Terminology in The Social Sciences and The Humanities

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TerminologyandDiscoursebetweentheSocialSciencesandtheHumanities
TerminologyandDiscourse
betweentheSocialSciencesandtheHumanities
RobertdeBeaugrande
[abstract]
TheepistemologyoftheWest(roughly,Europeanditssphereofinfluence)
hasbeenheavilycontentoriented.Eachknowledgedomain,rangingfroma
subject matter taught in school up to classical science, is held to consist
chieflyofacompartmentoffacts.Terminologyisnaturallyheldtobeaclear
andstraightforwardrefractionofthesefactsandoftheobjectstheyinvolve.
The role of terminology has accordingly been conceived too simply and
narrowly. Significant progress demands a new postclassical model of
discourse as a mode for accessing and constructing knowledge and hence
as antecedent rather than consequent to facts. This insight suggest a
comprehensive reseach and development plan for the coming years. If
successful, such a plan could have paradigm significance for discourse
throughoutthesciences.
Conceptscanneverberegardedaslogicalderivativesof
senseimpressions.Butdidacticandheuristicobjectives
makesuchanotioninevitable.Moral:itisimpossibleto
getanywherewithoutsinningagainstreason.
AlbertEinstein.
1.Socialscienceandhumanities:Terms,fields,discourse
1.1F.deSaussureswellknownCoursdelinguistiquegnraleremarkedover
seventy years ago that other sciences work with objects that are given in
advance,whereasinlinguisticsitwouldseemthatitistheviewpointthatcreates
theobject(1966[1916]:8).Today,wemightwanttoputthemattermoreradically:
itisnotsomuchtheviewpointbutthespecialpurposediscourseanditsrelation
totheobjectdomainthatcreatesthescienceanyscience,includinglinguistics,
butalsoanybranchofthehumanities.Thisthesis,whichpointsupthecentrality
ofLSPandterminologyresearch,ismoredisruptive,andtoappreciateitsforce,
we should continually and carefully reassess the role and function of special
purposediscourseandinparticularofterminology,itsthemostprominentsector.
http://www.beaugrande.com/TerminologyDiscourseSocialSciencesHumanities.htm
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1.2Oneplacetostartisthediscourseintendedtodefinethetermslabelingthe
domainitself.Herearetherespectivedictionarydefinitionsofsocialsciences[1]
and humanities [2] (from Websters Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, 1963:
828,404):
[1]branchesofsciencedealingwiththeinstitutionsandfunctioningofhuman
societyandtheinterpersonalrelationshipsofindividuals
[2]branchesoflearninghavingprimarilyaculturalcharacter.
To construct an opposition from these wordings, three potential distinctions
seemopportune:
1.2.1betweenscienceversuslearning.Therespectivedefinitionsofthosetwo
termsinthesamedictionary(771,480)read:
[3]knowledgeattainedthroughstudyorpracticeknowledgecoveringgeneral
truthsortheoperationofgenerallawsoneofthenaturalsciences
[4]knowledgeorskillacquiredbyinstruction,study,orexperience.
Apparently, science overlaps with learning but focuses more on general
truthsandlawsalso,thefinalsubdefinitionin[3]indicateshowtheEnglishterm
scienceispreemptedbynaturalscience,aperennialhandicapforsocialscience
(cf.4.1f).AlthoughthespecificallyEnglishtermhumanitiesmakesnoreference
to science, the corresponding term in other languages does, such as German
GeisteswissenschaftenandFrenchscienceshumaines.
1.2.2 between society versus culture. This distinction is more interesting
(4.3), but does not bear on the opposition at hand, because both concepts are
widelyacknowledgedinthesocialsciencesandthehumanitiesalike.
1.2.3betweendealingwithandhavingthecharacterof.Thisdistinctionbears
moreonmethodthanoncontent.Inconventionalviews,scienceismorelikelyto
be visualized standing apart from its object domain than are the humanities.
Echoes of these views can be detected in the diverse dictionary definitions
(Websters,202)ofculture:
[5]behaviourtypicalofagrouporclass
[6] development of intellectual and moral faculties, especially by education
enlightenment and excellence of taste acquired by intellectual and aesthetic
training.
Whereas [5] can be objectified, observed, and so on, [6] must be acquired
throughsubjectiveparticipation.
