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9/2/2014

COMPILATION OF
LEGAL MAXIMS
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

Balmeo, Marie Dominique


Cabatu, Rema Pazvia
Cantos, Julie Marie
Cay-an, Dorothy Joy
Galano, Faith Alexis
Reyes, Katherine Ann
1N

TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSOLUTA SENTENTIA EXPOSITORE NON INDIGET

10

WHEN LANGUAGE OF THE LAW IS CLEAR, NO EXPLANATION OF IT IS REQUIRED


AUGUSTUS CEAZAR GAN VS. HON. ANTONIO REYES
G.R. No.145527, May 28, 2002

10
10
10

ACTUS ME INVITO FACTUS NON EST MEUS ACTUS

10

AN ACT DONE BY ME AGAINST MY WILL IS NOT MY ACT


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO
G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999

10
10
10

ACTUS NON FACIT REUM, NISI MENS SIT REA

11

THE ACT ITSELF DOES NOT MAKE A MAN GUILTY UNLESS HIS INTENTIONS WERE SO
LILY SY VS. HON. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 171579 November 14, 2012

11
11
11

AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS FIAT RELATION NISI IMPEDIATUR SETENTIA

12

RELATIVE WORDS REFER TO THE NEAREST ANTECEDENTS, UNLESS THE CONTEXT OTHERWISE REQUIRES.
MAPA VS. HON. JOKER ARROYO AND LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)

12
12
12

ARGUMENTUM A CONTRARIO

12

NEGATIVE-OPPOSITE DOCTRINE; WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO WHAT IS IMPLIED


MISAEL VERA, ET AL. VS. HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, ET AL.

12
12

CASSUS OMISSUS PRO OMISSO HABENDUS EST

13

A PERSON, OBJECT OR THING OMITTED FROM AN ENUMERATION MUST BE HELD TO HAVE BEEN OMITTED INTENTIONALLY
13
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. GUILLERMO MANANTAN
13
G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962
13
CESSANTE RATIONE LEGIS, CESSAT IPSA LEX

14

WHEN THE REASON OF THE LAW CEASES, THE LAW ITSELF CEASES.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ALMUETE
G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976

14
14
14

CONTEMPORANEA EXPOSITION EST OPTIMA ET FORTISSIMO IN LEGE

14

THE CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION IS THE STRONGEST LAW.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ISABELO PUNO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993

14
14
14

DISTINGUE TEMPORA ET CONCORDABIS JURA

15

DISTINGUISH TIMES AND YOU WILL HARMONIZE THE LAW


UNITED STATES VS. GASPAR ALVIR
G.R. No. L-3981, January 14, 1908

15
15
15

DURA LEX SED LEX

16

THE LAW MAY BE HARSH, BUT THAT IS THE LAW.


ARNEL SAGANA VS. RICHARD FRANCISCO
G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009

16
16
16

EJUSDEM GENERIS

17

OF THE SAME KIND OR SPECIE


LIWAG VS. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.
G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012

17
17
17

EXCEPTIO FIRMAT REGULAM IN CASIBUS NON EXCEPTIS

17

A THING NOT BEING EXCEPTED MUST BE REGARDED AS COMING WITHIN THE PURVIEW OF THE GENERAL RULE
ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC VS. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY
G.R. No. L-24322; July 21, 1967

17
17
17

EX DOLO MALO NON ORITUR ACTIO

18

NO MAN CAN BE ALLOWED TO FOUND A CLAIM UPON HIS OWN WRONGDOING


BOUGH AND BOUGH VS. CANTIVEROS AND HANOPOL
G.R. No. 13300; September 29, 1919

18
18
18

EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS

19

THE EXPRESS MENTION OF ONE PERSON, THING OR CONSEQUENCE IMPLIES THE EXCLUSION OF ALL OTHERS

19

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. HON. RUBEN TORRES, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 132527; July 29, 2005

19
19

EXPRESSUM FACIT CESSARE TACITUM

19

WHAT IS EXPRESSED PUTS AN END TO THAT WHICH IS IMPLIED


COA CEBU VS. PROVINCE OF CEBU
G.R. No. 141386; November 29, 2001

19
19
19

EX NECESSITATE LEGIS

20

BY NECESSARY IMPLICATION OF LAW


COA CEBU VS. PROVINCE OF CEBU
G.R. No. 141386; November 29, 2001

20
20
20

FALSA DEMONSTRATIO NON NOCET, CUM DE CORPORE CONSTAT

20

FALSE DESCRIPTION DOES NOT PRECLUDE CONSTRUCTION NOR VITIATE THE MEANING OF THE STATURE
DELONG VS. STARKEY
120 Ind. App. 288; May 9, 1950

20
20
20

FAVORES AMPLIANDI SUNT; ODIA RESTRINGENDA

21

PENAL LAWS WHICH ARE FAVORABLE TO THE ACCUSED ARE GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
PEOPLE VS. QUIACHON
G.R. No. 170236; August 31, 2006

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21
21

GENERALE DICTUM GENERALITER EST INTERPRETANDUM

22

A GENERAL STATEMENT IS UNDERSTOOD IN A GENERAL SENSE


ABDUL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 184496; December 2, 2013

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22
22

GENERALIA VERBA SUNT GENERALITER INTELLIGENDA

22

WHAT IS GENERALLY SPOKEN SHALL BE GENERALLY UNDERSTOOD


ORCEO VS. COMELEC
G.R. No. 190779; March 26, 2010

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22
22

GENERALIA SPECIALIBUS NON DEROGANT

23

A GENERAL LAW DOES NOT NULLIFY A SPECIFIC OR SPECIAL LAW


CUSTOMS VS. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, SMITH BELL CO., INC.

23
23

G.R. No. L-41861; March 23, 1987

23

HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST SED ITA LEX SCRIPTA EST

23

THE LAW MAY BE EXCEEDINGLY HARD, BUT SO THE LAW IS WRITTEN


ROSA LIM VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000

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23
23

IMPOSSIBILIUM NULLA OBLIGATIO EST

25

THERE IS NO OBLIGATION TO DO IMPOSSIBLE THINGS


AKBAYAN-YOUTH VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001

25
25
25

INDEX ANIMI SERMO EST

26

SPEECH IS THE INDEX OF INTENTION

26

YOLANDA SIGNEY VS SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, AND GINA SERVANO,
REPRESEN TATIVE OF GINALYN AND RODELYN SIGNEY,
G.R. No. 173582, January 28, 2008

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26

IN EO QUOD PLUS SIT SEMPER INEST ET MINUS

27

THE GRANT OF A GREATER POWER NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE LESSER POWER


ELISEO F. SORIANO VS. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA

G.R. No. 164785, Mar 15, 2010

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27
27

INTEREST REIPUBLICAE UT SIT FINIS LITIUM

28

PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES THAT BY THE VERY NATURE OF THINGS THERE MUST BE AN END TO A LEGAL CONTROVERSY 28
FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ VS HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS
28
G.R. No. 164785, Mar 15, 2010
28
INTERPRETARE ET CONCORDARE LEGIBUS EST OPTIMUS INTERPRETANDI MODUS

29

EVERY STATUTE MUST BE SO CONSTRUED AND HARMONIZED WITH OTHER STATUTES AS TO FORM A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
JURISPRUDENCE
29
DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. VS CLEOFE S. JANIOLA
29

GR, 185861 30 June 2009

29

INTERPRETATIO FIENDA EST UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT

30

A LAW SHOULD BE INTERPRETED WITH A VIEW TO UPHOLDING RATHER THAN DESTROYING IT

30

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ROMAN DERILO


GR, 185861 30 June 2009

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30

INTERPRETATIO TALIS IN AMBIGUIS SEMPER FIENDA EST UT EVITETUR INCONVENIENS ET ABSURDUM


30
WHERE THERE IS AMBIGUITY, SUCH INTERPRETATION AS WILL AVOID INCONVENIENCE AND ABSURDITY IS TO BE ADOPTED
30
SERANA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
30
GR NO. 162059; Jan 22, 2008
30

LEGIS INTERPRETATIO LEGIS VIM OBTINET

31

THE INTERPRETATION PLACED UPON THE WRITTEN LAW BY A COMPETENT COURT HAS THE FORCE OF LAW)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PEOPLE VS JABINAL
GR NO. 162059; Jan 22, 2008

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31
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LEGES POSTERIORES PRIORES CONTRARIAS ABROGANT

32

A LATER STATUTE WHICH IS REPUGNANT TO AN EARLIER STATUTE IS DEEMED TO HAVE ABROGATED THE EARLIER ONE ON
THE SAME SUBJECT MATTER
32
CARABAO, INC. VS. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION
32
G.R. No. L-29304; Jul 3, 2014
32
LEX DE FUTURO, JUDEX DE PRATERITO

32

THE LAW PROVIDES FOR THE FUTURE, THE JUDGE FOR THE PAST.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION VS. STOCKHOLDERS OFINTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK
G.R. No. 181556 ; December 14, 2009

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32
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LEX PROSPICIT, NON RESPICIT

33

THE LAW LOOKS FORWARD, NOT BACKWARD.


CLEMENTE LACESTE VS. PAULINO SANTOS, DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
G.R. No. L-36886; February 1, 1932

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33
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MALEDICTA EST EXPOSITO QUAE CORRUMPIT TEXTUM

34

IT IS DANGEROUS CONSTRUCTION WHICH IS AGAINST THE TEXT.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. HON. JUDGE PALMA AND ROMULO INTIA Y MORADA
G.R. No. L-44113; March 31, 1977

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34
34

NOSCITUR A SOCIIS

34

WORD CONSTRUED WITH REFERENCE TO ACCOMPANYING OR ASSOCIATED WORDS.


FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ VS. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
G.R. No. 202242; April 16, 2013

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NOVA CONSTITUTIO FUTURIS FORMAM IMPONERE DEBET NON PRAETERITIS

35

A NEW STATUTE SHOULD AFFECT THE FUTURE, NOT THE PAST.


FERMIN MANAPAT VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 110478

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35
35

NULLUS COMMODUM POTEST DE INJURIA PROPRIASUA

36

NO MAN SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OWN WRONG.


MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
G.R. No. 143351; September 14, 2000

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36

NULLUM CRIMEN SINE POENA, NULLA POENA SINE LEGE

36

THERE IS NO CRIME WITHOUT A PENALTY, AND THERE IS NO PENALTY WITHOUT A LAW.


JUANITO R. RIMANDO VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) AND NORMA O. MAGNO
G.R. No. 176364

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36
36

NULLUM TEMPUS OCCURIT REGI

37

THERE CAN BE NO LEGAL RIGHT AS AGAINST THE AUTHORITY THAT MAKES THE LAW ON WHICH THE RIGHT DEPENDS.
REPUBLIC VS. VILLASOR
G.R. No. L-30671; November 28, 1973

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37
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OPTIMA STATUTI INTERPRETATRIX EST IPSUM STATUTUM

38

THE BEST INTERPRETER OF A STATUTE IS THE STATUTE ITSELF


LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC. VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117188; August 7, 1997

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38
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OPTIMUS INTERPRES RERUM USUS

39

THE BEST INTERPRETER OF THE LAW IS USAGE.


JM TUASON AND CO., ET AL. VS. HON. HERMINIO MARIANO, ET AL.
GR No. L-33140, October 23, 1978

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39
39

PARI MATERIA

39

RELATING TO THE SAME MATTER

39

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. SIMEONA MARTIN AND HERMIN ARCEO


G.R. No. L-38019 May 16, 1980

39
39

PRIVILEGIA RECIPRINT LARGAN INTERPRETATIONEM VOLUNTATE CONSONAN CONCEDENTIS

40

PRIVILEGES ARE TO BE INTERPRETED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE WILL OF HIM WHO GRANTS THEM
BARRETTO VS. TUASON
G.R. Nos. L-36872;March 31, 1934

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40
40

POTIOR EST IN TEMPORE, POTIOR EST IN JURE

41

HE WHO IS FIRST IN TIME IS PREFERRED IN RIGHT


CRUZ VS. CABANA
G.R. No. L-56232 June 22, 1984

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41
41

QUANDO ALIQUID PROHIBETUR EX DIRECTO, PROHIBETUR ET PER OBLIQUUM

42

WHAT IS PROHIBITED DIRECTLY IS PROHIBITED INDIRECTLY


COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES)
G.R. No. 153866 February 11, 2005

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42
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RATIHABITO MANDATO AQUIPARATUR

43

LEGISLATIVE RATIFICATION IS EQUIVALENT TO A MANDATE


THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS VS. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK
G.R. No. 5876 September 1, 1911

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43
43

RATIO LEGIS

44

INTERPRETATION ACCORDING TO THE SPIRIT


MANUEL UY VS. ENRICO PALOMAR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS POSTMASTER GENERAL
G.R. No. L-23248 February 28, 1969

44
44
44

RATIO LEGIS EST ANIMA LEGIS

45

THE REASON OF THE LAW IS ITS SOUL


VILLASI VS. GARCIA
G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014

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45
45

REDDENDO SINGULA SINGULIS

47

REFERRING EACH TO EACH; REFERRING EACH PHRASE OR EXPRESSION TO ITS APPROPRIATE OBJECT; OR LET EACH BE PUT IN
ITS PROPER PLACE
47
7

AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988

47
47

SALUS POPULI EST SUPREMA LEX

48

THE VOICE OF THE PEOPLE IS THE SUPREME LAW


RESTITUTO YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

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48
48

SURPLUSAGIUM NON NOCET

49

SURPLUSAGE DOES NOT VITIATE A STATUTE


UNITED STATES VS. JULIAN SANTIAGO
G.R. No. L-11374 March 14, 1917

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49
49

STARE DECISIS ET NON QUIETA MOVERE

50

FOLLOW PAST PRECEDENTS AND DO NOT DISTURB WHAT HAS BEEN SETTLED.
J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. V. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 177127 October 11, 2010

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50
50

UBI JUS, IBI REMEDIUM

51

WHERE THERE IS A RIGHT, THERE IS A REMEDY.


LEONARDO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
G. R. No. 125329. September 10, 2003

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51
51

UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT, NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMUS

51

WHERE THE LAW DOES NOT DISTINGUISH, WE SHOULD NOT DISTINGUISH


GUEVARA VS. INOCENTES
G. R. No. L-25577, 16 SCRA 379, March 15, 1966

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51
51

UTILE PER INUTILE NON VITIATUR

52

THE USEFUL IS NOT VITIATED BY THE NON-USEFUL.


PEOPLE VS. MARTIN
G.R. No. L-33487; May 31, 1971

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UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM PEREAT

53

THE CONSTRUCTION IS TO BE SOUGHT WHICH GIVES EFFECT TO THE WHOLE OF THE STATUTE ITS VERY WORD
PEOPLE VS. MANTALABA

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53

G.R. No. 186227

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VERBA ACCIPIENDA SUNT SECUNDUM SUBJECTAM MATERIAM

53

A WORD IS TO BE UNDERSTOOD IN THE CONTEXT IN WHICH IT IS USED


53
R (ON THE APPLICATION OF ST (ERITREA)) (FC) VS. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT 53
VERBA INTENTIONI, NON E CONTRA, DEBENT INSERVIRE

54

WORDS OUGHT TO BE MORE SUBSERVIENT TO THE INTENT AND NOT THE INTENT TO THE WORDS.
54
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINE REPRESENTATIVE BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT JERRY P. TRENAS, ET
AL.
54
GR. No. 176951 GR. No. 177499 GR. No. 178056
54
VERBA LEGIS

55

PLAIN-MEANING RULE.
REPUBLIC V. LACAP
G.R. No. 158253; March 2, 2007

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55
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VIGILANTIBUS ET NON DORMIENTIBUS JURA SUBVENIUNT

56

THE LAWS AID THE VIGILANT, NOT THOSE WHO SLUMBER ON THEIR RIGHTS.
ALONSO VS. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,
G.R. No. 130876; December 5, 2003

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56
56

VERBA LEGIS NON EST RECEDENDUM

58

FROM THE WORDS OF THE STATUTE THERE SHOULD BE NO DEPARTURE.


VICTORIA VS. COMELEC AND JESUS JAMES CALISIN
G.R. 109005;January 10, 1994

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Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget


When language of the law is clear, no explanation of it is required

AUGUSTUS CEAZAR GAN vs. HON. ANTONIO REYES


G.R. No.145527, May 28, 2002
Facts:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school her three (3)-year old daughter Francheska
Joy S. Pondevida, Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R. Gan demanding support for their
"love child." Petitioner, in his reply, denied paternity of the child. An ex asperated Bernadette thereafter instituted
in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite.
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to state a cause of action. He argued
that since Francheska' s certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no legal or factual
basis for the claim of support. His motion, however, was denied by the trial court.
Now, the petitioner is ordered by the court to give P20, 000 every month as a support to his illegitimate child. The
petitioner still is not satisfied on the decision so he filed an appeal concerning that the writ of execution must not
be immediate on the reason that the mother of the child committed adultery which qualifies as a defense against
the action for support.
Issue:
Whether the appeal of the petitioner against the immediate release of support will be honoured by the court.
Ruling:
No. Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further ex
planation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to
foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of
the petition.
The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and
without delay because if it had to w ait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered
because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the
payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much
the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with
such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely,
afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes
and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due
to non-payment of the funds when needed. (De Leon v. Soriano)

Actus me invito factus non est meus actus


An act done by me against my will is not my act

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JOSELITO DEL ROSARIO


G.R. No. 127755, April 14, 1999
Facts:
The accused-appellant was convicted of the robbery with homicide and sentenced to death. The conviction of the
accused was based on the testimony of a tricycle driver who claimed that the accused was the one
who drove the tricycle, which the suspects used as their get-away vehicle. The accused was then
invited by the police for questioning and he pointed to the location where he dropped off the suspects. When the
police arrived at the supposed hide-out, a shooting incident ensued, resulting to the death of some of the suspects.
After the incident, the accused was taken back to the precinct where his statement was taken on May 14,
1996.However, this was only subscribed on May 22, 1996 and the accused was made to execute a waiver of

10

detention in the presence of Ex-Judge Talavera. It was noted that the accused was handcuffed through all this time
up on orders of the fiscal and based on the authorities' belief that the accused might attempt to escape otherwise.
Issue:
(1)
(2)

Whether the Miranda rights of the accused-appellant were violated.


