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WHO MAY ISSUE A SEARCH WARRANT?

HORTENCIA SALAZAR, petitioner,


vs.
HON. TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, in his capacity as Administrator of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, and FERDIE MARQUEZ, respondents.
Gutierrez & Alo Law Offices for petitioner.

SARMIENTO, J.:
This concerns the validity of the power of the Secretary of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and
seizure under Article 38 of the Labor Code, prohibiting illegal recruitment.
The facts are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
1. On October 21, 1987, Rosalie Tesoro of 177 Tupaz Street, Leveriza, Pasay
City, in a sworn statement filed with the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA for brevity) charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar, viz:
04. T: Ano ba ang dahilan at ikaw ngayon ay narito
at
nagbibigay ng salaysay.
S: Upang ireklamo sa dahilan ang aking PECC Card ay
ayaw ibigay sa akin ng dati kong manager. Horty
Salazar 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Mla.
05. T: Kailan at saan naganap and ginawang
panloloko sa
iyo ng tao/mga taong inireklamo mo?
S. Sa bahay ni Horty Salazar.
06. T: Paano naman naganap ang pangyayari?
S. Pagkagaling ko sa Japan ipinatawag niya ako.
Kinuha
ang PECC Card ko at sinabing hahanapan ako ng
booking sa Japan. Mag 9 month's na ako sa Phils.
ay
hindi pa niya ako napa-alis. So lumipat ako ng
ibang

company pero ayaw niyang ibigay and PECC Card


ko.
2. On November 3, 1987, public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez to whom
said complaint was assigned, sent to the petitioner the following telegram:
YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO APPEAR BEFORE FERDIE
MARQUEZ POEA ANTI ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT UNIT 6TH
FLR. POEA BLDG. EDSA COR. ORTIGAS AVE.
MANDALUYONG MM ON NOVEMBER 6, 1987 AT 10 AM RE
CASE FILED AGAINST YOU. FAIL NOT UNDER PENALTY OF
LAW.
4. On the same day, having ascertained that the petitioner had no license to
operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas D.
Achacoso issued his challenged CLOSURE AND SEIZURE ORDER NO. 1205
which reads:
HORTY SALAZAR
No. 615 R.O. Santos St.
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment
agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila
and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to
be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you
have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of
the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution
under existing laws.
Done in the City of Manila, this 3th day of November, 1987.
5. On January 26, 1988 POEA Director on Licensing and Regulation Atty. Estelita
B. Espiritu issued an office order designating respondents Atty. Marquez, Atty.
Jovencio Abara and Atty. Ernesto Vistro as members of a team tasked to
implement Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205. Doing so, the group assisted by
Mandaluyong policemen and mediamen Lito Castillo of the People's Journal and
Ernie Baluyot of News Today proceeded to the residence of the petitioner at 615

R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. There it was found that petitioner
was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering the place, the team
served said Closure and Seizure order on a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar who
voluntarily allowed them entry into the premises. Mrs. Flora Salazar informed the
team that Hannalie Dance Studio was accredited with Moreman Development
(Phil.). However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce
any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers
practicing a dance number and saw about twenty more waiting outside, The team
confiscated assorted costumes which were duly receipted for by Mrs. Asuncion
Maguelan and witnessed by Mrs. Flora Salazar.
6. On January 28, 1988, petitioner filed with POEA the following letter:
Gentlemen:
On behalf of Ms. Horty Salazar of 615 R.O. Santos, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila,
we respectfully request that the personal properties seized at her residence last
January 26, 1988 be immediately returned on the ground that said seizure was
contrary to law and against the will of the owner thereof. Among our reasons are
the following:
1. Our client has not been given any prior notice or hearing, hence
the Closure and Seizure Order No. 1205 dated November 3, 1987
violates "due process of law" guaranteed under Sec. 1, Art. III, of
the Philippine Constitution.
2. Your acts also violate Sec. 2, Art. III of the Philippine
Constitution which guarantees right of the people "to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose."
3. The premises invaded by your Mr. Ferdi Marquez and five (5)
others (including 2 policemen) are the private residence of the
Salazar family, and the entry, search as well as the seizure of the
personal properties belonging to our client were without her
consent and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation,
together with grave abuse of the color of authority, and constitute
robbery and violation of domicile under Arts. 293 and 128 of the
Revised Penal Code.
Unless said personal properties worth around TEN THOUSAND
PESOS (P10,000.00) in all (and which were already due for
shipment to Japan) are returned within twenty-four (24) hours from
your receipt hereof, we shall feel free to take all legal action, civil
and criminal, to protect our client's interests.

We trust that you will give due attention to these important


matters.
7. On February 2, 1988, before POEA could answer the letter, petitioner filed the
instant petition; on even date, POEA filed a criminal complaint against her with
the Pasig Provincial Fiscal, docketed as IS-88-836. 1
On February 2, 1988, the petitioner filed this suit for prohibition. Although the acts sought to be
barred are alreadyfait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, we consider the petition as
one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.
The Court finds that a lone issue confronts it: May the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or
arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? It is also an issue squarely raised by the petitioner
for the Court's resolution.
Under the new Constitution, which states:
. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. 2
it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. 3 In one case, it was declared
that mayors may not exercise this power:
xxx xxx xxx
But it must be emphasized here and now that what has just been described is the
state of the law as it was in September, 1985. The law has since been altered.
No longer does the mayor have at this time the power to conduct preliminary
investigations, much less issue orders of arrest. Section 143 of the Local
Government Code, conferring this power on the mayor has been abrogated,
rendered functus officio by the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February 2,
1987, the date of its ratification by the Filipino people. Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution pertinently provides that "no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized." The constitutional proscription has
thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable
cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants,
may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination
in the present Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may
be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973

Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations


and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. 4
Neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body:
We agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was
meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to
be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause
for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally
interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is
done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he
stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to
issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge
and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes, to our mind and to that
extent, Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No.
2002, unconstitutional. 5
Section 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, as now written, was entered as an amendment by
Presidential Decrees Nos. 1920 and 2018 of the late President Ferdinand Marcos, to
Presidential Decree No. 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers under Amendment No. 6
of the 1973 Constitution. Under the latter, the then Minister of Labor merely exercised
recommendatory powers:
(c) The Minister of Labor or his duly authorized representative shall have the
power to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal
recruitment. 6
On May 1, 1984, Mr. Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree No. 1920, with the avowed
purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment. The Decree gave the
Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers:
(b) The Minister of Labor and Employment shall have the power to cause the
arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after
proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to
national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of jobseekers. The Minister shall order the closure of companies, establishment and
entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas
employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so. 7
On January 26, 1986, he, Mr. Marcos, promulgated Presidential Decree No. 2018, giving the
Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well:
(c) The Minister of Labor and Employment or his duly authorized representatives
shall have the power to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or
non-holder of authority if after investigation it is determined that his activities
constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further
exploitation of job-seekers. The Minister shall order the search of the office or

premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other


implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies,
establishment and entities found to be engaged in the recruitment of workers for
overseas employment, without having been licensed or authorized to do so.8
The above has now been etched as Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code.
The decrees in question, it is well to note, stand as the dying vestiges of authoritarian rule in its
twilight moments.
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest
warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare
Article 38, paragraph (c), of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo 9 is not well-taken. Vivo involved
a deportation case, governed by Section 69 of the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by
Section 37 of the Immigration Law. We have ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an
undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to
carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. 10 It is valid, however, because of the recognized
supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. We have held: 11
xxx xxx xxx
The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens (Chuoco Tiaco vs.
Forbes, 228 U.S. 549, 57 L. Ed. 960, 40 Phil. 1122, 1125). That power may be
exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the
peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." Justice Johnson's opinion is that
when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence
in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of
express law, deport them". (Forbes vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield, 16 Phil.
534, 568, 569; In re McCulloch Dick, 38 Phil. 41).
The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence
is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified (Tiu Chun Hai and Go
Tam vs. Commissioner of Immigration and the Director of NBI, 104 Phil. 949,
956). 12
The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional.
It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar.
Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.
Moreover, the search and seizure order in question, assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that it was
validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me under Presidential Decree No. 1920 and
Executive Order No. 1022, I hereby order the CLOSURE of your recruitment
agency being operated at No. 615 R.O. Santos St., Mandaluyong, Metro Manila

and the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to
be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that you
have
(1) No valid license or authority from the Department of Labor and
Employment to recruit and deploy workers for overseas
employment;
(2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 of
the New Labor Code in relation to Article 38 of the same code.
This ORDER is without prejudice to your criminal prosecution under existing
laws. 13
We have held that a warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and
void, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Another factor which makes the search warrants under consideration
constitutionally objectionable is that they are in the nature of general warrants.
The search warrants describe the articles sought to be seized in this wise:
1) All printing equipment, paraphernalia, paper, ink, photo
equipment, typewriters, cabinets, tables, communications/
recording equipment, tape recorders, dictaphone and the like used
and/or connected in the printing of the "WE FORUM" newspaper
and any and all documents/communications, letters and facsimile
of prints related to the "WE FORUM" newspaper.
2) Subversive documents, pamphlets, leaflets, books, and other
publications to promote the objectives and purposes of the
subversive organizations known as Movement for Free
Philippines, Light-a-Fire Movement and April 6 Movement; and
3) Motor vehicles used in the distribution/circulation of the "WE
FORUM" and other subversive materials and propaganda, more
particularly,
1) Toyota-Corolla, colored yellow with Plate No. NKA 892;
2) DATSUN, pick-up colored white with Plate No. NKV 969;
3) A delivery truck with Plate No. NBS 542;
4) TOYOTA-TAMARAW, colored white with Plate No. PBP 665;
and

5) TOYOTA Hi-Lux, pick-up truck with Plate No. NGV 472 with
marking "Bagong Silang."
In Stanford v. State of Texas, the search warrant which authorized the search for
"books, records, pamphlets, cards, receipts, lists, memoranda, pictures,
recordings and other written instruments concerning the Communist Parties of
Texas, and the operations of the Community Party in Texas," was declared void
by the U.S. Supreme Court for being too general. In like manner, directions to
"seize any evidence in connection with the violation of SDC 13-3703 or
otherwise" have been held too general, and that portion of a search warrant
which authorized the seizure of any "paraphernalia which could be used to
violate Sec. 54-197 of the Connecticut General Statutes (the statute dealing with
the crime of conspiracy)" was held to be a general warrant, and therefore invalid.
The description of the articles sought to be seized under the search warrants in
question cannot be characterized differently.
In the Stanford case, the U.S. Supreme court calls to mind a notable chapter in
English history; the era of disaccord between the Tudor Government and the
English Press, when "Officers of the Crown were given roving commissions to
search where they pleased in order to suppress and destroy the literature of
dissent both Catholic and Puritan." Reference herein to such historical episode
would not be relevant for it is not the policy of our government to suppress any
newspaper or publication that speaks with "the voice of non-conformity" but
poses no clear and imminent danger to state security. 14
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we reaffirm the following principles:
1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no
other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search:
2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens,
whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested,
following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The respondents are ORDERED to return all
materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and managed by
GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE, petitioners, vs. JUDGE APRONIANO B. TAYPIN, Presiding
Judge, RTC-BR. 12, Cebu City, CEBU PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Region VII, Cebu City, JUANITA NG MENDOZA, MENDCO

DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ALFREDO SABJON and DANTE


SOSMEA, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.: Supreme
Petitioners KENNETH ROY SAVAGE and K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING, owned and
managed by GEMMA DEMORAL-SAVAGE, seek to nullify the search warrant issued by
respondent Judge Aproniano B. Taypin of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12 Cebu City, which
resulted in the seizure of certain pieces of wrought iron furniture from the factory of petitioners
located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu. Their motion to quash the search warrant was denied by
respondent Judge as well as their motion to reconsider the denial. Hence, this petition for
certiorari.
The antecedent facts: Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng Mendoza,
president and general manager of Mendco Development Corporation (MENDCO),[1] Supervising
Agent Jose Ermie Monsanto of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed an application for
search warrant with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City.[2] The application sought the
authorization to search the premises of K Angelin Export International located in Biasong,
Talisay, Cebu, and to seize the pieces of wrought iron furniture found therein which were
allegedly the object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable under Art. 189 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended. The assailed Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 was
issued by respondent Judge on 16 October 1997 and executed in the afternoon of the following
day by NBI agents.[3] Seized from the factory were several pieces of furniture, indicated in
the Inventory Sheet attached to the Return of Search Warrant, and all items seized have
remained in NBI custody up to the present.[4]
On 30 October 1997 petitioners moved to quash the search warrant alleging that: (a) the crime
they were accused of did not exist; (b) the issuance of the warrant was not based on probable
cause; (c) the judge failed to ask the witnesses searching questions; and, (d) the warrant did not
particularly describe the things to be seized.[5]
On 10 November 1997 petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Quash where they additionally
alleged that the assailed warrant was applied for without a certification against forum shopping.
[6]
On 30 January 1998 respondent Judge denied the Motion to Quash and the Supplemental
Motion to Quash.[7] On 2 March 1998 petitioners moved to reconsider the denial of their motion
to quash and alleged substantially the same grounds found in their original Motion to Quash but
adding thereto two (2) new grounds, namely: (a) respondent court has no jurisdiction over the
subject-matter; and, (b) respondent court failed to "substantiate" the order sought to be
reconsidered.[8] The denial of their last motion[9] prompted petitioners to come to this
Court. Court
The principal issues that must be addressed in this petition are: (a) questions involving
jurisdiction over the offense; (b) the need for a certification of non-forum shopping; and, (c) the
existence of the crime.

Petitioners claim that respondent trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense since it was not
designated as a special court for Intellectual Property Rights (IPR), citing in support thereof
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 113-95 designating certain branches of the Regional
Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Trial Courts in Cities as Special Courts for
IPR. The courts enumerated therein are mandated to try and decide violations of IPR including
Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code committed within their respective territorial jurisdictions. The
sala of Judge Benigno G. Gaviola of the RTC-Br. 9, Cebu City, was designated Special Court for
IPR for the 7th Judicial Region.[10] Subsequently Supreme Court Administrative Order No.104-96
was issued providing that jurisdiction over all violations of IPR was thereafter confined to the
Regional Trial Courts.[11]
The authority to issue search warrants was not among those mentioned in the administrative
orders. But the Court has consistently ruled that a search warrant is merely a process issued by
the court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may
entertain pursuant to its original jurisdiction.[12] The authority to issue search warrants is inherent
in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction.[13] In the instant case, the
premises searched located in Biasong, Talisay, Cebu, are well within the territorial jurisdiction of
the respondent court.[14]
Petitioners apparently misconstrued the import of the designation of Special Courts for IPR.
Administrative Order No. 113-95 merely specified which court could "try and decide" cases
involving violations of IPR. It did not, and could not, vest exclusive jurisdiction with regard to all
matters (including the issuance of search warrants and other judicial processes) in any one
court. Jurisdiction is conferred upon courts by substantive law; in this case, BP Blg.129, and not
by a procedural rule, much less by an administrative order.[15] The power to issue search
warrants for violations of IPR has not been exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in
Supreme Court Administrative Order No.113-95. J lexj
Petitioners next allege that the application for a search warrant should have been dismissed
outright since it was not accompanied by a certification of non-forum shopping, citing as
authority therefor Washington Distillers, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[16] In that case, we sustained
the quashal of the search warrant because the applicant had been guilty of forum shopping as
private respondent sought a search warrant from the Manila Regional Trial Court only after he
was denied by the courts of Pampanga. The instant case differs significantly, for here there is no
allegation of forum-shopping, only failure to acquire a certification against forum-shopping. The
Rules of Court as amended requires such certification only from initiatory pleadings, omitting
any mention of "applications."[17] In contrast, Supreme Court Circular 04-94, the old rule on the
matter, required such certification even from "applications." Our ruling in Washington
Distillers required no such certification from applications for search warrants. Hence, the
absence of such certification will not result in the dismissal of an application for search warrant.
The last question to be resolved is whether unfair competition involving design patents
punishable under Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code exists in this case. Prosecutor Ivan
Herrero seems to agree as he filed the corresponding Information against petitioners on 17
March 1998.[18] However, since the IPR Code took effect on 1 January 1998 any discussion
contrary to the view herein expressed would be pointless. The repealing clause of the Code
provides -

All Acts and parts of Acts inconsistent herewith, more particularly, Republic Act
No. 165, as amended; Republic Act No. 166, as amended; and Articles 188 and
189 of the Revised Penal Code; Presidential Decree No. 49, including
Presidential Decree No. 285, as amended, are hereby repealed (italics ours).[19]
The issue involving the existence of "unfair competition" as a felony involving design patents,
referred to in Art. 189 of the Revised Penal Code, has been rendered moot and academic by the
repeal of the article.
The search warrant cannot even be issued by virtue of a possible violation of the IPR Code. The
assailed acts specifically alleged were the manufacture and fabrication of wrought iron furniture
similar to that patented by MENDCO, without securing any license or patent for the same, for
the purpose of deceiving or defrauding Mendco and the buying public.[20] The Code defines
"unfair competition" thus - Lexj uris
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to
good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which
he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having established
such goodwill, or shall commit any acts calculated to produce said result, shall be
guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection
against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair
competition:
(a) Any person who is selling his goods and gives them the
general appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer,
either as to the goods themselves or in the wrapping of the
packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words
thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance which would
be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered
are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual
manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with
such appearance as shall deceive the public and defraud another
of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of such goods or
any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like
purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any
other means calculated to induce the false belief that such person
is offering the services of another who has identified such services
in the mind of the public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course
of trade or who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of
a nature calculated to discredit goods, businesses or services of
another.[21]

There is evidently no mention of any crime of "unfair competition" involving design patents in the
controlling provisions on Unfair Competition. It is therefore unclear whether the crime exists at
all, for the enactment of RA 8293 did not result in the reenactment of Art. 189 of
the Revised Penal Code. In the face of this ambiguity, we must strictly construe the statute
against the State and liberally in favor of the accused,[22] for penal statutes cannot be enlarged
or extended by intendment, implication or any equitable consideration.[23] Respondents invoke
jurisprudence to support their contention that "unfair competition" exists in this case.[24] However,
we are prevented from applying these principles, along with the new provisions on Unfair
Competition found in the IPR Code, to the alleged acts of the petitioners, for such acts
constitute patent infringement as defined by the same Code-Juri smis
Sec. 76. Civil Action for Infringement. - 76.1. The making, using, offering for sale,
selling, or importing a patented product or a product obtained directly or indirectly
from a patented process, or the use of a patented process without authorization
of the patentee constitutes patent infringement.[25]
Although this case traces its origins to the year 1997 or before the enactment of
the IPR Code, we are constrained to invoke the provisions of the Code. Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws shall be applied retrospectively, if such
application would be beneficial to the accused.[26] Since the IPR Code effectively obliterates the
possibility of any criminal liability attaching to the acts alleged, then that Code must be applied
here.
In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding of probable cause in
connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to
be searched and the things to be seized.[27] Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the
search warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is therefore
defective on its face. The nullity of the warrant renders moot and academic the other issues
raised in petitioners' Motion to Quash and Motion for Reconsideration. Since the assailed
search warrant is null and void, all property seized by virtue thereof should be returned to
petitioners in accordance with established jurisprudence.[28]
In petitioners' Reply with Additional Information they allege that the trial court denied their
motion to transfer their case to a Special Court for IPR. We have gone through the records and
we fail to find any trace of such motion or even a copy of the order denying it. All that appears in
the records is a copy of an order granting a similar motion filed by a certain Minnie Dayon with
regard to Search Warrant No. 639-10-1697-12.[29] This attachment being immaterial we shall
give it no further attention. Jjj uris
WHEREFORE, the Order of the Regional Trial Court, Br. 12, Cebu City, dated 30 January 1998,
denying the Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 dated 30 October 1997 and
the Supplemental Motion to Quash dated 10 November 1997 filed by petitioners, as well as the
Order dated 8 April 1998 denying petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration dated 2 March 1998, is
SET ASIDE. Search Warrant No. 637-10-1697-12 issued on 16 October 1997 is ANNULLED
and SET ASIDE, and respondents are ordered to return to petitioners the property seized by
virtue of the illegal search warrant.