1.3. In sum, the standard dictionary definitions of the terms social sciences
and humanities do not clearly support an incisive opposition. To assess their
currentorpotentialrelationship,wemustratherturntotheirrespectivediscursive
andterminologicalpractices.
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2.Seventhesesonterminology
2.1 According to my opening thesis (1.1), the status of a domain, whether
scientificorhumanistic,hingesontheconstitutionofitsdiscourseastheprimary
mode of access to knowledge (cf. Beaugrande 1991a, b, c, d, e Beaugrande &
Dressler,inpreparation).Thisthesisopposestheconventionofscientistswhosee
knowledge as a formal or substantive absolute set apart from the means to
communicateitandwhomightclassifytheseveralsciencesbythedegreeoftheir
disengagement from discourse, ranging from mathematics, physics, and
electronics at the far end over to cultural anthropology and ethnography of
communication at the near end. But the same thesis might seem hardly
controversial in the humanities, which are after all often housed in a faculty of
letters(compareItalianFacoltdiLettere,orFrenchFacultdeLettres).
2.2.Terminologycanhelpustomakethethesismoreconcrete.Heretoo,we
canstartwithprospectivedefinitionsforthetermterminologyitself,thistimenot
commonsensicalonesfromadictionarybutfunctionalones:
2.2.1 A terminology is a specialized lexical repertory. This definition seems
solidenough,butsayslittleaboutthegenesisanduseoftherepertory.Arather
static image is projected of a selfsufficient finished product, a set of precisely
determinedanddeterminatelabelsforsomeindependentandperspicuousreality.
Thisimageisnolongertenableeveninthenaturalsciences,whereonestriking
example is the "black hole" and its circumstances, such as "event horizon",
"Schwarzschildradius",or"Hawkingevaporation".Theimageisallthemoreinept
forthesocialsciencesandthehumanities,where(asweshallsee)theconceptof
realityismoreasocialorliteraryproblemthanapredecidedconstant.
2.2.2 A terminology is a means of intervention in ordinary discourse. This
definitionprojectsamoredynamicimageofanongoingprocess,butrequiresus
to stipulate the relevant conditions and results. Some terms start out in highly
technicalusageforconspicuousinterventionandmoveintoordinaryusage,such
as black hole and relativity, although (as these examples show) with a
characteristic loss of special content. Others remain purely technical, such as
Schwarzschild radius or Gdel number, and cannot appear in ordinary
discoursewithoutsomemediation.
2.2.3Aterminologyprovidesthekeywordsforactivatingspecializedframesof
knowledge about the domain. This definition entails a psychological hypothesis
about the organization of knowledge in human memory and is thus open to
empirical testing. So far, however, most experiments have addressed ordinary
knowledgeoratmostmildlyspecializeddomainslikearithmetic(Riley,Greeno,&
Heller 1982) and baseball (Voss, Vesonder, & Spilich 1980). Work on expert
knowledge,e.g.medicineandchemistry,hasbeenmoreconcentratedinartificial
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intelligence,wherethetestingisdonebysimulationandjudgedbyefficiency.
2.2.4 A terminology asserts a claim to authorization. Here, the relevant
functionistosignalthattheinstantiatedcomplexesofknowledgeareauthorized
bytheestablishedconsensusinthefield.However,theuseofterminologydoes
not by itself carry authority or guarantee consensus. In diffuse and disputatious
fields like linguistics or literary theory, the choice of terminology is frequently a
doubleedged gesture of allegiance to one approach and defiance to the others
andauthorityvacillatesaccordingtothesideoneadopts.
2.2.5 A terminology is a system of signals to distinguish insiders from
outsiders.Thoughthiseffectisoftenattained,insiderswouldprobablynotwantto
declareitagenuinepurposenorcanapersonconvertfromoutsidertoinsiderby
adoptingtheterminologyalone.Themostrestrictedcasesaretermsderivedfrom
the names of persons who were of course eminent insiders themselves, e.g.
Gdel number from the Austrian mathematician Kurt Gdel. These terms are
mostinefficientiftheyrequireinsideknowledgeofspecificcareers,buttheyoften
fadetoimpersonallabels,evenfornotionsthepersonsmightnotevenapprove.
