3080935

The Reemergence of 'Emergence'
Author(s): Bryon Cunningham

Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 68, No. 3, Supplement: Proceedings of the 2000 Biennial
Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Part I: Contributed Papers (Sep., 2001), pp. S62
-S75
Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science
Association
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The Reemergenceof 'Emergence'

Bryon Cunninghamt$
EmoryUniversity
A variety of recent philosophical discussions, particularlyon topics relating to complexity, have begunto reemploythe conceptof'emergence'.Althoughmultipleconcepts
of 'emergence'are available, little effort has been made to systematicallydistinguish
them. In this paper, I provide a taxonomy of higher-orderpropertiesthat (inter alia)
distinguishesthree classes of emergentproperties:(1) ontologically basic propertiesof
complex entities, such as the mythical vital properties,(2) fully configurationalproperties, such as mental propertiesas they are conceived of by functionalistsand computationalists,and (3) highlyconfigurational/holisticproperties,such as the higher-level
patterns characteristicof complex dynamicalsystems. Or more simply:emergenceas
ontological liberality,emergenceas multiplerealizability,and emergenceas interactive
complexity.
1. Introduction. The concept of emergence is something of a curiosity, in

that philosophers' attitudes toward it differ so radically. To some, the
claim that things can be "greater than the sum of their parts" expresses
an unproblematic relation among perfectly ordinary entities or properties.
To others, it expresses a mystifying relation among almost magical entities
or properties. This dramatic discrepancy is largely attributable to the fact
that three quite distinct, though rarely distinguished, concepts of emergence circulate the philosophical literature across a wide range of topics.
Since these concepts are not equally defensible, the failure to distinguish
them has given the concept of 'emergence', as a genus, something of a bad
reputation. This is significant because a variety of philosophically important discussions, particularly on topics relating to complexity (e.g., Kauffman 1993; Holland 1998; Clark 1997), have begun to reemploy the concept, though sometimes without much attention to improving its
tSend requestsfor reprintsto the author, 1461 Rock SpringsCircle, #2, Atlanta, GA
30306; email: bryoncunningham@yahoo.com.
$An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Pacific A.P.A., 2000. Special
thanks to Robert N. McCauleyand Amy Coplan for their comments and support.
Philosophy of Science, 68 (Proceedings) pp. S62-S75. 0031-8248/2001/68supp-0006$0.00
Copyright 2001 by the Philosophy of Science Association. All rights reserved.
S62
REEMERGENCE
OF EMERGENCE
S63
reputation. In this paper I hope to remedy that to some extent, by distinguishing three classes of emergent properties: (1) ontologically-emergent
properties, such as the mythical vital properties, (2) epistemically-emergent,
properties, such as mental properties as they are conceived by functionalists in philosophy and (classic) computationalists in psychology, and
(3) epistemically-emergent2 properties, such as the higher-level patterns
characteristic of complex dynamical systems.
Each kind of emergence is, in effect, a class of higher-order properties.
Higher-order properties are, roughly, properties of properties. Just as firstorder properties classify individual entities into types, so higher-order
properties classify lower-order properties into types (see, e.g., Putnam
1975; Kim 1998). I will specify each class of emergence within the framework of a hierarchical taxonomy of higher-order properties (see Cunningham 2001). That taxonomy begins with a related pair of higher-order
property distinctions: internal and external properties, and basic and complex properties.
2. Internal/Externaland Basic/Complex Properties. I will call the entity to
which a first-order propertyp is attributedp's proprietary entity. I will call
the set of properties that collectively determine p's existence p's determinants. With this in mind:
(INT) An internal property is one whose determinants are fully internal to its proprietary entity.
(EXT) An external property is one whose determinants are partly
