Penn State University Press

ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS
Author(s): THOMAS DAVIDSON

Source: The Journal of Speculative Philosophy, Vol. 22, No. 3 (1892), pp. 225-253
Published by: Penn State University Press
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THE
JOURNAL
of
PHILOSOPHY.
SPECULATIVE
Vol.
XXII.
No.
[Whole
3.]
AEISTOTLE'S
No.
87.
METAPHYSICS.
A TRANSLATION OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK, BY THOMAS DAVIDSON.
Prefatory
Note.
forms a treatise by itself,

The eleventh book of theMetaphysics
and contains the profoundest doctrines of Aristotle's philosophy?
doctrines which have exercised, and are still exercising, an untold
In the following translation, which

influence upon the world.
a
a
forms part of first draft of
complete version of theMetaphys
have sought to make
I hope, to be published?I
the
ics??oon,
as
as
I could, without converting my work
clear
writer's meaning
Instead of accompanying
it with the commen
into a paraphrase.
tary, which will necessarily be very extensive, I have added, for

a brief
the benefit of those not familiar with Aristotle's
language,
more
of
the
vocabulary, arranged alphabetically,
important techni
in translating, I have
cal tei'ms occurring in this book. Although,
had before me two Latin and two German versions, and several
of Aphrodisias,
those of Alexander
commentaries,
including
am
aware
I
and
well
how
Bonitz,
Schwegler,
imperfect my work
to
I
be
and
shall
thankful
student
of
Aristotle who will
any
is,
or
forms
better
of
suggest corrections,
expression than those I
have used.
15
XXII?15

The Journal
226
of Speculative
Chapter
Philosophy.
I.
In it
The subject of theory [or speculative science] is essence.
essences.
are
investigated the principles and causes of
The truth is, if the All be regarded as a whole, essence is its
if we consider the natural order of
first [or highest] part. Also,
the categories, essence stands at the head of the list; then comes
It is true that the other categories,
then quantity.
quality;
such as qualities and movements, are not in any absolute sense
at all, and the same is true of [negatives, such as] not-white or
we use such expressions as: "Not
Nevertheless,
not-straight.
white
is."
no one of the other categories

is attested by the procedure
This
pendent].
was the principles, elements,
tor
it
phers;
that were the object of their investigations.
present day, to be sure, are rather inclined
Moreover,
is separable [or inde

of the older philoso
and causes of essence
The
thinkers of the
to consider universals
For genera are universals, and these they hold to

be principles and essences, mainly because their mode of investi
a
on the other
logical one. The older philosophers,
gation is
g., fire and
hand, considered particular things to be essences?e.
not
in
earth,
body
general.
Two of these are sensible, one being
There are three essences.
as essences.
The
latter is obvious to all,
eternal and the other transient.
in the forms of plants and animals; with regard to the former,
there is room for discussion, as to whether its elements are one or
The third, differing from the other two, is immutable and

many.
Some make
is maintained
by certain persons to be separable.
two divisions of it,whereas others class together, as of one nature,
ideas and mathematical
entities, and others, again, admit only the
latter. The first two essences belong to physical science, for they
the last belongs
subject to change;
common
no
to all.
there is
principle
are
Chapter
Sensible
is between
to another
science,
if
II.
essence
ismutable
[or changeable].
If, then, change
or
not
between all
intermediates, though
opposites
opposites indiscriminately (for sound is not-white), but between

there must be an underlying
contraries [in the same genus],

Aristotle's
that changes
something
themselves do not change.
persists
Besides
Metaphysics.
227
into
contrariety, for the contraries

Further, this underlying
something
in the change, whereas
the opposite does not persist.
the opposites, therefore, there is a 'third something?
matter.
If, as we have maintained,
there are four^sorts of changes?in

if change in quid
quiddity, quality, quantity,
locality?and
and
is
birth
in
simple
decay; change
dity
quality, mutation; change
in quantity, growth, and decay, and change in locality, locomotion,
and
But if any
changes will take place into the respective opposites.
such change is to take place, the matter must be capable of as
suming the opposite attributes.
Since being is twofold, every change is a change from poten
tial being to actual being?e.
g., from potential white to actual
white, and the same is true of growtli and decay. Hence, not
only may the accidental spring from non-being, but [from another
point of view] all generation is from being?potential
being, how
not
and
And
this
actual
ever,
being.
[potential being] is the One
of Anaxagoras
his
than
"all
(better
things together") and the
"
"
mixture
of Empedocles
and Anaximander.
And, as Democritus
u
says, all things were together in their dynamic, but not in their
these philosophers had risen to a conception
actual state." Hence
of matter.
Everything that changes has matter, though all things

the same matter.
The same is true of those eternal
things which, though ungenerated, have locomotion ; nevertheless,
their matter is not generated, but is conditioned by whence and
not have
whether.
One might be in doubt about what sort of non-being it is from

