G.R. No.

110015 October 13, 1995

MANILA
BAY
CLUB
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MODESTA SABENIANO and MIRIAM SABENIANO, JUDITH
SABENIANO, JOY DENNIS SABENIANO, et. al., respondents.
RESOLUTION

FRANCISCO, J.:
After carefully perusing the instant motion for reconsideration, petitioner's arguments, in sum, dwell
on the focal issues involved in the controversy which have been passed upon in the Court's July 11,
1995 Decision sought to be reconsidered. No reasons of significant and compelling import have been
advanced to alter the Court's observation and conclusion that 1) petitioner's non-designation of
private respondents as beneficiaries of the insurance policies was a violation of the "insurance
clause" amounting to a "substantial", and not a mere "slight or casual", breach entitling private
respondents to rescind the lease contract, and 2) the amount of rentals/damages petitioner was
bound to pay was correctly adjudged by respondent Court of Appeals after slightly modifying the trial
court's assessment. The Court, however, would like to make some additional disquisitions in
response to certain noteworthy contentions raised by petitioner.
Anent the issue of the rentals/damages, petitioner avers that "the Decision awards excessive
damages" since "the Decision of this Honorable Court condemned the petitioner to pay, up front, the
total sum of P12,029,800.00", "a staggering sum by any calculation . . . that will probably reduce the
petitioner to utter bankruptcy"; It is likewise maintained that private respondents will be "unjustly
enriched" simply because petitioner failed to present controverting evidence, or rebut Mrs.
Sabeniano's testimony which, according to petitioner, is mere "speculation".
We need to stress the one decisive fact that petitioner had all the opportunity at its disposal before
the trial court to refute, with all allowable pieces of evidence it can produce, Mrs. Sabeniano's
testimony or any other evidence of private respondents, and there is nothing to indicate that petitioner
was ever denied such opportunity/opportunities by the trial court. The trial court, respondent court and
this Court cannot be faulted for taking private respondents' uncontroverted evidence below vis-avis the monthly rentals on its face value no matter how "staggering" it may appear for
petitioner's omission to rebut that which would have naturally invited an immediate, pervasive and stiff
opposition from petitioner created an adverse inference that either the controverting evidences to be
presented by petitioner will only prejudice its case, or that the uncontroverted evidence of private
respondents indeed speaks of the truth. And such adverse inference, recognized and adhered to by
courts in judging the weight of evidence in all kinds of proceedings, surely is not without basis the
rationale and effect of which rest on sound, logical and practical considerations.
The presumption that a man will do that which tends to his obvious advantage, if he
possesses the means, supplies a most important test for judging of the comparative
weight of evidence . . . If, on the supposition that a charge or claim is unfounded, the
party against whom it is made has evidence within his reach by which he may repel that
which is offered to his prejudice, his omission to do so supplies a strong presumption
that the charge or claim is well founded; it would be contrary to every principle of
reason, and to all experience of human conduct, to form any other conclusion. (Starkie
on Evidence, p. 846, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 544).
Where the evidence tends to fix a liability on a party who has it in his power to offer
evidence of all the facts as they existed and to rebut the inferences which the proof
tends to establish, and he neglects or refuses to offer such proof, the natural inference

is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting, would support the inference against
him. (Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Anoka Nat. Bank, 108 Fed. Rep. 482, 486, 47 C.C.A. 454,
per Caldwell, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 545. Emphasis supplied)
It is a well-settled rule that when the evidence tends to prove a material fact which
imposes a liability on a party, and he has it in his power to produce evidence which from
its very nature must overthrow the case made against him if it is not founded on fact,
and he refuses to produce such evidence, the presumption arises that the evidence, if
produced, would operate to his prejudice, and support the case of his adversary.
(Missouri, etc. R. Co. v. Elliott, 102 Fed. Rep. 96, 102, 42 C.C.A. 188, per Caldwell,
C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 546. Emphasis supplied)
No rule of law is better settled than that a party having it in his power to prove a fact, if it
exists, which, if proved, would benefit him, his failure to prove it must be taken as
conclusive that the fact does not exist. (Wheeling v. Hawley, 18 W. Va. 472, 476, per
Patterson, J., quoted in Union Trust Co. v. McClellan, 40 W. Va. 405, 21 S.E. Rep.
1025, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 544)
Where the burden is on a party to a suit to prove a material fact in issue, the failure,
without excuse, to produce an important and necessary witness to such fact raises the
conclusive presumption that such witness's testimony, if introduced, would be adverse
to the pretensions of such party. (Union Trust Co. v. McClellan, 40 W. Va. 405, 21 S.E.
Rep. 1025, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 545).
The rule is that where a party to an issue on trial has proof in his power which, if
produced, would render material, but doubtful, facts certain, the law presumes against
him if he omits to produce that proof, and authorizes a jury to resolve all doubts
adversely to his defense. (People v. Sharp, 107, N. Y. 427, 465, 14 N.E. Rep. 319, 342,
per Danforth, J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 546).
Where facts are in evidence affording legitimate inferences going to establish the
ultimate fact that the evidence is designed to prove, and the party to be affected by the
proof, with an opportunity to do so, fails to deny or explain them, they may wall be taken
as admitted with all the effect of the inferences afforded. (Somers v. McCready, 96 Md.
437, 53 Atl. Rep. 1117, per Jones, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 559)
The ordinary rule is that one who has knowledge peculiarly within his own control, and
refuses to divulge it, cannot complain if the court puts the most unfavorable construction
upon his silence, and infers that a disclosure would have shown the fact to be as
claimed by the opposing party. (Societe, etc., v. Allen, 90 Fed. Rep. 815, 817, 33 C.C.A.
282, per Taft, C.J., Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 561)
The inference still holds even if it be assumed, for argument's sake, that Mrs. Sabeniano's
testimony is improbable or weak, for it has likewise been said that:
Even if a party's testimony is improbable, the failure of the opposite party to contradict it,
although it was entirely within his power to do so if it were false, fully entitles it to belief.
(Nutting v. El. R. Co., 21 N.Y. App. Div. 72, 47 N.Y. Supp. 327, Moore on Facts, Vol. I,
p. 572)
Weak evidence becomes strong by the neglect of the party against whom it is put in, in
not showing by means within the easy control of that party that the conclusion drawn

from such evidence is untrue. (Pittsburgh, etc., R. Co. v. Callaghan, 50 III. App. 678,
681, Moore on Facts, Vol. I, p. 572)
As weak evidence is often strengthened by failure of an opposing party to contradict by
evidence within his power, so the trier of facts may infer that testimony in chief is worth
its full face value when the other party is content to let it stand without crossexamination or contradiction by other evidence. (Moore on Facts, Vol. II, p. 1417)
As petitioner seemed willing to admit private respondents' evidence bearing on the fair rental
value without question, the trial court was well-justified in having done the same exhibiting,
still, due consideration when it reduced the monthly rental value from P400,000.00 as per Mrs.
Sabeniano's uncontroverted testimony, to P250,000.00. In answer, therefore, to petitioner's
questions, i.e.,
". . . does Mrs. Sabeniano's testimony cease to be speculation because the petitioner failed to
present 'controverting evidence'?", and "The fact that Mrs. Sabeniano could have testified that
she was offered P1 Million, indeed, P10 Million, indeed, P100 Million but would that, too,
'stand' simply because the petitioner failed to rebut it?", the Court is compelled, quite
regrettably, to answer in the affirmative.
With regard to petitioner's contention that it "did not raise a fresh matter on appeal", the Court merely
reiterates that petitioner's invocation of the principles of trust found its way only for the first time in its
"Motion For Reconsideration" of the respondent court's decision. If well-recognized jurisprudence
precludes raising an issue only for the first time on appeal proper, with more reason should such
issue be disallowed or disregarded when initially raised only in a motion for reconsideration of the
decision of the appellate court.
We cannot finally put this case to rest without confronting the perceived "unusual dispatch" in its
resolution the petitioner is "genuinely disturbed" of consisting in the rendition of the judgment (July
11, 1995) having been made in six (6) months from the ponente's appointment to the Court on
January 5, 1995. Petitioner amplifies that: 1) ". . . hardly has the ponente warmed his seat, the case
would be decided . . .", and 2) ". . . when prior to the appointment of the ponente, it took the rest of
the Justices of the Third Division of this Honorable Court more than a year to deliberate on the
Petition, . . . ".
It is the practice of the Court to encourage the speedy resolution of cases unloaded to a newlyappointed Member, especially those cases that are already ripe for decision and in which motions for
their early resolution have been filed by either of the parties concerned, as in this case. This is the
reason why it became imperative to resolve this case at the soonest possible time and without further
delay, lest we be charged with footdragging on the case thereby putting the Court in a more
objectionable situation.
In fact, the undersigned ponente has come across some of the maiden decisions of one of petitioner's
counsels, Mr. Justice Abraham F. Sarmiento, a distinguished former magistrate of this Court himself
who the undersigned holds in high-respect, which were disposed of by him in less than six (6) months
from the date of his appointment to the Court on January 26, 1987. To name a few are: People v.
Decierdo, G.R. No. L-46956, May 7, 1987, 149 SCRA 496; People v. Saavedra, G.R. No. L-48738,
May 18, 1987, 149 SCRA 610; People v. Pecato, G.R. No. L-41008, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA
14; People v. Ferrera, G.R. No. L-66965, June 18, 1987, 151 SCRA 113; Madrigal & Company, Inc.
v. Zamora, G.R. Nos. L-49023 and L-48237, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 355 (Labor Case); Banco
Filipino
Savings
&
Mortgage
Bank
v.
Pardo,
G.R.
No.
L-55354, June 30, 1987, 151 SCRA 481; and Del Rosario v. Hamoy, G.R. No. L-77154, June 30,

1987, 151 SCRA 719. And in all honesty, the undersigned ponente regards such prompt disposition
as something commendable, not condemnable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion For Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with
FINALITY.

G.R. No. 137873

April 20, 2001
D.
M.
CONSUNJI,
INC., petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M. Consunji, Inc.,
fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report dated
November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he
was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at
around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego
together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at
the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a
[p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain
block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block
with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall
down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby
crushing the victim of death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on
board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or
getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block
and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer raised,
among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion of
the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.

D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA
LOQUITOR [sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF
PETITIONER.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED

NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT

PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE.3

Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore, inadmissible.
The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records, is an exception to
the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. 4 A witness, therefore, may not
testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard the same.
Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has
learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as
evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of error
and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may be best
brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes
evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries in official records.
Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice Moran,
enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law
to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.

The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last
requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the trial
court. In Rodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the officer who
signed the fire report also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the report was
inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the report but
admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for crossexamination, the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which
consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as
the summary of the statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were
annexed to the Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the
offer [as part of the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently
relevant statementswhich were gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be
admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence
as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself
may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such
a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made
himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved
that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit
of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away
with the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the
matter as an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record
admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying
reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v.
Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions
in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a
witness are numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is
not done in which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no
exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater
part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering deposition before an
officer. The work of administration of government and the interest of the public having
business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for
many others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to
private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts
they do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true
under such a degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of each case may
appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on
his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report
was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements
given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information,"
there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements
for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of PO3
Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which were of his personal
knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash. PO3
Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the morgue, 12 making the latters death beyond dispute. PO3
Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the day after the
incident13 and saw the platform for himself.14 He observed that the platform was crushed 15and that it
was totally damaged.16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the
police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting
machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanuevas testimony that the cause of the fall of
the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such portion of the
testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions,18 the opinion of a witness is generally not
admissible.19
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur by
the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall of the
elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As a rule of
evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which recognizes
that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a substitute for
specific proof of negligence.20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally,
the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or
some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of
was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in
the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its
control or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose
from or was caused by the defendants want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is absent or
not available.22

The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is
grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent,
is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff,
without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the
cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which
the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of
necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the
doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no
negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power.
Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must
appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the
accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or
opportunity for explanation of the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14 th floor of a building to the
basement while he was working with appellants construction project, resulting to his death.
The construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a
safety engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in
complete control of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur
therein are peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other
hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a
rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the
following requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur
unless someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was
under the exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered
must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person
injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing
work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site
with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the
exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present.
No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased husband[;] thus[,] the
last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa
loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellants negligence
arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur, but
argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved that it
exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondents husband."

Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the
defendants negligence is presumed or inferred25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites for the
application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the elements, the
burden then shifts to defendant to explain.26 The presumption or inference may be rebutted or
overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances disputable presumption, such as
that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. 27 It is not for the defendant to explain or
prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of
say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established.1wphi1.nt
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed before the
police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabros sworn statement, the company
enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover, the leadman and
the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in arguing that
private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners employees, also assails the
same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are inadmissible
as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand to testify
thereon.28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of opportunity on
the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that,
generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his own
language in writing the affiants statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one
writing them.29Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more than
private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husbands death. Regrettably, petitioner does
not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the
application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits provided
under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceaseds employer
damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code,
Republic Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended,
and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the
government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act,
provided that:
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by this Act to
an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all
other rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents

or nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said
injury x x x.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well as
under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled the
matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the death of
the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in violation of
government rules and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the protection of the
employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court
of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En
Banc,31 following the rule inPacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of
death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the workers
right under the Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil
Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmens Compensation Act and sue
in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA
442, ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action
against the tortfeasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action
simultaneously. [Underscoring supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit under
the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmens Compensation
Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May
14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito
Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and
claims for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all
of them have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs
decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by herein
petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968 x x x in the lower
court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmens
Compensation Act before they learned of the official report of the committee created to
investigate the accident which established the criminal negligence and violation of law by
Philex, and which report was forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary
Rafael Salas in a letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmens
Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual
obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of
its negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmens Compensation

Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy
was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an
intelligent choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court,
the payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael Maritime
Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. Feliciano-Go,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs.
Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the
Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of
their employment could be filed only under the Workmens Compensation Law, to the
exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in
favor of the new rule that the claimants may invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act or
the provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will
exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will
preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a
claimant who has already been paid under the Workmens Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring
after he opted for the first remedy. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the exception because private
respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits from
the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she received
a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal
complaint against petitioners personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the
respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all,"
the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as
early as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigators report. The appellee merely
executed her sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her personal
circumstances, her relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file
the complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellants employees. It
was the investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the
same to the prosecutors office. This is a standard operating procedure for police investigators
which appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned
in the preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6,
1991, to wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance
to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said
memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present
controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the
appellee. Hence, notice of appellants negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before she
applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment therefrom. Her
using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991 may just be
an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the
Prosecutors Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating
therein that: "The death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the
respondents. If at all and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring

supplied.) Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellees allegation that
she learned about appellants negligence only after she applied for and received the benefits
under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception held in
the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights as
well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her
educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the
death of her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil
Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in her
complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by ignorance or
mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no authority to hear or
adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because as
early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint for
"Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioners employees. On February 6, 1991, two
months before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution
finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against petitioners employees, the case was
"civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on
January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of
remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies, the
election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy, in the
absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the
doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on
the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the
doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single
wrong.38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the rule
in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and
prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one
remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but
chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the
person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of the partys rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where
one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of
a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists
and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision.

Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an
awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be
illustrated on the record or by the evidence.40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the exception
in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioners contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in her
complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner to burden
private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant who ought to
plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer;41otherwise, the defense is waived. It is,
therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue
when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husbands death
and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this case, the
"fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioners employees, of
which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a resolution stating that
there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation
of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for
that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final
say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the
principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in
the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the elevator
crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from the ECC. The
police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the accomplishment of the
form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not aware
of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent cannot claim
ignorance of this Courts ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory
laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a persons
ignorance, does not excuse his or hercompliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private
respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance
thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate the
total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from Exhibit
"K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension from

November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit "K," was
P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she will
eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by
the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such
determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments
already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court'
award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double
compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award decreed by
the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to private
respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other respects, the
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171713

December 17, 2007
ESTATE
OF
ROGELIO
G.
ONG, petitioner, vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C.
Diaz, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing (1) the Decision1of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the Resolution 2 of
the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV
No. 70125.
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against
Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint,
Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and
thereafter to fix monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the premises. 4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got
acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.5
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at Fairlane
Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February 1998 was
born at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio
paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joannes needs
recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give
support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive pleading
despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in default in its Order
dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios Answer with Counterclaim and Special and Affirmative Defenses was
received by the trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her evidence ex

parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a decision granting the reliefs
prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and the
cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for reconsideration
seeking the courts understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a
very difficult problem of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial court
dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to be impressed with merit, the same is
hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court dated April
23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in record, subject to
cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to file a
reply and/or answer to defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be warranted,
defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum of P2,000.00 a month from
January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in arrears and the amount
of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support pendente lite during the pendency of
this case.9
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the plaintiff
Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time of the
birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child of the spouses
Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child is still presumed
legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).

The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for in Article
166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there must be physical
impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife within the first 120 days
of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he was living
outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home only once a year.
Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside the country and no evidence
was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year 1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff
Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man before she
met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations with other men on
or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her second child (see Exh. "A"),
so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have a different father or may
be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills representing
the expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of admission that he is
the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even when he stopped going out with
Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after 1996. Defendant also admitted that on
some instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even
the one who fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and
defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should support plaintiff.10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the
illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this Court
awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that the support
should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority age.11
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of the trial
court dated 19 January 2001.12 From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio appealed
to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case was submitted for
decision and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July 2002. 13
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation
informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution was filed
by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong, 14 which
motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed
Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 63 in
Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby REMANDED to the court a quo
for the issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for
the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon
consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early
stage of the proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiffs mother submit
themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as a sign of good faith.
However, the trial court did not consider resorting to this modern scientific procedure
notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is the biological father of the plaintiff
even as he admitted having actual sexual relations with plaintiffs mother. We believe that DNA
paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective
method of settling the present paternity dispute. Considering, however, the untimely demise of
defendant-appellant during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation with out
laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure
with whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the putative
father of plaintiff minor whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for support.17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS
RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION DESPITE ITS FINDING
THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS
HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE
RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER JAPANESE
HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION
OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE
TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT IS NO
LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the case to

the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for compulsory
recognition, and by declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to concentrate its
attention on the third one, the propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding the case to the
trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA testing will
decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve the first
two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result of the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of
support in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The
burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological
father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which
parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child.20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. 21 As a guaranty in
favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We explained the
rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is
based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code 23 provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the separation of the
spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred and twenty
days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access was not
possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.24

The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on
the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties to
the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological
father of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a
persons DNA profile can determine his identity.25
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an
individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for
identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is
exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share a single,
fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of every cell in the
human body, the DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his or her skin cells, hair
follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G (guanine),
C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in an individuals DNA
determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is
composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular sequence.
This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA framework, nonetheless,
are sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic loci," which are the areas analyzed in
DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply means
determining the "polymorphic loci."

How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a molecular
biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5) techniques to conduct
DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length polymorphism); "reverse dot blot"
or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases that were admitted as evidence by 37
courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable number tandem
repeats); and the most recent which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based
STR (short tandem repeats) method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic
laboratories in the world. PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence
sample a million times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and
can match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a
trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate, when
DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the evidence
collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a substantial amount of
the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But
then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is different, it is deemed not to have
come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In each of
these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one inherited from each
parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a number of these variable regions in
an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA profiles of the mother and
child, it is possible to determine which half of the childs DNA was inherited from the mother.
The other half must have been inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile
is then examined to ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the
paternal types in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is
excluded as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father. 26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological sample
obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as originating from that
person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods which include the extraction of
DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the comparison of the
information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for the purpose of
determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA obtained from two or more
distinct biological samples originates from the same person (direct identification) or if the
biological samples originate from related persons (kinship analysis); and

(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of parentage of a
putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two unrelated individuals in
a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may provide the
definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin v.
Court of Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe
Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we cautioned
against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been
accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and written, by the putative
father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory
has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR)
analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2)
copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,
being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule
on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
reject said results is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656, 9
May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and murder victims DNA samples from the
bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that "the
purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the
evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various
chemical processes to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we
acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts persist(ed) in
our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been
perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific
evidence to still our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March
2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of filiation of then
presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body

cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v. Court of
Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May 2004,
428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for rape with homicide, the
principal evidence for which included DNA test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the
appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for
DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of the case to the
RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged
impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible
than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the
parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a
persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes
blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. 29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may be
available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the impossibility of
obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v.
Umanito,30 citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections,31 this Court held:

The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424
SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise:
"[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of AAAs
child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair and correct
adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts are authorized,
after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing. However, while this Court
retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is to receive and act on the matter in
controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does not, in the course of daily
routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that the case be remanded to
the RTC for reception of evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties.
(Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals32:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a
much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long believed in
the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past. This case
comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a dependable and
authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this opportunity to forcefully
reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 173870

April 25, 2012
OSCAR
DEL
CARMEN,
JR., Petitioner, vs.
GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and representing the children, namely: MARY MARJORIE B.
MONSALUD, ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD, KAREEN B. MONSALUD,
LEONARDO B. MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B. MONSALUD, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 the registered owner of a motor vehicle challenges the
Decision2 dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 which held him
liable for damages to the heirs of the victims who were run over by the said vehicle.
Factual Antecedents
At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her spouse
Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way home from a
Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur. Upon reaching Purok
Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep bearing plate number UV-PEK600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The jeep was registered in the name of
petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur and vice versa route.
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-103473 for Reckless Imprudence
Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan before the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March 13, 1997, said court declared Allan guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.4
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in behalf of
the six minor children5 of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219,6 an independent civil action
for damages based on culpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also impleaded therein were his alleged
employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr. (Oscar Sr.) and Norma del Carmen (Spouses
del Carmen) and the registered owner of the jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo prayed for the
reimbursement of funeral and burial expenses, as well as the award of attorneys fees, moral and
exemplary damages resulting from the death of the three victims, and loss of net income earnings of
Emilia who was employed as a public school teacher at the time of her death. 7
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that the
Monsaluds have no cause of action against them because he and his wife do not own the jeep and
that they were never the employers of Allan.8 For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed to be a victim himself. He
alleged that Allan and his friends9 stole his jeep while it was parked beside his drivers rented house
to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be
started by mere pushing sans the ignition key. The vehicles engine shall then run but without any
headlights on.10 And implying that this was the manner by which the vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar
Jr. submitted as part of his documentary evidence the statements11 of Jemar Alarcon (Jemar) and
Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of the accident,
declared before the investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles headlights were off.
Because of this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial court a carnapping case against

Allan and his companions docketed as Criminal Case No. 93-10380.12 The case was, however,
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.13
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latters brother, Rodrigo
Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed as the driver. 14 In any event, Allans employment as
conductor was already severed before the mishap occurred on January 1, 1993 since he served as
such conductor only from the first week of December until December 14, 1992. 15 In support of this,
Oscar Jr. presented as witnesses Faustino Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio "Junior" Baobao
(Cresencio). Faustino, a resident of Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep heading to
Sominot on December 31, 1992, it was Cresencio who was the conductor. He also believed that
Crecencio started to work as such at around December 15 or 16, 1992. 16 Cresencio, for his part,
testified that he worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and
that Rodrigo was his driver.17 He stated that upon learning that the jeep figured in an accident, he
never bothered to verify the news. Instead, he went to Midsalip to work there as a conductor for his
brothers vehicle, thereby terminating his employment with Oscar Jr.18
Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a days trip, the jeep would be parked beside
Rodrigos rented house19 for the next early-morning operation.
Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.s employee subsequent to
December 14, 1992. To prove this, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan (Saturnino) and
Jose Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he would pay his fare to Allan every time he would board
the jeep in going to Molave and that the last time he rode the subject vehicle was on December 23,
1992. He also claimed that immediately before January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan used to park the
jeep at the yard of his house.20 Jose likewise attested that Allan was still the jeep conductor during
the said period as he had ridden the jeep many times in mid-December of 1992.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision22 dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from civil liability
for insufficiency of evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable in a subsidiary
capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the principle of res ipsa loquitur, i.e., that a
presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant may be inferred if the thing that caused an
injury is shown to be under his management and that in the ordinary course of things, the accident
would not have happened had there been an exercise of care. Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr.,
as the registered owner of the jeep, managed and controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo, in
whose house the jeep was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well aware that the
jeep could easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition key, they should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by unauthorized persons like Allan. The
RTC thus concluded that such lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight constitute negligence
making the registered owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the damage caused by the same.
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants Allan
Maglasang and Oscar del Carmen, Jr. ordering
1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and in case of insolvency, for
defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., to pay the plaintiffs, the following sums:
a. P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial expenses;

b. P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Emilia Monsalud;
c. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Leonardo Monsalud, Sr.;
d. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Glenda Monsalud;
e. P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
f. P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
g. The cost of this proceedings.
2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses OSCAR DEL CARMEN SR. and
NORMA DEL CARMEN.
SO ORDERED.23
Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration24 contending that the provision on vicarious liability of the
employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code 25 requires the existence of employer-employee
relationship and that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment when the tort
occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his employee, he was hired not as a driver
but as a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the scope of his employment when he drove the jeep.
Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running without its headlights on at the time of
the accident indubitably shows that the same was stolen. He further alleged that the jeep could not
have been taken by only one person. As Rodrigo declared in Criminal Case No. 93-10380
(carnapping case), based on his experience, the jeep cannot be pushed by only one person but by at
least five people in order for it to start. This was due to the vehicles mass and the deep canal which
separates the parking area from the curved road that was obstructed by a house. 26
Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its Order27 dated June 21, 2000 granted the
Motion for Reconsideration and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability. It cited Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code which provides that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable for the criminal acts
of his employee, the latter should have committed the same in the discharge of his duties. The court
agreed with Oscar Jr. that this condition is wanting in Allans case as he was not acting in the
discharge of his duties as a conductor when he drove the jeep.
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the property owner cannot
be made responsible for the damages caused by his property by reason of the criminal acts of
another. It then adjudged that only Allan should bear the consequences of his criminal acts. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR. is hereby absolved from
all civil liability arising from the felonious acts of convicted accused ALLAN MAGLASANG.
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
Geronimo appealed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In its July 11, 2006 Decision,29 the CA granted the appeal.