SO ORDERED.
SONY COMPUTER ENTERTAINMENT, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
SUPERGREEN, INCORPORATED, Respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated June 30, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67612 and the Resolution2 dated January 16, 2004, denying
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals had denied the petition for certiorari assailing the trial
courts quashal of the search warrant.
The case stemmed from the complaint filed with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) by
petitioner Sony Computer Entertainment, Inc., against respondent Supergreen, Incorporated.
The NBI found that respondent engaged in the reproduction and distribution of counterfeit
"PlayStation" game software, consoles and accessories in violation of Sony Computers
intellectual property rights. Thus, NBI applied with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila,
Branch 1 for warrants to search respondents premises in Paraaque City and Cavite. On April
24, 2001, the RTC of Manila issued Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 covering
respondents premises at Trece-Tanza Road, Purok 7, Barangay de Ocampo, Trece Martires
City, Cavite, and Search Warrants Nos. 01-1989 to 01-1991 covering respondents premises at
Room 302, 3rd Floor Chateau de Baie Condominium, 149 Roxas Boulevard corner Airport
Road, Paraaque City. The NBI simultaneously served the search warrants on the subject
premises and seized a replicating machine and several units of counterfeit "PlayStation"
consoles, joy pads, housing, labels and game software.
On June 11, 2001, respondent filed a motion to quash Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 011988 and/or release of seized properties on the ground that the search warrant failed to
particularly describe the properties to be seized. The trial court denied the motion for lack of
merit.
On August 4, 2001, respondent filed another motion to quash, this time, questioning the
propriety of the venue. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that it violated the omnibus
motion rule wherein all objections not included shall be deemed waived. In an Order3 dated
October 5, 2001, the trial court affirmed the validity of Search Warrants Nos. 01-1989 to 011991 covering respondents premises in Paraaque City, but quashed Search Warrants Nos.
01-1986 to 01-1988 covering respondents premises in Cavite. The trial court held that lack of
jurisdiction is an exception to the omnibus motion rule and may be raised at any stage of the
proceedings. The dispositive portion of the order read,
Accordingly, Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986, 01-1987 and 01-1988 are hereby ordered quashed
and set aside.

The National Bureau of Investigation and/or any other person in actual custody of the goods
seized pursuant thereto are hereby directed to return the same to the respondents.
SO ORDERED.4
Petitioner elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, which dismissed the petition for certiorari.
The appellate court ruled that under Section 2,5 Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of
Manila had no jurisdiction to issue a search warrant enforceable in Cavite, and that lack of
jurisdiction was not deemed waived. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the same was
denied. The Court of Appeals disposed, as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby denied and accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.6
Petitioner now comes before us raising the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT VENUE IN SEARCH WARRANT APPLICATIONS INVOLVES
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CORRECTNESS OF VENUE IN AN APPLICATION FOR SEARCH
WARRANT IS DEEMED WAIVED IF NOT RAISED BY THE RESPONDENT IN ITS MOTION
TO QUASH.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE OFFENSES INVOLVED IN THE SUBJECT SEARCH WARRANTS
ARE "CONTINUING CRIMES" WHICH MAY BE VALIDLY TRIED IN ANOTHER JURISDICTION
WHERE THE OFFENSE WAS PARTLY COMMITTED.7
In sum, we are asked to resolve whether the quashal of Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 011988 was valid.
Citing Malaloan v. Court of Appeals,8 where this Court clarified that a search warrant application
is only a special criminal process and not a criminal action, petitioner contends that the rule on
venue for search warrant application is not jurisdictional. Hence, failure to raise the objection
waived it. Moreover, petitioner maintains that applying for search warrants in different courts
increases the possibility of leakage and contradictory outcomes that could defeat the purpose
for which the warrants were issued.
Petitioner further asserts that even granting that the rules on search warrant applications are
jurisdictional, the application filed either in the courts of the National Capital Region or Fourth

Judicial Region is still proper because the crime was continuing and committed in both
Paraaque City and Cavite.
Respondent counters that Section 2 is explicit on where applications should be filed and
provided the territorial limitations on search warrants. Respondent claims that Malaloan is no
longer applicable jurisprudence with the promulgation of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
Even granting that petitioner has compelling reasons, respondent maintains that petitioner
cannot file the application with the RTC of Manila because Cavite belongs to another judicial
region. Respondent also argues that the doctrine on continuing crime is applicable only to the
institution of a criminal action, not to search warrant applications which is governed by Rule 126,
and in this case Section 2.
To start, we cautioned that our pronouncement in Malaloan should be read into the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 19809 conferring on the regional trial courts and their judges a territorial
jurisdiction, regional in scope. Both the main decision and the dissent in Malaloan recognized
this.
Now, in the present case, respondents premises in Cavite, within the Fourth Judicial Region, is
definitely beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of Manila, in the National Capital Region.
Thus, the RTC of Manila does not have the authority to issue a search warrant for offenses
committed in Cavite. Hence, petitioners reliance inMalaloan is misplaced. Malaloan involved a
court in the same judicial region where the crime was committed. The instant case involves a
court in another region. Any other interpretation re-defining territorial jurisdiction would amount
to judicial legislation.10
Nonetheless, we agree with petitioner that this case involves a transitory or continuing offense
of unfair competition under Section 168 of Republic Act No. 8293,11 which provides,
SEC. 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means contrary to good faith by
which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him or in which he deals, or his business, or
services for those of the one having established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts
calculated to produce said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an
action therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of protection against unfair
competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of unfair competition:
(a) Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general appearance of
goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods themselves or in the
wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or the devices or words thereon,
or in any other feature of their appearance, which would be likely to influence purchasers
to believe that the goods offered are those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the
actual manufacturer or dealer, or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance
as shall deceive the public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any

subsequent vendor of such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such
goods with a like purpose;
(b) Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other means
calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the services of another
who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
(c) Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or who shall
commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods,
business or services of another.
Pertinent too is Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code that enumerates the elements of
unfair competition, to wit:
(a) That the offender gives his goods the general appearance of the goods of another
manufacturer or dealer;
(b) That the general appearance is shown in the (1) goods themselves, or in the (2)
wrapping of their packages, or in the (3) device or words therein, or in (4) any other
feature of their appearance;
(c) That the offender offers to sell or sells those goods or gives other persons a chance
or opportunity to do the same with a like purpose; and
(d) That there is actual intent to deceive the public or defraud a competitor.12
Respondents imitation of the general appearance of petitioners goods was done allegedly in
Cavite. It sold the goods allegedly in Mandaluyong City, Metro Manila. The alleged acts would
constitute a transitory or continuing offense. Thus, clearly, under Section 2 (b) of Rule 126,
Section 168 of Rep. Act No. 8293 and Article 189 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, petitioner may
apply for a search warrant in any court where any element of the alleged offense was
committed, including any of the courts within the National Capital Region (Metro Manila).13
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated June 30, 2003 and the Resolution
dated January 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67612 are SET ASIDE. The
Order dated October 5, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1, is PARTLY
MODIFIED. Search Warrants Nos. 01-1986 to 01-1988 are hereby declared valid.
SO ORDERED.

REQUIREMENTS FOR SEARCH WARRANTS TO ISSUE

HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL


BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in
his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of Investigation; SPECIAL
PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and
ASST. FISCAL MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila;
JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE HERMOGENES CALUAG,
Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ,
Municipal Court of Quezon City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for
petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro,
Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero, Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C.
Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin1 hereinafter referred
to as Respondents-Prosecutors several judges2 hereinafter referred to as RespondentsJudges issued, on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein4 and/or the corporations of which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to
search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or
residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers,
journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and
profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or
"used or intended to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the
applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the
Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia: (1) they do not describe with
particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in
the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the
aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the searches and
seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in
accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this
original action for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending
final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining
Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as

aforementioned or any copies thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in
due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search warrants and
declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or
representatives to return to petitioners herein, in accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the
Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under
the search warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged, 6 (1) that the contested search warrants are
valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any,
were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible
in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned
searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition.
However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as
the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned
are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things
found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.7
Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in
question may be split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the
offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of
petitioners herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the
legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple
reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of
each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be.8 Indeed, it
is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have
been impaired thereby,9 and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely
personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. 10 Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to
the admission of said papers in evidence belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the
seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity. 11 Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to
the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect the personal defendants. If these papers
were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded,
they were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it
is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure can be raised only by one whose
rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the
constitutional rights of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of
whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for themselves the benefits
of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights

of another. Remus vs. United States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that
the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful search
and seizure does notextend to the personal defendants but
embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A Guckenheimer & Bros.
Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein,
the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary injunction
previously issued by this Court, 12 thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors
from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be
settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures
made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding
question is in the negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in
evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general
warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon the authority there of are null and
void. In this connection, the Constitution13 provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue
but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no
warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set
forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the
same were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named
had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue
(Code) and Revised Penal Code." In other words, no specificoffense had been alleged in said
applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed wereabstract. As a
consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the
existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that
the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of
fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein
petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation
of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without reference to any determinate
provision of said laws or

To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the
most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the
domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims
caprice or passion of peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the
constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general warrants. It is not
difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power
feels that the minority is likely to wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search
warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of
Court 14 by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court 15 that "a search
warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not
satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that "no search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants
was compounded by the description therein made of the effects to be searched for and seized,
to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and
related profit and loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business
transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of whether the transactions were legal or illegal.
The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of
Rights that the things to be seized be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its
major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that,
even if the searches and seizures under consideration were unconstitutional, the documents,
papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the
Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was in line with the American common law
rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has
blundered,"16 upon the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence unlawfully
obtained, 17 such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against
the party who procured the issuance of the search warrant and against those assisting in the
execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an
unlawful seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually
adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the only practical means of enforcing the

constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge
Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which
has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is the only practical way of enforcing the
constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending
official may have been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will that wrong be repressed.18
In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence
against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the 4th Amendment, declaring
his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as
those thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The
efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as
they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by
years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the
fundamental law of the land.19
This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same
Federal Court. 20After reviewing previous decisions thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs.
Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of
privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books,
are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by
official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a
specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. We hold that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same
authority, inadmissible in a State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against
the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against
them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government.
Were it otherwise, then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against
unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words," valueless and
underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so
too, without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral
and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish
means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a
freedom"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the Court held in Wolf
that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the
cases of this Court as we have seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the
Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded

operatively enforceable against the States, was not susceptible of destruction by


avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been
deemed dependent under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in
extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable
searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the
exclusion doctrine an essential part of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as
an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the
admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most
important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an
accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is
to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the
Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter to
compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by
removing the incentive to disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire
system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. Having once
recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable
against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by
state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to
remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like
effect as other basic rights secured by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit
it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement
itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth,
gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the
police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the
courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis
ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the
constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. To be sure, if the
applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the
commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no
reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. Upon
the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to
find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant.
The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of
the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant
and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures would suffice to protect the constitutional
guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general,
committed By agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could
not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the handicap under which the
minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one
must not lose sight of the fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility 21 of

securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for whose benefit
the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June
29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and 91 of Carmen Apartments, House No.
2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the ArmyNavy Club, should be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as
residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J. Brooks and Karl
Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the
offices of the corporations above referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and
other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which they have
a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States. 22
We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control
over the aforementioned records, papers and effects, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof,
has Been Advanced, not in their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for
Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said
theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to suit the approach
intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the
affidavits or copies of alleged affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted
in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations inconsistent with the
theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for
reconsideration, and the contents of the aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in
support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in the
cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed,
should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem it necessary to express our opinion
thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby,
abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as
specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures
therein made are illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection
with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said residences of herein
petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the
documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned residences are
concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as
it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices
and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to
costs.
It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and Sanchez, JJ., concur.

CASTRO, J., concurring and dissenting:


From my analysis of the opinion written by Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and from the
import of the deliberations of the Court on this case, I gather the following distinct conclusions:
1. All the search warrants served by the National Bureau of Investigation in this case are
general warrants and are therefore proscribed by, and in violation of, paragraph 3 of
section 1 of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution;
2. All the searches and seizures conducted under the authority of the said search
warrants were consequently illegal;
3. The non-exclusionary rule enunciated in Moncado vs. People, 80 Phil. 1, should be,
and is declared, abandoned;
4. The search warrants served at the three residences of the petitioners
are expressly declared null and void the searches and seizures therein made
are expressly declared illegal; and the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued
against the use of the documents, papers and effect seized in the said residences is
made permanent; and
5. Reasoning that the petitioners have not in their pleadings satisfactorily demonstrated
that they have legal standing to move for the suppression of the documents, papers and
effects seized in the places other than the three residences adverted to above, the
opinion written by the Chief Justice refrains from expresslydeclaring as null and void the
such warrants served at such other places and as illegal the searches and seizures
made therein, and leaves "the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the
future."
It is precisely the position taken by the Chief Justice summarized in the immediately preceding
paragraph (numbered 5) with which I am not in accord.
I do not share his reluctance or unwillingness to expressly declare, at this time, the nullity of the
search warrants served at places other than the three residences, and the illegibility of the
searches and seizures conducted under the authority thereof. In my view even the exacerbating
passions and prejudices inordinately generated by the environmental political and moral
developments of this case should not deter this Court from forthrightly laying down the law not
only for this case but as well for future cases and future generations. All the search warrants,
without exception, in this case are admittedly general, blanket and roving warrants and are
therefore admittedly and indisputably outlawed by the Constitution; and the searches and
seizures made were therefore unlawful. That the petitioners, let us assume in gratia argumente,
have no legal standing to ask for the suppression of the papers, things and effects seized from
places other than their residences, to my mind, cannot in any manner affect, alter or otherwise
modify the intrinsic nullity of the search warrants and the intrinsic illegality of the searches and
seizures made thereunder. Whether or not the petitioners possess legal standing the said
warrants are void and remain void, and the searches and seizures were illegal and remain
illegal. No inference can be drawn from the words of the Constitution that "legal standing" or the

lack of it is a determinant of the nullity or validity of a search warrant or of the lawfulness or


illegality of a search or seizure.
On the question of legal standing, I am of the conviction that, upon the pleadings submitted to
this Court the petitioners have the requisite legal standing to move for the suppression and
return of the documents, papers and effects that were seized from places other than their family
residences.
Our constitutional provision on searches and seizures was derived almost verbatim from the
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In the many years of judicial construction
and interpretation of the said constitutional provision, our courts have invariably regarded as
doctrinal the pronouncement made on the Fourth Amendment by federal courts, especially the
Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals.
The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of
documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be
summarized as follows; (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b)
ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive of premises searched gives
"standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn
application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the
"aggrieved person," gives "standing."
An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all
were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named
personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the
particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same
"office/house/warehouse/premises" declared to be owned by or under the control of the
petitioners in all the other search warrants directed against the petitioners and/or "the President
and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. (see pages 5-24 of Petitioners' Reply of
April 2, 1962). The searches and seizures were to be made, and were actually made, in the
"office/house/warehouse/premises" owned by or under the control of the petitioners.
Ownership of matters seized gives "standing."
Ownership of the properties seized alone entitles the petitioners to bring a motion to return and
suppress, and gives them standing as persons aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure
regardless of their location at the time of seizure. Jones vs. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261
(1960) (narcotics stored in the apartment of a friend of the defendant); Henzel vs. United States,
296 F. 2d. 650, 652-53 (5th Cir. 1961), (personal and corporate papers of corporation of which
the defendant was president), United States vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (narcotics seized in
an apartment not belonging to the defendant); Pielow vs. United States, 8 F. 2d 492, 493 (9th
Cir. 1925) (books seized from the defendant's sister but belonging to the defendant); Cf. Villano
vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683 (10th Cir. 1962) (papers seized in desk neither owned by
nor in exclusive possession of the defendant).

In a very recent case (decided by the U.S. Supreme Court on December 12, 1966), it was held
that under the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures, a person places
himself or his property within a constitutionally protected area, be it his home or his office, his
hotel room or his automobile:
Where the argument falls is in its misapprehension of the fundamental nature and scope
of Fourth Amendment protection. What the Fourth Amendment protects is the security a
man relies upon when heplaces himself or his property within a constitutionally protected
area, be it his home or his office, his hotel room or his automobile. There he is protected
from unwarranted governmental intrusion. And when he puts some thing in his filing
cabinet, in his desk drawer, or in his pocket, he has the right to know it will be secure
from an unreasonable search or an unreasonable seizure. So it was that the Fourth
Amendment could not tolerate the warrantless search of the hotel room in Jeffers, the
purloining of the petitioner's private papers inGouled, or the surreptitious electronic
surveilance in Silverman. Countless other cases which have come to this Court over the
years have involved a myriad of differing factual contexts in which the protections of the
Fourth Amendment have been appropriately invoked. No doubt, the future will bring
countless others. By nothing we say here do we either foresee or foreclose factual
situations to which the Fourth Amendment may be applicable. (Hoffa vs. U.S., 87 S. Ct.
408 (December 12, 1966). See also U.S. vs. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93
(November 13, 1951). (Emphasis supplied).
Control of premises searched gives "standing."
Independent of ownership or other personal interest in the records and documents seized, the
petitioners have standing to move for return and suppression by virtue of their proprietary or
leasehold interest in many of the premises searched. These proprietary and leasehold interests
have been sufficiently set forth in their motion for reconsideration and need not be recounted
here, except to emphasize that the petitioners paid rent, directly or indirectly, for practically all
the premises searched (Room 91, 84 Carmen Apts; Room 304, Army & Navy Club; Premises
2008, Dewey Boulevard; 1436 Colorado Street); maintained personal offices within the
corporate offices (IBMC, USTC); had made improvements or furnished such offices; or had paid
for the filing cabinets in which the papers were stored (Room 204, Army & Navy Club); and
individually, or through their respective spouses, owned the controlling stock of the corporations
involved. The petitioners' proprietary interest in most, if not all, of the premises searched
therefore independently gives them standing to move for the return and suppression of the
books, papers and affects seized therefrom.
In Jones vs. United States, supra, the U.S. Supreme Court delineated the nature and extent of
the interest in the searched premises necessary to maintain a motion to suppress. After
reviewing what it considered to be the unduly technical standard of the then prevailing circuit
court decisions, the Supreme Court said (362 U.S. 266):
We do not lightly depart from this course of decisions by the lower courts. We are
persuaded, however, that it is unnecessarily and ill-advised to import into the law
surrounding the constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
subtle distinctions, developed and refined by the common law in evolving the body of

private property law which, more than almost any other branch of law, has been shaped
by distinctions whose validity is largely historical. Even in the area from which they
derive, due consideration has led to the discarding of those distinctions in the homeland
of the common law. See Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 and 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31, carrying out
Law Reform Committee, Third Report, Cmd. 9305. Distinctions such as those between
"lessee", "licensee," "invitee," "guest," often only of gossamer strength, ought not be
determinative in fashioning procedures ultimately referable to constitutional safeguards.
See also Chapman vs. United States, 354 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1961).
It has never been held that a person with requisite interest in the premises searched must own
the property seized in order to have standing in a motion to return and suppress. In Alioto vs.
United States, 216 F. Supp. 48 (1963), a Bookkeeper for several corporations from whose
apartment the corporate records were seized successfully moved for their return. In United
States vs. Antonelli, Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, 873 (W D. N. Y. 1943), the corporation's
president successfully moved for the return and suppression is to him of both personal and
corporate documents seized from his home during the course of an illegal search:
The lawful possession by Antonelli of documents and property, "either his own or the
corporation's was entitled to protection against unreasonable search and seizure. Under
the circumstances in the case at bar, the search and seizure were unreasonable and
unlawful. The motion for the return of seized article and the suppression of the evidence
so obtained should be granted. (Emphasis supplied).
Time was when only a person who had property in interest in either the place searched or the
articles seize had the necessary standing to invoke the protection of the exclusionary rule. But
in MacDonald vs. Unite States, 335 U.S. 461 (1948), Justice Robert Jackson joined by Justice
Felix Frankfurter, advanced the view that "even a guest may expect the shelter of the rooftree
he is under against criminal intrusion." This view finally became the official view of the U.S.
Supreme Court and was articulated in United States vs. Jeffers, 432 U.S 48 (1951). Nine years
later, in 1960, in Jones vs. Unite States, 362 U.S. 257, 267, the U.S. Supreme Court went a step
further. Jones was a mere guest in the apartment unlawfully searched but the Court nonetheless
declared that the exclusionary rule protected him as well. The concept of "person aggrieved by
an unlawful search and seizure" was enlarged to include "anyone legitimately on premise where
the search occurs."
Shortly after the U.S. Supreme Court's Jones decision the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit held that the defendant organizer, sole stockholder and president of a corporation had
standing in a mail fraud prosecution against him to demand the return and suppression of
corporate property. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F 2d 650, 652 (5th Cir. 1961), supra. The
court conclude that the defendant had standing on two independent grounds: First he had a
sufficient interest in the property seized, and second he had an adequate interest in the
premises searched (just like in the case at bar). A postal inspector had unlawfully searched the
corporation' premises and had seized most of the corporation's book and records. Looking
to Jones, the court observed:
Jones clearly tells us, therefore, what is not required qualify one as a "person aggrieved
by an unlawful search and seizure." It tells us that appellant should not have been