"
takes place; for the phrase
generation
non-being" may
be used in three senses. When we say that a thing is potentially,
we do not mean that each potentiality is all
Nor is
potentiality.
"
it proper to say All things were together."
For things differ in
their matter; for how otherwise should they have become bound
less in number, and not one ? For the Intelligence
is one, and if
the matter were also one, the result would have been in
actuality
what the matter was potentially.
Three, then, are the causes
which
two of them form

and three the principles;
opposition?namely,
the idea or form and the privation;
and the third ismatter.

228
The Journal
of Speculative
Chapter
Philosophy.
III.
must next show that neither form nor matter
(I mean the
is
All
is
of
generated.
primal ones)
change
something, by some
to
That
which
something.
by
change is effected is the
thing,
Prime Mover;
that which is changed is matter;
that into which
it is changed is form. For we should have to go on to infinity, if
not only the bronze became round, but the round or the bronze
also became, or were generated.
We must certainly stop some
We
where.
show that every essence is generated by an

as itself. For example,
same appellation
the
agency bearing
natural essences are due to nature [artificial essences to art], and
so on. For essences are due either to art or nature, or else to
Art is principle in another; nature is
chance and spontaneity.
man
The other causes are
begets men.
principle in itself. For
privations of these.
There are three essences?(1)
matter, which is a this [is indi
for
the
things which exist by mere con
vidualized]
by appearing;
Next,* we
must
tact and not by concretion are matter and substance;

(2) nature,
is also a this, into which things pass, and a sort of having;
or Soc
(3) the result of those, the individual essence, as Callias
rates.
In the case of some things there is no this, or individual,
besides the composite essence; for example, there is no form for a
which
house except that due to art. Nor is there any generation or de

cay in the case of these, but the matterless house, and health, and
everything due to art have another mode of being and not-being
if there be [any
Hence,
[than that of things due to nature].
are
to
nature.
forms
due
For this
of
separate forms], they
things
was
not
he
maintained
that
forms
far
when
reason, Plato
wrong,
are as numerous
as natural
products, since indeed it is clear that

there are different forms for these things, such as fire, flesh, head.
For all these are matter, and the last is the matter of that which
is in the highest degree' essence. Moving
causes, therefore, are
like pre-existent entities, whereas the others are like the idea (X0709),
For example, when a man
which implies no temporal priority.
is in health, then health exists, and the form of the brazen sphere
coexists with [but does not precede] the sphere itself.
forms survive [their conjunction with matter] is some
Whether

Aristotle's Metaphysics.
229
In the case of certain forms

consideration.
hing demanding
there is nothing to prevent this. An example may be the soul?
not the whole of it, but the Intellect;
for it is impossible that the
whole should survive. From this it follows that there is no need
for ideas. For man generates man, the individual the particular.
same thing is true in the case of the arts; for example,
physician's art is the rationale or form of health.
The
Chapter
the
IV.
In one respect different things have different causes and

prin
ciples, and in another respect, if we are speaking universally and
It would be a proper sub
analogically, all things have the same.
essences
for
and relations have the same
ject
inquiry whether
so
in the case of the other categories.
principles and elements, and
But
it would be strange if all had the same; for then

and relations would have the same elements.
If this were
what could that common element be ? For, besides essence
other categories, there is nothing that is common ; and an
essences
the case,
and the
element
is prior to that of which it is an element.
is
neither
But, again,
essence an element of relation, nor relation of essence. How,
then,
is it possible that all things should have the same elements, since
it is impossible that any element should be identical with that
which is composed of elements?e.
B or A with BA.
Nor can
an
For
any intelligible entity be
element, such as One or Being.
these belong to individual things, even to such as are composite.
None of them, therefore, can be either an essence or a relation, and

