GENEROSO SALIGUMBA, ERNESTO SALIGUMBA, and HEIRS

OF SPOUSES VALERIA SALIGUMBA AND ELISEO SALIGUMBA,

SR. vs. MONICA PALANOG
G.R. No. 143365 (2008)

Section 17. Death of Party. - After a party dies

and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court
shall order, upon proper notice, the legal
representative of the deceased to appear and to be
substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty
(30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If
the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to
procure the appointment of a legal representative of
the deceased within a time to be specified by the
court, and the representative shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the interest of the
deceased. The court charges involved in procuring
such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party,
may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the
deceased, without requiring the appointment of an
executor or administrator and the court may appoint
guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. (Emphasis
supplied)

FACTS:
Petition for review of the decision of the RTC granting
respondents action for revival of judgment.
Monica Palanog and husband filed an action for quieting of
title before Kalibo RTC against Sps Saligumba. They alleged that
they were owners in actual, open, continuous and adverse
possession for more than 50 years of a parcel of land in Solido,
Nabas, Aklan and that they were prevented by the latter from
entering and residing in the premises. During the proceeding, court
processes were returned unserved to the Saligumbas with notation
Party-Deceased (Eliseo) and Party in Manila (Valeria). During
trial, counsel for Saligumbas, Atty. Miralles, who had not withdrawn
as counsel for the Saligumbas despite his appointment as Municipal
Circuit Trial Court judge, would be held responsible for the case of
spouses Saligumbas until he formally withdrew as counsel. The trial
court
reminded
Atty. Miralles to
secure
the
consent
of
spouses Saligumbas for his withdrawal. Several hearings were held
wherein the Saligumbas did not appear.
In 1987, the RTC ruled in favor of Palanog.
In 1997, the RTC denied Palanogs motion for issuance of
writ of execution, since more than 5 years had elapsed after the
date of its finality thereby the decision could no longer be executed
by mere motion.
Thus in May 2007, Palanog filed a Complaint seeking to
revive and enforce the 1987 RTC decision. She impleaded the heirs
of Valeria and Eliseo Saligumba. The heir of Saligumba contend that
the trial was null and void because no order of substitution was
issued thus they were not notified. RTC ruled in favor of Palanog.

Under the express terms of Section 17, in case of death of a

party, and upon proper notice, it is the duty of the court to order
the legal representative or heir of the deceased to appear for the
deceased. In the instant case, it is true that the trial court, after
receiving an informal notice of death by the mere notation in the
envelopes, failed to order the appearance of the legal
representative or heir of the deceased. There was no court order for
deceaseds legal representative or heir to appear, nor did any such
legal representative ever appear in court to be substituted for the
deceased. Neither did the respondent ever procure the
appointment of such legal representative, nor did the heirs ever ask
to be substituted.

ISSUE: W/N the trial court decision is binding on petitioners

considering their non-participation in the case from which
the decision sought to be enforced originated.

JOSE
PENEYRA
and
MILAGROS
CALDERON vs. HON.
INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE
COURT
and
HONORABLE
GODOFREDO RILLORAZA

RULING: YES. Civil Case No. 2570 is an action for quieting of title
with damages which is an action involving real property. It is an
action that survives pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87 as the claim is
not extinguished by the death of a party. And when a party dies in
an action that survives, Section 17 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court provides for the procedure, thus:

G.R. No. L-68935 January 22, 1990

FACTS: Petition for review of the decision of the IAC affirming the
RTCs order of dismissal of the Complaint.

In 1976, petitioners, stockholders of the Corregidor College Inc,

were awarded the management and operation of the colleges
canteen. Subsequently, upon instructions of Eugolio Dizon,
Chairman of the Board of Trustees, rental payments of petitioner
were refused and partial demolition of the canteen was effected.
Thus in 1980, petitioners commenced an action for damages with
preliminary mandatory injunction against Dizon. In 1983,
petitioners, after presenting evidence and resting their case,
moved for the amendment of the complaint so as to implead
Corregidor College Inc. This was denied by the trial court as such
amendment would substantially alter petitioners cause of action
thereby requiring Dizon to answer new issues wholly different from
those stated in the original complaint. In December 1983, pending
the resolution of the MR to the motion, Dizon died. Dizons counsel
informed the court of his death and moved for the dismissal of the
case based on the same. RTC dismissed the case.
Appeal to the IAC was denied on the ff grounds: the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has jurisdiction over
the case, the same being an intracorporate dispute, that the
amendment to include Corregidor College, Inc. cannot be allowed
and that the action for damages against Eulogio Dizon was
extinguished by his death.
ISSUE: W/N the action for
extinguished upon his death.

damages

against

Dizon

RULING: NO. As argued convincingly by petitioners, an action for

the recovery of damages for injury to personal property is not
extinguished by the death of the defendant. This is because such
action may still be brought against the executor or administrator of
the estate of the defendant. Since the demolition of petitioners'
canteen is a ground for the recovery of damages arising from injury
to personal property, then, as provided in Section 1 of Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court, the deceased defendant should now be
substituted by the executor, administrator or legal representative
of his estate as party-defendant.
TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted
by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA, ALBERTO ORFINADA,

and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA

UNGOS vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA,
LOURDES P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P.
ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P.
ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA
G.R. No. 129008

