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THE
IN BURMA
CAMPAIGN
By Horace
S. Sewell
north
from
Burma.
Sultan's
Lieutenant-General
and
forces
a Chinese
expeditionary
force
have
now
The first part of our mission therefore has been completed and it will not be long
before Brigadier-General Pick's United States Engineers will have the road ready for
tra?ne. This has been achieved through a truly inter-Allied, inter-service effort.
The air supply route to China is assured. With the rapid development of airfields
at Myitkyina,
the Allied
advance
this
route
is carrying
an
ever-increasing
volume
of
traffic.
In
addition,
to the
to Mandalay.
The advance of the Fifteenth Corps under Lieutenant General Christison, assisted
on the Arakan coast materially contributed to the overfall difficul
by the air and navy,
ties of the Japanese positions in Burma.
The fine fighting qualities and high morale of all the forces engaged in this great
?
I
the utter defeat of Japan ?
effort made victory certain. In the task still before us
am confident the same qualities will be shown by all and that final success will be
ours.
at
Slim's Fourteenth
William
of Lieutenant-General
victories
Army
under
and the advance of the Fifteenth
and
Kohima,
Army
Corps
Imphal
to which Admiral Mount
in Arakan,
Lieutenant-General
Philip Christison
The
THE CAMPAIGN
IN BURMA
497
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
498
batten refers in his Order of the Day, though only a part of the campaign, were
main factors in the liberation of northern Burma. Unless
the Japanese Army
the American,
had been fully engaged in other directions,
British and Chinese
Stilwell would not have been able to
forces under the leadership of General
move
into Burma from the north.
To appreciate how the battles that were fought by the Fourteenth
Army and
the Fifteenth
the situation of
Army Corps set the pattern for the campaign,
and the peculiarities
the opposing
forces in the winter of 1943-1944
of the
be
influenced
the
should
considered.
and
conduct
country
planning
Topography
of the campaign
in Burma to a greater extent than in any other theater of war.
in their central position,
The Japanese,
had good road, rail and river com
munications.
The Allies had to rely on the Assam railway for their main opera
18 miles
south of
tions, and on the railhead of the Eastern
railway
Bengal
in
Arakan.
for
for
the
General
Stilwell's
forces
Chittagong
Supplies
operations
also had to be sent by the Assam railway, which runs parallel to the front and
too close behind it for safety. This strategical weakness
in the Allied position
never
in
the
the
battle
necessi
Assam,
though
exploited by
during
Japanese,
r?le.
tated leaving some fighting troops along the railway in a defensive
of climate and rainfall affected the planning
Local and seasonal variations
and timing of operations. High mountains
covered with thick jungle separate
shores of the Bay of Bengal. For five
Burma
and the Arakan
from Assam
?
to September
the southwest monsoon
of the year ?'May
months
blows in
and during this period the
from the Indian Ocean across the Bay of Bengal,
rainfall is very heavy. In Arakan
the annual rainfall varies from 100 to 240
on the Assam
to locality;
in many places in the mountains
inches according
of this rain falls during the
Burma border it is more than 100 inches. Most
over the Japanese
monsoon
season. The Allies had one great advantage
in
and the greatest possible use was made of it.
Burma. They had air superiority,
All Allied plans were based on supplying
large forces from the air and on the
over long distances, whereas
reserve
air
of
the
formations
transfer
by
rapid
men.
were
use
and
the
of
this
method
of
denied
moving
Japanese
supplies
The plans for the 1943-1944 Burma campaign approved at the Ottawa Con
to the South East Asia
ference, when Admiral Mountbatten's
appointment
Command was announced,
included amphibious
These,
however,
operations.
intended for southeast Asia
had to be cancelled,
for the vessels and material
were wanted
in Europe and were actually used at Anzio and in Normandy.
New plans had to be framed on a less ambitious
scale, and to conform with
these the following tasks were laid down for the Fourteenth
Army by General
the Eleventh
Sir George GifFard, who was then commanding
Army Group,
which comprised all Allied
land forces of the South East Asia Command:
(1)
to the
in north Burma
Hold
the frontiers of Bengal and Assam.