Forexample,thevonRestorffeffectinpsychologyiswidelysaidforthememory
advantage of the salient items in a list, whereas Hedwig von Restorff (1933)
herself,amemberoftheGestaltschool,showedthedisadvantageofsuchitems
fortheformationofanintegratedarray(Bereich).
2.2.6 A terminology is an organizational and pedagogical tool for offering or
acquiring competence and fluency in the domain. This definition has a strong
practical emphasis, putting the terminology in an instrumental though not
exclusively decisive role. This role is undeniably crucial during introductory
training,witnesstheeffortexpendedonpresentingandquizzingitallthewayfrom
basic coursework up to degree examinations. However, the formulation of a
pedagogically effective terminology has not received sufficient attention in either
social science or humanities, despite the growing population of students in
general area studies, which primarily fulfill a service role in training for
professionslikemanagementandlaw.Thisshiftinemphasiscallsforaconcerted
reassessmentofthepedagogicaladaptationoftermstotherequirementsofnon
traditionaloutsiders.
2.2.7 A terminology names the control centers within domainspecific
knowledge. In this definition, which I have developed in my own work
(Beaugrande 1987, 1988b, 1989a, 1991d), the term control designates any
limiting of indeterminacy not merely a mechanical intervention (the everyday
meaningapplied,saytomachines),butanyinformationalorcognitiveenrichment
thathelpstoguideorselectsignificance.Thepotentialcontributionofterminology
to control in this expanded sense is virtually unlimited, provided that we can
grasp the fluctuation and regulation of determinacy within the entire discourse,
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andinrespecttospecificgroupsofparticipants.Inparticular,thediscourseshould
exert active and conscious control, e.g., by explaining each problematic term
conciselyuponfirstmentionandthenusingitconsistentlyhenceforth.
2.3.Eachofthesesevendefinitionsholdssomecogencyand,takentogether,
they encourage us to bear in mind that terminology is an emphatically multi
functionalresourcewhoseactualcontributioninspontaneousorroutineusageis
typically just a small part of its potential contribution under adequately planned
andcontrolledconditions.
3.Conventionalpreferencesinsocialsciencesandhumanities
3.1. Conventional usage of terminology so far is characterized by three
pervasivepreferences(Beaugrande1991e):
3.1.1forinternalusewithinthefieldoverexternalusebeyonditsborders
3.1.2 for objectoriented terms labeling specific objects of inquiry over
subjectorientedtermsgeneratedbytheinterpretationoftheuserand
3.1.3foratermcenteredviewofspecialpurposelanguageoveradiscourse
centered view implicating the entire texture, including the processes of
textualizingtheterminology.
3.2 These preferences are particularly dominant in the sciences, where the
folkwisdom flourishes that the terminology of a scientific field is just the proper
catalogue of labels for welldefined objects and makes an ideal means of
communicating in a normal science (in the popularized sense of Kuhn 1970).
Individualtermsareaccepteduncriticallyattheirnominalvalue,evenwhereas
forthetermsentenceinmodernlinguisticsaconsiderablespreadofdiverging
usescouldeasilybedocumented(Beaugrande1989a,1991a).
3.3 The impact of this uncritical acceptance can be seen in social science,
whereterminologypersistsinanunsettledstate.MarvinHarrisforinstance(1980:
15) diagnoses an overload of illdefined concepts in the social scientists basic
working vocabulary, such as state, role, group, institution, class, caste, tribe,
state,andsoforth.Inhiseyes,thecontinuingfailuretoagreeonthemeaningof
theseconceptsisareflectionoftheirunoperationalstatusandconstitutesagreat
barriertothedevelopmentofscientifictheoriesofsocialandculturallife(cf.4.2)
3.4However,giventhepressuresonsocialsciencetocreateascientificdiction
fordescribingordinaryknowledgeandbehavior,theprojectofmakingterms
operationalmaybecomepartoftheproblemratherthanthesolution(4.1).Ithas
helpedtofosteranuncritical,forcedoscillationormelange,wherebymechanical,
objectorientedtermsarecombinedwithtermsapplyingtosubjectiveeventsor
abilities.Hereisasample,whenTalcottParsons(citedinBolinger1975:172)
setsouttodefinethetermskills:
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[7]Skillsconstitutethemanipulativetechniquesofhumangoalattainmentand
control in relation to the physical world, so far as artifacts for machines
especiallydesignedastoolsdonotyetsupplementthem.Trulyhumanskills
are guided by organized and codified knowledge of both the things to be
manipulated and the human capacities that are used to manipulate them.