precluded from objecting to the Postal Inspector's search and seizure of the
corporation's books and records merely because the appellant did not show ownership
or possession of the books and records or a substantial possessory interest in the
invade premises . . . (Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 651). .
Henzel was soon followed by Villano vs. United States, 310 F. 2d 680, 683, (10th Cir. 1962).
In Villano, police officers seized two notebooks from a desk in the defendant's place of
employment; the defendant did not claim ownership of either; he asserted that several
employees (including himself) used the notebooks. The Court held that the employee had a
protected interest and that there also was an invasion of privacy.
Both Henzel and Villanoconsidered also the fact that the search and seizure were "directed at"
the moving defendant. Henzel vs. United States, 296 F. 2d at 682; Villano vs. United States, 310
F. 2d at 683.
In a case in which an attorney closed his law office, placed his files in storage and went to
Puerto Rico, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit recognized his standing to move to
quash as unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution a grand jury subpoena duces tecum directed to the custodian of his files. The
Government contended that the petitioner had no standing because the books and papers were
physically in the possession of the custodian, and because the subpoena was directed against
the custodian. The court rejected the contention, holding that
Schwimmer legally had such possession, control and unrelinquished personal rights in
the books and papers as not to enable the question of unreasonable search and seizure
to be escaped through the mere procedural device of compelling a third-party naked
possessor to produce and deliver them. Schwimmer vs. United States, 232 F. 2d 855,
861 (8th Cir. 1956).
Aggrieved person doctrine where the search warrant s primarily directed against said person
gives "standing."
The latest United States decision squarely in point is United States vs. Birrell, 242 F. Supp. 191
(1965, U.S.D.C. S.D.N.Y.). The defendant had stored with an attorney certain files and papers,
which attorney, by the name of Dunn, was not, at the time of the seizing of the records, Birrell's
attorney. * Dunn, in turn, had stored most of the records at his home in the country and on a
farm which, according to Dunn's affidavit, was under his (Dunn's) "control and management."
The papers turned out to be private, personal and business papers together with corporate
books and records of certain unnamed corporations in which Birrell did not even claim
ownership. (All of these type records were seized in the case at bar). Nevertheless, the search
in Birrell was held invalid by the court which held that even though Birrell did not own the
premises where the records were stored, he had "standing" to move for the return ofall the
papers and properties seized. The court, relying on Jones vs. U.S., supra; U.S. vs. Antonelli
Fireworks Co., 53 F. Supp. 870, Aff'd 155 F. 2d 631: Henzel vs. U.S., supra; and Schwimmer vs.
U.S., supra, pointed out that
It is overwhelmingly established that the searches here in question were directed solely
and exclusively against Birrell. The only person suggested in the papers as having

violated the law was Birrell. The first search warrant described the records as having
been used "in committing a violation of Title 18, United States Code, Section 1341, by
the use of the mails by one Lowell M. Birrell, . . ." The second search warrant was
captioned: "United States of America vs. Lowell M. Birrell. (p. 198)
Possession (actual or constructive), no less than ownership, gives standing to move to
suppress. Such was the rule even before Jones. (p. 199)
If, as thus indicated Birrell had at least constructive possession of the records stored
with Dunn, it matters not whether he had any interest in the premises searched. See
also Jeffers v. United States, 88 U.S. Appl. D.C. 58, 187 F. 2d 498 (1950), affirmed 432
U.S. 48, 72 S. Ct. 93, 96 L. Ed. 459 (1951).
The ruling in the Birrell case was reaffirmed on motion for reargument; the United States did not
appeal from this decision. The factual situation in Birrell is strikingly similar to the case of the
present petitioners; as in Birrell, many personal and corporate papers were seized from
premises not petitioners' family residences; as in Birrell, the searches were "PRIMARILY
DIRECTED SOLETY AND EXCLUSIVELY" against the petitioners. Still both types of documents
were suppressed in Birrell because of the illegal search. In the case at bar, the petitioners
connection with the premises raided is much closer than in Birrell.
Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless
whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the
documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate
papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control.
Prescinding a from the foregoing, this Court, at all events, should order the return to the
petitioners all personal andprivate papers and effects seized, no matter where these were
seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places.
The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to
this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other
places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners.
If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the
objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be:
(a) personal or private papers of the petitioners were they were unlawfully seized, be it their
family residences offices, warehouses and/or premises owned and/or possessed (actually or
constructively) by them as shown in all the search and in the sworn applications filed in securing
the void search warrants and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations. Under such
categorization or grouping, the determination of which unlawfully seized papers, documents and
things arepersonal/private of the petitioners or purely corporate papers will have to be left to the
lower courts which issued the void search warrants in ultimately effecting the suppression
and/or return of the said documents.
And as unequivocally indicated by the authorities above cited, the petitioners likewise have clear
legal standing to move for the suppression of purely corporate papers as "President and/or

General Manager" of the corporations involved as specifically mentioned in the void search
warrants.
Finally, I must articulate my persuasion that although the cases cited in my disquisition were
criminal prosecutions, the great clauses of the constitutional proscription on illegal searches and
seizures do not withhold the mantle of their protection from cases not criminal in origin or
nature.

PROBABLE CAUSE
PAPER INDUSTRIES CORPORATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, EVARISTO M. NARVAEZ JR.,
RICARDO G. SANTIAGO, ROBERTO A. DORMENDO, REYDANDE D. AZUCENA,
NICEFORO V. AVILA, FLORENTINO M. MULA, FELIX O. BAITO, HAROLD B.
CELESTIAL, ELMEDENCIO C. CALIXTRO, CARLITO S. LEGACION, ALBINO T.
LUBANG, JEREMIAS I. ABAD and HERMINIO V. VILLAMIL, petitioners, vs. JUDGE
MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, Presiding Judge, Branch 104, Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City; STATE PROSECUTOR LEO B. DACERA III; and the SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
UNIT
OF
THE
PNP
TRAFFIC
MANAGEMENT
COMMAND, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
To preserve and to uphold the constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures, the requisites for the issuance of a search warrant must be followed strictly. Where
the judge fails to personally examine the applicant for a search warrant and the latters
witnesses, or where the witnesses testify on matters not of their own personal knowledge, the
search warrant must be struck down.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[1] praying for (1) the nullification of
Search Warrant No. 799 (95) and the Orders dated March 23, 1993 and August 3, 1995, issued
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 104, of Quezon City; [2] and (2) the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) or an injunction against State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera III,
ordering him to desist from proceeding with IS No. 95-167.
In its October 23, 1995 Resolution, [3] this Court issued the TRO prayed for and required the
respondents to comment on the said Petition. On December 20, 1995, Respondent PNP Traffic
Management Command filed its 31-page Opposition[4] to the Petition, together with 90 pages of
annexes.[5] On February 22, 1996, the Office of the Solicitor General filed its
Comment[6] agreeing with petitioners that the writs prayed for must be granted. After petitioners
filed a Reply to the Opposition, the Court gave due course to the Petition and required the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.

In view of the contrary opinion of the Office of the Solicitor General, the Court, in its
February 5, 1997 Resolution,[7] required State Prosecutor Leo B. Dacera to prepare the
memorandum for the public respondents. After issuing a show-cause order to Dacera on June
23, 1997,[8] the Court in its September 24, 1997 Resolution gave him a non-extendible period
ending on October 31, 1997 within which to file the required memorandum. In view of Daceras
manifestation that he was only a nominal party and that he had yet to receive the records of the
case from the PNP, the Court, in its December 8, 1999 Resolution, ordered the Special
Operations Unit (SOU) of the PNP Traffic Management Command to file its memorandum within
thirty days from notice; otherwise, the petition will be deemed submitted for decision. [9] Even
after the expiration of the said period, the required pleading was not yet received by this Court.
Hence, this Court considered Respondent SOUs refusal/failure to submit its memorandum
as a waiver of its privilege to do so.

The Facts

On January 25, 1995, Police Chief Inspector Napoleon B. Pascua applied for a search
warrant before the said RTC of Quezon City, stating:[10]
1. That the management of Paper Industries Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP
compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President
Ricardo G[.] Santiago, is in possession or ha[s] in [its] control high powered firearms,
ammunitions, explosives, which are the subject of the offense, or used or intended to be used in
committing the offense, and which xxx are [being kept] and conceal[ed] in the premises herein
described.
2. That a Search Warrant should be issued to enable any agent of the law to take possession
and bring to this Honorable Court the following described properties:
'Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56, ten (10) M16 US rifles, two (2) AK-47 rifle[s], two (2)
UZI submachinegun[s], two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal.40mm, ten (10) cal.45 pistol[s],
ten (10) cal.38 revolver[s], two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s], assorted ammunitions for
said calibers of firearms and ten (10) handgrenades.'
Attached to the application[11] were the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and
SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito,[12] as well as a summary of the information and the supplementary
statements of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno.
After propounding several questions to Bacolod, Judge Maximiano C. Asuncion issued the
contested search warrant,[13] the pertinent portion of which reads:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath, SPO3 Cicero S.
Bacolod, that there is probable cause to believe that the management of Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao
del Sur, represented by its Sr. Vice President Ricardo G. Santiago, has in its possession or
control the following:
Seventy (70) M16 Armalite rifles cal. 5.56
Ten (10) M14 US rifles

Two (2) AK-47 rifle[s]


Two (2) UZI submachinegun[s]
Two (2) M203 Grenade Launcher[s] cal. 40mm.
Ten (10) cal 45 pistol[s]
Ten (10) cal 38 revolver[s]
Two (2) ammunition reloading machine[s]
Assorted ammunitions for said calibers of firearms
Ten (10) handgrenades
in violation of the Provisions of PD 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, Ammunition and
Explosives), and the same should be seized and brought before this Court.
NOW, THEREFORE, you are hereby authorized to make an immediate search daytime
between 8:00 a.m. [and] 4:00 p.m. of the aforementioned premises and to seize and bring the
articles above-described and make an immediate return there[of][14]
On February 4, 1995, the police enforced the search warrant at the PICOP compound and
seized the following:[15]
MAKE/TYPE CALIBER

SERIAL NUMBER

BRAND

01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13

M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle

5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56

14
15
16
17
18
19
20

M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle

5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56
5.56

RP 175636
Elisco
RP 175636 (Tampered)
Elisco
RP 171702
Elisco
Defaced
Elisco
RP174253 (Tampered)
Elisco
RP173627 (Tampered)
Elisco
RP171337
Elisco
RP171114
Elisco
RP171114 (Tampered)
Elisco
RP171167 (Tampered)
Elisco
170881 (Tampered)
Elisco
RP170897
Elisco
RP171509
Elisco
(With pending
case-Casaway Case)
RP 171754
Elisco
RP170881 (Tampered)
Elisco
RP174637
Elisco
RP171366
Elisco
RP174637 (Tampered)
Elisco
RP174610
Elisco
RP171367 (Tampered)
Elisco

01
02

M14Rifle
M14Rifle

7.62
7.62

1499694
889163

Elisco

01
01
02

BAR
Cal. 30
Carbine M1 Cal. 30
Carbine M1 Cal. 30

865975
384181
998201

Royal
US Carbin
US Carbin

Elisco

01
02
01
02

Garand M1
Garand M1
Shotgun
Shotgun

Cal. 30
Cal. 30

1194008
3123784
12 Gauge
H359704
12 Gauge
9211

Springfield
Springfield
Omega
Homemade
(

Paltik)
MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY
01
02
03
04

QTY.

M16 (long)
M16 (short)
Carbine M1
BAR

29 pcs.
48 pcs.
171 pcs.
19 pcs.

LIVE AMMUNITION
01
03
04
05
06
07

QTY.

M16
Carbine M1
M-60 Cal. 7.62
M1 Garand
Rifle Grenade
Hand Grenade

2,023 rounds
276 rounds
1,800 rounds
1,278 rounds
11 rounds
4 pcs.
AMMO DAM POST NO. 24

MAKE/TYPE
01. M16 Rifle
02. Machine Pistol

CALIBER
5.56
.22

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.

01.
02.
03.
04.

BRAND

171425 (Tampered)
651 (Tampered)

Gyno Corp.
Landmann

QTY.

M16 (short)
M16 (long)
M14
Clip M1 Garand
Mag Assy. Cal .22

3 pcs.
1 pc.
8 pcs.
3 pcs.
1 pc.

LIVE AMMUNITION

QTY.

M16
M14
M1 Garand Cal .30
Rifle Grenade

SERIAL NUMBER

73 rounds
160 rounds
30 rounds
1 round
MANAGEMENT INTEL/INVEST UNIT

MAKE/TYPE CALIBER

SERIAL NUMBER

BRAND

01.
02.
03.
04.

M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
M16 Rifle
Machine
Pistol
05. Three (3)
Shotguns

5.56
5.56
5.56
9 MM

RP 171725
Elisco
RP 170799 (Tampered) Elisco
RP 132320
Elisco
54887
Intratec

12 Gauge

Surit-Surit (H)

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY
01.
02.
03.
04.

01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.

QTY.

M16 (long)
M16 (short)
Intratec
US Carbine (defective)

3 pcs.
4 pcs.
1 pc.
2 pcs.

LIVE AMMUNITION

QTY.

M16
147 rds.
Cal. 30
5 rounds
12 gauge Shotgun
7 rounds
Carbine
5 rounds
Rifle grenade (AVA-0051-84/0056-84) 2 rounds
9MM
30 rounds
NEW ARMORY POST NO. 16
MAKE/TYPE

01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.
08.
09.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
Shotgun
LIVE AMMUNITION

01. 12 GAUGE shotgun


02. M16

CALIBER

SERIAL NUMBER

12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
12 Gauge
QTY.
306 rds.
2,349 rds.

A359910
A359716
A359706
A359707
1036847
A359702
A359732
A359728
A359708
A359711
A359723
A359713
1031271
A262338
A261619
Defaced

BRAND
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
Armscor
SB
SB
Not Indicated

MAGAZINE ASSEMBLY
01.
02.
03.
04.
05.
06.
07.

Carbine (defective)
Cal. 22 -doM16 (long-defective)
M16 (short-defective)
Thompson (defective)
Shotgun 12 Gauge (defective)
BAR (defective)

QTY.
76 pcs.
16 pcs.
2 pcs.
2 pcs.
8 pcs.
17 pcs.
2 pcs.

Believing that the warrant was invalid and the search unreasonable, the petitioners filed a
Motion to Quash[16] before the trial court. Subsequently, they also filed a Supplemental
Pleading to the Motion to Quash and a Motion to Suppress Evidence.[17]
On March 23, 1995, the RTC issued the first contested Order which denied petitioners
motions.[18] On August 3, 1995, the trial court rendered its second contested Order[19] denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.[20]
Hence, this recourse to this Court on pure questions of law.

Issues

In their Memorandum, petitioners submit the following grounds in support of their cause:[21]
I
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or
has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95). Probable cause
[has] not xxx been sufficiently established and partaking as it does of the nature of a general
warrant.
II
Petitioners respectfully submit that Judge Asuncion has committed grave abuse of discretion or
has exceeded his jurisdiction in refusing to quash Search Warrant No. 799(95) on the ground
that it was unlawfully served or implemented.
III
Petitioners respectfully submit that State Prosecutor Dacera is acting with grave abuse of
discretion or exceeding his jurisdiction in continuing with the proceedings in IS No. 95-167 on
the basis of illegally seized evidence.
In the main, petitioners question the validity of the search warrant. As a preliminary matter,
we shall also discuss respondents argument that the Petition should be dismissed for raising
factual questions.

This Courts Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Preliminary Issue:
Alleged Factual Questions

In their Opposition, respondents argue that the Petition should be dismissed for raising
questions of fact, which are not proper in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. They maintain
that the Petition merely assails the factual basis for the issuance of the warrant and the
regularity of its implementation.[22]
This argument is not convincing. It is settled that there is a question of fact when the doubt
arises as to the truth or the falsity of alleged facts. [23] In the present case, petitioners do not
question the truth of the facts as found by the judge; rather, they are assailing the way in which
those findings were arrived at, a procedure which they contend was violative of the Constitution
and the Rules of Court. We agree that the Petition raises only questions of law, which may be
resolved in the present case.

Main Issue:
Validity of the Search Warrant

The fundamental right against unreasonable searches and seizures and the basic
conditions for the issuance of a search warrant are laid down in Section 2, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, which reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized. (Emphasis supplied)
Consistent with the foregoing constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court,[24] detail the requisites for the issuance of a valid search warrant as follows:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. -- A search warrant shall not issue but upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the
warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and
under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known
to them and attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.

More simply stated, the requisites of a valid search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such presence is determined personally by the judge; (3) the complainant and the
witnesses he or she may produce are personally examined by the judge, in writing and under
oath or affirmation; (4) the applicant and the witnesses testify on facts personally known to
them; and (5) the warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.[25] In the present case, the search warrant is invalid because (1) the trial court failed to
examine personally the complainant and the other deponents; (2) SPO3 Cicero Bacolod, who
appeared during the hearing for the issuance of the search warrant, had no personal knowledge
that petitioners were not licensed to possess the subject firearms; and (3) the place to be
searched was not described with particularity.

No Personal Examination of the Witnesses

In his Order dated March 23, 1995, the trial judge insisted that the search warrant was
valid, stating that before issuing the subject warrant, the court propounded searching
questions to the applicant and the witnesses in order to determine whether there was probable
cause x x x.[26] (Emphasis supplied.) This was supported by the Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, which argued that it is erroneous for PICOP to allege that the Honorable Court did not
propound searching questions upon applicant P/Chief Inspector Napoleon Pascua and the
witnesses he produced.[27] The records, however, proclaim otherwise.
As earlier stated, Chief Inspector Pascuas application for a search warrant was supported
by (1) the joint Deposition of SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod and SPO2 Cecilio T. Morito, (2) a
summary of information and (3) supplementary statements of Mario Enad and Felipe
Moreno. Except for Pascua and Bacolod, however, none of the aforementioned witnesses and
policemen appeared before the trial court. Moreover, the applicants participation in the hearing
for the issuance of the search warrant consisted only of introducing Witness Bacolod:[28]
COURT:
Where is the witness for this application for search warrant?
P/Chief Insp. NAPOLEON PASCUA:
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, Your Honor.
COURT:
Swear the witness.
STENOGRAPHER: (To the witness)
Please raise your right hand, sir. Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth and
nothing but the truth before this Court?
WITNESS:
Yes Maam.
STENOGRAPHER:
Please state your name, age, civil status, occupation, address and other personal
circumstances.
WITNESS:

SPO3 Cicero S. Bacolod, 42 years old, married, policeman, c/o Camp Crame, Quezon
City, SOU, TMC.
xxx

xxx

x x x

Chief Inspector Pascua was asked nothing else, and he said nothing more. In fact, he
failed even to affirm his application. Contrary to his statement, the trial judge failed to propound
questions, let alone probing questions, to the applicant and to his witnesses other than Bacolod
(whose testimony, as will later be shown, is also improper). Obviously, His Honor relied mainly
on their affidavits. This Court has frowned on this practice in this language:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may
be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
xxx

xxx

xxx

It is axiomatic that the examination must be probing and exhaustive, not merely routinary
or pro-forma, if the claimed probable cause is to be established. The examining magistrate
must not simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry on the intent
and justification of the application.[29]

Bacolods Testimony Pertained Not to Facts Personally Known to Him

Bacolod appeared during the hearing and was extensively examined by the judge. But his
testimony showed that he did not have personal knowledge that the petitioners, in violation of
PD 1866, were not licensed to possess firearms, ammunitions or explosives. In his Deposition,
he stated:
Q How do you know that said properties were subject of the offense?
A

Sir, as a result of our intensified surveillance and case build up for several days, we
gathered informations from reliable sources that subject properties [which] are in their
possession and control [are] the herein described properties subject of the
offense. (Summary of Information dtd Oct 94, SSs of Mario Enad and Felipe Moreno
both dtd 30 Nov 94 are hereto attached).[30]

When questioned by the judge, Bacolod stated merely that he believed that the PICOP
security guards had no license to possess the subject firearms. This, however, does not meet
the requirement that a witness must testify on his personal knowledge, not belief. He declared:
Q This is an application for Search Warrant against Paper Industries Corporation located at
PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig, Surigao del Sur. How come that you have
knowledge that there are illegal firearms in that place?
A

At Camp Crame, Quezon City, I was dispatched by our Commander to investigate the
alleged assassination plot of Congressman Amante.

