AN AUTOPSY OF THE FIRST COUP D ETAT IN GHANA

By
Richard Kwaku Hagan
Index No. AR/HSP/14/001
(An MPhil Student of the History Department, University of Cape Coast-Ghana.)
INTRODUCTION
The attainment of Ghanas political independence on 6th March 1957 has always being a
significant landmark, not only for the people of the Gold Coast, now Ghana, but also for the
entire African populace and other people elsewhere. 1 In other words, Ghanas Independence
was not only seen as an unprecedented forward march in the struggle by the people of Africa
for the absolute emancipation of the continent from colonial domination, but it was equally
seen as a great stimulus towards the vision of the pan-African leaders of the time who stood
up for the political unification of the entire continent of Africa. Austin in his Politics in
Ghana, pointed out that, prior to the attainment of Ghanas Political Independence, Kwame
Nkrumah and his Convention Peoples Party (CPP) had to battle a stiff opposition not very
much from the Colonial Administration but from a cross section of religious minorities
notably the Muslims; ethnic groups notably the Ewe in Southern Togoland; historic units
popularly the Ashanti; and administrative units most especially the Northern Territories, all of
whom began to press forward for recognition of their claims before the country as a whole
attains self-government2. Austins claim of a minimal opposition from colonial administration
cannot go uncontested, given the circumstances of the time, viz Nkrumahs imprisonment by
the colonial administration during the independence struggle. This is because opposition to
Nkrumah and the CPP came from both the Colonial Administration and the various local
1

Gutteridge W.F.,the Millitary in African Politics, London, Methuen & Co, 1968, P. 96

Austin Dennis, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960, London, Oxford University Press, 1946, P. 29

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interest groups of the time. Ideally, Ghanas Political Independence should have laid a strong
foundation for the countrys absolute unity but the opposition against Nkrumah and his
Convention People Party (CPP) has become aggressive in nature even at independence.
Typical instances by which one could argue that opposition to Nkrumah has become
aggressive includes the number of assassination attempts on Nkrumahs life and the kind of
anti- CPP comments passed by some of the leaders of the opposition. Botwe-Asamoah agrees
with and quotes Awoonor as postulating that Dr. Busia, had signed a warning to the British
government that a CPP victory in the 1956 election would be disastrous for the nation, and
that the NLM was prepared to seek any means possible, including terrorism and
undemocratic means, to eliminate the evil CPP3. Gutteridge, however, in his The Millitary
and African Politics postulates that the events and the sentiments that led to the 1966 Coup in
Ghana has been nursed and nurtured rather slowly.
This turn of events, coupled with some other factors that this write-up will discuss,
contributed to the first military coup dtat in Ghana that toppled Nkrumah and the CPP
government on 24th February, 1966. This write-up however, traces the causes of the 1966
coup dtat, describes the actual events on the day of the coup and gives an insight into the
aftermath of the coup.

CAUSES OF THE 1966 COUP DETAT

Botwe-Asamoah K., Kwame Nkrumah,s Politico-Cultural Thought and Policies, New york,
Routledge, 2005, P.97.

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The 1966 coup dtat that ousted Nkrumah was precipitated by a number of political,
economic and social factors.
Political factors
Through the Preventive Detention Act of July 1958, which stipulated the arrest and detention
of persons known to be dangerous to society for a period of five years without trial, Afrifa
argues, Nkrumah had terrorised his political opponents4, most of whom although innocent
sometimes were confined at the Nsawam Medium Security Prison. Among his victims were J.
B Danquah and Obetsebi Lamptey both members of the Big Six, and all of whom died in in
detention at the Nsamam prison5. In his The Ghana Coup, Colonel Afrifa further argues that
the preventive Detention Act was expected to have been used for good but Nkrumah used it
for selfish reasons as a tool not only to disarm but to supress his political opponents and all
people with opinions and views divergent to that of Nkrumah and the CPP government.
Again with the passing of the Deportation Act of 1957 and the Preventive Detention Act of
1958, the independence of the judiciary was threatened under Nkrumahs administration,
Afrifa again argues, and cites the dismissal of the Chief Justice, Sir Arku Korsah over the trial
of Tawiah Adamafio and others in the Kulungugu assassination attempt on Nkrumah, in
which the trial judge acquitted the accused persons, as being a disrespect to the judiciary and
against the due process of law.
This kind of justification for the 1966 coup could be viewed and well understood by persons
wearing military spectacles, the likes of Afrifa, Colonel Kotoka and the rest who capitalised
on these turn of affairs in the newly independent Ghana to plan and successfully stage the
coup. Botwe-Asamoah, however disagrees with Afrifa and buttresses his stance by arguing
that the CPP government saw the need to combat itself against what he termed cessations
4