(2) Advance
to the Buthidaung-Maung
in Arakan
line Mogaung-Myitkyina.
(3) Advance
daw
road.
in
the Fifteenth
these tasks General
Slim had available
Army Corps
the Fourth Corps in Assam, and General Stilwell's Chinese-American
Arakan,
forces in the Ledo area. These Chinese-American
troops had been placed under
the operational
command of the Fourteenth
Army and were to remain so until
was
that they would combine
when
it
had
they
planned
occupied Kamaing,
on the Salween River. General
StilwelPs
with
the Chinese
forces operating
forces (five Chinese divisions, one American
brigade and the British Fort Hertz
For
THE CAMPAIGN
IN BURMA
5oo
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Tanahashi
road behind
the 5th Division.
Bawli-Maungdaw
accomplished
and at the same time the main Japanese forces launched
both these objectives,
a frontal assault against the 7th Division
to force it back on the Nechadauk
in the
this succeeded,
the division would have been annihilated
Pass. Had
on
to
with
the
Division
the
would
then
have
deal
and
Pass,
enemy
gone
5th
inmuch the same way by forcing it back onto the road-block,
south of Bawli.
on Chittagong;
to march
and when British
then intended
The Japanese
reserves had been drawn to that area, their main attack from the Chindwin
the 7th Division
stood firm and even
against Assam was to start. However,
with minimum
its
front
and the 5th Division,
took the offensive,
holding
this action both divi
with the 7th. During
forces, reopened communications
sions were supplied from the air.
if needed,
The 26th Division moved
up to Bawli ready to counterattack,
from India replaced the 26th in army reserve.
and the 36th British Division
force was caught between
the
the attacking
As a result of these movements,
in the
in the south and the 26th and 36th Divisions
5th and 7th Divisions
in the
north. After bitter fighting, much of which was with bomb and bayonet
was
into
and
broken
the
force
defeated,
hills,
enemy
up
dispersed
completely
than 5,000 dead were
small parties trying to escape through the jungle. More
once passed
to the offensive
counted on the ground. The Fifteenth
Corps at
was
area
which
of
the
defended
and took the tunnel
by the enemy
Mayu Range
to
to the last. The capture of Buthidaung
and the task allotted
followed
was
General Christison's
completed.
Corps
took part in the fighting which went on for many days during the
Everyone
in and around the area occupied by the 5th and 7th
counterattack,
Japanese
the rear organization with
and
Divisions.
Transport
supply personnel defended
in
the same tenacity that British and Indian infantry held the "box" defenses
consists of three British and six Indian
front. (Each Indian Infantry Division
or Gurkha
is largely
of the divisional
The personnel
battalions.
artillery
were
of
cold-blooded
this
there
deliberate,
British.) During
examples
period,
and non-combatants
by the Japanese. A 7th Division
slaughter of wounded
field dressing station, containing more than 80 wounded, was overrun at night
hours later, a senior Japanese
and occupied
Forty-eight
by the Japanese.
orderlies and
of the doctors, medical
officer arrived and ordered the massacre
Six doctors were lined up and dispatched with a bullet through the
wounded.
and Japanese soldiers went from stretcher to
ear, the orderlies were butchered,
the wounded.
stretcher bayoneting
Ill
of the Ledo
forces covering the construction
In the north, General Stilwell's
and reached the Hukawng
road had crossed the mountains
valley early in
led the
Divisions
Chinese
and
22nd
American-trained
The
38th
1944.
January
Frank Merrill's Marauders.
advance, their flanks covered by Brigadier-General
inflicted very heavy losses on the 18th
In their first action the Chinese divisions
a
to
back
which
fell
strong position astride the Hukawng
Japanese Division,
near Kamaing. The Fort Hertz detachment
which advanced on a parallel
valley
was
route further to the east
also opposed by elements of the 18th Division.
was moved
into
Division
Indian
in
the 3rd
March,
(Wingate's Force)
Early
behind the 18th Japanese Divi
the Indaw area, 100 miles south of Kamaing,
to Indaw from Ledo and
sion. One of Wingate's
brigades had started its march
THE CAMPAIGN
IN BURMA
501
suitable
the rest of the division was flown in. Indaw was selected as the most
a force to land and cut
Three
communications.
