was represented only by the Fiscal who did not interpose for him a timely appeal
despite receipt of the Decision on August 8, 1974, hence, said Decision has become final
and executory as to the Director of Forestry. 2
Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal of the Director of Forestry, gave due course to the appeal of
the Director of Lands, and directed the Solicitor General to amend the notice of appeal and record on
appeal within ten (10) days from notice.
In behalf of the Director of Forest Development, the Solicitor General filed a motion for partial
reconsideration of the Order of March 31, 1975, on the ground that since Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 478 vests
upon the Solicitor General the exclusive authority to represent the government and its officers, service of
the Decision upon the Provincial Fiscal who had "no legal personality by himself to appear for the Director
of Forestry" produced "no legal effect whatever and his inaction" could not bind the Director of Forestry.
The Solicitor General also contended that although he had not filed a formal opposition to the application
for land registration in behalf of the Director of Forestry, he should be "deemed for all legal intents and
purposes" said Director's counsel and receipt by him of copy of the Decision should be determinative of
its finality.
Said motion was denied by the lower court on June 17, 1975 for lack of merit. On July 22, 1975, the
Solicitor General filed a motion for a 30-day extension within which to submit an amended record on
appeal. Domingo Reyes opposed the motion, and on July 31, 1975, the lower court dismissed the
Solicitor General's appeal for his failure to amend the notice of appeal and record on appeal as required
in the order of March 31, 1975, after a lapse of more than three months.
It turned out, however, that a motion for extension of time dated July 23, 1975, had in fact been filed by
the Solicitor General because on August 1, 1975 the lower court issued an Order holding that such motion
had been "rendered moot and academic" by its Order of July 31, 1975, dismissing the appeal interposed
by the Solicitor General.
Nevertheless, on August 14, 1975, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, filed an amended
notice of appeal to the Court of appeals. On August 22, 1975, a special counsel filed a motion and
manifestation stating that upon the instruction of the Provincial Fiscal, he was submitting a motion for
reconsideration signed by the Assistant Solicitor General and an amended record on appeal incorporating
relevant pleadings and orders. He manifested that "the Office of the Provincial Fiscal was not able to
immediately comply with the wire-request dated July 22, 1975 for the reason that said wire-request was
received by this Office only on July 30, 1975, aside from the fact that the record of this office regarding
this case has all been forwarded to the Office of the Solicitor General." 3

The said motion for reconsideration of the Order of July 31, 1975, was filed by the Solicitor General for
the Director of Lands. It alleged:
xxx xxx xxx
2. That previously, on April 29, 1975 a partial motion for reconsideration of the Order of
March 31, 1975 was presented by undersigned counsel which was denied in an Order
dated June 17, 1975, which second order although received by the office of the Solicitor
General on June 23, 1975 was actually delivered to the undersigned Solicitor in charge of
the case only on July 16, 1975;
3. That, thereupon, on July 22, 1975 the Solicitor General wired the Provincial Fiscal
directing him to file immediately the amended record on appeal pursuant to the order of
March 31, 1971, at the same time filing a motion for extension of time to file the amended
record on appeal but which was erroneously filed with the Court of Appeals on July 22,
1975. Sad to state said Provincial Fiscal did not comply with aforesaid instruction to file
the amended record on appeal. Had he immediately done so upon receipt of the wire
dated July 22, 1975, there would have been no occasion for this Court to issue the Order
dated July 31, 1975 since the desired amendment, as we see it, merely involves the
simple expedient of deleting or striking out from the notice of appeal dated December 12,
1974, the Director of Forest Development as party appellant thereby leaving the Director
of Lands as the sole appellant herein, which act the Clerk of Court may well do by himself
upon the direction of the Court;
4. That there being no showing that the amendment directed by the Court is necessary
for the proper understanding and resolution of the issues, as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule
41, Rev. Rules of Court, the omission of the Fiscal in making such amendment should not
prejudice the Director of Lands who has seasonably perfected his appeal; . . .
To this motion, the Solicitor General attached the amended record on appeal.
In an order dated November 12, 1975, the lower court denied the said two motions.
Thereupon, the Solicitor General instituted the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus in behalf of the
Directors of Land and Forest Development. He averred that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion, "or at least, in violation of law," in dismissing the appeal of the Director of Forestry, because
while said official did not file a written opposition to the application for land registration, the lower court
allowed him to adduce evidence which fact "could not legally foreclose the said petitioner's right to appeal
through his principal counsel the Solicitor General who . . . interposed for him a timely appeal."
The Solicitor General also charged the lower court with having acted with grave abuse of discretion, "or at
least in violation of law," in dismissing the appeal of the Director of Lands for his failure to file an amended
record on appeal within the ten-day period granted him. He argued that while Sec. 7, Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules of Court mandates the inclusion in an amended record on appeal of any matter essential
to the determination of a case, the lower court directed the exclusion of the Director of Forestry as a party
litigant as well as all pleadings bearing on his opposition.
In his manifestation and motion, private respondent alleged, among others, that certain portions of the
tract of land subject of his application for registration are within the alienable and disposable areas of the
public forest lands. The Solicitor General disputed said allegation, stating that according to the National
Mapping and Resource Information Authority (NAMRIA), the areas referred to by private respondent are
not entirely alienable and disposable.