this would be necessary "[if they were elements].
It follows that
all things have not the same elements.
Or, as we have said, they
have in one sense the same elements, and in another sense
they
have not. For example, in the case of sensible bodies, warmth is,
in a sense, a form, and, in another way, the
privation of it is
in itself was potentially both
cold, while the matter is that which
are these, as well as the
these, and ^sences
things composed of
these as principles, and whatever out of warm and cold becomes
one?e. g., flesh or bone.
For that which arises from these must
be
necessarily
something different from these. Of these things^
are
such
the elements and principles:
some of them have
then,
one set, some another; we cannot
say absolutely that all things

230
The Journal
of Speculative
Philosophy.
and in this way

have the same principles, but only by analogy;
we come to say that there are three principles?form,
privation,
matter.
But each of these is different in the different genera?
e. g., in color we have white, black, surface; light, darkness, air;
and from these arise day and night. But, since not only indwell
ing things are causes, but also external things?e. g., that which
is evident that there is a difference between prin
imparts motion?it
this gives the
and
element, although both are causes. And
ciple
That which
division of principles
[into internal and external].
or rest is a principle and es
of
motion
the
inducing
part
plays
to analogy, are three, while
sence. Hence
elements, according
causes and principles are four. Different causes are in different
source of motion, is different for

things, and the first cause, the
different things. Health,
disease, body are three of the princi
is medical science.
Form, the special
ples ; the active principle
But since
is
architecture.
disorder, bricks ; the moving principle,
in
is
ideal men [or
in physical men the moving principle
man, but
a
men in the abstract], the form or the opposite, in certain sense
there will be three causes, whereas in the particular case we have
For in a certain sense, medical science is health, and archi
tecture the form of the house, and man generates man; but, fur
mover of all.
ther, over and above these is the prime
four.
Chapter
V.
the criterion of separateness and inseparateness,

essences.
For this reason they are the
separable things will be
causes of all things, that without essences there would be neither
From this point of view our essences
affections nor movements.
will be soul and body, or intellect, appetite, and body.
From another point of view still, and speaking analogically,
act and potencfe. But even
[all] principles are the same?viz.,
are
for
different
different
these
things, and exist in different waysv
one time in act, in
same
some
In
thing is at
things, indeed, the
even these tall
man.
But
as
in potence,
another
wine, flesh,
m in
is
For the form, if it
under the causes named.
separable,
is like
act, and so is the compound of form and matter (privation
darkness or sickness), whereas the matter is in potence; for this is
The difference between act
what has the power to become both.
If we
adopt

Aristotle's
Metaphysics.
231
and potence is different in the case of things whose matter is not

the same, from what it is in the case of things whose form is not the
same but another; for example, the material
cause of man is the
elements, tire and earth, whereas his form is his particular [char
his father
acter], and that [jet unnamed] exterior cause?namely,
sun
are
and
the
the
all
besides
of
which
this,
?and,
ecliptic,
neither matter, nor form, nor privation, nor similar, but motors.
Again, we must see that some things must be called universal,

others not.
Thus, the first principles of all things are (1) the
first actual this, and (2) something else which exists in potence.
is the principle
The former is not universal.
For the particular
in general, to be sure, is the principle of

Man
of particulars.
is the
but the truth is, there is no man in general.
Peleus
man;
is
of
this
father
your principle,
Achilleus, your
particu
principle
At the same time B in general
lar B is a principle of this BA.
in general.
is a principle of BA
From this point of view the
are forms. But, as ha^ been said, different

causes
and elements, [I mean] things not in
things have different
same
in
the
colors, sounds, essences, qualities?unless,
genus?as
And even for things in the
deed, we are speaking analogically.
same species, there are different causes and elements, different,
elements
of essences
not, indeed, in species, but because of their individuality?0.

g.}
cause
are
matter
form
and
and
from
different
your
mine,
moving
in their general concepts they are the same.
If we in
although
quire what are the principles or elements of essences and relations
and qualities, whether they be the same or different, it is ob
vious that, if we consider the different significations in which the

terms are used, they are the same for all; but, if we distinguish
the significations, they are not the same but different, and only in
u
a certain sense the same for all.
in a certain sense the
By
same," I mean by analogy : matter, form, privation, motor, and,

in a certain sense, even the causes of essences are the causes of
all things, since all things would be annihilated if they were an
nihilated.
that which is first is in complete actuality.
Moreover,
In another sense the opposites are other firsts, which are neither
as genera nor used in different
predicated
significations, and the
same thing is true of matters.
Such, then, are the principles of sensible things, their number
and the manner of their identities and their differences.