Whether the warrantless arrest of the accused-appellant was lawful.

Ruling:
(1) YES. It was established that the accused was not apprised of his rights to remain silent and to
have competent and independent counsel in the course of the investigation. The Court held that the accused should
always be apprised of his Miranda rights from the moment he is arrested by the authorities as this is deemed
the start of custodial investigation. In fact, the Court included i itatio s by police officers in the
scope of custodial investigations. It is evident in this case that when the police invited the accusedappellant to the station, he was already considered as the suspect in the case. Therefore, the questions asked
of him were no longer general inquiries into an unsolved crime, but were intended to elicit information about his
participation in the crime. However, the
Miranda rights may be waived, provided that the waiver is voluntary, express, in writing and made in the presence
of counsel. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to establish that the accused made such a waiver.
(2) NO. There are certain situations when authorities may conduct a lawful warrantless arrest: (a) when the accused
is caught in flagrante delicto; (b) when the arrest is made immediately after the crime was
committed; and when the one to be arrested is an escaped convict. The arrest of the accused in this c a s e d i d n o t
fall in any of these exceptions. The arrest was not conducted immediately after the
consummation of the crime; rather, it was done a day after. The authorities also did not have personal knowledge
of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed the offense because they were not there when
the crime was committed. They merely relied on the account of one eyewitness. Unfortunately, although the
warrantless arrest was not lawful, this did not affect the jurisdiction of the Court in this case because the accused
still submitted to arraignment despite the illegality of his arrest. In effect, he waived his right to contest the legality
of the warrantless arrest.

Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea


The act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so

LILY SY vs. HON. MERCEDITAS GUTIERREZ, ET AL.


G.R. No. 171579 November 14, 2012
Facts:
In a Complaint-Affidavit filed by, petitioner, Lily Sy, she claimed that in the morning of December 16, 1999, respondents Benito Fernandez Go
and Glenn Ben Tiak Sy, together with "Elmo," a security guard, went to petitioner's residence at the 10th Floor, Fortune Wealth, 612 Elcano
St., Binondo, Manila and forcibly opened the door, destroyed and dismantled the door lock then replaced it with a new one, without
petitioner's consent. She, likewise, declared that as a diversionary ruse, respondent, Jennifer was at the lobby of the same building who
informed petitio e s helper Geralyn Juanites that the elevator was not working. Glenn and Be ito s act of replacing the door lock appeared
to be authorized by a resolution of Fortune Wealth Mansion Co po atio s Board of Directors.
In the evening of the same date, petitioner supposedly saw Benito, Glenn, Jennifer, Merry and respondent Berthold Lim (Berthold) took from
her residence numerous boxes containing her personal belongings without her consent and, with intent to gain, load them inside a familyowned van/truck named "Wheels in Motion. The same incident supposedly happened in January 2000 and the "stolen" boxes allegedly
reached 34, the contents of which were valued at P10, 244,196.00.
Respondents Benito and Berthold denied the accusations against them. They explained that petitioner made the baseless charges simply
because she hated their wives Merry and Jennifer due to irreconcilable personal differences on how to go about the estates of their deceased
parents then pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 51. They also manifested their doubts on petitio e s capability
to acquire the personal belongings allegedly stolen by them.

11

Issue:
Whether the respondent being a co-owner with the petitioner of the subject property can be charged of robbery?
Ruling:
NO. Indeed, on second look, we note that what is involved here is a dispute between and among members of a family corporation, the
Fortune Wealth Mansion Corporation. Petitioner Lily Sy and respondents Merry, Jennifer, and Glenn, all surnamed Sy, are the ownersincorporators of said corporation, which owns and manages the Fortune Wealth Mansion where petitioner allegedly resided and where the
crime of robbery was allegedly committed. As part-owners of the entire building and of the articles allegedly stolen from the 10th floor of said
building the very same properties that are involved between the same parties in a pending estate proceeding, the respondents cannot, as
co-owners, be therefore charged with robbery. The fact of co-ownership negates any intention to gain, as they cannot steal properties which
they claim to own.

Ad proximum antecedens fiat relation nisi impediatur setentia


Relative words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the context otherwise requires.

MAPA vs. HON. JOKER ARROYO AND LABRADOR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION


G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
Facts:
Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay
the instalment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that
the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause
obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility
company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D.
957 requires Labrador to p o ide the fa ilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of
de elop e t if offe ed a d i di ated i the app o ed subdivision plans.
Issue:
Whether or not Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last
antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect.
Ruling:
No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason
of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after
the execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment
as ade the de elope . The o ds hi h a e offered and indicated in the su di isio o o do i iu pla s
refer not only to othe fo s of de elop e t ut also to fa ilities, i p o e e ts, a d i f ast u tu es . The o d
a d is ot ea t to sepa ate o ds, ut is a o ju tio used to denote a joinder or a union.

Argumentum a contrario
Negative-opposite doctrine; what is expressed puts an end to what is implied

MISAEL VERA, ET AL. vs. HON. JOSE F. FERNANDEZ, ET AL.


G.R. No. L-31364, March 30, 1979
Facts:
The BIR filed on July 29, 1969 a motion for allowance of claim and for payment of taxes representing the estate's tax
deficiencies in 1963 to 1964 in the intestate proceedings of Luis Tongoy. The administrator opposed arguing that the
claim was already barred by the statute of limitation, Section 2 and Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court which

12

provides that all claims for money against the decedent, arising from contracts, express or implied, whether the
same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the
decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice;
otherwise they are barred forever.
Issue:
Does the statute of non-claims of the Rules of Court bar the claim of the government for unpaid taxes?
Ruling:
No. The reason for the more liberal treatment of claims for taxes against a decedent's estate in the form of exception
from the application of the statute of non-claims, is not hard to find. Taxes are the lifeblood of the Government and
their prompt and certain availability are imperious need. (CIR vs. Pineda, 21 SCRA 105). Upon taxation depends the
Government ability to serve the people for whose benefit taxes are collected. To safeguard such interest, neglect or
omission of government officials entrusted with the collection of taxes should not be allowed to bring harm or
detriment to the people, in the same manner as private persons may be made to suffer individually on account of
his own negligence, the presumption being that they take good care of their personal affairs. This should not hold
true to government officials with respect to matters not of their own personal concern. This is the philosophy behind
the government's exception, as a general rule, from the operation of the principle of estoppel.

Cassus omissus pro omisso habendus est


A person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUILLERMO MANANTAN


G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962
Facts:
Guillermo Manantan is a justice of peace who violated Section 54 of the Revised Election Code which is
about aiding of an election candidate on the election. Manantan argued that the words justice of peace is not
included on the enumeration on Section 54 not like on the section 449of the Revised Administrative Code. The rule
of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a
person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. If that rule
is applicable to the present, then indeed, justices of the peace must be held to have been intentionally and
deliberately exempted from the operation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.
Issue:
Whether a justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code?
Ruling:
Yes. The rule "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" has no applicability to the case at bar. The maxim "casus
omisus" can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case under
consideration, it has already been shown that the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the
enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by
another term. In the new law, or Section 54 of the Revised Election Code, justices of the peace were just called
"judges."

13

Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex


When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ALMUETE


G.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976
Facts:
Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of section
39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that the accused being tenants of Margarita
Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective
harvests of five cavans of palay each to her damage.
The lower held that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe the circumstances under which
the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon
for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten
percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest.
Issue:
Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is punishable
pursuant to Section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law.
Ruling:
No. The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954
is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the
landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis,
cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases) applies to this case.
Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as contrary
to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the
entire country "as a land reform area".
The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the
landlord is inferable from the fact that the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural
Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and prethreshing.
As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense
under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian
Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant
or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish
anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.

Contemporanea exposition est optima et fortissimo in lege


The contemporary construction is the strongest law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISABELO PUNO, ET AL.


G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
Facts:
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City called Nika Cakes and
Pastries. At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is the personal driver

14

of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband, arrived at the bakeshop. Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came
and so she got into the car. After the car turned right in a corner, it stopped and then a young man, accused Enrique
Amurao, and boarded the car beside the driver. Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front
seat and went onto where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poked a gun at her and Isabelo, who earlier told
her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I want to get money from you." She said she has
money inside her bag and they may get it just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7, 000.00. The two accused
told her they wanted P100, 000.00more. Socorro agreed to give them that but would they drop her at her gas station
in Kamagong St., Makati where the money is located. Beloy asked Socorro to issue a check for P100, 000.00.Socorro
complied. She drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one forP40 thousand. Being able to
escape by jumping out of the vehicle, Socorro upon reaching Balintawak, reported the matter to CAPCOM.
Issue:
Whether or not the said robbery can be classified as "highway robbery" under PD No.532 (Anti-Piracy and AntiHighway Robbery Law of 1974)
Ruling:
No. PD No. 532 punishes as highway robbery only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against
any person or persons on Philippine highways and not acts of robbery committed against only a predetermined or
particular victim. The mere fact that the robbery was committed inside a car which was casually operating on a
highway does not make PD No 532applicable to the case.

Distingue tempora et concordabis jura


Distinguish times and you will harmonize the law

UNITED STATES vs. GASPAR ALVIR


G.R. No. L-3981, January 14, 1908
Facts:
This defendant was accused before the court of the justice of the peace of Bulacan, Province of Bulacan,
of the crime of seduction, and, having been found guilty, he was sentenced to three months of arresto
mayor, to pay an "indemnity of P1,000 to the offended party, to acknowledge the offspring, to make an allowance
of P15 monthly for subsistence until the child becomes of age, and to pay the costs of the proceedings."
From the above decision the defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of said province. Upon the
evidence adduced at the trial the judge also found the accused guilty of the crime of seduction and sentenced him
to three months of arresto mayor, "with the accessory penalties thereof, to indemnify the girl, Maria Sempia,
in the sum of P500, to recogniz e the offspring, to allow her for the subsistence of said child the sum of
P15 per month, and to pay the costs."
After the defendant had been served his imprisonment, he filed for a motion to the court to claim his child so that
the writ of attachment that is included in his penalty will be considered moot.
Issue:
Whether the party who provides the subsistence is in this case entitled to claim that the person who enjoys
the same shall live with him in his own house, and there receive the support which he is under obligation to provide.
Ruling:
Yes. The obligation prescribed by article 449 of the Penal Code was construed, prior to the enforcement of
the Civil Code, in the light of the said doctrines. And after the enforcement of the last-named code it should be
construed in a similar manner, because the rule of its article 149 is not absolute.
As long as the father shall support the child on his care it is not in violation of article 449 of the Penal Code.

15

Dura lex sed lex


The law may be harsh, but that is the law.

ARNEL SAGANA vs. RICHARD FRANCISCO


G.R. No.161952, October 2, 2009
Facts:
Petitioner filed a Complaint, before Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, to recover damages alleging that on
November 20, 1992, respondent with intent to kill him and without justifiable reason, shot him with a gun hitting
him on the right thigh. On January 31, 1995, Process Server Manuel Panlasigue attempted to personally serve
summons at espo de t s address at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Baesa Q.C., but was unsuccessful. In his Servers
Return, he stated that the occupant in that house refused to give his identity and that respondent is unknown at
said residence. The Trial Court also attempted to serve summons to the espo de t s office through registered mail,
however, respondent failed to pick up summons. The case was dismissed by the Trial Court on account of petitio e s
lack of interest to prosecute that he did not take action since the filing of the Servers Return. Petitioner filed a Motion
for Reconsideration, contended that he exerted efforts to locate the respondent, it was confirmed that respondent
indeed lived at No. 36 Sampaguita Street, Bausa, Q.C. Trial Court granted the Motion with a condition upon the
service of summon on the respondent within 10 days from the receipt of the Order. On August 25, 1995, Process
Server Jarvis Iconar tried to serve summons at espo de t s address but no avail. In his handwritten annotation, he
stated that espo de t s brother, Michael Francisco, told him that respondent no longer lived at the said address,
however, Iconar left a copy of the summons to Michael Francisco. Petitioner filed a Motion to Declare Respondent
in Default for failure off respondent to file Answer despite the service of summons. Trial Court declared that the
summons was validly served to respondent, declared that respondent in default and allowed petitioner to present
his evidence ex parte. Michael Francisco, through his lawyer filed a Manifestation and Motion, he denied that he
received the summons and hewas authorized to receive on behalf of his brother. He prayed his name to be stricken
off the records as having received the copy of summons. In his Affidavit of Merit, he asserted that he was 19 y/o,
and respondent had left the house since 1993 andrespondent would only write or call them without informing his
whereabouts. On the other hand, petitioner attached in his Rejoinder, the Affidavit prepared by respondent dated
December 23, 1992, where declared he was a resident of No. 36 Sampaguita St. Bausa Q.C. and the lawyer who
notarized the affidavit was the same lawyer who represented his brother. Trial Court denied the Manifestation and
Motion for lack of merit, it rendered a judgment in favor of the petitioner, ordered respondent to pay the damages.
Respondent received the copy of the Trial Cou t s Decision, he then filed a Notice of Appeal to Court of Appeals. The
appellate court directed the parties to file respective briefs, a copy of which was sent by respondent at No. 36
Sampaguita St., Bausa, Q.C. Respondent prayed that the trial court erred in assuming jurisdiction over the person,
despite the irregularity of the substituted service of summons by the court Process Server and in awarding of
damages to petitioner. Court of Appeals rendered decision granting the Appeal of respondent and setting aside the
decision of the trial court for the irregularity of the service of summons. Petitioner filed Petition for Review on
Certiorari to Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the substituted service of summons was validly made upon respondent through his brother.
Ruling:
The Petition for Review on Certiorari was granted, Court of Appeals decision was reversed and set aside, and the
Trial Court decision was reinstated and affirmed. Although, in general, the statutory requirement of substituted
service must be followed strictly, faithfully and fully and that any substituted service other than that authorized by
Rules is considered ineffective. The Supreme Court ruled that strict application of the Rules is not warranted to this
case as it would clearly frustrate the spirit of laws as well as do injustice to the parties waiting almost 15 years for
resolution of this case. The respondents actively attempt to frustrate the proper service of summons by refusing to
give their identity, rebuffing requests to sign for or receive documents or eluding the officers of court. Respondent
tried to avoid the service of summons, prompting the court to declare that sheriff must be resourceful, but sheriffs
cannot be faulted of the respondent themselves engage in deception to thwart the orderly administration of justice.

16

Ejusdem generis
Of the same kind or specie

LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.


G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012
Facts:
In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P.
Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to
Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the
successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human
Settlement Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said water facility
has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11,
Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099was issued to the latter. In
2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association
demanding the removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a case before
the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving
heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was
the existence of an easement for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein
the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of Commissioners, the
Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space.
Issue:
Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an ope space as defined in P. D. 1216.
Ruling:
Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an ope spa e.
The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine whether the area
falls under othe similar facilities and a e ities since P. D. 1216 makes no specific mention of areas reserved for
water facilities.
Ejusdem generis - states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific
words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or to be restricted to things akin
to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court
found out that the enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community.
Therefore, the phrase othe similar facilities and a e ities should be interpreted in like manner. It is without a
doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is a basic necessity, without which, survival
in the community would be impossible

Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis


A thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule

ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC vs. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY
G.R. No. L-24322; July 21, 1967
Facts:

17

The Municipal Board of Ormoc City enacted and approved an ordinance providing the regulation of the City Tax. Its
validity was assailed before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, and the lower court sustained its validity in its
decision, hence this appeal.
Issue:
WON the Municipal Ordinance assailed in this case is valid?
Ruling:
YES. Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act enlarged the sphere of autonomy granted to chartered cities in terms of
enactment of taxing measures. It covers everything excepting those which are mentioned therein. The coverage of
the Ordinance does ot come under any of the specific exceptions listed in Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act. Not
being excepted, it must be regarded as coming within the pu ie of the ge e al ule as the a i goes, E eptio
fi at egula i asi us o e eptis .