Although the avertments of the parties are factual matters which are not within the ambit of this Court's
jurisdiction, the contradictory allegations on such factual issues necessitate a review of the merits of the
application for land registration. Such a review may only be done upon a favorable action on the instant
petition which we find to be impressed with merit.
The instant petition actually requires an examination of the extent of the authority of the Solicitor General
to represent the government and to delegate his authority to the Provincial Fiscal, although principally
assailing the ruling of the lower court as regards the timeliness of the appeal interposed by the petitioners.
As regards the authority of the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the government when he
entered an opposition to the private respondent's application for land registration, the law then governing
was the Revised Administrative Code, as amended, which states:
Sec. 1661. Duties of the Solicitor General. As principal law officer of the Government,
the Solicitor-General shall have authority to act and represent the Government of the
Philippines, its offices and agents, in any official investigation, proceeding, or matter
requiring the services of a lawyer. Upon the request of the President or Speaker of any of
the Houses of the Congress of the Philippines, the Solicitor-General or his authorized
representative shall assist and attend any legislative committee that may be practicing
any investigation ordered by the Congress, or by any of the Houses thereof.
It shall, among other things, be his duty, in person or by proper subordinate:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) To represent (the United States in the Supreme Court in all criminal cases, and to
represent the United States and) the Government of the Philippines in the Supreme Court
in all civil actions and special proceedings in which (either of) said Government, or any
officer thereof in his official capacity, is a party.
xxx xxx xxx
When the decision in the land registration case was promulgated on July 31, 1974, the law in force was
Presidential Decree No. 478, the Magna Carta of the Office of the Solicitor General, 4 which took effect
immediately after its issuance on June 4, 1974. 5 This law provides that:
Sec. 1. Functions and Organization. (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent
the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and
agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a
lawyer. When authorized by the President or head of the office concerned, it shall also
represent government owned or controlled corporations. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as such, shall discharge
duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Represent the Government in all land registration and related proceedings. Institute
actions for the reversion to the Government of lands of the public domain and
improvements thereon as well as lands held in violation of the Constitution.

xxx xxx xxx


(g) Deputize, whenever in the opinion of the Solicitor General the public interest requires,
any provincial or city fiscal to assist him in the performance of any function or discharge
of any duty incumbent upon him, within the jurisdiction of the aforesaid provincial or city
fiscal. When so deputized, the fiscal shall be under the control and supervision of the
Solicitor General with regard to the conduct of the proceedings assigned to the fiscal, and
he may be required to render reports or furnish information regarding the assignment.
The Solicitor General, therefore, has "control and supervision" over the fiscal who has been deputized to
appear for him. As such deputy, the fiscal is no more than the "surrogate" of the Solicitor General in any
particular proceeding. 6 The Solicitor General's request for his representation does not make the fiscal the
counsel of the Republic. 7 As the principal counsel, the Solicitor General is entitled to be furnished copies
of all court orders, notices, and decisions. 8 Since court orders and decisions sent to the fiscal, acting as
an agent of the Solicitor General in land registration cases, are not binding until they are actually received
by the Solicitor General, 9 "service of decisions on the Solicitor General is the proper basis for computing
the reglementary
period for filing appeals and for determining whether a decision had attained finality." 10
All these jurisprudential pronouncements inexorably point to no other conclusion than that the appeal
herein involved was timely filed by the Solicitor General. Considering, however, that the Solicitor General
entered his appearance only for the Director of Lands, was the appeal interposed by the Director of
Forestry (later Forest Development) likewise deemed timely filed?
We hold that under the law and the peculiar circumstances of this case, such appeal was timely filed.
After he had entered his appearance as counsel for the Director of Lands and deputized the provincial
fiscal to appear during the hearings, the latter appeared, not only as counsel for the Director of Lands, but
also for the Director of Forestry. In fact, the court allowed the Provincial Fiscal to adduce evidence for the
latter official and his government agency without the private respondent registering any opposition. That
fact estopped the court and the private respondent from later questioning the personality of the Director of
Forestry. Moreover, pursuant to the aforequoted provisions of the Revised Administrative Code and P.D.
No. 478, the Solicitor General acts as counsel for the government in land registration cases and not that
of any particular government official and agency. His appearance therein is premised on his authority to
protect the interest of the government and not that of any particular government official or agency.
Considering the foregoing, the lower court gravely abused its discretion on dismissing the appeal of the
government on the basis of what it perceived as a procedural lapse. The lower court should be reminded
that the ends of substantial justice should be the paramount consideration in any litigation or proceeding.
As this Court ruled in Republic v. Associacion Benevola de
Cebu, 11 "to dismiss the Republic's appeal merely on the alleged ground of late filing is not proper
considering the merits of the case" and to ignore the evidence presented by the provincial fiscal in behalf
of the Director of Forestry which constituted the crux of the government's case "would defeat the timehonored Constitutional precepts and the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to
the State, and that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony." This notwithstanding, we need not discuss the issue raised as regards
the filing of the record on appeal, as such procedural requirement has been dropped under Sec. 18 of the
Interim Rules and Guidelines dated January 11, 1983.
Now, a word about the working relationship between the Solicitor General and his deputy, the Provincial
Fiscal. The problems ventilated in this petition would not have arisen had there been close coordination
between the two officials and their respective offices to the end that all problems, whether substantive or
procedural, could have been ironed out before they worsened. They should have remembered that they