external to its proprietary entity.
For any first-orderproperty p, the internal/externaldistinction specifies
a relation between (1) the boundary around p's proprietary entity, and
(2) the boundary around the proprietary entities of p's determinants (see
Figure 1). If (2) is at least as narrow as (1), then the property is internal.
If (2) is wider than (1), then the property is external. In the context of
scientific discovery and explanation, this is a matter of distinguishing
INTERNAL
EXTERNAL
Figure1. Internaland externalproperties.
S64
BRYON CUNNINGHAM
(i) the boundary between the system under investigation and its environment, and (ii) the locus of control for the system's behavior. If (ii) is at
least as narrow as (i), then subsequent explanations tend to be internalist,
e.g., both mechanistic and dynamical explanations are internalist (see, e.g.,
Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Port and Van Gelder 1995). If (ii) is wider
than (i), then subsequent explanations tend to be externalist, e.g., both
teleological and genetic explanations are externalist (see, e.g., GodfreySmith 1998).
The distinction between basic and complex properties is helpful for,
among other things, identifying the ontological liberality of theories and
theorists. A complex property is one that is determined by properties of
multiple entities, viz. the relata of the property. The relata of any complex
property p are: (1)p's proprietary entity, and (2) the proprietary entities
of p's determinants. If the proprietary entities of p's determinants are external to p's proprietary entity, then p is simply an external property. If,
however, the proprietary entities of p's determinants are internal to p's
proprietary entity, then p is a complex-internal, i.e., a microdetermined,
property:'
(MICRO) A first-order property p is microdetermined iff:
1. p's proprietary entity is complex (i.e., has components).
2. p is fully determined by properties of its proprietary entity's components, including:
i. internal properties of the components, and
ii. external properties of the components (vis-a-vis each other).2
Countenancing microdetermined properties provides for ontological economizing by conceiving of some higher-level properties as identical to conjunctive sets of lower-level properties (see, e.g., Armstrong 1997). In this
way the class of complex properties admits of two subclasses, viz. external
and microdetermined properties (see Figure 2).
A basic (i.e., "simple") property, in contrast, is one that is not determined by properties of multiple entities. In other words, a basic property
is internal but not microdetermined. In a sense, basic properties are selfdetermined, which is to say that they cannot be identified with conjunctive
sets of lower-level properties. Hence the more basic properties a theory
admits, the more ontologically liberal it is. In this way the class of internal
1. Microdeterminationis sometimes called mereologicalsupervenience.See, e.g., Kim
1993.
2. This last restrictionis necessaryto prevent a contradiction,viz. that a microdetermined (and hence internal)propertyis partly determinedby propertiesof entities externalto its proprietaryentity.
REEMERGENCE OF EMERGENCE
S65
properties admits of two subclasses, viz. basic and microdetermined properties (see Figure 3). With this in mind:
A basic property is an internal property that is not microdetermined.
A
(COM)
complex property is either an external property or a microdetermined property.3
(BAS)
COMPLEX
MICRODETERMINED
EXTERNAL
Figure 2. The class of complex properties admits of two subclasses, viz. external properties
and microdetermined properties.
INTERNAL
MICRODETERMINED
BASIC
Figure 3. The class of internal properties admits of two subclasses, viz. microdetermined
properties and basic properties.
3. The definition 'complex property' may seem objectionable, since it is disjunctive. I
am not, however, countenancing disjunctive properties in the sense typically objected
to, since I am advocating a "sparse" approach to higher-order properties (see, e.g., Kim
1998), under which higher-order properties are concepts. Hence 'complex property' is
a disjunctive concept, which is much less objectionable.
S66
BRYON CUNNINGHAM
Physicalist explanations rely crucially on the discovery of complex