Such knowledge is an aspect of cultural level symbolic processes, and, like
other aspects to be discussed presently, requires the capacity of the central
nervoussystem,particularlythebrain.
On the one hand, Parsons wants to specify truly human skills, presumably as
distinctfromskillsattributedtoanimalsor,anthropomorphically,tomachinesand
tools. On the other hand, he clearly leans toward the objectoriented terms of
conventionalscience.Thus,hedirectshumangoalattainmentandcontroltoward
thephysicalworldratherthantowardthehumanagentsmentalagendaofplans
and wishes cognitive and communicative skills would thereby be restricted to
merelyinstrumentalroles.Healsosetsupaskewedinterchangebetweenskills
and the means of supplementing them the construction implies that the skills
operate on the world only insofar as they are not yet supplemented, which is
patentlyfalse.
3.5 He further tries to mediate between object and subject in the opening
sentence by injecting the terms artifacts and design, both of which imply skills
by definition, but the mediation goes awry in the syntax. Artifacts are not for
machines designed as tools both machines and tools are artifacts, only the
former necessarily requiring special design (a tool could be a mere piece of
rock)andamachinethatwasnotdesignedasatoolwouldbeamarginalcase
hardlyrelevanthere.
3.6 Again to grant the objects equal weight, the second sentence pairs off
things with capacities, as if they were two parallel types of organized and
codified knowledge. But the parallel conjures up a distinction between the
knowledge of capacities versus the capacities themselves, which seems
gratuitoushere:ifyouwanttomanipulateathingyoumusthaveanduse them,
notjustknowaboutthem.Afinalforcedbalanceisdrawnbetweenculturallevel
[i.e.notindividual]symbolicprocessesandthecentralnervoussystemplusthe
brain, the latter being either trivially involved in every skill and process or else
misleadinglyimpliedtobetheactualphysicalcodificationoftheknowledge,like
theDNAincells.
3.7 Linguistically, the objectoriented approach favours a pronounced
preference for nouns and noun phrases over verbs. The opening of Parsons
definition is a conspicuous example, as we can see by contrasting to a version
withtheactionsandprocessesexpressedbyverbs:
[7a]Skillsenablehumanstomanipulateandcontrolthephysicalworldsoasto
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attaintheirgoals.
Amoresweepingrevisiontorelaxthedistortivetensionbetweenobjectversus
subjectmightbe:
[7b]Trulyhumanskills are guided by the organized and codified knowledge
that both constitutes the capacities for attaining goals and schematizes the
physicalworldtobemanipulatedandcontrolled.Thisknowledgedevelopsout
of the potential of the central nervous system, particularly the brain, in the
performance of cultural symbolic processes, including communication. Tools
andmachinescanbespeciallydesignedtosupplementtheskills,butdonot
actuallycompriseorembodythem.
Thisdefinitionisnotmerelyshorter(70wordstoParsons87),butquitedifferent
infocus.Thetargetoftheskillsnowisnotthephysicalworldworlditself,butthe
schematized version of it that serves as the cognitive operational base for
applyinghumanskillsaswellasforcommunicatingwithintheculture.Toolsand
machines are introduced not as a major reservation at the start, but as a
concessivestipulationattheend.Thecentralnervoussystemandthebrainare
not trivially implicated nor implied to be a material codification, but cited as the
developmental resource whose performance centers more on cultural symbolic
processes,includingcommunication,thanonmechanicalmanipulation.
3.8 The humanities are less dominated by the anxiety about subject and
object,thoughhardlyfreeofit.Objectcenteredtermshavelongbeenafavourite
in textbooks and surveys, as we can see in the Heath Introduction to Literature
(Landy1980:837f):
[8] A simile is a comparison and is always stated as such. You will usually find
like, as, so, or some such word of comparison within it. Like similes,
metaphors are direct comparisons of one object with another. In metaphors,
however,thefusionbetweenthetwoobjectsismorecomplete,formetaphoruses
noasorliketoseparatethetwothingsbeingcompared.Instead,themetaphor
simply declares that A is B one element of the comparison becomes, for the
moment at least, the other. Some metaphors go even farther and omit the is.