In the course of your investigation, what happened?

We found out that some of the suspects in the alleged assassination plot are employees
of PICOP.

Know[ing] that the suspects are employees of PICOP, what did you do?

We conducted the surveillance in that area inside the compound of PICOP in Tabon.

What did you find xxx?

I found xxx several high-powered firearms.

How were you able to investigate the compound of PICOP?

I exerted effort to enter the said compound.

By what means?

By pretending to have some official business with the company.

So, in that aspect, you were able to investigate the compound of PICOP?

Yes, sir.

What did you f[i]nd xxxt?

I found xxx several high-powered firearms being kept in the compound of PICOP.

Where are those located?

Sir, there are firearms kept inside the ammo dam.

Inside the compound?

Located inside the compound.

Then what?

Others, sir, were kept in the security headquarters or office.

You mean to say that this Paper Industries Corporation has its own security guards?

Yes, they call it Blue Guards.

You mean to say that their own security guards guarded the PICOP?

Yes, sir.

So, it is possible that the firearms used by the security guards are illegally obtained?

I believe they have no license to possess high-powered firearms. As far as the


verification at FEU, Camp Crame, [is concerned,] they have no license. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Have you investigated the Blue Guards Security Agency?

I conducted the inquiry.

What did you find out?

They are using firearms owned by PICOP.

Using firearms owned by PICOP?

Yes, sir.

You mean to say that this Blue Guard Security Agency has no firearms of their own?

No high-powered firearms.

By the way, Mr. Witness, what kind of firearms have you seen inside the compound of
PICOP?

There are M-16 armalite rifles.

What else?

AK-47, armalites, M-203 Grenade Launcher, M-14 US rifles, .38 caliber revolvers, .45
caliber pistols, several handgrenades and ammos.[31] (Emphasis supplied)

Moreover, Bacolod failed to affirm that none of the firearms seen inside the PICOP
compound was licensed. Bacolod merely declared that the security agency and its guards were
not licensed. He also said that some of the firearms were owned by PICOP. Yet, he made no
statement before the trial court that PICOP, aside from the security agency, had no license to
possess those firearms. Worse, the applicant and his witnesses inexplicably failed to attach to
the application a copy of the aforementioned no license certification from the Firearms and
Explosives Office (FEO) of the PNP, or to present it during the hearing. Such certification could
have been easily obtained, considering that the FEO was located in Camp Crame where the
unit of Bacolod was also based. In People v. Judge Estrada,[32] the Court held:
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that
could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary in
cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the offense charged for
instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence
is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if
the best evidence could not be secured at the time of the application, the applicant must show a
justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge.

Particularity of the Place to Be Searched

In view of the manifest objective of the constitutional safeguard against unreasonable


search, the Constitution and the Rules limit the place to be searched only to those described in
the warrant.[33] Thus, this Court has held that this constitutional right [i]s the embodiment of a
spiritual concept: the belief that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its
constitutional protection against the long reach of government is no less than to value human
dignity, and that his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and
then only under stringent procedural safeguards.[34] Additionally, the requisite of particularity is
related to the probable cause requirement in that, at least under some circumstances, the lack
of a more specific description will make it apparent that there has not been a sufficient showing
to the magistrate that the described items are to be found in a particular place.[35]
In the present case, the assailed search warrant failed to describe the place with
particularity. It simply authorizes a search of the aforementioned premises, but it did not
specify such premises. The warrant identifies only one place, and that is the Paper Industries
Corporation of the Philippines, located at PICOP Compound, Barangay Tabon, Bislig[,] Surigao
del Sur. The PICOP compound, however, is made up of 200 offices/buildings, 15 plants, 84
staff houses, 1 airstrip, 3 piers/wharves, 23 warehouses, 6 POL depots/quick service outlets and
some 800 miscellaneous structures, all of which are spread out over some one hundred fifty-five

hectares.[36] Obviously, the warrant gives the police officers unbridled and thus illegal authority
to search all the structures found inside the PICOP compound.[37]
In their Opposition, the police state that they complied with the constitutional requirement,
because they submitted sketches of the premises to be searched when they applied for the
warrant. They add that not one of the PICOP Compound housing units was searched, because
they were not among those identified during the hearing.[38]
These arguments are not convincing. The sketches allegedly submitted by the police were
not made integral parts of the search warrant issued by Judge Asuncion. Moreover, the fact that
the raiding police team knew which of the buildings or structures in the PICOP Compound
housed firearms and ammunitions did not justify the lack of particulars of the place to be
searched.[39] Otherwise, confusion would arise regarding the subject of the warrant the place
indicated in the warrant or the place identified by the police. Such conflict invites uncalled for
mischief or abuse of discretion on the part of law enforcers.
Thus, in People v. Court of Appeals,[40] this Court ruled that the police had no authority to
search the apartment behind the store, which was the place indicated in the warrant, even if
they really intended it to be the subject of their application. Indeed, the place to be searched
cannot be changed, enlarged or amplified by the police, viz.:
x x x. In the instant case, there is no ambiguity at all in the warrant. The ambiguity lies outside
the instrument, arising from the absence of a meeting of the minds as to the place to be
searched between the applicants for the warrant and the Judge issuing the same; and what was
done was to substitute for the place that the Judge had written down in the warrant, the
premises that the executing officers had in their mind. This should not have been done. It
[was] neither fair nor licit to allow police officers to search a place different from that stated in
the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched although not that specified in the
warrant [was] exactly what they had in view when they applied for the warrant and had
demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the validity of a
search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their thoughts, or
had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. Indeed, following
the officers theory, in the context of the facts of this case, all four (4) apartment units at the rear
of Abigail's Variety Store would have been fair game for a search.
The place to be searched, as set out in the warrant, cannot be amplified or modified by the
officers own personal knowledge of the premises, or the evidence they adduced in support of
their application for the warrant. Such a change is proscribed by the Constitution which requires
inter alia the search warrant to particularly describe the place to be searched as well as the
persons or things to be seized. It would concede to police officers the power of choosing the
place to be searched, even if it not be that delineated in the warrant. It would open wide the
door to abuse of the search process, and grant to officers executing a search warrant that
discretion which the Constitution has precisely removed from them. The particularization of the
description of the place to be searched may properly be done only by the Judge, and only in the
warrant itself; it cannot be left to the discretion of the police officers conducting the
search. (Emphasis supplied.)

Seized Firearms and Explosives Inadmissible in Evidence

As a result of the seizure of the firearms, effected pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95)
issued by the respondent judge, the PNP filed with the Department of Justice a complaint
docketed as IS No. 95-167 against herein petitioners for illegal possession of firearms. State
Prosecutor Dacera, to whom the Complaint was assigned for preliminary investigation, issued a
subpoena requiring petitioners to file their counter-affidavits.
Instead of complying with the subpoena, petitioners asked for the suspension of the
preliminary investigation, pending the resolution of their motion to quash the search
warrant. They argued, as they do now, that the illegally obtained firearms could not be the basis
of the criminal Complaint. Their motion was denied. A subsequent Motion for Reconsideration
met the same fate. In the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, petitioners assert that
State Prosecutor Dacera cannot have any tenable basis for continuing with the proceedings in
IS No. 95-167.[41]
Because the search warrant was procured in violation of the Constitution and the Rules of
Court, all the firearms, explosives and other materials seized were inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.[42] As the Court noted in an earlier case, the exclusion of unlawfully
seized evidence was the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[43] Verily, they are the fruits of the poisonous
tree. Without this exclusionary rule, the constitutional right would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing
evidence xxx.[44]
In the present case, the complaint for illegal possession of firearms is based on the firearms
and other materials seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 799 (95). Since these illegally
obtained pieces of evidence are inadmissible, the Complaint and the proceedings before State
Prosecutor Dacera have no more leg to stand on.
This Court sympathizes with the police effort to stamp out criminality and to maintain peace
and order in the country; however, it reminds the law enforcement authorities that they must do
so only upon strict observance of the constitutional and statutory rights of our people. Indeed,
there is a right way to do the right thing at the right time for the right reason.[45]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and
Search Warrant No. 799 (95) accordingly declared NULL andVOID. The temporary restraining
order issued by this Court on October 23, 1995 is hereby MADE PERMANENT. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUDGE ESTRELLA
T. ESTRADA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BRANCH 83, QUEZON CITY; and AIDEN
LANUZA, respondents.
DECISION
MARTINEZ, J.:
The People of the Philippines, through this petition for review, seeks the reversal of the
order of respondent Judge Estrella T. Estrada, dated December 7, 1995, which granted private
respondent Aiden Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant No. 958 (95), as well as the order
dated April 1, 1996 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.

On June 27, 1995, Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and
Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, an application for the issuance of a search warrant
against Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City, for violation
of Article 40 (k) of Republic Act 7394 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines).
In her application for search warrant, Atty. Cabanlas alleged, among others, as follows:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received reports
from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence Command of
the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City sold to said Officer
Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P
7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu
City has no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug products from the BFAD;
1.c. Distribution, sale or offer for sale or transfer of drug products without license to operate from
BFAD is in violation of Art. 40 (k) of RA 7394 (or the Consumer Act).
2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the various
drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1
and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were enclosed; and the same are likewise submitted herewith.
xxx

xxx

xxx. [1] (Emphasis supplied)

The application, however, ended with the statement that the warrant is to search the
premises of another person at a different address:
3. This is executed to support affiants application for a search warrant on the premises of
Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay Cebu.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
In support of the application, the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles, a member of the
Regional Intelligence Group IV of the PNP Intelligence Command, Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna, was attached thereto, wherein he declared that:
1. Upon the request for assistance by BFAD, he conducted surveillance for persons
distributing, selling or transferring drug products without license to operate from BFAD.
2. On May 29, 1995, a certain Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City sold to him various drug products amounting to P7,232.00 and
3. Upon further verification in the BFAD registry of licensed persons or premises, the said
person and place have in fact no license to operate.

4. Earlier than May 29, 1995, affiant saw a delivery of drug products from the residence of Mrs.
Lanuza in 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City to another person.
5. Accompanying this affidavit are the various products sold to/and purchased by the affiant
contained in two (2) plastic bags marked Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2.
This is executed in support of the affiants report to BFAD and for whatever legitimate purpose
this may serve. [3] (Emphasis supplied)
The BFAD also submitted with the application a copy of the sketch [4] of the location of Aiden
Lanuzas residence at her stated address.
On the same day the application was filed, the respondent Judge issued Search Warrant
No. 958 (95), which reads in full:
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
NATIONAL CAPITAL JUDICIAL REGION
BRANCH 83 QUEZON CITY
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
- versus -

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)

AIDEN LANUZA,
Defendant.
X---------------------------X
SEARCH WARRANT

It appears to the satisfaction of this Court, after examining under oath Atty. Lorna Frances F.
Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of the Bureau of Food
and Drugs (BFAD) and her witness, Manuel P. Cabiles, member of the Intelligence Group IV,
Intelligence Command, PNP, Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that a violation of Article 40(k) in relation to Article 41 of Republic Act No.
7394 (Consumer Act) has been committed or about to be committed and there are good and
sufficient reasons to believe that Ms. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose dela Montana Street, Cebu
City has in her possession and control at said address the following described properties:
medicines and drugs of undetermined quantity among which are Bricanyl Tablet, Bisolvon
Tablet, Buscopan Tablet, Buscopan Ampoule, Mucosolvan Ampoule, Persantin Tablet,
Tegretol Tablet, PZA-Ciba Tablet, Voltaren Tablet, Zantac Ampoule, Ventolin Tablet, Ventolin

Inhaler, Dermovate Cream, Fortum Vial, Zinacef Vial, Feldene 1M Ampoule, Norvasoc
Tablet, Bactrim Forte Tablet, Rochephin Vial, Tilcotil Tablet, Librax Tablet, Methergin Tablet
and Tagamet Tablet
which she is selling, distributing and transferring without the necessary license from the
Department of Health.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the DAY or NIGHT of
the premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the undetermined
amount of drugs and medicines subject of the offense and to bring the same to this Court to be
dealt with as the law directs.
You are further directed to submit a return of this Search Warrant within ten (10) days from
today.
This Search Warrant is valid within a period of ten (10) days from the date of issue.
GIVEN UNDER THE HAND AND SEAL of this Court this 27th day of June 1995 at Quezon City.
(Sgd.)ESTRELLA T. ESTRADA
Second Vice Executive Judge[5]
(Emphasis supplied)
On June 28, 1995, the search warrant was served at private respondent Lanuzas
residence at the indicated address by a composite team of policemen from the PNP 7 th Criminal
Investigation Command, Camp Sotero Cabahug, Cebu City.
How the search warrant was implemented was briefly narrated in the Joint Affidavit, [6] dated
June 29, 1995, of SPO2 Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Marckbilly Capalungan, both members
of the search and seizure team. They stated in their affidavit that their team, armed with the
search warrant, conducted a raid at the premises of one AIDEN LANUZA of 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Cebu City x x x; that the raid was witnessed by Luis Rivera, Demetrio
Panimdim and Francisco Ojales, both (sic) Brgy. Tanod of Kasambagan, Cebu City; that the
service of the (search) warrant resulted in the confiscation of fifty-two (52) cartoons (sic) of
assorted medicines from the possession and control of AIDEN LANUZA; and that the said
items were brought to the 7CICRO office for detailed inventory headed by Atty. Lorna F.
Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal Information and Compliance Division of the BFAD,
Manila.[7] (Emphasis supplied)
The present petition, however, narrates a different account of what actually happened
during the implementation of the search warrant. Paragraph 5 of the petition states: At the
commencement of the search, the members of the team discovered that the premises described
as 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City was actually a five thousand (5,000)
square meter compound containing at least fifteen (15) structures which are either leased
residences, offices, factories, workshops or warehouse. The policemen proceeded to search

the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot No. 41 of said address. Finding no drug
products thereat, they proceeded to search a nearby warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same
compound and address above stated. This search yielded fifty-two (52) cartons of assorted
drug products which were then inventoried in due course. x x x.[8] (Emphasis supplied)
In an order[9] dated July 3, 1995, the respondent Judge noted the inventory of the seized
drugs and authorized the BFAD to retain custody of the same, to have samples of the drugs
analyzed and be brought to the registered drug manufacturers for parallel testing.
On August 22, 1995, private respondent Aiden Lanuza filed a verified motion [10] praying that
Search Warrant No. 958 (95) be quashed and that the seized articles be declared inadmissible
in any proceeding and ordered returned to the warehouse owned by Folk Arts Export & Import
Company located at Lot No. 38 inside the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Cebu City. The motion is based on the grounds that the search warrant is illegal and null and
void because: (1) it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New
Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of private respondent
Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Cebu City; (2) it was issued for a nonexisting offense; (3) Atty. Lorna Frances F. Cabanlas was not duly authorized by applicant
BFAD to apply therefor; (4) it failed to particularly describe the place to be searched and the
things to be seized; (5) the applicant's witnesses had no personal knowledge of the facts upon
which it was issued; and (6) its implementation was unreasonable as it was enforced on a
different or wrong place which was lawfully occupied by a different or wrong person.[11]
Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas, who appeared for the BFAD, opposed[12] the motion to quash
the search warrant, to which the private respondent countered with a reply.
After the contending parties had submitted their respective positions without further oral
arguments, the respondent Judge issued the assailed order [13] dated December 7, 1995,
quashing Search Warrant No. 958 (95). Accordingly, the order dated July 3, 1995 was revoked
and all the articles seized were declared inadmissible in any and all proceedings against private
respondent Aiden Lanuza. Also, the BFAD was ordered to return at its expense all the seized
items to the warehouse of Folk Arts Import & Export Company at Lot No. 38, 516 San Jose de la
Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice of the said order.
[14]

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the December 7, 1995 order was denied in an
order[15] dated April 1, 1996, impelling petitioner to file the present petition asserting that the
respondent Judge erred:
a) In holding that the defect appearing in BFAD's application for a search warrant
is so "grave" in nature as to warrant quashal of the search warrant issued
thereunder, considering that such variance is actually a harmless clerical error.
b) In holding that Atty. Cabanlas was not authorized by the BFAD to apply for a
search warrant concerning the unlicensed distribution of drugs, considering that
the grant of BFAD authorization upon her to investigate fake, misbranded,

adulterated or unregistered drugs necessarily contemplates the authority to


investigate the unlicensed activities above noted.
c) In holding that applicant BFAD had failed to discharge the burden of proving
probable cause for issuance of a search warrant, by failing to present
documentary proof indicating that private respondent had no license to sell or
distribute drug products, considering that under the authority ofCarillo v.
People (229 SCRA 386) the BFAD only had the burden of proving the negative
ingredient of the offense charged on the basis of the best evidence procurable
under the circumstances.
d) In holding that the place sought to be searched had not been described with
sufficient particularity in SW No. 958 (95), considering that Aiden Lanuza's
residence at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City
was not so conspicuously or notoriously represented to the public as such by
her as to contradict the investigating and serving officers' perception of the
outward appearance of her dwelling, which led them to believe that the more
general address of 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City
referred to her dwelling.
e) In ordering the return of the things seized, the possession of which is
prohibited.[16]
We granted the petitioners application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order in a
resolution[17] dated June 26, 1996 and restrained the implementation of the assailed orders,
effective immediately and until further orders from this Court.
Private respondent Aiden Lanuza later filed her comment[18] on the petition, but petitioner's
reply thereto was not admitted by this Court in a resolution [19] dated January 13, 1997, for failure
by the Solicitor General to file the same within his first extension of thirty (30) days, that was
granted, but with a warning that no further extension would be given. Instead of filing his reply,
the Solicitor General asked for two (2) more extensions of time, which were denied.
Now to the assigned errors of the respondent Judge raised by petitioner.
The requirements for the issuance of a search warrant are inscribed in Section 2, Article III
of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
"SEC. 2. THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE IN THEIR PERSONS,
HOUSES, PAPERS, AND EFFECTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES OF WHATEVER NATURE AND FOR ANY PURPOSE SHALL BE
INVIOLABLE, AND NO SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF ARREST SHALL
ISSUE EXCEPT UPON PROBABLE CAUSE TO BE DETERMINED PERSONALLY BY
THE JUDGE AFTER EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OR AFFIRMATION OF THE
COMPLAINANT AND THE WITNESSES HE MAY PRODUCE, ANDPARTICULARLY
DESCRIBING THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED AND THE PERSONS OR THINGS TO
BE SEIZED." (Emphasis supplied)

In quashing the subject search warrant, it is the finding of the respondent Judge that the
application for its issuance suffered from a grave defect, "which escaped (her) attention,"
considering that it was applied to search the premises of one Belen Cabanero at New Frontier
Village, Talisay, Cebu, but was issued to search the residence of herein private respondent
Aiden Lanuza at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Cebu City.[20]
We nonetheless find such error in the application for search warrant a negligible defect.
The title of the questioned application, which reads:
"PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff,
- versus -

SEARCH WARRANT NO. 958 (95)

AIDEN LANUZA,

For: Violation of Article

516 San Jose de la

40 (k) in relation to

Montana Street, Mabolo,

Article 41 of Republic

Cebu City,

Act No. 7394 (or the


Defendant.