properties of natural systems. On the one hand, mechanistic and dynamical explanations rely on the discovery of microdetermined properties of
natural systems. On the other hand, teleological and genetic explanations
rely on the discovery of external properties of natural systems. In each
case, the success of physicalist explanations depends on the discovery of
complex properties. Resistance to physicalist explanations is sometimes
based on claims that an entity possesses ontologically basic properties.
The vitalists, for example, argued that vital properties were ontologically
basic properties of organisms, and therefore beyond the scope of conventional physicalist explanations. More recently, some philosophers (e.g.,
Searle 1992; Chalmers 1996) have claimed that qualia are ontologically
basic properties of organisms, and therefore beyond the scope of conventional physicalist explanations.4In both cases, resistance to physicalist explanations depends on the putative discovery of ontologically basic properties.
This constitutes the core of the framework of higher-order property
classes I will use to distinguish the three classes of emergence. Internal and
complex properties are classes of second-order properties, whereas external, basic, and microdetermined properties are classes of third-orderproperties (see Figure 4). This is somewhat surprising, since the pairs that form
natural distinctions (i.e., internal/external, basic/complex) are not at the
same order of organization. Though initially counterintuitive, this organization captures the appropriate relations among these higher-order
classes.
2nd order
3rd order
COMPLEX
EXTERNAL
INTERNAL
MICRODETERMINED
BASIC
Figure4. Complexandinternalpropertiesareclassesof second-order

properties.External,
and basicpropertiesare classesof third-orderproperties.
microdetermined,
4. For a physicalistreply, see, e.g., Cunningham2001.
S67
3. Emergence as Ontological Liberality. The class of ontologically basic

properties admits of two subclasses, viz. fundamental and ontologicallyemergent properties, corresponding to two possible reasons why an internal property could fail to be microdetermined (see Figure 5).5 A fundamental property, such a property postulated in elementary particle
physics, is a basic property of an entity with no component parts. In other
words:
(FUND) A fundamental property is an ontologically basic property
of a basic entity.
A fundamental property fails to be microdetermined simply because an
entity that has no component parts is a fortiori one whose properties cannot be determined by properties of "them." An ontologically-emergent
property, in contrast, fails to be microdetermined because it is ontologically "greater than the sum of its parts." In other words:
(O-EMER) An ontologically-emergent property is an ontologically
basic property of a complex entity.
Since basic properties are third-order properties, fundamental and
ontologically-emergent properties are classes of fourth-order properties. It
is the conjunction of the following three claims that underlies ontologicalemergence:
1. Emergent properties are internal properties.
ONTOLOGICALLY
BASIC
FUNDAMENTAL
EMERGENT
Figure 5. The class of ontologically basic properties admits of two subclasses, viz. fundamental and ontologically-emergent properties. The first kind of emergence is the class of
ontologically-emergent properties.
5. A particular property fails to be microdetermined if it violates either of the two
conditions identified in (MICRO), viz., if either (1) its proprietary entity is not complex,
or (2) it is not fully determined by properties of its proprietary entity's components.
S68
BRYON CUNNINGHAM
2. Emergent properties are properties of complex entities.

3. Emergent properties are not microdetermined.
Asserting these three claims together leads to the conclusion, advocated
by vitalists, that emergent properties are non-physical. To see this, consider: Though physicalists countenance ontologically basic properties at
the lowest levels in physics, they do not countenance such properties at
higher levels of organization,6 at which emergent properties are alleged to
exist. Hence the conjunction of the three claims above seems impossible
to accommodate under a physicalist paradigm. It is a short step to the
conclusion that emergent properties are therefore non-physical properties,
making ontological emergence a kind of property dualism (or pluralism).
Thus the first class of emergent properties-viz. basic properties of complex entities-can be thought of in terms of the ontological liberality of
theories that (and theorists who) postulate them.
4. Emergence as Multiple Realizability. The class of microdetermined
properties also admits of two subclasses, viz. compositional and configurational properties, corresponding to two ways a property can be microdetermined. A compositional property, such as mass, is a property of a
whole entity that is determined by internalproperties of that entity's components. A configurational property, such as a formal property, is a property of a whole entity that is determined by external properties of that
entity's components (see Figure 6). Less precisely, a compositional property is determined by the componentsthemselves,whereas a configurational
property is determined by the organization of the components. Or, more
precisely:
(COMP) A compositional property is one that is fully determined by
internal properties of its proprietary entity's components.
(CONF) A configurational property is one that is fully determined
by external properties of its proprietary entity's components.
Since microdetermined properties are third-order properties, compositional and configurational properties are classes of fourth-order properties. Together with fundamental and ontologically-emergent properties,
this completes the taxonomy of higher-order property classes that distinguishes the three kinds of emergence (see Figure 7).7
6. Physicalists
as basicallthetime.Butthissenseof basic
do, however,treatproperties
is not the one at stake, since it is merely an idealizationphysicalistsmake relativeto