Colonel Afrifa A.A., The Ghana Coup, London, Frank Cass, 1966, P.75

Ibid., P.79

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threats, rebellion and violence from the leaders of the opposition parties. According to
Botwe-Asamoah, some comments and threats that came especially from the leader of the
major opposition at the time conveyed not only anti-CPP but anti-democratic undertones
against which Nkrumah sought to arm and protect himself and the CPP. The following extract
from Botwe Asamoahs Kwame Nkrumahs Politico-Cultural Thought and Policies gives a
true picture of happenings at the time.
In fact, fears were constantly put into the people (this author, then a child, also head
it) that the CPP strongholds in Akyem Abuakwa would be destroyed by the oprem
(cannons) in front of the Omanhenes palace. In our village, the NLM supporters
vowed publicly that all strangers settlers would be chased out of Akyem leaving
their cocoa farms behind, should the NLM emerged victorious; in addition, they
vowed that the CPP supporters would be made to plant their plantains inside their
houses. We the children from Ettokrom, who had to walk from Ettokrom to attend
primary school at Osiem at the time, would run to hide in the bush, anytime we heard
the approaching NLM Peugeot caravans, especially their resounding horns.
Considering this foregoing discourses, I think it was only natural that Nkrumah sought to
pursue among others, a one party system of governance with which the minority parties
became largely unpopular. And Botwe-Asamoah rightly argues that policies such as The
Preventive Detention Act and The Avoidance of Discrimination Act were the result of
Nkrumahs attempt to bring some sanity into the political atmosphere of the newly
independent nation6. Albeit all these forgoing arguments, one cannot deny the fact that,
Nkrumah has by this act established himself as a constitutional dictator; a move frowned
upon by super powers of the west such as the United States of America.

Botwe-Asamoah K., Kwame Nkrumah,s Politico-Cultural Thought and Policies, New york,
Routledge, 2005, P.97.

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Austin, describes these kind of measures as emergency measures and goes on to argue that
they were not met with any known objections from any of Nkrumahs closest associates, the
likes of K.A. Gbedemah, Kojo Botsio and Krobo Edusei 7. The results, according to Austin
was that opposition parties became violently anti-CPP and cites a clear case in point quoted
in his Politics in Ghana in which Alfai Laden of the Moslem Association Party is noted to
have written to the Ashanti Pioneer: True Moslems can never be friends with the CPP. The
Moslem Association is prepared to hold the devil (Nkrumah or CPP) by the throat until
everybody is free in this country8. This turn of affairs played a key role in the first coup
dtat that overthrew the first legitimately elected Ghana government. Much as I would not
comment on where the opposition leaders at the time got their inspiration and motivation
from, I must comment that opposition has always been a part and parcel of every human
society especially in chieftaincy and in politics. I think also that opposition, if at all it is
necessary, must be in the best interest of the society and the nation at large. But inferring
from the commentaries and records from 1954 through to the 1960s as reported by Afrifa,
Austin, Botwe-Asamoah, Ama-Biney and others, one is apt to conclude that opposition
against Nkrumah at the time was based on personal interest to the neglect of national interest.
It cannot be refuted that one of the areas where Nkrumahs undying desire to liberate the
whole of Africa from Colonialism and imperialism is manifested, is his role in the formation
of the Organisation of African Unity. Based on his Pan-African ideals, Nkrumah is on record
to have made a popular Pronouncement on that fateful day of Ghanas independence
declaration ... the independence of Ghana is meaningless unless it is linked to the total
liberation of the African continent. The struggle for the liberation and unity of African
States was thus set in motion. To his critics, who did not see anything good in Nkrumah, and
7