Consumer Act).

x------------------------------------------ ------------- x"[21] (Emphasis supplied)


and the allegations contained therein, pertinent portions of which we quote:
1. On June 5, 1995, in my official capacity as Attorney V and Chief of LICD, I received
reports from SPO4 Manuel P. Cabiles of the Regional Intelligence Group IV, Intelligence
Command of the PNP that certain
1.a. Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City
sold to said Officer Cabiles various drug products amounting to Seven
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty Two Pesos (P 7,232.00) on May 29, 1995;
1.b. Said Aiden Lanuza or her address at 516 San Jose de la Montana Street,
Mabolo, Cebu City has no license to operate, distribute, sell or transfer drug
products from the BFAD;
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. In support of the report, the subscribed affidavit of Mr. Cabiles, his report and the
various drug products sold and purchased contained in a (sic) plastic bags marked
Lanuza Bag 1 of 1 and Lanuza Bag 2 of 2 were enclosed; and the same are likewise
submitted herewith.

xxx

xxx

x x x. [22] (Emphasis supplied)

unmistakably reveal that the said application was specifically intended against private
respondent Aiden Lanuza of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. She has
been the only one identified in the application, as well as in the aforequoted affidavit of SPO4
Manuel Cabiles upon which the application was based, as having allegedly sold to said SPO4
Cabiles various drugs amounting to P7,232.00 on May 29, 1995, without any license to do so, in
alleged violation of Article 40 (k) of R.A. 7394. It is noteworthy that, as stated in the abovequoted paragraph 2 of the application, the plastic bags which contained the seized drugs and
which were submitted together with the application, were marked as "Lanuza Bag 1 of 1" and
"Lanuza Bag 2 of 2." These markings with the name "Lanuza" obviously refer to no other than
the herein private respondent. And when the respondent Judge issued the search warrant, it
was directed solely against private respondent Aiden Lanuza at her address: 516 San Jose de
la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
The Solicitor General explained the error in the application by saying that on the same day
applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas filed the questioned application on June 27, 1995,
another application for search warrant was also filed against one Belen Cabanero at her
residence at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu City. This can be deduced from the following
examination conducted by respondent Judge on Atty. Cabanlas:
"(COURT)
Q.

And who is your respondent?

A. Mrs. Aiden Lanuza and the other one is Belen Cabanero.


Q.

Where are they situated?

A. Mrs. Lanuza is situated in No. 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City.
Q.

About the other?

A. New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu.


Q.

Do you have any specific address at New Frontier Village?

A. It was reported by Mr. Manuel Cabiles.


Q.

Will he be testifying?

A. Yes Ma'am. Your Honor, this is the vicinity of the New Frontier Village, Cebu (witness
presenting a sketch) (sic)
Q.

How about this San Jose de la Montana. This is just in Cebu City?

A. At 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City."[23]

From the foregoing discussion, it is obvious that the name and address of one Belen
Cabanero were erroneously copied in paragraph 3 of the application in question. Such defect,
as intimated earlier, is not of such a gravity as to call for the invalidation of the search warrant.
There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant.
Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was
not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant
to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to
sell drugs.
It must be noted that in the application for search warrant, private respondent is charged
with the specific offense of selling drugs without the required license from the Department of
Health, which is in violation of Article 40 (k) of R. A. 7394, and penalized under Article 41
thereof. The said application was supported by the affidavit of SPO4 Manuel Cabiles where, in
paragraph 3 thereof, he declared that he made a "verification in the BFAD registry of licensed
persons or premises" and discovered that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had "no license" to
sell drugs.
We agree with the respondent Judge that applicant Atty. Lorna Frances Cabanlas should
have submitted documentary proof that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no such
license. Although no explanation was offered by respondent Judge to support her posture, we
hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a
search warrant, the applicant must show facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that
the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched."[24]
The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence
that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is
necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence of the negative ingredient of the
offense charged - for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily
produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the
applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The
necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is
to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and
personalties. As well stated by this Court through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando
in Villanueva vs. Querubin:[25]
It is deference to ones personality that lies at the core of this right, but it could be also
looked upon as a recognition of a constitutionally protected area, primarily ones home
but not necessarily thereto confined (Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
[1966]). What is sought to be guarded is a mans prerogative to choose who is allowed
entry to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only
in the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,

however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by


government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life (Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 US 757, Brennam, J.
and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616, 630). In the same vein, Landynski in his
authoritative work, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court (1966), could fitly
characterize this constitutional right as the embodiment of a spiritual concept: the belief
that to value the privacy of home and person and to afford its constitutional protection
against the long reach of government is no less than to value human dignity, and that
his privacy must not be disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then
only under stringent procedural safeguards (Ibid, p. 47). (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that
private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect
from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel could have easily procured such certification
when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable
reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the
non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for
a search warrant. The presumption of regularity cannot be invoked in aid of the process when
an officer undertakes to justify it. [26] We apply by analogy our ruling in 20th Century Fox Film
Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et. al.:[27]
The presentation of the master tapes of the copyrighted films from which the pirated films were
allegedly copied, was necessary for the validity of search warrants against those who have in
their possession the pirated films. The petitioners argument to the effect that the presentation
of the master tapes at the time of application may not be necessary as these would be merely
evidentiary in nature and not determinative of whether or not a probable cause exists to justify
the issuance of the search warrants is not meritorious. The court cannot presume that duplicate
or copied tapes were necessarily reproduced from master tapes that it owns.
The application for search warrants was directed against video tape outlets which allegedly
were engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of copyrighted films belonging to the
petitioner pursuant to P.D. 49.
The essence of a copyright infringement is the similarity or at least substantial similarity of the
purported pirated works to the copyrighted work. Hence, the applicant must present to the court
the copyrighted films to compare them with the purchased evidence of the video tapes allegedly
pirated to determine whether the latter is an unauthorized reproduction of the former. This
linkage of the copyrighted films to the pirated films must be established to satisfy the
requirements of probable cause. Mere allegations as to the existence of the copyrighted films
cannot serve as basis for the issuance of a search warrant. (Emphasis supplied)
Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient
particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden
Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo,
Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within
the same compound. The said warehouse is owned by a different person. Again, the
respondent Judge is correct on this point.

This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched
and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. [28] In the present
case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch [29]of
the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the
2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within
the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and
warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the
residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the
other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely
indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu
City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the
specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of
private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as
a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.
While the questioned search warrant had all the characteristic of a general warrant, it was
correctly implemented. For, the searching team went directly to the house of private respondent
Aiden Lanuza located at Lot No. 41 inside the compound known as 516 San Jose de la
Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City. However, the team did not find any of the drug products
which were the object of the search. Frustrated, and apparently disappointed, the team then
proceeded to search a nearby warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one
David Po located at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. It was in the warehouse that drug
products were found and seized which were duly receipted. In the Joint Affidavit of SPO2
Fructuoso Bete, Jr. and SPO2 Markbilly Capalungan, members of the searching team, is a
statement that the confiscated 52 cartons of assorted medicines were found in the possession
and control of private respondent Aiden Lanuza. This is a blatant falsehood and is aggravated
by the fact that this was committed by officers sworn to uphold the law. In searching the
warehouse of Folk Arts Export & Import Company owned by one David Po, the searching team
went beyond the scope of the search warrant. As the trial court aptly observed:
x x x. The verified motion to quash and reply also show that the search at the house of
defendant-movant yielded negative result and the confiscated articles were taken from
another place which is the warehouse of Folk Arts Import and Export Company owned
by another person. In the return of the search warrant, it is stated that Search Warrant
No. 958 (95) was served at the premises of 516 San Jose dela Montana St., Cebu City
and that during the search, drug products were found and seized therefrom which were
duly receipted. Accompanying said return is the Joint Affidavit of two (2) members of
the searching team, namely: SPO2 Froctuoso Bete and SPO2 Markbilly Capalingan,
both of the 7th Criminal Investigation Command, PNP, with station at Camp Sotero
Cabahug, Gerardo Avenue, Cebu City which also mentioned only the address as 516
San Jose dela Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City and the confiscation of 52 cartoons(sic)
of assorted medicines purportedly from the possession and control of defendantmovant. However, as indicated in the sketch attached to the application for search
warrant, said Folk Arts Import and Export Company is owned by one David Po, which is
a concrete proof that the searching team exceeded their authority by conducting a
search not only in the residence of defendant-movant Lanuza but also in another place
which the applicant itself has identified as belonging to another person, David Po. The

foregoing are strong reasons to support the conclusion that there has been an
unreasonable search and seizure which would warrant the quashal of the search
warrant.[30]
The respondent Judge acted correctly in granting the motion to quash the search warrant.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued in
a resolution dated June 26, 1996 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

COCA-COLA VS GOMEZ
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Is the hoarding of a competitors product containers punishable as unfair competition
under the Intellectual Property Code (IP Code, Republic Act No. 8293) that would entitle the
aggrieved party to a search warrant against the hoarder? This is the issue we grapple with in
this petition for review on certiorari involving two rival multinational softdrink giants; petitioner
Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. (Coca-Cola) accuses Pepsi Cola Products Phils., Inc. (Pepsi),
represented by the respondents, of hoarding empty Coke bottles in bad faith to discredit its
business and to sabotage its operation in Bicolandia.
BACKGROUND
The facts, as culled from the records, are summarized below.
On July 2, 2001, Coca-Cola applied for a search warrant against Pepsi for hoarding Coke
empty bottles in Pepsis yard in Concepcion Grande, Naga City, an act allegedly penalized as
unfair competition under the IP Code. Coca-Cola claimed that the bottles must be confiscated
to preclude their illegal use, destruction or concealment by the respondents.[1] In support of the
application, Coca-Cola submitted the sworn statements of three witnesses: Naga plant
representative Arnel John Ponce said he was informed that one of their plant security guards
had gained access into the Pepsi compound and had seen empty Coke bottles; acting plant
security officer Ylano A. Regaspisaid he investigated reports that Pepsi was hoarding large
quantities of Coke bottles by requesting their security guard to enter the Pepsi plant and he was
informed by the security guard that Pepsi hoarded several Coke bottles; security guard Edwin

Lirio stated that he entered Pepsis yard on July 2, 2001 at 4 p.m. and saw empty Coke bottles
inside Pepsi shells or cases.[2]
Municipal Trial Court (MTC) Executive Judge Julian C. Ocampo of Naga City, after taking
the joint deposition of the witnesses, issued Search Warrant No. 2001-01 [3] to seize 2,500 Litro
and 3,000 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles at Pepsis Naga yard for violation of Section
168.3 (c) of the IP Code.[4] The local police seized and brought to the MTCs custody 2,464 Litro
and 4,036 eight and 12 ounces empty Coke bottles, 205 Pepsi shells for Litro, and 168 Pepsi
shells for smaller (eight and 12 ounces) empty Coke bottles, and later filed with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Naga a complaint against two Pepsi officers for violation of Section 168.3 (c)
in relation to Section 170 of the IP Code. [5] The named respondents, also the respondents in
this petition, were Pepsi regional sales manager Danilo E. Galicia (Galicia)and its Naga
general manager Quintin J. Gomez, Jr. (Gomez).
In their counter-affidavits, Galicia and Gomez claimed that the bottles came from various
Pepsi retailers and wholesalers who included them in their return to make up for shortages of
empty Pepsi bottles; they had no way of ascertaining beforehand the return of empty Coke
bottles as they simply received what had been delivered; the presence of the bottles in their
yard was not intentional nor deliberate; Ponce and Regaspis statements are hearsay as they
had no personal knowledge of the alleged crime; there is no mention in the IP Code of the crime
of possession of empty bottles; and that the ambiguity of the law, which has a penal nature,
must be construed strictly against the State and liberally in their favor. Pepsi security guards
Eduardo E. Miral and Rene Acebuche executed a joint affidavit stating that per their logbook,
Lirio did not visit or enter the plant premises in the afternoon of July 2, 2001.
The respondents also filed motions for the return of their shells and to quash the search
warrant. They contended that no probable cause existed to justify the issuance of the search
warrant; the facts charged do not constitute an offense; and their Naga plant was in urgent need
of the shells.
Coca-Cola opposed the motions as the shells were part of the evidence of the crime,
arguing that Pepsi used the shells in hoarding the bottles. It insisted that the issuance of
warrant was based on probable cause for unfair competition under the IP Code, and that the
respondents violated R.A. 623, the law regulating the use of stamped or marked bottles, boxes,
and other similar containers.

THE MTC RULINGS


On September 19, 2001, the MTC issued the first assailed order [6] denying the twin
motions. It explained there was an exhaustive examination of the applicant and its witnesses
through searching questions and that the Pepsi shells are prima facie evidence that the bottles
were placed there by the respondents.
In their motion for reconsideration, the respondents argued for the quashal of the
warrant as the MTC did not conduct a probing and exhaustive examination; the applicant and its
witnesses had no personal knowledge of facts surrounding the hoarding; the court failed to
order the return of the borrowed shells; there was no crime involved; the warrant was issued
based on hearsay evidence; and the seizure of the shells was illegal because they were not
included in the warrant.
On November 14, 2001, the MTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the second
assailed order,[7] explaining that the issue of whether there was unfair competition can only be
resolved during trial.
The respondents responded by filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City on the ground that
the subject search warrant was issued without probable cause and that the empty shells were
neither mentioned in the warrant nor the objects of the perceived crime.

THE RTC RULINGS


On May 8, 2002, the RTC voided the warrant for lack of probable cause and the noncommission of the crime of unfair competition, even as it implied that other laws may have been
violated by the respondents. The RTC, though, found no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the issuing MTC judge.[8] Thus,
Accordingly, as prayed for, Search Warrant No. 2001-02 issued by the
Honorable Judge Julian C. Ocampo III on July 2, 2001 is ANNULLED and SET
ASIDE. The Orders issued by the Pairing Judge of Br. 1, MTCC of Naga City
dated September 19, 2001 and November 14, 2001 are also declared VOID and
SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Naga City and SPO1 Ernesto Paredes are

directed to return to the Petitioner the properties seized by virtue of Search


Warrant No. 2001-02. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[9]

In a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on July 12, 2002, the
petitioner stressed that the decision of the RTC was contradictory because it absolved Judge
Ocampo of grave abuse of discretion in issuing the search warrant, but at the same time
nullified the issued warrant. The MTC should have dismissed the petition when it found out that
Judge Ocampo did not commit any grave abuse of discretion.
Bypassing the Court of Appeals, the petitioner asks us through this petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to reverse the decision of the RTC. Essentially,
the petition raises questions against the RTCs nullification of the warrant when it found no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the issuing judge.

THE PETITION and


THE PARTIES POSITIONS

In its petition, the petitioner insists the RTC should have dismissed the respondents
petition for certiorari because it found no grave abuse of discretion by the MTC in issuing the
search warrant. The petitioner further argues that the IP Code was enacted into law to remedy
various forms of unfair competition accompanying globalization as well as to replace the inutile
provision of unfair competition under Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. Section 168.3(c) of
the IP Code does not limit the scope of protection on the particular acts enumerated as it
expands the meaning of unfair competition to include other acts contrary to good faith of a
nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another. The inherent element
of unfair competition is fraud or deceit, and that hoarding of large quantities of a competitors
empty bottles is necessarily characterized by bad faith. It claims that its Bicol bottling operation
was prejudiced by the respondents hoarding and destruction of its empty bottles.

The petitioner also argues that the quashal of the search warrant was improper because
it complied with all the essential requisites of a valid warrant. The empty bottles were concealed
in Pepsi shells to prevent discovery while they were systematically being destroyed to hamper
the petitioners bottling operation and to undermine the capability of its bottling operations in
Bicol.
The respondents counter-argue that although Judge Ocampo conducted his own
examination, he gravely erred and abused his discretion when he ignored the rule on the need
of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause; satisfactory and convincing evidence is
essential to hold them guilty of unfair competition; the hoarding of empty Coke bottles did not
cause actual or probable deception and confusion on the part of the general public; the alleged
criminal acts do not show conduct aimed at deceiving the public; there was no attempt to use
the empty bottles or pass them off as the respondents goods.
The respondents also argue that the IP Code does not criminalize bottle hoarding, as the
acts penalized must always involve fraud and deceit. The hoarding does not make them liable
for unfair competition as there was no deception or fraud on the end-users.
THE ISSUE
Based on the parties positions, the basic issue submitted to us for resolution is whether
the Naga MTC was correct in issuing Search Warrant No. 2001-01 for the seizure of the empty
Coke bottles from Pepsis yard for probable violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. This
basic issue involves two sub-issues, namely, the substantive issue of whether the application for
search warrant effectively charged an offense, i.e., a violation of Section 168.3 (c) of the IP
Code; and the procedural issue of whether the MTC observed the procedures required by the
Rules of Court in the issuance of search warrants.
OUR RULING
We resolve to deny the petition for lack of merit.
We clarify at the outset that while we agree with the RTC decision, our agreement is
more in the result than in the reasons that supported it. The decision is correct in nullifying the
search warrant because it was issued on an invalid substantive basis the acts imputed on the

respondents do not violate Section 168.3 (c) of the IP Code. For this reason, we deny the
present petition.
The issuance of a search warrant[10] against a personal property[11] is governed by Rule
126 of the Revised Rules of Court whose relevant sections state:
Section 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant
shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific
offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath
or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Section 5.
Examination of complainant; record. The judge must,
before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching
questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the
record their sworn statements together with the affidavits submitted.
Section 6.
Issuance and form of search warrant. If the judge is
satisfied of the existence of facts upon which the application is based or that
there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he shall issue the warrant,
which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules. [Emphasis
supplied]

To paraphrase this rule, a search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause
in connection with a specific offense alleged in an application based on the personal knowledge
of the applicant and his or her witnesses. This is the substantive requirement in the issuance of
a search warrant. Procedurally, the determination of probable cause is a personal task of the
judge before whom the application for search warrant is filed, as he has to examine under oath
or affirmation the applicant and his or her witnesses in the form of searching questions and
answers in writing and under oath. The warrant, if issued, must particularly describe the place
to be searched and the things to be seized.
We paraphrase these requirements to stress that they have substantive and procedural
aspects. Apparently, the RTC recognized this dual nature of the requirements and, hence,
treated them separately; it approved of the way the MTC handled the procedural aspects of the
issuance of the search warrant but found its action on the substantive aspect wanting. It
therefore resolved to nullify the warrant, without however expressly declaring that the MTC
gravely abused its discretion when it issued the warrant applied for. The RTCs error, however,
is in the form rather than the substance of the decision as the nullification of the issued warrant

for the reason the RTC gave was equivalent to the declaration that grave abuse of discretion
was committed. In fact, we so rule as the discussions below will show.
Jurisprudence teaches us that probable cause, as a condition for the issuance of a
search warrant, is such reasons supported by facts and circumstances as will warrant a
cautious man in the belief that his action and the means taken in prosecuting it are legally just
and proper. Probable cause requires facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably
prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in
connection with that offense are in the place to be searched. [12] Implicit in this statement is the
recognition that an underlying offense must, in the first place, exist. In other words, the acts
alleged, taken together, must constitute an offense and that these acts are imputable to an
offender in relation with whom a search warrant is applied for.
In the context of the present case, the question is whether the act charged alleged to
be hoarding of empty Coke bottles constitutes an offense under Section 168.3 (c) of the IP
Code. Section 168 in its entirety states:
SECTION 168. Unfair Competition, Rights, Regulation and Remedies.
168.1. A person who has identified in the mind of the public the goods he
manufactures or deals in, his business or services from those of others, whether
or not a registered mark is employed, has a property right in the goodwill of the
said goods, business or services so identified, which will be protected in the
same manner as other property rights.
168.2. Any person who shall employ deception or any other means
contrary to good faith by which he shall pass off the goods manufactured by him
or in which he deals, or his business, or services for those of the one having
established such goodwill, or who shall commit any acts calculated to produce
said result, shall be guilty of unfair competition, and shall be subject to an action
therefor.
168.3. In particular, and without in any way limiting the scope of
protection against unfair competition, the following shall be deemed guilty of
unfair competition:
(a)
Any person, who is selling his goods and gives them the general
appearance of goods of another manufacturer or dealer, either as to the goods
themselves or in the wrapping of the packages in which they are contained, or
the devices or words thereon, or in any other feature of their appearance, which
would be likely to influence purchasers to believe that the goods offered are
those of a manufacturer or dealer, other than the actual manufacturer or dealer,
or who otherwise clothes the goods with such appearance as shall deceive the
public and defraud another of his legitimate trade, or any subsequent vendor of

such goods or any agent of any vendor engaged in selling such goods with a like
purpose;
(b)
Any person who by any artifice, or device, or who employs any other
means calculated to induce the false belief that such person is offering the
services of another who has identified such services in the mind of the public; or
(c)
Any person who shall make any false statement in the course of trade or
who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to
discredit the goods, business or services of another.
168.4. The remedies provided by Sections 156, 157 and 161 shall apply
mutatis mutandis. (Sec. 29, R.A. No. 166a)
The petitioner theorizes that the above section does not limit the scope of protection on
the particular acts enumerated as it expands the meaning of unfair competition to include other
acts contrary to good faith of a nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of
another. Allegedly, the respondents hoarding of Coca Cola empty bottles is one such act.
We do not agree with the petitioners expansive interpretation of Section 168.3 (c).
Unfair competition, previously defined in Philippine jurisprudence in relation with R.A.
No. 166 and Articles 188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code, is now covered by Section 168 of
the IP Code as this Code has expressly repealed R.A. No. 165 and R.A. No. 166, and Articles
188 and 189 of the Revised Penal Code.
Articles 168.1 and 168.2, as quoted above, provide the concept and general rule on the
definition of unfair competition. The law does not thereby cover every unfair act committed in
the course of business; it covers only acts characterized by deception or any other means
contrary to good faith in the passing off of goods and services as those of another who has
established goodwill in relation with these goods or services, or any other act calculated to
produce the same result.
What unfair competition is, is further particularized under Section 168.3 when it provides
specifics of what unfair competition is without in any way limiting the scope of protection
against unfair competition. Part of these particulars is provided under Section 168.3(c) which
provides the general catch-all phrase that the petitioner cites. Under this phrase, a person
shall be guilty of unfair competition who shall commit any other act contrary to good faith of a
nature calculated to discredit the goods, business or services of another.