theories and problemdomains.
7. An interesting parallel exists between this taxonomy and recent psychological research on concepts. It is widely agreedthat the human conceptualsystem is both pro-
REEMERGENCE
OF EMERGENCE
S69
COMPLEX-INTERNAL
(microdeterm
ined)
COMPOSITIONAL CONFIGURATIONAL
i.e., microdetermined,
Figure6. The class of complex-internal,
propertiesadmitsof two
subclasses,viz. compositionaland configurational
properties.
In reality, there are probably few examples of fully compositional or
fully configurational properties. Instead, compositional and configurational properties should be understood as idealizations that represent the
end points of a spectrum of microdetermined properties (see Figure 8).
The location of a microdetermined property p on that spectrum is a function of the comparative roles of p's microdeterminants, i.e., the properties
of the components of p's proprietary entity.
Expressing that comparison in terms of a ratio of internal:external
properties of the components, fully compositional properties have a ratio
of 1:0, whereas fully configurational properties have a ratio of 0:1. This
ductive and systematic,and that these characteristicsare attributableto the fact that
concepts are producedthroughthe combinationand recursionof more basicconceptual
constituents (see, e.g., Fodor 1998b;Barsalou 1999). According to some, those more
basic conceptualconstituentsinclude image-schemas,i.e., postulatedmentalstructures
that organize our experienceand understandingof the world in terms of patternsand
relations that recur across a wide range of perceptual,cognitive, and motor domains
(see, e.g., Lakoff 1987;Johnson 1987). Moreover, it is widely agreed that the combination and recursionof basic conceptualconstituents,whateverthey are, producetaxonomic hierarchiesof concepts that are divisibleinto superordinate,"basic,"and subordinatelevels (see, e.g., Medin and Waxman 1998).
These featuresof humanconceptualsystemsare consistentwith my discussionabove
as follows: First, each of the higher-orderpropertyclasses consideredcan be produced
by the combination and recursionof two more basic relations, viz. compositionality
and determination.Second, both compositionalityand determinationare among the
centralcandidatesfor image-schemas,the buildingblocks of concepts (at least according to some researchers).And third,the combinationand recursionof compositionality
and determinationproduces a taxonomic hierarchyof higher-orderpropertyclasses
divisibleinto characteristicallysuperordinate,basic, and subordinatelevels(2nd, 3rd, and
4th
orders, respectively).
1st order
2nd order
3rd order
specified in another vocabulary
COMPLEX
EXTERNAL
INTERNAL
COMPLEX-INTERNAL
BASIC
(microdetermined)
4th order COMPOSITIONAL

FUNDAMENTA
CONFIGURATIONAL
Figure 7. A hierarchical taxonomy of higher-order property classes, including one cross-classification (v
S71
COMPOSITIONAL
CONFIGURATIONAL
1:0
internal:external
0:1
role of components
role of organization
undefined
interlevel contact
type-identity
interlevel relation
realization
Figure 8. The spectrum of microdetermined properties defined by the end points of fully
compositional and fully configurational properties. Any microdetermined property p can be
located on the spectrum according to the comparative roles ofp's microdeterminants (components vs. organization), expressed as a ratio of the internal:externalproperties of p's proprietary entity's components. Interlevel contact is undefined for fully compositional properties, and so the only available interlevel relation is type-identity. Interlevel contact is
impossible for fully configurational properties, and so the only available interlevel relation
is realization. The second kind of emergence, viz. epistemically-emergentl properties, is the
class of fully configurational properties.
ratio reflects the amount of interlevel contact between the higher-level