for
landing
locality
Japanese
and Chowringhee.
places for gliders had been chosen: Piccadilly,
Broadway
in 1943, during his first
Their suitability had been noted by General Wingate
March
in
and
the
behind
lines,
1944 it was uncertain what
expedition
Japanese
state they were in. If Allied planes had visited the area enemy suspicions would
have been aroused; one plane was sent to reconnoitre, however, just before the
obstructed
division was to be flown in, and found Piccadilly
by large logs.
towed by
The whole of the advance glider force of Wingate's
Division,
was
was
to
that
site
neither
then
directed
Dakotas,
Fortunately
Broadway.
$oi
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
THE CAMPAIGN
IN BURMA
503
reinforcements
garrison at Kohima. Headquarters
through to the hard-pressed
to take
was moved
to Dimapur
from
India
of the Thirty-Third
Army Corps
area under the direction
over control of
in
the
Dimapur-Kohima
operations
the
Slim. Lieutenant-General
of General
commanding
Montagu
Stopford,
India.
Division
from
2nd
British
with
him
the
had
Thirty-Third
Corps,
had
Sum's strategical
From the start of the campaign, General
objective
but he was
Stilwell advanced;
been to draw off the Japanese while General
and when the
the frontier of Bengal and Assam,
also responsible for holding
were
of
communications
for
the
line
first
attacked
his
by the
thoughts
Japanese
Assam railway to General Stilwell's forces. The two generals met, and Stilwell
to protect the railway, pointing
offered one of his two best Chinese divisions
of this division from the Ledo road exten
that the withdrawal
out, however,
in the Hukawng
sion would compel him to abandon or postpone his operations
was refused by Slim who was reluctant to give up operations
offer
This
valley.
in the north at the moment when the whole of the Japanese Army was com
to battle. Slim took the responsibility
of directing Stilwell to continue
mitted
to Myitkyina
that the
with all possible vigor. He guaranteed
his advance
than ten days.
for more
lines of communication
would not be interrupted
Stilwell willingly
this and continued his advance with characteristic
accepted
energy.
to
Slim also decided that the 3rd Indian Division
should continue
rear
that
it
and
in
the
of
the
18th
the
Division
north,
operate against
Japanese
should come directly under General Stilwell's
command as soon as it had ad
Slim made this decision during the crisis of the battle
vanced north of Hopin.
in Assam, when the 3rd Division was in a good position to strike at the rear of
the Fifteenth Japanese Army.
of
the three divisions
The battle round Imphal was fought out between
and the
the Fourth Corps reinforced by the two brigades of the 5th Division
reinforced by elements of two more Japa
15th and 33rd Japanese Divisions,
nese and one Indian National
Kohima was relieved after bitter
Army Division.
and two brigades of the 7th
the British 2nd Division
fighting during which
the
stormed the Kohima Hills and defeated
Indian Division
and destroyed
This division attacked bravely but showed very little
31st Japanese Division.
to send a detachment
to cut the Assam
It had made no attempt
enterprise.
a
was
so.
to
it
do
when
in
railway
position
the final stages of the Japanese
attack on Imphal, General Muta
During
to carry out the last desperate
ordered
the
Division
reinforced
33rd
guchi
assault. "The fate of the Empire depends on the results of this battle," he said.
of the 33rd Division
"Imphal will be taken at all costs." The commander
on
to
his
"You
will
this
take
troops, adding:
passed
Imphal, but the division
a
will be annihilated." With
its accustomed
fierceness this division delivered
series of fanatical attacks, all of which, after bloody fighting, were held and
smashed by the 17th Division,
reinforced by a brigade of the 20th Division.
There was no pause after the defeat of the Japanese at Kohima
and Imphal;
the pursuit was kept up through the worst of the monsoon
rains. The 33rd
was driven south, first by the 17th Division
Division
and then by the 5th
while the Lushai Brigade,
Division,
supplied from the air, operated against the
enemy's flanks and rear and inflicted heavy casualties. The remnants of the
were driven back across the Chindwin
31st and 15th Divisions
by the Thirty
Third Corps.
General
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FOREIGN AFFAIRS
IV