Ex dolo malo non oritur actio


No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing

BOUGH and BOUGH vs. CANTIVEROS and HANOPOL


G.R. No. 13300; September 29, 1919
Facts:
Defendant Matilde Cantiveros is regarded as the richest resident of Carigara, Leyte and was the owner of various
parcels of realty of the value of thirty thousand pesos or more. In 1912, she sighed a marital contract of separation
from her husband. Petitioner Basilia Bough is the cousin of the defendant and was married to Gustavus Bough.
Through the influence of Gustavus Bough, who brought a story to Cantiveros that her husband was in town and
might contest the contract fir the separation of the conjugal property, she was induced to sign a fictitious contract
of sale of all her property to Basilia Bough. As an assurance, the spouses signed a document donating the said
properties to Cantiveros in case of their death and their children.
Petitioners Basilia Bough and Gustavus Bough sought to have themselves put in possession of the property covered
by the dead of sale quoted in the complaint, and to require the defendant Matilde Cantiveros to pay them damages
and costs. Cantiveros answered with a general denial and a special defense in which she asked that judgment be
rendered declaring the contract of sale made between herself and Basilia Bough null. The plaintiffs, thereupon,
denied under oath the genuineness and due execution of the so-called donation intervivos set forth in the answer.
The Court of First Instance of Leyte, therefore, declared the deed of sale fictitious, null, and without effect.
Issue:
WON the Dead of Sale, hereby a fictitious document, is valid and has legal effects?
Ruling:
NO. As the a i goes, E dolo alo o o itu a tio, it is ell settled that a pa t to a ellegal o t a t a ot
come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. Where, however, the parties to an illegal
contract are not equally guilty, and where public policy is considered as advanced by allowing the more excusable
of the two to sue for relief against the transaction, relief is given to him. Cases of this character are, where they
conveyance was wrongfully induced by the grantee through imposition or overreaching, or by false representations,
especially by one in a confidential relation. The Court, therefore, affirmed the decision of the trial court against the
petitioners.

18

Expressio unius est exclusion alterius


The express mention of one person, thing or consequence implies the exclusion of all others

COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, et. al.
G.R. No. 132527; July 29, 2005
Facts:
This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity as Executive Secretary
from allowing other private respondents to continue with the operation of tax and duty-free shops located at the
Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare RA
7227 as unconstitutional on the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw materials,
capital and equipment. Petitioners contend that the wording of RA 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax incentives to
the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. He also assailed the constitutionality of EO 97-A for being violative of their right to equal protection.
They asserted that private respondents operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments
located outside. The respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal standing and
unreasonable delay in filing of the petition
Issue:
WON there is a violation of equal protection clause?
Ruling:
NO. The ph ase ta a d dut -f ee i po tatio s of a
ate ials, apital a d e uip e t as e el ited as a
example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone. Public respondent SBMA correctly
a gued that the a i
e p essio u ius est e lusio alte ius", o
hi h petitio e s i pliedl el to suppo t thei
restrictive interpretation, does not apply when words are mentioned by way of example.
The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 97-A cannot be, likewise, sustained. The
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based which was based on reasonable
classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of
the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying
the foregoing test to the present case, the Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws. There
is a substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside the zone.

Expressum facit cessare tacitum


What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied

COA CEBU vs. PROVINCE OF CEBU


G.R. No. 141386; November 29, 2001
Facts:
The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local
Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension
classes that would accommodate students in the public schools. It was charged against the provincial Special
Education Fund (SEF) along with college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, COA issued Notices of
Suspension saying that disbursements for the salaries and scholarship grants are not chargeable to SEF. Faced with
the Notices of Suspension, the Province of Cebu filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court to which a
decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures was rendered.
Issue:
Is RA 5447 repealed by the effectivity of the Local Government Code?

19

Ruling:
The SEF was created by virtue of RA 5447 which defined the activities of DECS that may exclusively be funded, and
which it took effect on 1 January 1969. With the effectivity of the Local Government Code of 1991, the petitioners
contend that RA 5447 was repealed. Evidently, in the repealing clause of the Code, it expressly repealed only Section
3 of RA 5447. Hence, the provisions allocating funds for the salaries of teachers under Section 1, of R.A. No. 5447,
which are not inconsistent with Sections 272 and 100 (c) of the Local Government Code, remain in force and effect.

Ex necessitate legis
By necessary implication of law

COA CEBU vs. PROVINCE OF CEBU


G.R. No. 141386; November 29, 2001
Facts:
The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under Section 98 of the Local
Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in the DECS plantilla to handle extension
classes that would accommodate students in the public schools. It was charged against the provincial Special
Education Fund (SEF) along with college scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, COA issued Notices of
Suspension saying that disbursements for the salaries and scholarship grants are not chargeable to SEF. Faced with
the Notices of Suspension, the Province of Cebu filed a petition for declaratory relief with the trial court to which a
decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures was rendered.
Issue:
May the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local chief executives in
connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes as well as the expenses for college
scholarship grants be charged to the SEF of the local government unit concerned?
Ruling:
YES. The SEF was created by virtue of RA 5447 which defined the activities of DECS that may exclusively be funded.
Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for the establishment and maintenance of
extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers who should, as a matter of course, be compensated for their
services. Ex necessitate legis. Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are
necessary and indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.

Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat


False description does not preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the stature

DeLONG vs. STARKEY


120 Ind. App. 288; May 9, 1950
Facts:
Mary Starkey was the owner of the West Half of the Northwest Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 4,
Township 16 North, Range 2 East, in Marion County, Indiana. She died in 2 September 1933 leaving two children,
the appellee Albert Starkey and the appellant DeLong, as her sole and only heirs at law. Appellee and his wife claim
title to the abovementioned estate through a warranty deed as tenants by entireties. DeLong contends that said
deed is defective in its description of the land involved that it conveys nothing and that upon the death of her mother
she inherited an undivided one-half thereof.
Issue:
WON appellant Nellie DeLong inherited one-half of the la d i

20

uestio upo he

othe s death?

Ruling:
The o st u tio the t ial ou t pla ed upo the deed i uestio is o e t
i tue of the legal a i , falsa
de o st atio o o et, u de o po e o stat. The efo e, the Cou t uled that by her deed, Mary Starkey
conveyed to the appellees the fee simple title to the land involved in the case at bar and therefore the appellant
DeLo g i he ited o pa t of it at he othe s death.

Favores ampliandi sunt; odia restringenda


Penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect

PEOPLE vs. QUIACHON


G.R. No. 170236; August 31, 2006
Facts:
Appellant Roberto Quiachon was charged with the crime of qualified rape. On or about 12 May 2001, the accused,
by means of force and intimidation had sexual intercourse with a certain Rowena Quiachon, his daughter, 8 years
old, a deaf-mute. Rowel recounted that on the night of 12 May 2001, he saw his father on top of his sister Rowena
and they were covered by a blanket. His father's buttocks were moving up and down, and Rowel could hear Rowena
crying. He could not do anything because he was afraid of his father. Rowel remained in the room but the following
morning, he told his aunt, Carmelita Mateo about what he had witnessed. Together, Carmelita and Rowel went to
the police to report what had transpired.
The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape defined and penalized
under Articles 266-A and B of the RPC. The court imposed death penalty against the accused. The defense argued
that the benefits of RA 9346 should be extended to the accused.
Issue:
WON the appellant can benefit from RA 9346?
Ruling:
Yes. In view of the enactment of RA 9346 on 24 June 2006 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty, the
penalty to be meted on appellant is reclusion perpetua in accordance with Section 2 thereof which reads:
SECTION 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed:
(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or
(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code.
The aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 9346 is applicable in this case pursuant to the principle in criminal law, [favors
ampliandi sunt; odia restrigenda]. Penal laws which are favorable to accused are given retroactive effect. This
principle is embodied under Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides as follows: Retroactive effect of
penal laws. Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty of a felony, who is
not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws, a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.

21

Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum


A general statement is understood in a general sense

ABDUL vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


G.R. No. 184496; December 2, 2013
Facts:
Petitioner was first elected as municipal mayor of Mulondo, Lanao del Sur in the May 1998 election and re-elected
for a second term in the May 2001 election. It was while serving his second term as municipal mayor when the Office
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed an Information on 5 September 2002 charging petitioner, along with Abdul and
Domado, with falsification of public documents, defined and penalized under Article 171(2) of the RPC. During the
arraignment, petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. Before the commencement
of the trial, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) moved for the suspension pendente lite of the petitioner and
his co-accused as mandated under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioner asserted that
he cannot be suspended as such because the crime for which he was charged is not among those enumerated under
the provision, thus he moved for reconsideration but was denied by the trial court. The suspension, however, was
superseded by the expiration of his second term and his unsuccessful bid for re-election during the May 2004
elections.
During the May 2007 elections, he emerged as the winner in the mayoralty race in Mulondo, Lanao del Sur and so
on 2008, the OSP once again moved for his and his co-a used s suspe sio pe de te lite to i ple e t espo de t s
final and executor suspension.
Issue:
WON the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in imposing
suspension pendent lite on the petitioner and his co-accused?
Ruling:
YES. The Court ruled that the Petition be dismissed for being moot and academic. For a court to exercise its power
of adjudication, there must be an actual case or controversy, otherwise there is no justiciable controversy. In the
case at bar, the acquittal of the petitioner operates as a supervening event that mooted the present Petition. This is
regardless whether or not the petitioner has indeed committed an offense of "fraud or property." In construing the
term "fraud" as used in Section 13 of RA 3019, nevertheless, the Court held in said case that the same is understood
in its general sense that is referring to "an instance or an act of trickery or deceit especially when involving
misrepresentation."

Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda


What is generally spoken shall be generally understood

ORCEO vs. COMELEC


G.R. No. 190779; March 26, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members, and families are entitled
to protection by the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Pursuant thereto, they
are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities. These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged
by the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State policies. As
a response, COMELEC defends that constitutional freedoms are not absolute in a sense, and they may be abridged
to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.

22

Issue:
WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their replicas/imitations in the term
fi ea
i e tio
of A
?
Ruling:
NO. A word of general significance in a stature is to be taken in its ordinary sense and comprehensive sense, unless
it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be
generally understood and general words shall be understood in a general sense.
The te
fi ea
i esolutio No.
as i te ded fo pu poses of the gu a du i g the ele tio pe iod. The
i lusio of ai soft gu s i the te
fi ea
a d thei esulta t o e age
the ele tio gun ban is to avoid the
possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen
may not be able to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter, whether
brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun which is sought to be averted.

Generalia specialibus non derogant


A general law does not nullify a specific or special law

CUSTOMS vs. COURT OF TAX APPEALS, SMITH BELL CO., INC.


G.R. No. L-41861; March 23, 1987
Facts:
The legal provisions involved in this case are Sections 1005, 2521, and 2523 of the Tariff and Customs Code. Section
1005 lays down the indispensable requirement that every vessel coming from a foreign part must have on board a
complete manifest of all her cargo, further stating therein the required contents of each manifest intended to be
submitted to the customs authorities while both Secs. 2521 and 2523 provide for the corresponding penalties in
case Sec. 1005 is violated.
Issue:
In case the weight of a cargo is inaccurately or incorrectly stated in the manifest, which provision of the Tariff and
Customs Code should be applied, Section 2521 or Section 2523?
Ruling:
If the weight of the cargo is in issue, the provision of the Tariff and Customs Code properly applicable is Sec. 2523.
As the a i goes, Ge e alia spe iali us o de oga t, ea i g a spe ial a d spe ifi p o isio p e ails o e a
general provision irrespective of their relative position in the statute. learly, Sec. 2523 is directly applicable to the
case at bar since said provision specifically applies to the situation where there is a discrepancy between the actual
gross weight of any article or package described in the manifest and the gross weight as declared in the manifest or
bill of lading.

hoc quidem perquam durum est sed ita lex scripta est
The law may be exceedingly hard, but so the law is written

ROSA LIM vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000

Facts:
On August 25, 1990, petitioner bought various kinds of jewelry worth P300, 000.00 from Maria Antonia Seguan. She
ote out a he k ith the sa e a ou t, dated August ,
, pa a le to ash d a o Met o a k a d ga e
the check to Seguan.

23

The next day, petitioner agai e t to egua s sto e a d pu hased je el alued at P


,
. . Petitio e issued
a othe he k pa a le to ash dated August ,
da
o Met o a k i the a ou t of P
,
.
a d
sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera.
Segua deposited the t o he ks ith he a k. The he ks e e etu ed ith a oti e of disho o . Petitio e s
account in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed.
Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks, but she never did.
On June 5, 1991, an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the RTC, Cebu City, Branch 23, two informations
against petitioner for violations of BP No. 22.
After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the two cases convicting petitioner.
Petitioner appealed to the CA, but the same was dismissed by the CA in its October 15, 1996 Decision wherein it
affi ed i toto the TC s De isio .
Issue:
WON Lim violated B.P. No. 22.
Ruling:
The elements of B.P. Blg. 22 are:
The aki g, d a i g a d issua e of a
he k to appl fo a ou t o fo alue;
The k o ledge of the ake , d a e , o issue that at the ti e of issue he does ot ha e suffi ie t fu ds i o
credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
The su se ue t disho o of the he k
the d a ee a k fo i suffi ie
of fu ds o edit o disho o fo
the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop pa e t.
The gravamen of B.P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to
public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief.
Why and to whom the check was issued, and the terms & conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks, are
irrelevant in determining culpability.
Under BP No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that there was
damage.
It was ruled in United States v. Go Chi o, that i a ts ala p ohi ita, the o l i ui is, has the la ee iolated?
When dealing with acts mala prohibita it is ot e essa that the appella t should ha e a ted ith i i al i te t.
In many crimes, the intention of the person who commits the i e is e ti el i
ate ial
This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. The first and last elements of the offense are admittedly
present. B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when
the first and third elements of the offense are present. If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. To escape
liability, she must prove that the second element was absent. Petitioner failed to rebut this presumption and she
failed to pay the amount of the checks or make arrangement for its payment within 5 banking days from receipt of
notice of dishonor. B.P. No. 22 was clearly violated. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law
may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written.
However, the penalty imposed on petitioner must be modified. In Vaca v. Court of Appeals [298 SCRA 658 (1998)],
it was held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the philosophy underlying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material, and to prevent
unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of the social
order. The prison sentence imposed on petitioners is deleted, and imposed on them only a fine double the amount
of the check issued.
Consequently, the prison sentences imposed on petitioner are deleted. The two fines imposed for each violation,
each amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient. The award of moral damages and order to pay
atto e s fees a e deleted fo la k of suffi ie t asis.

24

impossibilium nulla obligatio est


There is no obligation to do impossible things

AKBAYAN-YOUTH vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 147066. March 26, 2001
Facts:
On January 25, 2001, AKBAYAN-Youth, together with other youth movements sought the extension of the
registration of voters for the May 2001 elections. The voters registration has already ended on December 27, 2000.
AKBAYAN-Youth asks that persons aged 18-21 be allowed a special 2-day registration. The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) denied the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth the sued COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion for denying
the petition. AKBAYAN-Youth alleged that there are about 4 million youth who were not able to register and are now
disenfranchised. COMELEC invoked Section 8 of Republic Act 8189 which provides that no registration shall be
conducted 120 days before the regular election. AKBAYAN-Youth however counters that under Section 28 of
Republic Act 8436, the COMELEC in the exercise of its residual and stand-by powers, can reset the periods of preelection acts including voters registration if the original period is not observed.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC exercised grave abuse of discretion when it denied the extension of the voters
registration.
Ruling:
No. The COMELEC was well within its right to do so pursuant to the clear provisions of Section 8, RA 8189 which
provides that no voters registration shall be conducted within 120 days before the regular election. The right of
suffrage is not absolute. It is regulated by measures like voters registration which is not a mere statutory
requirement. Beyond this, it is likewise well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done. The
law obliges no one to perform an impossibility, expressed in the maxim, nemo tenetur ad impossible. In other words,
there is no obligation to do an impossible thing. Impossibilium nulla obligatio est. Hence, a statute may not be so
construed as to require compliance with what it prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally, coincidentally, it must be
presumed that the legislature did not at all intend an interpretation or application of a law which is far removed
from the realm of the possible. The State, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to
safegua d a d egulate the a t of ote s egist atio fo the ulti ate pu pose of o du ti g ho est, o de l a d
peaceful election, to the incidental yet generally important end, that even pre-election activities could be performed
by the duly constituted authorities in a realistic and orderly manner one which is not indifferent and so far removed
from the pressing order of the day and the prevalent circumstances of the times. RA 8189 prevails over RA 8436 in
that A
s p o isio is e pli it as to the p ohi itio . uffi e it to sa that it is a p e-election act that cannot be
reset.
Further, even if what is asked is a mere two-day special registration, COMELEC has shown in its pleadings that if it is
allowed, it will substantially create a setback in the other pre-election matters because the additional voters from
the special two day registration will have to be screened, entered into the book of voters, have to be inspected again,
e ified, sealed, the e te ed i to the o pute ized ote s list; a d the the
ill ha e to ep i t the ote s
information sheet for the update and distribute it by that time, the May 14, 2001 elections would have been
overshot because of the lengthy processes after the special registration. In short, it will cost more inconvenience
than good. Further still, the allegation that youth voters are disenfranchised is not sufficient. Nowhere in AKBAYANYouth s pleadi g as atta hed a a tual o plaint from an individual youth voter about any inconvenience arising
from the fact that the voters registration has ended on December 27, 2001. Also, AKBAYAN-Youth et al admitted in
their pleading that they are asking an extension because they failed to register on time for some reasons, which is
not appealing to the court. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights.