properties of the whole entity and the lower-level properties of its components. In the case of fully compositional properties, the ratio-1l:0-is
undefined, indicating that no interlevel distinction exists. In this case, the
properties of the whole entity simply are the properties of its components.
In other words, fully compositional properties are type-identical to the
properties of their proprietary entities' components. Hence they are ideally
suited for microreduction. In the philosophy of psychology, this is, in effect, the approach of (type-) physicalism. In particular, physicalists have
argued that mental properties are type-identical to physical (e.g., neurobiological) properties, and that mental properties are therefore ideally
suited for microreduction.
In the case of fully configurational properties, the ratio-0: 1-is equal
to 0, indicating that, although an interlevel distinction exists, no interlevel
contact is possible. In this case, the higher-level properties of the whole
entity have no theoretically significant relations to the lower-level properties of its components. In other words, fully configurational properties
are merely realized by the properties of their proprietary entities' components. Hence they are ideally resistant to microreduction. In the philosophy of psychology, this is, in effect, the approach of functionalism and
(classic) computationalism. In particular, functionalists and computationalists have argued that mental properties are merely realized by properties
S72
BRYON CUNNINGHAM
of their proprietary entities' components, and that, in light of the endless

diversity of possible realizations, mental properties are ideally resistant to
microreduction. This is commonly expressed in antireductionist contentions that the multiple realizability of mental properties entails (1) that
their relations to the lower-level properties that realize them are theoretically insignificant, and (2) that the sciences whose generalizations quantify
over those properties are therefore autonomous (see, e.g., Fodor 1974,
1998a). Hence:
(E-EMER,) A fully configurational property p is epistemicallyemergentl to the extent thatp is so multiply and diversely
realizable that p's relations to the lower-level properties
of p's proprietary entity's components are theoretically
insignificant.
Thus the second class of emergent properties-viz. fully configurational
properties-can be thought of in terms of their multiple realizability and
the consequent theoretical autonomy sometimes attributed to the sciences
whose generalizations quantify over them.
5. Emergence as Interactive Complexity. The class of microdetermined
properties admits of two additional subclasses, viz. aggregative and holistic
properties. An aggregative property, such as mass, is a property that a
whole entity possesses irrespective of the causal interactions among that
entity's components (see, e.g., Wimsatt 1986, 1996). Hence the proprietary
entity of an aggregative property comprises components that are causally
insulated. A holistic property, such as the higher-level patterns characteristic of complex dynamical systems, is a property that an entity possesses
in virtue of the causal interactions among the entity's components. Hence
the proprietary entity of a holistic property comprises components that
are causally integrated. Or more simply:
(AGG) An aggregative property is one whose proprietary entity comprises causally insulated components.
A
holistic property is one whose proprietary entity comprises
(HOL)
causally integrated components.
I would like to propose that the class of aggregative properties is coextensive with the class of compositional properties, whereas the class of
holistic properties is not coextensive with the class of configurational properties. This can be represented by a two dimensional space in terms of
which the third class of emergent properties can be specified (see Figure
9).The horizontal axis of that space is simply the spectrum of microdetermined properties between fully compositional and fully configurational
properties. The vertical axis of that space is simply the spectrum between
S73
HOLISTIC
epistemicallyemergent2
2
I~~~~~~~
COMPOSITIONAL/
AGGREGATIVE
CONFIGURATIONAL
Figure 9. A two dimensional space in terms of which the third kind of emergence, viz.
epistemically-emergent2properties, can be located. The horizontal axis is the spectrum of
microdetermined properties defined by the end points of fully compositional and fully configurational properties (see Figure 8). The vertical axis is the spectrum of microdetermined
properties defined by the end points of fully aggregative and increasingly holistic properties.
fully aggregativeand increasinglyholisticproperties.In this space,aggregative and compositionalpropertiescovary,whereasholisticand configurationalpropertiesare orthogonal.

