EMINENT DOMAIN

CITY OF MANILA v.
COMMUNITY OF MANILA

CHINESE

The Charter of the city of Manila

authorizes
the
taking
of private property
for public use.
Suppose the owner of the property
denies and successfully proves that
the taking of his property serves no
public use: Would the courts not be
justified in inquiring into that question
and in finally denying the petition if no
public purpose was proved? Can it be
denied that the courts have a right to
inquire into that question? If the courts
can ask questions and decide, upon an
issue properly presented, whether the
use is public or not, is not that
tantamount to permitting the courts to
inquire into the necessity of the
appropriation? If there is no public use,
then there is no necessity, and if there
is no necessity, it is difficult to
understand how a public use can
necessarily exist. If the courts can
inquire into the question whether a
public use exists or not, then it seems
that it must follow that they can
examine into the question of the
necessity.
The very foundation of the right to
exercise eminent domain is a genuine
necessity, and that necessity must be
of
a
public
character.
The
ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany, and not follow,
the
taking
of
the
land. (Morrison vs. Indianapolis,
etc.
Ry.
Co.,
166
Ind.,
511;
Stearns vs. Barre,
73
Vt.,
281;
Wheeling, etc. R. R. Co. vs. Toledo, Ry.
etc. Co., 72 Ohio St., 368.)
The general power to exercise the
right of eminent domain must not be

confused with the right to exercise it in

aparticular case. The power of the
legislature to confer, upon municipal
corporations and other entities within
the State, general authority to
exercise the right of eminent domain
cannot be questioned by the courts,
but
that
general
authority
of
municipalities or entities must not be
confused with the right to exercise it in
particular instances. The moment the
municipal
corporation
or
entity
attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the
conditions
accompanying
the
authority. The necessity for conferring
the
authority upon
a
municipal
corporation to exercise the right of
eminent domain is admittedly within
the power of the legislature. But
whether
or
not
the
municipal
corporation or entity is exercising the
right in a particular case under the
conditions imposed by the general
authority, is a question which the
courts have the right to inquire into.

REPUBLIC v. PLDT
Facts:
Joint appeals heard and CFI decided a
permanent mandatory injunction for
PLDT on the interconnection of
telephone
facilities
owned
and
operated by the said parties.
Republic of the Phils is a political
entity exercising govt powers thru its
branches and instrumentalities, one of
which
is
Bureau
of
Telecommunications.
Powers: (a)To operate and maintain
existing wire telegraph and radiotelegraph
offices,
stations,
and
facilities, etc.; (b)
To investigate,
consolidate, and negotiate for operate
and maintain wire-telephone or radio-

tel communication service throughout

the Phils.
PLDT is a public service corporation
holding a legislative franchise (Act
4326), to install, operate, and
maintain
a
telephone
system
throughout the Phils and electrical
transmission of messages to other
countries.
RCA Communications, Inc. is an
American corp. authorized to transact
business in the Phils and is the
grantee by assignment by the
legislative franchise to operate a
domestic station and reception of long
distance wireless msgs.
1933- PLDT and RCA entered a
contract (tel messages from U.S
received by RCA will be transferred to
PLDT).
The
contract
was
later
terminated in 1958.
1947- Govt rented trunk lines of the
PLDT to enable govt offices to call
private parties. GTS subscribers could
make a call to PLDT subscribers and
v.v
1958 Plaintiff entered an agreement
with RCA for a joint overseas tel
service whereby the Bureau would
convey radio-telephone overseas calls
received by RCAs station.
PLDT then complained to the bureau
that the latter violated the conditions
of the contract as regards Private
Branch Exchange (rented trunk lines
had used to serve private persons, in
competition with the business of PLDT
RESULT: isolation of Phils from the
rest of the world (except U.S) due to
severance of PLDT connection.
ISSUE: Should PLDT be restrained to
sever tel connections with the govt as
such would isolate Phils from the rest
of the world?
HELD:
Parties cannot be coerced to enter an
agreement. Freedom to stipulate

such terms and conditions is the

essence of our contractual system.
But, the court a quo erred that even if
Republic cannot compel PLDT, the
Republic in the exercise of its
sovereign power of EMINENT
DOMAIN require the telephone
company
to
permit
interconnection s.t the payment
of JUST COMPENSATION to be
determined by the court.
POWER OF E.D - results in the taking
or appropriation of title to, and
possession of, the expropriated ppty. It
is unquestionable that real ppty,
through expropriation, may be
subjected to easement of right of
way. Private ppty is subjected to a
burden of public use and benefit.
Art. XIII, Sec. 6 The State may
transfer utilities to public ownership
upon payment of JC. Therefore, there
is no reason why the State may not
require a public utility to render some
services in the general interest,
provided JC is paid therefor.
Note: Since this relationship has been
maintained for a long time and the
public has patronized both telephone
systems, it is NOT now at liberty to
unilaterally sever connection of trunk
lines.
DECISION: PLDT is compelled to
continue servicing the Govt system
upon such terms and JC. REMANDED.