TheysimplytalkaboutAasifitwereB,usingtermsappropriatetoB.Theymay
notevennameBatall,butletusguesswhatitisfromthewordsbeingused.In
thiscasethemetaphorbecomesanimpliedmetaphor.
Threeitemsofterminology,allnouns,aredefinedandcontrastedasiftheywere
tangible things rather than cognitive and aesthetic activities. Each thing is tidily
identified by ostensibly formal and observable criteria, namely the presence or
absence of comparison words the prepositions or conjunctions like and as
andthecopulaisthoughthetextfudgesthequestionsofwhetherthesearein
fact required and if not, how the three things could be differentiated on other
grounds.
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3.9 Moreover, each term is stated to designate a specific kind of relation

between distinct objects, presumably in the physical world, albeit the passage
cloudstheirstatusbygivingthemonlythequasialgebraicsymbolsAandB,as
ifwecouldsolveeachtermlikeanequationbyinsertingtheunknowns.Yetisis
preciselythedistinctnessofobjectsorotherentities,notinthephysicalworldbut
in our mental representations of any real or possible word, that similes and
metaphorscallinquestion.
3.10 Such definitions thus promulgate a termcentered and objectoriented
view of literature and poetry, as if they were patchworks of schemes and tropes
waitingtobereducedtocomparisonsandequations.Structuralistpoeticsdidlittle
to correct this view, and if anything reaffirmed it on the basis of its more refined
termsandmethods(cf.4.5).Suchaviewappliesmuchbettertomediocreefforts
(e.g. Robert Burns my love is like a red, red rose) than to aesthetically valid
works,suchasEmilyDickinsonspoemnr.1129:
[9]TellalltheTruthbuttellitslant
SuccessinCircuitlies
ToobrightforourinfirmDelight
TheTruthssuperbsurprise
AsLightningtotheChildreneased
Withexplanationkind
TheTruthmustdazzlegradually
Oreverymanbeblind
Tosolvethesimileidentifiedbytheasinline5(whichthetextbookadvocates),
the definitions in [8] require us to select two compared objects, such as
Lightning and Truth or is it surprise? For an implied metaphor, we could
guess on the basis of blind that Delight stands for eyesight, but that seems
ironically literalminded for a poem expressly counseling against direct
presentation.
3.11 On the other hand, we would not be encouraged to focus on an
association between a noun suggesting an object and a verb suggesting an
activity.Wewouldaccordinglymisstheprocesscenteredanalogybetweentelling
slantversusCircuit,alongwiththeexquisitetensionbetweentheprocessease
versusthesuddeneventLightning,whosefantasyresolutionisprojectedinthe
oxymorondazzlegradually.
3.12 In sum, the conventional terminology of humanities would seem to be
just as riddled with forced compromises and evasions as the conventional
terminology of the social sciences. The search for poetic things and the real
objectstheyrefertoandcomparethusdistractsawayfromtherealimportofthe
entiretextasoneintegralmetaphoricfieldwherein,asinEmilyDickinsonspoem,
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preciseequationsareskillfullyevadedandidentitiesaredeliberatelyeffacedeven
thesyntacticconstructionisblurredbyheravoidanceofconventionalpunctuation.
And if this metaphor asserts anything, then surely that Truth is not an object,
butaprocessandthatthisTruthandanySuccessorDelightpertainingtoit
ispreciselynottobegraspedthroughacommonsensicalcorrespondencewith
the real world, but through utterly unexpected and astonishing bursts. Emily
Dickinsonmaywellhaveviewedherownpoetryasoneslantedmodalityforsuch
Truth, but unlike lesser, more selfserving poets, she does not say so by
presentingusatidytextbooksimileormetaphor,sheenactsitandhasusenactit
thoughtheengagementhertextrequires.Andtheengagedreaderhereletsloose
ofidentities,objects,andwordclasseslikeconjunctionsandprepositions,inorder
to constitute an ephemeral but powerful aesthetic terminology for the unique
experience.