In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary issue of whether there was an
employer-employee relationship between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the accident. It ruled in
the affirmative and gave more credence to the testimonies of Geronimos witnesses than to those of
Oscar Jr.s witnesses, Faustino and Cresencio. The CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness presented
by Geronimo, Faustino never resided in Poblacion and thus has limited knowledge of the place. His
testimony was also unreliable considering that he only rode the subject jeep twice30 during the last
two weeks of December 1992. As regards Cresencios testimony, the appellate court found it puzzling
why he appeared to have acted uninterested upon learning that the jeep was the subject of an
accident when it was his bread and butter. Said court likewise considered questionable Oscar Jr.s
asseveration that Cresencio replaced Allan as conductor when Cresencio testified that he replaced a
certain Sumagang Jr.31
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims based on
the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily responsible for the injuries
or death of third parties caused by the operation of such vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense
that the jeep was stolen not only because the carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions
was dismissed but also because, given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan
the implied permission to use the subject vehicle. To support its conclusion, the CA cited the following
circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were both employees assigned to the said jeep; after a
days work, said vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigos house where Allan also lived; the jeep
could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said parking area was not fenced
or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle which can be started even without the
ignition key.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Order dated 21
June 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 23), Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, in Civil Case No. 9620,219 is SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered. OSCAR DEL CARMEN, Jr. and ALLAN
MAGLASANG are held primarily liable, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiffs-appellants:
1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda
Monsalud in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) each or for the total amount of
One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00);
2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos (P25,000.00) each for
the death of Emilia Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and Glenda Monsalud (collectively the
Monsaluds) or for the total amount of Seventy-five thousand pesos (P75,000.00);
3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each for the death of
the Monsaluds or for a total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P150,000.00);
4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Issues

As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari alleging that
the CA erred in:
1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations, surmises and conjectures;
misapprehension of facts which are in conflict with the findings of the trial court;
2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord with law and with the applicable
decisions of the Supreme Court;
3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial proceedings in the disposition of the
appeal and [in going] beyond the issues of the case.33
Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs ruling in its June 21, 2000 Order which
was in accord with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed by an employee should
have been done within the scope of his assigned tasks for an employer to be held liable under culpa
aquiliana. However, the CA never touched upon this matter even if it was glaring that Allans driving
the subject vehicle was not within the scope of his previous employment as conductor. Moreover,
Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep was stolen and stresses that the liability of a registered owner of a
vehicle as to third persons, as well as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, should not apply to him. He
asserts that although Allan and his companions were not found to have committed the crime of
carnapping beyond reasonable doubt, it was nevertheless established that the jeep was illicitly taken
by them from a well secured area. This is considering that the vehicle was running without its
headlights on at the time of the accident, a proof that it was started without the ignition key.
Our Ruling
Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by Allan and his alleged
cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Oscar Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the Monsaluds is that his
jeep was stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the parking area was
indeed carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and his five companions,
notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking area and the weight of the jeep.
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already dismissed by the RTC for
insufficiency of evidence. But even in this civil case and as correctly concluded by the CA, the
evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence required was likewise not met to support Oscar
Jr.s claim that his jeep was unlawfully taken.
Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and Benjamin, declared before the police
that when Allan invited them to ride with him, he was already driving the jeep:
04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 oclock on December 31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that] happened?
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January 1,
1993, Allan Maglasang arrived driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together with
Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rezada and Joven Orot.34

xxxx
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening more or less on December 31,
1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that]
happened?
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,] January 1,
1993, Allan Maglasang arrive[d] driving the jeep and he invited me to ride together with Jemar
Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rizada and Joven Orot.35
There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and Benjamin were fetched by Allan who
was driving the jeep, this would mean that only three men pushed the jeep contrary to Rodrigos
testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to be pushed by at least five people so that it
could start without the ignition key.
On direct examination,36 Oscar Jr. was asked as to what Rodrigo, his driver who had informed him
about the accident on January 1, 1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to him after the incident, viz:
Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you about the accident, what did he carry
with him if any and turned over to you?
A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of Registration) Sir.
Q: How about the key of the vehicle?
A: It was not turned over, Sir.37
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group, the ignition key
should then be with Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the jeeps possession. Thus, at the time
Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable to expect that the driver should
have also returned the key to the operator together with the Official Receipt and Certificate of
Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead, the key was allegedly handed over to the
police for reasons unexplained and not available from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never
presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither was he able to attest on cross-examination that Allan really
stole the jeep by pushing or that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo:
Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was Rodrigo Maglasang who gave the key
to Allan Maglasang. Is that correct?
A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an affidavit to show that he turned it over to
the police.
Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of December 31, 1992, when it was driven by
Allan Maglasang, you did not know that the key was voluntarily given by Rodrigo Maglasang to
Allan Maglasang?
A: I was not there.

Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct?

A: Yes Sir, I was not there.38
Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the carnapping case, thus:
Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang and [his] x x x co-accused x x x
[n]amely: Benjamin Andojar, Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, [Jemar Azarcon] and [Arniel] Rizada,
for carnapping. Is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that on December 31, 1992, your jeep was
carnapped by Allan Maglasang and his co-accused, the said mentioned, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And you could well remember that this representation is the counsel of the co-accused of
Allan Maglasang, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, is that correct
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish that the jeep was carnapped, is that
correct?
A: Yes Sir.39
While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his claim that his jeep was
stolen, this circumstance by itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason why the
headlights were not on at the time of the accident was not sufficiently established during the trial.
Besides, the fact that the headlights were not on cannot be exclusively attributed to the lack of ignition
key in starting the jeep as there may be other possibilities such as electrical problems, broken
headlights, or that they were simply turned off.
Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant evidence to support the defense of
unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was stolen. The evidence
on record brings forth more questions than clear-cut answers.

Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (literally,
the thing speaks for itself) should not have been applied because he was vigilant in securing his
vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well secured area not remote to the watchful senses
of its driver Rodrigo.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that caused the injury complained of is
shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the accident, in the
ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management or control used proper
care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient, reasonable and logical
explanation by defendant that the accident arose from or was caused by the defendants want of
care."40 Res ipsa loquitur is "merely evidentiary, a mode of proof, or a mere procedural convenience,
since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of
negligence."41 It "recognizes that parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof,
thus, it allows the principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to
present along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the
doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the defendant the
burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part." 42 The doctrine is based partly on "the
theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the
cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such
knowledge, and is therefore compelled to allege negligence in general terms." 43
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as follows:
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent;
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge and
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the
part of the person injured.44
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the road would
suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one in charge of the said
vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury was under the exclusive control
of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to
instruct him with regard to the specific restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who may not
drive it. As he is aware that the jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to
park it safely and securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly,
there was no showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or contribution on
their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of negligence
against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he exercised due care and
diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed to do so.
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave his
implied permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to provide solid proof
that he ensured that the parking area is well secured and that he had expressly imposed restrictions
as to the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the
CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan by his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned,
Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any specific and strict instructions on matters regarding its use.
Rodrigo therefore is deemed to have been given the absolute discretion as to the vehicles operation,
including the discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.

The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths or injuries
consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the registered owners vehicle
in connection with his employment.
Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was still his
employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no reason to disturb, Oscar Jr. contends
that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an employers vicarious liability for the
employees fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply to him.
The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, 45 the car of therein
respondent bank caused the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its assistant vice
president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for damages for the accident as said
provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents involving registered motor
vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if not used for public service, would
primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle
was being driven on the highways or streets.46 We have already ratiocinated that:
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or
that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can
be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles
running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without
positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to
forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle
registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for
damages or injuries caused on public highways.47
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use48 or that the subject vehicle was stolen49 which are
valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape liability for quasi-delict
resulting from his jeeps use.1wphi1
All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded are in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, the Court concurs with the findings of the CA and sustains the awards made. In
addition, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 50 an interest of six percent
(6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the judgment of
the RTC is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon
finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 11,
2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby AFFIRMED with further
MODIFICATION that an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall be
imposed, computed from the time the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, Molave,
Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such
amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment thereof.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193261

April 24, 2012
MEYNARDO
SABILI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul the Resolutions in SPA No. 09-047 (DC) dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August
2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of Mayor of
Lipa City for the May 2010 elections. At the
heart of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials.
When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein that he
had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010 elections, he
had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member representing the 4th
District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the position of Representative of the
4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of Batangas includes Lipa City. 2However, it is
undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007 elections, he and his family were then
staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico, San Juan, Batangas.
Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course and to
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some Grounds for
Disqualification"3 against him before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 09-047 (DC). Citing
Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, 4private respondent alleged that
petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and likewise failed to comply
with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the Local Government
Code. 5 Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he had already been a
resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled 10 May 2010 local
elections.
In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the following:
1. Petitioners COC for the 2010 elections filed on 1 December 20096
2. 2009 Tax Declarations for a house and lot (TCT Nos. 173355, 173356 and buildings
thereon) in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City registered under the name of Bernadette Palomares,
petitioners common-law wife7
3. Lipa City Assessor Certification of Property Holdings of properties under the name of
Bernadette Palomares8
4. Affidavit executed by private respondent Florencio Librea 9
5. Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Eladio de Torres10

6. Voter Certification on petitioner issued by COMELEC Election Officer Juan D. Aguila, Jr.11
7. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner12
8. National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages regarding petitioner13
9. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City
registered in the name of petitioner14
10. NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette Palomares15
11. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 5, Brgy. Lood, Lipa City
registered in the name of petitioner16
12. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that petitioner has no business
therein17
13. Apparent printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioners daughter, Mey Bernadette Sabili18
14. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certification that the names
Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioners son) do
not appear on its list of graduates19
15. Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that Bernadette Palomares,
Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do not appear in its list of voters 20
16. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez21
17. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet22
18. Affidavit Executed by Pablo Lorzano23
19. Petitioners 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative24
For ease of later discussion, private respondents evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1)
Certificates regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioners Voter Registration and Certification
(common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioners COCs in previous elections; (3) Certifications
regarding petitioners family members; and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City residents.
On the other hand, petitioner presented the following evidence to establish the fact of his residence in
Lipa City:
1. Affidavit executed by Bernadette Palomares25
2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili26
3. Affidavit of Leonila Suarez (Suarez)27
4. Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, Dominador
Honrade28

5. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet29

6. Certificate of Appreciation issued to petitioner by the parish of Sto. Nino of Pinagtong-ulan30
7. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City
Chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.31
8. COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.32
9. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated 6 June 2009 signed by
Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.33
10. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 200734
11. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 200735
12. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 200836
13. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 2008 37
14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili38
15. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Cornejo, Sr.39
16. Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including past and incumbent
Pinagtong-ulan officials.40
For ease of later discussion, petitioners evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) his Income Tax
Returns and corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification from the
barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of his common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares; and
(4) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, Certificate of Appreciation from the
barangay parish and Memorandum from the local chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.
The COMELEC Ruling
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition of
private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa City,
and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for his failure to
meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC, during the
pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was proclaimed the
duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast for the said position.
He accordingly filed a Manifestation42 with the COMELEC en banc to reflect this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43 the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no prior
notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him. Meanwhile,
Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification Cases Filed in Connection
with the May 10, 2012 Automated National and Local Elections) requires the parties to be notified in
advance of the date of the promulgation of the Resolution.

SEC. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a

Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon
the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax, or thru the fastest means
of communication.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this
Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the 26
January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC. Petitioner attached to his Petition a
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa City Mayor and
Vice-Mayor issued by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers,44 as well as a copy of his Oath of
Office.45 He also attached to his Petition another Certification of Residency46 issued by Pinagtongulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade and sworn to before a notary public.
On 7 September 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order 47 requiring the parties to observe
the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions. Thereafter, the
parties filed their responsive pleadings.
Issues
The following are the issues for resolution:
1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its
Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure; and
2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to
prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials.
The Courts Ruling
1. On whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate its
Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure
Petitioner argues that the assailed 17 August 2010 COMELEC Resolution, which denied petitioners
Motion for Reconsideration, is null and void. The Resolution was allegedly not promulgated in
accordance with the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure and, hence, violated petitioners right to
due process of law.
The rules governing the Petition for Cancellation of COC in this case is COMELEC Resolution No.
8696 (Rules on Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010 Automated
National and Local Elections), which was promulgated on 11 November 2009. Sections 6 and 7
thereof provide as follows:
SEC. 6. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a
Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance upon
the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means
of communication.
SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling
of a Division shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not proforma, suspends the execution for implementation of the Decision, Resolution, Order or Ruling.

Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify the
Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the
Commission en banc.
The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for Reconsideration for the resolution of the
Commission en banc within three (3) days from the certification thereof.
However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 201048 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution
No. 8696 by ordering that "all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate
promulgation" in view of "the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of
material time." The Order states:
ORDER
Considering the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material time,
the Commission hereby suspends Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 8696 promulgated on November 11,
2009, which reads:
Sec. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a
Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served upon the parties or
their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest means of
communication."
Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said suspension of Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696. Thus, his right to due process was still violated. On the other hand, the
COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure and invokes Section 6,
Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power "to promulgate its own rules concerning
pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices."
We agree with the COMELEC on this issue.
In Lindo v. Commission on Elections,49 petitioner claimed that there was no valid promulgation of a
Decision in an election protest case when a copy thereof was merely furnished the parties, instead of
first notifying the parties of a set date for the promulgation thereof, in accordance with Section 20 of
Rule 35 of the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure, as follows:
Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The decision of the court shall be promulgated on
a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after
promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Rejecting petitioners argument, we held therein that the additional rule requiring notice to the parties
prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of promulgation. Since lack of such
notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a procedural lapse
that does not vitiate the validity of the decision. Thus:
This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially
announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice

to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration, L-24800, May 27, 1968, 23
SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication (Araneta
v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the signed decision with the clerk of court (Sumbing v.
Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En Banc Minute Resolution). The additional requirement
imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of promulgation is not part of the process of
promulgation. Hence, We do not agree with petitioners contention that there was no promulgation of
the trial court's decision. The trial court did not deny that it had officially made the decision public.
From the recital of facts of both parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's counsel of
record and petitioners (sic) himself. Another copy was sent to private respondent.
What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the promulgation of the
decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the promulgation of its decision
as required by the COMELEC rules. The failure to serve such notice in advance of the promulgation
may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not prejudice the rights
of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court nor (sic) of the
promulgation of said decision.
Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC,50 citing Macabingkil v. Yatco,51 we further held in the same
case that failure to receive advance notice of the promulgation of a decision is not sufficient to set
aside the COMELECs judgment, as long as the parties have been afforded an opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered, viz:
The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the promulgation of the decision in the
election protest cases, in Our view, does not constitute reversible error or a reason sufficient enough
to compel and warrant the setting aside of the judgment rendered by the Comelec. Petitioners anchor
their argument on an alleged denial to them (sic) due process to the deviation by the Comelec from
its own made rules. However, the essence of due process is that, the parties in the case were
afforded an opportunity to be heard.
In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the holding
of the countrys first automated national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC suspend the
rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the delivery of all resolutions to the Clerk
of the Commission for immediate promulgation. Notably, we see no prejudice to the parties caused
thereby. The COMELECs Order did not affect the right of the parties to due process. They were still
furnished a copy of the COMELEC Decision and were able to reckon the period for perfecting an
appeal. In fact, petitioner was able to timely lodge a Petition with this Court.
Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make its own rules of
procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No.
8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the COMELEC cannot be set aside on the
ground of COMELECs failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the date of the promulgation
thereof.
2. On whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to
prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELECs appreciation and evaluation
of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the COMELEC's
appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to turn into an error of
jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden constitutional duty to intervene
and correct the COMELEC's error.52

In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, (G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010), we explained that the
COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint its
action with grave abuse of discretion As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to "capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse of discretion must
be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in
deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5, Rule 64
of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial evidence, shall
be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept to support a conclusion.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari case
the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC in this
regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation of
evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the Court is
not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of discretion is
present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment to one of
jurisdiction.
Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of his
residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation. Among others, petitioner pointed to the
COMELECs inordinate emphasis on the issue of property ownership of petitioners declared
residence in Lipa City, its inconsistent stance regarding Palomaress relationship to the Pinagtongulan property, and its failure to consider in the first instance the certification of residence issued by
the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan. Petitioner bewails that the COMELEC required "more"
evidence to show the change in his residence, notwithstanding the various pieces of evidence he
presented and the fact that under the law, the quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely
substantial evidence and not clear and convincing evidence. Petitioner further ascribes grave abuse
of discretion in the COMELECs brushing aside of the fact that he has been filing his ITR in Lipa City
(where he indicates that he is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan) on the mere expedient that the law allows
the filing of the ITR not only in the place of legal residence but, alternately, in his place of business.
Petitioner notes that private respondents own evidence shows that petitioner has no business in Lipa
City, leaving only his residence therein as basis for filing his ITR therein.
Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling that
petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least one year prior to the
May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the parties and the COMELECs
appreciation thereof.
In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the domicile of origin of Sabili was Brgy. Sico,
San Juan, Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established his domicile
of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him qualified to run for Lipa City mayor.
On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no such change in domicile or residence took

place and, hence, the entry in his Certificate of Candidacy showing that he was a resident of Brgy.
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City constituted a misrepresentation that disqualified him from running for Lipa
City mayor.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with conduct
indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode. 53 As in all
administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial evidence, or
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 54
The ruling on private respondents evidence
We begin with an evaluation of the COMELECs appreciation of private respondents evidence.
a) Petitioners Voter Certification, Registration and COCs in previous elections
Petitioners Voter Certification is a common exhibit of the parties. It states, among others, that
petitioner is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, Batangas; that he had been a resident of Lipa
City for two (2) years and three (3) months; and that he was so registered on 31 October 2009. The
information therein was "certified correct" by COMELEC Election Officer Juan B. Aguila, Jr.
Private respondent presented this document as proof that petitioner misrepresented that he is a
resident of Lipa City. On the other hand, the latter presented this document as proof of his residency.
The COMELEC correctly ruled that the Voter Certification issued by the COMELEC Election Officer,
Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr., was not conclusive proof that petitioner had been a resident of Lipa City
since April 2007. It noted that Aguila is not the competent public officer to certify the veracity of this
claim, particularly because petitioners COMELEC registration was approved only in October 2009.
The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on 21 June 1997 showing that he was a
resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas, as well as his various COCs dated 21 June 1997 and March
2007 indicating the same thing, were no longer discussed by the COMELEC and rightly so. These
pieces of evidence showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas on the said dates are
irrelevant as, prior to April 2007, petitioner was admittedly a resident of Sico, San Juan Batangas.
Rather, the relevant time period for consideration is that from April 2007 onwards, after petitioners
alleged change of domicile.
b) Certificates regarding ownership of real property
The various certificates and tax declarations adduced by private respondent showed that the Lipa
property was solely registered in the name of petitioners common-law wife, Bernadette Palomares. In
discussing the import of this document, the COMELEC reasoned that, being a "seasoned politician,"
he should have registered the Lipa property (which he claimed to have purchased with his personal
funds) in his own name. Such action "would have offered positive proof of intent to change actual
residence" from San Juan, Batangas to Lipa City, considering that he had previously declared his
ancestral home in San Juan, Batangas as his domicile. Since Palomares and petitioner are commonlaw spouses not capacitated to marry each other, the property relation between them is governed by
Article 148 of the Family Code,55 where only the parties actual contributions are recognized. Hence,
petitioner cannot prove ownership of a property and residence in Lipa City through the registered
ownership of the common-law wife of the property in Lipa City.

On the other hand, petitioner bewails the inordinate emphasis that the COMELEC bestowed upon the
question of whether the Lipa property could be considered as his residence, for the reason that it was
not registered in his name. He stresses that the issue should be residence, not property ownership.
It is true that property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local
election.56 Rather, it is a candidates residence in a locality through actual residence in whatever
capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence tending to establish a
candidates domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an apartment by a candidate
in the same province where he ran for the position of governor. 57 In the more recent case of Mitra v.
Commission on Elections,58 we reversed the COMELEC ruling that a candidates sparsely furnished,
leased room on the mezzanine of a feedmill could not be considered as his residence for the purpose
of complying with the residency requirement of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 59
The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in Palomaress name does not prove
petitioners residence as it merely showed "donative intent" without the necessary formalities or
payment of taxes.
However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be, this point is immaterial for the purpose of
ascertaining petitioners residence. We have long held that it is not required that a candidate should
have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It is enough that he
should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or relative.60 What is of central
concern then is that petitioner identified and established a place in Lipa City where he intended to live
in and return to for an indefinite period of time.
Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself, Palomares ownership of the Lipa property
does not prove that she or and in view of their common-law relations, petitioner resides in Lipa
City, nevertheless, the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by petitioners common-law
wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes plausible petitioners allegation of
bodily presence and intent to reside in the area.
c) Certifications regarding the family members of petitioner
Private respondent presented a Certification from the DepEd, Lipa City Division, indicating that the
names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioners daughter) and Francis Meynard
Sabili (petitioners son) do not appear on the list of graduates of Lipa City. Private respondent also
presented a Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that the names of these
family members of petitioner do not appear in its list of voters.
As the issue at hand is petitioners residence, and not the educational or voting record of his family,
the COMELEC properly did not consider these pieces of evidence in arriving at its Resolution.
The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children do not attend educational institutions in
Lipa and are not registered voters therein, and because petitioner does not maintain a business
therein nor has property
in his name, petitioner is unable to show the existence of real and substantial reason for his stay in
Lipa City.
As to the Dissents first assertion, it must be stressed that the children, like the wife, do not dictate the
family domicile. Even in the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly decided by both
husband and wife.61 In addition, we note that the transfer to Lipa City occurred in 2007, when

petitioners children were already well into college and could very well have chosen to study
elsewhere than in Lipa City.
Also, it is petitioners domicile which is at issue, and not that of his children. But even assuming that it
was petitioner himself (rather than his children) who attended educational institutions or who
registered as a voter in a place other than Lipa City, we have held that "absence from residence to
pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is
elected, does not constitute loss of residence." 62 In fact, Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code
provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession;
employment in private and public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations;
service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or
detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of residence.
As to the Dissents second assertion, petitioner apparently does not maintain a business in Lipa City.
However, apart from the Pinagtong-ulan property which both Suarez (the previous property owner)
and Palomares swear was purchased with petitioners own funds, the records also indicate that there
are two other lots in Lipa City, particularly in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa City 63 which are registered jointly
in the name of petitioner and Palomares. In fact, it was private respondent who presented the Lipa
City Assessors Certificate to this effect. Even assuming that this Court were to disregard the two
Lodlod lots, it is well-established that property ownership (and similarly, business interest) in the
locality where one intends to run for local elective post is not requirement of the Constitution. 64
More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there is nothing "wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with
reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law." 65
d) Affidavits of Lipa City residents
Private respondent also presented the affidavits of Violeta Fernandez66 and Rodrigo Macasaet,67 who
were also residents of Pinagtong-ulan. Both stated that petitioner did not reside in Pinagtong-ulan, as
they had "rarely seen" him in the area. Meanwhile, Pablo Lorzano, 68 in his Affidavit, attested that
although the Lipa property was sometimes used for gatherings, he did "not recall having seen"
petitioner in their barangay. On the other hand, private respondent 69 and Eladio de Torres,70both
residents of Brgy. Calamias, reasoned that petitioner was not a resident of Lipa City because he has
no work or family there.
The COMELEC did not discuss these Affidavits in its assailed Resolution. It was correct in doing so,
particularly considering that these Affidavits were duly controverted by those presented by petitioner.
Moreover, even assuming the truth of the allegation in the Affidavits that petitioner was "rarely seen"
in the area, this does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In Fernandez v. House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal,71 we held that the averments of certain barangay health workers
that they failed to see a particular candidate whenever they made rounds of the locality of which he
was supposed to be a resident is of no moment. It is possible that the candidate was out of the
house to attend to his own business at the time. The law does not require a person to be in his home
twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement.
The ruling on petitioners evidence
We now evaluate how the COMELEC appreciated petitioners evidence:

a) Petitioners Income Tax Returns for 2007 and 2008

The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below showed that petitioner had been paying his
Income Tax (2007 and 2008) to the Revenue District Office of Lipa City. In waving aside his Income
Tax Returns, the COMELEC held that these were not indications of residence since Section 51(B) of
the National Internal Revenue Code does not only state that it shall be filed in a persons legal
residence, but that it may alternatively be filed in a persons principal place of business.
In particular, Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code 72 provides that the Income Tax
Return shall be filed either in the place where a person resides or where his principal place of
business is located. However, private respondents own evidence a Certification from the City
Permits and Licensing Office of Lipa City showed that there was no business registered in the City
under petitioners name.
Thus, COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because an individual income tax return may only
be filed either in the legal residence OR the principal place of business, as prescribed under the law,
the fact that Sabili was filing his Income Tax Returns in Lipa City notwithstanding that he had no
business therein showed that he had actively elected to establish his residence in that city.
The Dissent claims that since the jurisdiction of RDO Lipa City includes both San Juan and Lipa City,
petitioners filing of his ITR therein can also support an intent to remain in San Juan, Batangas petitioners domicile of origin.
However, a simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and Revenue Official Receipts for 2007 and
2008 shows that petitioner invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, rather
than San Juan, Batangas.73 Hence, while petitioner may be submitting his income tax return in the
same RDO, the declaration therein is unmistakable. Petitioner considers Lipa City to be his domicile.
b) Certification from the Barangay Captain of Pinagtong-ulan
The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade74 (Honrade) that petitioner had been residing in Brgy
Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an issue in petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was not
sworn to before a notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on." Subsequently, petitioner presented
another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, save for
the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public.
We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of the Barangay Captains Certification and find the
same tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrades Certification would not only be
admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration.
Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 44. Entries in official records.Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by
a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by
law, are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.

In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose Cooperative,
Inc.,75 we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in official records to
be admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other person
in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by him, which
facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to "keep
an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay."76 Regarding the second requisite, we have
explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 77 that "it is the business of a punong
barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third requisite, the Barangay
Captains exercise of powers and duties78 concomitant to his position requires him to be privy to these
records kept by the Barangay Secretary.
Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrades Certification
on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.
Meanwhile, the Dissent opines that the sworn affidavit of the barangay chair of Pinagtong-ulan that
petitioner is a resident of Lipa City does not help petitioners case because it was not shown that the
term "resident" as used therein carries the same meaning as domicile, that is, not merely bodily
presence but also, animus manendi or intent to return. This Court has ruled otherwise.
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,79 the declaration of Aborlans punong barangay that petitioner
resides in his barangay was taken to have the same meaning as domicile, inasmuch as the said
declaration was made in the face of the Courts recognition that Mitra "might not have stayed in
Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because his office and activities as a
Representative were in Manila."
Assuming that the barangay captains certification only pertains to petitioners bodily presence in
Pinagtong-ulan, still, the COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this evidence in establishing
petitioners bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan since 2007.
c) Affidavit of petitioners common law wife
To substantiate his claim of change of domicile, petitioner also presented the affidavit of Palomares,
wherein the latter swore that she and petitioner began residing in Lipa City in 2007, and that the funds
used to purchase the Lipa property were petitioners personal funds. The COMELEC ruled that the
Affidavit was self-serving for having been executed by petitioners common-law wife. Also, despite the
presentation by petitioner of other Affidavits stating that he and Palomares had lived in Brgy.
Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, the latters Affidavit was rejected by the COMELEC for having no
independent collaboration.
Petitioner faults the COMELECs stand, which it claims to be inconsistent. He argues that since the
property regime between him and Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code (based
on the parties actual contribution) as the COMELEC stressed, then Palomaress Affidavit expressly

stating that petitioners money alone had been used to purchase the Lipa property (notwithstanding
that it was registered in her name) was not self-serving, but was in fact, a declaration against interest.
Petitioners argument that Palomaress affidavit was a "declaration against interest" is, strictly
speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant. A declaration against interest, under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, refers to a "declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify against the
interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far
contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made the
declaration unless he believed it to be true."80 A declaration against interest is an exception to the
hearsay rule.81 As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to, testimonial
evidence.82
Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioners claim that the COMELEC had committed grave abuse of
discretion in being inconsistent in its stand regarding Palomares, particularly regarding her assertion
that the Lipa property had been purchased solely with petitioners money. If the COMELEC accepts
the registration of the Lipa property in her name to be accurate, her affidavit disavowing ownership
thereof in favor of petitioner was far from self-serving as it ran counter to her (and her childrens)
property interest.
The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the COMELEC to believe that Palomares may
have committed misrepresentations in her affidavit considering that she had perjured herself as an
informant on the birth certificates of her children with respect to the supposed date and place of her
marriage to petitioner. However, this was not the reason propounded by the COMELEC when it
rejected Palomares affidavit.
Moreover, it is notable that Palomares assertion in her affidavit that she and petitioner have been
living in the Pinagtong-ulan property since April 2007 is corroborated by other evidence, including the
affidavits of Pinagtong-ulan barangay officials and neighbors.
d) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, certificate from parish and designation from
socio-civic organization
The Affidavit issued by Leonila Suarez83 (erstwhile owner of the Lipa house and lot) states that in
April 2007, after she received the down payment for the Lipa property and signed an agreement that
petitioner would settle her bank obligations in connection with the said transaction, he and Palomares
actually started residing at Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC brushed this Affidavit aside as one that
"merely narrates the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property and mentions in passing that
Sabili and Palomares lived in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007 up to the present."84
We disagree with the COMELECs appreciation of the Suarez Affidavit. Since she was its owner,
transactions for the purchase of the Lipa property was within her personal knowledge. Ordinarily, this
includes the arrangement regarding who shall pay for the property and when, if ever, it shall be
occupied by the buyers. We thus consider that her statements impact positively on petitioners claim
of residence.
The Dissent on the other hand argues that the claim that petitioner started living in the Lipa house
and lot in April 2007 is made dubious by the fact that (1) there might not be enough time to effect an
actual and physical change in residence a month before the May 2007 elections when petitioner ran
for representative of the 4th District of Batangas; and (2) the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized,
and the subsequent transfer of ownership in the tax declaration was made, only in August 2008.