PEOPLE v. FAJARDO
FACTS:
Appeal from decision of CFI convicting
Juan F. Fajardo and Pedro Babilonia for
violating Ordinace No.7 of Baao, Cam
Sur for having constructed w/o permit
from the mayor a bldg that destroys
the view of the public plaza.
During the incumbency of Fajardo as
mayor, they passed an Ordinance in
its Sec.3: If said bldg destroys the

view of the Public Plaza, it shall be

removed at his expense.
He and his son-in-laws request was
denied for the reason among others
that the proposed bldg would destroy
the view or beauty of the public plaza.
But still the defendants proceeded
the construction of their place of
residence WITHOUT a permit.
HELD:
The Ordinance fails to state any
policy, or to setup any standard that
would guide or limit the mayors
action; no condition for its grant is
expressed; standards are entirely
lacking.
The ordinance confers the mayor
ARBITRARY
and
UNRESTRICTED
POWER to grant or deny the issuance
of the building permits invalid power.
DANGER of such Ordinance: it makes
possible an arbitrary discriminations
and abuses in its execution, depending
upon no conditions whatever.
The Ordinance is UNREASONABLE and
OPPRESSIVE since it operates to
permanently deprive appellants of the
right to use THEIR OWN PPTY hence, it
amount to TAKING W/O J.C.
The State may not, under the
guise
of
police
power,
PERMANNENTLY DIVEST owners of
the beneficial use of their ppty
and
practically
CONFISCATES
SOLELY to preserve or assure the
aesthetic
appearance
of
the
community.
Thus, to legally achieve result,
municipality MUST GIVE appellants,
J.C.
RESTRICTION v. TAKING
The former cave the owner s.t the
burdn of pymt of taxation and the
latter would relieve him of that
burden.

NOTE: Zoning limits the ppty w/o

J.C. Use of ppty is an element of
ownership therein. If it be public
benefit that ppty remain open and
unused, then certainly the public and
not the private individuals, should
bear
the
cost
of
reasonable
compensation for such ppty.
*Ordinance is NULL and VOID. No
absolute showing that municipal
council had either est.limits for the
kind of bldg to be constructed.
REPUBLIC v. VDA. DE CASTELLVI
FACTS:
Plaintiff filed a complaint for E.D
against Carmen M. Vda de Castellvi,
judicial administratrix of the late
Alfonso de Castellvi over a parcel of
land in Pampanga and of Maria Toledo
Gozuns ppty.
Republic alleged that FMV of the ppty
of the parties was not more than
P2k/ha.or P259, 669.10.
CONTENTION OF DEFENDANT: Total MV
should
be:
P11,389,485.00
(or
P15/sqm v. govts P.20/sqm), and that
the AFP and PAF despite repeated
demands are illegally occupying her
ppty.
However, the RTC ordered that the
Republic be placed in the possession
of the land.
MOTION TO DISMISS by Gozun: some
of the lots are already for sale to the
general
public
and
others
for
expansion sites of already completed
subdivisions.
Reckoning point of taking? From the
time of the special lease agreement
with Castellvi, Republic has given the
rights and privileges to buy the ppty
should the lessor wish to terminate the
lease?
2
ESSENTIAL
TAKING:

ELEMENTS

IN

1. Entrance and occupation by the

condemnor upon the private
ppty for more than momentary
or limited period
2. Devoting it to a public use in
such a way as to oust the owner
and deprive him of all the
beneficial enjoyment of the ppty
CONTENTION OF CASTELLVI: FIRST
AND SECOND ELEMENTS ARE
WANTING, no rights and privileges
are conferred to buy the premises
value at the time of the occupancy.
BACKGROUND: Since 1947, PAF had
occupied their ppty with a contract of
lease (75.93 has of land)
CONTRACT is from JULY 1, 1952JUNE 30, 1953 (monthly rentals of
P458.58)renewable from year to
year FAIR VALUE= Value as of the
time of occupancy fair wear and tear
depreciation.
Heirs of the lessor, however, refused
to continue leasing the ppty, despite
desire by AFP to renew the contract,
because the heirs wanted to
subdivided the land and sell to
the general public.
ANSWER OF AFP: It would be difficult
to vacate the ppty because of the
facilities and permanent installations
worth P500K. NO OTHER RECOURSE
BUT TO EXPROPRIATE SAID PPTY
by Presidents recomm.
TAKING:
1. The expropriator must enter a
private pty
2. Entrance to ppty mut be for a
momentary
period.
Momentary means lasting but
a moment; of but a moments
duration; lasting a very short
time; transitory; a limited
period
(In
an
express
provision of the contract,
the lessee shall undertake
to return the premises in

substantially
the
same
position)
3. Entry into the ppty shd be under
warrant of color of legal
authority (Republic entered as a
lessess)
4. The ppty must be devoted for
public
use
or
otherwise
informally
appropriated
or
injuriously affected. (Used by
the AFP)
5. Utilization must be to oust the
owner and deprive him of all the
beneficial enjoyment of the ppty
(utilization of the same did not
oust Castellvi and deprive her
of all the beneficial enjoyment
of the ppty as shown by the
renewal of contract
ERGO, the TAKING of Castellvis
ppty cannot be considered to
have taken place in 1947 when it
commenced the lease.
ALSO, the 2 elements of taking as
cited by Castellvi were not met. Also,
the
COURT
did
not
sustain
Republics contention that a yearto-year basis or renewal means
permanent right to occupy. This
is devoid as legal provisions say
that a lease on a determinate time
ceases upon the dayfixed, without
any demand.
SC: Neither can we see how a right
to buy the land could be merged in a
contract
of
lease
without
any
agreement to that effect.
WHY is the Republic asserting that its
taking must be reckoned from the very
moment of its lease? This is a
deceptive scheme so much so that
the value of ppty is lower than the
present depriving the owner of
the TRUE AND FAIR MV of the ppty.
WHAT WAS IN THE CONTRACT: the
lessee would have a right and
privilege of paying the lessor
what it would fairly cost to put
the
premises
in
the
same
condition.

Hence, the value of the ppty should

not be reckoned in 1947 due to costs
of installations the AFP need to pay
the lessor.
SEC. 4 RULE 67, RULES OF COURT: the
JUST
OMPENSATION
is
to
be
determined from the DATE OF THE
FILING OF THE COMPLAINT.
Note: Thus, the reckoning point for
propoer determination of JC should be
as of June 26, 1959 when the
complaint for ED was filed same with
Toledo-Gozun ppties.

Pampanga that Castellvis ppty can be

sold between P3-4 while ToledoGozuns P2.5-3 (fixed the same price
considering also that Phil peso has
gone down in 1959)
Payment of interest: 6% p.a on the
value of her land minus provisional
value deposited
RULING:
Republic
has
to
pay
Castellvi: P3M+ as J.C minus deposits
*Necessity must be of public character

City of Manila v. Corrales, in

determining
value
of
the
land
expropriated:
What is the worth of ppty in the
market considering its valuable uses?
The owner of the ppty has the right
to determine value of the ppty. It must
show advantage that his ppty possess.
In this case, the land is available for a
proposed
subdivision
plans
as
residential lots.

AMIGABLE v. CUENCA

WHAT IS THE J.C?

ISSUE: May the appellant sue the govt

under this expropriation?

Republics Contention: should still be

P.20/sqm (value in 1949; sugarlands)
in connection with an expropriation
proceeding in Republic v. Narciso
cannot be sustained..
Circumstances
consideration:

taken

into

Strategc
location:
theres
national road fronting them
(lowest price to be awarded is
P10/sqm; near Basa Air base;
near
first
calss
town
of
Floridablanca
Ocular
inspection,
find
similarities with other lands in
Pamapanga

SC: P5/sqm would be a fair

valuation of the ppty. WHY? The
Court taken into consideration the
resolution of the provincial Committee
on Appraisal of the province of

FACTS:
Without prior expropriation, the govt
used a portion of Victoria Amigables
lot for the construction of Mango and
Gorordo aves.