4.Recentshifts
4.1 In both social science and humanities, a general reassessment of
epistemological groundwork has been gaining momentum, with an increasingly
conspicuous impact on terminology. In the social sciences, this impact can be
seenbycontrastingthreedefinitionsofthetermculture:
[10] culture is best seen as a set of control mechanisms plans, recipes,
rules, instructions, which are the principle bases for the specificity of
behaviourandanessentialconditiongoverningit.(Durbin1973:470)
[11]culturereferstothelearnedrepertoryofthoughtsandactionsexhibitedby
membersofsocialgroups.(Harris1980:47).
[12] Believing, with Max Weber, that man is an animal suspended in webs of
significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs, and the
analysisofittobethereforenotanexperimentalscienceinsearchoflawsbut
aninterpretiveoneinsearchofmeaning.(Geertz1973:5)
Marshal Durbins ostensibly operational appeal to control mechanisms in [10]
ironicallyimpliedthathumansintheculturedonothavemuchcontrolthemselves,
but function like regulated parts of a large machine. The terminology within the
definition left at best scant leeway for personal choice, i.e. from marginal (not
principle) bases and incidental (not essential) conditions that influence (not
govern)behaviour.ButDurbintookadifferenttackwhenstatingtheoverallgoal
ofanthropology:tounderstandthewayinwhichmanprocessesinformationfrom
thesurroundingenvironment(1973:468).Thisgoalisnotrelatedinanyinsightful
way to his own definition of culture. Evidently, his terms were beset by an
uneasy,partialtransferofallegiancefromnaturalscience,especiallyphysics,over
toinformationscienceasthemodelparadigm(cf.1.2.1).
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4.2MarvinHarrisdefinition[11]reflectshisconvictionwhichhechampions
againsttheinfluenceofnaturalsciencethatmatterisnomoreorlessrealthan
thoughts(1980:30).Hence,thesubstanceofcultureisnolongerjustbehaviour,
but thoughts and actions and in place of physicalist mechanisms we have a
more mental repertory. However, the operational turn persists in the stipulation
exhibited,whichappliesto actions,whereas thoughts wouldneedtoreported
or inferred. Still, Harriss motive for the dualism is not a division or transfer of
allegiance, but an essential step in his plan to maintain an important distinction
between what the members of a culture do or say (the etic system) and what
they think they are doing or saying (the emic system). Between these two
systemsliestheslippagethatenablesthemystificationofsociallife,whichruling
groupsthroughouthistoryandprehistoryhavealwayspromotedastheirfirstline
of defense against actual or potential enemies (1980: 158). He even diagnoses
this slippage within social science itself, where in the contemporary political
context, idealism and eclecticism serve to obscure the very existence of ruling
classes, thus shifting the blame for poverty, exploitation, and environmental
degradation from the exploiters to the exploited and preventing people from
understanding the causes of war, poverty, and exploitation. In contrast, Harris
ownculturalmaterialism
[13]holdsthattheeliminationofexploitationwillneverbeachievedinasociety
which subverts the empirical and operational integrity of social science for
reasons of political expediency. Because without the maintenance of an
empiricist and operationalist critique, we shall never know if what some call
democracyisanewformoffreedomoranewformofslavery.(1980:157f)
Thisrationaleforanoperationalterminologyisutterlydifferentfrompayingtribute
to a timeworn folk wisdom about scientific method. The explanatory task is to
create a discursive and terminological framework for representing thoughts and
actions so as to reflect not merely their valence defined by the culture, but also
theoperationalimpactofmaterialconditionslikethedistributionofresourcesand
power, and thereby to account for the origin, maintenance, and change of the
global inventory of sociocultural differences and similarities (1980: 27). The
terminology of social science would thus have two correlated but distinctive
modesofreference,theemicandtheeticones,whosemutualcontrastsorgaps
would be the focal points and fulcrums for a radical critique of the status quo
(1980:158).Aneminentcasecanbeseenintheelaborateeuphemismsadopted
bycultureswhopracticeinfanticide,e.g.whenmotherstermthedeathablessing
orGodswillandthevictimslittleangels(ScherperHughes1987).