Propertiesthat are both highlyconfigurationaland highlyholistic(the
upperright-handquadrantof the definedspace)tend to be epistemicallyis to say that
emergent2.To say that a propertyis epistemically-emergent2
relativeto the computationalresourcesof theoriesand theorists,it is difficult (or perhapsimpossible)to map generalizationsthat quantifyover
the propertyonto generalizationscast at lower levels of organization.In
otherwords:
(E-EMER2) A highlyconfigurationaland highly holisticpropertyp
is epistemically-emergent2
to the extentthatp's proprietary entity is so interactivelycomplexthat it is difficult
(or perhaps impossible)to track p's relations to the
lower-levelpropertiesof p's proprietaryentity's components.
For example:Under at least some interpretations,connectionistnetworks provideidealizedimagesof the dynamicalactivitiesof local pop-
S74
BRYON CUNNINGHAM
ulations of neurons (see, e.g., Bechtel and Abrahamsen 1991). Connectionist networks, and by implication local neuron ensembles, support
system properties that are both highly configurational and highly holistic.
As a result, connectionist networks support system properties whose relations to the lower-level properties of their systems' components, i.e.,
individual processing units, are difficult for theorists to track, and therefore difficult to predict, without the aid of computer simulations (see, e.g.,
Bechtel and Richardson 1992). Of course, this is not to say that there are
no mathematical operations for specifying how component activities collectively determine system activities within connectionist networks. It is
rather to say that, generally, algorithms have not been developed for describing various types of system behaviors within connectionist networks.
Hence the relations between their system-level properties and componentlevel properties remain epistemically "invisible." In this respect, connectionist networks, and a fortiori local neuron populations, support system
properties that are epistemically-emergent2.A wide variety of other complex
dynamical systems seem to support epistemically-emergent2properties as
well, from ecosystems (see, e.g., Kauffman 1993) to economic systems (see,
e.g., Holland 1996). Thus the third class of emergent properties-viz.
highly configurational/holistic properties-can be thought of in terms of
the interactive complexity of the systems that realize them.
In summary, I have distinguished three classes of emergent properties:
(1) ontologically basic properties of complex entities, such as the mythical
vital properties, (2) fully configurational properties, such as mental properties as they are conceived by functionalists in philosophy and (classic)
computationalists in psychology, and (3) highly configurational/holistic
properties, such as the higher-level patterns characteristic of complex dynamical systems. Or more simply: emergence as ontological liberality,
emergence as multiple realizability, and emergence as interactive complexity.
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The Reemergence of 'Emergence'

Author(s): Bryon Cunningham

The Reemergenceof 'Emergence'

1. Introduction. The concept of emergence is something of a curiosity, in

Figure1. Internaland externalproperties.

Physicalist explanations rely crucially on the discovery of complex

Figure4. Complexandinternalpropertiesareclassesof second-order

3. Emergence as Ontological Liberality. The class of ontologically basic

2. Emergent properties are properties of complex entities.

is not the one at stake, since it is merely an idealizationphysicalistsmake relativeto

specified in another vocabulary

4th order COMPOSITIONAL

Figure 7. A hierarchical taxonomy of higher-order property classes, including one cross-classification (v

ratio reflects the amount of interlevel contact between the higher-level

of their proprietary entities' components, and that, in light of the endless

fully aggregativeand increasinglyholisticproperties.In this space,aggregative and compositionalpropertiescovary,whereasholisticand configurationalpropertiesare orthogonal.

Armstrong, David (1997), A Worldof States of Affairs. Cambridge: Cambridge University

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