From jurisprudence, unfair competition has been defined as the passing off (or palming
off) or attempting to pass off upon the public the goods or business of one person as the goods
or business of another with the end and probable effect of deceiving the public. It formulated
the true test of unfair competition: whether the acts of defendant are such as are calculated to
deceive the ordinary buyer making his purchases under the ordinary conditions which prevail in
the particular trade to which the controversy relates. [13] One of the essential requisites in an
action to restrain unfair competition is proof of fraud; the intent to deceive must be shown before
the right to recover can exist.[14] The advent of the IP Code has not significantly changed these
rulings as they are fully in accord with what Section 168 of the Code in its entirety
provides. Deception, passing off and fraud upon the public are still the key elements that must
be present for unfair competition to exist.
The act alleged to violate the petitioners rights under Section 168.3 (c) is hoarding
which we gather to be the collection of the petitioners empty bottles so that they can be
withdrawn from circulation and thus impede the circulation of the petitioners bottled
products. This, according to the petitioner, is an act contrary to good faith a conclusion that, if
true, is indeed an unfair act on the part of the respondents. The critical question, however,
is not the intrinsic unfairness of the act of hoarding; what is critical for purposes of Section 168.3
(c) is to determine if the hoarding, as charged, is of a nature calculated to discredit the goods,
business or services of the petitioner.
We hold that it is not. Hoarding as defined by the petitioner is not even an act within the
contemplation of the IP Code.
The petitioners cited basis is a provision of the IP Code, a set of rules that refer to a
very specific subject intellectual property. Aside from the IP Codes actual substantive
contents (which relate specifically to patents, licensing, trademarks, trade names, service
marks, copyrights, and the protection and infringement of the intellectual properties that these
protective measures embody), the coverage and intent of the Code is expressly reflected in its
Declaration of State Policy which states:
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy. The State recognizes that an
effective intellectual and industrial property system is vital to the development of
domestic and creative activity, facilitates transfer of technology, attracts foreign
investments, and ensures market access for our products. It shall protect and
secure the exclusive rights of scientists, inventors, artists and other gifted

citizens to their intellectual property and creations, particularly when beneficial to


the people, for such periods as provided in this Act.
The use of intellectual property bears a social function. To this end, the
State shall promote the diffusion of knowledge and information for the promotion
of national development and progress and the common good.
It is also the policy of the State to streamline administrative procedures of
registering patents, trademarks and copyright, to liberalize the registration on the
transfer of technology, and to enhance the enforcement of intellectual property
rights in the Philippines. (n)
Intellectual property rights have furthermore been defined under Section 4 of the Code to
consist of: a) Copyright and Related Rights; b) Trademarks and Service Marks; c)

Geographic

Indications; d) IndustrialDesigns; e) Patents; f) Layout-Designs (Topographies) of Integrated


Circuits; and g)Protection of Undisclosed Information.
Given the IP Codes specific focus, a first test that should be made when a question
arises on whether a matter is covered by the Code is to ask if it refers to an intellectual property
as defined in the Code. If it does not, then coverage by the Code may be negated.
A second test, if a disputed matter does not expressly refer to an intellectual property
right as defined above, is whether it falls under the general unfair competition concept and
definition under Sections 168.1 and 168.2 of the Code. The question then is whether there is
deception or any other similar act in passing off of goods or services to be those of another
who enjoys established goodwill.
Separately from these tests is the application of the principles of statutory construction
giving particular attention, not so much to the focus of the IP Code generally, but to the terms of
Section 168 in particular. Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, when a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is
found or with which it is associated.[15]
As basis for this interpretative analysis, we note that Section 168.1 speaks of a person
who has earned goodwill with respect to his goods and services and who is entitled to protection
under the Code, with or without a registered mark. Section 168.2, as previously discussed,
refers to the general definition of unfair competition. Section 168.3, on the other hand, refers to
the specific instances of unfair competition, with Section 168.1 referring to the sale of goods

given the appearance of the goods of another; Section 168.2, to the inducement of belief that
his or her goods or services are that of another who has earned goodwill; while the
disputed Section 168.3 being a catch all clause whose coverage the parties now dispute.
Under all the above approaches, we conclude that the hoarding - as defined and
charged by the petitioner does not fall within the coverage of the IP Code and of Section 168
in particular. It does not relate to any patent, trademark, trade name or service mark that the
respondents have invaded, intruded into or used without proper authority from the
petitioner. Nor are the respondents alleged to be fraudulently passing off their products or
services as those of the petitioner. The respondents are not also alleged to be undertaking any
representation or misrepresentation that would confuse or tend to confuse the goods of the
petitioner with those of the respondents, or vice versa. What in fact the petitioner alleges is an
act foreign to the Code, to the concepts it embodies and to the acts it regulates; as alleged,
hoarding inflicts unfairness by seeking to limit the oppositions sales by depriving it of the bottles
it can use for these sales.
In this light, hoarding for purposes of destruction is closer to what another law - R.A. No.
623 covers, to wit:
SECTION 1. Persons engaged or licensed to engage in the
manufacture, bottling or selling of soda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider,
milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels,
and other similar containers, with their names or the names of their principals or
products, or other marks of ownership stamped or marked thereon, may register
with the Philippine Patent Office a description of the names or are used by them,
under the same conditions, rules, and regulations, made applicable by law or
regulation to the issuance of trademarks.
SECTION 2. It shall be unlawful for any person, without the written
consent of the manufacturer, bottler or seller who has successfully registered the
marks of ownership in accordance with the provisions of the next preceding
section, to fill such bottles, boxes, kegs, barrels, or other similar containers
so marked or stamped, for the purpose of sale, or to sell, dispose of, buy,
or traffic in, or wantonly destroy the same, whether filled or not, or to use
the same for drinking vessels or glasses or for any other purpose than that
registered by the manufacturer, bottler or seller. Any violation of this section
shall be punished by a fine or not more than one hundred pesos or imprisonment
of not more than thirty days or both.
As its coverage is defined under Section 1, the Act appears to be a measure that may
overlap or be affected by the provisions of Part II of the IP Code on The Law on Trademarks,

Service Marks and Trade Names. What is certain is that the IP Code has not expressly
repealed this Act. The Act appears, too, to have specific reference to a special type of
registrants the manufacturers, bottlers or sellers of soda water, mineral or aerated waters,
cider, milk, cream, or other lawful beverages in bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, or barrels, and other
similar containers who are given special protection with respect to the containers they use. In
this sense, it is in fact a law of specific coverage and application, compared with the general
terms and application of the IP Code. Thus, under its Section 2, it speaks specifically of unlawful
use of containers and even of the unlawfulness of their wanton destruction a matter that
escapes the IP Codes generalities unless linked with the concepts of deception and passing
off as discussed above.
Unfortunately, the Act is not the law in issue in the present case and one that the parties
did not consider at all in the search warrant application. The petitioner in fact could not have
cited it in its search warrant application since the one specific offense that the law allows and
which the petitioner used was Section 168.3 (c). If it serves any purpose at all in our
discussions, it is to show that the underlying factual situation of the present case is in fact
covered by another law, not by the IP Code that the petitioner cites. Viewed in this light, the lack
of probable cause to support the disputed search warrant at once becomes apparent.
Where, as in this case, the imputed acts do not violate the cited offense, the ruling of this
Court penned by Mr. Justice Bellosillo is particularly instructive:
In the issuance of search warrants, the Rules of Court requires a finding
of probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined
personally by the judge after examination of the complainant and the witnesses
he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized. Hence, since there is no crime to speak of, the search
warrant does not even begin to fulfill these stringent requirements and is
therefore defective on its face. The nullity of the warrant renders moot and
academic the other issues raised in petitioners Motion to Quash and Motion for
Reconsideration. Since the assailed search warrant is null and void, all property
seized by virtue thereof should be returned to petitioners in accordance with
established jurisprudence.[16]
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the RTC correctly ruled that the petitioners
search warrant should properly be quashed for the petitioners failure to show that the acts
imputed to the respondents do not violate the cited offense. There could not have been any
probable cause to support the issuance of a search warrant because no crime in the first place
was effectively charged. This conclusion renders unnecessary any further discussion on

whether the search warrant application properly alleged that the imputed act of holding Coke
empties was in fact a hoarding in bad faith aimed to prejudice the petitioners operations, or
whether the MTC duly complied with the procedural requirements for the issuance of a search
warrant under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. Accordingly, we confirm
that Search Warrant No. 2001-01, issued by the Municipal Trial Court, Branch 1, Naga City,
is NULL and VOID. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROBERTO SALANGUIT y
KO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision,[1] dated January 27, 1998, of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of violation of
16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him accordingly to suffer
imprisonment ranging from six (6) months ofarresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and
two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, and of 8 of the same law and sentencing
him for such violation to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P700,000.00.
Charges against accused-appellant for violations of R.A. No. 6425 were filed on December
28, 1995. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the information alleged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly possess and/or use 11.14 grams of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (Shabu) a regulated drug, without the necessary license
and/or prescription therefor, in violation of said law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the information charged:
That on or about the 26th day of December 1995, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused
not being authorized by law to possess or use any prohibited drug, did, then and there willfully,
unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control 1,254 grams
of Marijuana, a prohibited drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

When arraigned on May 21, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty,[4] whereupon he
was tried.
Three witnesses were presented by the prosecution: P/Insp. Sonia S. Ludovico, forensic
chemist and chief of the Physical Science Branch of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory, Senior Inspector Rodolfo Aguilar of the Narcotics Command, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, and PO3 Rolando Duazo of Station 10, Kamuning, Quezon City, a field operative. The
prosecution evidence established the following:
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant [5] in the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, Dasmarias, Cavite, to search the residence of accused-appellant Robert Salanguit
y Ko on Binhagan St., Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as his witness SPO1 Edmund
Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
accused-appellant. The sale took place in accused-appellants room, and Badua saw that
the shabu was taken by accused-appellant from a cabinet inside his room. The application was
granted, and a search warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge Dolores L. Espaol.
At about 10:30 p.m. of December 26, 1995, a group of about 10 policemen, along with one
civilian informer, went to the residence of accused-appellant to serve the warrant.[6]
The police operatives knocked on accused-appellants door, but nobody opened it. They
heard people inside the house, apparently panicking. The police operatives then forced the
door open and entered the house.[7]
After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his group
started searching the house.[8] They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in
newsprint[9] having a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. [10] A receipt of the items seized
was prepared, but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.[11]
After the search, the police operatives took accused-appellant with them to Station 10,
EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along with the items they had seized.[12]
PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. [13] The white
crystalline substance with a total weight of 2.77 grams and those contained in a small box with a
total weight of 8.37 grams were found to be positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. On
the other hand, the two bricks of dried leaves, one weighing 425 grams and the other 850
grams, were found to be marijuana.[14]
For the defense, accused-appellant testified in his own behalf. His testimony was
corroborated by his mother-in-law, Soledad Arcano.
Accused-appellant testified that on the night of December 26, 1995, as they were about to
leave their house, they heard a commotion at the gate and on the roof of their house. Suddenly,
about 20 men in civilian attire, brandishing long firearms, climbed over the gate and descended
through an opening in the roof.[15]

When accused-appellant demanded to be shown a search warrant, a piece of paper inside


a folder was waved in front of him. As accused-appellant fumbled for his glasses, however, the
paper was withdrawn and he had no chance to read it.[16]
Accused-appellant claimed that he was ordered to stay in one place of the house while the
policemen conducted a search, forcibly opening cabinets and taking his bag containing money,
a licensed .45 caliber firearm, jewelry, and canned goods.[17]
The policemen left at around 12:30 a.m. of December 27, 1995, and, after putting handcuffs
on accused-appellant, took him with them to the NARCOM on EDSA, Quezon City, where
accused-appellant was detained.[18]
Accused-appellants mother-in law, Soledad Arcano, corroborated his testimony. Arcano
testified that the policemen ransacked their house, ate their food, and took away canned goods
and other valuables.[19]
After hearing, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, for violation of Sec. 16, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate sentence
with a minimum of six (6) months ofarresto mayor and a maximum of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional; and,
2. In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, for violation of Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, finding the accused ROBERTO SALANGUIT y KO guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime charged and he is hereby accordingly sentenced to suffer reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of P700,000.00.
The accused shall further pay the costs of suit.
The 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride and the 1,254 grams of marijuana bricks
are hereby confiscated and condemned for disposition according to law. The evidence
custodian of this Court is hereby directed to turn such substances over to the National Bureau of
Investigation pursuant to law.
SO ORDERED.[20]
Hence this appeal. Accused-appellant contends that THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THE SEARCH WARRANT VALID
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF METHAMPHETAMINE HYDRO-CHLORIDE (SHABU)

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT FOR


VIOLATION 8, R.A. NO. 6425
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE TWO (2) BRICKS OF
MARIJUANA
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE POLICEMEN USED
EXCESSIVE FORCE IN ENFORCING THE SEARCH WARRANT.
Accused-appellant is contesting his conviction on three grounds. First, the admissibility of
the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the ground that
the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid. Second, the admissibility in evidence of the
marijuana allegedly seized from accused-appellant pursuant to the plain view doctrine. Third,
the employment of unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.
First. Rule 126, 4 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[21] provides that a search
warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal Procedure. No presumption of regularity can be invoked
in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify its issuance. [22] Nothing can justify the
issuance of the search warrant unless all the legal requisites are fulfilled.
In this case, the search warrant issued against accused-appellant reads:
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 160
For: Violation of RA 6425
SEARCH WARRANT
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER:
GREETINGS:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining under oath SR. INSP.
RODOLFO V. AGUILAR, PNP and his witness SPO1 EDMUND M. BADUA, PNP that there is
probable cause to believe that ROBERT SALANGUIT has in his possession and control in his
premises Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City as shown in Annex A, the properties to wit:
UNDETERMINED QUANTITY OF SHABU AND DRUG PARAPHERNALIA
which should be seized and brought to the undersigned.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search anytime of the day/night of the
premises above-described and forthwith seize and take possession of the above-stated
properties and bring said properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law directs.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND this 26th day of December 1995 at Imus, Cavite, Philippines.
(SGD.) DOLORES L. ESPAOL
Judge
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was no
probable cause to search for drug paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant was issued for
more than one specific offense; and (3) that the place to be searched was not described with
sufficient particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause

The warrant authorized the seizure of undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia. Evidence was presented showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Accused-appellant contends, however, that the
search warrant issued is void because no evidence was presented showing the existence of
drug paraphernalia and the same should not have been ordered to be seized by the trial court.
[23]

The contention has no merit. To be sure, SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence officer
who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not testify in the proceedings for the issuance of a search
warrant on anything about drug paraphernalia. He stated:
Q

Being a member of the Intelligence and Operation Section, NMDU, NARCOM,


do you remember if you were assigned into a monitoring or surveillance work?

Of what particular assignment or area were you assigned for monitoring or


surveillance?

Its within the Quezon City area particularly a house without a number located at
Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City, sir.

Do you know the person who occupies the specific place?

Yes, sir, he is ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.

Are you familiar with that place?

Yes, sir.

Yes, sir, as part of my surveillance, I was able to penetrate inside the area and
established contract with ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert through my friend who
introduced me to the former.

In what particular occasion did you meet ROBERT SALANGUIT alias Robert?

sir.

When I was introduced by my friend as a good buyer and drug pusher of shabu,

Were you able to buy at that time?

Yes, sir.

How much if you can still remember the amount involved?

I was able to buy two point twelve (2.12) grams of shabu in the amount of Two
Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P2,750.00) pesos, sir.

Having established contact with ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, do you know


where the stuff (shabu) were being kept?

Yes, sir, inside a cabinet inside his room.

How were you able to know the place where he kept the stuff?

When I first bought the 2.12 grams of shabu from him, it was done inside his
room and I saw that the shabu was taken by him inside his cabinet.

Do you know who is in control of the premises?

Yes, sir, it was ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert.

How sure are you, that the shabu that you bought from ROBERT SALANGUIT
@ Robert is genuine shabu?

After I left the house of ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert, I proceeded back to


our office and reported the progress of my mission to our Chief and presented to him the
2.12 grams of shabu I bought from the subject. Then afterwards, our Chief formally
requested the Chief PNP Central Crime Laboratory Services, NPDC, for Technical
Analysis which yielded positive result for shabu, a regulated drug as shown in the
attached certification of PNP CLS result No. D-414-95 dated 19 Dec. 95.

Yes, sir, I was offered by him (ROBERT SALANGUIT @ Robert) that anything I
wish to buy bigger quantity of shabu, he is willing to transact to me on cash basis at his
price of One Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750.00) pesos per gram.

Do you have anything more to add or retract from your statement?

Are you willing to sign your statement freely and voluntarily?