4.3In[12],CliffordGeertzindirectlysuggestsananalogybetweencultureitself
andaterminologicalsystem:thewebsofsignificancewhichthesocialscientist
mustinterpretinsearchoftheirmeaning.Finally,theobjectdomainisnolonger
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aconstellationofobservablebehavioursorexhibitedactions,buttheirsymbolic
valences within a complex system within a cultural terminology, so to speak.
Thedistinctionbetweenculturalsystemversussocialsystem,whichwesawto
bearonthedefinitionsofhumanitiesversussocialscience(1.2.2),wouldbe
[14] to see the former as an ordered system of meaning and of symbols in
terms of which social interaction takes place and to see the latter as the
patternofsocialinteractionitself[...]cultureisthefabricofmeaninginterms
ofwhichhumanbeingsinterprettheiractionsocialstructureistheformthat
action takes, the actually existing network of social relations. (Geertz
1973:144f)
Heretoo,theterminologyofsocialsciencehastwocorrelatedbutdistinctivesets
of referents, one for exhibited social interaction and one for its significances
whereby the actions themselves function as culturally interpretable terms. Then,
no discontinuity or disparity arises when the discourse of the science accepts
discoursesofthecultureintoitsdomain,viz.:
[15]Sincecommunicationacts,especiallyspeechacts,usuallyoccurinhuman
scenesofevenmoderateduration,allmajoreticrubricsaretosomedegree
built up out of the observation of communication events. [...] studies of etic
components (kinship, political ideology, national ideology, etc.) usually
involve the identification of speech acts and other communication events,
[e.g.] in the description of domestic hierarchies by means of requests and
compliancestorequests(Harris1980:54f)
4.4Thenextstepistoreflectonthediscursivequalityofsocialscienceitself.
For Geertz (1988: 5), one crucial peculiarity of ethnographic writing is the fact
that
[16]somuchofitconsistsofincorrigibleassertion.Thehighlysituatednature
ofethnographicdescriptionthisethnographer,inthistime,inthisplace,with
theseinformants,thesecommitments,andtheseexperiences,representative
ofaparticularculture,amemberofacertainclassgivestothebulkofwhat
issaidarathertakeitorleaveitquality.
Due to the usual objectoriented view of science, anxieties about subjectivity
have made it extremely difficult to address the question of how ethnographical
textsareauthorized(1988:9).Usually,
[17] anthropologists [...] have traced their difficulties in constructing such
descriptionstotheproblematicsoffieldworkratherthantothoseofdiscourse.
Iftherelationbetweenobserverandobserved(rapport)canbemanaged,the
relationbetweentheauthorandtext(signature)willfollowitisthoughtof
itself.(1988:9f)
This belief thoroughly obscures the oddity of constructing texts, ostensibly
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scientific, out of experiences broadly biographical and of finding somewhere to

standinatextthatissupposedtobeatoneandthesametimeanintimateview
andacoolassessment(ibid.).Geertzsownrevisioncentersonhisclaimthatthe
conviction carried by the ethnographic text does not rest either on factual
substantiality or on theoretical arguments but on the authors capacity to
convince us that what they say is the result of their having penetrated (or if you
prefer, been penetrated by) another form of life (1988: 4). He now proposes a
closereadingofethnographicdiscoursestounderstandwhy
[18] some ethnographers are more effective than others in conveying in their
prosetheimpressionthattheyhavehadclosecontactwithfaroutlives[...]As
the criticism of fiction and poetry grows best out of an imaginative
engagement with fiction and poetry themselves, not out of imported notions
aboutwhattheyshouldbe,thecriticismofanthropologicalwriting(whichisin
a strict sense neither, and in a broad sense both) ought to grow out of a
similarengagementwithit,notoutofpreconceptionsofwhatitmustlooklike
toqualifyasascience.(1988:6)
4.5 Such deliberations are a clear signal of a basic reorientation which could
bring the social sciences much closer to the humanities. The conditions for a
rapproachement are also improving in the wake of a reorientation on the
humanisticside.Literarystudiesiscurrentlyreconsideringthespecialstatusand
qualities of literary discourse, and the implications of this status for humanistic
discourse about such discourse (Beaugrande 1988a). The problematics of
engagement are acknowledged on many levels. The reliance on the object
orientedterminologiesandmethods,whethertraditionalorstructuralist(cf.3.8f),is