Austin Dennis, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960, London, Oxford university Press, 1964, p.
44
8

Ibid., P. 188

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some of whom have argued that this was a lunatic drive for African Unity, Nkrumah called
for a United State of Africa to the neglect of his home affairs such as the untold economic
hardship, the corrupt nature of government and CPP officials, the unwarranted arrest and
detention of Ghanaian citizens among others, Afrifa reports. Closely related to Nkrumahs
foreign policy, Afrifa specifically attacks Nkrumah for sending the Ghana troops to Congo to
maintain peace under the command of the United Nations while at the same time taking sides
in the whole Congo Affair9. Botwe-Asamoah, however, throws more light on Afrifas Claim
from a perspective different from that of a soldier and explains thus:
The Ghanaian troops initially restored order by disarming the mutinous Congolese
troops. By the time the Congo crisis resurfaced at a higher level, Lumumba had
developed a very deep suspicion of General Alexander but Nkrumah would not
withdraw him, because of an unimpeachable confidence Nkrumah had in the general.
Little did he know that General Alexander grew increasingly hostile to Lumumba
whom the Belgian and US feared might become another anti-colonialist militant
(like Nkrumah) in the heart of Africa. Lumumba now accused Ghana of treachery
when the UN Commander using Ghanaian troops, denied him (Lumumba)
permission to broadcast on his own government radio at a time of serious escalation
of tension in the Congo10.
This extract reveals the following; that Nkrumah was actively in support of Patrice
Lumumba, that Belgium and the United states of America played an active role in ousting
Lumumba and finally it confirms the claims made by some writers that the 1966 coup that
toppled Nkrumahs Government was the brain child not only of some disgruntled Ghana
army and police officers but also of the American Central Intelligence Agency.
9

Colonel Afrifa A.A., The Ghana Coup, London, Frank Cass, 1966, P.66

10

Botwe-Asamoah Kwame, Kwame Nkrumahs Politico-Cultural Thought and Policies, New

York, Routledge, 2005, P.110

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Nkrumahs critics have again accused him of having meddled with the Affairs of the Ghana
armed Forces and trying to indoctrinate it with ideologies that were inimical to military
tenets. The formation of the Special Intelligence Unit, the Presidents Own Guard Regiment
(POGR) and other security units which played roles similar to that of a National Security
Service, has been cited as a typical instance in support of this claim. Although these new
security groups existed side by side the army and the police, members of the newer security
structures were better equipped and enjoyed more appealing conditions of service such as
promotions and retirement benefits unlike their counterparts in the regular Police and Armed
Forces, Austin postulates. Austin again argues that the Coup was the result of an
amalgamation of Fear and Bitterness on the part of the police and regular army who
suspected that the President Own Guard Regiment (POGR), having been established by
Nkrumah himself with help from Russia may displace the regular Army. For example, the
fact that the POGR was directly accountable to the President instead of the defence ministry,
created a problem with regards to the conventional military norms of hierarchy and
discipline. This and other issues such as the forced retirement of Major-General Otu and
Major-General Ankrah, the distribution of CPP Application forms and the opening of a CPP
branch at the Teshie Military Academy did not only become a great source of worry and
dissatisfaction, but it also gave the indication to members of the regular army that their
continued employment would depend on their loyalty to Nkrumah, Afrifa argues. These and
other grievance as put forward by Nkrumahs critics could not be overlooked as having
contributed immensely to the 1966 coup11.
Economic factors
Even though the CPP administration is on record to have flourished considerably in spite of
all oppositions, Austin, in his Politics in Ghana, reports that economic problems beginning
11

