LANSANG vs. CA G.R. No.

102667 February 23, 2000

FACTS
Private respondents were allegedly given office and library space as well as kiosks area
selling food and drinks. One such kiosk was located along T.M. Kalaw St., in front of the Army
and Navy Club. Private respondent General Assembly of the Blind, Inc. (GABI) was to remit to
NPDC, 40 percent of the profits derived from operating the kiosks, without again anything
shown in the record who received the share of the profits or how they were used or spent.
With the change of government after the EDSA Revolution, the new Chairman of the NPDC,
herein petitioner, sought to clean up Rizal Park. In a written notice dated February 23, 1988
and received by private respondents on February 29, 1988, petitioner terminated the socalled verbal agreement with GABI and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and
the kiosks it ran privately within the public park. In another notice dated March 5, 1988,
respondents were given until March 8, 1988 to vacate. The latter notice was signed by
private respondent Iglesias, GABI president, allegedly to indicate his conformity to its
contents. However, Iglesias, who is totally blind, claims that he was deceived into signing
the notice. He was allegedly told by Ricardo Villanueva, then chief warden of Rizal Park, that
he was merely acknowledging receipt of the notice. Although blind, Iglesias as president was
knowledgeable enough to run GABI as well as its business. GABI's action for damages and
injunction was subsequently dismissed by the RTC, ruling that the complaint was actually
directed against the State which could not be sued without its consent. Moreover, the trial
court ruled that GABI could not claim damages under the alleged oral lease agreement since
GABI was a mere accommodation concessionaire. As such, it could only recover damages
upon proof of the profits it could realize from the conclusion. The trial court noted that no
such proof was presented. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial
court. The Court of Appeals ruled that the mere allegation that a government official is being
sued in his official capacity is not enough to protect such official from liability for acts done
without or in excess of his authority.
Granting that petitioner had the authority to evict GABI from Rizal Park, "the abusive and
capricious manner in which that authority was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for
which he must now be held liable for damages" according to the Court of Appeals. Hence,
this petition.
Ruling:
The doctrine of state immunity from suit applies to complaints filed against public officials
for acts done in the performance of their duties. The rule is that the suit must be regarded
as one against the state where satisfaction of the judgment against the
publicofficial concerned will require the state itself to perform a positive act, such asappropri
ation of the amount necessary to pay the damages awarded to the plaintiff. The rule does
not apply where the public official is charged in his official capacity for acts that are unlawful
and injurious to the rights of others.
Public officials are not exempt, in their personal capacity, from liability arising from acts
committed in bad faith. Neither does it apply where the public official is clearly being sued
not in his official capacity but in his personal capacity, although the acts complained of may
have been committed while he occupied a public position. We are convinced that petitioner

is being sued not in his capacity as NPDC chairman but in his personal capacity. The
complaint filed by private respondents in the RTC merely identified petitioner as chairman of
the NPDC, but did not categorically state that he is being sued in that capacity.
Also, it is evident from paragraph 4 of said complaint that petitioner was sued allegedly for
having personal motives in ordering the ejectment of GABI from Rizal Park. The parties do
not dispute that it was petitioner who ordered the ejectment of GABI from their office and
kiosk at Rizal Park. There is also no dispute that petitioner, as chairman of the NPDC which
was the agency tasked to administer Rizal Park, had the authority to terminate the
agreement
with
GABI
and
order
the
organization's
ejectment.The question now is whether or not petitioner abused his authority in ordering the
ejectment of private respondents. We find, however, no evidence of such abuse of authority
on record. As earlier stated, Rizal Park is beyond the commerce of man and, thus, could not
be the subject of a lease contract. Admittedly, there was no written contract. That private
respondentswereallowed to occupy office and kiosk spaces in the park was only a matter of
accommodation by the previous administrator. This being so, also admittedly, petitioner may
validly discontinue the accommodation extended to private respondents, who may be
ejected from the park when necessary. Private respondents cannot and does not claim a
vested right to continue to occupy Rizal Park.
IBP vs. Zamora
Facts:
At bar is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order seeking to nullity on constitutional grounds the order of
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanding the deployment of the Philippine Marines (the
Marines) to join the Philippine National Police (the "PNP") in visibility patrols around the
metropolis. Formulated Letter of Instruction 02/2000 1 (the "LOI") which detailed the
manner by which the joint visibility patrols, called Task Force Tulungan, would be conducted.
2 Task Force Tulungan was placed under the leadership of the Police Chief of Metro Manila
through a sustained street patrolling to minimize or eradicate all forms of high-profile crimes
especially those perpetrated by organized crime syndicates whose members include those
that are well-trained, disciplined and well-armed active or former PNP/Military personnel.
Issue:
1. Whether the deployment of soldiers for law enforcement is in derogation of Article 2,
Section
3
of
the
Constitution;
2. Whether the deployment constitutes incursion in a civilian function of law enforcement;
3. Whether the deployment creates a dangerous tendency to rely on the military to perform
civilian
functions
of
the
government
4. Whether the deployment gives more power to the military than what it should be under
the
Constitution.
The issues raised in the present petition are: (1) Whether or not petitioner has legal
standing; (2) Whether or not the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling
the armed forces is subject to judicial review, and, (3) Whether or not the calling of the
armed forces to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violates the constitutional provisions
on civilian supremacy over the military and the civilian character of the PNP.

Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.

Ratio:
The question of deployment of the Marines is not proper for judicial scrutiny since the same
involves a political question; that the organization and conduct of police visibility patrols,
which feature the team-up of one police officer and one Philippine Marine soldier, does not
violate
the
civilian
supremacy
clause
in
the
Constitution.

In view of standing

Apart from this declaration, however, the IBP asserts no other basis in support of its locus
standi. The mere invocation by the IBP of its duty to preserve the rule of law and nothing
more, while undoubtedly true, is not sufficient to clothe it with standing in this case.
National President of the IBP who signed the petition, is his alone, absent a formal board
resolution authorizing him to file the present action. Indeed, none of its members, whom the
IBP purportedly represents, has sustained any form of injury as a result of the operation of
the
joint
visibility
patrols.
Nevertheless, the Court does not automatically assume jurisdiction over actual constitutional
cases brought before it even in instances that are ripe for resolution. One class of cases
wherein the Court hesitates to rule on are ''political questions." The reason is that political
questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a
particular act or measure being assailed. Moreover, the political question being a function of
the separation of powers, the courts will not normally interfere with the workings of another
co-equal branch unless the case shows a clear need for the courts to step in to uphold the
law
and
the
Constitution.

In view of abuse of discretion

The President did not commit grave abuse of discretion in calling out the Marines.
President as stated in Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, specifically, the power to call
out the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. Calling
the armed forces is not proper for judicial scrutiny since it involves a political question and
the resolution of factual issues which are beyond the review powers of this Court.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant simply capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
that is patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power
is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. When the
President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.

In view of burden of proof on factual basis

It is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally bereft of
factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge such heavy burden as there is no
evidence to support the assertion that there exist no justification for calling out the armed
forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the proposition that grave abuse was
committed because the power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional
provision
on
civilian
supremacy
over
the
military.
The present petition is anchored on fear that once the armed forces are deployed, the
military will gain ascendancy, and thus place in peril our cherished liberties. Indeed, whether
it is the calling out of the armed forces alone in order to suppress lawless violence, invasion
or rebellion or also the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the
proclamation of martial law (in case of invasion or rebellion), the exercise of the President's
powers as commander-in-chief, requires proof not mere assertion. 4 As has been pointed
out, "Standing is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable' . . . but requires . . .
a
factual
showing
of
perceptible
harm."
Because of the absence of such record evidence, we are left to guess or even speculate on
these questions. Thus, at one point, the majority opinion says that what is involved here is
not even the calling out of the armed forces but only the use of marines for law
enforcement. We need to have evidence on these questions because, under the
Constitution, the President's power to call out the armed forces in order to suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion is subject to the limitation that the exercise of this power is
required
in
the
interest
of
public
safety.
Moreover, under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution, in the exercise of the power to
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or to impose martial law, two conditions
must concur: (1) there must be an actual invasion or rebellion and, (2) public safety must
require it. These conditions are not required in the case of the power to call out the armed
forces. The only criterion is that "whenever it becomes necessary," the President may call
the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion." The
implication is that the President is given full discretion and wide latitude in the exercise of
the
power
to
call
as
compared
to
the
two
other
powers.

