Intervention

Reason, Inductive Inference, and True

Religion in Hume

BRUCE JANZ University of Waterloo

Although it is acknowledged that Hume's matters offact are established

by inductive reasoning, it is not always clear which inferences may be
called reasonable. In deductive reasoning, it is only reasonable to admit
true conclusions of valid arguments. However, in an argument which
uses probability as Hume's inductive arguments do, the criterion for
reasonableness is not as clear.
D. C. Stove's position is that Hume holds that "all predictive­
inductive inferences are unreasonable" ,I based on the inclusion of the
suppressed premise "all deductively invalid arguments are unreasona­
ble" , which is simply the thesis ofdeductivism. 2 Fred Wilson, however,
has provided an alternative to that interpretation. 3 Wilson outlines
Hume's defence of empirical science against scepticism and Cartesian
rationalism on the one hand, and superstition and enthusiasm on the
other. He points out that knowledge based on probability (that is,
knowledge generated by inductive reasoning), which does not aspire to
the impossible goal ofabsolute certainty, can still be regarded as reason-
J D. C. Stove, Probability and Hume' s Inductive Scepticism (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1973), 44-45.
2 Ibid., 50.
3 Fred Wilson, "Hume's Defence of Science", Dialogue 25 (1986). 611-628. Henceforth
referred to as "W".

DiIllogue XXVII (1988), 721·726

722 Dialogue

able in that it enables us to get on with the task of living. Nonetheless,

even though such knowledge does not try to meet the standard of
deduction, it does not countenance just any sort ofcausal connections as
good reasoning. Wilson maintains that Hume rules out superstition and
enthusiasm as good reasoning on the grounds that neither one allows
curiosity alone to be a guide to life (W624).
Wilson establishes that inductive reasoning can produce reasonable
results for Hume by demonstrating that the deductivist premise Stove
includes is not the basis for calling an inference reasonable. Wilson's
reason for regarding induction as reasonable is simply that since induc­
tion is necessary, it must therefore be virtuous. He is correct in pointing
out that it is inappropriate to import deductive standards into inductive
reasoning; however, this observation is only the first step on the way to
understanding what sort of inductive inferences may be called reason­
able. My contention in this article is that Wilson places the dividing line
between reasonable and unreasonable inductive inferences in the wrong
place. This can be seen most easily in his discussion of superstition and
enthusiasm.
Hume condemns superstition and enthusiasm for mixing something
other than curiosity with the understanding; Wilson infers from this that
Hume's condemnation is true of religion in general (W625). He cites the
Natural History of Religion in defence of this; the sections he gives
concern the origins of polytheism, and the "something other than
curiosity" includes concern over the events oflife, the incessant hopes
and fears which actuate the human mind, and the postulating of
unknown causes to account for events which occur in the natural course
ofhuman life. 4 He also points out that the Treatise seems to indicate that
religion in general is a product of indolent reasoning. 5
There are several reasons why this inference is unwarranted. First,
the inference from the fact that polytheism has motivations other than
curiosity to the notion that its descendants in all forms are either false or
characterized by these motivations is weak. Hume does not fall into the
genetic fallacy, as one editor of the Natural History points out
(NHR15). Second, in interpreting Hume's words as a rejection of all
religion, Wilson ignores Hume's statements about true religion. The
author's introduction to the Natural History of Religion, for instance,
says that "The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and
no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a
moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and
Religion" (NHR21). In another essay that Wilson mentions, Hume
4 D. Hume, The Natural History of Religion, ed. H. E. Root (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 1956). 27, 29. Henceforth referred to as "NHR".
5 D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (London: Oxford
University Press, 1888), 115. Henceforth referred to as "T".
 Intervention 723