25

index animi sermo est


speech is the index of intention

YOLANDA SIGNEY vs SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, EDITHA ESPINOSA-CASTILLO, and GINA SERVANO, represen
tative of GINALYN and RODELYN SIGNEY,
G.R. No. 173582, January 28, 2008
Facts:
odolfo ig e , ., a e e of the , died o
Ma
. I his e e s e o ds, he had desig ated Yola da
Signey (petitioner) as primary beneficiary and his four children with her as secondary beneficiaries. On 6 July 2001,
petitioner filed a claim for death benefits with the public respondent SSS.She revealed in her SSS claim that the
deceased had a common-law wife, Gina Servano (Gina), with whom he had two minor children namey, Ginalyn
Servano (Ginalyn), born on 13 April 1996, and Rodelyn Signey (Rodelyn), born on 20 April 2000.
Petitio e s de la atio as o fi ed he Gi a he self filed a lai fo the sa e death e efits o
Jul 2001
in which she also declared that both she and petitioner were common-law wives of the deceased and that Editha
Espinosa (Editha) was the legal wife.
In addition, in October 2001, Editha also filed an application for death benefits with the SSS stating that she was the
legal wife of the deceased.
The SSS, through a letter dated 4 December 2001, denied the death benefit claim of petitioner. However, it
recognized Ginalyn and Rodelyn, the minor children of the deceased with Gina, as the primary beneficiaries under
the SSS Law. The SSS also found that the 20 March 1992 marriage between petitioner and the deceased was null and
void because of a prior subsisting marriage contracted on 29 October 1967 between the deceased and Editha, as
confirmed with the Local Civil Registry of Cebu City.
Issue:
Whether petitioner has a superior legal right over the SSS benefits as against the illegitimate minor children of the
deceased.
Ruling:
As to the issue of who has the better right over the SSS death benefits, Section 8(e) and (k) of R. A. No. 8282 is very
clear.
Section 8(e) and (k) of R.A. No. 8282 provides:
SEC. 8. Terms Defined.For the purposes of this Act, the following terms shall, unless the context
indicates otherwise, have the following meanings:
(e) Dependents The dependent shall be the following:
(1) The legal spouse entitled by law to receive support from the member;
2) The legitimate, legitimated, or legally adopted, and illegitimate child who is unmarried, not
gainfully employed and has not reached twenty-one years (21) of age, or if over twenty-one (21)
years of age, he is congenitally or while still a minor has been permanently incapacitated and
incapable of self-support, physically or mentally; and
3) The parent who is receiving regular support from the member.
(k) Beneficiaries The dependent spouse until he or she remarries, the dependent legitimate,
legitimated or legally adopted, and illegitimate children, who shall be the primary beneficiaries of
the member: Provided, That the dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to fifty percent
(50%) of the share of the legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children: Provided, further, That
in the absence of the dependent legitimate, legitimated or legally adopted children of the member,
his/her dependent illegitimate children shall be entitled to one hundred percent (100%) of the
benefits. In their absence, the dependent parents who shall be the secondary beneficiaries of the
member. In the absence of all of the foregoing, any other person designated by the member as
his/her secondary beneficiary.
SEC. 13. Death Benefits. Upon the death of a member who has paid at least thirty-six (36)
monthly contributions prior to the semester of death, his primary beneficiaries shall be entitled

26

to the monthly pension: Provided, That if he has no primary beneficiaries, his secondary
beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to thirty-six (36) times the monthly
pension. If he has not paid the required thirty-six (36) monthly contributions, his primary or
secondary beneficiaries shall be entitled to a lump sum benefit equivalent to the monthly pension
times the number of monthly contributions paid to the SSS or twelve (12) times the monthly
pension, whichever is higher. (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, we need only apply the law. Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statute is clear, plain and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain
meaning rule or verba legis, derived from the maxim index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention), rests
on the valid presumption that the words employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent by the
use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or, from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.

in eo quod plus sit semper inest et minus


the grant of a greater power necessarily includes the lesser power

ELISEO F. SORIANO vs. MA. CONSOLIZA P. LAGUARDIA


G.R. No. 164785, Mar 15, 2010
Facts:
On August 10, 2004, at around 10:00 p.m., petitioner, as host of the program Ang Dating Daan, aired on UNTV 37,
made the following remarks:
Lehitimong anak ng demonyo; sinungaling;
Gago ka talaga Michael, masahol ka pa sa putang babae o di ba. Yung putang babae ang gumagana lang doon yung
ibaba, [dito] kay Michael ang gumagana ang itaas, o di ba! O, masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sabi ng lola ko
masahol pa sa putang babae yan. Sobra ang kasinungalingan ng mga demonyong ito.
Two days after, before the MTRCB, separate but almost identical affidavit-complaints were lodged by Jessie L.
Galapon and seven other private respondents, all members of the Iglesia ni Cristo (INC), against petitioner in
o e tio ith the a o e oad ast. espo de t Mi hael M. a do al, ho felt di e tl alluded to i petitio e s
remark, was then a minister of INC and a regular host of the TV program Ang Tamang Daan. Forthwith, the MTRCB
sent petitioner a notice of the hearing on August 16, 2004 in relation to the alleged use of some cuss words in the
August 10, 2004 episode of Ang Dating Daan.
After a preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB, by Order of August 16, 2004, preventively
suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan program for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004 Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of PD 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of Procedure. The same order also set the case
for preliminary investigation.
Ruling:
Whether or not MTRCB has the power to suspend petitioner from appearing in Ang Dating Daan for three months.
Ruling:
The grant of powers to the MTRCB under Section 3 of PD 1986 does not categorically express the power to suspend
a television program or a host thereof that violates the standards of supervision, regulation and classification of
television programs provided under the law. Nonetheless, such silence on the part of the law does not negate the
existence of such a power.

27

First, a general grant of power is a grant of every particular and specific power necessary for the exercise of such
general power. Other than powers expressly conferred by law on them, administrative agencies may lawfully
exercise powers that can be reasonably inferred in the wordings of the enabling law.
Second, the grant of a greater power necessarily includes the lesser power. In eo quod plus sit, semper inest et
minus.
The MTRCB has the power to cancel permits for the exhibition or television broadcast of programs determined by
the said body to be objectionable for being "immoral, indecent, contrary to law or good customs x x x." This power
is a power to impose sanctions.
First, a general grant of power is a grant of every particular and specific power necessary for the exercise of such
general power. Other than powers expressly conferred by law on them, administrative agencies may lawfully
exercise powers that can be reasonably inferred in the wordings of the enabling law.

interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium


Public interest requires that by the very nature of things there must be an end to a legal controversy

FELICISIMA DE LA CRUZ vs HON. EDGARDO L. PARAS


G.R. No. 164785, Mar 15, 2010
Facts:
In 1962, Pedro San Miguel filed a partition case against Pablo San Miguel involving a parcel of land (Lot A). The case
was dismissed due to non-prosecution. But 11 years later, Pedro filed a second partition case this time involving the
same Lot A and another parcel of land (Lot B). Judge Edgardo Paras dismissed the partition case in so far as Lot A is
concerned due res judicata but he continued in hearing the issue on Lot B. Lot B was eventually partitioned but the
successors-in-interest of Pedro San Miguel, Felicisima De La Cruz et al, appealed the dismissal of the case insofar as
Lot A is concerned.
Pablo San Miguel opposed the appeal on the ground that the order to dismiss the said case was merely interlocutory
hence it is not appealable.
Issue: Whether or not the order dismissing the case on Lot A is merely interlocutory.
Ruling:: No. The said order is a final and appealable order. The test to determine whether an order or judgment is
interlocutory or final is this: Does it lea e so ethi g to e do e i the t ial ou t ith espe t to the e its of the
ase? If it does, it is i te lo uto ; if it does ot, it is fi al.
The te
fi al judg e t o o de sig ifies a judg e t o a o de hi h disposes of the ause as to all the parties,
reserving no further questions or direction for future determination.
In this case, the fact that the twin case for other lot (Lot B) was still under litigation when the order was issued and
the respective claims of the parties thereto yet to be settled by the trial court would not affect the final nature of
the subject order, because a decree, is nonetheless final although some independent branch of the case is reserved
for future consideration.
Nevertheless, the petition filed by De La Cruz should be dismissed because in the first place, a final order of dismissal
cannot be assailed by certiorari (as what she did in this case). There was no grave abuse of discretion or lack thereof
on the part of Judge Paras in dismissing the case due to res judicata. The original dismissal was based on merits (due
to non litigation by Pedro San Miguel). He cannot again revive the same action by re-filing it 11 years later. Public
poli a d sou d p a ti e de a d that at the isk of o asio al e ors, judgments of courts should become final at
so e defi ite date fi ed la . eipu li ae ut sit fi is litiu .

28

interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi modus


every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of
jurisprudence

DREAMWORK CONSTRUCTION, INC. vs CLEOFE S. JANIOLA


GR, 185861 30 June 2009
FACTS:
On October 18, 2004, petitioner, through its President, Roberto S. Concepcion, and Vice-President for Finance and
Marketing, Normandy P. Amora, filed a Complaint Affidavit dated October 5, 2004 for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 (BP 22) against private respondent Cleofe S. Janiola with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Pias City.
The case was docketed as I.S. No. 04-2526-33. Correspondingly, petitioner filed a criminal information for violation
of BP 22 against private respondent with the MTC on February 2, 2005 entitled People of the Philippines v. Cleofe S.
Janiola.
On September 20, 2006, private respondent, joined by her husband, instituted a civil complaint against petitioner
by filing a Complaint dated August 2006 for the rescission of an alleged construction agreement between the parties,
as well as for damages. The case was filed with the RTC, Branch 197 in Las Pias City. Notably, the checks, subject of
the criminal cases before the MTC, were issued in consideration of the construction agreement.
Thereafter, on July 25, 2007, private respondent filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings dated July 24, 2007, alleging
that the civil and criminal cases involved facts and issues similar or intimately related such that in the resolution of
the issues in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. In other words,
private respondent claimed that the civil case posed a prejudicial question as against the criminal cases.
Petitioner opposed the suspension of the proceedings in the criminal cases in an undated Comment/Opposition to
A used s Motio to uspe d P o eedi gs ased o P ejudicial Question on the grounds that: (1) there is no
prejudicial question in this case as the rescission of the contract upon which the bouncing checks were issued is a
separate and distinct issue from the issue of whether private respondent violated BP 22; and (2) Section 7, Rule 111
of the ules of Cou t states that o e of the ele e ts of a p ejudi ial uestio is that the p e iousl i stituted i il
action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal actio ; thus, this
element is missing in this case, the criminal case having preceded the civil case.
Issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT PERCEIVING GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE
PART OF THE INFERIOR COURT, WHEN THE LATTER RULED TO SUSPEND PROCEEDINGS IN CRIM. CASE ON THE BASIS
OF PEJUDICIAL QUETION I the said CIVIL CAE.
Ruling:
This petitio
ust e g a ted. It is a asi p e ept i statuto
o st u tio that a ha ge i ph aseolog
amendment of a provision of law indicates a legislative intent to change the meaning of the provision from that it
o igi all had. I the i sta t ase, the ph ase, p e iousl i stituted, as i se ted to ualif the atu e of the i il
action involved in a prejudicial question in relation to the criminal action. This interpretation is further buttressed
the i se tio of su se ue t di e tl efo e the te
i i al a tio . The e is o othe logi al e pla atio fo
the amendments except to qualify the relationship of the civil and criminal actions, that the civil action must precede
the criminal action.
Additio all , it is a p i iple i statuto o st u tio that a statute should e o st ued ot o l to e o siste t
with itself but also to harmonize with other laws on the same subject matter, as to form a complete, coherent and
i telligi le s ste . This p i iple is o siste t ith the a i , i te p eta e et o o da e leges legi us est opti us
interpretandi modus or every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform
system of jurisprudence.

29

interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat


A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROMAN DERILO


GR, 185861 30 June 2009
Facts:
Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doos, Alejandro Cofuentes and one John Doe were charged with the
so-called crime of murder. Of the five accused, only accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo was apprehended and
brought within the trial court's jurisdiction. At his arraignment on March 18, 1985, and after the information was
translated in the Waray dialect with which he is well versed, appellant pleaded not guilty. However, by the time the
People had formally finished presenting its evidence on August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de parte,
manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and substitute the same with
one of guilty. Consequently, a re-arraignment was ordered by the lower court and, this time, appellant entered a
plea of guilty to the charge of murder. Appellant does not deny his participation in the commission of the crime.
Rather, in his brief pitifully consisting of two pages, he merely asks for the modification of the death penalty imposed
by the lower court to life imprisonment.
Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed in the country, Congress passed a law
imposing the death penalty on certain heinous offenses and further amending for that purpose the Revised Penal
Code and other special penal laws. Said law was officially enacted as Republic Act No. 7659 and took effect on
December 31, 1993. This is now the governing penal law at the time of this review of the case at bar.
Ruling:
Whether or not the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed to the accused instead of death penalty.
Ruling:
For failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and by virtue of the
command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court a quo is accordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant
Isidoro Q. Baldimo is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the
victim in the amount of P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on death indemnity.
It can be readily seen that the reduction of the penalty is not and was not made dependent on a law, decree,
condition, or period before the aforementioned Section 19 can be applied by the courts. It cannot be inferred, either
from the wordings of the subject provision or from the intention of the framers of the Constitution, that a death
sentence should be brought to the Supreme Court for review within a certain time frame in order that it can be
reduced to reclusion perpetua. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent
of the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be given is that
which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis
valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view to upholding rather than destroying it.

interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum


Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted

SERANA vs. SANDIGANBAYAN


GR NO. 162059; Jan 22, 2008
Facts:
Serana, accused of estafa, petitioned and claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not haveany jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP studentregent.She claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No.
3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumeratesthe crimes or offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa. It only has jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII,

30

Chapter II, Section 2(Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling
under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction.
Ruling:
Whether or the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over estafa; petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27
and she paid her tuition fees; the offense charged was not committed in relation to her office; the funds in question
personally came from President Estrada, not from the government.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa. Relyingon Section 4 of P.D.
No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crime scognizable by the Sandiganbayan. We note that
in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, without regard to the
succeeding paragraphs of the said provision. The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should
receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Interpretatio talis inambiguis semper
fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.

legis interpretatio legis vim obtinet


The interpretation placed upon the written law by a competent court has the force of law)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. PEOPLE VS JABINAL


GR NO. 162059; Jan 22, 2008
Facts:
Jabinal was found guilty of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition.
The accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in possession of the revolver and the ammunition
described in the complaint, without the requisite license or permit. He, however, claimed to be entitled to
exoneration because, although he had no license or permit, he had an appointment as Secret Agent from the
Provincial Governor of Batangas and an appointment as Confidential Agent from the PC Provincial Commander, and
the said appointments expressly carried with them the authority to possess and carry the firearm in question.
The accused contended before the court a quo that in view of his above-mentioned appointments as Secret Agent
and Confidential Agent, with authority to possess the firearm subject matter of the prosecution, he was entitled to
a uittal o the asis of the up e e Cou t s de isio i People s. Ma a a da g
a d People vs. Lucero(1958)
and not on the basis of the latest reversal and abandonment in People vs. Mapa (1967).
Issue:
Whethe o ot appella t should e a uitted o the asis of the ou t s uli gs i Ma a a da g a d Lu e o, o
should his conviction stand in view of the complete reversal of the MAcarandang and Lucero doctrine in Mapa.
Ruling:
De isio s of this Cou t, u de A ti le of the Ne Ci il Code states that Judi ial de isio s appl i g o i te p eti g
the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal s ste . The settled ule suppo ted
u e ous
autho ities is a estate e t of legal a i legis i te p etatio legis i o ti et" the interpretation placed upon
the written law by a competent court has the force of law.
Appellant was appointed as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to
the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero under which no criminal liability would attach to his

31

possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved.
Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant


A later statute which is repugnant to an earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on the same
subject matter

CARABAO, INC. vs. AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTIVITY COMMISSION


G.R. No. L-29304; Jul 3, 2014
Facts:
Plaintiff had filed on October 3, 1967 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal its complaint to recover the sum of
P238,500.00 representing the unpaid price of 300 units of fire extinguishers sold and delivered by it to defendant
Agricultural Productivity Commission. It alleged that it had presented on June 14, 1967 a claim for payment of the
sum with the Auditor General, but that since the latter had failed to decide the claim within two (2) months from
date of its presentation which should have been by August 13, 1967, it had acquired the right under Act No. 3083 to
file the original action for collection in the lower court
Ruling:
Whether or not case should be dismissed for lack of jourisdiction by the court
Ruling:
The sole question of law that plaintiff submits on appeal is its contention that under Act 3083 which it claims to
be still in force, not having been amended, repealed or declared unconstitutional it had the clear right to institute
its direct action in the lower court upon the Auditor General's failure to decide its claim within two months from the
date of its presentation, and that the lower court's jurisdiction which had thus attached could no longer be displaced,
notwithstanding the Auditor General's subsequent adverse decision of October 6, 1967.
The corresponding provisions of Act 3083 which are utterly incompatible with those of Commonwealth Act must
therefore be deemed superseded and abrogated, under principle of "leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant"
a later statute which is repugnant to an earlier statute is deemed to have abrogated the earlier one on the same
subject matter.