Yes, sir.[24]

However, the fact that there was no probable cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia does not warrant the conclusion that the search warrant is
void. This fact would be material only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized by the
police. The fact is that none was taken by virtue of the search warrant issued. If at all,
therefore, the search warrant is void only insofar as it authorized the seizure of drug
paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride as to which
evidence was presented showing probable cause as to its existence. Thus, in Aday v. Superior
Court,[25] the warrant properly described two obscene books but improperly described other
articles. It was held:
Although the warrant was defective in the respects noted, it does not follow that it was
invalid as a whole. Such a conclusion would mean that the seizure of certain articles, even
though proper if viewed separately, must be condemned merely because the warrant was
defective with respect to other articles. The invalid portions of the warrant are severable from
the authorization relating to the named books, which formed the principal basis of the charge of
obscenity. The search for and seizure of these books, if otherwise valid, were not rendered
illegal by the defects concerning other articles. . . . In so holding we do not mean to suggest
that invalid portions of a warrant will be treated as severable under all circumstances. We
recognize the danger that warrants might be obtained which are essentially general in character
but as to minor items meet the requirement of particularity, and that wholesale seizures might be
made under them, in the expectation that the seizure would in any event be upheld as to the
property specified. Such an abuse of the warrant procedure, of course, could not be tolerated.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a warrant, which was issued on probable cause and
particularly describing the items to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be invalidated in
toto because the judge erred in authorizing a search for other items not supported by the
evidence.[26] Accordingly, we hold that the first part of the search warrant, authorizing the search
of accused-appellants house for an undetermined quantity of shabu, is valid, even though the
second part, with respect to the search for drug paraphernalia, is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged

Accused-appellant contends that the warrant was issued for more than one specific offense
because possession or use of methamphetamine hydrochloride and possession of drug
paraphernalia are punished under two different provisions of R.A. No. 6425. [27] It will suffice to
quote what this Court said in a similar case to dispose of this contention:
While it is true that the caption of the search warrant states that it is in connection with Violation
of R.A. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, it is clearly recited in the
text thereof that There is probable cause to believe that Adolfo Olaes alias Debie and alias
Baby of No. 628 Comia St., Filtration, Sta. Rita, Olongapo City, has in their session and control
and custody of marijuana dried stalks/leaves/seeds/cigarettes and other regulated/prohibited
and exempt narcotics preparations which is the subject of the offense stated above. Although

the specific section of the Dangerous Drugs Act is not pinpointed, there is no question at all of
the specific offense alleged to have been committed as a basis for the finding of probable
cause. The search warrant also satisfies the requirement in the Bill of Rights of the particularity
of the description to be made of the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized. [28]
Indeed, in People v. Dichoso[29] the search warrant was also for Violation of R.A. 6425,
without specifying what provisions of the law were violated, and it authorized the search and
seizure of dried marijuana leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) and sets of
paraphernalias (sic). This Court, however, upheld the validity of the warrant:
Appellants contention that the search warrant in question was issued for more than (1) offense,
hence, in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, is unpersuasive. He engages in
semantic juggling by suggesting that since illegal possession of shabu, illegal possession of
marijuana and illegal possession of paraphernalia are covered by different articles and sections
of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, the search warrant is clearly for more than one (1) specific
offense. In short, following this theory, there should have been three (3) separate search
warrants, one for illegal possession of shabu, the second for illegal possession of marijuana and
the third for illegal possession of paraphernalia. This argument is pedantic. The Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 is a special law that deals specifically with dangerous drugs which are
subsumed into prohibited and regulated drugs and defines and penalizes categories of
offenses which are closely related or which belong to the same class or species. Accordingly,
one (1) search warrant may thus be validly issued for the said violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act.[30]
Similarly, in another case,[31] the search warrant was captioned: For Violation of P.D. No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). The validity of the warrant was questioned on the
ground that it was issued without reference to any particular provision in P.D. No. 1866, which
punished several offenses. We held, however, that while illegal possession of firearms is
penalized under 1 of P.D. No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under 3
thereof, the decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives which offenses are so related as to be subsumed within the
category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. Thus, only one warrant
was necessary to cover the violations under the various provisions of the said law.
Particularity of the Place

Accused-appellant contends that the search warrant failed to indicate the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit. As the Solicitor General states:
. . . While the address stated in the warrant is merely Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City,
the trial court took note of the fact that the records of Search Warrant Case No. 160 contained
several documents which identified the premises to be searched, to wit: 1) the application for
search warrant which stated that the premises to be searched was located in between No. 7
and 11 at Binhagan Street, San Jose, Quezon City; 2) the deposition of witness which described

the premises as a house without a number located at Binhagan St., San Jose, Quezon City;
and 3) the pencil sketch of the location of the premises to be searched. In fact, the police
officers who raided appellants house under the leadership of Police Senior Inspector Rodolfo
Aguilar could not have been mistaken as Inspector Aguilar resides in the same neighborhood in
Binhagan where appellant lives and in fact Aguilars place is at the end of appellants place in
Binhagan. Moreover, the house raided by Aguilars team is undeniably appellants house and it
was really appellant who was the target. The raiding team even first ascertained through their
informant that appellant was inside his residence before they actually started their operation.[32]
The rule is that a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended to be searched.
[33]
For example, a search warrant authorized a search of Apartment Number 3 of a building at
83 Pleasant Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it turned out, there were five apartments in
the basement and six apartments on both the ground and top floors and that there was an
Apartment Number 3 on each floor. However, the description was made determinate by a
reference to the affidavit supporting the warrant that the apartment was occupied by the
accused Morris Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro Mass. [34] In this case, the location of
accused-appellants house being indicated by the evidence on record, there can be no doubt
that the warrant described the place to be searched with sufficient particularity.
In sum, we hold that with respect to the seizure of shabu from accused-appellants
residence, Search Warrant No. 160 was properly issued, such warrant being founded on
probable cause personally determined by the judge under oath or affirmation of the deposing
witness and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
Second. The search warrant authorized the seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However, seizure of the latter drug is being justified on the ground
that the drug was seized within the plain view of the searching party. This is contested by
accused-appellant.
Under the plain view doctrine, unlawful objects within the plain view of an officer who has
the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in
evidence.[35] For this doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent
discovery of the evidence; and (c) immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the
police.[36] The question is whether these requisites were complied with by the authorities in
seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by Inadvertence

Because the location of the shabu was indicated in the warrant and thus known to the
police operatives, it is reasonable to assume that the police found the packets of
the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the search warrant has been executed, the plain view
doctrine can no longer provide any basis for admitting the other items subsequently found. As
has been explained:
What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior
justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of

evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident to lawful
arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with a search directed
against the accused and permits the warrantless seizure. Of course, the extension of the
original justification is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they
have evidence before them; the plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.[37]
The only other possible justification for an intrusion by the police is the conduct of a search
pursuant to accused-appellants lawful arrest for possession ofshabu. However, a search
incident to a lawful arrest is limited to the person of the one arrested and the premises within his
immediate control.[38] The rationale for permitting such a search is to prevent the person arrested
from obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or to reach for incriminatory evidence and destroy
it.
The police failed to allege in this case the time when the marijuana was found, i.e., whether
prior to, or contemporaneous with, the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether it was recovered
on accused-appellants person or in an area within his immediate control. Its recovery,
therefore, presumably during the search conducted after the shabu had been recovered from
the cabinet, as attested to by SPO1 Badua in his depostion, was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence

The marijuana bricks were wrapped in newsprint. There was no apparent illegality to justify
their seizure. This case is similar to People. v. Musa[39] in which we declared inadmissible the
marijuana recovered by NARCOM agents because the said drugs were contained in a plastic
bag which gave no indication of its contents. We explained:
Moreover, when the NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen,
they had no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag
contained. When the appellant refused to respond, they opened it and found the marijuana.
Unlike Ker v. California, where the marijuana was visible to the police officers eyes, the
NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of the contents
of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that the NARCOM agents
inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within their plain view, what may be
said to be the object in their plain view was just the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The
incriminating nature of the contents of the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the
plain view of said object. It cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents,
whether by its distinctive configuration, is transparency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer.[40]
No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. [41] In this case, the
marijuana allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks
wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint
could not have been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or
manner these items were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the

seizure of the marijuana without a warrant was conducted in accordance with the plain view
doctrine, we hold that the marijuana is inadmissible in evidence against accusedappellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, 7 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure[42] provides:
Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused admittance to the place
of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and authority, may break open any outer or
inner door or window of a house or any part of a house or anything therein to execute the
warrant or liberate himself or any person lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.
Accused-appellants claim that the policemen had clambered up the roof of his house to
gain entry and had broken doors and windows in the process is unsupported by reliable and
competent proof. No affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested persons, like the barangay
officials or neighbors, has been presented by accused-appellant to attest to the truth of his
claim.
In contrast, Aguilar and Duanos claim that they had to use some force in order to gain entry
cannot be doubted. The occupants of the house, especially accused-appellant, refused to open
the door despite the fact that the searching party knocked on the door several
times. Furthermore, the agents saw the suspicious movements of the people inside the
house. These circumstances justified the searching partys forcible entry into the house,
founded as it is on the apprehension that the execution of their mission would be frustrated
unless they do so.
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. Q-95-64357, the decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 96, Quezon City, finding accused-appellant Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession
of illegal drugs under 16 of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer a prison term ranging from six (6) months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, and four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum,
and ordering the confiscation of 11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride
is AFFIRMED.
In Criminal Case No. Q-95-64358, the decision of the same court finding accused-appellant
Roberto Salanguit y Ko guilty of possession of prohibited drugs under 8 of R.A. No. 6425, as
amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine
of P700,000.00 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and accused-appellant is ACQUITTED
of the crime charged. However, the confiscation of the 1,254 grams of marijuana, as well as the
11.14 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and its disposition as ordered by the trial court
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

EXAMINATION OF APPLICANT
NICOMEDES SILVA @ " Comedes", MARLON SILVA, @ "Tama" and ANTONIETA
SILVA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF NEGROS
ORIENTAL, BRANCH XXXIII, DUMAGUETE CITY, respondent.
Marcelo G. Flores for petitioners.

FERNAN, C.J.:p
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioners seek the nullification of Search Warrant No. 1
issued by respondent Judge as well as the return of the money in the amount of P1,231.00
seized from petitioner Antonieta Silva.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1986, M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr., as chief of the PC Narcom Detachment in
Dumaguete City, Negros Oriental, filed an "Application for Search Warrant" with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City against petitioners Nicomedes Silva and Marlon
Silva. 1 This application was accompanied by a "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Arthur
M. Alcoran and Pat. Leon T. Quindo, also dated June 13, 1986. 2
On the same day. Judge Nickarter A. Ontal, then Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch XXXIII, Dumaguete City, pursuant to the said "Application for Search Warrant" and
"Deposition of Witness", issued Search Warrant No. 1, directing the aforesaid police officers to
search the room of Marlon Silva in the residence of Nicomedes Silva for violation of Republic
Act No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. as amended. Pertinent
portions of Search Warrant No. 1 read as follows:
It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned after examining oath
(sic) MSGT. Ranulfo T. Villamor, Jr. and his witnesses (sic) Pfc. Arthur M. Alcoran
and Pat. Leon T. Quindo that there is probable cause to believe that possession
and control of Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has been committed or is
about to be committed and that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe
that marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes, joint has in possession and/or control
at Tama's Room (Rgt. side lst Floor) located at Nono-Limbaga Drive, Tanjay,
Neg. Or. which is/are:
X (Subject of the offense stated above
(Stolen or embezzled or other proceeds of fruits of the offense;
X (Used or intended to be used as means of committing an offense.

You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time of the day
(night) of the room of Tama Silva residence of his father Comedes Silva to
open (sic) aparadors, lockers, cabinets, cartoons, containers, forthwith seize and
take possession of the following property Marijuana dried leaves, cigarettes,
joint and bring the said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs. 3
In the course of the search, the serving officers also seized money belonging to Antonieta Silva
in the amount of P1,231.40.
On June 16, 1986, Antonieta Silva filed a motion for the return of the said amount on the
grounds that the search warrant only authorized the serving officers to seize marijuana dried
leaves, cigarettes and joint, and that said officers failed or refused to make a return of the said
search warrant in gross violation of Section 11, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 4
Acting on said motion, Judge Ontal issued an Order dated July 1, 1986, stating that the court
"holds in abeyance the disposition of the said amount of P1,231.40 pending the filing of
appropriate charges in connection with the search warrant." 5
On July 28, 1987, petitioners filed a motion to quash Search Warrant No. 1 on the grounds that
(1) it was issued on the sole basis of a mimeographed "Application for Search Warrant" and
"Deposition of Witness", which were accomplished by merely filling in the blanks and (2) the
judge failed to personally examine the complainant and witnesses by searching questions and
answers in violation of Section 3, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. 6
On August 11, 1987, respondent trial court, through Judge Eugenio M. Cruz, who, by then, had
replaced retired Judge Ontal, issued an Order denying the motion for lack of merit, finding the
requisites necessary for the issuance of a valid search warrant duly complied with. 7
A motion for reconsideration dated September 1, 1987 filed by petitioners was likewise denied
by Judge Cruz in an order dated October 19, 1987.
Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.
Petitioners allege that the issuance of Search Warrant No. 1 was tainted with illegality and that
respondent Judge should be viewed to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when he issued the Order
dated August 11, 1987, denying their motion to quash Search Warrant No, 1.
We rule for petitioners.
Section 2, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to personal
liberty and security of homes against unreasonable searches and seizures. This section
provides:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for

any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against unlawful searches and seizures is to prevent
violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful invasion of the sanctity of the
home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction, and to give remedy
against such usurpations when attempted. 8
Thus, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court provide for the requisites for the
issuance of a search warrant, to wit:
SEC. 3. Requisite for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue
but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the things to be seized.
SEC. 4. Examination of complainant; record. The judge must, before issuing
the warrant, personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers,
in writing and under oath the complainant and any witnesses he may produce on
facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn statements
together with any affidavits submitted.
Based on the aforecited constitutional and statutory provisions, the judge must, before issuing a
search warrant, determine whether there is probable cause by examining the complainant and
witnesses through searching questions and answers.
In the case of Prudente vs. Dayrit, G.R. No. 82870, December 14, 1989, 180 SCRA 69, 767 this
Court defined "probable cause" as follows:
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched". This
probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the
complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
In the case at bar, we have carefully examined the questioned search warrant as well as the
"Application for Search Warrant" and "Deposition of Witness", and found that Judge Ontal failed
to comply with the legal requirement that he must examine the applicant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers in order to determine the existence of probable
cause. The joint "Deposition of Witness" executed by Pfc. Alcoran and Pat. Quindo, which was
submitted together with the "Application for Search Warrant" contained, for the most part

suggestive questions answerable by merely placing "yes" or "no" in the blanks provided
thereon. In fact there were only four (4) questions asked, to wit:
Q Do you personally know M/Sgt. Ranulfo Villamor, Jr. the
applicant for a search warrant?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you have personal knowledge that the said premises subject
of the offense stated above, and other proceeds of fruit of the
offense, used or obtain (sic) or intended to be used as means of
committing an offense?
A Yes, sir.
Q Do you know personally who is/are the person who has/have
the property in his/their possession and control?
A Yes, sir.
Q How did you know all this (sic) things?
A Through discreet surveillance. 9
The above deposition did not only contain leading questions but it was also very broad. The
questions propounded to the witnesses were in fact, not probing but were merely routinary. The
deposition was already mimeogragphed and all that the witnesses had to do was fill in their
answers on the blanks provided.
In the case of Nolasco vs. Pao, G.R. No. 69803, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 152, 163, this
Court held:
The "probable cause" required to justify the issuance of a search warrant
comprehends such facts and circumstances as will induce a cautious man to rely
upon them and act in pursuant thereof. Of the 8 questions asked, the 1st, 2nd
and 4th pertain to identity. The 3rd and 5th are leading not searching questions.
The 6th, 7th and 8th refer to the description of the personalities to be seized,
which is identical to that in the Search Warrant and suffers from the same lack of
particularity. The examination conducted was general in nature and merely
repetitious of the deposition of said witness. Mere generalization will not suffice
and does not satisfy the requirements or probable cause upon which a warrant
may issue.
Likewise, in the Prudente case cited earlier, this Court declared the search warrant issued as
invalid due to the failure of the judge to examine the witness in the form of searching questions
and answers. Pertinent portion of the decision reads:

Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florencio Angeles shows that it


was too brief and short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of
searching questions and answers". On the contrary, the questions asked were
leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no" answer. As held inQuintero vs.
NBI, "the questions propounded by respondent Executive Judge to the
applicant's witness' are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant,
and conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the
requirements for issuance of a valid search warrant. 10
Thus, in issuing a search warrant, the judge must strictly comply with the constitutional and
statutory requirement that he must determine the existence of probable cause by personally
examining the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. His
failure to comply with this requirement constitutes grave abuse of discretion. As declared
in Marcelo vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-29077, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 657, "the capricious
disregard by the judge in not complying with the requirements before issuance of search
warrants constitutes abuse of discretion".
The officers implementing the search warrant clearly abused their authority when they seized
the money of Antonieta Silva. This is highly irregular considering that Antonieta Silva was not
even named as one of the respondents, that the warrant did not indicate the seizure of money
but only of marijuana leaves, cigarettes and joints, and that the search warrant was issued for
the seizure of personal property (a) subject of the offense and (b) used or intended to be used
as means of committing an offense and NOT for personal property stolen or embezzled or other
proceeds of fruits of the offense. Thus, the then presiding Judge Ontal likewise abused his
discretion when he rejected the motion of petitioner Antonieta Silva seeking the return of her
seized money.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. Search Warrant No. 1 is hereby declared null and void.
Respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Negros Oriental, Branch XXXIII is directed to
order the return to petitioner Antonieta Silva of the amount of P1,231.40 which had earlier been
seized from her by virtue of the illegal search warrant. This decision is immediately executory.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
DR. NEMESIO E. PRUDENTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE JUDGE ABELARDO M. DAYRIT, RTC Manila, Branch 33 and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Francisco SB Acejas III, Oscar S. Atencio, Rodolfo M. Capocyan, Ernesto P. Fernandez,
Romulo B. Macalintal, Rodrigo H. Melchor, Rudegelio D. Tacorda Virgilio L. Valle and Luciano
D. Valencia for petitioner.

PADILLA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge dated 9
March 1988 which denied the petitioner's motion to quash Search Warrant No. 87-14, as well as
his order dated 20 April 1988 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the earlier order.
It appears that on 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the Intelligence
Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District (WPD) filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33, presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals. an application 1 for the issuance of a search warrant,
docketed therein as SEARCH WARRANT NO. 87-14, for VIOLATION OF PD NO. 1866 (Illegal
Possession of Firearms, etc.) entitled "People of the Philippines, Plaintiff, versus Nemesis E.
Prudente, Defendant." In his application for search warrant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw
alleged, among others, as follows:
1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE who may be found at the Polytechnic University of the
Philippines, Anonas St. Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or
possession firearms, explosives handgrenades and ammunition which are
illegally possessed or intended to be used as the means of committing an
offense which the said NEMESIO PRUDENTE is keeping and concealing at the
following premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, to wit:
a. Offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the
ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor;
b. Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second
Floor and other rooms at the second floor;
2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact, and
therefore, believes that a Search Warrant should be issued to enable the
undersigned or any agent of the law to take possession and bring to this
Honorable Court the following described properties:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades; and,
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
In support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, OIC of
the Intelligence Section of (ISAD) executed a "Deposition of Witness" dated 31 October 1987,
subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge. In his deposition, P/Lt. Florenio Angeles
declared, inter alia, as follows:

Q: Do you know P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, the applicant for a


Search Warrant?
A: Yes, sir, he is the Chief, Intelligence and Special Action
Division, Western Police District.
Q: Do you know the premises of Polytechnic University of the
Philippines at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila
A: Yes, sir, the said place has been the subject of our surveillance
and observation during the past few days.
Q: Do you have personal knowledge that in the said premises is
kept the following properties subject of the offense of violation of
PD No. 1866 or intended to be used as a means of committing an
offense:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunitions;
b. .38 and 45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and handgrenades; and d. Assorted weapons with ammunitions?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Do you know who is or who are the person or persons who has
or have control of the above-described premises?
A: Yes sir, it is Dr. Nemesio Prudente, President of the Polytechnic
University of the Philippines.
Q: How do you know that said property is subject of the offense of
violation of Pres. Decree No. 1866 or intended to be used as the
means of committing an offense?
A: Sir, as a result of our continuous surveillance conducted for
several days, we gathered information from verified sources that
the holder of said firearms and explosives as well as ammunitions
aren't licensed to possess said firearms and ammunition. Further,
the premises is a school and the holders of these firearms are not
students who were not supposed to possess firearms, explosives
and ammunition.
On the same day, 31 October 1987, respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 87-14, 3 the
pertinent portions of which read as follows:

It appearing to the satisfaction of the undersigned, after examining under oath


applicant ALLADIN M. DIMAGMALIW and his witness FLORENIO C. ANGELES
that there are good and sufficient reasons to believe (probable cause) that
NEMESIO PRUDENTE has in his control in the premises of Polytechnic
University of the Philippines, Anonas St., Sta. Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila,
properties which are subject of the above offense or intended to be used as the
means of committing the said offense.
You are hereby commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day
or night of the premises of Polytechnic University of the Philippines, more
particularly (a) offices of the Department of Military Science and Tactics at the
ground floor and other rooms at the ground floor; (b) office of the President, Dr.
Nemesio Prudente at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor,
and forthwith seize and take possession of the following personal properties, to
wit:
a. M 16 Armalites with ammunition;
b. .38 and .45 Caliber handguns and pistols;
c. explosives and hand grenades; and
d. assorted weapons with ammunitions.
and bring the above described properties to the undersigned to be dealt with as
the law directs.
On 1 November 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was enforced by some
200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre, Deputy Superintendent, WPD, and
P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander.
In his affidavit, 4 dated 2 November 1987, Ricardo Abando y Yusay, a member of the searching
team, alleged that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's
office a bulging brown envelope with three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades separately
wrapped with old newspapers, classified by P/Sgt. J.L. Cruz as follows (a) one (1) pc.M33
Fragmentation hand grenade (live); (b) one (11) pc.M26 Fragmentation hand grenade (live);
and (c) one (1) pc.PRB423 Fragmentation hand grenade (live).
On 6 November 1987, petitioner moved to quash the search warrant. He claimed that (1) the
complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles, had no personal knowledge of the facts
which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said
witness was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search warrant was a
general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly describe the place to be searched and
that it failed to charge one specific offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of
Circular No. 19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under oath that the
issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent. 5