Before further discussing this, it is pertinent to point out that these were not the reasons adduced by
the COMELEC in the assailed Resolutions. Assuming that the above reasons were the unuttered
considerations of the COMELEC in coming up with its conclusions, such reasoning still exhibits grave
abuse of discretion.
As to the Dissents first argument, it must be remembered that a transfer of domicile/residence need
not be completed in one single instance. Thus, in Mitra v. Commission on Elections,85 where the
evidence showed that in 2008, petitioner Mitra had leased a small room at Maligaya Feedmills
located in Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in the same locality a lot where he began constructing his
house, we recognized that petitioner "transferred by incremental process to Aborlan beginning 2008
and concluded his transfer in early 2009" and thus, he transferred his residence from Puerto Princesa
City to Aborlan within the period required by law. We cannot treat the transfer to the Pinagtong-ulan
house any less than we did Mitras transfer to the Maligaya Feedmills room.1wphi1
Moreover, the Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including former and
incumbent barangay officials, attests that petitioner had begun living in the Pinagtong-ulan house and
lot before the May 2007 elections such that it was where his coordinators for the May 2007 elections
went to meet him.86 Jacinto Cornejo Sr., the contractor who renovated the Pinagtong-ulan house
when it was bought by petitioner, also swore that petitioner and his family began living therein even
while it was being renovated.87 Another Affidavit petitioner adduced was that of Rosalinda Macasaet,
a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan,88 who stated that she also sold a lot she owned in favor of
petitioner and Palomares. The latter bought her lot since it was adjacent to the Lipa house and lot
they had earlier acquired. Macasaet also swore that the couple had actually resided in the house
located in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007, and that she knew this because her own house was very
near the couples own. Macasaets Affidavit is a positive assertion of petitioners actual physical
presence in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
While private respondent had adduced affidavits of two Pinagtong-ulan residents (that of Violeta
Fernandez89 and Rodrigo Macasaet)90 attesting that petitioner could not be a resident of Pinagtongulan as he was "rarely seen" in the area, these affidavits were controverted by the Joint affidavit of
twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents who plainly accused the two of lying. Meanwhile, the
affidavits of private respondent91 and Eladio de Torres92 stating that petitioner is not a resident of Lipa
City because he has no work or family there is hardly worthy of credence since both are residents of
Barangay Calamias, which is, and private respondent does not contest this, about 15 kilometers from
Pinagtong-ulan.
As to the Dissents second argument, the fact that the notarization of the deed of absolute sale of the
property was made months after April 2007 does not negate petitioners claim that he started residing
therein in April 2007. It is clear from the Affidavit of the propertys seller, Leonila Suarez, that it was
not yet fully paid in April 2007, so it was understandable that a deed of absolute sale was not
executed at the time. Thus:
That initially, the contract to sell was entered into by and between Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili
and Bernadette Palomares and myself, but eventually the spouses changed their mind, and after the
couple settled all my loan obligations to the bank, they requested me to put the name of Ms.
Bernadette P. Palomares instead of Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and Bernadette Palomares in
the absolute deed of sale;
That it was Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili who came to my former residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan
sometime in the month of April 2007. At that time, Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili was still running for
Representative (Congressman) in the 4th District of Batangas;

That after payment of the down payment and signing of an agreement that Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili
will be the one to settle my bank obligations, Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo A. Sabili and Bernadette
Palomares had an actual transfer of their residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City;
That they started living and residing in Pinagtong-ulan in the month of April, 2007 up to this point in
time; xxx93
As to the rest of the documents presented by petitioner, the COMELEC held that the Memorandum
issued by the Guardians Brotherhood Inc. San Jose/Lipa City Chapter merely declares the
designation of petitioner in the organization, without any showing that residence in the locality was a
requirement for that designation. Meanwhile, the Certificate of Appreciation was nothing more than an
acknowledgment of petitioners material and financial support, and not an indication of residence.
We agree that considered separately, the Guardians Brotherhood Memorandum and the Pinagtongulan Parish Certificate of Appreciation do not establish petitioners residence in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa
City. Nevertheless, coupled with the fact that petitioner had twice been elected as Provincial Board
Member representing the Fourth District of Batangas, which encompasses Lipa City, petitioners
involvement in the religious life of the community, as attested to by the certificate of appreciation
issued to him by the Pinagtong-ulan parish for his "material and financial support" as President of the
Barangay Fiesta Committee in 2009, as well as his assumption of a leadership role in the socio-civic
sphere of the locality as a member of the advisory body of the Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City
Chapter of the Guardians Brotherhood Inc. , manifests a significant level of knowledge of and
sensitivity to the needs of the said community. Such, after all, is the rationale for the residency
requirement in our elections laws, to wit:
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding elective
public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs, difficulties,
aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their constituencies; likewise, it
enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers qualifications and fitness for the job they aspire
for xxx. 94
Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that while separately, each evidence presented
by petitioner might fail to convincingly show the fact of his residence at Pinagtong-ulan since 2007,
collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently establish the said fact.
Petitioners actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the presence of a place
(Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various persons in
Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain. Petitioners substantial and real interest
in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently shown not only by the acquisition
of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration, but also his participation in
the communitys socio-civic and religious life, as well as his declaration in his ITR that he is a resident
thereof.
We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate
compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law.
In view of this Courts finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his residence at Pinagtong-ulan
and the duration thereof, there is no need to further discuss whether there was material and
deliberate misrepresentation of the residency qualification in his COC.1wphi1
As a final note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their own judgment
regarding the qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him, notwithstanding that the issue of his

residency qualification had been raised prior to the elections. Petitioner has garnered the highest
number of votes (55,268 votes as opposed to the 48,825 votes in favor of his opponent, Oscar
Gozos)95 legally cast for the position of Mayor of Lipa City and has consequently been proclaimed
duly elected municipal Mayor of Lipa City during the last May 2010 elections 96
In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections97 that "(t)o successfully
challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly demonstrate that the
ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such
ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would ultimately create greater
prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so
zealously protect and promote."
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,98 we concluded that "when the evidence of the
alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive
and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor's right
to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give
effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."
In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner sufficiently established his compliance with
the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law. We also recognize that
"(a)bove and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is
their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we
continue to hold sacred."99
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed COMELEC Resolutions
dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 in Florencio Librea v. Meynardo A. Sabili [SPA No. 09047(DC)] are ANNULLED. Private respondents Petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of
Meynardo A. Sabili is DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by this Court on 7 September
2010 is MADE PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131421

November 18, 2002
GERONIMO
DADO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 26, 1997
decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, which affirmed the decision2 dated April
22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2056, finding
petitioner Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide.
In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo Dado and accused Francisco Eraso
were charged with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay Sagasa, Municipality of Esperanza,
Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS
with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which
caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, with the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.3
Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not guilty.4 Trial
thereafter followed.
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas 5 and Rufo Alga6 are as
follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three
teams to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed of
petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo
Alga, waited behind a large dike at Sitio Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who
were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, positioned themselves between petitioner, who was armed
with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. They
were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position and were about 2 arms length away from each
other. At around 11:00 of the same evening, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50
meters. Though it was a moonless night, they noticed that he was half-naked. When he was about 5
meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso, who was on his right side,
was making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash
light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter, petitioner,
who was on the left side of Rufo Alga, fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim
shouted, "Tay Dolfo, ako ini," ("Tay Dolfo, [this is] me")7as he fell on the ground. The victim turned out

to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team
were ordered to intercept. Repentant of what he did, accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas
saying, "Pare, this was not intentionally done and this was merely an accident." 8
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The post-mortem examination
conducted on his cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, yielded the following results:
Gunshot wounds located at:
1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a diameter of 0.25 cm coursing tangentially
and exiting at the right inner arm, about 4 cm below the elbow, 2.5 cm by 3cm in diameter
(Point of Exit).
No powder burns noted.
2. (Point of Entry) 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at upper mid-inner thigh, about 5 cm from the
ischial spine. Exposed were the damaged muscles, blood vessels and the surrounding tissues
along the femoral triangle. The wound coursed upwards toward the pelvic area through the
inguinal canal with blast injuries noted [at] the urinary bladder prostate gland, urethra, part of
the ureter, the mid-pelvic bone (symphysis pubis), and the surrounding vessels and tissues of
the pelvis. Marked bleeding was noted along the injured pelvic area. Three (3) pieces of
irregularly shaped metallic slugs were recovered from the body; one, silvery colored, along the
iliac spine almost glued to the bone; two, copper colored, embedded in the urinary bladder
substance; three, copper colored, embedded in blasted substance almost on the pelvic floor.
Hematoma noted along the penile area.
No other injuries noted.9
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was
the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in
the pelvic region where she found three irregularly shaped metallic fragments. Dr. Antenor
added that the position of the victim at that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant
considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards. She added that the wound on the
victims right outer lateral arm alone, would not bring about death, unless not immediately
treated.10
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments recovered
from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet, thus:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
xxxxxxxxx
1. Evidence marked "SB-1" is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56mm jacketed bullet and was
fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56mm firearms.
2. Evidence marked "SB-2" and "SB-3" could be parts of the lead core of evidence copper jacketed
marked "SB-1".
x x x x x x x x x.11

On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked
as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of "SB-1"
which is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.12
For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident, he was armed with a .45 caliber pistol.
He claimed that while waiting for the cattle rustlers, he and his team positioned themselves beneath a
big hole from which a big tree had been uprooted. He was facing eastward while his companions,
CAFGU members, Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, were facing southwards. When
he heard rapid gun bursts, he thought they were being fired upon by their enemies, thus, he
immediately fired a single shot eastward. It was only when accused Eraso embraced and asked
forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized somebody was shot. 13
On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the rapid gun burst which he thought to be
from their enemies came from 2 meters behind him. He explained that his arm was then broken
making it difficult for him to move. Thus, when he heard the gun burst, he did not turn to face the
source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him. He declared that his purpose in
firing his .45 caliber pistol opposite the source of the rapid gun burst was to demoralize their enemy. 14
On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, SPO4 Geronimo
Dado and Francisco Eraso, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the
accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment, ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Silvestre Balinas, Jr.:
a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages which was duly established in relation to the
expenses incurred for the complete funeral services given to the deceased victim;
b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;
c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary damages;
d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death; and to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.15
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 1997. 16
A petition for review17 was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated February 11, 1998,18 which became final and executory on March 30, 1998.19 Hence, as
regards Francisco Eraso, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide has
become final.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred: (1) in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso; and (2) in
finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.

In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner and accused Eraso
conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal
wound inasmuch as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of all.
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show that the prosecution
failed to allege the circumstance of conspiracy. Pertinent portion of the information states: " x x x the
said accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE
BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the
latter which caused his instantaneous death. x x x" Undoubtedly, the information does not satisfy the
requirement that conspiracy must be conveyed in "appropriate language." 20 The words "conspired,"
"confederated," or the phrase "acting in concert" or "in conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivatives
do not appear in the indictment. The language used by the prosecution in charging the petitioner and
his co-accused contains no reference to conspiracy which must be alleged, not merely inferred from
the information. Absent particular statements in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet
concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy, the same cannot be considered against the
petitioner who must perforce be held accountable only for his own acts or omissions.21 In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. To ensure that the due process rights of an accused are observed, every indictment must
embody the essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable particularity as to the name of
the accused, the time and place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof. 22
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same cannot be
considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Although the agreement
need not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be
convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy.23
In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos seemingly concerted and almost simultaneous acts
were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan to kill the victim.
Simultaneity alone would not be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action
and purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals particularly
if, as in the case at bar, the incident occurred at the spur of the moment. In conspiracy, there should
be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense.24
Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or omissions which can be proved to have
been committed by him personally. In other words, his criminal accountability, if any, should be
determined on an individual rather than on a collective basis. Petitioner could not be made to answer
for the acts done by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he participated directly
and personally in the commission of those acts. It becomes important therefore to determine whether
petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that directly caused the death of the victim.
The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a bigger entrance wound as compared to a
5.56 mm. bullet which is of a lower caliber. It concluded that the wound on the inner thigh of the victim
must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet because said wound had a bigger entrance than the
wound sustained by the victim on the right outer lateral arm. 25However, this conclusion is entirely
devoid of basis because no evidence was presented to substantiate said conclusions. What is
decisive is the result of the Ballistic Examination conducted by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, on
the 3 metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim. Piedad found that one of said

fragments, marked "SB-1," "is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was
fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56 mm. firearm," 26and not a part of a .45 caliber
bullet.27 Pertinent portion of his testimony, reads:
ATTY. MONTEFERIO:
Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court [a] piece of paper marked "A-1". This
refer to the very same Exhibit "A-1"?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Please tell us, how did you arrive in your findings that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of a
caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet; how did you arrive?
A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a] copper jacket, that is upper part of the
bullet, sir.
Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm.?
A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper jacket[ed] bullet fired from [a] 5.56 mm.,
and I found out that the lands and grooves of the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked SB-1 is
riflings of the standard 5.56 mm., they have the same lands and grooves.
Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine?
A: A bullet comparison microscope.28
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. PASOK:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the composition of the bullet of [a] .45 caliber
and that of [an] armalite?
A: Copper jacket.
Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45 caliber and that of armalite?
A: We are not in the composition but we are on a caliber (sic).
Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this Exhibit "2", SB -1, SB-2 and SB-3, could be
bullet from a caliber .45, M-14 or M-16?
A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and the lead core
evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the copper jacket
evidenced (sic) marked SB-1.29

xxxxxxxxx
Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit "3-A", in page 2 under the column, "Findings and
Conclusions" and I quote: "Evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the lead
core of evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked [as] SB-1. My question, you said could be part
of copper jacket marked SB-1, are you telling the Court, you are sure that this Exhibits "SB-2"
and "SB-3" [are] not part of a copper . . . jacket marked as SB-1?
A: It could be parts or it could not be parts.
Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?
A: It could be part, I am doubting.
COURT:
Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the copper jacket of 5.56 mm. caliber ammunition,
would you say that the same would be part of the lead core of the copper jacket of a different
caliber or ammunition?
A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56 and the lead core could be parts. We
cannot evidently conclude. It could be parts of copper jacket evidenced marked SB-1.
There is no basis.
COURT:
Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition has copper jacket?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper jacket (sic) but something in caliber .38 copper jacket,
rubber putted and lead (sic).
Q: How about .45 firearm?
A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet or copper putted (sic) or lead.
Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?
A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.
COURT:
Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings and conclusion that the
evidenced (sic) marked as SB-2 and SB-3 could be possibly parts of the lead core or the
evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked as SB-1?
A: Could be, Your Honor.
COURT:
Cross for the prosecution.

FISCAL DE PERALTA:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that correct?
A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper putted (sic), some lead.
Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why is it that in your findings in Exhibit "2",
particularly SB-1, you made it appear that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and not
from a .45 caliber?
A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.
Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm?
A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm because it is only a part.
COURT:
Q: But you said it could be a part?
A: It is a part, Your Honor.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and copper jacket of .45 caliber?
A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I compared that to a caliber 5.56 mm. copper
jacket fired from armalite under a microscope, the lands and grooves of the copper jacket and
the standard bullet fired from 5.56., they are the same in width.
Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the specimen marked SB-1?
A: No need to compare because the caliber .45 lands and grooves is too wide, the lands and
grooves of .45 caliber is very wide.
They are not the same.
Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber 5.56 mm. compared to a .45 caliber?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber .45 are very wide. 30
The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to whether the 2 other metallic
fragments (marked as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") are indeed parts of the lead core of the "SB-1",
which is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor of
petitioner; that is, said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber bullet
fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of
fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the

innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. 31
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the
victim are particles of a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner.
For this reason, the Court cannot in good conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide.
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victims right
outer lateral arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that
said wound was caused by the bullet fired from petitioners .45 caliber pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of the trial
court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant circumstances, it
appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to
kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the
victim.32 Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is
dangerous to life.33 Animus interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.34
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the
crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. 35 The elements of
this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the
offender has no intention to kill that person.36 Though the information charged the petitioner with
murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily
included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person. Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal discharge of firearm is punishable with
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods There being no modifying circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 16886, affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is SET ASIDE and
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of
firearm and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 131421

November 18, 2002
GERONIMO
DADO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 26, 1997
decision of the Court of Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, which affirmed the decision2 dated April
22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2056, finding
petitioner Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide.
In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo Dado and accused Francisco Eraso
were charged with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay Sagasa, Municipality of Esperanza,
Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS
with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which
caused his instantaneous death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, with the
aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.3
Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not guilty.4 Trial
thereafter followed.
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas5 and Rufo Alga6 are as
follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three
teams to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed of
petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo
Alga, waited behind a large dike at Sitio Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. Alfredo Balinas and Rufo Alga, who
were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, positioned themselves between petitioner, who was armed
with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. They
were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position and were about 2 arms length away from each
other. At around 11:00 of the same evening, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50
meters. Though it was a moonless night, they noticed that he was half-naked. When he was about 5
meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso, who was on his right side,
was making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash
light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter, petitioner,
who was on the left side of Rufo Alga, fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim
shouted, "Tay Dolfo, ako ini," ("Tay Dolfo, [this is] me")7as he fell on the ground. The victim turned out
to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team

were ordered to intercept. Repentant of what he did, accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas
saying, "Pare, this was not intentionally done and this was merely an accident." 8
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The post-mortem examination
conducted on his cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, yielded the following results:
Gunshot wounds located at:
1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a diameter of 0.25 cm coursing tangentially
and exiting at the right inner arm, about 4 cm below the elbow, 2.5 cm by 3cm in diameter
(Point of Exit).
No powder burns noted.
2. (Point of Entry) 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at upper mid-inner thigh, about 5 cm from the
ischial spine. Exposed were the damaged muscles, blood vessels and the surrounding tissues
along the femoral triangle. The wound coursed upwards toward the pelvic area through the
inguinal canal with blast injuries noted [at] the urinary bladder prostate gland, urethra, part of
the ureter, the mid-pelvic bone (symphysis pubis), and the surrounding vessels and tissues of
the pelvis. Marked bleeding was noted along the injured pelvic area. Three (3) pieces of
irregularly shaped metallic slugs were recovered from the body; one, silvery colored, along the
iliac spine almost glued to the bone; two, copper colored, embedded in the urinary bladder
substance; three, copper colored, embedded in blasted substance almost on the pelvic floor.
Hematoma noted along the penile area.
No other injuries noted.9
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was
the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in
the pelvic region where she found three irregularly shaped metallic fragments. Dr. Antenor
added that the position of the victim at that time of the shooting was higher than the assailant
considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards. She added that the wound on the
victims right outer lateral arm alone, would not bring about death, unless not immediately
treated.10
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments recovered
from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet, thus:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
xxxxxxxxx
1. Evidence marked "SB-1" is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56mm jacketed bullet and was
fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56mm firearms.
2. Evidence marked "SB-2" and "SB-3" could be parts of the lead core of evidence copper jacketed
marked "SB-1".
x x x x x x x x x.11

On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked
as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of "SB-1"
which is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet. 12
For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident, he was armed with a .45 caliber pistol.
He claimed that while waiting for the cattle rustlers, he and his team positioned themselves beneath a
big hole from which a big tree had been uprooted. He was facing eastward while his companions,
CAFGU members, Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, were facing southwards. When
he heard rapid gun bursts, he thought they were being fired upon by their enemies, thus, he
immediately fired a single shot eastward. It was only when accused Eraso embraced and asked
forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized somebody was shot. 13
On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the rapid gun burst which he thought to be
from their enemies came from 2 meters behind him. He explained that his arm was then broken
making it difficult for him to move. Thus, when he heard the gun burst, he did not turn to face the
source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him. He declared that his purpose in
firing his .45 caliber pistol opposite the source of the rapid gun burst was to demoralize their enemy. 14
On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide.
The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, SPO4 Geronimo
Dado and Francisco Eraso, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the
accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment, ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Silvestre Balinas, Jr.:
a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages which was duly established in relation to the
expenses incurred for the complete funeral services given to the deceased victim;
b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;
c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary damages;
d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death; and to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.15
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 1997. 16
A petition for review17 was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same was denied in a Resolution
dated February 11, 1998,18 which became final and executory on March 30, 1998. 19 Hence, as
regards Francisco Eraso, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide has
become final.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial court and the Court of
Appeals erred: (1) in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso; and (2) in
finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of the evidence presented by the prosecution.

In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner and accused Eraso
conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal
wound inasmuch as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of all.
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show that the prosecution
failed to allege the circumstance of conspiracy. Pertinent portion of the information states: " x x x the
said accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did
then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one SILVESTRE
BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the
latter which caused his instantaneous death. x x x" Undoubtedly, the information does not satisfy the
requirement that conspiracy must be conveyed in "appropriate language." 20 The words "conspired,"
"confederated," or the phrase "acting in concert" or "in conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivatives
do not appear in the indictment. The language used by the prosecution in charging the petitioner and
his co-accused contains no reference to conspiracy which must be alleged, not merely inferred from
the information. Absent particular statements in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet
concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy, the same cannot be considered against the
petitioner who must perforce be held accountable only for his own acts or omissions. 21 In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. To ensure that the due process rights of an accused are observed, every indictment must
embody the essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable particularity as to the name of
the accused, the time and place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof. 22
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same cannot be
considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Although the agreement
need not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must nonetheless be
convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of
conspiracy.23
In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos seemingly concerted and almost simultaneous acts
were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan to kill the victim.
Simultaneity alone would not be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action
and purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility of two or more individuals particularly
if, as in the case at bar, the incident occurred at the spur of the moment. In conspiracy, there should
be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense.24
Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or omissions which can be proved to have
been committed by him personally. In other words, his criminal accountability, if any, should be
determined on an individual rather than on a collective basis. Petitioner could not be made to answer
for the acts done by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he participated directly
and personally in the commission of those acts. It becomes important therefore to determine whether
petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that directly caused the death of the victim.
The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a bigger entrance wound as compared to a
5.56 mm. bullet which is of a lower caliber. It concluded that the wound on the inner thigh of the victim
must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet because said wound had a bigger entrance than the
wound sustained by the victim on the right outer lateral arm.25However, this conclusion is entirely
devoid of basis because no evidence was presented to substantiate said conclusions. What is
decisive is the result of the Ballistic Examination conducted by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, on
the 3 metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim. Piedad found that one of said

fragments, marked "SB-1," "is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was
fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56 mm. firearm," 26and not a part of a .45 caliber
bullet.27 Pertinent portion of his testimony, reads:
ATTY. MONTEFERIO:
Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court [a] piece of paper marked "A-1". This
refer to the very same Exhibit "A-1"?
A: Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Please tell us, how did you arrive in your findings that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of a
caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet; how did you arrive?
A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a] copper jacket, that is upper part of the
bullet, sir.
Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm.?
A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper jacket[ed] bullet fired from [a] 5.56 mm.,
and I found out that the lands and grooves of the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked SB-1 is
riflings of the standard 5.56 mm., they have the same lands and grooves.
Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine?
A: A bullet comparison microscope.28
xxxxxxxxx
ATTY. PASOK:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the composition of the bullet of [a] .45 caliber
and that of [an] armalite?
A: Copper jacket.
Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45 caliber and that of armalite?
A: We are not in the composition but we are on a caliber (sic).
Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this Exhibit "2", SB -1, SB-2 and SB-3, could be
bullet from a caliber .45, M-14 or M-16?
A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and the lead core
evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the copper jacket
evidenced (sic) marked SB-1.29

xxxxxxxxx
Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit "3-A", in page 2 under the column, "Findings and
Conclusions" and I quote: "Evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the lead
core of evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked [as] SB-1. My question, you said could be part
of copper jacket marked SB-1, are you telling the Court, you are sure that this Exhibits "SB-2"
and "SB-3" [are] not part of a copper . . . jacket marked as SB-1?
A: It could be parts or it could not be parts.
Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?
A: It could be part, I am doubting.
COURT:
Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the copper jacket of 5.56 mm. caliber ammunition,
would you say that the same would be part of the lead core of the copper jacket of a different
caliber or ammunition?
A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56 and the lead core could be parts. We
cannot evidently conclude. It could be parts of copper jacket evidenced marked SB-1.
There is no basis.
COURT:
Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition has copper jacket?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper jacket (sic) but something in caliber .38 copper jacket,
rubber putted and lead (sic).
Q: How about .45 firearm?
A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet or copper putted (sic) or lead.
Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?
A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.
COURT:
Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings and conclusion that the
evidenced (sic) marked as SB-2 and SB-3 could be possibly parts of the lead core or the
evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked as SB-1?
A: Could be, Your Honor.
COURT:
Cross for the prosecution.