begins by stating: ''That the corruption of the best of things produces the
worst, is grown into a maxim, and is commonly proved, among other
instances, by the pernicious effects of superstition and enthusiasm, the
corruptions of true religion."6 If there were only afew statements ofthis
nature, they could be dismissed as ironic; however, they tum up
whenever HUme talks about religion. Furthermore, ironic or not, the
text must still be dealt with. We need to consider the possibility that
Hume was serious when he made these statements. Third,the passage
cited by Wilson from the Treatise (W624; TIt5) clearly refers to the
Roman Catholics, mentioned in the paragraph previous to the quotation,
who represent the spirit of superstition.
Hume's essay "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm" makes clear that he
intends "superstition" to refer to Catholics, while "enthusiasm" refers
to Pietists, Puritans, Anabaptists, and other evangelicals. 7 Hume is
reacting to the unjustified causal assertions and excesses of religious
people, not to the belief in the existence of an invisible, intelligent power
(NHR30). It could be argued that Hume really meant to censure all
religion, and merely limited himself to the excesses to placate the
religious authorities. However, apart from the Treatise (in which he
hesitated to include the essay on miracles for that reason), Hume spoke
candidly. After all, he had nothing to lose by rejecting all religion. Most
of the religious community had already branded him an atheist on the
basis of the Treatise. Yet, he did not do that. He tolerated true religion,
and condemned excess.
But what is true religion, for Hume? It is certainly not anything which
provokes religious sentiment in him. It is, rather, belief in an invisible,
intelligent power whose existence is "reasoned from the admirable
contrivance of natural objects" (NHR45). The Natural History ofReli­
gion makes this deity out to be the most likely explanation for the
regularities in nature. However, Hume is unwilling in either the Natural
History or in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion to say any­
thing at all about this invisible intelligent power. Anthropomorphizing
this power is the beginning of superstition or enthusiasm, and is defi­
nitely ruled out by Hume.

6 D. Hume, "Of Superstition and Enthusiasm" in Of the Standard of Taste and Other
Essays, ed. J. Lenz (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 146.
7 This use is not limited only to Hume. Bishop Tillotson, for instance, says that the
enthusiasts of these latter times are "those who call into question the power of the civil
magistrate in matters ofreligion' , (Tillotson, Sermons [London: Katherine Richardson,
1704], sermon 27, 320), evidently a reference to the Pietists and Puritans. As well,
superstition is spoken about several times in reference to the Catholics. In one sermon
(John Tillotson, Works of the Most Reverent Dr. John Tillotson [London: William
Rogers et aI., 1712], sermon 177, vol. 2.509), for instance, when speaking about the
Church or Rome, Tillotson claims that "where the Inquisition rules, and Ignorance. the
Mother, not of true Devotion, but of credulity and superstition. is carefully preserved,
there is no need of miracles, to make people believe ... ".
724 Dialogue