HELD:
In MInsiterio v. City of Cebu,
thru J. Fernando: where the govt
takes away the ppty from a
private landowner for public use
w/o
legal
process
of
expropriation , the proper
party may maintain a suit
against the govt.
THE DOCTRINE OF GOVT IMUNITY
CANNOT SERVE AS AN INSTURMENT
FOR PERPETRAING INJUSTICE ON A
CITIZEN.
Note: Considering that no annotation
in favour of the govt appears at the
back of the Certificate of title and has
not executed conveyance, defendant
remains owner of the lot.
ONLY
AVAILABLE
COMPENSATION

RELIEF:

JUST

What is the basis of JC? The value of

the land at the time of the taking

publishers to donate hence NOT a

valid exercise.

PPI v. COMELEC

RULING laid down by the Court is

based
on
the
THEORY
of
DEMOCRATIC GOVT: the economic
costs of informing the public of those
seeking for office is most appropriately
distributed thru taxation rather than
cast solely on one small sector, i.e.,
print media enterprises.

FACTS:
COMELEC Resolution 2772 OR THE
COMELEC space free print space not
less than page in a newspaper of
general circulation.
COMELEC then sent letters to Phil Star,
Malaaya, Business World, and the Phil
Times Journal, all mems of PPI
PPI asks that said
Resol was
unconstitutional on the ground that it
prohibits govt from taking ppty for
public use without JC and violative of
freedom of speech, of the press, and
expression.
To compel print media companies
to donate Comelec space amounts to
TAKING of private personal ppty for
public or purposes.Sec. 2 failed to
specify frequency of such compulsory
donation. The extent of the
taking is NOT INSUBSTANTIAL. The
monetary value of the compulsory
donation may be very substantial
indeed.
THRESHOLD REQUISITES FOR LAWFUL
TAKING:
1. Necessity of the taking it has
not been said that PPI was
unwilling to sell print space at
their normal rates to COMELEC
for election purposes. NOTE: If
the owner is willing to sell and
aprties agree to the price and
other conditions of the sale no
need for judicial action. BUT,
when there is unwillingness or
cannot agree to the conditions,
then it is necessary for the govt
to
exercise
its
COERCIVE
POWER.
2. Legal authority to effect the
taking
Sec. 2 of the COMELEC Resol does not
provide constitutional basis compelling

SEC.2 of the Resol is a BLUNT and

HEAVY
INSTRUMENT
that
purposrtsm
without
showing
of
existence of a national emergency or
other imperious public necessity,
indiscriminately and without regard to
individual businesses.
NO ATTEMPT MADE TO SHOW
REAL AD PALAPABLE OR URGENT
NECESSITY for the taking of print
space.
RULING: Sec. 2 is null ad void
SUMULONG v. GUERERO
FACTS:
NHA filed an expropriation proceeding
for expropriation of parcels of land
covering 25 hectares including the lots
of Lorenzo Sumulong and Emilia
Balaoing valued by the NHA at
P1/sqm.
LIMITATIONS OF E.D:
1. Art. IV, Sec. 9 Property shall
not be taken for public use w/o
J.C
2. Art IV, Sec. 1 (Art. III now) No
person shall be deprived of life,
liberty , and ppty w/o due
process of law, nor shall ay
person be denied the equal
protection of laws.
1. PUBLIC USE
Accdg to petitioners, Socialized
housing as defined in PD 1225 for the
purpose of condemnation proceedings

is not public use since it will benefit

only a handful of people.
a.

Socialized Housing - the

construction of dwelling units
for the middle and lower class
members
of
the
society,
including the construction of the
supporting infrastructure and
facilities.

Note: The public use reqt of E.D is a

flexble
and
evolving
concept
influenced by changing conditions.
The Constitution made it incumbent
upon the State to establish ,maintain
and ensure adequate social services
incliuding housing (Art. II, Sec. 7, 1973
Consti)
*Housing is a basic human need.
Shortage in housing is a matter of
state concern since it directly and
significantly affects public health,
safety, th environment, and general
welfare.
Thus, socialized housing = public use.
The expropriated lots by NHA are for
the eexpansion of Bagong Nayon
Housing Project for low-salaried govt
employees.
b. Size of ppty area of the land
and NOT the number of people
who stood to be benefitted.
The Stewardship concept private
ppty is held by an ndividual onlya s a
trustee for the people in general its
real owners.
2. JUST COMPENSATION
It means the full and fair equivalent
for the lsos sustained,.
3. DUE PROCESS
It is violative of due process to deny
th owner he opportunity to prove the
valuation in the tax docs is unfair and
wrong,