FISCAL DE PERALTA:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that correct?
A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper putted (sic), some lead.
Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why is it that in your findings in Exhibit "2",
particularly SB-1, you made it appear that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and not
from a .45 caliber?
A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.
Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm?
A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm because it is only a part.
COURT:
Q: But you said it could be a part?
A: It is a part, Your Honor.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and copper jacket of .45 caliber?
A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I compared that to a caliber 5.56 mm. copper
jacket fired from armalite under a microscope, the lands and grooves of the copper jacket and
the standard bullet fired from 5.56., they are the same in width.
Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the specimen marked SB-1?
A: No need to compare because the caliber .45 lands and grooves is too wide, the lands and
grooves of .45 caliber is very wide.
They are not the same.
Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber 5.56 mm. compared to a .45 caliber?
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber .45 are very wide. 30
The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to whether the 2 other metallic
fragments (marked as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") are indeed parts of the lead core of the "SB-1",
which is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor of
petitioner; that is, said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber bullet
fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of
fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the
burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the

innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill
the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a conviction. Briefly stated, the needed
quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. 31
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the
victim are particles of a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner.
For this reason, the Court cannot in good conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide.
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victims right
outer lateral arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that
said wound was caused by the bullet fired from petitioners .45 caliber pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of the trial
court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant circumstances, it
appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to
kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the
victim.32 Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is
dangerous to life.33 Animus interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the
absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt. 34
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the
crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code.35 The elements of
this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the
offender has no intention to kill that person.36 Though the information charged the petitioner with
murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is necessarily
included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person. Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or
information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.
Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal discharge of firearm is punishable with
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods There being no modifying circumstances and
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of six
(6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision
correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 16886, affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is SET ASIDE and
petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of
firearm and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.

PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

PUNO, J.:
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the shooting
of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was charged with:
MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED MURDER for the
shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When Hultman died on October
17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated Murder against accused was
amended to MURDER. 1
The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with and shoot with the said handgun Roland John
Chapman who war hit in the chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly
caused the death of said Roland John Chapman.
Contrary to law. 2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent to kill and evident
premeditation, and by means of treachery, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously attack, assault and shoot with the said handgun Maureen Navarro
Hultman who was hit in the head, thereby inflicting moral wounds which directly caused
the death of the said Maureen Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4607 reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill, treachery and evident
premeditation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which

ordinarily would have caused the death of said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby performing all
the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes
independent of his will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered
to said Jussi Olavi Leino which prevented his death.
Contrary to law. 4
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against accused, bail was set at twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for the murder of Roland John
Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was set on August 9, 1991, while his
arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution manifested that it would
present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of Chapman and on the
circumstances resulting to the wounding of the witness himself and Hultman. Defense counsel Atty.
Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident pending that day was hearing of the
evidence on the petition for bail relative to the murder charge for the killing of Chapman only. He
opined that Leino's testimony on the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding of Leino
and Hultman would be irrelevant. 5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be wasted if the testimony of
Leino would be limited to the killing of Chapman considering that the crimes for which accused were
charged involved only one continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino should be allowed to testify on
all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the inconvenience of recalling him later to prove the two (2)
frustrated murder charges. 6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution wanted to present Leino to
testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after the arraignment of accused on August 14,
1991. The defense pointed out that if accused did not file a petition for bail, the prosecution would still
have to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it could present Leino. 7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail until after arraignment of
accused on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time, hearing on the
petition for bail. The defense counsel acceded. 8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges. The prosecution then started
to adduce evidence relative to all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland Chapman,
Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party started
at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub where students
of International School hang out. 10 After an hour, they transferred to Vintage, another pub in Makati,
where they stayed until past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group returned to Roxy's to pick up a
friend of Maureen, then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarias Village,
Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino to stop along
Mahogany Street, about a block away from her house in Campanilla Street. She wanted to walk the
rest of the way for she did not like to create too much noise in going back to her house. She did not
want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino offered to walk with her while
Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio. 13

Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany Street. When they reached the
corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car, driven by
accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the middle of the road.
Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: "Who are you? (Show me your) I.D."
Leino thought accused only wanted to check their identities. He reached into his pocket, took out his
plastic wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank (ADB) I.D. 14 Accused did not
bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and pocketed it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind Leino and inquired what was
going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: "Why are you bothering us?"
Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman felt his
upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you shoot me?" Chapman crumpled on
the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him to get up and leave
Chapman alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: "Do you want a trouble?"
Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen. When she came
to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She repeatedly shouted: "Oh,
my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to shut
up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt to move
away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. He knew he could not run far without being shot by
accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused's car.
Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car, trying to put some
distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused caught
Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away and directly in front of them
stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from the two. He faced them again and
shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not lose
consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his head to see
what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three (3) people looking on and
standing outside their houses along Caballero Street. 20 The three were: DOMINGO FLORECE, a
private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence at #1357 Caballero Street,
Dasmarias Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of Margarita Canto, residing at
#1352 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village; 22 and AGRIPINO CADENAS,
a private security guard assigned at the house of Rey Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street,
corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of their employer, while driver
Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to return to his own house. These three (3) eyewitnesses
heard the first gunshot while at their respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see what was happening, while
Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's house and looked out to Caballero
Street. Each saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on the ground, another man (Leino) sitting on the
sidewalk, a third man standing up ad holding a gun and a woman (Hultman). They saw the gunman

shoot Leino and Hultman and flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because of Florece's distance
from the scene of the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the gunman. He saw the control
numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He described the gateway car as a box-type Lancer, its color
somewhat white ("medyo maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the plate number of the getaway car and
gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat
saw the gunman's face. They had a good look at him. Cadenas was then a mere four (4) meters
away from the gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat was about twenty (20) meters away from the scene
of the crime. 28 The three confirmed that the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the
shooting took place was adequately illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house and went near the scene of
the crime. He noticed security guard Florece along Caballero Street. A man on a bike passed by and
Mangubat requested him to report the shooting incident to the security officers of Dasmarias
Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and narrated to his employer, Mrs. Helen Roxas,
what he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired to the crime scene while Florece noted the incident in his logbook
(Exhibit "B"). He also jotted down the license plate control number of the gunman's car as 566. 31
The security guards of Dasmarias Village came after a few minutes. They rushed Leino and
Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES BALDADO of the Makati
police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, investigated the incident. 33 Their initial
investigation disclosed that the gunman's car was a box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control
number 566. They checked the list of vehicles registered with the village Homeowners' Association
and were able to track down two (2) Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566. One was
registered in the name of JOSE MONTAO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmarias Village, with plate
number PKX 566, and another was traced to accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339
Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, with plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, was also tasked by
then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to investigate the shooting. Ranin's team immediately
proceeded to the house of Jose Montao 35where they found ahead of them the Makati police and
operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin tried to verify from Mrs. Montao whether the
white Lancer car registered in the name of Mr. Montao and bearing plate number 566 was the
gunman's car. Mrs. Montao denied and declared they had already sold the car to Saldaa
Enterprises. She averred the car was being used by one Ben Conti, a comptroller in said company,
who resides in Cubao, Quezon City. Mrs. Montao called up her husband and informed him about the
investigation. She also called up Conti and asked him to bring the car to the house. 36
Jose Montao came around noon. Conti followed with white Lancer car. Ranin brought them to the
NBI office for investigation, together with Lancer car. At the NBI Ranin inquired from Montao the
whereabouts of his car on July 12 and 13, 1991. Montao informed him that the car was at the
residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street, Cubao, Quezon City, the night of July
12, 1991. In the morning of July 13, 1991, Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaa Enterprises.
Conti confirmed this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2) NBI agents who
made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request, Montao left his car at the NBI parking
lot pending identification by possible witnesses. 37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot investigation and neighborhood
inquiry of the shooting incident. They interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him to report to their
office the next day for further investigation. 38They also interviewed Agripino Cadenas who was
reluctant to divulge any information and even denied having witnessed the incident. Sensing his

reluctance, they returned to Cadenas' post at Dasmarias Village that night and served him a
subpoena, inviting him to appear at the NBI office for investigation the next day. 39 The NBI agents
also talked with Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national residing at #1350 Caballero Street,
Dasmarias Village, near the scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents that the gunman's car
was not white but light gray. A foreign national, Asliami was afraid and refused to give a statement
about the incident. The agents exerted every effort to convince Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of
their protection. Ranin even asked a representative of the Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to
cooperate. They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as summoned. Florece readily
executed a sworn statement. 41 Cadenas, however, continued to feign ignorance and bridled his
knowledge of the incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI agents
informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding information from them. Ranin talked to
Cadenas in his office. Cadenas confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the case. He was
apprehensive that the gunman would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin assured him of
NBI protection, Cadenas relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He described the gunman's car
as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He was brought to the NBI parking lot where
Montao's white Lancer car was parked to identify the gunman's car. Ranin asked Cadenas if
Montao's was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that its color was different. Ranin directed him to
look around the cars in the parking lot and to point the color that most resembled the color of the
gunman's car. He pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the color of the car he pointed to was
not white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas replied in the affirmative. Ranin
led Cadenas to his office and showed him ten (10) pictures of different men (Exhibits "CC-1" to "CC10) taken from the NBI files. One of the pictures belonged to accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture (Exhibit "CC-7"), and identified him as the
gunman. Cadenas wrote his name and the date at the back of said picture. Atty. Alex Tenerife of the
NBI then took down Cadenas' statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial Court to apply for a search
warrant. After a searching examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a search
warrant (Exhibit "RR"), authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray, 1983
Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number PDW 566. Ranin and his agents
drove to accused's house at #1339 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, to implement the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of accused, of their search
warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from Director Lim to invite accused to
the NBI office for investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that accused was not in the house at
that time. She excused herself, went to the kitchen and called up someone on the phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and secured accused's car.
After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for the car keys but she told him that the
keys were with accused. Upon Ranin's request, Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with accused on the
phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited him to the NBI for investigation. Accused assured
Ranin that he would report to the NBI later that day. The agents then towed the car of accused to the
NBI office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the NBI office and waited for
accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3) Makati policemen, after an hour. He informed them

that he just came from the Makati police station where he was also investigated. He told Lim that he
was given a statement to the Makati police and was brought to the PC Crime Laboratory for paraffin
test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts of his Lancer car at the
time of the shooting. Accused claimed that his car was involved in an accident a few weeks back and
was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in his mother's house at Dasmarias Village
since then. Due to the lateness of the evening, the group decided to continue the investigation the
following day. 49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed accused on what really
happened at Dasmarias Village. Accused said he did not see anything. Lim apprised accused that
he would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into silence. 50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was requested to join the lineup
composed of seven (7) men and he acceded. Cadenas was called from an adjoining room 51 and
Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to
accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas. 53
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2) other agents brought
accused to Forbes Park for further identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has just
been discharged from the hospital the day before. Since Leino's parents were worried about his
safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the identification of the gunman in Forbes Park where the
Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house and escorted him and his
father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes, Leino was
brought out of the house and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was parked about
five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car with Leino was his father, NBI-SOG Chief
Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino was instructed to look at the men who would be coming out of the
house and identify the gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the unoccupied house, into the street,
in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could not yet speak
at that time due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of paper a request for
one of the men in the lineup to remove his sunglasses. Leino handed this written request to his father.
The men in the lineup were herded back inside the house. After a couple of minutes, they again
stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup, Leino identified accused as the
gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred the cases of murder and
double frustrated murder against accused to the Department of Justice for appropriate action. At the
inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar as the murder charge was
concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado went to see security
guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his employer in Dasmarias Village. Baldado
interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police station where his statement (Exhibit "D")
was taken. 58
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat from his house and
brought him to the Makati police station. At the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man who would

be coming and see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top of the stairs at the
second floor of the station. 59
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete. He ascended the stairs,
passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the second floor. While accused was
going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat
initially declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to see the man again to be sure. He also
confided to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and afraid for accused was accompanied by a police
Major. When accused came out from Major Lovete's office, Pat. Baldado again asked Mangubat if
accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in response. 60 Accused, together with Major
Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a Mercedes Benz and left. Mangubat was brought back to his post
at
Dasmarias
Village
by
other
Makati
61
policemen.
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house and asked him again if
accused was really the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat. Baldado told
Mangubat that he would no longer ask him to sign a statement which he (Baldado) earlier prepared
(Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI agents. Director Lim
asked Mangubat if he could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was shown
twelve (12) pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-11) of different men and was asked to identify the gun gunman
from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that of accused, and identified him as the gunman.
Mangubat's statement was taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the next day to make a personal
identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the presence of the media. At that
time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the office of then Asst. Director
Epimaco Velasco protesting to the submission of accused to identification. They pointed out that
since the cases against accused had already been filed in court and they have secured a court order
for the transfer of accused to the Makati municipal jail, any identification of accused should be made
in the courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was part of their on-going
investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but requested that identification be made
without the presence of the media. Velasco turned them down and explained that if accused is not
identified n the lineup, the media coverage would favor accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at Lim's office and
remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the SOG office the men composing the lineup and
he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat pointed to
accused as the gunman.
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its investigation. 66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm. in diameter,
located at the upper lip, mouth, along the medial line, directed backwards
and downwards, fracturing the maxillary bone and central and lateral

incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then lacerating the tongue with
fragments of the bullet lodged in the right palatine, tongue and tonsillar
region.
SKULL
CHEST
July 13, 1991

FOR

RIBS

X-RAY

#353322

No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of radioopaque foreign body

(bullet fragments) along the superior alveolar border on the right. No
remarkable findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone fragments in the right
palatine, tongue and tonsillar regions with associated soft tissue swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.
xxx xxx xxx 67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino. After entering Leino's head, it
fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth. Some of the bullet fragments pierced his palette and
tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage on the covering of
the brain. Physical deformity resulted as a consequence of the gunshot wound because of the
fractured upper jaw and the loss of the front teeth. Sutures were performed on the upper portion of his
tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue caused him difficulty in speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman. He opined that the muzzle
of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must have been at a higher level than the victim's head. He
concluded that the gun must have been pointed above Leino's head considering the acuteness and
downward trajectory of the bullet. 69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center, operated on MAUREEN
HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw Maureen, she was unconscious and her face was
bloodied all over. Maureen had a bullet hole on the left side of the forehead, above the eyebrow.
Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on the left side of the forehead where the bullet
entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She was also given a CT scan.
The examination revealed that she suffered injuries on the skull and brain. There were several
splintered bullets in her brain and the major portion of the bullet, after it fragmented, was lodged
beneath her right jaw. 71

Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a team who operated on her
brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head, remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve the
splintered bullets embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive swelling of Maureen's brain and her
very unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed undersurface covering of her brain. 72 After
the surgery, Maureen's vital signs continued to function but she remained unconscious. She was
wheeled to the ICU for further observation.
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of Maureen's nostrils due to the
unpatched undersurface covering of her brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed. A
second surgery was made on July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen's brain covering. He used the fascia
lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace the destroyed covering of the brain. Nonetheless, Maureen
remained unconscious. The trickle of brain tissues through her nose was lessened but Maureen
developed infection as a result of the destruction of her brain covering. Maureen developed brain
abscess because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to remove brain abscess and all
possible focus of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis explained that Maureen
was shot at the left side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the eyebrow. Upon
entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented into pieces and went from the left to the right side of the
temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull. The bullet eventually settled behind the right jaw of
Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital parts of the body, the brain.
When Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they discovered hemorrhage in her brain. After the bullet
hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of the brain and the second covering of
the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling underneath the forehead brought
about by edema in the area. Scanning also showed that Maureen's right jaw was affected by the
fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also swollen. 76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the internal bleeding and
remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments and dead tissues. The main bullet was recovered
behind Maureen's right jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory of the bullet. Hence, it was
opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen survived, she would have
led a vegetating life and she would have needed assistance in the execution of normal and ordinary
routines. 78 She would have been completely blind on the left eye and there was possibility she would
have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her senses would have been modified and the same
would have affected her motor functions. There was practically no possibility for Maureen to return to
normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of confinement in the hospital, she
ceased to be a breathing soul on October 17, 1991.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that on said
date and time, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was then in his
house at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July 13, 1991 and
woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning. Accused avowed his two (2) maids could
attest to his presence in his house that fateful day. 80

Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the Dasmarias shooting when he
read the newspaper reports about it. He denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses Agripino Cadenas
and Vicente Mangubat before they identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate number
PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition after its
involvement in an accident in February 1991. Since May 1991 until the day of the shooting, his
Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house in Dasmarias Village. He has not
used this car since then. Accused, however, conceded that although the car was not in good running
condition, it could still be used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at around 5:00 p.m. upon
invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who wanted to ask him about the
ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother's house. He readily gave a statement to the Makati
police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted himself to a paraffin test. He was accompanied
by the Makati police to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and was tested negative for gunpowder
nitrates. 83 After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to accompany him to the NBI for he had
earlier committed to his mother that he would present himself to Director Lim. 84
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished Lim with the statement he
earlier gave to the Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the Manila Hotel for breakfast.
When they returned to the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's office. On his way, he saw a lineup
formed inside Lim's office. The NBI agents forced him to join the lineup and placed him in the number
seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to identify him was already in the room. As soon
as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas identified him as the gunman. 86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI agents
brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified him as the gunman
in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated at the office of Ranin for he
refused to join another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct of the
identification and ordered a group of men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he was
identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was not assisted by counsel at any
stage of said investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. He
testified that from May 1989 to February 1991, he had been using his father's Lancer car bearing
plate number PDW 566 in going to school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit a bicycle driver and two (2)
trucks parked at the side of the road. The accident resulted in the death of the bicycle driver and
damage to his father's car, 90 especially on its body. The timing of the engine became a little off and
the car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at Reliable Shop located in Banawe Street,
Quezon city. After a month, he brought the car to the residence of his grandmother, Pilar Teehankee,
at Dasmarias Village, Makati. He personally started the car's engine and drove it to Makati from the
shop in Quezon City. He did not bring the car to their house in Pasig for it was still scheduled for
further repairs and they preferred to have the repair done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed
that from that time on, he was prohibited by his father from using the car because of his careless

driving. He kept the keys to the car and since he was busy in school, no further repair on said car had
been made. 91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders Hultman, adoptive father of
deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may have
been an overprotective father. This theory was formed when an eyewitness allegedly overheard
Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The defense presented Anders
Hultman as a hostile witness.
ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian Hultman were married in
the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two (2) children by her previous marriage, one of whom was
Maureen. He legally adopted Vivian's two (2) daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had three (3) children
of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the initial stage of the
investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag,
Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen could not have uttered those words for Maureen never spoke
Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him "Papa," not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out but instructed her to be home
by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first salary in her first job and she wanted to celebrate with
friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in their house. He woke up at
around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard came to their house and informed them
about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to accused at the Makati
municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked on accused in jail and discovered that accused was
not in his cell. The jail guards even covered up accused's whereabouts. His complaint was
investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime Prevention, headed by Congressman
Concepcion. 95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F. BALDADO and SPO3
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned from Mr. Jose Montao that
he sold his white Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaa Lending Investors in February
1991. This car was assigned to Ben Conti, Operations Manager of said company and was in the
residence of Conti at the time of the shooting. The other witnesses he interviewed confirmed that
Montao's white Lancer car was not in the vicinity of Montao's residence at the time of the
incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente Mangubat. Mangubat saw the
gunman and the get-away car but could not give the central letters of the car's license plate.
Fernandez went to one of the houses at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero Streets and asked the
maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call, the maid told him that he saw the gunman
and heard one of the victims say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez tried to get the maid's
name but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court nor asked the court to
subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged statement of the maid included in the Progress
Report (Exhibit "13") prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he and Baldado fetched the
latter at Dasmarias Village for identification of the gunman at the Makati police station.

At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the lobby. After a few minutes,
accused and company arrived. When accused passed by them, they instructed Mangubat to look
around and see if he could identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify accused. Mangubat told
Fernandez that the gunman was younger and shorter than accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo Florece (Exhibit "MM"). It was
signed by Florece in his presence. In said statement, Florece described the gunman's car as "medyo
puti" (somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified on the paraffin test
she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both hands of accused. 100 As per Chemistry Report No. C 27491, 101 the test yielded a negative result of gunpowder nitrates on accused's hands. In said Report,
she noted that accused was subjected to paraffin test more than seventy-two (72) hours after the
shooting incident. She explained that 72 hours is the reasonable period within which nitrate residues
may not be removed by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands of a person who has fired a
gun.102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also took the stand for the
defense. He testified that in the course of handling the cases, he was able to confer with Ponferrada,
Cadenas' supervisor at the Security agency where Cadenas was employed. Ponferrada informed him
that Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at the NBI and was compelled to execute a
statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to testify. Atty. Malvar, however, admitted the defense did
not compel the attendance of Ponferrada by subpoena. On rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture
story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the irregularities committed in the
off-court identification of their client. When asked what he did to remedy this perceived irregularity,
Malvar said he objected to the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether he filed a petition
for review raising this issue with the Department of Justice upon the filing of the cases therewith, he
said he did not. He offered the excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez, the principal counsel of
accused at that time. He also declared that although they knew that arraignment would mean waiver
of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the investigation and preliminary investigation, he and
Atty. Jimenez allowed accused to be arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the progress in the investigation
of the case. It presented seven (7) newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor Barrameda of the
Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, Nida Mendoza of
Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of the People's Journal and Elena Aben of the Manila Bulletin.
The bulk of defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the testimonies of the news
reporters, thus:
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified two (2) news reports as
having been partly written by him. One was a news item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS
PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"), appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of the
Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is usually the product of collaborative work
among several reporters. They follow the practice of pooling news reports where several reporters
are tasked to cover one subject matter. The news editor then compiles the different reports they file
and summarizes them into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "1-A":

Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the investigation of
the murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25, and three members of a family
Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters, Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.
Exhibit "1-B"
Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when Hultman, a 10th
grader at the International School in Makati was escorted home by Chapman after going
to a disco.
Exhibit "1-C"
The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman.
Exhibit "l-D"
The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they tried to escape.
Exhibit "1-E"
Other angles
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly sensitive" matter that might
involve influential people. 106
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of the news items marked as
Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He just culled them from previous news reports of other newspapers. He
admitted that the only portion he wrote based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director Velasco
was Exhibit "I-E."
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the Manila Times, entitled: "NBI
INSISTS IT HAS "RIGHT" SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY" which was marked as Exhibit "2." Certain
portions thereof, which were not written by Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the defense and offered in
evidence, viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital region, claims,
however, that another security guard, Vic Mangubat, had testified before the police that
another man, not Teehankee, had fired at Chapman and his companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on Teehankee's
hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS laboratory indicated that he may not have
fired the gun. 108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two (2) newspaper clippings
which were partly written by him.

One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, was
entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3", thus:
Exhibit "3-a"
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called "Daddy" shortly
before Chapman's shooting.
Exhibit "3-b"
But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was a dancer before
she was adopted by her foster parent.
Exhibit "3-c"
Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street inside the village
after the shooting and was believed to have proceeded toward Forbes Park using the
Palm street gate.
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a" and "3-c". He just reiterated
previous reports in other newspapers. They were based on speculations.
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD FOR DASMA
SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit "4"), viz:
Exhibit "4-B"
According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came when the witness
showed up and said that the gunman was on board a silver-metallic Lancer.
Exhibit "4-C"
The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the car and was
talking to Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several times. 110
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that the
news reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were written based on information available at
that time. 111
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON
HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of Malaya. She testified
that she wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-c", and the sources of her information were
several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c" reads:
Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee was arrested at
his house.

They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate control number 566
who had not been questioned, voluntarily went to police headquarters upon invitation of
Makati police chief Superintendent Remy Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged concerted effort of the investigators
to implicate accused as the lone gunman; (b) that there were other suspects aside from accused and
that someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual gunman; (c) that the initial police
investigation showed that the gunman's car was a white Lancer with plate no. 566; and, (d) that after
the NBI took over the investigation, the white Lancer car of the gunman became a silver gray Lancer
of accused and thereafter, he became the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the portions she wrote in the news
item, entitled: ''I WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October 24, 1991 issue of People's
Journal (Exhibit "6"). She identified the source of her information as Mr. Anders Hultman himself. 114
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion," Hultman said the day
after his 17-year old daughter was cremated. 115
Exhibit "6-b"
The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the Hultman family's request
for permission to visit Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding behind the curtain,"
Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can take the curtain down and jail authorities will
pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item marked as Exhibit "6".
Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was quoted as telling
Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-Hultman, Vizconde
and Eldon Maguan cases because he belongs to a secret but very influential multisectoral group monitoring graft and corruption and other crimes in high levels of
government and society. 118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given to him by BIR insiders for
the latter refused to be identified. 119

Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged blind and consuming personal
rage and bias of Anders Hultman against accused; and (b) the unwarranted pressure, prejudice and
prejudgment by some congressional leaders in favor of the Hultmans in violation of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified the news account which
appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED"
(Exhibit "7"). He wrote a portion of said article (Exhibit "7-c") and the source of his information was
Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate number
"566." The witnesses cannot tell the plate's control letters. 121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991 issue of the Inquirer,
entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8"). The
portions of said news item which he wrote were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who asked not to be
identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man. The NBI has taken over the case
from the CIS.
Exhibit "8-c"
He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he described as "resembling
Teehankee but looks much younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as Mangubat, saw
everything that happened in the early morning of July 13. The witness, however, failed
to identify Teehankee as the gunman. 122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP CHAPMAN SLAY CASE", which
appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit 9). 123 He wrote the entire
news account, 124 portions of which were marked by the defense in evidence, thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise witness" picked
Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup.
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to interview Mangubat
himself. 125
Exhibit "9-b"

Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si Bobby
(Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya.Hindi raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon bigla niyang
ituturo, said a red-faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did not want to be identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article, entitled: "US DIPLOMAT'S
SON SHOT DEAD", which appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin (Exhibit
"10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof were marked as evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in Olanileino's Mercedez Benz with a diplomat's
plate number when a white Lancer with plate number PKX-566 blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"
US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a communications
specialist. He said the shooting could be the result of an altercation on the street. 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the news account he wrote which
appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: "4 MURDER SUSPECTS FALL" (Exhibit
"22"). Portions of said news item were marked by the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of Mahogany and
Caballero Sts. in Dasmarias Village at past 4 a.m. Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman who was killed in
front of his friends on his way home from a party. The armed men, on board a white
Lancer car, blocked the path of the victim's Mercedes Benz car inside the village before
the shooting.
Exhibit "22-a-1"
The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered Chapman to alight
from the car. They shot Chapman several times in the body, while his companions
identified as Maureen Hultman, and Jussi Olanileino, were seriously wounded when the
gunmen sprayed the car with bullets.
The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce later the names of
the detained suspects after their initial investigation. 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "23"), which appeared
on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the defense in evidence as
follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"

The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked Chapman's car on
Mahogany St. in the subdivision.
Exhibit "23-a-2"
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two companions, Maureen
Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a Finn, to get out of their car.
Exhibit "23-a-3"
They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with plate No. PDW
566. They added that they saw the same car in the garage of the Teehankee family. 129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (a) stories was the NBI and they
were based on information available to the NBI at that time 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT as its rebuttal witness.
Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify accused when he saw the latter at the Makati police
station. Her reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati police went to his place of work in
Dasmarias Village and asked him if he was sure about the identity of the gunman. He told Baldado
he was positive. Baldado then said him he would no longer require him to sign the statement he
prepared for him earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, was also presented as
a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified that extensive washing of hands or excessive
perspiration can eliminate gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores of the hands. Continued washing
with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate residue embedded in the skin pores.
Application of vinegar on the hand can register the same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a suspect within 72 hours from
the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during which time, any possible trace of nitrate may still be
found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of the paraffin test. She related
that she once attended a training in Baguio City where they tried to test the accuracy of a paraffin
test. In said training, two (2) NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of them washed his hands. They
then subjected both agents to a paraffin test using diphylamine reagent. Both yielded a negative
result. Thus, she opined, the result of a paraffin test should merely be taken as a corroborative
evidence and evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992 for the presentation by the
defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a day before the scheduled hearing, the defense filed a
Constancia 135 manifesting that it shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the same being
unneccesary. The defense, however, declared that this is without prejudice to the presentation of its
evidence in the trial proper should the same be necessary.
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear. The prosecution moved in
open court that the main cases and the petition for bail be submitted for decision in view of the
absence of defense counsels who had manifested that they would no longer present their sur-rebuttal
evidence. The motion was granted and the parties were given ten (10) days from receipt of the Order
within which to submit their simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does not appear that the defense

objected to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a motion asking for additional
time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time, both parties submitted their respective Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. of the crimes
charged. 138 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal
shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer
imprisonment of Reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum
of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50, 000.00), Philippine Currency, plus moderate or
temperate and exemplary damages in the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), Philippine Currency;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the fatal
shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment
of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two Million Three
Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos
(P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of earning capacity of the said
deceased; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral,
moderate and exemplary damages;
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4607, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for
the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the sum of Thirty
Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00), Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One Hundred
Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos
(P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum equivalent in Philippine Pesos of
U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount equivalent in Philippine Pesos of
U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of earning capacity of said offended party; and One Million
Pesos (P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages.
(4) In all these three cases ordering said accused to pay all the offended parties the
sum of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as and for attorney's
fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a Motion for
New Trial, 139 alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in considering as submitted for

decision not only the petition for bail but also the case on the merits. He claimed that accused's right
to adduce further evidence was violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD BEEN
POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND MANGUBAT AS THE
ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS MASSIVE,
OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVE THE
ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF CHAPMAN
AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS ATTENDED BY
TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL AND
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF THREE
MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE MERITS
AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME WITHOUT GIVING THE
ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS
DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3) eyewitnesses who positively
identified him as the gunman. He vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by these
eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone surviving victim of the
crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly
irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents was
suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence turned
over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation.

Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The shooting lasted for only five
(5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman's face. His
senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution witnesses
in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence and, in most cases,
decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness identification is significant,
it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of identification evidence such as the
fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe eyewitness evidence as "inherently
suspect." 141 The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a crime,
whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event actually occurring.
Second, the witness must memorize details of the event. Third, the witness must be
able to recall and communicate accurately. Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness
testimony arise at each of these three stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire,
retain, and retrieve information accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities
and suggestive influences. (Emphasis Supplied) 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups where
the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru mug shots
where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done thru lineups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the purpose. Since
corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court identification during the
trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness and its compliance with the
requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the admissibility of and relying on out-of-court
identification of suspects, courts have adopted the totality of circumstances test where they consider
the following factors, viz: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2)
the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the
witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of
time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification
procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant did
not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in Leino's
identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal that this mode
was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. 144 The need for security even compelled that
Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S. embassy security officials and
brought to the house where he was to make the identification. The Leinos refused to have the
identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and with high security risk. 145 Leino's
fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions had been shot in cold blood in one of the
exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special
Operations Group of the NBI, correctly testified that there is no hard and fast rule as to the place
where suspects are identified by witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done
in hospitals while the crime and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim. 146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the
shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991, while
Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the investigators.
He identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures. He, however, categorically stated that,

before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of appellant or read any report relative
to the shooting incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to prove that his mug shot identification was
unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the
admission of his out-of-court identification by Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by Leino. The scene of the
crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when he shot
Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely testify
against appellant. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the brutal
cross-examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of appellant. When
asked how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he confidently replied: "I'm very
sure. It could not have been somebody else." 148
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn statement
the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently established that
Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility. The day he identified
appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak. He was being fed through a tube
inserted in his throat. 149 There is also no rule of evidence which requires the rejection of the
testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly reduced to writing. Reliance by
appellant on the case of People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's credibility is misplaced. In Alindog,
accused was acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in taking his statement, but mainly on the
finding that the prosecution evidence was, at best, circumstancial and "suspiciosly short in important
details," there being no investigation whatsoever conducted by the police.
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on the
basis of the description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said sketch was
turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch was
suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble appellant is not evidence. It is
unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have
remembered appellant's face when the incident happened within a span of five (5) minutes. Five (5)
minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience shows
that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes, eyewitnesses,
especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability the identity of
criminals. 151 We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence is to strive to see
the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was committed. Most often, the
face end body movements of the assailant create an impression which cannot be easily erased from
their memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no improper motive for Leino to impute a
serious crime to appellant. The victims and appellant were unknown to each other before their chance
encounter. If Leino identified appellant, it must be because appellant was the real culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas did not witness the
crime. He stresses that when the Dasmarias security force and the Makati police conducted an onthe-spot investigation on the day of the incident, neither came across Cadenas. The next day, in the
afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw the incident. He
merely replied: "Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to anyone as to what he
supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for investigation. He went to the
NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that he gave his statement to the NBI.
Cadenas allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the NBI tortured him.

We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he
witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related that he feared for his and his family's
safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence perpetrated by
appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential family. It was only after consistent prodding
and assurance of protection from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate with the
authorities. 153 The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses to get involved
in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of these all too real risks,
the court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped witnesses to cooperate with
authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. 154 It will not depart from this ruling.
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out by the records.
Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about his torture.
The allegation is an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented in the witness stand.
Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of torture is also belied by the fact
that Cadenas' entire family was allowed to stay with him at the NBI headquarters and likewise
extended protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing the testimony of defense
witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat failed to
identify appellant as the gunman the first time he was brought to the Makati police station. Mangubat,
however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he positively identified appellant as the gunman at the
Makati police station. He averred that the day after he identified appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to
his place of work in Dasmarias and asked him again whether appellant was the gunman. Again, he
replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado said he would no longer ask him to sign a statement
(Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier prepared by Baldado. In said statement previously prepared by Baldado,
Mangubat was supposed to state that appellant, whom he saw at the Makati police station, was NOT
the gunman. We give more weight to the testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to
suspect that Mangubat would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous to Pat. Baldado of
the Makati Police. Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati police, including some of its jail officials,
gave appellant favored treatment while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a
congressional investigation.
II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in not holding
that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting
incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain thing at
one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing at another
time. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired from the gun at
the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman. Third, the prosecution
eyewitnesses described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court found it to be silver mettalic
gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been the gunman for Mangubat, in his statement dated July
15, 1991, said that he overheard the victim Maureen Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please,
don't shoot me and don't kill me. I promise Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in a
house near the scene of the crime told Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say:
"Daddy don't shoot. Don't." Fifth, the NBI towed accused's car from Dasmarias Village to the NBI
office which proved that the same was not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin
test conducted on appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.

Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the eyewitnesses
was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy.";
and, (b) JOSE MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village, who had a white Lancer car, also
bearing license plate number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule on res
inter alios acta when he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This stance is a
specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a trial court's
error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice and therefore, almost
automatically required a new trial." 158 The Exchequer rule has long been laid to rest for even English
appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence "unless in its opinion, some
substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this
approach especially after the enactment of a 1915 federal statute which required a federal appellate
court to "give judgment after an examination of the entire record before the court, without regard to
technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the
parties." 160 We have likewise followed the harmless error rule in our jurisdiction. In dealing with
evidence improperly admitted in trial, we examine its damaging quality and its impact to the
substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact is slight and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will
not overcome the weight of the properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. 161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of
appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence
appreciated by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was convicted
mainly because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets found at
the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate appellant. The omitted comparison
cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was not in running condition.
Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village where it
was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show that said car
was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the possession of
appellant. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running condition. Even appellant's
evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio Teehankee III, drove
it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarias Village, in Makati, where it was
parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' description of the color of the
gunman's car. Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was somewhat white
("medyo puti"); 163 Mangubat declared the car was white; 164 and Cadenas testified it was silver
metallic gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than shades of differences and are
not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat white and silver metallic gray.
Considering the speed and shocking nature of the incident which happened before the break of dawn,
these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do not make the prosecution eyewitnesses
unworthy of credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen
Hultman, deserves scant consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper item 166 where Maureen was
allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The evidence on

record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the gunman. It was clearly
established that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two (2) reasons: Maureen did not
speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not "Daddy." 167 Moreover, Leino
outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and when informed that the Makati police
were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that Anders Hultman was NOT the
gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific
experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved extremely unreliable in use. The only
thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or nitrites on the hand. It
cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates or nitrites was the discharge
of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a number of substances which give the
same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, fertilizers,
pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans, and alfalfa. A person who uses
tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands since these substances are present in
the products of combustion of tobacco." 169 In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several
factors which may bring about the absence of gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz:
when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or
if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of firing. 170 In the case at bar, NBI
Forensic Chemist, Leonora Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of
hands with the use of warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She
likewise opined that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the
time of the shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already
been removed by washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on the paraffin test conducted on
appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant was tested for the presence
of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the alleged shooting.
III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the
publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was pressure on
the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the developments in the case (as
no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then Department of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon
attended some of the hearings and, President Corazon Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman
while she was still confined at the hospital). He submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from
prejudicial publicity and disruptive influences which attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims
there were placards displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside the courtroom
clapped their hands and converted the proceedings into a carnival. In another instance, he was
allegedly given the "finger sign" by several young people while he was leaving the courtroom on his
way back to his cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial
publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like
all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a
fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused's
right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field . . . The press does not
simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in
the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism." 173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that
the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that the

publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is
impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of
sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings news as they
happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news form part of our
everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and impartial judge is not
that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed the jury system whose
members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their impartiality. Criticisms against the jury
system are mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom put them all in better perspective when he
observed: "When a gentleman of high social standing, intelligence, and probity swears that testimony
given under the same oath will outweigh with him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon
mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and stupidity . . .
Why could not the jury law be so altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with
fools and miscreants?" 174 Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court
evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications
and publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et
al. v. Alejandro, et a1., 175 we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of
actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation
and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage
of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias
against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge acquired a fixed
opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence presented
during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the
burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do not disclose that the trial
judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any
manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of the
case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the attention of the court
to the visible display of a placard inside the courtroom. Acting on the manifestation, the
trial judge immediately directed that the placard be hidden. Only then did he order the
start of the arraignment of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of the media after
they had enough opportunity to take pictures. The court granted defense's request,
noting that the courtroom was also too crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued between the defense
lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the audience clapped their hands, the defense
counsel invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of the Rules of Court and moved for the exclusion
of the public. Assistant Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio objected on the ground that the public
was not unruly. The trial judge noted that there were yet no guidelines drafted by the
Supreme Court regarding media coverage of the trial proceedings. 178 Collaborating
defense counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of sympathy by
spectators inside the courtroom has turned the proceedings into a carnival. He also
manifested that he personally saw that when accused was being brought back to his
cell from the courtroom, a group of young people were pointing dirty fingers at accused

in full view of policemen. Forthwith, the trial judge declared that he could not be
dissuaded by public sentiments. He noted that the clapping of hands by the public was
just a reaction at the spur of the moment. He then admonished the audience not to
repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the coverage of the trial
by the press. The defense alleged that the media coverage will constitute mistrial and
deny accused's constitutional right to due process. It invoked the provision in the Rules
of Court which allows the accused to exclude everybody in the courtroom, except the
organic personnel. The prosecutor, however, argued that exclusion of the public can be
ordered only in prosecution of private offenses and does not apply to murder cases. He
added that the public is entitled to observe and witness trial of public offenses. He
quoted the U.S. case of Sheppard v. Maxwell 180where it was held: "A responsible press
is always regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration especially in
the criminal field. The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. What transpires in the courtrooms
public property." The trial judge then ruled that the media should be given a chance to
cover the proceedings before the trial proper but, thereafter, he prohibited them from
taking pictures during the trial. They were allowed to remain inside the courtroom but
were ordered to desist from taking live coverage of the proceedings. 181
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial judge gave the
media two (2) minutes to take video coverage and no more. Trial then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the media two (2)
minutes to take pictures before the trial proper. Afterwards, the reporters were duly
admonished to remain silent, to quietly observe the proceedings and just take down
notes. 183
6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon session, the judge
admonished the media people present in the courtroom to stop taking pictures. 184
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial
coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than seven (7) newspaper
reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defense's
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case
at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant
at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge voluntarily inhibited
himself from further hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and
partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this Court, we
directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the administration of justice. 186 We found
nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge.
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not present in the killing of Hultman
and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman consciously and
deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of the crime. Appellant
asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.

The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the crimes at bar with treachery
and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial court for,
admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting on the street
since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa It, however, appreciated the presence of
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution witness
Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no apparent
reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen Hultman who were
then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned who they were and demanded for an I.D. After
Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino and asked what was going on.
Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from appellant what was wrong. There
and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun
attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to defend
himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously and
deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design without
risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their meeting was by
chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the initial encounter and the shooting
was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the result of a rash and impetuous
impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of will. We have consistently ruled that
mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by itself, constitute treachery. 187 Hence,
absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only be held liable for Homicide for the shooting
and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that treachery clearly
attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting Chapman in cold
blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became hysterical and wandered to
the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her, Maureen moved around his car and tried to
put some distance between them. After a minute or two, appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to
sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated, unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were
gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant purposely placed his two victims in a completely
defenseless position before shooting them. There was an appreciable lapse of time between the
killing of Chapman and the shooting of Leino and Hultman a period which appellant used to
prepare for a mode of attack which ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself.
Treachery was thus correctly appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of
Hultman and the wounding of Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant posits that the awards of moral
and exemplary damages and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland Chapman and
Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He likewise claims that the trial court's award of attorney's fees was
excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the heirs of victims Hultman and Chapman
the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced to pay the heirs
of the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for death

and the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moderate or

temperate and exemplary damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was sentenced to pay the
heirs of the deceased the sum of: Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as indemnity for
death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and
Eighty-Three
Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of
earning capacity of deceased; and, One Million Pesos as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to pay: Thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury; One Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84)
and the sum equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages;
an amount equivalent in Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of earning capacity
of Jussi Leino; and, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the offended parties the
sum of One Million Pesos (or a total of three million pesos) for attorney's fees and
expenses of litigation.
5. Costs of litigation. 188
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail the matter of damages
recoverable in case of death arising from a felony, thus:
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising therefrom
are governed by penal laws, ". . . subject to the provisions of Art. 2177, and of the
pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on Human Relations, and of Title
XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." (Art. 100, Revised
Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves death, includes
indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104,id.) and said consequential
damages in turn include ". . . those suffered by his family or by a third person by reason
of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since these provisions are subject, however, as above
indicated, to certain provisions of the Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be liable for all damages
which are the natural and probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been foreseen
or could have reasonably foreseen by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206 which provides
thus:

The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-delict shall

be at least three thousand pesos even though there may have been
mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the
deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such
indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court,
unless the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not
caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions
of article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to the descendant's
inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support
from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years,
the exact duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason
of the death of the deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been increased by
this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil. 426, and lately to
P12,000.00 in the case of People v. Pantoja, G.R. No. L-18793, promulgated October
11, 1968 190, and it must be stressed that this amount, as well as the amount of moral
damages, may be adjudicated even without proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of
the moral damages being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the
circumstances of each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability when the crime
has been committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, such damages being
"separate and distinct from fines and shall be paid to the offended party." (Art. 2230).
Exemplary damages cannot however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will
decide whether or not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity for the sole
fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and is cases wherein exemplary damages are
awarded precisely because of the attendance of aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230)
". . . damages to be adjudicated may be respectively increased or lessened according to
the aggravating or mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) "but the party suffering the loss
or injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize the
damages resulting from the act or omission in question." (Art. 2203) "Interest as a part
of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in the discretion of the Court."
(Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses of litigation, the same may be recovered
only when exemplary damages have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or . . . when there
is a separate civil action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the deceased
are entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense P12,000.00
(now P50,000.00), without the need of any evidence or proof of damages,

and even though there may have been mitigating circumstances attending
the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased an amount
to be fixed by the court according to the circumstances of the deceased
related to his actual income at the time of death and his probable life
expectancy, the said indemnity to be assessed and awarded by the court
as a matter of duty, unless the deceased had no earning capacity at said
time on account of permanent disability not caused by the accused. If the
deceased was obliged to give support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the
recipient who is not an heir, may demand support from the accused for not
more than five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount to be fixed by the
court. This may be recovered even by the illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended by one or more
aggravating circumstances, an amount to be fixed in the discretion of
the court, the same to be considered separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, the actual amount
thereof, (but only when a separate civil action to recover civil liability has
been filed or when exemplary damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of earning capacity
of the deceased and for moral damages are recoverable separately from
and in addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00)
corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death, and that these
damages may, however, be respectively increased or lessened according
to the mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1 and 4
above, for obvious reasons. 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN CHAPMAN in light of the
law and the case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos as moderate or
temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of Roland John Chapman was baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped together the awards for
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00),
without specifying the particular amount which corresponds to each, as they are of a different kind.
We shall, however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be given as temperate or
moderate damages for the records do not show any basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be
given as exemplary damages. The killing of Chapman was not attended by either evident
premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be considered as one for moral damages
under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code. 192 It states:

Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . . shall be at least
(fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence) . . . In addition:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased
may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased.
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by appellant, we increase
the amount of moral damages to One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death of Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded to her mother, Vivian
Hultman, and her natural father. He contends that under Article 352 of the New Civil Code, Anders
Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is not entitled to said award. Only the parents by nature of
Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in effect at the time of Maureen's
death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled to the award made by the trial court. Article 190
of the Family Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate descendants of the
adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be
inherited by the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate;
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her natural father. During the
trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their claim of damages. Hence, we
find that the award of damages in their favor has sufficient factual and legal basis.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant and
should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply justified by the circumstances.
The records reveal that Maureen recovered between life and death for ninety-seven (97) days. Her
family experienced the peaks and valleys of unspeakable suffering. During that time, she underwent
brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was never stable and remained critical. It was always
touch and go with death. She could not be left alone at the hospital. Her parents had to be perpetually
by her side at least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily. After the shooting, their siblings had to be sent
back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended, her family's business took a downspin. Soon, her
family's assets were depleted, then wiped out. A total of twenty-three (23) doctors attended to her and
their bills ballooned without abatement. They were forced to rely on the goodness of the gracious. Her
family started receiving contributions from other people to defray the medical expenses and hospital

bills. 193 Maureen never regained consciousness until her demise on October 17, 1991, at the tender
age of seventeen. Under the foregoing circumstances, we thus find the award of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the circumstances of the case.
Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in addition to the award of moral damages, exemplary or
corrective damages may be adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar acts in the future.
The award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the courts to mould behavior that has
socially deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to suppress the wanton
acts of an offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen Hultman, a girl in
the prime of her youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned down by appellant in cold-blood,
for no apparent reason. Appellant's vicious criminality led to the suffering of his victims and their
families. Considering our soaring crime rate, the imposition of exemplary damages against appellant
to deter others from taking the lives of people without any sense of sin is proper. Moreover, since the
killing of Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to Article 2229 of the new Civil
Code, 195we impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages against
appellant for the death of Maureen Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive injuries as a result of the
shooting. His upper jaw bone was shattered. He would need a bone transplant operation to restore it.
His tongue was also injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for his taste buds were also affected.
When he was discharged from the hospital, he had difficulty in speaking and had to be fed through a
tube running down his nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth were cut off and the raw
nerves were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries and suffering. More devastating
was the emotional strain that distressed Leino. His parents were in Europe for a vacation at the time
of the shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at the hospital. It took two (2) days for his father to
come and comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble sleeping in peace at night. The traumatic event
woke him up in the middle of the night. Black memories of the incident kept coming back to
mind. 196 Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family. Seppo Leino, Jussi's father,
was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had to relocate his entire family to Europe where he felt
they would be safe. 197 Under the foregoing circumstances, we find that an award of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral damages is justified and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with treachery and pursuant to
Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 198 appellant is additionally adjudged liable for the payment to
Leino of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY
OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of
injury or death, is gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings
but for loss of capacity to earn money. InCariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, 199 we awarded
to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss of his earning capacity although he was still a medical
student at the time of injury. However, the award was not without basis for Cariaga was then a fourth
year medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic record, which was presented at the trial,
justified an assumption that he would have been able to finish his course and pass the board in due

time; and a doctor, presented as witness for the appellee, testified as to the amount of income
Cariaga would have earned had he finished his medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in Philippine pesos, of Forty
capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly speculative and should
be denied considering that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the International School,
Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the military and has just arrived in Manila in
February 1991 to pursue his ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the shooting on July 13, 1991,
he has just enrolled at the Manila Aero Club to become a professional pilot. He was thus only on his
first year, first semester, in said school and was practically, a mere high school graduate. Under the
foregoing circumstances, we find the records wanting with substantial evidence to justify a reasonable
assumption that Leino would have been able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club and
ultimately become a professional pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for loss of
earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We find that the award is not supported by the
records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial court incorrectly used the
monthly salary of a secretary working in Sweden, computed at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) a
month, as per the estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it appear that, at
the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills needed for a secretarial job or that she
intended to take a secretarial course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman himself
testified that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path, thus:
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot and she continued
her studies, what professional career would she (sic) like to pursue
considering her interests and inclinations?
WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17 and our projection is
that, certainly she would have been an artist in the creative side. She
would have become an actress or a movie producer or probably she
would have been a college graduate.
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the salary of a secretary in Sweden,
how much would she have much earned?
A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month.

200

Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million (P13,000,000.00) pesos to the heirs
of Maureen far loss of earning capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high school, Maureen took up a
short personality development course at the John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed at the
John Roberts Powers at the time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just received her
first salary, for which reason she went out with her friends to celebrate on that fateful day. However,

neither the nature of her work nor her salary in said company was disclosed at the trial. Thus, to
compute the award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are constrained to use the minimum
wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17, 1991), i.e., one hundred eighteen pesos
(P118.00). 201 Allowing for reasonable and necessary expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net
income per annum would amount to P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by
this Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 age of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income
which would have been received by the heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of earning as
capacity of deceased Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and
Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled that
the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the deceased, and
not the beneficiary. 205
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the amount of Three Million
Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the ACCRA law firm, with Atty.
Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of One Million (P1,000,000.00)
pesos each as attorney's fees and for litigation expenses. The three criminal cases were
consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some hearings having both morning and
afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for almost one and a half years. More than forty (40) witnesses
testified during the hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of sixty-eight (68)
documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents related to the trial of the cases
came up to this Court for review at least twice during the pendency of the trial. 206 Given these
circumstances and the evident effort exerted by the private prosecutor throughout the trial, the trial
court's award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as attorney's fees and litigation
expenses appears just and reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on the cases, where no less
than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by the parties, 207 were merely hearings on the petition
for bail concerning the murder charge for the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a trial on the merits
of all three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the termination of the hearing, he still had the right to
adduce evidence at the trial proper. He claims he was denied due process when the trial court
considered all the cases submitted for decision after the defense waived its right to present its
surrebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first hearing of the cases on
August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was appellant's petition for bail for the murder of
Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, there was only one murder charge against appellant
since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the course of the proceedings on October 17,
1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution was appellant's petition for
bail. The prosecution sought to present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three (3)
charges to obviate delay and inconvenience since all three (3) charges involved one continuing
incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony of Leino insofar as the two (2)
frustrated murder charges (with respect to the wounding of Leino and Hultman) were concerned. He

argued that since the pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the killing of Chapman,
any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail were recommended was irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would present Leino to testify on all
three (3) charges, it should wait until after accused's arraingment on August 14, 1991. 208 The
prosecution agreed on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time,
hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented Jussi Leino as its first
witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the hearings conducted by the
trial court were limited to the petition for bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary evidence relative to
the shooting incident, including evidence in support of the claim for damages. These
witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the defense counsels. The defense
never objected that evidence on damages would be unnecessary if its intention was
really to limit presentation of evidence to appellant's petition for bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial court issued an
Order 211 directing the parties to submit their Memorandum, after which "the main case
as well as the petition for bail are respectively submitted for Decision and Resolution."
After receipt of this Order, the defense counsel filed two (2) motions for extension of
time to file the defense Memorandum. In both Motions, the defense did not object to the
trial court's Order submitting for decision the main case and the petition for bail. Neither
did it move for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the court that it still had
witnesses to present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez, filed a
Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum praying for accused's acquittal. This is
inconsistent with the defense's position that the hearing conducted was only on the
petition for bail. If the defense insist that what was submitted for decision was only his
petition for bail, he would have only prayed that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the trial court, the
defense did not interpose any objection to the intended promulgation. In fact, the
defense attended the promulgation of the Decision and manifested that they were ready
therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail were heard simultaneously
and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present additional evidence was not
abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the records disclose that the trial court afforded the
defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took the defense almost one and a half years to
submit its evidence. The defense presented more than twenty (20) witnesses and several
documentary evidence. It was only after the trial court rendered a decision against appellant that he
filed
a
motion
for
new
212
trial,
through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he alleged that the joint
decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition for bail, was irregular for he was not
given a chance to present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note that in his motion for new
trial, 213 appellant did not even identify his alleged additional witnesses and the substance of their
testimonies. Nor was it shown that he could not have produced these evidence at the trial with

reasonable diligence. Appellant's motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on his cases. His
motion was properly denied by the trial court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial court,
dated December 22, 1992, thus:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the shooting of Roland John
Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as
maximum, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for the victim's death; and, One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages.
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by treachery, for the shooting
of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion
perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the said deceased the following amounts: Fifty
Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos as indemnity for her death; Two Million Three Hundred
Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83) as actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Fourty-Two
Pesos and Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said
deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and Two Million
(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(3) In Criminal Case No. 91-4807, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr., guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder, qualified by treachery, for
the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the
following amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as
indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine
pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and equivalent in Philippine Pesos of
U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral
damages; and, Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3) offended
parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of Three Million
[P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 136849

October 23, 2003
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
NESTOR CODERES y ABLAZA, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

THE

PHILIPPINES, appellee,

Before us for automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Pinamalayan,
Oriental Mindoro finding appellant Nestor Coderes y Ablaza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping
his daughter, Elsa Coderes y Mauhay, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of death and ordering him
to indemnify Elsa in the amount of P50,000.00.
The criminal complaint,1 dated January 24, 1997, filed by Elsa against herein appellant reads as
follows:
That on or about the 16th day of November, 1996 at 8:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, in
barangay Subaan, municipality of Socorro, province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, NESTOR CODERES y Ablaza, by
means of force and intimidation, with lewd and unchaste design, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously lay with and have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant
against her will and without her consent.
That the commission of the crime is attended by the aggravating circumstance of the victim being
only 16 years old and the offender-accused is her own father and living in the same house.
CONTRARY TO ART. 335 OF THE RPC IN RELATION TO R.A. 7659.2
When arraigned on March 3, 1997, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the complainant and Dr. Alita Fetizanan Venturanza as witnesses.
Complainant Elsa, 17 years old, declared on the witness stand that she had been repeatedly raped
by her father since she was eight years old, the first sexual molestation having been committed on
November 23, 1988 and the latest on November 16, 1996 when she was already sixteen years old.
Around 8:00 in the evening of November 16, 1996, Elsa testified that she was sleeping together with
her two sisters in one of the rooms of their house located at Subaan, Socorro, Oriental Mindoro. She
woke up finding appellant lying beside her. He undressed her and, thereafter, inserted his penis in her
vagina. Elsa knew that her sisters were aware of the various times that their father raped her but they
did not inform anybody about these incidents. Complainant herself did not tell their mother that their
own father was raping her. However, after she was raped on November 16, 1996, she was prompted
by her conscience and her fear that her sisters might suffer the same fate in the hands of their father

to reveal her ordeal to her Lola Mercedes who in turn informed her Lola Leonor. Both grandmothers
brought her to the Municipal Health Officer in Socorro and had her examined. 3
Testifying on the physical examination she conducted on Elsa, Dr. Venturanza confirmed her findings
that complainants sexual organ had a "healed lacerated hymen with non-coaptible borders and
retraction of the edges, 7 oclock position" which could have been caused by the penetration of a hard
object, like a penis, or by the stretching of the thigh.4
Defense, on the other hand, presented appellant as its lone witness. He admitted that complainant
Elsa is her daughter and that she was born in 1980. However, he denies her accusations against him.
Appellant testified that since the birth of Elsa, she stayed with her maternal grandmother, Leonora
Mauhay, whose house is located at Zone I, Socorro, Oriental Mindoro. Complainant only went to live
with her parents for one year in 1992. On November 17, 1996, complainant returned to her parents
house. She told her father that she eloped with her boyfriend four days earlier. Surprised by her
daughters revelation, appellant hit her telling her that she is still too young. Complainant answered
back saying, "Isinusumpa ko kayo bilang magulang". Thereafter, appellant returned complainant to
the care of her grandmother. On December 8, 1996, appellant came to know of the charges against
him. He cannot think of any reason why her daughter accused him of raping her.5
After evaluation of the evidence presented by the opposing parties, the trial court upheld the
prosecution evidence and rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime of rape, imposing
upon him the penalty of death.6 Hence, this automatic review under Article 47 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended.
In his Brief, appellant assails the decision of the trial court and submits the following Assignment of
Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON
THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD CARNAL KNOWLEDGE OF
THE COMPLAINANT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING THE SUPREME PENALTY OF
DEATH NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF RELATIONSHIP.7
We find the appeal meritorious.
In reviewing rape cases, we have always been guided by the following principles: (1) an accusation of
rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for
the person accused, though innocent, to disprove the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of
things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense.8
In the case at bar, we find that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. There was no evidence that appellant forced or threatened Elsa
in having carnal knowledge with him on November 16, 1996. We quote verbatim her testimony, thus:

Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court why you filed this case, in Court?
A: Because the reason behind is that even my sister will be raped by him if I will not file this
case sir.
Q: How about you, what did your father do to you which compel you to file this case?
A: He often times injure me sir.
Q: Aside from bitting you or injuring your physical body, what did he do to you?
A: He threatened me sir.
Q: What was done to you by your father, please tell the Honorable Court.
A: He raped me sir.