Colonel Afrifa A.A., The Ghana Coup, London, 1966, p. 100

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from 1954 through to the 1960s presented an almost insurmountable difficulty for the party.
Austin records that at a time when the government was largely dependent on its capital
expenditure cocoa prices begun to fall on the international market and the government had no
option than to rely heavily on its reserves. This fall in the price of cocoa, as reported,
adversely affected Ghana because she depended heavily on the cocoa12, a situation that is
dangerous for any young economy like Ghana in the 1960s. Ama Biney agrees with Austin
who further explains by saying that an upward revision of duties on consumer goods was
done, the system of purchase tax was introduced, and a compulsory 5% savings levy was
debited to all salaried workers, all in the an attempt to remedy the situation, yet, government
expenditure remained the same resulting to far reaching consequences on the ordinary
Ghanaian farmers, wage earners, skilled and semi-skilled workers. 13 Even though this fall in
the price of cocoa at the international market is through no fault of Nkrumah and the CPP
government, his critics saw this kind of economic hardships as contrary to the promise of
economic paradise and riches that will follow soon after independence, as was implied in
Nkrumahs famous maxim Seek ye first the political kingdom and all else shall be added
unto you14 The discontent that came with this feeling precipitated an unprecedented strike
action in September 1961 with genuine grievances which according to Austin, the
government snubbed without recourse, ordering the demonstrators to return to work or face
extreme consequences.
Austin reports that as at the time of the overthrow, it became evident that the 200 million
reserves that was bequeathed to the country at independence has long been depleted; making
12

Biney Ama, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, Ney York: Palgrave,
Macmillan, 2011, P.
13

Austin Dennis, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960, London, Oxford University press, 1946,
P.364,400
14

Biney Ama, Nkrumahs legacy in Retrospect, The Journal of Pan African Studies, vol.2,
no.3, march 2008, P.133

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the country insolvent with a huge external debt obligation of 349.2 million as early as 1964.
The country lacked sufficient funds to service her external debt obligations. 15 Black
marketing, popularly called Kalabule16 became a lucrative business and most people
especially government and party officials enriched themselves at public expense. The
resultant high inflation necessitated the closing down of many companies. There was
evidence of poor planning and high incidence of corruption in almost every sector of the
economy17. This resulted to a seizure of foreign support Ghana previously received from the
developed countries from the West. In the midst of these undesirable developments,
Nkrumahs political and ideological enemies turned the table in their favour using the army
with active support from the police in a coup dtat code named Operation Cold Chop.
Afrifa in his The Ghana Coup justifies the 1966 coup not only by economic reasons but also
by factors such as the high rate of corruption, the breakdown of the moral fabric of society
and the continued subversion of the judiciary system and the army among a host of others.
On the contrary, Austin argues that these allegations may be true to some extent yet the coup
conspirators depended so much on it and used it to justify their action as being the only way
to bring about change even though they may have ulterior motives for forcibly ceasing power
and installing a new junta18.
Social factors
Nkrumah is on record to have exhibited a true sense of Ghanaian and African culture dating
as far back as his student days, Ama Biney argues that Nkrumah did not only stand for
15

Austin Dennis, The Politicians and the Soldiers in Ghana, London, Frank Cass, 1975,
P.37
16

Kalabule is a popular term for black marketing. Mike Oquaye in his Politics in Ghana
traces the origin of the word to hausa expression kure kabure meaning keep it quiet.
17

Austin Dennis, The Politicians and the Soldiers in Ghana 1966-1972, London, Frank
Cass, 1975, P.40
18

Ibid., P.37

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political liberation of Africa but cultural liberation as well. Whereas she commends Nkrumah
for exhibiting Africas material culture as reflected in his wearing of African dress, such as
the northern style dress and the traditional Kente cloth of the Ashanti, she subscribes to
Botwe-Asamoahs view that the quest for cultural liberation predated Nkrumahs cultural
policies, and that Kobina Sekyi, J. E. Casely- Hayford, Ephraim Amu, and Kwegyir Aggrey
were Ghanaians who unreservedly promoted Ghanaian culture and were forerunners to
Nkrumahs project of a cultural renaissance in Ghanaian society.19 Even though these
forerunners of Ghanaian cultural renaissance did very well in projecting African and
Ghanaian cultural values through music and use of African symbols, Nkrumahs own role
could not be underestimated. For example, Nkrumah is on record to have insisted on the
incorporation of aspects of African culture such as the traditional political systems with their
checks and balances, African traditional religion, customary law, languages, folklore and
music and dance into the educational system of the time 20. It is apparent that Nkrumah,s
critics had little to criticise him for especially when it comes to his policies on African and
Ghanaian culture, yet, his opponents managed to argue that the moral fabric of society was
broken during Nkrumahs regime, citing unverifiable instances of corruption among ministers
of states and CPP activists. In support of criticisms against Nkrumah, Afrifa for instance
argues in his the Ghana coup that people lived in constant fear and insecurity of being
reported by informants for minor comments or actions that indicated their dislike for the CPP
government in one way or the other.21
Another important argument used by Nkrumahs ideological and political opponents is that
his ideological disposition was in contrast with what today will be called freedom of
19