were representing the interests of the Republic which should, in no case, be compromised through
neglect, inefficiency, or even ignorance, but accorded utmost attention.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby GRANTED and the questioned
orders of the lower court dismissing the appeal interposed by the Solicitor General in behalf of the
government are SET ASIDE. The Solicitor General is directed to file the proper petition for review before
the Court of Appeals which shall resolve with dispatch the instant land registration case which has been
pending for some twenty years.
SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: Chavez v. National Housing Authority


Posted: August 4, 2010 in Case Digests
Tags: case, constitution, digest, land, law, nha, Philippines, territory

2
G.R. No. 164527

15 August 2007

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.


FACTS:
On August 5, 2004, former Solicitor General Francisco Chavez, filed an instant petition raising
constitutional issues on the JVA entered by National Housing Authority and R-II Builders, Inc.
On March 1, 1988, then-President Cory Aquino issued Memorandum order No. (MO) 161
approving and directing implementation of the Comprehensive and Integrated Metropolitan
Manila Waste Management Plan. During this time, Smokey Mountain, a wasteland in Tondo,
Manila, are being made residence of many Filipinos living in a subhuman state.
As presented in MO 161, NHA prepared feasibility studies to turn the dumpsite into low-cost
housing project, thus, Smokey Mountain Development and Reclamation Project (SMDRP), came
into place. RA 6957 (Build-Operate-Transfer Law) was passed on July 1990 declaring the
importance of private sectors as contractors in government projects. Thereafter, Aquino
proclaimed MO 415 applying RA 6957 to SMDRP, among others. The same MO also
established EXECOM and TECHCOM in the execution and evaluation of the plan, respectively,
to be assisted by the Public Estates Authority (PEA).
Notices of public bidding to become NHAs venture partner for SMDRP were published in
newspapers in 1992, from which R-II Builders, Inc. (RBI) won the bidding process. ThenPresident Ramos authorized NHA to enter into a Joint Venture Agreement with RBI.
Under the JVA, the project involves the clearing of Smokey Mountain for eventual development
into a low cost housing complex and industrial/commercial site. RBI is expected to fully finance

the development of Smokey Mountain and reclaim 40 hectares of the land at the Manila Bay
Area. The latter together with the commercial area to be built on Smokey Mountain will be
owned by RBI as enabling components. If the project is revoked or terminated by the
Government through no fault of RBI or by mutual agreement, the Government shall compensate
RBI for its actual expenses incurred in the Project plus a reasonable rate of return not exceeding
that stated in the feasibility study and in the contract as of the date of such revocation,
cancellation, or termination on a schedule to be agreed upon by both parties.
To summarize, the SMDRP shall consist of Phase I and Phase II. Phase I of the project involves
clearing, levelling-off the dumpsite, and construction of temporary housing units for the current
residents on the cleared and levelled site. Phase II involves the construction of a fenced
incineration area for the on-site disposal of the garbage at the dumpsite.
Due to the recommendations done by the DENR after evaluations done, the JVA was amended
and restated (now ARJVA) to accommodate the design changes and additional work to be done
to successfully implement the project. The original 3,500 units of temporary housing were
decreased to 2,992. The reclaimed land as enabling component was increased from 40 hectares
to 79 hectares, which was supported by the issuance of Proclamation No. 465 by President
Ramos. The revision also provided for the 119-hectare land as an enabling component for Phase
II of the project.
Subsequently, the Clean Air Act was passed by the legislature which made the establishment of
an incinerator illegal, making the off-site dumpsite at Smokey Mountain necessary. On August
1, 1998, the project was suspended, to be later reconstituted by President Estrada in MO No. 33.
On August 27, 2003, the NHA and RBI executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby both
parties agreed to terminate the JVA and subsequent agreements. During this time, NHA reported
that 34 temporary housing structures and 21 permanent housing structures had been turned over
by RBI.
ISSUES:
1. Whether respondents NHA and RBI have been granted the power and authority to
reclaim lands of the public domain as this power is vested exclusively in PEA as claimed
by petitioner
2. Whether respondents NHA and RBI were given the power and authority by DENR to
reclaim foreshore and submerged lands
3. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands
considered as alienable and outside the commerce of man
4. Whether respondent RBI can acquire reclaimed lands when there was no declaration that
said lands are no longer needed for public use
5. Whether there is a law authorizing sale of reclaimed lands