232
The Journal
of Speculative
Chapter
Philosophy.
VI.
Since there are, as we have seen, three essences?two

physical
must now speak of the last, and show that
and one immovable?we
there must exist some eternal substance that is immovable.
Es
sences are the first among existences, and if they are all perishable,
all things are perishable.
But it is impossible that motion should
or
either be generated
And
the
destroyed, for it was always.
same is true of time, since it is impossible that there should be4
any fore or after without time. Nay, more: motion is continuous
in the same way as time; for time is either the same thing as
motion, or an affection of it [something to wThich motion is sub
But no motion is continuous save the local, and of it the
ject].
circular.
If, however, there be something endowed with power
of imparting movement or creative activity, but if it be not in act,
then there is no movement.
For it is possible for that which has
It would therefore be of no avail, even
potence not to be in act.
ifwe assume eternal essences, like the ideas which certain philoso
phers have assumed, unless they contained some principle capable
of inducing change. Nay, even this would not be sufficient, nor
would any essence alongside the ideas; for, unless the essence were
in actual energy, there would be no motion.
Yet more, even if
it were in actual energy, the result would not follow, if the essence
of itwere potence ; that is, there would be no eternal motion. For
that which
exists only in potence may conceivably not be. It fol

this that there must be a principle such that its
is activity.
Such essences, moreover, must be with
lows from all

[very] essence
out matter.
For, if there is anything at all eternal, these must be
so. They must, therefore, be actual.
But here there arises a difficulty. It is generally assumed that,
while all the actual is potential, not all the potential is actual;
from which it would follow that potence was prior to act. But if
for it is possible
this were true, there would be ho real existence;
for a*thing to be in potence, and not yet to be. To be sure, if
we follow the theologians, who tell us that everything was pro
duced from Night, or the physical philosophers, who tell us that
we shall
all things were [originally]
together [undistinguished],
run into the same impossibility.
For how shall the movement
[from potence
to act] begin, unless
there be
some cause

in act.
233
of a house does not move itself, but has to wait for

art, and the same is true of the menses, and the
to wait, respectively, for semen and seeds. Cer
have
which
earth,
tain philosophers, therefore, assume an everlasting activity?e.
g.y
that there is always motion.
and Plato, maintaining
Leucippus
But why motion exists, what motion it is, how it takes place in
For
the matter
the architect's
each particular instance, and what is its cause, they do not inform
us. The truth is that there is no such thing as motion by chance.
Every motion must have something behind it; in other words, as
we see, some things are moved
in a particular way by nature,
others
in another way
by force, by
intellect, or by something
else.
is the primal motion ?

Then there comes up the question :What
a question of the utmost moment.
in the case of Plato, it
Even
is impossible to tell, in some instances, which principle he con
siders the self-mover to be; for, as he says, the soul is both subse
quent to, and coeval with, the heavens.

The view which places potence before act is in one sense cor
rect, in another incorrect; how this is, has been explained above.
But that act is prior, is maintained
by Anaxagoras
(for his Nous
is in act); by Empedocles,
with his love and hate ; and by those
assume the eternity of motion.

It follows
who, like Leucippus,
from this that we must reject the notion of a Chaos or Night,
that the present
existing through indefinite time, and maintain
a
or in some
in
state
either
of
revolution
things always existed,
other way, if it be true that act precedes potence.
But, if the
same thing is always in a, state of revolution, there must be some
thing always abiding which similarly exerts the action of revolu
tion. In like manner, if there is any such thing as production and
decay, there must be something which exerts the different actions
manifested in all the stages of these processes.
It must, therefore,,
exert this particular action with reference to itself on the one
hand, and, on the other, this- particular action with reference to
something e4se; in other words, therefore, either in reference to a

third or in reference to the first. Of necessity in reference to the
latter; for this again is cause to itself and the other. Wherefore,,
the first is superior; for it was the cause of the eternally uniform
To
motion, whereas the other was the cause of different motion.
the fact that this difference is eternal, both plainly contribute.
In