Q: And the last time that you were raped by your own father, when was that if you still
remember?
A: November 16, 1996 sir.
Q: What time more or less, if you still remember?
A: 8:00 oclock in the evening sir.
Q: In what place were you rape?
A: At Subaan, Socorro sir.
Q: In whose house?
A: In our own house sir.
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court, how you were raped by your own father on
November 16, 1996?
A: He laid beside me in our room and undressed me sir.
Q: And thereafter, what did he do?
A: He again inserted his penis in my vagina sir.
Q: This time, after you were rape by your father on November 16, 1996, what did you do in
order to protect your rights?
A: I reported this matter to my Lola Mercedes.9

It is clear from complainants above-quoted testimony that while she claims that she was threatened
and injured by appellant, Elsa did not specify how she was threatened, why she was threatened and
on what particular occasion she was threatened by appellant. Thus, the prosecution failed to establish
that threat or injury was employed by appellant during or on the occasion of the rape allegedly
committed on November 16, 1996 as a means to force complainant to have sex with him.
In rape committed through force or intimidation under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal
Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), the prosecution must prove that force or intimidation
was actually employed by the appellant upon his victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to
prosecutions cause.10 In the instant case, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of
sufficient force or intimidation that would have created a state of fear in the mind of Elsa so as to
effectively prevent her from putting up a determined resistance.
It is true that in a long line of cases,11 the most recent of which is People vs. Servano,12 we held that
in rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the formers moral ascendancy or influence
over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation; that ascendancy or influence necessarily flows
from the fathers parental authority as well as the childrens duty to obey and observe respect towards
their parents; that such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino children;
that abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughters will, thereby forcing her to do whatever he
wants.13
However, a review of the evidence presented in the present case discloses that the rule on moral
ascendancy cannot be applied in this particular case. We find that the trial court failed to appreciate
the fact that appellant could have hardly wielded any moral ascendancy or parental influence over
complainant as evidenced by the unrefuted testimony of appellant that since her birth, Elsa lived with
her grandmother and stayed in the house of her parents for only one year in 1992 when she was only
twelve years old or four years before the complained incident. On November 16, 1996, Elsa was
already sixteen years old. Thus, she could hardly be considered to be of such tender age that she
would be easily conditioned or controlled into submitting herself to appellants sexual desires specially
so, when she lived with appellant for only one year when she was twelve years old.
In his Brief, appellant does not deny having sexual intercourse with complainant. He claims that she
consented to the sexual act. As earlier found by us, the prosecution failed to adduce evidence to
prove that complainant resisted the sexual advances of appellant when she was allegedly raped on
November 16, 1996. The gravamen in the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her
will or without her consent.14 We find nothing in the testimony of complainant to show that she offered
any semblance of resistance when appellant allegedly raped her. While it may be said that tenacious
resistance from the victim is not a requirement for the crime of rape, the lack of evidence signifying
obstinate resistance to submit to the intercourse, naturally expected from an unwilling victim, could
likewise indicate that no rape has occurred.15Nothing in private complainants testimony indicates that
she struggled against the sexual advances of appellant. There was no evidence of appellants use of
force or threat in having sex with her that evening of November 16, 1996.
So too, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that when a woman says that she has been raped, she
says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. Moreover, there is no question
that a rape by a father of his own daughter is an odious and despicable crime that deserves
condemnation in the strongest possible terms.
In the present case, after scrutiny of the testimonies of complainant and appellant, we found certain
facts and circumstances that evince reasonable doubt as to the guilt of appellant. Unfortunately, the
trial court failed to comprehend the same.

First, when complainant was asked, during her direct examination, as to what impelled her to inform
her grandmother of the rape committed against her by appellant on November 16, 1996, she testified
as follows:
Q: After you were raped by your own father on November 16, 1996 what prompted you to
report this matter to your lola?
A: Nakukunsensya po ako at baka gawin sa aking mga kapatid ang gahasain din ng aking
magulang.16
During her cross-examination, she testified thus:
Q: And the reason why you finally revealed what according to you, your father did against you
was that you were nakukunsensya, is it not?
A: Yes mam.
Q: And you were nakukunsensya because you know for a fact that what you and your father
were doing was a sin against your mother, is it not?
A: Yes mam.17
While we find the last quoted question propounded by the counsel for appellant to be
downright misleading under the Rules on Evidence, to which the inattentive prosecutor
unfortunately did not object, private complainant could have easily denied the same, if it were
not really true. But she did not. Although misleading, the question is simple enough to be easily
understood and evaluated by Elsa who, on the date of her testimony was already seventeen
years old.
Her above-quoted statements are open to different interpretations. Was she bothered by her
conscience ("nakunsiyensya") because she was afraid that appellant would also rape her
sisters; or was she bothered by her conscience because she realized that what she and her
father were doing was a sin against her mother?
In a criminal case, every circumstance or evidence favoring a mans innocence must be taken
into account. If the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
interpretations, one of which is consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, then the
evidence does not pass the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.18 Thus, the presumption of innocence founded on the basic principle of justice as
embodied in our Constitution prevails in the present case.
Second, appellants act of trying to settle the case filed by Elsa against him cannot be
considered in this particular case as an implied admission that he raped his daughter. During
his cross-examination, the public prosecutor propounded questions on him to which he
answered, as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness, I would like you to listen very well and understand my question before you
answer, because this is a grave offense charged against you and if the Court will find you
guilty, you maybe included in the list of those who will be given lethal injection. I would like to
remind you that I filed this case with a weak heart, bearing in mind that you are the father of
the complainant. And to remind you clearly, when you and your wife was (sic) crying in our
office. Do you remember that?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were pleading to your wife that you be given pity and commensuration (sic). Is it
not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was for several occasion (sic). If I remember right, there were 3-5 times coming to
our office and trying to settle the case between you and your wife and Elsa?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You will agree with me that your wife, at that time, as well as Elsa Coderes did not conform
with the amicable settlement, for which reason, I was constrained to file this case as actually
you were raping her since childhood. Is it not?
A: No, sir.
Q: When Elsa Coderes testified here in Court, you were present, and when I directed her to
point at you, she went down from that witness stand and shouted to you, in this wise: "Ito po
ang aking walang hiyang ama na gumahasa sa akin". Do you still remember that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And when you were pointed at, your head bowed as if in acceptance. Is it not?
A: No, sir.19
From the foregoing, it can be seen that while appellant admits that he tried to settle the case filed
against him by his daughter, he, nonetheless, denied that he raped her. Thus, the fact that appellant
admitted having tried to settle the case against him may not be used as a basis of his conviction in
the absence of competent evidence presented by the prosecution that complainant was raped
through force and intimidation. The prosecution may not rely on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. Instead, it must depend on the strength of its own evidence and establish the guilt of
appellant beyond reasonable doubt. This, the prosecution failed to do.
Where the prosecution has failed to discharge the onus probandi for a pronouncement of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the accused will result in
acquittal.20
We need to emphasize however what we have enunciated in People vs. Eliarda, to wit:
In an acquittal, an accused is set free not necessarily because he did not commit the offense but,
more likely than not, because the exacting proof for conviction may not have been met. A person is
presumed innocent of a crime unless his guilt has been proven beyond any reasonable doubt. Thus,
an acquittal does not always mean that the defense evidence is given full credence, but, rather that
the prosecution has failed to overcome the presumption of innocence.21
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt,
the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Pinarnalayan, Oriental Mindoro in Criminal Case
No. P-5586 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Nestor Coderes y Ablaza is ACQUITTED and

his immediate RELEASE from confinement is ordered, unless some other lawful cause warrants his
further detention. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court immediately of the action
taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-3544

April 18, 1952
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
EMETERIO
SASOTA,
ET
AL., defendants;
EMETERIO SASOTA and ALEJO SANCHEZ, defendants-appellants.
Sulpicio
Platon
for
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for appellee.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the two Sanchez brothers Pablo and Alejo, their
nephew Juan Sanchez and one Emeterio Sasota were accused of murder for killing one Sabino
Bucad. After trial, Emeterio Sasota and Alejo Sanchez were found guilty of the crime of murder and
were sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, to jointly and severally indemnify the heirs of the
deceased Sabino Bucad in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the proportional costs of the proceedings.
Their co-defendants Pablo Sanchez and Juan Sanchez died during the pendency of the case in the
lower court and no motion of the Fiscal, the case was dismissed as against them. Alejo and Emeterio
are now appealing from that decision.
It is not disputed that Sabino Bucad was taken from his house by four armed men, and thereafter he
was never again seen or heard from. The witnesses for the prosecution point to the two appellants
and their two companions (Pablo and Juan Sanchez) as four the individuals who not only took Sabino
Bucad from his house to the Bato lake, ill-treating him all the way, but upon reaching there, took him
with them for about ride on the lake, and while sailing, continued to ill-treat him until he died, and
presumably thereafter secretly disposing of his body.
The two appellants disclaim any knowledge of, much less connection with the disappearance of
Sabino, and insist that on the night of October 17, 1943, they were nowhere near his house. After
hearing the testimony of the witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense, and observing their
demeanor while on the witness stand, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of the
Government witnesses and disbelieved that of the defense. We have gone over the record of the
case and we see nothing in it to disapprove of this attitude and disturb this finding of the trial court as
regards to the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, we believe the story told by the witnesses for
the prosecution to be more natural and probable and therefore, more worthy of belief. Moreover, we
see no reason why this Government witnesses should deliberately and falsely pin the killing on the
two appellants and their co-defendants and accuse them of this serious crime of murder with its
corresponding heavy penalty.
The evidence in the record shows that about ten o'clock in the evening of October 17, 1943, Sabino
Bucad who was living with his common law wife Maria Evalla and his 18-year old son Arsenio Bucad
in the barrio of Masoli, Bato, Camarines Sur, was awakened by calls from outside his house. Lighting
an oil lamp, he took it to the window to see who was calling. Arsenio who was also awakened
followed his father to the window and peeping, saw and recognized the two appellants herein with

their two co-accused, Pablo and Juan, armed with bolos. Sabino inquired from his nocturnal visitors
why they came, and the group requested him to come down so that they could all go to the house of
the councilor. Reluctantly, Sabino complied with their request. According to Arsenio, as soon as his
father had gone down, the four accused grabbed his hands and tide them and took him away. Not
long thereafter Arsenio heard the sound of beating and the groans of his father. Because he was
scared he did not dare leave the house to follow his father. Three days afterward Pablo Villez came
and told him that his father had been taken to the lake by the four accused, placed in a banca and
while sailing toward the opposite shore, was maltreated and killed by them.
While on their way to the lake the four accused and their victim Sabino Bucad were seen by a
member of the rondaorganization of Agos, who possibly, because of the extra ordinary spectacle of a
man with his hands tied being led by four armed men and late at night, hastened to inform the barrio
lieutenant named Eladio Barbacena who forthwith came and inquired from the four men what they
intend to do with Sabino. The group was apparently, in no mood to answer questions or give
explanations and Juan Sanchez even told him to stop asking questions otherwise he would be next.
Possibly, his curiosity and sense of responsibility as a barrio lieutenant prompted Barbacena to follow
the group secretly, hiding behind tall grasses until they came to the lake where he saw the accused
place Sabino in a banca and take him away in the direction of the opposite shore. He heard Sabino
groaning as if in pain and asking for forgiveness. Barbacena also saw a man in a banca follow the
boat occupied by the group and their victim.
Pablo Villez that same evening happened to be in the house of his father-in-law preparing to pound
palay on the occasion of the wedding of his sister-in-law. The four accused and Sabino with hands
tied passed by the yard and Pablo recognized the accused because they were fellow members of the
guerilla organization. He secretly followed the group and upon reaching the lake he saw the four
defendants place Sabino in a boat with them and sail; in the direction of the opposite shore. Villez
took another banca and followed them at a safe distance and he saw the four accused take turns in
beating Sabino who pleaded that he be forgiven because he had not committed any fault, to which
appellant Sasota answered, "what forgiveness." Villez says that as a result of the beating Sabino
died. Villez is the same person who as already stated, three days later informed Arsenio Bucad that
he had seen his father being taken into a boat to the opposite shore of the lake, in the meantime
being maltreated until he died. Villez must have been the man who Barbacena had seen take
abanca and follow the defendants as they sailed away with Sabino.
Another witness Roman Arbo, after fishing in the lake that same evening was on his way home when
he heard a noise at the bend of the road and he immediately took cover behind tall grasses. From his
hiding place he saw appellant Sasota puling Sabino whose hands were then tied, followed by Juan,
Pablo and appellant Alejo. He saw Juan Sanchez beating the victim and he also heard Sabino asking
for forgiveness. The following morning Arbo went to the house of Pablo Sanchez and asked the
latter's wife where her husband was because he had seen him the night before taking Sabino away.
When Pablo returned home and was informed by his wife of the visit of Arbo he got angry and that
same afternoon, his wife went to Arbo's house telling him that her husband was mad at him for
gossiping and spreading the news. Fearing that Pablo may do him harm because of his meddling,
Arbo changed his residence and with to live on the other side of the City of Legaspi where he stayed
until Liberation.
For the purpose of determining the criminal responsibility of the appellants, it is unnecessary to
ascertain and find the specific criminal acts of each. It is clear that they and their co-accused
confederated and helped each other and acted in concert from the time that they lured Sabino from
his home to come down and tied his hands until they reached the lake where they placed him in a
banca and then took turns in maltreating their victim until he died. In other words there was a

conspiracy between all of them and consequently, appellants are responsible for the acts of each and
every one.
The appellants interpose the defense of alibi, insisting that could not have committed the crime
because in the day in question, particularly that time of the night, they were elsewhere. The trial court
has analyzed the evidence in this regard and in our opinion correctly rejected this theory of alibi and
we find no profit in further discussing it. Suffice it to say that aside from the inherent weakness of this
kind of defense, the appellants were clearly identified by no less than four witnesses as the persons
who took away Sabino from his home and liquidated him. The important point raised by counsel for
the appellants is that of corpus delicti. He claims that inasmuch as there is no conclusive evidence of
the death of the deceased, because his body was never found, neither was the place where he was
supposed to have been buried indicated corpus delicti was not established. In a case of murder of
homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or to show where it can be found. There are cases
like death at sea, where the finding or recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that the death
and the criminal agency causing it be proven. There are even cases where said death and the
intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be presumed or established by circumstancial
evidence. Wharton in his book on Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, Sec. 871, pp. 1505-1506, says:
. . . the rule now established by the weight of authority is that the element of death in
the corpus delicti may be established by circumstancial evidence. Hence, in the case of the
destruction of the body, or in the case of its disappearance, as in murder upon the high seas,
where the body is rarely, if ever, found, death may be proved circumstantially. To establish the
corpus delicti by circumstancial evidence, facts are admissible, to show the impossibility of
rescue, as at sea; to show the existence and extent of wounds, and deceased's condition of
health; and to show that the wound was sufficient to cause death, and that the party was
reported dead. Death is sufficiently shown by the testimony of a witness that he saw the flash
and heard the report, and that the deceased fell to the ground, declaring he was shot, and that
accused did the shooting.
Francisco in his book on Criminal Evidence, Vol. III section 27, 1517, also has the following to say:
A conviction of murder cannot be supported unless the body has been found or there is
equivalent proof of death. The more modern rule is that the fact of death as well as the other
branch of the corpus delicti may be established by circumstancial or presumptive evidence.
Thus is held that, where the body has been destroyed or is not recovered, it is competent to
establish both elements by presumptive evidence . . .
Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cases decided by this Court, where besides
the act of treason the accused is held responsible for the death of persons he had arrested or tortured
or taken away, where the victims were never later seen or heard from, it has been presumed that they
were killed or otherwise criminally disposed of or liquidated by the accused, this, for the purpose of
fixing the penalty.
There is nothing in the record to show that the witnesses for the prosecution had any reason for
falsely imputing this serious crime of murder to them. Of course, appellant Alejo Sanchez insinuates
that Arsenio Bucad had a motive to testify against him because he (Alejo) was a witness against him
in criminal case in the Justice of the Peace Court for physical injuries where Arsenio was sentenced
to arresto menor and to pay P60.00 damages. It turns out however that Alejo never testified in said
case for the reason that arsenio Bucad pleaded guilty to the charge.
As regards motive behind the killing, there is evidence showing that defendant Pablo Sanchez was
maintaining illicit relations with Sabino's common law wife, Maria Evalla, and that the former probably

to have the woman all to himself, liquidated Sabino. Now, why did his co-defendants help him in
carrying out his dastardly plan? The reason is not far to seek. Alejandro Sanchez was his brother,
and Juan Sanchez was a nephew. As to Emeterio Sasota, he was a friend.
In view of all the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, except the
amount of indemnity of P2,000.00 which should be raised to P6,000.00, the same is hereby affirmed,
with cost against the appellants. So ordered.

G.R. No. 101797 March 24, 1994

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant.
CARLOS DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO ASMOLO, TEODULFO DAGUING,
FEDERICO SIMPRON, BIENVENIDO SIMPRON and DIDOC BONGCALOS (all at large), accused.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto D. Labastida, Sr. for accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were charged with the crime of Kidnapping
with Murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay, Leyte. 1 They were Abundio Roluna,
Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing, Federico Simpron,
Bienvenido Simpron and Didoc Bongcalos. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of Baybay, Province of
Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with the
use of firearms and taking advantage of superior strength, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously hogtie and kidnap one Anatalio Moronia and take him away
to a place unknown up (to) this time whereat said victim was killed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted. The other seven (7) accused
remain at large.
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado Sombilon and Buenaventura
Nogalada, both of whom were residents of barangay Amguhan, Baybay, Leyte.
CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around seven o'clock in the morning, he
was on his way to sitio Bungabungan in barangay Amguhan to attend to the pasture of his carabao.
At a distance of thirty (30) meters, he saw his neighbor, Anatalio Moronia, stopped in his tracks and
taken captive by accused Abundio Roluna. Roluna was then accompanied by seven (7) other
persons. viz: Didoc Bongcalos, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo Daguing, Carlos
Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo and Paterno Daguing. Accused Roluna was armed with an armalite while
his companions were carrying short firearms. Using an abaca strip, he saw Carlos Daguing tie up the
hands of Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did not shout for help and proceeded on his way. With
the exception of his wife, he did not inform anyone about what he saw that fateful day. 2

BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the testimony of Sombilon. He testified

that on said day, at around nine o'clock in the morning, he came from his farm in barangay Monterico,
Baybay and was on his way home to barangay Amguhan. At a distance of about twenty-five (25)
meters, he saw Moronia walking along a human trail in barangay Amguhan, with his hands tied by a
rope behind his back. Moronia was followed by accused Roluna, Carlos Daguing and five (5) other
persons whom he did not recognize. Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while Carlos Daguing
was armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada immediately left the place. 3
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never seen or heard from.
At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and alibi. Roluna claimed that on May 24,
1984, Danilo Noroo, a cousin of his wife, went to their house in barangay Amguhan. They were
informed by Danilo that Iluminada Cortines y Noroo, his wife's grandmother, was bedridden and
seriously ill. He and his wife immediately proceeded to Iluminada's house in barangay Banahaw,
Baybay, Leyte. As soon as they arrived, he gathered some herbal plants for Iluminada. He boiled
these plants and regularly applied them on Iluminada's body. He and his wife attended to Iluminada
for three (3) weeks. After Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they returned to their home in
barangay Amguhan. 4 His testimony was corroborated in substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna and
his grandmother-in-law, Iluminada Cortines de Noroo.
Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and Nogalada, harboring ill-feelings
against him, testified falsely and implicated him in the disappearance of Anatalio Moronia. He claimed
that in 1983, he and Sombilon had a dispute over a cara y cruz game held in their barangay.
Sombilon was then drunk and he, as chairman of the Kabataang Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon
but the latter got mad at him. Since then, they have not talked with each other. Nogalada on the other
hand, also had a grudge against him. In 1982, they had an altercation during a volleyball game held
during the barangay fiesta. 5
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, 6 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Abundio Roluna y Elhig guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping With Murder. As kidnapping (and
serious illegal detention) is penalized withreclusion perpetua to death and murder
with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, under Article 48 of the Code,
the herein accused should be punished with the maximum of the more serious crime,
hereat the supreme penalty of death. Considering that the Constitution of 1987 does not
allow the imposition of the death penalty, however, herein accused is hereby sentenced
to life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties of the law, and
to indemnify the heirs of Anatalio Moronia the sum of P30,000.00. He is credited with
the full period of his detention in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, except if he did not sign an agreement to obey the prison laws, rules and
regulations at the inception.
SO ORDERED.
Hence this appeal.
In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant points and stresses that
the corpus delicti was not duly proved by the prosecution. He submits, inter alia, that considering that
the body of Anatalio Moronia was never found, Moronia's questionable and unexplained absence and
disappearance should not be blamed on him for the alleged victim, in all probability, may still be alive.