Lex de futuro, judex de praterito


The law provides for the future, the judge for the past.
DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION vs. STOCKHOLDERS OFINTERCITY SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK
G.R. No. 181556 ; December 14, 2009
Facts:
The Central Bank of the Philippines, now known as Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, filed on June17, 1987 with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati a Petition for Assistance in the Liquidation of Intercity Savings and Loan Bank,
Inc. (Intercity Bank) alleging that said bank was already insolvent and its continuance in business would involve
probable loss to depositors, creditors and the general public. The trial court gave it due course. Petitioner Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation was eventually substituted as the therein petitioner, liquidator of Intercity Bank. In
the ea ti e, epu li A t No.
hi h p o ides that Afte the pa e t of all lia ilities a d lai s agai st the
closed bank, the Corporation shall pay any surplus dividends at the legal rate of interest, from date of takeover to
date of distribution, to creditors and claimants of the closed bank in accordance with legal priority before distribution
to the sha eholde s of the losed a k . el i g o epu li A t No.
PDIC filed on August 8, 2005 a Motion for
Approval of the Final Distribution of Assets and Termination of the Liquidation Proceedings

32

Issue:
Whether or not Section 12 of RA 9302 should be applied retroactively in order to entitle Intercity Bank creditors to
surplus dividends.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that Statutes are prospective and not retroactive in their operation, they being the
formulation of rules for the future, not the past. Hence, the legal maxim lex de futuro, judex de praeterito the law
provides for the future, the judge for the past, which is articulated i A ti le of the Ci il Code: La s shall ha e
o et oa ti e effe t, u less the o t a is p o ided.
The reason for the rule is the tendency of retroactive legislation to be unjust and oppressive on account of its liability
to unsettle vested rights or disturb the legal effect of prior transactions. Further, a perusal of RA 9302 shows that
nothing indeed therein authorizes its retroactive application. In fact, its effectivity clause indicates a clear legislative
intent to the contrary, Section 2 . Effe ti it Clause. This A t shall take effe t fiftee
da s follo i g the
o pletio of its pu li atio i the Offi ial Gazette o i t o
e spape s of ge e al i ulatio .

Lex prospicit, non respicit


The law looks forward, not backward.

CLEMENTE LACESTE vs. PAULINO SANTOS, DIRECTOR OF PRISONS


G.R. No. L-36886; February 1, 1932
Facts:
Together with Nicolas Lachica, he had been prosecuted, found guilty, and sentenced to commitment for the crime
of rape. Subsequently Nicola Lachica married the victim, Magdalena de Ocampo, and was accordingly relieved from
the criminal prosecution by virtue of section 2, Act No. 1773, and article 448 of the Penal Code then in force, which
provided that such a marriage extinguished penal liability, and hence, the penalty. But the petitioner herein
continued serving his sentence, which was not affected by the marriage of his coaccused and the offended party.
The petitioner, Clemente Laceste, prays the court to set him at liberty through the writ of habeas corpus, pleading
that there is no sufficient legal ground for continuing his imprisonment any longer. Paragraph of article 344 of the
Revised Penal Code, now in force, provides as follows:
I ases of sedu tio , a du tio , a ts of las i ious ess a d ape, the marriage of the offender with the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or remit the penalty already imposed upon him. The provisions of this
paragraph shall also be applicable to the coprincipals, accomplices and accesories after the fact of the abovee tio ed i es.
Issue:
Whether or not the last paragraph of Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, now in force, shall apply to petitioner.
Ruling:
Petition granted. The law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective,
not retroactive, effect However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual criminal, shall be given
retroactive effect. These are the rule, the exception and exception to the exception on effectivity of laws.
Article 22 of the new Penal Code which provides for the retroactive effect of Penal laws is applicable to the petitioner,
who comes within one of the cases especially provided for in article 344 of the Code: this is a point upon which there
neither is, nor can be, any discussion between the parties to this case.

33

Maledicta est exposito quae corrumpit textum


It is dangerous construction which is against the text.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. JUDGE PALMA AND ROMULO INTIA Y MORADA
G.R. No. L-44113; March 31, 1977
Facts:
Private Respondent Romulo, 17 years of age, was charged with vagrancy. Respondent Judge dismissed the case on
the ground that her court has no jurisdiction to take further cognizance of this case without prejudice to the re-filing
thereof in the Juvenile Court, because he believed that jurisdiction over 16 years olds up to under 21 was transferred
to the Juvenile Court by the issuance of PD 603 or the Child and Youth Welfare Code, which defines youthful
offenders as those over 9years of age but under 21 at the time of the commission of the offense.
Issue:
Whether or not the issuance of PD 603 transferred the case of the accused from the regular courts to the Juvenile
Court.
Ruling:
The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court expressly confers upon it a special and limited jurisdiction over criminal
cases wherein the accused is under 16 years of age at the time of the filing of the case. The subsequent issuance of
PD 603 known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code and defines a youth offende as o e ho is o e
ea s of age
ut u de
at the ti e of the o
issio of the offe se did ot
su h defi itio t a sfe ju isdi tio o e
criminal cases involving accused who are 16 and under 21 years of age from the regular courts to the Juvenile Court.
Maledicta est exposito quae corrumpit textum it is dangerous construction which is against the text.

Noscitur a sociis
Word construed with reference to accompanying or associated words.

FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. JUDICIAL BAR COUNCIL (JBC)


G.R. No. 202242; April 16, 2013
Facts:
The case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the Judicial Bar Council (JBC) in a prior decision rendered July 17,
that JBC s a tio of allo i g o e tha o e e e of the o g ess to ep ese t the JBC to e unconstitutional.
espo de t o te ds that the ph ase a ep ese tati e of o g ess efe s that oth houses of o g ess should
ha e o e ep ese tati e ea h, a d that these t o houses a e pe a e t a d a dato o po e ts of o g ess
as part of the bicameral system of legislature. Both houses have their respective powers in performance of their
duties. Art. VIII Sec. 8 of the constitution provides for the component of the JBC to be 7 members only with only one
representative from congress.
Issue:
Whethe o ot the JBC s p a ti e of ha i g e e s f o the e ate a d the House of ep ese tati es to e
unconstitutional as provided in Art. VIII. Sec 8 of the constitution.
Ruling:
The p a ti e is u o stitutio al; the ou t held that the ph ase a ep ese tati e of o g ess should e o st ued
as to having only one representative that would come from either house, not both.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally
susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company
of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated.

34

Appl i g the fo egoi g p i iple to this ase, it e o es appa e t that the o d Co g ess used i A ti le VIII,
Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. That the framers of the constitution only intended for
one seat of the JBC to be allotted for the legislative. The motion was denied.

Nova constitutio futuris formam imponere debet non praeteritis


A new statute should affect the future, not the past.

FERMIN MANAPAT vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 110478
Facts:
o eti e i the
s, o a Catholi A h ishop of Ma ila CAM allo ed a u e of i di iduals to o up
the Grace Park property on condition that they would vacate the premises should the former push through with the
plan to construct a school in the area. The plan, however, did not materialize, thus, the occupants offered to
purchase the portions they occupied. Late , as the ould ot affo d CAM s p oposed p i e, the o upa ts,
organizing themselves as exclusive members of the Eulogio Rodriguez, Jr. Tenants Association, Inc., petitioned the
Government for the acquisition of the said property, its subdivision into home lots, and the resale of the subdivided
lots to them at a low price, however the Government could not buy the lot due to budget constraints. RCAM then
decided to effect, on its own, the subdivision of the property and the sale of the individual subdivided lots to the
public.
Significant turn of events however happened in 1977 when the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued
P eside tial De ee PD No.
, app op iati g P . M out of the P eside t s pe ial Ope atio s Fu ds to o e the
additio al a ou t eeded fo the e p op iatio of G a e Pa k. The Natio al Housi g Autho it NHA , PHHC s
successor, then filed several expropriation proceedings over the already subdivided lots for the purpose of
developing Grace Park under the Zonal Improvement Program (ZIP) and subdividing it into small lots for distribution
and resale at a low cost to the residents of the area.
NHA, in its petition in G.R. Nos. 116491-503, primarily contends that the CA erred when it issued its March 2, 1994
Resolution and modified the May 27, 1993 Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 10200-10212 to the extent that it applied
retroactively Article VI, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7279, thus exempting from expropriation the 300-sq m
lots of respondents Loberanes, Quimque, Vega, Santos, Oracion and Mercado.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in giving R.A. No. 7279 retroactive effect.
Ruling:
The CA s uli g o this poi t is i o e t. .A. No.
as e a ted i
, al ost t o de ades afte the
expropriation cases against the property owners herein were instituted with the RTC in 1977. Nova constitutio futuris
formam imponere debet, non praeteritis. A new statute should affect the future, not the past. The law looks forward,
not backward. Article 4 of the Ci il Code e e e pli itl de la es, l a s shall ha e o et oa ti e effe t, u less the
o t a is p o ided.
In these consolidated cases, the Court finds that the language of R.A. No. 7279 does not suggest that the Legislature
has intended its provisions to have any retroactive application. On the contrary, Section 49 of the said law indicates
that it shall take effe t upo its pu li atio i at least t o
atio al e spape s of ge e al i ulatio . The la s
prospective application being clearly stated, the Court cannot agree with the disposition of the appellate court that
the subject lots not exceeding 300 sq m are exempt from expropriation.

35

Nullus commodum potest de injuria propriasua


No man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.

MA. AMELITA C. VILLAROSA vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL


G.R. No. 143351; September 14, 2000
Facts:
Petitioner Villarosa and Private respondent Quintos were the only candidates for the office of Representative of the
Lone Legislative District of Occidental Mindoro in the 11 May1998 synchronized national and local elections. The
Provincial Board of Canvassers proclaimed VIillarosa as the winning candidate with a margin of 3,032 votes.
Quintos filed an election protest against VILLAROSA contesting the results of the election in all the 882 precincts in
the eleven municipalities of Occidental Mindoro. Petitioner is the wife of JOSE T. Villarosa, who was Representative
of the District in question for two terms, the last of which ended on June 30, 1998; in his certificate of candidacy for
the ele tio of Ma ,
, JOE T. VILLAOA ote as his i k a e o stage a e: JOE-JTV. I he e tifi ate
of a dida , Petitio e
ote JTV as he
i k a e/stage a e.
Issue:
Whether or not the JTV

otes should e ou ted i fa o of Petitio e A elita . Villa osa.

Ruling:
From all the foregoing, bad faith or malice on the part of VILLAROSA was evident when, in her certificate of candidacy
and campaign materials, she appropriated the initials or nickname of her husband, the incumbent Representative of
the district in question whom she wanted to succeed in office. She tried to make a mockery of a process whose
credibility is essential in preserving democracy. Nullus commodum potest de injuria propiasua - no one should be
allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
Villa osa s use of JTV as he i k a e as a le e plo to ake a o ke of the ele tio p o ess. HET did ot
commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the only issue for its determination was whether "JTV" votes or
variations thereof should be counted in favor of VILLAROSA and in ruling that such votes are stray votes.

Nullum crimen sine poena, nulla poena sine lege


There is no crime without a penalty, and there is no penalty without a law.

JUANITO R. RIMANDO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC) AND NORMA O. MAGNO


G.R. No. 176364
Facts:
On July 13, 2001, herein private respondent lodged a Complaint with the COMELEC, Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Santa Cruz Laguna, accusing Jacinto Carag, Jonry Enaya and herein petitioner Juanito R. Rimando of
violating Section 2, paragraph (e) and Section 3, paragraph (d) of COMELEC Resolution No. 3328 in relation to Section
261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7166.
Petitioner denied the allegation in his counter-affidavit. In a Resolution dated October 8, 2001, the Provincial Election
upe iso of a ta C uz, Lagu a, dis issed p i ate espo de t s o plai t against petitioner, private respondent
then appealed to COMELEC. On May 6, 2002, the COMELEC En Banc rendered a Resolution affirming the dismissal
of the complaint against security guards but directing its Law Department to file the proper information against
petitioner Juanito Rimando for violation of Article XXII, Section 261, paragraph (s) of the Omnibus Election Code.

36

Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by COMELEC En Banc in its Resolution dated January
30, 2004. Private Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration for the aforementioned resolution which was
granted by the COMELEC on October 11, 2005. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the October 11, 2005
Resolution but was denied by COMELEC.
Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to reverse and set 1) Resolution promulgated on October 11,
2005 and 2) Resolution promulgated on January 5, 2007.
Issue:
Whether or not Public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or without or in excess of jurisdiction in
disregarding the time-ho o ed do t i e of ullu
i e [si e poe a], ulla poe a si e lege.
Ruling:
Under Section 261 (s) of the Omnibus Election Code, the punishable act is the bearing of arms outside the immediate
i i it of o e s pla e of o k du i g the ele tio pe iod a d ot the failu e of the head o espo si le offi e of the
security agency to obtain prior written COMELEC approval.
In any event, there is likewise nothing in R.A. 7166 that expressly penalizes the mere failure to secure written
authority from the COMELEC as required in Section 32 thereof. Such failure to secure an authorization must still be
accompanied by other operative acts, such as the bearing, carrying or transporting of firearms in public places during
the election period. All told, petitioner should be absolved of any criminal liability, consistent with the doctrine of
nullum crimen [sine peona], nulla poena sine lege - there is no crime when there is no law punishing it. Thus, the
Court finds that respondent COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, The Resolutions of the COMELEC En Banc issued on October 11, 2005 and January 5, 2007 in Election
Case No. 01-130 are hereby reversed and set aside.

Nullum tempus occurit regi


There can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.

REPUBLIC vs. VILLASOR


G.R. No. L-30671; November 28, 1973
Facts:
The decision rendered on July 3, 1961 in favor of P.J. Kiener Co., Ltd., Gavino Unchuan, and International
Construction Corporation was declared final and executory by respondent Judge Guillermo P. Villasor. Pursuant to
the said order dated June 24, 1969, the corresponding Alias Writ of Execution was issued. For the strength of the
aforementioned writ, the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal served notices of garnishment with several banks, especially on
the o ies due the A ed Fo es of the Philippi es i the fo of deposits ; the Philippi e Vete a s Ba k e ei ed
the same notice of garnishment.
The fund of the AFP on deposit with the banks, particularly with the Philippine Veterans Bank and the Philippine
National Bank [or] their branches are public funds duly appropriated and allocated for the payment of pensions of
retirees, pay and allowance of military and civilian personnel and for the maintenance of operations of the AFP.
Petitioner, on certiorari, filed a petition against respondent Judge Villasor for acting in excess of jurisdiction with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in granting the issuance of a Writ of Execution against the
properties of AFP, hence the notices of garnishment are null and void.
Issue:

37

Whether or not the Writ of Execution rendered by respondent Judge Villasor is valid.
Ruling:
No. What was done by respondent Judge is not in conformity with the dictates of the Constitution. It is a fundamental
concept of sovereignty that the state as well as its government is immune from the suit unless it gives consent
e ause the e a e o legal ight as agai st the autho it that akes the la o
hi h the ight depe ds
ullu te pus o u it egi. The tate a ot e sued ithout its o se t. A o olla , oth di tated logi a d
sound sense from such a basic concept is that public funds cannot be the object of a garnishment proceeding even
if the consent to be sued had been previously granted and the state liabilit adjudged. Dis u se e ts of pu li
fu ds ust e o e ed the o espo di g app op iatio as e ui ed la .

Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum


The best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself

LOYOLA GRAND VILLAS HOMEOWNERS (SOUTH) ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 117188; August 7, 1997
Facts:
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners (South) Association, Inc. (LGVHAI) was organized as the association of homeowners
and residents of the Loyola Grand Villas. It was organized by the developer of the subdivision and its first president
was Victorio V. Soliven, himself the owner of the developer. For unknown reasons, however, LGVHAI did not file its
corporate by-laws. The officers of the LGVHAI tried to register its by-la s. The failed to do so. To the offi e s
consternation, they discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision the North
Association and the South Association. When one of the officers inquired about the status of LGVHAI, the head of
the legal department of the HIGC, informed him that LGVHAI had been automatically dissolved for two reasons. First,
it did not submit its by-laws within the period required by the Corporation Code and, second, there was non-user of
corporate charter e ause HIGC had ot e ei ed a
epo t o the asso iatio s a ti ities.
Issue:
Whethe o ot the LGVHAI s failu e to file its -laws within the period prescribed by Section 46 of the Corporation
Code had the effect of automatically dissolving the said corporation?
Ruling:
No. Taken as a whole and under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself (optima statuli
interpretatix est ipsum statutum), Section 46 reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory,
ea i g fo the o d ust i the fi st se te e the eof.
Note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the by-laws even prior to
incorporation. This provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the requirement
of filing the by-la s
ithi o e
o th afte e eipt of offi ial oti e of the issua e of its e tifi ate of
i o po atio
the e u ities a d E ha ge Co
issio . It e essa il follo s that failu e to file the by-laws
ithi that pe iod does ot i pl the de ise of the o po atio . B -la s a e e essa fo the go e
e t
of the corporation but these are subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and
related statutes.
There can be no automatic corporate dissolution simply because the incorporators failed to abide by the required
filing of by-la s e odied i e tio
of the Co po atio Code. The e is o out ight de ise of o po ate
existence. Proper notice and hearing are cardinal components of due process in any democratic institution, agency
or society. In other words, the incorporators must be given the chance to explain their neglect or omission and

38

remedy the same. Non-filing of the by-laws will not result in automatic dissolution of the corporation. In fact, under
the rules and regulations of the SEC, failure to file the by-laws on time may be penalized merely with the imposition
of an administrative fine without affecting the corporate existence of the erring firm.

Optimus interpres rerum usus


The best interpreter of the law is usage.

JM TUASON AND CO., ET AL. vs. HON. HERMINIO MARIANO, ET AL.