6. Whether the transfer of reclaimed lands to RBI was done by public bidding
7. Whether RBI, being a private corporation, is barred by the Constitution to acquire lands
of public domain
8. Whether respondents can be compelled to disclose all information related to the SMDRP
9. Whether the operative fact doctrine applies to the instant position
HELD:
1. Executive Order 525 reads that the PEA shall be primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government. This does not mean that it shall be responsible for all. The requisites for a
valid and legal reclamation project are approval by the President (which were provided
for by MOs), favourable recommendation of PEA (which were seen as a part of its
recommendations to the EXECOM), and undertaken either by PEA or entity under
contract of PEA or by the National Government Agency (NHA is a government agency
whose authority to reclaim lands under consultation with PEA is derived under PD 727
and RA 7279).
2. Notwithstanding the need for DENR permission, the DENR is deemed to have granted
the authority to reclaim in the Smokey Mountain Project for the DENR is one of the
members of the EXECOM which provides reviews for the project. ECCs and Special
Patent Orders were given by the DENR which are exercises of its power of supervision
over the project. Furthermore, it was the President via the abovementioned MOs that
originally authorized the reclamation. It must be noted that the reclamation of lands of
public domain is reposed first in the Philippine President.
3. The reclaimed lands were classified alienable and disposable via MO 415 issued by
President Aquino and Proclamation Nos. 39 and 465 by President Ramos.
4. Despite not having an explicit declaration, the lands have been deemed to be no longer
needed for public use as stated in Proclamation No. 39 that these are to be disposed to
qualified beneficiaries. Furthermore, these lands have already been necessarily
reclassified as alienable and disposable lands under the BOT law.
5. Letter I of Sec. 6 of PD 757 clearly states that the NHA can acquire property rights and
interests and encumber or otherwise dispose of them as it may deem appropriate.
6. There is no doubt that respondent NHA conducted a public bidding of the right to become
its joint venture partner in the Smokey Mountain Project. It was noted that notices were
published in national newspapers. The bidding proper was done by the Bids and Awards
Committee on May 18, 1992.

7. RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718 explicitly states that a contractor can be paid a portion
as percentage of the reclaimed land subject to the constitutional requirement that only
Filipino citizens or corporation with at least 60% Filipino equity can acquire the same. In
addition, when the lands were transferred to the NHA, these were considered Patrimonial
lands of the state, by which it has the power to sell the same to any qualified person.
8. This relief must be granted. It is the right of the Filipino people to information on matters
of public concerned as stated in Article II, Sec. 28, and Article III, Sec. 7 of the 1987
Constitution.
9. When the petitioner filed the case, the JVA had already been terminated by virtue of
MOA between RBI and NHA. The properties and rights in question after the passage of
around 10 years from the start of the projects implementation cannot be disturbed or
questioned. The petitioner, being the Solicitor General at the time SMDRP was
formulated, had ample opportunity to question the said project, but did not do so. The
moment to challenge has passed.

G.R. No. 133250

July 9, 2002

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,


vs.
PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.

384 SCRA 152 Civil Law Land Titles and Deeds Lands of the Public Domain
The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake
reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR
(Department of Environmental and Natural Resources) insofar as reclaimed or about to be
reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned.
PEA sought the transfer to the Amari Coastal Bay and Development Corporation, a private
corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have
290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to Amari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the transfer is valid.

HELD: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to
Amari as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
The Supreme Court affirmed that the 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom
Islands, now covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the public
domain. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural
resources of the public domain. The transfer (as embodied in a joint venture agreement) to
AMARI, a private corporation, ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands, is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Furthermore, since
the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to Amari ownership of 290.156 hectares of still
submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being contrary to Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits the alienation of natural resources other than
agricultural lands of the public domain.

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