In view of the Courts concurrence

We do not doubt the veracity of the President's assessment of the situation, especially in the
light of present developments. The Court takes judicial notice of the recent bombings
perpetrated by lawless elements in the shopping malls, public utilities, and other public
places. These are among the areas of deployment described in the LOI 2000. The
deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy clause.
The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military assets for
civilian law enforcement. Under the LOI, the police forces are tasked to brief or orient the

soldiers on police patrol procedures. 38 It is their responsibility to direct and manage the
deployment
of
the
Marines.
Considering the above circumstances, the Marines render nothing more than assistance
required in conducting the patrols. As such, there can be no "insidious incursion" of the
military in civilian affairs nor can there be a violation of the civilian supremacy clause in the
Constitution.
Political questions are defined as "those questions which under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." 2 They
have two aspects: (1) those matters that are to be exercised by the people in their primary
political capacity and (2) matters which have been specifically delegated to some other
department or particular office of the government, with discretionary power to act. 3 The
exercise of the discretionary power of the legislative or executive branch of government was
often the area where the Court had to wrestle with the political question doctrine.

Republic vs. Sandoval

Campos, Jr., March 19, 1993
Topic: Sovereignty - Suit not against the State - Beyond the Scope of Authority
Facts:
The heirs of the deceased of the January 22, 1987 Mendiola massacre, together with those
injured (Caylao group), instituted the petition, seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
orders of respondent Judge Sandoval (May 31 and Aug 8, 1988) in "Erlinda Caylao, et al. vs.
Republic of the Philippines, et al." which dismissed the case against the Republic of the
Philippines
May 31 order: Because the impleaded military officers are being charged in their
personal and official capacity, holding them liable, if at all, would not result in
financial responsibility of the government
Aug 8 order: denied the motions filed by both parties for reconsideration
In January 1987, farmers and their sympathizers presented their demands for what they
called "genuine agrarian reform"
The Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), led by Jaime Tadeo, presented their problems
and demands such as:

giving lands for free to farmers

zero retention of lands by landlords
stop amortizations of land payments

Dialogue between the farmers and then Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) began on January
15, 1987. On January 20, 1987, Tadeo met with MAR Minister Heherson Alvarez. Alvarez was
only able to promise to do his best to bring the matter to the attention of then President
Cory Aquino during the January 21 Cabinet meeting. Tension mounted the next day. The
farmers, on their 7th day of encampment, barricaded the MAR premises and prevented the
employees from going inside their offices.
On January 22, 1987, following a heated discussion between Alvarez and Tadeo, Tadeo's
group decided to march to Malacanang to air their demands . On their march to Malacanang,
they were joined by Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN),
League of Filipino Students (LFS), and Kongreso ng Pagkakaisa ng Maralitang Lungsod
(KPML). Government intelligent reports were also received that the KMP was heavily
infliltrated by CPP/NPA elements, and that an insurrection was impending. Government antiriot forces assembled at Mendiola. The marchers numbered about 10,000 to 15,000 at
around 4:30 pm. From CM Recto, they preceded toward the police lines. No dialogue took
place; "pandemonium broke loose"
After the clash, 12 marchers were officially confirmed dead (13 according to Tadeo). 39 were
wounded by gunshots and 12 sustained minor injuries, all belonging to the group of
marchers. Of the police and military, 3 sustained gunshot wounds and 20 suffered minor
physical injuries. The "Citizens' Mendiola Commission" submitted its report on the incident
on February 27, 1987 as follows
The march did not have any permit. The police and military were armed with handguns
prohibited by law. The security men assigned to protect the government units were in
civilian attire (prohibited by law). There was unnecessary firing by the police and military.
The weapons carried by the marchers are prohibited by law. It is not clear who started the
firing. The water cannons and tear gas were not put into effective use to disperse the crowd;
the water cannons and fire trucks were not put into operation because:

there was no order to use them

they were incorrectly prepositioned
they were out of range of the marchers

The Commission recommended the criminal prosecution of four unidentified, uniformed

individuals shown either on tape or in pictures, firing at the direction of the marchers. The
Commission also recommended that all the commissioned officers of both the Western Police
District (WPD) and Integrated National Police (INP) who were armed be prosecuted for
violation of par. 4(g) of the Public Assembly Act of 1985. Prosecution of the marchers was
also recommended. It was also recommended that Tadeo be prosecuted both for holding the
rally without permit and for inciting sedition. Administrative sanctions were recommended
for the following officers for their failure to make effective use of their skill and experience in
directing the dispersal operations in Mendiola:
Gen. Ramon E. Montao
Police Gen. Alfredo S. Lim
Police Gen. Edgar Dula Torres
Police Maj. Demetrio dela Cruz