GR No. L-33140, October 23, 1978
Facts:
Respondents Aquial claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in Quezon City having an area of 383 hectares.
They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal
and that it was registered in the names of Petitioners Tuason pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No.
7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be
declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding.
Issue:
Whether or not OCT No. 735 is valid.
Ruling:
OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of
Benin vs Tuason, Alcantara vs Tuason and Pili vs Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases
involving the validity of OCT No. 735. Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere
(follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled) and optimus interpres rerum usus (the best
interpreter of the law is usage), the court ruled that respondents cannot maintain their action without eroding the
long settled holding of the courts that OCT No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

Pari Materia
Relating to the same matter

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SIMEONA MARTIN AND HERMIN ARCEO


G.R. No. L-38019 May 16, 1980
Facts:
That on or about April 5, 1972, in the municipalities of Bocaue and Guiguinto, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused Hermin Arceo and Simeona Martin, conspiring and
confederating together and helping each other, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have in their
possession such false and counterfeit science stamps worth Php 90,080.00 for, the purpose of using and selling the
same in the payment of internal revenue tax, and in fact sold and offered for sale a part of the same, with intent of
gain thus defrauding the government. The accused contend that their act does not constitute an offense and the
Fiscal respondent judge dismissed the case.
The respondent judge expressed the opinion that the word "penalties" found in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 5448 refers to
"administrative" penalties, like administrative fines provided for in the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC for
short), basing this view on Sec. 5 of the same Act, which speaks of "taxes and penalties" which should be turned over
by certain officials to the Treasurer of the Philippines.

39

The respondent judge interpreted the word "penalties" in phrase "subject to the same penalties", as administrative
fines, not penalties imposed for a criminal offense, by a court of justice after proper criminal proceedings. In this
sense, "penalties" would have reference to fines to be imposed in cases of improper or incorrect collection of the
tax with respect to the amount and to the time of payment thereof, not as penalties imposed on acts considered as
criminal offenses under the law.
Issue:
Is the word "penalties" found in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 5448 refers to "administrative" penalties?
Ruling:
No, the word "penalties" found in Sec. 4 of R.A. No. 5448 refers to "administrative" penalties.
The penalties mentioned in the phrase "subject to the same penalties" would then refer to Sec. 240 of the NIRC,
which are for specific offenses enumerated therein, thereby investing Republic Act 5448 with the character of
completeness, not that of incompleteness which would be against all reasonable presumptions as to how the
legislative body performs its functions.
With the certainty in the mind of the Court that the legislative body, in enacting Republic Act 5448 and relating it to
the documentary stamp tax provisions of the NIRC in the manner it did, intended to make the later law as effective
and fool-proof as the earlier statute, considering their kindred aims and objectives, and therefore are in pari materia
with each other, We have no hesitation in adopting the construction of Sec. 4 of Republic Act 5448 as providing
penalties for the same acts as those enumerated in Sec. 240 of the NIRC 4 Which clearly include those charged in
the information filed against private respondents. It may even be more accurate to say that more than just statutes
in pari materia with each other, Republic Act 5448 is an amplification of the NIRC, as may be gleaned from the
provisions of Sec. 4 of Republic Act 5448 which states that "in addition to the documentary stamp taxes imposed
under Sections 211 to 235 of Commonwealth Act No. 466, as amended, otherwise known as the National Internal
Revenue Code, there are hereby imposed science stamp taxes, etc." The second paragraph of the same Section 4
which provides that "that tax imposed herein shall be ... subject to the same penalties as the documentary stamp
imposed under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended," should, accordingly, be interpreted as referring
to the penalties imposed for the prohibited acts specified in Sec. 240 of the NIRC, designed to protect the integrity
of both kind of stamp taxes, for the full attainment of the purpose and aim of both statutes as revenue measures,
and prevent any form of subversion thereof.

Privilegia reciprint largan interpretationem voluntate consonan concedentis


Privileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them

BARRETTO vs. TUASON


G.R. Nos. L-36872;March 31, 1934
Facts:
The mayorazgo was founded by Don Antonio Tuason on February 25, 1794. On June 4 of 1794, the founder died in
the City of Manila. The mayorazgo was approved by Royal Cedula of August 20, 1795. On October 11, 1820, the
Statute of Civil Disentailments was promulgated in Spain, was extended to the Philippine Islands, and took effect
therein on March 1, 1864, by virtue of a Royal Decree of October 31, 1863.
The properties of the mayorazgo consist of the Haciendas de Santa Mesa y Diliman, Hacienda de Mariquina, and two
urban properties situated on Rosario Street, Manila. By agreement of the parties, the assessed value of the said
properties is: (a) Haciendas de Santa Mesa y Diliman for P3,550,646.00; (b) Hacienda de Mariquina for Php
1,507,140.00; and (c) Properties on Rosario Street for Php 542,382.00.
Issue:

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Who are entitled to the mayorazgo?


Ruling:
The recipients of the fifth of the revenues are indicated in the sixth clause of the instrument of foundation, the text
of which we again transcribe:
If the descendants of the younger children, subsequent to the grandchildren of the founder, are granted under
certain circumstances the right to possess the mayorazgo itself, with all its properties, we do not see how it can be
said that these descendants, subsequent to grandchildren, the sons of sons, were prohibited from receiving a fifth
of the revenues of said properties.
It is our understanding that the intention of the founder was not to restrict the grant of the usufruct of the fifth of
the revenue by limiting it to a certain number of generations of the younger children, but that he intended to extend
it to all of the descendants of the latter. If this is so we should apply to the case the rule of law of the Partidas (Rule
28, Title 34, 7th Partido), which says: "Privilegia recipiunt largum interpretationem voluntati consonan concedentis."
(Privileges are to be interpreted with liberality in accordance with the will of him who grants them.)
The foregoing paragraphs contain conclusions of fact and of law established after a careful study of the provisions
found in the foundation and of the laws applicable to the case, and are squarely applicable to the facts recently
proved at the new trial, except that five-eighths of the fifth should be divided among the descendants of the five (5)
younger children with succession and the remaining three-eighths of the fifth among the relatives in general of the
founder, because it developed that the younger daughter Eustaquia Ma. Tuason had left heirs, contrary to the
stipulation of the plaintiffs and the defendants.
That the said appealed decision and order be amended in the sense that the sales executed in favor of the
defendants-appellants of the participations coming from the younger children without succession, are valid in their
entirety, and therefore, said participations should be adjudicated in favor of said defendants-appellants.

Potior est in tempore, potior est in jure


He who is first in time is preferred in right

CRUZ vs. CABANA


G.R. No. L-56232 June 22, 1984
Facts:
On June 1, 1965, Leodegaria Cabana sold the subject property to respondent spouses Teofilo Legaspi and Iluminada
Ca a a spouses Legaspi u de a o t a t e titled Biliha g Muli g Ma i ili hi h stipulated that Ca a a can
repurchase the land within one year from December 31, 1966. However, the said land was not repurchased. On
October 21, 1968, Cabana formally sold the subject property to spouses Legaspi in an absolute sale. The spouses
Legaspi then attempted to register the deed of sale, but failed because they could not present the owner's duplicate
of title which was still in the possession of the Philippine National Bank as mortgage. Subsequently, they were able
to register the sale on May 13, 1969 under Primary Entry No. 210113 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon Province.
On November 29, 1968, Cabana sold the subject property to Abelardo Cruz (now deceased), who, in turn, tried to
register the deed of sale on September 3, 1970. However, he was informed that Cabana had already sold the subject
property to the spouses Legaspi, so he was only able to register the land in his name on February 9, 1971.
Issue:
Who is the true and rightful owner of the property in litigation?
Ruling:

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The Court declared spouses Legaspi as the true and rightful owners of the property in litigation.
As the Court held in Carbonell vs. Court of Appeals "it is essential that the buyer of realty must act in good faith in
registering his deed of sale to merit the protection of the second paragraph of Article 1544." As the writer stressed
in his concurring opinion therein, "The governing principle here is prius tempore, potior jure (first in time, stronger
in right). Knowledge gained by the first buyer of the second sale cannot defeat the first buyer's rights except only as
provided by the Civil Code and that is where the second buyer first registers in good faith the second sale ahead of
the first. Such knowledge of the first buyer does not bar her from availing of her rights under the law, among them,
to register first her purchase as against the second buyer. But in converso knowledge gained by the second buyer of
the first sale defeats his rights even if he is first to register the second sale, since such knowledge taints his prior
registration with bad faith. This is the price exacted by Article 1544 of the Civil Code for the second buyer being able
to displace the first buyer; that before the second buyer can obtain priority over the first, he must show that he
acted in good faith throughout (i.e. in ignorance of the first sale and of the first buyer's rights) from the time of
acquisition until the title is transferred to him by registration or failing registration, by delivery of possession. The
second buyer must show continuing good faith and innocence or lack of knowledge of the first sale until his contract
ripens into full ownership through prior registration as provided by law."

Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo, prohibetur et per obliquum


What is prohibited directly is prohibited indirectly

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE vs. SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY (PHILIPPINES)


G.R. No. 153866 February 11, 2005
Facts:
Respondent Seagate Technology (Philippines) is a resident foreign corporation duly registered with the Securities
and Exchange Commission to do business in the Philippines, with principal office address at the new Cebu Township
One, Special Economic Zone, Barangay Cantao-an, Naga, Cebu. Petitioner Commissioner of Internal Revenue is sued
in his official capacity, having been duly appointed and empowered to perform the duties of his office, including,
among others, the duty to act and approve claims for refund or tax credit.
The respondent is registered with the Philippine Export Zone Authority (PEZA) and has been issued PEZA Certificate
No. 97-044 pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 66 (P.D. No. 66), as amended, to engage in the manufacture of
recording components primarily used in computers for export. Such registration was made on June 6, 1997. The
respondent is Value Added Tax (VAT)-registered entity as evidenced by VAT Registration Certification No. 97-083000600-V issued on April 2, 1997. The respondent filed VAT returns for the period April 1, 1998 to June 30, 1999.
On October 4, 1999, an administrative claim for refund of VAT input taxes in the amount of Php 28,369,226.38 with
supporting documents (inclusive of the Php 12,267,981.04 VAT input taxes subject of this Petition for Review), was
filed at the Revenue District Office No. 83, Talisay, Cebu. No final action has been received by the respondent from
the petitio e o the espo de t s lai fo VAT efu d.
Issue:
Is the respondent entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax Credit Certificate?
Ruling:
Yes, the respondent is entitled to the refund or issuance of Tax Credit Certificate.
As a PEZA-registered enterprise within a special economic zone, the respondent is entitled to the fiscal incentives
and benefits provided for in either P.D. No. 66 or Executive Order No. 226. It shall, moreover, enjoy all privileges,
benefits, advantages or exemptions under both Republic Act Nos. 7227 and 7844.

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The respondent as an entity is exempt from internal revenue laws and regulations. This exemption covers both direct
and indirect taxes, stemming from the very nature of the VAT as a tax on consumption, for which the direct liability
is imposed on one person but the indirect burden is passed on to another. Respondent, as an exempt entity, can
neither be directly charged for the VAT on its sales nor indirectly made to bear, as added cost to such sales, the
equivalent VAT on its purchases. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. Where the law does not
distinguish, we ought not to distinguish.
Republic Act No. 7916 (RA 7916) states that "no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed on business
establishments operating within the ecozone." Since this law does not exclude the VAT from the prohibition, it is
deemed included. Exceptio firmat regulam in casibus non exceptis. An exception confirms the rule in cases not
excepted; that is, a thing not being excepted must be regarded as coming within the purview of the general rule.
Moreover, even though the VAT is not imposed on the entity but on the transaction, it may still be passed on and,
therefore, indirectly imposed on the same entity -- a patent circumvention of the law. That no VAT shall be imposed
directly upon business establishments operating within the ecozone under RA 7916 also means that no VAT may be
passed on and imposed indirectly. Quando aliquid prohibetur ex directo prohibetur et per obliquum. When anything
is prohibited directly, it is also prohibited indirectly.
To summarize, special laws expressly grant preferential tax treatment to business establishments registered and
operating within an ecozone, which by law is considered as a separate customs territory. As such, respondent is
exempt from all internal revenue taxes, including the VAT, and regulations pertaining thereto. It has opted for the
income tax holiday regime, instead of the 5 percent preferential tax regime. As a matter of law and procedure, its
registration status entitling it to such tax holiday can no longer be questioned. Its sales transactions intended for
export may not be exempt, but like its purchase transactions, they are zero-rated. No prior application for the
effective zero rating of its transactions is necessary. Being VAT-registered and having satisfactorily complied with all
the requisites for claiming a tax refund of or credit for the input VAT paid on capital goods purchased, respondent is
entitled to such VAT refund or credit.

Ratihabito mandato aquiparatur


Legislative ratification is equivalent to a mandate

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS vs. THE STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF NEW YORK
G.R. No. 5876

September 1, 1911

Facts:
On about July 27, 1901, the defendant, The Standard Oil Company of New York, imported into the Philippine Islands
30,000 cases of refined petroleum which contained approximately 300,000 gallons. That same day, the defendant
company presented to the Bureau of Customs of this city an affidavit setting forth that the said 30,000 cases of
refined petroleum had been sold by the former to the commissary department of the United States Army in Manila,
and that the said company retained no interest therein.
From August 7 to October 28, 1901, the defendant company removed from its warehouse the 30,000 cases there
deposited, which it did with the authorization of the customs authorities of the port of Manila, upon the express
representation of the duly authorized agents of the defendant that the withdrawal of the said cases was for their
delivery to the commissary department of the United States Army and for the exclusive use of the said Army, in
conformity with the terms of the privilege of free entry granted thereto.
But, of the 30,000 cases, only 10,679 were actually delivered to the commissary department of the United States
Army, and the remaining 19,321 cases, which contained 193,210 gallons of refined petroleum, equivalent to
608,321.685 kilograms, were, free of customs duties, sold to private parties; the Government of the Philippine

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Islands, as alleged by the plaintiff, being, by these deceitful and fraudulent means, defrauded of the tax or duty
which the defendant company should have paid upon the said cases.
As prescribed by Section 30 of the Provisional Customs Tariff, then in force in the Philippine Islands, the duty
chargeable was 6.318 pesos Mexican currency for each 100 kilograms; so that, for the 608,321.685 kilograms, the
defendant company was indebted in the sum of 38,433.76 pesos Mexican currency which, at the exchange of one
dollar for each 2 pesos in Mexican currency, make exactly 38,433.76 pesos in Philippine currency.
The Government of the Philippine Islands demands of The Standard Oil Company of New York the payment of Php
38,433.76, together with the interest thereon due from October 28, 1901, and the costs and expenses occasioned
by this suit, by reason of the customs duties payable by the defendant company,
Issue:
Is the defendant company liable to pay the obligation?
Ruling:
Yes, the defendant company is liable to pay the obligation.
The intention and will of the legislator being so clear, so explicit, to approve, confirm, and ratify as by an act of his
own prior to April 11, 1899, and even also to July 12, 1898 (the date of the order of the President), the acts of the
latter and of the officials of the Government of these Islands, with respect to "the collection of all the said duties
prior to March 8, 1902," and also with regard to "the import and export duties levied by the authorities of the United
States or of the provisional military government of the same in the Philippine Islands prior to March 8, 1902"two
subjects that are the purpose of the said Act, it being an axiom of law, that the ratification is equivalent to a mandate
(ratihabitio aequiparatur mandato), the conclusion cannot be avoided that, by the legislators will, the tariff duties
demandable during the period mentioned in the complaint, are so, not by a null and void order of the President, but
by an Act of Congress. Such, and no other, is for the courts the status of the established law in this matter, be
whatever it may, in abstract law, the legality of the legislative act concerned, for there is no question pending before
us with respect to its constitutionality. We do not treat of the question in this brief, says the appellant, as we do not
consider it necessary to do so."

Ratio Legis
Interpretation according to the spirit

MANUEL UY vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, IN HIS CAPACITY AS POSTMASTER GENERAL


G.R. No. L-23248 February 28, 1969
Facts:
Manuel Uy is an agent of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO). PCSO is a government entity created and
empowered by law to hold sweepstakes draws and lotteries for charitable and public purposes.
For the Grand Christmas Sweepstakes Draw, the PCSO directed its agents to undertake every means possible to
a hie e its sales goal. u se ue tl , U de ised a G a d Ch ist as Bo us A a d pla , he e his su -agents and
the purchasers of the tickets themselves, in addition to the prize money from PCSO, would win certain items.
Pu sua t to this, Post aste Ge e al E i o Palo a issued a F aud O de a d o de ed U s pa els o tai i g
sweepstakes tickets and other personal mail to be refused for acceptance for mailing, on the basis of the Postal Law
which proscribes the use of the mail system to conduct lotteries, gift enterprises, schemes, etc. Thus, Uy filed a
complaint challenging the issuance of the Fraud Order.
Issue:
Does the Grand Christmas Bonus Award constitute a lottery or a gift enterprise?