Biney Ama, The Political and Social Thought of Nkrumah, New York, Palgrave Macmillan,
2011, P.113
20

Botwe-Asamoah K., Kwame Nkrumahs Politico- Cultural Thought and Policies, New
York, Routlledge, 2005, P. 121
21

Colonel Afrifa A.A., The Ghana Coup, London, Frank Cass, 1966, P.37

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association. Nkrumah has always stood up for national unity above all other individual or
group interests. Up until 1966 however, Nkrumah recognized the myriad social groups such
as women, youth, semi-skilled workers, chiefs, small businessmen, teachers, clerks, and
professionals who constituted the Ghanaian society22. Nkrumah appealed to this various
social groups to place national unity above the groups, something he insisted on even before
independence and was prepared to carry it through at all cost after independence. In the end
leading members of such groups most of whom were chiefs, intellectuals and other
professionals became victims of circumstances23. And this could not be ignored as having
sparked up the grievances that culminated in the 1966 coup

EVENTS ON THE DAY OF THE COUP: 24 FEBRUARY 1966

Morris Janowitz in his The Military in the Development of new Nations opines that, were
democratic foundations of a country and the principle of rule of law is at work, the
interference of the military establishment in domestic politics is minimal and its influence is
felt mainly in the conduct of foreign affairs and defence policies 24. This argument in other
words means that, in any country were the democratic foundations and the principle of rule of
law has lost their relevance due probably to authoritarianism and dictatorship among others,
the military interferes to restore peace, order and dignity. In the case of Ghana, Afrifa
postulates that this was the case as he justifies the 1966 coup by arguing that but in our case
where there were no constitutional means of offering opposition to the one party government,
the Armed Forces were automatically made to become the official opposition of the
22

Biney Ama, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, New York, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011, P
23

Afrifa Colonel A.A., The Ghana Coup, London, Frank Cass, 1966, P.62.

24

Janowitz Morris, The military in the Political Development of New Nations, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, p.2

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government.25 It is against this background that in the early hours of February 24, 1966, a
group of disgruntled Officers and men of the Ghana Army, led by General Emmanuel Kwasi
Kotoka and Major Akwasi Amankwa Afrifa, with the active support from the Police ousted
Nkrumah (while he was on a peace mission to Hanoi) in a coup operation code named
"Operation Cold Chop" At exactly six oclock in the morning that fateful day, Colonel
Kotoka was on air and substantiated the coup dtat by announcing that the myth surrounding
Nkrumah has been broken, parliament has been dissolved and that Nkrumah has been
dismissed together with all CPP ministers, Parliament and all auxiliary structures 26 of the
CPP. Later at 1 oclock pm the same day an announcer further substantiated the coup by
accusing Nkrumah of having "been running the country as his own personal property"
leading to "gross economic mismanagement" from which everyone has suffered. After its
commander, Colonel David Zanlerigu was place in custody, the Prersidents Own Guard
Regiment was incorporated in the regular army and all political prisoners were to be released.
More over the countrys boarders were opened to encourage those who went into exile during
Nkrumahs regime to return. Subsequently, it was declared that the 1964 Constitution has
been abolished and the new regime was to "govern by decrees which shall have the force of
law until a new constitution was promulgated.
THE AFTERMATH OF THE 1966 COUP
By the time of the take-over, the nation was bankrupt and the economy was in a stagnant
position. For example, between 1960 and 1965 the nations foreign exchange reserves had
declined from 424 million pounds to 37.4 million pounds. Ghanas external debt, which stood
at 20 million pounds at independence, had risen to 400 million pounds as at February 1966.
25