Col. Cezar Nazareno

Maj. Filemon Gasmin
Last and most important recommendation: for the deceased and wounded victims to
be compensated by the government,

It was this portion that petitioners (Caylao group) invoke in their claim for
damages from the government
No concrete form of compensation was received by the victims

On January, 1988, petitioners instituted an action for damages against the

Republic of the Philippines, together with the military officers, and personnel involved in
the Mendiola incident. Solicitor general filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that
the State cannot be sued without its consent. Petitioners said that the State has
waived its immunity from suit. Judge Sandoval dismissed the case on the ground that
there was no such waiver. Motion for Reconsideration was also denied
Issues:
1. Whether or not the State has waived its immunity from suit (i.e. Whether or not this
is a suit against the State with its consent)
Petitioners argue that by the recommendation made by the Commission for the
government to indemnify the heirs and victims, and by public addresses made by
President Aquino, the State has consented to be sued
2. Whether or not the case qualifies as a suit against the State
Holding:
No.
This is not a suit against the State with its consent.
No.
Ratio:
Art. XIV, Sec. 3, 1987 Constitution: The State may not be sued without its consent

The recommendations by the Commission does not in any way mean that
liability automatically attaches to the State
The Commission was simply a fact-finding body; its findings shall serve
only as cause of action for litigation; it does not bind the State
immediately
President Aquino's speeches are likewise not binding on the State; they are
not tantamount to a waiver by the State

Some instances when a suit against the State is proper:

When the Republic is sued by name;

When the suit is against an unincorporated government agency

No

When the suit is on its face against a government officer but the case is
such that the ultimate liability will belong not to the officer but to the
government
Although the military officers and personnel were discharging
their official functions during the incident, their functions ceased
to be official the moment they exceeded their authority
There was lack of justification by the government forces in the use of
firearms.
Their main purpose in the rally was to ensure peace and order, but they
fired at the crowd instead

reversible

error

by

the

respondent

Judge

found.

Petitions

dismissed.

Department of Agriculture vs. NLRC G.R. No. 104269, November 11, 1993

Facts: Petitioner Department of Agriculture (DA) and Sultan Security Agency entered into a
contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said governmental entity.
Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in the
various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of
wages, nonpayment of 13th month pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay,
holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security
agency.
The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the
security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant security guards. The
DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became final and
executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment
against the property of the DA and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on

execution

the

motor

vehicles

of

the

DA.

Issue: Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case
Held: The basic postulate enshrined in the Constitution that the State may not be sued
without its consent reflects nothing less than a recognition of the sovereign character of the
State and an express affirmation of the unwritten rule effectively insulating it from the
jurisdiction of courts. It is based on the very essence of sovereignty. A sovereign is exempt
from suit based on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as
against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends.
The rule is not really absolute for it does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The States consent may be given expressly
or impliedly. Express consent may be made through a general law or a special law. Implied
consent, on the other hand, is conceded when the State itself commences litigation, thus
opening itself to a counterclaim, or when it enters into a contract. In this situation, the
government is deemed to have descended to the level of the other contracting party and to
have
divested
itself
of
its
sovereign
immunity.
But not all contracts entered into by the government operate as a waiver of its non-suability;
distinction must still be made between one which is executed in the exercise of its sovereign
function and another which is done in its proprietary capacity. A State may be said to have
descended to the level of an individual and can this be deemed to have actually given its
consent to be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the
contract
relates
to
the
exercise
of
its
sovereign
functions.
In the case, the DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in
fact,
performed
any
act
proprietary
in
character.
But, be that as it may, the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute
money claims. Act No. 3083 gives the consent of the State to be sued upon any moneyed
claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied. Pursuant, however, to
Commonwealth Act 327, as amended by PD 1145, the money claim must first be brought to
the Commission on Audit.