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Ruling:
No, Grand Christmas Bonus Award does not constitute a lottery or a gift enterprise.
There is no statutory definition of the terms "lottery" and "gift enterprise". This Court, in the case of "El Debate" Inc.
vs. Topacio, supra, referring to lottery, said:
... while countless definitions of lottery have been attempted, the authoritative one for this jurisdiction is that of the
United States Supreme Court, in analogous cases having to do with the power of the United States Postmaster
General, viz: The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing,
gift exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance (Horner vs. United States [1902] 147 U.S. 449; Public
Clearing House vs. Coyne [1903] 194 U.S., 497; U.S. vs. Filart and Singson [1915] 30 Phil. 80; U.S. vs. Olsen and Marker
[1917] 36 Phil. 395; U.S. Vs. Baguio [1919] 39 Phil. 962: Valhalla Hotel Construction Company vs. Carmona, p. 233,
ante.)
Thus, for lottery to exist, three elements must concur, namely: consideration, prize, and chance.
In the instant case, as stated by the lower court, the prizes offered by Uy were to be taken from his share in the
agent's prize, which was 10% of the amount of the prize won by each ticket sold. Therefore, since none of the prizes
(awards and bonuses) offered in Uy's plan were to come directly from the aggregate price of the sweepstakes tickets
sold by Uy, as a part thereof, no consideration exists for the chance to win said prizes, there being no "contribution
in kind to the fund or property to be distributed."
Even in the light of the mischief or evil sought to be redressed by the Postal Law, or the ratio legis, Uy's scheme
cannot be condemned as a lottery. It is merely a scheme set up to promote the sale of tickets for the Grand Christmas
Sweepstakes Draw held on December 15, 1963. Should any question be raised it would be: whether or not
sweepstakes draws cultivate or stimulate the gambling spirit among the people. It should be so, because it cannot
be doubted that sweepstakes tickets purchasers are induced to buy said tickets because of the desire to win any of
the substantial prizes offered by the PCSO. This question, however, is at once rendered moot and academic because
sweepstakes draws are authorized by law.

Ratio legis est anima legis


The reason of the law is its soul

VILLASI vs. GARCIA


G.R. No. 190106 January 15, 2014
Facts:
Sometime in 1990, petitioner Magdalena Villasi (Villasi) engaged the services of respondent Fil-Garcia Construction,
Inc. (FGCI) to construct a seven-storey condominium building located at Aurora Boulevard corner N. Domingo Street,
Cubao, Quezon City. For failure of Villasi to fully pay the contract price despite several demands, FGCI initiated a suit
for collection of sum of money before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. In its action, FGCI prayed, among
others, for the payment of the amount of Php 2,865,000.00, representing the unpaid accomplishment billings.
Served with summons, Villasi filed an answer specifically denying the material allegations of the complaint.
Contending that FGCI has no cause of action against her, Villasi averred that she delivered the total amount of Php
7,490,325.10 to FGCI but the latter accomplished only 28% of the project. After the pre-trial conference was
terminated without the parties having reached an amicable settlement, trial on the merits ensued.

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To enforce her right as prevailing party, Villasi filed a Motion for Execution of the November 20, 2000 Court of
Appeals Decision, which was favorably acted upon by the RTC. A Writ of Execution was issued on April 28, 2004,
commanding the Sheriff to execute and make effective the November 20, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals.
To satisfy the judgment, the sheriff levied on a building located at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, covered
by Tax Declaration No. D-021-01458, and built in the lots registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 379193
and 379194. While the building was declared for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, the lots in which it was
erected were registered in the names of the Spouses Filomeno Garcia and Ermelinda Halili-Garcia (Spouses Garcia).
After the mandatory posting and publication of notice of sale on execution of real property were complied with, a
public auction was scheduled on January 25, 2006.
To forestall the sale on execution, the Spouses Garcia filed an Affidavit of Third Party Claim and a Motion to Set Aside
Notice of Sale on Execution, claiming that they are the lawful owners of the property which was erroneously levied
upon by the sheriff.
Issue:
Are the Spouses Garcia the lawful owners of the property?
Ruling:
Yes, the Spouses Garcia are the lawful owners of the property.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless,
they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a
property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests
ot o l o e s si e e a d ho est desi e to o tai title to the p ope t a d a ou es his ad e se lai agai st the
State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such
a a t st e gthe s o e s o a fide lai of a uisitio of o e ship.
It likewise failed to escape our attention that FGCI is in actual possession of the building and as the payment of taxes
coupled with actual possession of the land covered by tax declaration strongly supports a claim of ownership. Quite
significantly, all the court processes in an earlier collection suit between FGCI and Villasi were served, thru the
fo e s ep ese tati e Filomeno Garcia, at No. 140 Kalayaan Avenue, Quezon City, where the subject property is
located. This circumstance is consistent with the tax declaration in the name of FGCI.
The explanation proffered by the Spouses Garcia, that the City Assessor merely committed an error when it declared
the property for taxation purposes in the name of FGCI, appears to be suspect in the absence of any prompt and
serious effort on their part to have it rectified before the onset of the instant controversy. The correction of entry
belatedly sought by the Spouses Garcia is indicative of its intention to put the property beyond the reach of the
judgment creditor. Every prevailing party to a suit enjoys the corollary right to the fruits of the judgment and, thus,
court rules provide a procedure to ensure that every favorable judgment is fully satisfied. It is almost trite to say that
execution is the fruit and end of the suit. Hailing it as the "life of the law," ratio legis est anima, this Court has
zealously guarded against any attempt to thwart the rigid rule and deny the prevailing litigant his right to savour the
fruit of his victory. A judgment, if left unexecuted, would be nothing but an empty triumph for the prevailing party.
The rule on accession is not an iron-clad dictum. On instances where this Court was confronted with cases requiring
judicial determination of the ownership of the building separate from the lot, it never hesitated to disregard such
rule. The case at bar is of similar import. When there are factual and evidentiary evidence to prove that the building
and the lot on which it stands are owned by different persons, they shall be treated separately. As such, the building
or the lot, as the case may be, can be made liable to answer for the obligation of its respective owner.

46

Reddendo singula singulis


Referring each to each; referring each phrase or expression to its appropriate object; or let each be put in its proper
place

AMADORA vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. L-47745 April 15, 1988
Facts:
A few days before graduation, Alfredo Amadora was shot and killed when his classmate, Pablito Daffron fired a gun
in the auditorium of their school. Daffon was convicted of homicide thru reckless imprudence. Additionally, the
petitioners filed a civil action for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code against the Colegio de San JoseRecoletos, its rector the high school principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher, together with Daffon and
two other students, through their respective parents. The complaint against the students was later dropped.
Issue:
Can the school be held liable?
Ruling:
No, the school cannot be held liable.
In the Exconde Case, Dante Capuno, a student of the Balintawak Elementary School and a Boy Scout, attended a
Rizal Day parade on instructions of the city school supervisor. After the parade, the boy boarded a jeep, took over
its wheel and drove it so recklessly that it turned turtle, resulting in the death of two of its passengers. Dante was
found guilty of double homicide with reckless imprudence. In the separate civil action filed against them, his father
was held solidarily liable with him in damages under Article 1903 (now Article 2180) of the Civil Code for the tort
committed by the 15-year old boy.
This decision, which was penned by Justice Bautista Angelo on June 29, 1957, exculpated the school in an obiter
dictum (as it was not a party to the case) on the ground that it was riot a school of arts and trades. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, with whom Justices Sabino Padilla and Alex Reyes concurred, dissented, arguing that it was the school
authorities who should be held liable under this rule, he said, was imposed on (1) teachers in general; and (2) heads
of schools of arts and trades in particular. The modifying clause "of establishments of arts and trades" should apply
only to "heads" and not "teachers."
After an exhaustive examination of the problem, the Court has come to the conclusion that the provision in question
should apply to all schools, academic as well as non-academic. Where the school is academic rather than technical
or vocational in nature, responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of
such student, following the first part of the provision. This is the general rule. In the case of establishments of arts
and trades, it is the head thereof, and only he, who shall be held liable as an exception to the general rule. In other
words, teachers in general shall be liable for the acts of their students except where the school is technical in nature,
in which case it is the head thereof who shall be answerable. Following the canon of reddendo singula singulis
"teachers" should apply to the words "pupils and students" and "heads of establishments of arts and trades" to the
word "apprentices."
The Court finds under the facts as disclosed by the record and in the light of the principles herein announced that
none of the respondents is liable for the injury inflicted by Pablito Damon on Alfredo Amadora that resulted in the
latter's death.

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Salus populi est suprema lex


The voice of the people is the supreme law

RESTITUTO YNOT vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT


G.R. No. 74457

March 20, 1987

Facts:
Executive Order No. 626-A (E. O. 626-A) prohibits the inter-provincial movement of carabaos and the slaughtering
of carabaos. Any carabao or carabeef transported in violation of E.O. 626-A shall be subject to confiscation and
forfeiture by the governmentt, to be distributed to charitable institutions as Chairman of National Meat Inspection
may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the
case of carabao.
On January 13, 1984, Restituto Ynot transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when the same
was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. 626-A.
Issue:
Is Executive Order No. 626-A constitutional?
Ruling:
No, Executive Order No. 626-A is not constitutional.
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our
judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty
to the rule of law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by
the awesome power of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two
hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, as "the law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be
secured beyond the reach of officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process
clause into a worn and empty catchword.
This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of
these requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed
on sight because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials,
contaminated meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of
a person sought for a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has
fled. Filthy restaurants may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect
the public morals. In such instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in
view of the nature of the property involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear
and present danger.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is
restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty
and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public
needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent
powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed
in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the
womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous

48

and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public
welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the
venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the
subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number.
The Court finds that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed
to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense
and is immediately condemned and punished.
The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them
whenever they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is
embellish and impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and
fulfill the role assigned to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not
afraid to assert them.
The Court declared Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

Surplusagium non nocet


Surplusage does not vitiate a statute

UNITED STATES vs. JULIAN SANTIAGO


G.R. No. L-11374 March 14, 1917
Facts:
Julian Santiago, as Roman apostolic priest and the confessor of Eufrasia Siasat, a virgin, 16 years old, wilfully,
unlawfully, and criminally seduced the said girl and succeeded in lying with her several times during the period
covering the months of July to November 1914.
Issue:
Is the defendant liable for qualified seduction?
Ruling:
Yes, the defendant is liable for qualified seduction.
The words "by means of deceit and promise of marriage: used in the complaint in question cannot have the effect
of varying the qualification of the crime charged, inasmuch as in the complaint it was expressly stated that the carnal
knowledge was had between Julian Santiago, roman apostolic priest, and the girl Eufrasia Siasat, a virgin 16 years
old, and much less can those words have the effect of accusing the same Julian Santiago of the crime of simple
seduction, that is, of two crimes punished with different penalties.
Said words can be considered as a redundancy in the complaint, or in other words as mere surplusage, for the reason,
as has been stated in speaking of the crime of qualified seduction, that the law does not require that there should
be deceit on the part of the agent in order that he may be punished as guilty of the said crime.
Mere surplusage will not vitiate an indictment which contains sufficient matter to charge a crime. An unnecessary
averment may be considered surplusage and rejected, as may be a defective but immaterial averment, and a fact
stated may be rejected as surplusage if it be merely in aggravation, so that it may be stricken out and yet leave the
offense fully describes. . . . (Ruling Case Law, volume 14, par. 37, page 191 and the cases therein cited.)
xxx
xxx
xxx

49

Mere surplusage does not amount to duplicity, and where a count charges one offense, and defectively charges
another, the latter charge may be rejected as surplusage. . . . (Ruling Case Law, volume 14, par. 40 page 196, and the
cases therein cited.)
It cannot therefore be held, that in the complaint in question two crimes are charged and that the phrase used in
the said complaint, "by means of deceit and promise of marriage," which can be considered as superfluous because
in the complaint Julian Santiago is accused of the crime of qualified seduction, has vitiated the complaint with a
nullity, and that the lower court has committed an error in overruling the second ground of the demurrer interposed
to the said complaint by the counsel for the defense.
The acts proven at the trial constitute the crime of qualified seduction prescribed and punished by Article 443, par.
1 of the Penal Code. The guilt of the accused as the author of the said crime having been proven without the
concurrence of any modifying circumstance, the penalty imposed upon said accused in its medium degree, such as
has been imposed upon him by the trial court in the judgment appealed from, is property, although the accused
should also be condemned to recognize and maintain the offspring which his illicit relations with the said girl would
produce.

Stare decisis et non quieta movere


Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled.

J.R.A. PHILIPPINES, INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE


G.R. No. 177127 October 11, 2010
Facts:
Petitioner, a PEZA Corporation, filed applications for tax credit/refund of unutilized input VAT on its zero-rated sales
for the taxable quarters of 2000. The claim for credit/refund, however, remained unacted by the respondent. Hence,
petitioner was constrained to file a petition before the CTA. The CTA eventually denied the petition for lack of the
o d ze o- ated o the i oi es/ e eipts.
Issue:
Whether or not the failure to p i t the o d ze o- ated o the i oi es/ e eipts is fatal to a lai fo
of input VAT on zero-rated sales

edit/ efu d

Ruling:
Yes. The a se e of the o d ze o ated o the i oi es/ e eipts is fatal to a lai fo edit/ efu d of i put VAT.
This has been squarely resolved in Panasonic Communications Imaging Corporation of the Philippines (formerly
Matsushita Business Machine Corporation of the Philippines) v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (G.R. No. 178090,
612 SCRA 28, February 8, 2010). In that case, the claim for tax credit/refund was denied for non-compliance with
Section 4.108-1 of Revenue Regulations No. 7- , hi h e ui es the o d ze o ated to e p i ted o the
invoices/receipts covering zero-rated sales.
From the abovementioned de isio , the Cou t uled that the appea a e of the o d ze o- ated o the fa e of
invoices covering zero-rated sales prevents buyers from falsely claiming input VAT from their purchases when no
VAT was actually paid. If, absent such word, a successful claim for input VAT is made, the government would be
refunding money it did not collect.
Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Courts are bound by prior decisions. Thus, once a case has been decided one
way, courts have no choice but to resolve subsequent cases involving the same issue in the same manner.

50

Ubi jus, ibi remedium


Where there is a right, there is a remedy.

LEONARDO vs. COURT OF APPEALS


G. R. No. 125329. September 10, 2003
Facts:
Petitioner Ann Brigit Leonardo was born in Manila to common-law spouses Eddie Fernandez and Gloria Leonardo.
In her Birth Certificate Leonardo was her surname.
Wanting to change her surname to that of her father, they sent a letter to the Local Civil Registrar on August 1, 1994.
The Local Civil Registrar denied their request citing FC 176 which states that petitioner, being illegitimate, should
carry the surname of the mother.
Issue:
Whethe o

ot A

B igit Leo a do ould use he fathe s su a e.

Ruling:
No. The Family Code has repealed NCC 366 which allows natural children to use the surname of the father if the
child is recognized by BOTH parents. Now, in the Family Code, an illegitimate child should use the surname of the
mother even if the father acknowledges him/her. Hence, Ann Brigit has NO right to use the surname of the father.
Ubi jus, ibi remedium. When there is a right, there is a remedy. Conversely, if there is no right, there is no remedy
as every remedial right is based on a substantive right.

Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus


Where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish

GUEVARA vs. INOCENTES


G. R. No. L-25577, 16 SCRA 379, March 15, 1966
Facts:
The petitioner, Onofre Guevara was extended an ad interim appointment as Undersecretary of Labor by the former
Executive on November 18, 1965. Took his oath of office on November 25th same year. The incumbent Executive
issued Memorandum Circular No. 8 dated January 23, 1966 declaring that all ad interim appointments made by the
former Executive lapsed with the adjournment of the special session of Congress at about midnight of January 22,
1966. The respondent, Raoul Inocentes was extended an ad interim appointment for the same position by the
incumbent Executive on January 23, 1966. Guevara filed before the court an instant petition for Quo Warranto
seeking to be declared person legally entitled to the said Officer of the Undersecretary of Labor under Art. VII Sec.
10 (4) of the 1935 Constitution. which states that:
The p eside t shall ha e the po e to ake appoi tments during the recess of the Congress, but such
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjou
e t of Co g ess .
Since there was no Commission on Appointments organized during the special session which commenced on January
,
, the espo de t o te ded that the petitio e s ad i te i appoi t e t as ell as othe ade u de
similar conditions must have lapsed when the Congress adjourned its last special session. But the petitioner stated
that
the spe ifi p o isio i the Co stitutio hi h states that: u til the e t adjou
e t of Co g ess ea s
adjournment of a regular session of Congress and not by a special session and (2) only the Senate adjourned sine die
at midnight of Ja ua
,
a d the House of the ep ese tati e e el suspe ded its sessio a d to e

51

resumed on January 24, 1966 at 10:00 AM. The petitioner therefore concludes that Congress has been in continuous
session without interruption since January 17.
Issue:
. Whethe o ot, the petitio e s o te tio ega di g the e t adjou
e t of Co g ess spe ifi all p o ides fo
regular session only.
. Whethe o ot, the petitio e s o te tio that Co g ess is still i o ti uous sessio ?
Ruling:
1. NO. The ph ase u til the e t adjou
e t of Co g ess does ot ake a
efe e e to spe ifi sessio of
Congress, whether regular or special. But a well-k o Lati
a i is statuto o st u tio stated that he the
law does not distinguish we should not distinguish. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus. It is safe to
o lude that the autho s of the
Co stitutio used the o d adjou
e t had i
i d eithe egula o
special and not simply the regular one as the petitioner contended.
2. NO. The mere fact that the Senate adjourned sine die at midnight of January 22, 1966, the House of the
Representative is only a part of the Congress and not the Congress itself. So logically, the adjournment of one of its
Houses is considered adjournment of the Co g ess as a hole. A d the petitio e s ad i te i appoi t e t ust
have been lapsed on January 22, 1966 upon adjournment of the Senate.