234
The Journal
a similar relation
Why
to each
of Speculative
other stand
then seek for any other principles

Chapter
Philosophy.
the different movements.
?
VII.
Since, now, this is a possible explanation, and there is no other

alternative but that all things have sprung from Night, and indis
tinction, and non-being, wTe are forced to this conclusion that there
is something which always moves with a ceaseless motion, and
This result becomes plain not only

that this motion is circular.
from reasoning, but also from observation.
It follows that the
It follows also that there is something
first heaven is eternal.
which imparts movement
But, inasmuch as
[or, which itmoves].
that which moves
imparts motion is a middle [something], it

must
be [a beginning], something which im
follows that there
parts motion without itself having motion imparted to it, and this
.
will be eternal, an essence and an act. But
[in the sensible world]
in this way, and in the intel
the object of desire imparts motion
lectual world, the intelligible imparts motion without itself being
moved.
These are at bottom the same; for the object of desire is
the object of will is that which is
that which seems beautiful;
It ismore correct to say that we desire things because
beautiful.
they seem beautiful, than that they seem beautiful because we
desire them. For the intellectual act is the principle.
The in
tellect is moved by the intelligible, and self-intelligible is the one
and
series [the positive] ; in this series, the first essence, and in the first
But we must beware of
essence, that which is simple and actual.
one
are
and
the simple
the same.
The one sig
thinking that the
a
nifies measure, while the simple signifies kind of self-relation or
quality.
But both
the beautiful and the self-eligible are in the same

to the best.
the first is either the best or analogous
one
aim
is
is
the
shown
that
the
of
immovables
Moreover,
by the
"
"
a
are
two
for
which
division.
there
kinds
of
of
aim,
process
(For
"
in which."
Of these, one is, and the other is not.) The
and an
immovable aim moves as a beloved object, and that which ismoved
moves all other things.
If, then, there is something moved, itmay
be otherwise than it is. It follows that, if the first act be motion,
the thing may be otherwise in so far as it is moved?that
is, it may
if
not
But since the [prime]
be locally,
essentially, otherwise.
series;
and

235
is itself an immovable
mover
entity, being in act, this cannot in

For the first of changes is locomotion,
any respect be otherwise.
And the prime mover imparts this
and, indeed, circular motion.
motion.
It is therefore necessarily existent, and in so far as it
necessarily exists, it exists well, and in so far it is also a principle.
"
"
is used in several senses : (1) as that which
(The term necessity
as
contrary to natural tendency ; (2) as that
happens violently,
which is the essential condition of the good ; (3) that which can
On such a principle, then,
not exist otherwise, but is absolute.)
the whole of heaven and nature. And its free life is alto
For this is its normal
gether equal to our brief best moments.
condition (whereas this is impossible for us), because its energy is
at the same time joy.
It is for this reason that waking, percep
and
intellectual
tion,
activity are the sweetest thing; and hopes
on
account
of these. But thought in itself is thought
and memories
of that which is in itself, and the supreme thought is thought of
depends
the supreme existence [or that which in.thfe highest degree is].
But the intellect thinks itself in seizing the intelligible.
For it
becomes intelligible by touching and thinking, so that intellect and
intelligible are the same thing. For intellect is that which is re
ceptive of the intelligible and of essence. And it is actual through
the possession of these. And it is this actuality, rather than the in
telligible, that seems to be the divine element in the intellect. And
the vision of the divine is the sweetest and best.

If, then, God is
as well as we are sometimes, it iswonderful;
and if he is
always
more so, it is still more wonderful.
And this iswhat is true. And
life is his attribute ; for the energy of intellect is life, and he is
that energy. And his self-energy [self-act] is life, best and eternal.
We say that God is living, eternal, best, so that life, and uniform
belong to God ; for God is this.
and Speusippus, who
thinkers, like the Pythagoreans
maintain that the fairest and best is not in the principle, because,
while the principles of plants and animals are causes, the beautiful
and eternal existence
Those
to what springs from them, do not think

perfect belongs
comes from previous plants and animals
the
For
seed
correctly.
which are perfect, and the first is not the seed, but the perfect.
For example, we might say that the man is prior to the seed, not
the man that comes from the seed, but the man from whom the
and
seed
comes.