January 13, 2004

FACTS: Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the decision and
resolution of the CA affirming the order of the RTC.
Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will leaving several personal
and real properties. Private respondents discovered that petitioner
Teodora Rioferio (the paramour) and her children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with
Quitclaim, real estate mortgages and transfers involving the
properties of the estate of the decedent. To recover their rights,
Alfonso Clyde P.Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration praying that letters of administration encompassing
the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.
ISSUE: Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property
of the estate pending the appointment of an administrator
RULING: YES. Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the
heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in behalf of
the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of
Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he rights to succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of thedecedent.
The provision in turn is the foundation of the principle that the
property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to
another or others by his will or by operation of law. Even if
administration proceedings have already been commenced, the
heirs may still bring the suit if an administrator has not yet been
appointed. The heirs cannot be expected to wait for the
appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the
administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect
the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime

do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are
violated or dissipated.
GIACOMINA MARINI-GONZALES vs. HON. GUARDSON R.
LOOD, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Sixth Branch Pasig, Rizal; CELIA ANGELES-PASCUA; ELISEO
ZARI, Assistant Clerk of Court of above-mentioned branch,
as appointed legal representative of deceased defendant
RAFAEL J. GONZALES; ESTEBAN S. ANGELES; SPOUSES
ROGELIO ANGELES and SINFORESA SALVADOR ANGELES;
SPOUSES REMEDIOS ANGELES-FERRAER and FLORENCIO
FERRAER; JAIME ANGELES; SPOUSES BENJAMIN ANGELES
and MERLINA TORRES-ACABE and her husband surnamed
ACABE (first name unknown to petitioner)

Gonzales. She is also the sole heir under his will. The Omnibus
motion was denied by the court and appointed Atty. Eliseo Zari, the
assistant clerk of court, as legal representative of Rafael in the
case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering Atty. Zari the represent Rafael in the case.
RULING: YES. Under the provisions of Section 2, Rule 87 of the
Rules of Court, it is the executor or administrator of the estate of
the decedent who may bring or defend actions in the name of the
deceased, and tills Court has ruled that the choice of an executor is
the sole prerogative of the testator and is not address to the
discretion of the court. In the case of Ozaeta vs. Pecson, 20 this
Court said:

G.R. No. L-35098 March 16, 1987

FACTS: Petition for certiorari seeking to set aside order of the RTC.
In 1969, petitioner (now deceased; represented by special
administrator of her estate, Atty. Norberto Quisumbing) filed a
complaint, against her husband, Rafael J. Gonzales and other
private respondents, for annulment of allegedly fraudulent
disposition of properties made by Rafael to the latter in fraud and in
impairment of her interest in the conjugal partnership of gains and
without her knowledge and consent.
In 1970, petitioner filed a "Notice of Death of Party and Omnibus
Motion" notified the court of the death of the defendant Rafael J.
Gonzales and of her appointment by the then Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Quezon City branch) in Special Proceeding No. Q-14838 as
special administratrix of his testate estate, and prayed that she be
substituted in place of the deceased; that the pleadings, motions
and papers, including the Answer with Counterclaim filed by the
decedent, be withdrawn and stricken out; and that she be granted
leave to amend her own complaint so as to allege therein her two
capacities and rights one, as wife and two, as special
administratrix of the testate estate of the late Rafael J.
Gonzales. Later, the probate court appointed said plaintiff (herein
petitioner) as executrix in the testate estate of the late Rafael J.

The choice of his executor is a precious prerogative

of a testator, a necessary concomitant of his right to
dispose of his property in the manner he wishes. It is
natural that the testator should desire to appoint one
of his confidence, one who can be trusted to carry
out his wishes in the disposal of his estate. The
curtailment of this right may be considered as a
curtailment of the rights to dispose. And as the rights
granted by him will take effect from the time of his
death (Article 777, Civil Code of the Philippines), the
management of his estate by the administrator of his
choice should be made as soon as practicable, when
no reasonable objection to his assumption of the
trust can be interposed any longer. It has been held
that when a will has been admitted to probate, it is
the duty of this court to issue letters testamentary to
the person named as executor upon his application
(23 C.J. 1023). It is the testator that appoints his
executor, as the question as to his peculiar fitness for
such position or his want of ability to manage the
estate cannot be addressed to the discretion of the
county judge. (Holbrook vs. Head, 6 S.W. 592, 593, 9
Ky 755).

Furthermore, the joinder of the deceased Rafael J. Gonzales as

party defendant is no longer necessary and may be dispensed with,
since no cross-claim has been filed against him by his codefendants (private respondents herein); and the petitioner's right
under Article 173 of the Civil Code may be enforced against third
persons even without joining her husband as party defendant.