Utile per Inutile non vitiatur


The useful is not vitiated by the non-useful.

PEOPLE vs. MARTIN


G.R. No. L-33487; May 31, 1971
Facts:
Respondents were charged with violating Sec. 46 of C.A. No. 613 or the Philippine Immigration Act by the Court of
First Instance of La Union, specifically in the act of bringing in and landing. The Court dismissed the charges on the
ground of it being a continuous offense with Criminal Case 6258-M filed in Bulacan against other Respondents who
were concealing and harboring the same Chinese Immigrants who were brought in therefore they had no
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the the act of bringing in and landing constitute a continuous offense with concealing and harboring.
Ruling:
No. They are two separate offenses. C.A. No. 613 clearly provides that the four acts are in fact four separate acts.
Each act possesses its own distinctive, different, and disparate meaning. The word OR in C.A. No. 613 cannot be
given a non-disjunctive meaning signifying the separation of one act from the other. The words in the information
suggesting conspiracy are considered a mere surplusage. A well-know Latin maxim is statutory construction stated
that The useful is ot itiated the o -useful. Utile pe i utile o itiatu .

52

Ut res magis valeat quam pereat


The construction is to be sought which gives effect to the whole of the statute its very word

PEOPLE vs. MANTALABA


G.R. No. 186227
Facts:
The Task Force Regional Anti-Crime Emergency Response (RACER) in Butuan City received a report from an informer
that a certain Allen Mantalaba, was selling shabu at Purok 4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City. Thus, a buy-bust
team was organized. Around 7 o'clock in the evening the team, armed with the marked money, proceeded to Purok
4, Barangay 3, Agao District, Butuan City for the buy-bust operation. The two poseur-buyers approached Allen who
was said to be in the act of selling shabu. PO1 Pajo saw the poseur-buyers and appellant talking to each other.
Afterwards, the appellant handed a sachet of shabu to one of the poseur-buyers and the latter gave the marked
money to the appellant. The poseur-buyers went back to the police officers and told them that the transaction has
been completed. Police officers Pajo and Simon rushed to the place and handcuffed the appellant as he was leaving
the place. The police officers, still in the area of operation and in the presence of barangay officials, searched the
appellant and found a big sachet of shabu. PO1 Simon also pointed to the barangay officials the marked money, two
pieces of P100 bill, thrown by the appellant on the ground. The RTC found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of violation of R.A. 9165. The appellant pleaded not guilty and states the lone argument that the
lower court gravely erred in convicting him of the crime charged despite failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Issue:
Whether or not the appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the violation of R.A. 9165.
Ruling:
Yes. This Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for
apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and
capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities. Further, What determines if there was, indeed,
a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to
wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing
sold and the payment therefor. From the above testimony of the prosecution witness, it was well established that
the elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly identified. The subject
dangerous drug, as well as the marked money used, were also satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear
as to the manner in which the buy-bust operation was conducted. Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam
pereat. Such interpretation is to be adopted so that the law may continue to have efficacy rather than fail. A perfect
judicial solution cannot be forged from an imperfect law, which impasse should now be the concern of and is
accordingly addressed to Congress.

Verba Accipienda sunt secundum subjectam materiam


A word is to be understood in the context in which it is used

R (ON THE APPLICATION OF ST (ERITREA)) (FC) vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Facts:
The appellant is of Eritrean nationality. But she has never lived in Eritrea. She was born on 2 July 1981 and was
formerly resident in Ethiopia. She came to the United Kingdom on 3 July 1998. Immediately on her arrival in this
country she claimed protection as a refugee. Her reason was that she feared persecution in both Eritrea and Ethiopia.
Her claim was registered, and she was granted temporary admission into the United Kingdom under paragraph 21
of Schedule 2 to the Immigration Act 1971.

53

The appella t s status has ot ha ged si e the date of he a i al o e tha


ea s ago. He te po a
admission has been extended from time to time, and she remains liable to detention. The latest notification of
temporary admission was issued to her on 17 October 2011. She was told that she must reside at the address given
on the notification form and she was to report to an immigration official on 22 December 2011 and then on the
fourth Thursday every two months. She was also told that she was not allowed to work or engage in any business
unless she had been explicitly granted permission to do so.
Issue:
Whether the appellant is entitled to the protection of article 32 of the Convention, which precludes the contracting
states f o e pelli g a efugee ho is la full i thei te ito
sa e o g ou ds of atio al se u it o pu li
order.
Ruling:
For these reasons, I am not persuaded that there are sound grounds for departing from my provisional view that the
o d la full i a ti le
ust e take to efe to hat is to e t eated as la ful a o di g to the do esti
laws of the contracting state. I think, in agreement with the Court of Appeal and with Lord Dyson, that this is what
the framers of the Convention intended by the use of this word in this context. I would dismiss the appeal.
M D a le did ot seek to el o Lo d B o s o se atio s i zo a e eta of State for Work and Pensions
[2006] 1 AC 564, para 24, that in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex p Bugdacay [1987] AC 514 Lord
B idge has de ided the ase of I e Musisi ightl ut fo the o g easo s, a d that the te
efugee i a ticle
32(1) of the Refugee Convention must be taken to mean someone who has been determined to have satisfied the
article 1 definition of that term. I think that he was right not to do so. The ancient maxim verba accipienda sunt
secundum subjectam materiam (words are to be understood according to the subject-matter with which they deal)
provides the best guide to the meaning that should be given to what Lord Brown said in this paragraph.

Verba intentioni, non e contra, debent inservire


Words ought to be more subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words.

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINE REPRESENTATIVE BY LCP NATIONAL PRESIDENT JERRY P. TRENAS, ET
AL.
GR. No. 176951 GR. No. 177499 GR. No. 178056
Facts:
These cases were initiated by the consolidated petitions for prohibition filed by the League of Cities of the
Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Trenas, assailing the constitutionality of the sixteen laws, each
converting the municipality covered thereby into a component city and seeking to enjoin the COMELEC from
conducting plebiscites pursuant to the subject laws. The supreme court en banc, by a majority vote, struck down the
subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause.
O
Ma h
, the up e e Cou t E Ba , agai
a ajo it ote, de ied the espo de ts fi st otio fo
e o side atio . O
Ap il
, the up e e Cou t E Ba ,
a split ote, de ied the espo de ts se o d
motion for reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the subject 16 Cityhood Laws is a violation of the Constitution.
Ruling:
Yes! It s fi al. The
Cit hood La s a e o stitutio al. We should ot e e lose sight of the fa t that the
ities
covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also
complied with the requirements of the [Local Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No.

54

9009. Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this
Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly
e og izi g the e tai olle ti e isdo of Co g ess, the C said. The Cou t st essed that Congress clearly
intended that the local government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009,
hi h i poses a highe i o e e ui e e t of PhP
illio fo the eatio of ities. The Cou t eite ated that
while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of
several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June
30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt the municipalities
covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint
Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress
before June 30, 2001 from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint
Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress,
and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills
of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and
favorably voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both
Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are but the
express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception, from the coverage
of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the
express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses. The Court held that the imposition of the income
e ui e e t of P
illio f o lo al sou es u de A
as a it a . While the Co stitutio
a dates that
the creation of local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to
insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently
producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside
development, and the o o ita t atio al g o th. I fa t, a i te p etatio that u s ou te ith the legislati e
intent is unacceptable and invalid. Verba intentioni, non e contra debent inservire. Words ought to be more
subservient to the intent than intent to the words.

Verba legis
Plain-meaning rule.

REPUBLIC v. LACAP
G.R. No. 158253; March 2, 2007
Facts:
Case is a petitio fo e to ia i, assaili g the de isio of the Cou t of Appeals hi h affi ed, ith odifi atio s,
ruling by the RTC granting the complaint for Specific Performance anddamages filed by Lacap against RP
Dist. E g. Of Pa pa ga issued a i itatio to id dated Ja
,
he e La ap a d t oothe o t a to s e e
pre-qualified
Bei g the lo est idde , La ap o the id fo o eti g of a e tai baranggay, andthereafter undertook the
works and purchased materials and labor in connection with
O O t ,
, Offi e of the Dist. E g o du ted fi al i estigatio of e d p odu t a d fou tit
% o pleted
according to specs. Lacap thereafter sought the payment of the DPWH
DPWH ithheld pa e t o the g ou ds that the CoA disapp o ed fi al elease of fu ds dueto La ap s li e se as
contractor having expired
Dist. E g sought the opi io of DPWH legal. Legal the espo ded to Dist. E g that theCo t a tors License Law (RA
4566) does not provide that a contract entered into by acontractor after expiry of license is void and that there is no
law that expressly prohibits or declares void such a contract
DPWH Legal Dept, th ough Di III Cesa Mejia, issued First Indorsement on July 20 1994recommending that
payment be made to Lacap. Despite such recommendation, no paymentwas issued

55

O Jul ,
, espo de t filed the o plai t fo pe ifi Pe fo a e a d Da agesagai st petitio e efo e
the RTC.14
O eptember 14, 1995, petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed aMotion to Dismiss the
complaint on the grounds that the complaint states no cause of actionand that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the
nature of the action since respondent did notappeal to the COA the decision of the District Auditor to disapprove
the claim.
Follo i g the su issio of espo de t s Oppositio to Motio to Dis iss, the TC issued a O de dated Ma h
11, 1996 denying the Motion to Dismiss. The OSG filed a Motion for Reconsideration18 but it was likewise denied
by the RTC in its Order dated May 23, 1996.
O August ,
, the OG filed its A s e i oki g the defe ses of o -exhaustion of administrative remedies
and the doctrine of non-suability of the State
Follo i g t ial, the TC e de ed o Fe ua
,
a de isio o de i g DPWH to pa La ap fo the o t a t of
the project, 12% interest from demand until fully paid, and the costs of the suit
CA affi ed the de isio ut lo e ed i te est to %
Issue:
Whether or not a contractor with an expired license is entitled to be paid for completed projects
Ruling:
A contractor with an expired license is entitled payment for completed projects, but does not exonerate him from
corresponding fines thereof. e tio
of .A. No.
e pli itl p o ides:
SEC. 35. Penalties. Any contractor who, for a price, commission, fee or wage, submits or attempts to submit a bid to
construct, or contracts to or undertakes to construct, or assumes charge in a supervisory capacity of a construction
work within the purview of this Act, without first securing a license to engage in the business of contracting in this
country; or who shall present or file the license certificate of another, give false evidence of any kind to the Board,
or any member thereof in obtaining a certificate or license, impersonate another, or use an expired or revoked
certificate or license, shall be deemed guilty of misdemeanor, and shall, upon conviction, be sentenced to pay a fine
of not less than five hundred pesos but not more than five thousand pesos.
The "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction is that if the statute is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without interpretation. The wordings of R.A. No. 4566 are
clear. It does not declare, expressly or impliedly, as void contracts entered into by a contractor whose license had
already expired. Nonetheless, such contractor is liable for payment of the fine prescribed therein. Thus, respondent
should be paid for the projects he completed. Such payment, however, is without prejudice to the payment of the
fine prescribed under the law.

Vigilantibus et non dormientibus jura subveniunt


The laws aid the vigilant, not those who slumber on their rights.

ALONSO vs. CEBU COUNTRY CLUB, INC.,


G.R. No. 130876; December 5, 2003
Facts:
The Supreme Court rendered a decision declaring that neither Tomas N. Alonso nor his son Francisco M. Alonso or
the latte s hei s a e the la ful o e s of the lot in dispute. Neither has the respondent Cebu Country Club, Inc.
been able to establish a clear title over the contested estate. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of
a lost duplicate certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership
of the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself
does not vest ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.

56

It declared that the subject lot legally belongs to the Government of the Philippines. Wherefore, the petition for
review was denied.
Petitioners and respondent filed separate motions for reconsideration, each assailing a different aspect of the
decision.
Issue:
Petitioners, in their MR vigorously argue that:
The ajo it de isio u dul dep i es petitio e s of thei p ope t ithout due p o ess of la a d i a a e
sho ki g to good o s ie e ; i i alidati g the sale to the late To as Alo so, the po e ia unfairly deviated from
established doctrine, using as basis factual findings either unsupported by the evidence or contradicted by the
appellate ou t s fi di gs of fa t; the o e issues of f aud a d a t of ju isdi tio affli ti g the e o stitutio of
espo de t Ce u Cou t Clu s title e e ot s ua el a d f o tall
et, to the p ejudi e a d da age of the
petitioners; and the dissenting opinion deserves a second hard look as it presents a more balanced, sober, factually
accurate, and juridically precise approach to the critical issues of this case, including prescription and
laches.Respondents, in their MR staunchly assails the decision insofar as it declared that that the subject land legally
belongs to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Moreover: The Torrens Certificate of Title of
respondent, covering subject lot cannot be collaterally attacked and nullified in this case at bar.
Ruling:
IN VIEW THEREOF, we DENY with finality the separate motions for reconsideration of the petitioners and respondent.
Tomas Alonso had caused the reconstitution of his title on a Lot which is adjacent to the disputed property, and yet
petitioners failed to show that Tomas Alonso exerted the same effort to reconstitute his alleged title to the subject
property. As successors-in-interest, petitioners merely stepped into the shoes of Tomas Alonso. They cannot claim
a right greater than that of their predecessor.
Moreover, it cannot be over-a e tuated that To as Alo so, petitio e s p ede esso -in-interest, never asserted
any claim of ownership over the disputed property during his lifetime. When he was alive, Tomas Alonso did not
exert any effort to have the title of the disputed property reconstituted in his name or seek recovery thereof from
the respondent which was in possession since 1931
On the part of respondent, it failed to shed light on how its predecessor in interest, United Services Country Club,
Inc., acquired its title. Surprisingly, there is not even one evidence to show when and how its predecessor in interest,
United Services Country Club, Inc., acquired the property from anybody.
Respondent relies solely on its reconstituted title which, by itself, does not determine or resolve the ownership of
the land covered by the lost or destroyed title. The reconstitution of a title is simply the re-issuance of a lost duplicate
certificate of title in its original form and condition. It does not determine or resolve the ownership of the land
covered by the lost or destroyed title. A reconstituted title, like the original certificate of title, by itself does not vest
ownership of the land or estate covered thereby.
Fu the o e, the de la atio i the Cou t s judg e t that the su je t p ope t elo gs to the Go e
e t is ot
an offshoot of a collateral atta k o espo de t s title. The alidit of the e o stitutio of title to the la d i
question was directly in dispute, and the proceedings before the trial court was in the nature of a direct attack on
the legalit of espo de t s title.
Neither may the rewards of prescription be successfully invoked by respondent, as it is an iron-clad dictum that
prescription can never lie against the Government. Since respondent failed to present the paper trail of the
p ope t s o e sio to p i ate p ope t , the lengthy possession and occupation of the disputed land by respondent
cannot be counted in its favor, as the subject property being a friar land, remained part of the patrimonial property
of the Government. Possession of patrimonial property of the Government, whether spanning decades or centuries,
cannot ipso facto ripen into ownership. Their claims can hardly evoke judicial compassion. Vigilantibus et non
do ie ti us ju a su e iu t. "If ete al igila e is the p i e of safet , o e a ot sleep o o e s right for more
than a tenth of a century and expect it to be preserved in its pristine purity"

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Verba legis non est recedendum


From the words of the statute there should be no departure.

VICTORIA vs. COMELEC AND JESUS JAMES CALISIN


G.R. 109005;January 10, 1994
Facts:
Due to the suspension of Governor Romeo Salalima of the Province of Albay, Vice-Governor Danilo Azana
automatically assumed the powers and functions of the governor, leaving vacant his post as vice-governor. Under
the la , Aza a s positio as vice-governor should be occupied by the highest ranking Sangguniang member, a post
being contested by petitioner and private respondent.
I a s e to p i ate espo de t s petitio fo his de la atio as se io a ggu ia e e fo the P o i e of Al a ,
the COMELEC issued a resolution dated January 22, 1993, certifying him as first in the order of ranking, garnering
21.78% out of the total registered voters while petitioner herein as second ranking member with 21.19%. The
COMELEC based its certification on the number of votes obtained by the Sanggunian members in relation to the
number of registered voters in the district.
However the petitioner claims that the ranking of the Sanggunian members should not only be based on the number
of votes obtained in relation to the total number of registered voters, but also on the number of voters in the district
who actually voted therein.
Issue:
The issue at bar is the ranking of the members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Albay for purposes
of succession.
Ruling:
The Local Government provides:
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the Sanggunian shall be determined on the basis
of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the total number of registered voters in each
district in the immediately preceding local election.
The law is clear. In such a case, the Court has no recourse but to merely apply the law. The courts may not speculate
as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words.
Petitio e s o te tio is the efo e u te a le o side i g the lea a date of the la , hi h lea es o oo fo
other interpretation but it must very well be addressed to the legislative branch and not to this Court which has no
power to change the law.
Under the principles of statutory construction, if a statue is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given it
literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. This plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from
the maxim, index animi sermo est (speech is the index of intention) rests on the valid presumption that the words
employed by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it
differently. The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisely, and to have
expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from
the words of a statute there should be no departure
No grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in issuing the Resolution dated January 22, 1999 was
committed. The petition is DISMISSED.

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