236
The Journal of SpeculativePhilosophy.
It is clear, then, from what has been said, that there exists an es
It
sence, eternal, immovable, and separaie from sensible things.
has been further shown that the essence cannot have any bulk, but
that it iswithout parts or divisions. For it imparts motion through

infinite time, and nothing finite has infinite power.
Since, now,
is either infinite or finite, for the reason given
every magnitude
it cannot have a finite magnitude
; and it cannot have an infinite
has no existence.
because such a magnitude
magnitude,
It has been still further shown that it is exempt from all affec
The reason is that all other move
tion and qualitative change.
to local movement.
ments are subsequent
How
these things are
as they are, is now clear.
Chapter
VIII.
we are to assume one or more such essences, and, if

that must not be left unsettled.
how
more,
many, is a question
even
to
must
mind
statements
We
the
call
of other philosophers,
on the sub
observing that they have laid down nothing definite
In the first place, the Doctrine
ject of the number of essences.
Whether
of Ideas contains no special inquiry into this subject.

The ad
herents of this doctrine call their ideas numbers, indeed ; but they
speak of these numbers sometimes as if they were infinite, at other
times as if the}7 were limited to ten ; but for what reason the
number of numbers is just this, they do not show with any apodic
on the contrary, must determine this from the
tic cogency. We,
and definitions already laid down.

principle and the first of beings is immovable, both in
itself and in its accidents [both absolutely and relatively], moving
the first eternal and one motion.
But, since that
[imparting]
foundations
The
which is in motion must be moved by something, and the prime

mover must be in itself immovable, and the eternal motion must
be due to an Eternal, and the one motion to a One, we find, along
side the one simple motion of the All, which we hold to be due
essence, that there are other eternal

of
those
the
motions?namely,
planets (for the body that moves
in a circle is eternal and unresting, as has been proved in the
follows of necessity that each of these motions is due
Physics)?it
to an essence in itself immovable and eternal.
For, inasmuch as
to the first and
immovable

Aristotle's
Metaphysics.
237
the nature of the stars is an eternal essence, and that which moves
must be eternal and prior to that which is moved, and that which
is prior to an essence must be itself an essence, it follows that such
essences must exist?eternal,
and in themselves immovable and
without bulk?and
this for the cause assigned above.
It is thus
plain that there are [these] essences, and which is the first, and
which the second among them, in an order corresponding to the
movements of the stars. As regards the number of these move
science which
ments, we must have recourse to that mathematical
it most akin to philosophy?namely,

astrology, whose aim it is to
construct a theory in regard to that essence which is at once sen
sible and eternal.
The other mathematical
sciences?e.
g., arith
metic and geometry?deal
with no essence.
That the motions of
moving bodies, then, are Several, must be clear even to those who
have but a moderate grasp of the subject; for every one of the
more than one motion.
wandering stars moves with
How many these movements are, is a question in regard to which
we shall now state the views of certain mathematicians,
for the
sake of affording a basis on which, by reasoning, to arrive at a
the same time, we must investigate some
draw information with regard to others
and
ourselves,
from other inquirers; and, if specialists in these matters arrive at
conclusions different from ours, we must love both parties, but fol
low the more accurate.
laid it down that the motion of the sun and moon are
Eudoxus
definite number.
At
matters
each in three spheres.

The first of these, he says, is that of the
fixed stars, the second passes through the middle of the zodiac,
and the third passes obliquely across the breadth of the zodiac.
further says that the path of the moon passes across the
He
breadth of the zodiac more obliquely than that of the sun. With
regard to the planets, he says that the motion of each is in four

spheres, and that the first and second of these motions are the
same as those of the sun and moon, the sphere of these
being that
which carries all the others, and the one which comes next in or
der to it and passes through the middle' of the zodiac being com
mon to all. With
respect to the third motion, he says that the
of
all
the
poles
planets lie in the diameter of the zodiac, and that
the motion of the fourth sphere is in a circle inclined obliquely
to the centre of the third sphere.
In the case of the third sphere,
16