Colonel Afrifa A.A., The Ghana Coup, London, Frank Cass, 1966, P.31

26

the Ghana Young Pioneers, the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, the Young
Farmers League and the Market Womens Union

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This impacted negatively on the economy leading to a short supply of commodities such as
drugs, sugar, and flour and clothing items. All these, according to Austin, were not only
blamed on Nkrumahs foreign policy, but also on the high degrees of poor planning,
administrative blundering and the governments high desire for foreign exchange.
Attempts were made to find lasting solutions to the myriad of problems through the formation
various committees normally made up of Ghanaian experts some of whom had been in exile
in opposition to Nkrumah. A typical example of such committees was the Economic
Committee whose head E.N. Omaboe, had described the first four months after the coup as an
emergency period27. The Omaboe Committee is on record to have recommended the payment
of the debts the country owed her external creditors which totalled 889 million pounds at the
time of the coup. This expression of commitment has apparently given enough indicators to
her creditor nations to come in to help and consequently, Western, and later Eastern, creditor
nations allowed Ghana to reschedule foreign debt repayment, reports Austin.
In addition, the newly established government of the National Liberation Movement (NLM)
made an appeal to friendly nations for assistance. This saw nations such as the USA, Britain,
West Germany and Canada responding positively to the appeal. For instance, between March
and May 1966, United States of America, presented 240 pieces of cutlasses and 100,000 bags
of corn to Ghana. The British Government on the other hand presented consignments of
drugs on April 13, 1966, whiles the Government of West Germany also came in with some
essential drugs in September 1966. These developments leaves much to be desired because
for a nation that was previously independent to have appealed for assistance in this direction
actually indicates a state of emergency, a clear indication that the 1966 coup conspirators did
the nation more harm than good.

27

Austin Dennis, The politicians and the Soldiers in Ghana 1966-1972, London, Frank
Cass, P.42

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CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it could be argued that the unexpected collapse of the CPP government and the
termination of Nkrumahs foreign policies as a result of the 1966 coup dtat is in history to
have had far-reaching repercussions for Ghanas developmental goals as well as her external
relations. Apart from the abrupt change in leadership style resulting from the dismissal of
CPP government officials, there was a complete change in the countrys ideological stance
when the new government, the National Liberation Movement (NLM) opted for a typically
pro- Western stance. Again judging from the way coup dtats happened in rapid succession
within a surprisingly short period of time, it could be argued that the first coup dtat of 24
February 1966 prepared the grounds for a series of coup dtats and counter-coup dtats 28
spanning nearly two decades with their accompanying brutal consequences.

28

25 February 24, 1966: Joseph Arthur Ankrah overthrows Kwame Nkrumah, April 17,
1967 : Failed military coup, January 13, 1972: Ignatius Kutu Acheampong overthrows Kof
Abrefa Busia, July 5, 1978: Fred Akuffo overthrows Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, June 4,
1979: Jerry John Rawlings overthrows Fred Akuffo December 31, 1981: Jerry John Rawlings
overthrows Hilla Limann

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BIBLIOGRAPHY
Austin Dennis, Politics in Ghana 1946-1960, London, Oxford University Press, 1964.
Austin Dennis, Politicians and the Soldiers in Ghana 1966-1972, London, Oxford
University Press, 1975
Botwe-Asamoah K., Kwame Nkrumahs Politico-Cultural Thought and Policies, New
York, Routledge, 2005.
Biney Ama, The Political and Social Thought of Kwame Nkrumah, New York, Palgrave
Macmillan, 2011.
Biney Ama, The legacy of Nkrumah in Retrospect, The Journal of Pan African Studies,
vol.2, no.3, March, 2008.
Colonel Afrifa A.A., The Ghana Coup, London, Frank Cass and Co., 1966.
Gutteridge W.F., The Millitary in African Politics, London, Methuen &Co, 1968.

Page 15 of 16

Janowitz Morris, The military in the Political Development of New Nations, Chicago,
University of Chicago Press, 1964
Oquaye Mike, Politics in Ghana 1972-1979, Christianborg, Accra, Tornado Publications,
1980.

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