now receding, as we can sense in some recent statements of literary theorists
fromthe(erstwhile)Yaleschool:
[19]methodology[...]promotesclosereading[but]isanevasionifitrestswitha
distinctionbetweenthelanguageofdescriptionandthelanguageoftheobject
described and privileges the former as a scientific metalanguage (Hartman
1979:187,1980:156)
[20]sinceitisassumedlyscientific,thelanguageofastructuralistpoeticswould
itself be definitely outside literature, but it would prescribe (in deliberate
opposition to describe) a generalized and ideal model of a discourse that
defines itself without having to refer to anything beyond its own boundaries
(DeMan1983:107)
[21]weshouldtakebackfromthescienceswhathisours[andnot]dependon
thephysicalorhumansciencesforthemodelofamechanismthatfascinates
byitsanonymous,compulsive,impersonalcharacter(Hartman1980:270)
The conventional activity of resolving the literary text through its similes,
metaphors,andsoon(3.8ff)intoanaworldofimpliedrealobjectsanobjective
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correlative (to borrow T.S. Eliots stodgy phrase) is viewed with accelerating
scepticism.Thefocusofconcernisrathertheselfcomplicatingnatureofliterary
discourse,viz.:
[22]wordsareonlywords,notthingsorfeelings[...]allinterpretationdepends
on the antithetical relation between meanings, not on the supposed relation
betweenatextanditsmeaning(Bloom,1979:8f,1975b:76)
[23] language appears to be a restless medium that both transcends and
negatesitsrelationtothephenomenalworld[...]themorepressureweputon
a text to interpret or decode it, the more indeterminacy appears (Hartman
1980:152,202)
[24] literary language takes it for granted that sign and meaning can never
coincide [...] the sign points to something that differs from its literal meaning
and has for its function the thematization of this difference (De Man 1983:
261,209)
Insuchanambience,theobjectdomaintobeaddressedisnotapileofpoems
andtheirpieces,buttheexperienceofengagingwithadiscoursewhoseaesthetic
valueandvalencedependpreciselyonapluralismofalternativesignificances,as
suggested by my sketch of the Emily Dickinson poem in 3.812 (cf. Beaugrande
1988a,1988c).Inparticular,wewouldnotbeconcernedtodecidejustwhatisreal
or metaphoric, or to guess exactly what is implied, but would attempt to
experiencetheshiftsandinterchangesofidentitieswhichthepoembothportrays
andenacts.
4.6 The key question for us today is how the intensifying engagements with
discourse in social science reflect upon those in the humanities and vice versa.
Admittedly,themodeofdiscourseontheonesidediffersconspicuouslyfromthat
of the other. But, as I have tried to indicate, the ways in which cultural domains
represent the world also has important commonalities with the ways in which
humanisticdomainslikeliteratureandpoetrydo:
4.6.1 both sides make strategic decisions about how significances should be
assignedtosymbolsandviceversa
4.6.2 both take it for granted that the actions which humans perform and the
objects with which they surround themselves are meaningful well beyond
observablephysicalconditionslikeforce,motion,anddimension
4.6.3bothdependcruciallyoninteractionandcommunicationtonegotiateand
regulatethesesignificancesandmeanings
4.6.4 both are fundamentally creative and innovative, though the cultural side
usuallyprogressesinbroaderandslowercycles
4.6.6 both present expansive interpretive problems to the professional
investigator.
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4.7 It follows that both sides should have powerful motives to be wary of the
static, objectoriented terminology favoured by long tradition and folkwisdom
(3.1). Which terms may prove appropriate and insightful must be carefully
assessedinrespecttofarmorefundamentalepistemologicalandcommunicative
issues and problems than the mere affixing of convenient labels to things. This
task was never more urgent than now, when the current reorientation of social
scienceandhumanitieshaspowerfullyincreasedtheawarenessonbothsidesof
thecentralityandcomplexityofdiscourse.Suchanambienceishighlyauspicious
for a new assessment not merely of the current terminologies, but of the role of
terminologyatlargeintheexpandinginteractionamongthedisciplines.
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knowledge and lowknowledge individuals. Journal of Verbal Learning and

VerbalBehavior19,651667.
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3.9 Moreover, each term is stated to designate a specific kind of relation

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