However, it is worth noting that this deity of Hume's as described in

the Natural History ofReligion may take either of two fonns.1t may be
that Hume merely used the notion of an invisible intelligent power as a
convenient locution for the heuristic device which allows us to expect
regularities in nature based on the regularities we have already
observed. Speaking of an invisible intelligent power enables us to
advance knowledge by not having to always re-demonstrate the regu­
larities of nature to ourselves before we can make new inductive infer­
ences. Philo suggests in the Dialogues that "God" or' 'Deity" should be
changed to the less religious "Mind" or "Thought" ,8 perhaps to allow
this alternative interpretation.
On the other hand, the deity Hume describes could be taken in a
religious sense. There is nothing to suggest that Hume could not allow a
limited deity to exist. His attacks are not against the moderates in
religion, but against those who succumb to superstition or enthusiasm.
It is probably too much to suggest that Hume himself held to a religious
interpretation of the invisible, intelligent power, but the point is that it is
quite conceivable that he could allow that someone else could hold a
moderate religious position without being branded as irrational. This is
the point which Wilson will not allow.
Donald Livingston, in a recent book on Hume, 9 makes Hume out to be
a theist, although the theism outlined by Livingston bears little resem­
blance to religion at all. He interprets the deity in the first of the two
manners mentioned above. Livingston argues that Hume needs a unify­
ing principle to ground advanced scientific research, and that this prin­
ciple must be philosophical theism.
Livingston is correct in noting that Hume distinguishes sharply
between superstition and enthusiasm on the one hand, and true religion
on the other, although his insistence that advanced scientific research is
impossible without this unifying principle seems to ge too far (PCL178).
He is also correct in pointing out that the main function of the deity for
Hume is as a unifying principle for the relations in the world. He would
not agree, however, that this deity could be ambiguous, in that it may
have religious connotations and it may not. Hume, though, seems to
leave the description of the deity ambiguous. I agree that Hume himself
quite likely did not hold to a belief in a traditional deity, and yet he
allowed that someone could, and still be reasonable.
Hume's attitude is one of tolerance. He may not accept the reJigious
interpretation of the deity for himself, but he does allow that another
person could accept a religious description of the deity without being
8 D. Hume. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, ed. N. K. Smith (Indianapolis, IN:
Hobbs-Merrill, 1947), 217.
9 D. Livingston, Hume's Philosophy of Common Life (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1984), 172-186. Henceforth referred to as "PCL".
 Intervention 725

branded irrational. The Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion are a

case in point of this attitude. Neither Cleanthes nor Philo emerges as the
clear victor in that debate. Only Demea, representing false religion, is
unable to present a reasonable case. Philo (representing Hume at least in
this respect) never condemns Cleanthes as unreasonable; he only pre­
sents evidence for his position, and belittles false religion. Philo does
question the strength of Cleanthes' evidence for the design argument,
but that questioning does not in itself mean that Cleanthes' position is
untenable; it only shows that Philo has reasons for holding to one
position in the midst of several reasonable positions.
Wilson's interpretation of Hume's epistemology does not allow that
several positions may at the same time be reasonable. His discussion of
curiosity is the crucial point for this discussion. Curiosity (the love of
truth) is the only proper motivation for scientific inquiry, according to
Wilson. It is the basis for the "rules by which to judge causes and
effects" (T173-175). But these rules allow for many possible inferences.
One does not necessarily arrive at a single rational inference by appeal­
ing to these rules. Hume thought he was being particularly restrained
with his list (Tl75), which indicates that he saw relatively few restric­
tions on causal inferences. Furthermore, it will not do to appeal to
curiosity as the arbiter between several possible causal inferences.
Curiosity will not help to decide which reasonable causal inference is in
fact correct. The motivation ofcuriosity is simply the reason why we, as
scientific observers, would want to make causal inferences at all. It
motivates us to want to make reasonable inferences ("there is likewise
requir'd a degree of success in the attainment of the end, or in the
discovery of the truth we examine", T451), but there is no hint in
Hume's discussion of curiosity that there is a single reasonable infer­
ence. It remains the case that the inferences we make are subject to
probability, and the inference we take to be correct may reasonably
differ from the inference another person takes to be correct, as long as
those inferences are within the bounds of reasonableness set down in the
"rules by which to judge causes and effects".
Wilson uses the standard of motivation by curiosity to establish that
the inference of the highest probability sbould be taken as reasonable,
and all others should be rejected as unreasonable. My position is that
Hume does not set a maxim'lm standard for rationality. which would
rule out all but the "best" inference, but rather he sets a minimum
standard, with which he can rule out certain inferences as unreasonable
for well defined reasons. Any inference which meets the minimum
standard is reasonable, although there may be reasons why one person
would hold one position and another person would hold a different one.
One of the important reasons for this move is that it allows Hume to
retain something which clearly is a priority in his philosophy-the ideal
 726 Dialogue

oftoleration. Hume' s tolerance would be rather empty ifhe recognized a

person as reasonable only if they agreed with him. Wilson's account
seems to lead to this conclusion, and therefore gives reason for hesita~
tion.

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