Also before a writ of ossession was

issued by the Court in exprop
proceedings, ff must occur:
1. There must be a complaint
sufficient in form ad substance
2. JC must be made on the basis of
judicial discretion
3. Deposit reqt under Sec. 2, Rule
67 must be complied with
RULING: Provision of such decree is
unconstitutional.
REMANDED
to
determine
compensation.
NOTE:
CHECK
this
site:
http://coffeeafficionado.blogspot.com/
2012/03/sumulong-vs-guerrero-nol.html

MANOZCA v. CA
Petitioners inherited piece of land
located at P. Burgos, Taguig, M.M, with
an area of about 492sqm.
When the NHI ascertained the site to
have been the birthplace of Felix
Manalo, INC founder, it passed Resol 1
that land to be a national historical
landmark.
ISSUE: WN the public use reqt of E.D
is
extant
in
the
attempted
expropriation by the Republic of a 492
sqm land so declared by National
Historical Institute as a national
landmark (NHI)
HELD:
E.D need not be clothed with any
constitutional gear to exist; instead
provisions in our Constitution are
meant to regulate.
E.D is:
the highest and most exact
idea of ppty remaining to the
govt .
a right to take or reassert
dominion over ppty within the
stae for public use or to meet a
public exigency.

 Limitation: public use with just

compensation.
WHY?
TO
SAFEGUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE
ABUSE and so to protect
individual whose ppty the
power is sought to be enforced.
GUIDELINES in exprop ( Guido v. Rural
Process Admn):
a. The size of the land
b. Large no.of people benefited
c. Extent of social and economic
reform
Public use mtg a public need or
exigency
Accdg to Black: Public use is one which
confers some benefits or advantages
to the public. It is not confined to
actual use of the public. It is
measured in terms of RIGHT of
public to use proposed facilities
for
which
cobndemnation
is
sought.

Public
use,
in
restricting
exercise to take private ppty,
means a USE concerning the
whole
community
as
distinguished from particular
individuals. There must be a
great
public
want
(not
necessary that each and every
individual is personally and
directly affected by it)
Public use is NOT always =
to use by the public (not a
street or park concept)
Whatever
is
beneficially
employed is public use. (Sena
v. Manila Road Co.)

Note:
Constitution
a
dynamic
instrument and one that is not
narrowly or pedantically to be
construed so as to enable it to meet
adequately whatever problems the
future has in store
WHAT
IS
THE
PURPOSE
OF
EXPROP NOW? To recognize the
distinctive contribution of the late Felix
Manalo to the culture of the Phils.

RULING: PETITION DENIED.

REPUBLIC vs. LIM

GR no. 161656, June 29, 2005
FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic
instituted a special civil action for
expropriation of a land in Lahug, Cebu
City for the purpose of establishing a
military
reservation
for
the
Philippine Army. The said lots were
registered in the name of Gervasia
and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic
deposited P9,500 in the PNB then
took possession of the lots. Thereafter,
on May 1940, the CFI rendered its
Decision ordering the Republic to pay
the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as
just compensation. The Denzons
appealled to the CA but it was
dismissed on March 11, 1948. An entry
of judgment was made on April 5,
1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the
Denzons, filed with the National
Airports Corporation a claim for rentals
for the two lots, but it "denied
knowledge
of
the
matter."
On
September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal rejected
the claim but expressed willingness to
pay the appraised value of the lots
within a reasonable time.
For failure of the Republic to pay
for the lots, on September 20, 1961,
the Denzons successors-in-interest,
Valdehueza and Panerio, filed with
the same CFI an action for
recovery
of
possession
with
damages against the Republic and
AFP officers in possession of the
property. (up to this point, there was
no JC)

On November 1961, Titles of the

said lots were issued in the names of
Valdehueza and Panerio with the
annotation "subject to the priority
of
the
National
Airports
Corporation
to
acquire
said
parcels of land, Lots 932 and 939
upon previous payment of a
reasonable market value".
On
July
1962,
the
CFI
promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that
they are the owners and have retained
their right as such over lots because of
the Republics failure to pay the
amount of P4,062.10, adjudged in the
expropriation proceedings. However,
in view of the annotation on their land
titles, they were ordered to execute a
deed of sale in favor of the Republic.
They
appealed
the
CFIs
decision to the SC. The latter held that
Valdehueza and Panerio are still the
registered owners of Lots 932 and
939, there having been no payment of
just compensation by the Republic. SC
still ruled that they are not entitled to
recover possession of the lots but may
only demand the payment of their fair
market value.
Meanwhile, in 1964, Valdehueza
and Panerio mortgaged Lot 932 to
Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as
security for their loans. For their
failure to pay Lim despite demand, he
had the mortgage foreclosed in
1976. The lot title was issued in
his name.
On 1992, respondent Lim filed a
complaint for quieting of title with
the RTC against the petitioners herein.
On 2001, the RTC rendered a decision
in favor of Lim, declaring that he is the
absolute and exclusive owner of the