The applicant, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw thru the Chief, Inspectorate and Legal Affairs
Division, WPD, opposed the motion. 6 After petitioner had filed his reply 7 to the opposition, he
filed a supplemental motion to quash. 8
Thereafter, on 9 March 1988, respondent Judge issued an order, 9denying the petitioner's
motion and supplemental motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration 10 was
likewise denied in the order 11 dated 20 April 1988.
Hence, the present recourse, petitioner alleging that respondent Judge has decided a question
of substance in a manner not in accord with law or applicable decisions of the Supreme Court,
or that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion tantamount to excess of jurisdiction,
in issuing the disputed orders.
For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be determined
personally by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized. 12 The probable cause must be in connection with one specific
offense 13 and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine in the form of
searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and any witness
he may produce, on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted. 14
The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet arid prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the offense are in the
place sought to be searched." 15 This probable cause must be shown to be within the personal
knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere
hearsay. 16
Petitioner assails the validity of Search Warrant No. 87-14 on the ground that it was issued on
the basis of facts and circumstances which were not within the personal knowledge of the
applicant and his witness but based on hearsay evidence. In his application for search warrant,
P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw stated that "he has been informed" that Nemesio Prudente "has in
his control and possession" the firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has
verified the report and found it to be a fact." On the other hand, in his supporting deposition,
P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several
days, they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the said fire arms
and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other words, the applicant and his witness
had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing
the questioned search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through information from
other sources or persons.
While it is true that in his application for search warrant, applicant P/Major Dimagmaliw stated
that he verified the information he had earlier received that petitioner had in his possession and
custody the t there is nothing in the record to show or indicate how and when said applicant
verified the earlier information acquired by him as to justify his conclusion that he found such
information to be a fact. He might have clarified this point if there had been searching questions

and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no questions and answers, whether
searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.
What the records show is the deposition of witness, P/Lt. Angeles, as the only support to
P/Major Dimagmaliw's application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. For, it avers
that they (presumably, the police authorities) had conducted continuous surveillance for several
days of the suspected premises and, as a result thereof, they "gathered information from
verified sources" that the holders of the subject firearms and explosives are not licensed to
possess them.
In Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance, 17 this Court laid the following test in determining whether
the allegations in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition, are based on
personal knowledge or not
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a
search warrant is whether it has been drawn in a manner that perjury could be
charged thereon and the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the
applicant for search warrant, and/or his witnesses, not of the facts merely
reported by a person whom one considers to be reliable.
Tested by the above standard, the allegations of the witness, P/Lt. Angeles, in his deposition, do
not come up to the level of facts of his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be held
liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned search warrant.
In the same Alvarez case, 18 the applicant stated that his purpose for applying for a search
warrant was that: "It had been reported to me by a person whom I consider to be reliable that
there are being kept in said premises books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other papers
used by him in connection with his activities as a money lender, challenging usurious rate of
interests, in violation of law." The Court held that this was insufficient for the purpose of issuing
a search warrant.
In People vs. Sy Juco, 19 where the affidavit contained an allegation that there had been a report
to the affiant by a person whom lie considered reliable that in said premises were "fraudulent
books, correspondence and records," this was likewise held as not sufficient for the purpose of
issuing a search warrant. Evidently, the allegations contained in the application of P/ Major
Alladin Dimagmaliw and the declaration of P/Lt. Florenio C. Angeles in his deposition were
insufficient basis for the issuance of a valid search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case:
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and
seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause.
Besides, respondent Judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by the Rules
of Court. As held inRoan v. Gonzales, 20 "(m)ere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses

are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach them to the record."
Moreover, a perusal of the deposition of P/Lt. Florenio Angeles shows that it was too brief and
short. Respondent Judge did not examine him "in the form of searching questions and
answers." On the contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or
"no" answer. As held in Quintero vs. NBI," 21 the questions propounded by respondent Executive
Judge to the applicant's witness are not sufficiently searching to establish probable cause.
Asking of leading questions to the deponent in an application for search warrant, and
conducting of examination in a general manner, would not satisfy the requirements for issuance
of a valid search warrant."
Manifestly, in the case at bar, the evidence failed to show the existence of probable cause to
justify the issuance of the search warrant. The Court also notes post facto that the search in
question yielded, no armalites, handguns, pistols, assorted weapons or ammunitions as stated
in the application for search warrant, the supporting deposition, and the search warrant the
supporting hand grenades were itself Only three (3) live fragmentation found in the searched
premises of the PUP, according to the affidavit of an alleged member of the searching party.
The Court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of
"probable cause" in the valid issuance of a search warrant, as enunciated in earlier cases. True,
these requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional right of the
individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both meaningful and effective.
Petitioner also assails the validity of the search warrant on the ground that it failed to particularly
describe the place to be searched, contending that there were several rooms at the ground floor
and the second floor of the PUP.
The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant
can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and Identify the place intended . 22 In the case at bar, the
application for search warrant and the search warrant itself described the place to be searched
as the premises of the Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta.
Mesa, Sampaloc, Manila more particularly, the offices of the Department of Military Science and
Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP,
Second Floor and other rooms at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched
sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search warrant must particularly
describe the place to be searched, even if there were several rooms at the ground floor and
second floor of the PUP.
Petitioner next attacks the validity of the questioned warrant, on the ground that it was issued in
violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in connection with one specific
offense. The search warrant issued by respondent judge, according to petitioner, was issued
without any reference to any particular provision of PD No. 1866 that was violated when
allegedly P.D. No. 1866 punishes several offenses.
In Stonehill vs. Diokno, 23 Where the warrants involved were issued upon applications stating
that the natural and juridical persons therein named had committed a "violation of Central Bank

Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code," the Court
held that no specific offense had been alleged in the applications for a search warrant, and that
it would be a legal hearsay of the highest order to convict anybody of a "Violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue Code and Revised Penal Code" without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws and codes.
In the present case, however, the application for search warrant was captioned: "For Violation of
PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.) While the said decree punishes several
offenses, the alleged violation in this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of
firearms, etc." As explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions and
explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the specific offense of illegal
possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the failure of the search warrant to mention the
particular provision of PD No. 1-866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its
invalidation on this score. Besides, while illegal possession of firearms is penalized under
Section 1 of PD No. 1866 and illegal possession of explosives is penalized under Section 3
thereof, it cannot be overlooked that said decree is a codification of the various laws on illegal
possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives; such illegal possession of items
destructive of life and property are related offenses or belong to the same species, as to be
subsumed within the category of illegal possession of firearms, etc. under P.D. No. 1866. As
observed by respondent Judge: 24
The grammatical syntax of the phraseology comparative with the title of PD 1866
can only mean that illegal possession of firearms, ammunitions and explosives,
have been codified under Section 1 of said Presidential Decree so much so that
the second and third are forthrightly species of illegal possession of firearms
under Section (1) thereof It has long been a practice in the investigative and
prosecution arm of the government, to designate the crime of illegal possession
of firearms, ammunitions and explosives as 'illegal possession of firearms, etc.'
The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not recognize
the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession of firearms, one warrant
for illegal possession of ammunitions, and another for illegal possession of
explosives. Neither is the filing of three different informations for each of the
above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of Court. The usual practice adopted by
the courts is to file a single information for illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions. This practice is considered to be in accordance with Section 13,
Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides that: 'A
complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases
in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various
offenses. Describably, the servers did not search for articles other than firearms,
ammunitions and explosives. The issuance of Search Warrant No. 87-14 is
deemed profoundly consistent with said rule and is therefore valid and
enforceable. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, in connection with the petitioner's contention that the failure of the applicant to state,
under oath, the urgent need for the issuance of the search warrant, his application having been
filed on a Saturday, rendered the questioned warrant invalid for being violative of this Court's
Circular No. 19, dated 14 August 1987, which reads:

3. Applications filed after office hours, during Saturdays, Sundays and holidays
shall likewise be taken cognizance of and acted upon by any judge of the court
having jurisdiction of the place to be searched, but in such cases the applicant
shall certify and state the facts under oath, to the satisfaction of the judge, that
the issuance is urgent.
it would suffice to state that the above section of the circular merely provides for a guideline,
departure from which would not necessarily affect the validity of an otherwise valid search
warrant.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the petition is GRANTED. The questioned orders
dated 9 March 1988 and 20 April 1988 as well as Search Warrant No. 87-14 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The three (3) live fragmentation hand grenades which, according to Ricardo Y. Abando, a
member of the searching team, were seized in the washroom of petitioner's office at the PUP,
are ordered delivered to the Chief, Philippine Constabulary for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, finding appellant Benhur
Mamaril guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8 [1] of Republic Act (RA) No.
6425, as amended by RA No. 7659.
The Information filed against appellant reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1999 and sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of
Lingayen, province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, willfully, unlawfully and criminally [did] keep and possess
crushed marijuana leaves contained in seventy eight (78) sachets with a total weight of two
hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth (236.83) grams and two (2) bricks of marijuana
fruiting tops weighing one thousand six hundred grams, each brick weighing eight hundred
(800) grams, with a total weight of one thousand eight hundred thirty six and eighty three
hundredth (1,836.83) grams, a prohibited drug, without authority to possess the same.
CONTRARY to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.[2]
When arraigned on October 8, 1999, appellant pleaded not guilty.[3] At the pre-trial
conference held on October 18, 1999, the parties admitted the following facts:

1.

That the search was made in the house and premises of the parents of the
accused where he (accused) also lives, at Ramos St., Lingayen, Pangasinan, on
February 1, 1999 at about 2:30 o clock in the afternoon;

2.

That the search was conducted by the elements of the PNP particularly SPO4
Faustino Ferrer, SPO1 Alfredo Rico and others;

3.

That the policemen brought along with them a camera;

4.

That the accused was in the balcony of the house when it was searched;

5.

The existence of the report of physical science report No. (DT-077-99) issued by
the PNP Crime Laboratory through Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid;

6.

That accused was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2, 1999.[4]

Thereafter, trial ensued.


The Prosecutions Evidence
On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police Station,
represented by SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda, applied[5] before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 39, for a search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana, a prohibited
drug, at the family residence of appellant Benhur Mamaril, situated at Ramos Street, Poblacion,
Lingayen, Pangasinan. On said date, then presiding Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos (now
retired) issued Search Warrant No. 99-51.[6]
On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 p.m., the Chief of Police of the Lingayen Police Station,
SPO3 Alfredo Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police officers went to the residence of
appellant and implemented Search Warrant No. 99-51. When they arrived at appellants house,
they saw appellants mother under the house. They asked her where appellant was, and she
told them that appellant was in the house, upstairs. When they went upstairs, they saw
appellant coming out of the room. Upon seeing the policemen, appellant turned back and tried
to run towards the back door. SPO3 Rico told appellant to stop, which appellant did. SPO3 Rico
informed appellant that they had a search warrant to search the house premises. They showed
appellant and his mother the search warrant. Appellant looked at the search warrant and did
not say anything. Thereafter, the policemen searched the house. The search was witnessed by
two members of the barangay council in said area, namely, Barangay Kagawad Leonardo
Ramos and Barangay Tanod Valentino Quintos, whom the police brought with them.[7]
The searching team confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a buri bag (bayong) under
appellants house; (2) three heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves
and seeds contained in an eye-glass case; (3) twenty-two (22) heat-sealed plastic sachets
containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc
chair; and (4) two (2) bricks of suspected marijuana contained inside a white and gray bag
found inside the closet of appellants room. SPO3 Alfredo Rico took pictures [8] of the confiscated

items and prepared a receipt[9] of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. prepared a
certification[10] that the house was properly searched, which was signed by appellant and the
barangay officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers brought
appellant and the confiscated articles to the Lingayen Police Station and turned them over to the
desk officer.[11]
The next day, on February 2, 1999, police officers Alfredo Rico, Alberto Santiago and
Rodolfo Madrid brought the confiscated articles to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Florendo, San
Fernando, La Union for examination. Appellant was also brought there for a drug test.[12]
Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, forensic chemist and head of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, Regional Office I, Camp Florendo, Parian, San Fernando City, La Union,
testified that on February 2, 1999, she received from the Chief of Police of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, a request[13] for a drug test on the person of appellant Benhur Mamaril and a
laboratory examination of the confiscated specimens. [14] After weighing the specimens and
testing the same, Police Superintendent Cid issued a report [15] finding the specimens[16] to be
POSITIVE to the test for the presence of marijuana x x x.[17]
Moreover, Police Superintendent Cid affirmed the findings in her report [18] that the
examination conducted on the urine sample of appellant was positive for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride known as shabu.[19]
After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary exhibits on March 5,
2000, appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with memorandum [20] contending that: (1)
the exhibits of the prosecution are inadmissible in evidence under Section 2 and Section 3
(2) of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which
said exhibits were seized, was illegally issued, considering that the judges examination of the
complainant and his two witnesses was not in writing; and (2) said search warrant was illegally
or improperly implemented. Appellant prayed that all the exhibits of the prosecution be excluded
as evidence or in the alternative, that the resolution of the admissibility of the same be deferred
until such time that he has completed the presentation of his evidence in chief. On August 25,
2000, the prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court denied appellants motion.[21]
The Defenses Evidence
Appellant Benhur Mamaril, 31, single, laborer, denied that he was residing at his parents
house at Ramos Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan since he has been residing at a rented house at
Barangay Matic-matic, Sta. Barabara, Pangasinan since December 18, 1998. Appellant
declared that on February 1, 1999, it was his brother and the latters family who were residing
with his mother at Ramos Street, but on said day, his brother and family were not in the house
since they were at the fishpond.[22]
Appellant testified that on February 1, 1999, he was at his parents house at Ramos Street,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, because he and his live-in partner visited his mother on said day and
arrived there at 10:00 a.m. At about 2:00 p.m. of February 1, 1999, while appellant was at the
back of his parents house, about seven to nine policemen, in civilian clothes, arrived. The
policemen asked appellant to go upstairs and they immediately handcuffed him and brought him

to the balcony of the house. He stayed at the balcony until the search was finished after more
than 30 minutes. Thereafter, he was brought to the clinic of one Dr. Felix and a medical
examination was conducted on him. Then he was brought to the municipal hall.[23]
Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray and white bag
containing suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the search when he was at the
balcony of their house. He also testified that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first
time while he was testifying in court. He admitted that the signature on the certification that the
house was properly searched was his.[24]
Moreover, appellant testified that in the early morning of February 2, 1999, he was brought
to the PNP Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where he gave his urine sample.
Appellant insinuated that the confiscated items were only planted because he had a
misunderstanding with some policemen in Lingayen. However, he admitted that the policemen
who searched his parents house did not threaten or harm him in any way and he had no
misunderstanding with SPO3 Alfredo Rico.[25]
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39, Lingayen, Pangasinan, was
requested to testify on the available records regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51 on file in the
trial court and to identify said documents. Atty. Castillo testified that he only had with him the
application for search warrant, the supporting affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado
Fernandez and the return of the search warrant.[26]
Atty. Enrico declared that before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court, the person
supposed to be in custody of any transcript of the searching questions and answers made by
Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos in connection with the application for Search Warrant No.
99-51 was Mrs. Liberata Ariston, who was then a legal researcher and at the same time OICBranch Clerk of Court. However, during the trial of this case, Mrs. Liberata Ariston was in the
United States of America. Atty. Enrico averred that he asked Mrs. Liberata Aristons daughter,
Catherine Ramirez, who is a court stenographer, about said transcript, but it has not been
found. Atty. Enrico testified that based on the records, there is no stenographic notes. He
added that they tried their best to locate the subject transcript, but they could not find it.[27]
The Trial Courts Decision
On January 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
accused of the crime of possession of marijuana defined and penalized under Section 8 of RA
6425, as amended, this Court in the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby
sentences said accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000), plus costs of this suit.
The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in
service of his sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.[28]
The Appeal
Appellant contends that the trial court made the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE
ARTICLES ALLEGEDLY SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT
SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-51 WAS ILLEGALLY ISSUED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS TOTALLY INADMISSIBLE
THE INVENTORIED ARTICLES IN THE RECEIPT OF SEIZED PROPERTY AND THE
CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATION ISSUED THERETO (EXHS. J AND I) SINCE THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT ASSISTED BY COUNSEL WHEN HE SIGNED THE SAME.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE THE FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.[29]
Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51 was illegally
issued considering that there was no evidence showing that the required searching questions
and answers were made anent the application for said search warrant. Appellant pointed out
that Branch Clerk of Court Enrico O. Castillo testified that based on the records, there was no
transcript of stenographic notes of the proceedings in connection with the application for said
search warrant. Appellant thus asserts that it cannot be said that the judge made searching
questions upon the alleged applicant and his witnesses, which is in violation of Section 2, Article
III of the Constitution and Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
Appellants contention is meritorious.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III,
Section 2, of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable,
and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge
after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which
may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the warrant,
personally examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath,
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding
of probable cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place sought to be searched.[30] In determining the existence of probable cause, it is required
that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and his witnesses personally; (2) the
examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in writing in the form
of searching questions and answers.[31]
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, who was requested to testify on the available records kept in their office regarding
Search Warrant No. 99-51, presented before the court only the application for search
warrant[32] and the supporting affidavits[33] of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez.
Atty. Castillo could not produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his witnesses
showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in
writing as required by law. Atty. Castillo testified, thus:
xxx

xxx
xxx

Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of the
proceedings of a searching questions and answers made by the Executive Judge
upon the complainant as well as the two (2) witnesses not only in connection with
application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those application covered by that
record namely, 99-49, 99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-54?

Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic notes.

Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata Ariston
about said transcript?

I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday and she
told me that she will try to find on (sic) the said transcript.

But until now there is no transcript yet?

Yes, sir.

Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the records of
this case together with the application for search warrant as well as the supporting
affidavit of the said application, but there is no records available to have it with you
and there is no proof with you?

Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store room
which they placed is topsy turvy and all the records are scattered. So, we are
having a hard time in scanning the records, sir.

But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate said
transcript, Mr. Witness?

Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said
transcript.

You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes?

No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.

That is by a machine steno?

Yes, sir.

Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who are using
the machine steno to identify what cases does that stenographic notes (sic)?

Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the
transcript of stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant No. 99-49 to 9954.[34] (Underscoring ours)

Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to
prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant
and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search
warrant. The records only show the existence of an application[35] for a search warrant and the
affidavits[36] of the complainants witnesses. In Mata v. Bayona,[37] we held:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining
Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
and to attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.

We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to
the record, rendering the search warrant invalid.
We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing judge
examined under oath, in the form of searching questions and answers, the applicant SPO2
Chito S. Esmenda and his witnesses on January 25, 1999 as it is so stated in Search Warrant
No. 99-51. Although it is possible that Judge Ramos examined the complainant and his
witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, the fact remains that there is no
evidence that the examination was put into writing as required by law. Otherwise, the
depositions in writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the
record, together with the affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court. Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor
General that the subject stenographic notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of
Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court because of the confused state of the records
in the latters branch when he assumed office.
The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to
question the legality of the search because he did not protest against it, and even admitted
during his testimony that he was neither threatened nor maltreated by the policemen who
searched their residence.
We disagree. The cases[38] cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless search. In
this case, the police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant before his residence
was searched. At that time, appellant could not determine if the search warrant was issued in
accordance with the law. It was only during the trial of this case that appellant, through his
counsel, had reason to believe that the search warrant was illegally issued causing appellant to
file a motion with memorandum objecting to the admissibility of the evidence formally offered by
the prosecution. In People v. Burgos,[39] we ruled:
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to
be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that
the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the
existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the
right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object
to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia
v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia
v. Locsin (supra):
xxx
x

xx
xxx

x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the
courts do not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force,
or waiving his constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search
or seizure is not a consent, or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for
the supremacy of the law. (56 C.J., pp.1180, 1181).

We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of
fundamental constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458).
In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the
search warrant as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover, appellant
seasonably objected[40] on constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized
pursuant to said warrant during the trial of the case,[41] after the prosecution formally offered its
evidence.[42] Under the circumstances, no intent to waive his rights can reasonably be inferred
from his conduct before or during the trial.
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure
cannot validate an invalid warrant.[43] In Mata v. Bayona,[44] we ruled:
.[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal
requisites. It might be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc.
vs. Herrera:
It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more
essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the
exemption of his private affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While
the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and
the law enforced without transgressing the constitutional rights of the citizens, for the
enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify indifference to the basic principles
of government.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the
Constitution and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the
individual to prevent stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured
by the Constitution. No presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when
an officer undertakes to justify it.
We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the
complainant and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of
searching questions and answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid.
Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in
evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3 (2),[45] Article III of the Constitution.
It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to exclude the
evidence seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant.
Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to sustain the
conviction of appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch
39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, is REVERSED andSET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Search Warrant No. 99-51 NULL and VOID and the search and seizure made at

appellants residence illegal. For lack of evidence to establish appellants guilt beyond
reasonable
doubt,
appellant
BENHUR
MAMARIL
is
hereby ACQUITTEDand
ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal grounds.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMPLEMENT without delay this
Decision and to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date
appellant was actually released from confinement.
The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is
hereby directed to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper
disposition.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

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