In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia's death and the culpability of accusedappellant were sufficiently established by the evidence. The People relies on the disputable
presumption provided under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four (4) years.
Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that fateful day of May 27, 1984. During this time,
Moronia, with his hands tied at the back, was accompanied by eight (8) armed men. Clearly, he was
then in danger of death. Since that day until the date of the trial (or for a span of six years), Moronia
has not been seen or heard from. The People urges that these circumstances raised a presumption
that Moronia has been killed by accused-appellant and his companions.
The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances proved by the prosecution are
sufficient to establish the death of Anatalio Moronia, and; (b) if in the affirmative, whether or
not accused-appellants and his companions could be held liable therefor.
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its primary sense,
refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. As applied to a particular offense, it
means the actual commission by someone of the particular crime charged. 7 The corpus delicti is a
compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz: the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis
of the criminal charge, and the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. 8
Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this case?
Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last seen on May 27, 1984 with his
hands tied at the back and accompanied by eight (8) armed men undoubtedly shows that his life was
then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact that Moronia has been absent and unheard from since
that time until the trial of this case (or a total of six years), a presumption of death was sufficiently
raised. This is in consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court,viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the
estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his
existence has not been known for four (4) years.
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough to hold accusedappellant responsible for the death of Moronia.
In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for murder
although the body of the victim was not found or recovered. In said case, we ruled that in case of
murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body of the victim or show where it can be
found. It is enough that the death and the criminal agency causing death is proven. The Court

recognized that there are cases where the death and intervention of the criminal agency that caused
it may be presumed or established by circumstantial evidence.
However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at bench. In the Sasota
case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4) armed accused forcibly take the victim from his
house to a lake, beating him up all the way to the boat. While sailing, the accused continued illtreating the victim until the latter died. The body of the victim was never found.
In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they merely saw one of the accused,
Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of Moronia. He was then taken in the direction of barangay
Monterico and was never seen or heard from since. At no point during the trial was it ever established
that any of the eight (8) accused beat up Moronia or in any way laid a violent hand on him. Nogalada
even testified that he did not hear any shot fired by any of the eight (8) armed accused 10 so as to
warrant a reasonable conclusion that Moronia was killed by accused-appellant or any of his coconspirators. Indeed, even the possible motive of accused-appellant and his group for abducting
Moronia was not definitively established. To be sure, the circumstances proved are insufficient to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule
131 of the Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the presumptive death of
Moronia. Whether accused-appellant is responsible for the death of Moronia is a different matter. The
Rules did not authorize that from this disputable presumption of death, it should be further presumed
that the person with whom the absentee was last seen shall be responsible for the subsequent
unexplained absence/disappearance of the latter. The conviction of accused-appellant for the serious
crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on the vague and nebulous facts
established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier, the evidence presented by the prosecution
surrounding the events of that fateful day are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of
accused-appellant for the death of Moronia.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused is presumed innocent until proven
otherwise. No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to convict him. On the whole, the
evidence adduced by the prosecution would not prove beyond a shadow of a doubt that accusedappellant should be convicted for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (kidnapping
with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping of Anatalio Moronia was
established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal detention under Article 268 of the
Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime, more than three (3) armed malefactors acted
together in its commission. Thus, since the generic aggravating circumstance of band 11 attended the
commission of the crime and there being no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period as maximum and prision mayor as minimum should be imposed on
accused-appellant. 12
IN
VIEW
WHEREOF,
the
appealed
decision
is
hereby
MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal detention and is meted an
indeterminate sentence from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal as maximum. 13 Costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994

DIOSDADO
JOSE
ALLADO
and
ROBERTO
L.
MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro
Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION, respondents.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of the State to prosecute perceived
transgressors of the law, which can be regulated, and the innate value of human liberty, which can
hardly be weighed.
Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem when former Senator Jovito R.
Salonga invoked before this Court his "right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause,
alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for
subversion against him." 1 We resolved the issue then and sustained him. He is now back before us,
this time as counsel pleading the cause of petitioners herein who, he claims, are in a situation far
worse than his predicament twelve (12) years ago. He postulates that no probable cause likewise
exists in this case, and what is worse is that no bail is recommended.
This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept and implication of probable cause, the
existence of which is necessary for the prosecutor to have an accused held for trial and for a trial
judge to issue a warrant for his arrest. It is mandatory therefore that there be probable cause before
an information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued. Unfortunately, however, at times a criminal case
is filed, a warrant of arrest issued and a person consequently incarcerated on unsubstantiated
allegations that only feign probable cause.
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law, University
of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of
their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security guard, they have
been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent judge.
The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated 16 September
1993 of Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine Constabulary, implicating
them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of one Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a
German national. 2 In that extrajudicial confession, Umbal claimed that he and his companions were
met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend Van
Twest who allegedly had an international warrant of arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June 1992, after
placing him under surveillance for nearly a month, Umbal, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG

Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2 Sergio Antonino abducted Van Twest. They blocked his blue
Nissan Pathfinder under the Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought him to a
"safe house" just behind the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over their quarry. After
four (4) days, Gamatero, Santiago and Antonino returned to the "safe house" together with petitioners
and SPO2 Roger Bato, known to Umbal also as "Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the interrogation of Van
Twest, pretending it was official, and then made him sign certain documents. The following day,
Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby armalite, after which Antonino stabbed him
repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned his cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and
rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the exact date when the incident happened, but he was certain it
was about a year ago.
A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the PACC, armed with a
search warrant issued by Judge Roberto A. Barrios of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br.
11, 3 separately raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago, one located at No. 7 Sangley Street, and the
other, along Amalingan Street, both in Green Heights Subdivision, Paraaque. The raiders recovered
a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and placed Santiago and his trusted
aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that day were Antonio and Bato who were found
to have in their possession several firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.
After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives, Sr., Supt. Panfilo Lacson,
Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat, referred the case to the Department of Justice for the institution
of criminal proceedings against AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago, SPO1 Sergio Antonino, SPO2
Roger Bato, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, Efren Madolid, and petitioners herein, Atty. Diosdado
Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition,
carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of authority. 4 In his letter to the State
Prosecutor dated 17 September 1993, Sr. Supt. Lacson charged that
Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado Law
Offices . . . planned and conspired with other suspects to abduct and kill the German
national Alexander Van Twest in order to eliminate him after forcing the victim to sign
several documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting to several
million pesos and caused the withdrawal of P5M deposit from the victim's bank account.
Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued a subpoena
to
petitioners
informing
them
that
a
complaint
was filed against them by PACC TF-Habagat, directing them to appear on
30 September 1993 at the Multi-Purpose Hall of the Department of Justice and to submit their
counter-affidavits. Attached to the subpoena were copies of the affidavits executed by Umbal and
members of the team who raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago. 5
Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena, petitioner Mendoza moved for the
production of other documents for examination and copying to enable him to fully prepare for his
defense and to submit an intelligible counter-affidavit. 6 Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was
interested in (a) the "several documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting to
several million pesos and the withdrawal of P5M deposits from the victim's bank account," as stated
in the complaint; (b) the complete records of the PACC's investigation, including investigations on
other suspects and their disposition, PACC's Order of Battle for 1992 and early 1993; and, (c) such
other written statements issued in the above-entitled case, and all other documents intended to be
used in this case. 7 Petitioners likewise sought the inhibition of the members of the panel of
prosecutors, which was created to conduct the preliminary investigation, on the ground that they were
members of the legal staff assigned to PACC and thus could not act with impartiality.

In its Order of 11 October 1993, 8 the new panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State Prosecutor
Bernelito R. Fernandez as Chairman, with Rogelio F. Vista and Purita M. Deynata as Members,
confirmed that the motion for inhibition of the members of the old panel as well as the appeal to the
Secretary of Justice was resolved on 8 October 1993 resulting in the creation of a new panel.
Thereafter, the new panel granted the prayer of petitioner Mendoza for the production of additional
documents used or intended to be used against him. Meanwhile, Task Force Habagat, in compliance
with the order, submitted only copies of the request for verification of the firearms seized from the
accused, the result of the request for verification, and a Philippine Times Journal article on the case
with a marginal note of President Fidel V. Ramos addressed to the Chief of the Philippine National
Police directing the submission of a report and summary of actions taken thereon.
Not having been provided with the requested documents, petitioners nevertheless submitted their
respective counter-affidavits denying the accusations against them. 9
After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory questions were additionally propounded, the case was
deemed submitted for resolution. But before the new panel could resolve the case, SPO2 Bato filed a
manifestation stating that he was reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file counteraffidavit, 10 and "in the greater interest of truth, justice and fair play" moved for the admissions of his
counter-affidavit 11 confessing participation in the abduction and slaying of Van Twest and implicating
petitioners Allado and Mendoza. Sometime in January 1994, however, before petitioners could refute
Bato's counter-affidavit, he moved to suppress it on the ground that it was extracted through
intimidation and duress.
On 3 February 1994, with the new penal failing to act on the twin motions of SPO2 Bato, petitioners
heard over the radio that the panel had issued a resolution finding a prima facie case against them
and that an information had already been filed in court. Upon verification with the Department of
Justice, however, petitioners were informed that the resolution was not yet ready for release, but later
that afternoon they were able to secure a copy of the information for kidnapping with murder against
them 12 and the 15-page undated resolution under the letterhead of PACC, signed by the panel of
prosecutors, with the Head of the PACC Task Force recommending approval thereof. 13 That same
day, the information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Makati and raffled off to Branch 62
presided by respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno.
On 4 February 1994, respondent judge, in response to petitioners' request, gave them until 8
February 1994 to submit their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the
accused. 14 On 7 February 1994, petitioners complied with the order of respondent judge. 15 The
following
day,
8 February 1994, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice seeking review and
reversal
of
the
undated
resolution
of
the
panel
of
prosecutors, 16 which
appeal
was
adopted
by
petitioner
Mendoza. 17 On
11 February 1994, petitioner Allado moved to defer the proceedings before the trial court pending
resolution of his appeal before the Secretary of Justice. 18 However, on even date, respondent judge
issued the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners. 19 Hence, on 15 February 1994, petitioners
filed with us the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining
order.
On 16 February 1994, we required respondents to comment on the petition and set the case for
hearing on 28 February 1994. After the hearing, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and respondent judge from conducting further proceedings
on the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. Meanwhile, on 27 February 1994, petitioners
voluntarily surrendered at the Headquarters of the Capital Command (CAPCOM), Philippine National

Police (PNP), Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila, and on 29 February 1994, they were
released on the basis of our temporary restraining order.
Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally contend that respondent judge
acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is
probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the evidence against
petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings," 20 and in "relying on the Resolution of
the Panel and their certification that probable cause exists when the certification is
flawed." 21 Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation which respondent
judge solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause against them to justify the issuance of the
warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear sign of bias and impartiality
(sic)." 22
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the determination of probable cause
is a function of the judge who is merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to convince him
that the accused probably committed the crime charged.
Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce.
As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 23 this Court speaking through Associate Justice
Sherman Moreland defined probable cause as "the existence of such facts and circumstances as
would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted." This
definition is still relevant today as we continue to cite it in recent cases. 24 Hence, probable cause for
an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed by the person sought to be arrested. 25 And as a protection against false prosecution and
arrest, it is the knowledge of facts, actual or apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in
the belief that he was lawful grounds for arresting the accused. 26
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan 27 sets a standard for determining the existence of probable cause. While it
appears in that case that we have granted the prosecutor and the trial judge seemingly unlimited
latitude in determining the existence of absence of probable cause by affirming the long-standing
procedure that they can base their findings merely on their personal opinion and reasonable belief,
yet, this permissiveness should not be interpreted as giving them arbitrary powers and letting them
loose in the determination of the existence of probable cause, a delicate legal question which can
result in the harassment and deprivation of liberty of the person sought to be charged or arrested.
There we said
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well
founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion,
that a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding
of probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is it believed that the act or omission
complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the
reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charge.

Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and whether the
same was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can only be made out by
proper and sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a conclusion can be arrived at when the
case has already proceeded on sufficient proof. 28
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to
be arrested is probably guilty thereof. In the Order of respondent judge dated 11 February 1994, it is
expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record, believes and rules
that probable cause exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be issued." However, we are
unable to see how respondent judge arrived at such ruling. We have painstakingly examined the
records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On the contrary, we discern a number of
reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be insufficient for a finding of probable cause
against petitioners.
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard
Umbal who supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van
Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not
been established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was
completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the
evening to six o'clock the next morning. 29 This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body
cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an
open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense
heat. 30 Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust.
In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were exerted to
recover traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged cremation. 31 Could it be that the
government investigators did to the place of cremation but could not find any? Or could it be that they
did not go at all because they knew that there would not be any as no burning ever took place? To
allege then that the body of Van Twest was completely burned to ashes in an open field with the use
merely of tires and gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.
Strangely,
if
not
awkwardly,
after
Van
Twest's
reported
abduction
on
16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent
him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus on 31 July 1992, his counsel filed in his
behalf a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 106253, and on 18 March 1993,
a memorandum before the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case No. 3896. On
26 November 1993, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the panel of prosecutors,
counsel again manifested that "even then and even as of this time, I stated in my counter-affidavit that
until the matter of death is to be established in the proper proceedings, I shall continue to pursue my
duties and responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van Twest." 32 Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General
Estoesta
believes
that
counsel
of
Van
Twest
doubted
the
latter's
death. 33 Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in fact already dead otherwise
his obligation to his client would have ceased except to comply with his duty "to inform the court
promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator,
guardian or other legal representative," 34 which he did not.
Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners' theory that the supposed death of Van
Twest who is reportedly an international fugitive from justice, a fact substantiated by petitioners and
never refuted by PACC, is a likely story to stop the international manhunt for his arrest. In this regard,
we are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin 35 decided ninety-two years ago where this

Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not found, and there is but
one witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved.
Then, the extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In his sworn
statement, he said that he together with his cohorts was met by petitioners in Silahis Hotel where they
hatched the plan to abduct Van Twest. 36However, during the preliminary investigation, he stated that
he was not part of the actual meeting as he only waited outside in the car for his companions who
supposedly discussed the plan inside Silahis Hotel. 37
Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted a mock interrogation of Van Twest
who thereafter signed various documents upon being compelled to do so. 38 During the clarificatory
questioning, however, Umbal changed his story and said that he was asked to go outside of the "safe
house" at the time Van Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if Van Twest indeed signed
certain documents. Why Umbal had to be sent out of the "safe house,"
no explanation was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could the
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC was not able to comply with the order of
the prosecutors to produce them during the preliminary investigation? And then, what happened to
the P2.5M that was supposedly offered by petitioners in exchange for the abduction of Van Twest?
These and more remain unanswered.
Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly triggered off by
Umbal's confession of 16 September 1993, the application of the PACC operatives for a search
warrant
to
be
served
in
the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 15
September 1993, a day before Umbal executed his sworn statement. In support of the application, the
PACC agents claimed that Umbal had been in their custody since 10 September 1993. Significantly,
although he was said to be already under their custody, Umbal claims he was never interrogated until
16 September 1993 and only at the security barracks of Valle Verde V, Pasig, where he was a
security guard. 39
The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel of prosecutors also considered in filing
the charges against petitioners, can hardly be credited as its probative value has tremendously
waned. The records show that the alleged counter-affidavit, which is self-incriminating, was filed after
the panel had considered the case submitted for resolution. And before petitioners could refute this
counter-affidavit, Bato moved to suppress the same on the ground that it was extracted through
duress and intimidation.
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the State
invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody
for that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the
dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it
was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. 40 While there may be bits of
evidence
against
petitioners'
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the least
prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is
nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners. For them to stand trial
and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law appropriately exacts much
more to sustain a warrant for their arrest facts and circumstances strong enough in themselves to
support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact happened. Quite obviously, this has not
been met.

Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of
petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the
complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on
the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found
out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. In
this regard, we restate the procedure we outlined in various cases we have already decided.
In Soliven v. Makasiar, 41 we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may
disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Inting, 42 we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The
determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or
prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The
preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the
determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to
him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the
prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable
cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two
inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion
about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The
preliminary
investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor.
In Lim v. Felix, 43 where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said
[T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the
evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the
Fiscal's bare certification. All these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its annexes depends
on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine beforehand how cursory or
exhaustive the Judge's examination should be. The Judge has to exercise sound
discretion for, after all, the personal determination is vested in the Judge by the
Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the circumstances of each case require.
To be sure, the judge must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation
report whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances of the case
so require.
Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively
believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good faith
alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would be
"secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the judge. 44 On

the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the
facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and
prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. 45 This, as we
said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge, after reviewing
the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists must either
call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason
to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime
when no probable cause exists.
But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not
abused, their discretion. If they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they should have
armed themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is not
enough. They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the existence of
probable cause. For the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its
obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win
a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant
of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may
prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But, while he may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just
one" 46
In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest of the
government cannot be ignored. From the gathering of evidence until the termination of the preliminary
investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case and secure a
warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention. Umbal's sworn
statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's counter-affidavit was considered
without giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC which gathered the evidence
appears to have had a hand in the determination of probable cause in the preliminary inquiry as the
undated resolution of the panel not only bears the letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for
approval by the head of the PACC Task Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in securing
a copy of the resolution and the information against them.
Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to jail in the hope that
they will in the future reform and be productive members of the community rests both on the
judiciousness of judges and the prudence of prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary
investigation by the prosecutor, which ascertains if the respondent should be held for trial, or a
preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the
bottomline is that there is a standard in the determination of the existence of probable cause, i.e.,
there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a prudent and
cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Judges and
prosecutors are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a delicate legal duty defined by
law and jurisprudence.
In this instance, Salonga v. Pao 47 finds application
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty,
malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an open and public
accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to
protect the state from useless and expensive trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA
241, citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a

statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process

(People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277).However, in order to satisfy the due process clause
it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making
sure that the transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation
serves not only for the purposes of the State. More importantly, it is a part of the
guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in the country. It
is therefore imperative upon the fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the
accused from the pain of going thru a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is
insufficient to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a
sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused (emphasis supplied).
The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the seeming immensity of
government power which when unchecked becomes tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, defines the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state
actions. But on occasion, for one reason or another, the State transcends this parameter. In
consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily suffers. The case before us, if uncurbed, can be
illustrative of a dismal trend. Needless injury of the sort inflicted by government agents is not
reflective of responsible government. Judges and law enforcers are not, by reason of their high and
prestigious office, relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting unnecessary injury.
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from vicious acts which
endanger the proper administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to prosecute and
punish violators of the law. This is essential for its self- preservation, nay, its very existence. But this
does not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the State to prosecute is
not a carte blanche for government agents to defy and disregard the rights of its citizens under the
Constitution. Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to pay for reckless and impulsive
prosecution. Hence, even if we apply in this case the "multifactor balancing test" which requires the
officer to weigh the manner and intensity of the interference on the right of the people, the gravity of
the crime committed and the circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see probable cause
to order the detention of petitioners. 48
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use of
political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which include
personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches or
instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over the
right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt towards
the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported enforcement of criminal law where it is
necessary to provide for an orderly administration of justice, to prevent the use of the strong arm of
the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate protection to constitutional
rights. 49
Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if petitioners were ordinary people submissive
to the dictates of government. They would have been illegally arrested and detained without bail.
Then we would not have the opportunity to rectify the injustice. Fortunately, the victims of injustice are
lawyers who are vigilant of their rights, who fight for their liberty and freedom not otherwise available
to those who cower in fear and subjection.
Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and other government agents tasked with
the enforcement of the law that in the performance of their duties they must act with circumspection,
lest their thoughtless ways, methods and practices cause a disservice to their office and maim their
countrymen they are sworn to serve and protect. We thus caution government agents, particularly the
law enforcers, to be more prudent in the prosecution of cases and not to be oblivious of human rights

protected by the fundamental law. While we greatly applaud their determined efforts to weed society
of felons, let not their impetuous eagerness violate constitutional precepts which circumscribe the
structure of a civilized community.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining
order we issued on 28 February 1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty.
Roberto L. Mendoza, is made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued against them is SET ASIDE
and respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is ENJOINED from proceeding any further against herein
petitioners in Crim. Case No. 94-1757 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and RODERICK
ODIAMAR,respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR. No.
42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders 2 of the lower court granting
accused-respondent's Motion for Bail and denying petitioner People's Motions "to Recall and
Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995" and "to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of May 5, 1995"
confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.
Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille
Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused- respondent filed a motion praying that he be
released on bail which petitioner by presenting real, documentary and testimonial evidence. The
lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial, this court is
constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty of the accused Roderick Odiamar in
the amount of P30,000.00. (Emphasis supplied)
Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was strong,
the prosecution filed the two abovementioned motions which the lower court disposed of, thus:
WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed by Atty.
Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of merit.
The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with prayer
for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied the petition
reasoning thus:
We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of this case, and find that
the claim of the People that the respondent judge had over-stepped the exercise of his
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders, is unimpressed with merit. We are not
inclined to declare that there was grave abuse in respondent court's exercise of its
discretion in allowing accused to obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion,

prejudice, or personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual

refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. We do not
find this to be so in this case. Our ruling is based not only on the respect to be accorded
the findings of facts of the trial court, which had the advantage (not available to Us) of
having observed first-hand the quality of the autoptic preference and the documentary
exhibits of the parties, as well as the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, but is
grounded on the liberal slant given by the law in favor of the accused. Differently stated,
in the absence of clear, potent and compelling reasons, We are not prepared to
supplant the exercise of the respondent court's discretion with that of Our own.
Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition submitting the following sole
issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ASSAILED DECISION
AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION THAT THERE IS STRONG
EVIDENCE PROVING RESPONDENT'S GUILT FOR THE CRIME CHARGED.
The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court granting used-respondent's
application for bail which it justified through its summary of the evidence presented during the
hearing. Said order states, thus:
Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for bail filed by
the accused through counsel, the court believes that the evidence so far presented by
the prosecution is not strong. This is so because the crime of rape is not to be
presumed; consent and not physical force is the common origin of acts between man
and woman. Strong evidence and indication of great weight alone support such
presumption. It is the teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape
prosecution. In the final analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not necessarily because the
untarnished truth is on its side but merely because it can raise reasonable, not fanciful
doubts. It has the right to require the complainant (sic) strong evidence and an
indication of great weight (People v. Godoy, G.R. No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in
the instant case, the reasonable doubt is on the evidence of the prosecution, more so,
because the intrinsic nature of the crime, the conviction or the acquittal of the accused
depends almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant (People v. Oliquino, G.R.
No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in the commission of the offense of rape
the facts and circumstances occuring either prior, during and subsequent thereto may
provide conclusion whether they may negate the commission thereof by the accused
(People v. Flores, L-6065, October 26, 1986). If they negate, they do presuppose that
the evidence for the prosecution is not strong. More so, because in the instant case, the
facts and circumstances showing that they do seem to negate the commission thereof
were mostly brought out during the cross-examination. As such, they deserve full faith
and credence because the purpose thereof is to test accuracy and truthfulness and
freedom from interest and bias or the reverse (Rule 132, Sec. 6, Revised Rules of
Evidence). The facts and circumstances brought up are as follow, to wit:
a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode in the jeepney then
driven by the accused Roderick Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994
at about 8:00 o'clock from the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur the
former knew that it was for a joy ride. In fact, she did not even offer any
protest when the said jeepney proceeded to the Pilapil Beach resort at
Telegrafo, San Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang, same

municipality, where she and Stephen Florece intended to go. And when
the said jeepney was already inside that resort, Cecille even followed the
accused in going down from the jeepney also without protest on her part,
a fact which shows voluntariness on the part of the offended party and,
therefore, to the mind of the court her claim of rape should not be received
with precipitate credulity. On the contrary, an insight into the human nature
is necessary (People v. Barbo, 56 SCRA 495). And it is only when the
testimony is impeccable and rings true throughout where it shall be
believed (People v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October 23, 1981). Rightly
so, because the aphorism that evidence to be believed must not only
proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in
itself in conformity with the common experience and observation of
mankind is nowhere of moral relevance than in cases involving
prosecution of rape (People v. Macatangay, 107 Phil. 188);
b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick Odiamar and
companions allegedly forced the offended party Cecille Buenafe to drink
gin, the latter, at first, refused and even did not swallow it but later on
voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that there (was) no force. And
as regards the claim that the accused Roderick Odiamar and companions
allegedly forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a small
cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it becomes doubtful because the
prosecution, however, failed to present any portion of that so-called small
cigarette much less did it present an expert witness to show that inhaling
of smoke from the said cigarette would cause dizziness. Rightly so,
because administration of narcotics is covered by Art. 335, par. 2 Revised
Penal Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. 1434 citedin the Revised
Penal Code, Aquino, Vol.III, pp. 392). As such, the burden of proof rests
with the prosecution but it failed to do so;
c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick Odiamar allegedly
brought the offended party, Cecille Buenafe, the former was able to
consummate the alleged offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands of
the offended party, placed them on her knee, separating them thereby
freeing the said hand and consequently pushed the head of the accused
but the latter was able to insert his penis when the said offended party
was no longer moving and the latter became tired. Neither evidence has
been presented to show that the offended party suffered an injury much
less any part of her pants or blouse was torn nor evidence to show that
there was an overpowering and overbearing moral influence of the
accused towards the offended party (People v. Mabunga, G.R. No.
96441d, March 13, 1992) more so, because force and violence in the
offense of rape are relative terms, depending on the age, size and
strength of the parties and their relation to each other (People v. Erogo,
102077 January 4, 1994);
d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about 3:00 o'clock in the
early morning of July 21, 1994, the offended party, Cecille, Stephen
Florece and the latter's companions all boarded the same jeepney going
back to the Poblacion of Lagonoy, without the said offended party,
protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of grief regarding the alleged
commission of the offense of rape until the jeepney reached the house of

Roderick Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in other cases, the
testimony of the offended party shall not be accepted unless her sincerity
and candor are free from suspicion, because the nature of the offense of
rape is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but harder to be
defended by the party accused though innocent (People v. Francisco G.R.
No. L-43789, July 15, 1981). It becomes necessary, therefore, for the
courts to exercise the most painstaking care in scrutinizing the testimony
of the witnesses for the prosecution (People v. Dayag, L-30619, March 29,
1974);
e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself physically
examined by Dr. Josephine Decena for medical certificate dated July 27,
1994 and it states, among others, that there was a healed laceration on
the hymen, her laceration might have been sustained by the said offended
party, a month, six (6) months, and even a year, prior to the said
examination and that the said laceration might have been caused by
repeated penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that the
offended party might have experienced sexual intercourse. This piece of
testimony coming from an expert, such finding is binding to court (Rules of
Court, Moran, op.cit,vol 5, 1963, ed. pp. 413).
f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe accompanied by the Station
Commander of Lagonoy, Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga City and
upon the suggestion of Gov. Bulaong, the said offended party submitted
for medical treatment before the same physician per medical certificate
dated August 1, 1994 but according to the said physician the lesions near
the umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said offended party claim
they were made by the accused after the sexual acts. As such, there were
contradictions on material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity (People
v. Palicte 83 Phil.) and it also destroys the testimony (People v. Garcia,
G.R. No. 13086, March 27, 1961). As to the fact that the said lesion was
made by the accused subsequent to the commission of the act, it is
immaterial. As such, it has no probative value.
The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
The office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside from failing to
include some pieces of evidence in the summary, the trial also misapplied some well-established
doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out the following circumstances
duly presented in the hearing for bail:
First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous crime of rape
against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83 SCRA 105 [1978]; People v. Delovino, 247
SCRA 637 [1995]).
Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that based on
her psychiatric examination of the latter, Cecille manifested psychotic signs and
symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor
retardation, poverty of thought content as well as depressive signs and symptoms.
These abnormal psychological manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable
to the rape incident (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 22, 1994.)

Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied admission of

guilt (People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]).
Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered unconscious by
intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.
Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations, "no bail was
recommended in the information" constitutes "clear and strong evidence of the guilt of
(all) the accused" (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284 [1995].
Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (pages 5-7, Order) that
respondent succeeded in forcibly deflowering her because she was already weak and
dizzy due to the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her declarations remain unrebutted.
Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts manifesting her lament,
torment and suffering due to the rape. She went to Stephen Florece, cried and
complained about the incident. Instead of helping her, Florece threatened to harm her
and her family. (Pages 9-13, November 17, 1994). The statements of Cecille are
positive statements which, under existing jurisprudence, are stronger than the denials
put forth by respondent (Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 [1996]).
Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect that the
lacerations suffered by Cecille "might have been sustained by the latter a month, six (6)
months or even a year prior to the examination" (Page 12 (e), Order, March 24, 1995)
thus implying that respondent could not have committed the crime is highly misplaced.
Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell "how old is an old hymenal laceration"
because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the size
of the vagina she "could not point the exact cause" (Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9,
1994). Nevertheless, proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable in indictments for
rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime (People v. Echegaray,
257 SCRA 561 [1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of
the victim's genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful prosecution of
the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature. (People v. Arce, 227
SCRA 406 [1993]).
Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr, Decena positively testified that the
wounds could have been '"aused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim" (Page 6,
TSN, December 9, 1994) which confirms Cecile's testimony (quoted in the Order at
page 9) that respondent burned her "right side of the stomach" thrice.
The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this Court the merits of the instant petition.
The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or
be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required. (Emphasis supplied)

In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and in accordance with its rulemaking powers, 3 the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted the following
provision:
Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. 4 (Emphasis suppplied)
In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly
weapon punishable byreclusion perpetua to death. 5 As such, bail is discreationary and not a matter
of right. The grant or denial of an application for is, therefore, dependent on whether the evidence of
guilt is strong which the lower should determine in a hearing called for the purpose. The
determination of the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial discretion. While
the lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to exercise judicial discretion,
this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial court's findings if found to be laced with grave abuse
of discretion.
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong. 6"Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this connection has been held to
mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded disspositionate judgment to the conclusion
that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will
probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. 7 "Presumption great" exists when the
circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is
strong, clear, and convinsing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all reasonable probability of any
other conlusion. 8 Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an
examination of the entire record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense,
bail should be refused. 9 (Emphasis and supplied)
In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt but
rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the court is ministerially
bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show evident guilt or
presumption of guilt as defined above. 10
This Court has observed that the lower court's order failed to mention and include some significant
factors and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear and convincing. First, it
excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric examination of the victim as well as her
findings that the latter manifested "psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual fear,
sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as
depressive signs and symptom." 11 This particular testimony should have been considered and
included in the summary as it was given by an expert witness. Second, the unrebutted offer of
compromise by accused-respondent is an implied admission of guilt which should have been noted
as an offer of a compromise is generally considered as admissible evidence against the party making
it. 12
Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence and testimonies, this Court has
likewise observed that the lower court misappplied some doctrines in criminal law. First, the lower
court, in its order, intoned the following doctrine that "evidence to be believed must not only proceed
from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity with common
experience and observation of mankind."
According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is suspect because she willingly went
with accused-respondent to the resort where she was allegedly raped. In the scene of the crime,

complainant allegedly voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The complainant, likewise, never protested
nor cried while they on their way to accused-respondent's house. Because of those findings, the court
doubted the credibility of complainant and stated that the crime of rape is not to be presumed and that
sexual acts between a man and a woman are presumed to be consensual. In overcoming such
presumption, much depends on the credibility of the complainant.
This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive on the part of complainant in
filing the rape charge against accused-respondent. This should have been taken into consideration.
The following rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the lower court is more credible:
It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she was forced by respondent to drink
gin with the help of his friends by holding her hair and putting the glass on her mouth
(Pages 5-7, TSN, November 17, 1994). More, respondent and his friends blew smoke
into her face forcing her to inhale the intoxicating smoke. Whenever she attempted to
leave the place, she was forced to sit down by Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7,
TSN, November 17, 1994).
Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened by Florece with a gun
(Page 17, TSN, November 17, 1994).
The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape are relative and must be
viewed in light of the victim's perspective and the offender's physical condition (People
v. Plaza, 242 SCRA 724 [1995]). Further, physical resistance need not be established in
rape when intimidation is exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself
against her will because of fear for life and personal safety. (People v. Ramos, 245
SCRA 405 [19951)
In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (l5) years old at the time of the incident in question.
At her age, it is reasonable to assume that a shot of gin rendered her tipsy. Thus, four
(4) shots of gin must have rendered her dizzy, intoxicated and deprived of will or
reason. The resulting weakness and dizziness which deprived Cecille of reason, will
and freedom must be viewed in light of her perception and judgment at the time of the
commission of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule because in "rape cases,
submission does not necessarily imply volition." (Querido, 229 SCRA 745 [1994])
It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went with the group of accusedrespondent, she was of the impression that it was just for a joy ride. The conclusion made by the trial
court that Cecille must have consented to the sexual act because she acquiesced to go with them in
the first place is, therefore, bereft of any legal or factual support, if not non sequitur. That she agreed
to accompany them for a joy ride does not mean that she also agreed to the bestial acts later
committed against her person.
Second, the lower court stated that "force and violence in the offense of rape relative terms,
depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other." The lower
court enunciated this doctrine in finding that the alleged rape was actually a consensual act since the
prosecution was unable to show the complainant suffered any injury nor show any evidence that her
pants or blouse was torn. Neither was there any evidence that accused-respondent exerted
overpowering and overbearing moral influence over the offended party.
This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked the above doctrine, it readily
concluded that complainant agreed to the sexual act disregarding testimonies lending credence to
complainant's allegation that she was threatened and intimidated as well as rendered weak and dizzy,

not only by the smoke of the marijuana cigarette but also by intoxication, thereby facilitating the
commission of the crime. It was not imperative for the prosecution, in order to prove the elements of
force or intimidation to show that Cecille had broken limbs or that her blouse or pants were torn. Her
testimony to that effect would have sufficed. Nevertheless, the prosecution still exerted efforts to
corroborate Cecille's claim by presenting the physician who testified that Cecille suffered hymenal
lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus area. Unfortunately, however, the lower court chose to
ignore these telling pieces of evidence.
In addition, the lower court doubted complainant's allegation that she was to smoke a small cigarette,
presumably marijuana, due to the fact that "the prosecution failed to present any portion of that socalled small cigarette much less did it present an expert witness to show that inhaling of smoke from
the said cigarette would cause the said offended party to suffer weakness and dizziness." Said
ratiocination is trifling and unpersuasive. In fact, it is even misleading as complainant categorically
asserted that what made her weak and dizzy were the smoke of the cigarette and the intoxicating
effect of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the smoke alone. In any case, complainant could not
be expected to produce that "portion of that so-called small cigarette." Moreover, one does not need
an expert witness to testify on what is common knowledge - that four shots of gin have a "weakening
and dizzying" effect on the drinker, especially one as young as the fifteen-year old complainant.
More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law doctrines is the lower court's
misinterpretation of the medical findings and deliberate withholding of some testimonies which would
have shown a very strong likelihood that complainant could indeed have been raped. The following
pieces of evidence cited in the summary of the assailed order are indications of misleading findings:
First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical certificate issued after complainant's
physical examination. On the contrary, it interpreted it to mean that the offended party is already
experienced in sexual intercourse, after the examining physician had testified that the hymenal
lacerations might have been sustained a month, six months or even a year prior to the examination.
Interestingly, the lower court failed to mention that Dr. Decena also testified that she cannot tell "how
old is an hymenal laceration" because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted and
that from the size of the vagina she "could not point the exact cause."
This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court with and agrees with petitioner, in
accordance with well established jurisprudence, that proof of hymenal laceration is not indispensable
in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the crime. Further, in against
chastity, the medical examination of the victim's genitalia is not an indispensable element for the
successful prosecution of the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature. 13 And
contrary to the theory espoused by the lower court, a hymenal laceration is not conclusive proof that
one is experienced in sexual intercourse.
Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect the cigarette burns
indicated that the lesions near complainant's umbilicus were due to skin diseases. Notably, however,
the lower court again failed to mention that Dr. Decena likewise positively testified that the wounds
could have been "caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim" which corroborates Cecille's
testimony that respondent burned her "right side of the stomach" thrice.
It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower court abuse its discretion and showed
manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining which circumstances are to be
considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this regard, it must be
remembered that the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, according to Basco v.
Rapatalo 14 "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised reasonable bounds.
Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's individual opinion. It is

because of its very nature that the law has wisely provided that its exercise be guided by well-know
rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views,
prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a
judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, of the discretion to be exercised in granting or
denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a court of justice, means sound discretion guided by
law. It must be governed by rule, not by humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and; but legal and
regular."
The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been irregularly disregarded indicate
that they have not been considered at all in arriving at the decision to grant bail. This irregularity is
even more pronounced with the misapplication of the two criminal law doctrines cited to support the
grant of the bail application. This Court cannot help but observe that the lower court exerted
painstaking efforts to show that the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent is not strong by its non
sequitur justifications, misleading or unsupported conclusions, irregular disregard of vital prosecution
evidence and strained interpretation, if not misinterpretation, of criminal law doctrines.
It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena confirming complainant's allegation
that accused-respondent burned the right side of her stomach with cigarette butts, (2) the testimony
of Dr. Belmonte stating that complainant exhibited psychological manifestations which are "traceable
to the rape incident'', and (3) the unrebutted offer of compromise, are indications of the strength of the
evidence of guilt of accused-respondent.
Lending credence to petitioner's case is the fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary
investigations, "no bail" was recommended in the information. According to Baylon v. Sison, 15 such
recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the accused.
Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and pieces of
evidence are to be considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with jurisprudential
guidelines in the exercise of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v. Maglalng, 16 discretion is guided
by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules which this
Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are deemed to be part
of the laws of the land.
The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not matter of right. This Court has reiterated this
mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court laid down the following rules
in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo 17 which outlined the duties of a judge in case an application for bail is
filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution; (Emphasis supplied)
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the court's order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for prosecutions. 18 A summary is defined as "a
comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement." 19
There are two corollary reasons for the summary: First, the summary of the evidence in the order is
an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part of procedural due process wherein the evidence
presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been presented and most
importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of evidence in the summary presented by
the prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing would be tantamount to not giving them the
opportunity to be heard in said hearing, for the inference would be that they were not considered at all
in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due process, for due process means not
only giving every contending party the opportunity to be heard but also for the Court to consider every
piece of evidence presented in their favor. 20 Second, the summary of the evidence in the order is the
for the basis for the judge's exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of
evidence as contained in the summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong based on his discretion. 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a complete compilation or
restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower court cannot
exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the summary. While
conceding that some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration was incomplete. An
incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the prosecution in the order
cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a reasonable recital of any evidence
presented by the prosecution. A "summary" that is incomplete is not a summary at all. According
to Borinaga v. Tamin, 22 the absence of a summary in the order would make said order defective in
form and substance. Corollarily, an order containing an incomplete "summary" would likewise be
defective in form and substance which cannot be sustained or be a semblance of validity. In Carpio v.
Maglalang, 23 said order was considered defective and voidable. As such, the order granting or
denying the application for bail may be invalidated. 24
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August 1, 1997 and the resolution dated
December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No. 42318 are REVERSED and the order dated March 24, 1995 in
Criminal Case No. T-1417 is declared void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The
court a quo shall immediately issue a warrant for the rearrest of Roderick Odiamar if his bail bond has
been approved and thereafter, proceed with dispatch in the disposition of said case. This resolution is
immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL
P.
PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this
appeal by certiorari through a petition which raises issues centering mainly on said petitioner's
right to be admitted to bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended information as a coconspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the killing of members of the Bucag family
sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original
information, filed on October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, 1 had
initially indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion, Manuel
Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And Richard Doe as the
alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and
their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended,
tried and eventually convicted. Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained
at large up to the present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the crime. In an
amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a co-accused therein. As
herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew him well, Roxas engaged the
former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically, in the course of the preliminary
investigation therein, said accused, in a signed affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he
later retracted on June 20, 1990, implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the
massacre of the Bucag family. 3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the case per his
resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance of said prosecutor,
designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, for purposes of both the
preliminary investigation and prosecution of Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution
of the new prosecutor dated September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as a coconspirator in said criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6, 1992.
Petitioner assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in G.R. No.
96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon. Silvestre H. Bello

III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B. Tan." In an en banc decision
promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained the filing of the second amended
information against him. 4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of an arrest
warrant for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on him, petitioner through
counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission to bail with the trial court which set
the same for hearing on November 5, 1992. Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to
State Prosecutor Henrick F. Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private
prosecutor, Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear
the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only Assistant
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office appeared for the
prosecution. 5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital due to "acute
costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting custody over the person of
their client to the local chapter president of the integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for
purposes of said hearing of his bail application, he considered being in the custody of the law.
Prosecutor Abejo, on the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the
directive of the chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the
prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. 6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he was waiving
any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a resolution dated November 5,
1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in the amount of P200,000.00. The following
day, November 6, 1992, petitioner, apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then,
managed to personally appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the
amount thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also personally
appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on
November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the petition for
admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its omnibus order dated
March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months later, Prosecutor Gingoyon
elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a special civil action for certiorari. Thus
were the resolution and the order of the trial court granting bail to petitioner annulled on November
24, 1993, in the decision now under review, on the ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. 8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's application for bail, he
was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because he filed his motion for admission to
bail before he was actually arrested or had voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart
from the circumstance that petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion
perpetua, the evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was
recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of bail was doubly
improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court, was not afforded an
opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail contrary to the requirements of due
process. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago vs. Vasquez
etc., et al., 9 his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial court effectively conferred

on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all intents and purposes, he was in the
custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the "invocation by the accused of the court's
jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the
person of the accused and bring him within the custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence of such strong
evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail. Furthermore, the prosecution, by reason
of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of any further presentation of evidence to oppose the
application for bail and whose representation in court in behalf of the prosecution bound the
latter, cannot legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due process. Finally, petitioner
points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent court after an
unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved in this case,
the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing
before any court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its main purpose,
then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet
secure his appearance at the trial. 10 As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional
liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial
authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this Court has put it in a
case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." 12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious
practice whereby an accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without
recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance
with the requirements therefor. 13 Thus, in Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., 14 where the
petitioner who had been charged with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without
surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix the amount of
the bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court categorically pronounced that
said petitioner was not eligible for admission to bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been arrested, detained, or
other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have occasion to seek the protective mantle
extended by the right to bail. The person seeking his provisional release under the auspices of
bail need not even wait for a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is
available to "all persons" 15 where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the
condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law. 16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a) when he is
arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to Section 6, Rule 112, or by
warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b) when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court by surrendering to the proper authorities. 17 in this light, the ruling, vis-avis the facts in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., 18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what purported to be an "Urgent Exparte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond." Said petitioner was at the time confined in a
hospital recuperating from serious physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular

mishap. Consequently, she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed
herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial and
other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-parte motion and the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner to post a cash bail bond for
her provisional liberty without need of her personal appearance in view of her physical
incapacity and as a matter of humane consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she question the
jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this Court, on the ground that
"she neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the fact that she
has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court" In rejecting
her arguments, the Court held that she was clearly estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgent ex parte motion for bail she
had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually posting a cash bail was
accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its jurisdiction over her person.
Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took pains to reiterate that the same cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by
his arrest or voluntary surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his motion for
admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under arrest. He may, however,
at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be considered as being constructively and
legally under custody. Thus in the likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of
his bail application with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be
deemed to have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily, to
the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In fact, an arrest is
made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his submission to the custody of
the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode may be exemplified by the so-called "house
arrest" or, in case of military offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the
military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically made it known to
the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail that he could not personally
appear as he was then confined at the nearby Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for
acute costochondritis, and could not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The
prosecution and the trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific
whereabouts of petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon
him. Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the physical
custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under medication in a hospital
bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his confinement or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of the law.
Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point since they never
attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his lawyers, he expressly submitted to
physical and legal control over his person, firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail
court; secondly, by furnishing true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more
importantly, by unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner never made
any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or concealed his
whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in court, up to the submission
application for bail, and until the day of the hearing thereof.

At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital on account of
an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they were easily verifiable. And, as a
manifestation of his good faith and of his actual recognition of the authority of trial court,
petitioner's counsel readily informed the court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner
to the president of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis Oriental Chapter. 20 In other
words, the motion for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the
former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority and
jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here no intent or
strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to avoid arrest should the
application therefore be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all indictees shall
be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when the
evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now provides
that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right.
The right to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature 21 and which, to repeat, arises
from the time one is placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence
accorded every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after trial
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt. 22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal offense, an
accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions thereto being
the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment 23 and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general
rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the court having custody of the accused should, as
a matter of course, grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions
of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant
of bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule,
a hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of the
court, 24 is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified representative of the
prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the provisional
liberty of the applicant. 25 Of course, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to show that the
evidence meets the required quantum. 26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give an
opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to introduce before
the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the accused to due process. 27 If
the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a denial of procedural due process, as a
consequence of which the court's order in respect of the motion or petition is void. 28 At the hearing,
the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal. 29 When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing
bail, the same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its
conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 30 The court, though, cannot rely on
mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only hearsay
evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that the law requires. 31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due process
when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is
claimed to be the sole government prosecutor expressly authorized to handle the case and who
received his copy of the motion only on the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly,

the prosecution now insists that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to waive the presentation of
any further evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound
discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded "reasonable
time" to oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted as the
collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case No. 86-39 on the
basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon which was sent through
radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor on
the same date. This authorization, which was to be continuing until and unless it was expressly
withdrawn, was later confirmed and then withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of
Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of
Regional State Prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their
appearance as collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case. 32 It was in fact by virtue
of this arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana
entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in said case. 33 Hence,
on the strength of said authority and of its receipt of the notice of the hearing for bail, the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could validly represent the prosecution in the
hearing held on November 5, 1992.
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not familiar with the
case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position of the Regional State
Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado, whose office received its copy of the
motion on the very day when it was sent, that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor
Abejo to manifest to the court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the
application for bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously,
what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case, was waiving
the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a quo sought to ascertain
whether or not that was the real import of the submission by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter
readily answered in the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:
PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
I was informed to appear in this case just now Your Honor.
COURT:
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a copy of the motion
as early as October 28. There is an element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only informed just now. The one
assigned here is State Prosecutor Perseverando Arena, Jr. who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick son. I do not know
about this but before I came I received an instruction from our Chief to
relay to this court the stand of the office regarding the motion to admit bail.
That office is neither supporting nor opposing it and we are submitting to
the sound discretion of the Honorable Court.

COURT:
Place that manifestation on record. For the record, Fiscal Abejo, would
you like to formally enter your appearance in this matter?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional State Prosecutor's
Office represented by State Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.
COURT:
By that manifestation do you want the Court to understand that in effect, at
least, the prosecution is dispensing with the presentation of evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the denial . . .
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the incident covered by
this particular motion for resolution by this court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Without presenting any further evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. 34
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of Regional
State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the motion for bail and this
should be so notwithstanding the statement that they were "neither supporting nor opposing"
the motion. What is of significance is the manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting
(the motion) to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not be any
clearer. The prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidence en contra and this it
did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the mandatory hearing for
bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that such was the position of the
prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 35 it was stressed that where the trial court has
reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing the application for bail is not
justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in
the interest of Justice, must inquire from the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his

evidence to determine whether or not it is strong. And, in the very recent administrative
matter Re: First Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan City
vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas, etc., 37 held that where the
prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the accused, the trial court should
nevertheless set the application for hearing and from there diligently ascertain from the
prosecution whether the latter is really not contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be attributed to the
trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A review of the transcript of the
stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of
March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As summarized
in its aforementioned order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince itself of the
propriety of the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus order
contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution and the defense, and
only after sifting through them did the court conclude that petitioner could be provisionally
released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no showing that, since then and up to the present,
petitioner has ever committed any violation of the conditions of his bail.
As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present its evidence
within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records indicate that the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the application for bail on the very same day
that the it was filed with the trial court on October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the
day of the hearing on November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week to
muster such evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the
motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than reasonable. The fact
that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the application only on November 6, 1992 is
beside the point for, as already established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was
authorized to appear for the People.
4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably unreasonable
period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the respondent court the resolution and
the omnibus order of the trial court through a special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor
General submits that the delay of more than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-four (184)
days to be exact, was reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which characterized the
prosecution of the criminal case against petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was
initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case had ensued in the
court below with the active participation of prosecution lawyers, including Prosecutor
Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now in that the special civil action for certiorari should
not be instituted beyond a period of the three months, 38 the same to be reckoned by taking
into account the duration of time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained
to annul the same. 39
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,
promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and the
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, as well as
said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration of said
judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid resolution and omnibus order of
the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189122

March 17, 2010
JOSE
ANTONIO
LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to guarantee his
appearance before any court as may be required,1 is the answer of the criminal justice system to a
vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose guilt has not yet been proven, in the
"dubious interval," often years long, between arrest and final adjudication? 2 Bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in
assuring the accuseds presence at trial.3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to prison must typically begin
serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted to bail. 4 An accused not released on
bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms that his conviction is legal and proper. An
erroneously convicted accused who is denied bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has
never owed.5 Even if the conviction is subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail
pending appeal includes freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case
and avoidance of potential hardships of prison.6 On the other hand, society has a compelling interest
in protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. 7 Other recognized societal interests in the denial of
bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight from court custody, the protection of
the community from potential danger and the avoidance of delay in punishment. 8 Under what
circumstances an accused may obtain bail pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the
interests of society and those of the accused.9
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending appeal to
those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper courts are to be guided by
the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending appeal should be exercised not with
laxity but with grave caution and only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has been in
fact convicted by the trial court.10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was convicted by the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and sentenced to suffer an

indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to 12 years and one day
of reclusion temporal as maximum.11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application
for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health condition, and claiming the
absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. 13 It invoked the bedrock principle in the
matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the course of appeal should be
exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons." Citing well-established jurisprudence, it
ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care
outside the prison facility. It found that petitioner
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during
trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x Notably, the physical condition of
[petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical attention while confined in prison, though he
clearly preferred to be attended by his personal physician.14
For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed pending appeal,
the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It made a preliminary
evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination that there was no reason
substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.15
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail, considering
that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial
court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years, does the
discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should automatically be
granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary. The
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. However, if the
decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on provisional liberty
during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the accused
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the prosecution, with
notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of
the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of the Regional
Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an appellant sentenced by the
Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years imprisonment should automatically be
granted.
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the
denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal. While
the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory order, such remedy is proper only
where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.16
Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that none of the conditions to
justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present, much less proven by the
prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted
with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals
committed a grave error and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground
that the evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in excess of its
jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared

to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail pending appeal in a case such as
this where the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed the nature of the offense
from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the
Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission to
bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of discretion
when it denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of discretion is not
simply an error in judgment but it is such a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is
tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.18 Ordinary abuse of discretion is insufficient. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, that is, the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason
of passion or personal hostility.19 It must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law.
In other words, for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion.20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court of Appeals
exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or arbitrariness in the
exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor could any such implication or
imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of Appeals exercised grave caution in the
exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners application for bail pending appeal was not
unreasonable but was the result of a thorough assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By
making a preliminary appraisal of the merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court also
determined whether the appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The
appellate court did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of
this Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and interpretation of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not be
issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law or fact. 21 In this connection, Lee
v. People22 is apropos:
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked or
exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned acts would
at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct errors of
procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory order may be assailed
by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court generally frowns upon this remedial
measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be
the subject of review by certiorari will not only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly
burden the courts.23 (emphasis supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioners Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty imposed on
the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first scenario deals with the
circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual
delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; previous
escape from legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a
valid justification; commission of the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon;

circumstances indicating the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another
crime during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the commentary of
retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be summarized in the
following rules:
xxx

xxx

xxx

e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the circumstances stated in Sec.
5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec.
5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment exceeding 6
years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other
similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x
x x24 (emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of the same
thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense charged is not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by
the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then bail is a
matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances under paragraph 3 of
Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be denied.25 (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of the
circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court
has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending appeal may be denied even if
the bail-negating26 circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other
words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending appeal where none of the said circumstances
exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent discretion,
that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending appeal. Conversely, if the
appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal should be
viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion stage, where the
appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound
discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the
exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario

allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including
the demands of equity and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate courts
stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the
proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial to the allowance of bail. This is
so because the existence of any of those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke
bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use the
less stringent sound discretion approach.
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations that are
governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists on a simplistic
treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes the established policy
governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a situation, the grant of bail
pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is, onerestricted to the determination of
whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that,
if any such circumstance is present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending
appeal.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body whose authority
is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion" into merely filling out the checklist of
circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty
imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short,
petitioners interpretation severely curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to
determine a singular factual issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice." 28 Choice occurs where, between "two
alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one possible
outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker." 29 On the other hand, the
establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of discretion. 30Thus, by severely clipping
the appellate courts discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications
for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is
imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that
"upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule on
applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment on the part of
the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own view of the case, its
appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on the matter. 31 In view of the
grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether or not, under all circumstances, the
accused will be present to abide by his punishment if his conviction is affirmed. 32 It should also give
due regard to any other pertinent matters beyond the record of the particular case, such as the
record, character and reputation of the applicant, 33 among other things. More importantly, the
discretion to determine allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the

very least, an initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of
law or fact which must be determined by the appellate court. 34 In other words, a threshold
requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely intended for
delay but presents a fairly debatable issue.35 This must be so; otherwise, the appellate courts will be
deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the purpose of taking advantage of a
lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more significantly, this comports with the very strong
presumption on appeal that the lower courts exercise of discretionary power was sound,36 specially
since the rules on criminal procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the
Court of Appeals except for substantial error.37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating circumstances to those
expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est exclusio alterius 38 rule in statutory
construction. However, the very language of the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts
the idea that the enumeration of the five situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision
categorically refers to "the following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules,
similarly relevant situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may
be considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable or
senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners interpretation that,
where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six years, bail ought to be
granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists. Allowance of bail pending appeal in
cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in
cases where the penalty imposed does not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in
cases where the penalty imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of
the five bail-negating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed
does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be more
accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of less serious
crimes?
Petitioners Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending Appeal
Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of the
provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of the 1940
Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First Instance. After
judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the Court of First Instance, the
defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance. After conviction
by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application, be bailed at the discretion of
the court.
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this rule, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death.

Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission of a capital
offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964 Rules of
Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to
read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense
or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at the time of the
application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by death. (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92 dated January
20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of Rule 114
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final conviction, be
entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an offense which,
under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter of right even if he
appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that the evidence of his guilt of the
offense charged is strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending cases before
the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies concerning the effectivity of the
bail of the accused, to wit:
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at the time of its
commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by a penalty lower than
reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense
charged or of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, he may be
allowed to remain free on his original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the
proper court directs otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as
amended;
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion
perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a lesser offense than
that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph
shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at the
time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable by reclusion

perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by the trial court of the offense charged,
his bond shall be cancelled and the accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution
of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending appeal before
his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10) days from
notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this Court of the fact of
surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of Prisons thru
the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under confinement pending
resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten (10) days, his
bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by this Court. The appeal taken
by the accused shall also be dismissed under Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of
Court as he shall be deemed to have jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16, 1994
which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after conviction by
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on application, may admit
the accused to bail.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under the same
bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty (20)
years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice
to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these Rules, is an
offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the time of the application
to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong, shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage
of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis supplied)
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter amended
by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive approach
to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail pending
appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital offense by the
Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court) discretionary. The 1988
amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable to the appellant-applicant. Bail
before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses or offenses not punishable by reclusion
perpetua was a matter of right, meaning, admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the
action where the charge was not for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua. 39
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending appeal (of a
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No. 12-94 laid down more stringent
rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying which court has
authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain conditions and in particular
situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail pending appeal" configuration of
Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal
Procedure which entitled the accused to bail as a matter of right before final conviction. 40 Under the
present rule, bail is a matter of discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on
bail pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or
revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as grave as
conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending appeal? What
is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending appeal? Is it a rule which
favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the circumstances under the third

paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that authorizes the denial of bail after due
consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if none of the circumstances under the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal parallels
the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions
on bail emanated.41 While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it nonetheless shows that our
treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending appeal is
anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to extending bail
should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong reasons.42 In fact, it has even
been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail
to a convicted accused is best illustrated and exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94
amending Rule 114, Section 5."43
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be granted
only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore, where that
uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a
person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the conviction. From
another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so
enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on
bail than before conviction.44 (emphasis supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court declared in
Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were already effective), that
denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise discretion."
A Final Word
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis supplied)1avvphi1
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and, accordingly, the
constitutional right to bail ends.46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with grave caution and only for strong
reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail
pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds
strong support in the history and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the
accused should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may
destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending appeal
because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In addition, at
the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison sentence and thus may be more likely to
flee regardless of bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of

conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice
system and court processes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of petitioner
Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.