lot with all the rights of an absolute

owner
including
the
right
to
possession. Petitioners elevated the
case to the CA. In its Decision dated
September 18, 2003, it sustained the
RTC Decision saying: ...This is
contrary to the rules of fair play
because
the
concept
of
just
compensation embraces not only the
correct determination of the amount to
be paid to the owners of the land, but
also the payment for the land within a
reasonable time from its taking.
Without
prompt
payment,
compensation cannot be considered
"just"...
Petitioner, through the OSG,
filed with the SC a petition for review
alleging that they remain as the owner
of Lot 932.
ISSUE:
Whether the Republic
has retained ownership of Lot 932
despite
its
failure
to
pay
respondents
predecessors-ininterest the just compensation
therefor pursuant to the judgment
of the CFI rendered as early as May
14, 1940.
HELD:
One
of
the
basic
principles
enshrined
in
our
Constitution is that no person shall
be
deprived
of
his
private
property without due process of
law; and in expropriation cases,
an essential element of due
process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private
property is taken for public use.
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of
our Constitution mandates: "Private
property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation." The
Republic disregarded the foregoing
provision when it failed and refused to

pay
respondents predecessors-ininterest the just compensation for Lots
932 and 939.
The Court of Appeals is
correct in saying that Republics
delay is contrary to the rules of fair
play. In jurisdictions similar to ours,
where an entry to the expropriated
property precedes the payment of
compensation, it has been held
that if the compensation is not
paid in a reasonable time, the
party may be treated as a
trespasser ab initio.
As early as May 19, 1966, in
Valdehueza, this Court mandated the
Republic
to
pay
respondents
predecessors-in-interest the sum of
P16,248.40 as "reasonable market
value of the two lots in question."
Unfortunately, it did not comply and
allowed several decades to pass
without obeying this Courts mandate.
It is tantamount to confiscation of
private property. While it is true that
all private properties are subject to the
need
of
government,
and
the
government may take them whenever
the necessity or the exigency of the
occasion demands, however from the
taking of private property by the
government under the power of
eminent domain, there arises an
implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss.
There is a recognized rule
that
title
to
the
property
expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only
upon full payment of the just
compensation. So, how could the
Republic acquire ownership over
Lot 932 when it has not paid its
owner the just compensation,

required by law, for more than

50 years? Clearly, without full
payment of just compensation,
there can be no transfer of title
from
the
landowner
to
the
expropriator.
SC ruled in earlier cases that
expropriation of lands consists of two
stages. First is concerned with the
determination of the authority of
the plaintif to exercise the power of
eminent domain and the propriety of
its exercise. The second is concerned
with the determination by the
court of "the just compensation
for the property sought to be taken." It
is only upon the completion of these
two stages that expropriation is said to
have been completed In Republic v.
Salem Investment Corporation, we
ruled that, "the process is not
completed until payment of just
compensation." Thus, here, the failure
of the Republic to pay respondent and
his predecessors-in-interest for a
period of 57 years rendered the
expropriation process incomplete.
Thus, SC ruled that the special
circumstances prevailing in this case
entitle
respondent
to
recover
possession of the expropriated lot
from the Republic.
While the prevailing doctrine is
that
"the
non-payment
of
just
compensation does not entitle the
private
landowner
to
recover
possession of the expropriated lots,
however,
in
cases
where
the
government
failed
to
pay
just
compensation within five (5) years
from the finality of the judgment
in the expropriation proceedings,
the owners concerned shall have the
right to recover possession of their

property. After all, it is the duty of the

government,
whenever
it
takes
property from private persons against
their will, to facilitate the payment of
just compensation. In Cosculluela v.
Court of Appeals, we defined just
compensation as not only the correct

determination of the amount to be

paid to the property owner but also
the payment of the property within a
reasonable time. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just."