238
The Journal of
Speculative Philosophy.
each of the other planets has its own poles distinct, Venus
and Mars have the same poles.
laid down the same arrangement of the spheres as
Callippus
while
is, the order of their distances?and

assigned to
same
Saturn
the
number
of
whereas
he
Jupiter
spheres,
case
sun
more
in
two
and
the
of
the
moon,
thought that,
spheres
had to be added, if the phenomena were to be explained, and one
to each of the other planets.
The fact is, if all the spheres put together are to explain the
Eudoxus?that
and
phenomena, there must for each of the planets be other spheres,

fewer in number by one, to roll back and restore to its [original]
position the first sphere of the planet which in each case is next
in order below it. Only in this way is it possible for the entire
motion of the planets to take place.
Since, then, the spheres in
which the planets move are eight and twenty-five, and among
these those alone
do not require to be brought back in which the

lowest planet ismoved, those that roll back the spheres of the first
two will be six, and those that roll back those of the other four
will be sixteen, and thus the number of all the spheres taken to
gether, both of those that bear forward and those that roll back,
will be fifty-five. If, however, those movements of which we have
spoken be not added to the sun and moon, the whole number of
the spheres will be forty-seven.

then, that the number of the spheres is so great, it
Admitting,
will be fair to assume that the essences and principles which are
at once immovable and yet sensible are of the same number.
The task of showing the necessity of this, we will leave to stronger

men.
And, if it is impossible that there should be any motion
which does not tend toward the motion of a star (constellation),
and if, further, we are forced to think that every nature and
every essence which is free from affection and self-existent has
the highest end, there can be no other nature besides
attained
For, if there
these, but this must be the number of the essences.
were others besides these, they would have to impart motion, as
But it is impossible that there should be
being ends of motion.
this truth we may derive
motions
besides
those
mentioned;
any
of moving bodies.
from the consideration
For, if every mover
exists for the sake of that which is moved, and every motion im
no motion which
a
plies
something that is moved, there can be

Aristotle's
23^
Metaphysics.
exists for its own sake or for the sake of another motion, but all
exist for the sake of the stars. For, if one motion existed
for the sake of another, that other would exist for the sake of a
must
third, and so on. But, since it is impossible that there should be

any regressus in infinitum, the end of all motion must be some
one of the divine bodies which move in the heaven.
That there is but one heaven, is obvious.
For, if there were
several heavens, in the same sense that there are several men, the
principle connected with each would be one in form and many in
is many in number has matter;

But whatever
for the
of
the same, but'
the concept man?is
many things?e.g.,
concept
Socrates is one. But the primal self-realizing idea has no matter,
the prime immovable mover
for it is self-end. Hence
is one in
number.
concept and one in number ; that, likewise, which ismoved always

and continuously is but one.
It follows that there is but one
heaven.
There has been handed down to us a tradition from our fore

fathers and from men of primitive ages, in the form of a myth,
that the movers are gods, and that the divine embraces the whole
of nature.
The remaining stories about them have been added
in subsequent times, in the form of myths, for the management
of
the multitude, and for the sake of law and expediency.

Human
forms and forms of other living things are ascribed to them, and
so likewise other things following from these, and similar to these.
If, now, we separate the first assertion from the rest, and take it by
itself?namely,
that
the
primal
essences
are
gods?we
must
con
sider this statement divinely made, and, inasmuch as it is probable

that every art and every science has been, to the extent possible
at a given time, repeatedly discovered and again been lost, we
must look upon these views as remnants of those that have sur
vived to the present time. To this extent only is the opinion of
our fathers and of the primeval world obvious to us.
Chapter
IX.
With
It is in
regard to the Intellect certain questions arise.
deed usually held to be the divinest of phenomena;
but what this
implies with regard to its nature, is a question that presents some
difficulties.
For,
if it thinks nothing, but is in the condition

of
240
The Journal
of Speculative
Philosophy.
one who
sleeps, what dignity can it have ? If, on the other hand,

it thinks, and this thinking is conditioned by something else be
is its essence will not be
sides itself (in which case that which
but
itwill not be the best
of
then
the
power
thinking),
thinking,
for its dignity comes to it through thinking.
Further,
granting that its essence is intellect or intelligence, what is the ob
or some
ject of that intelligence ? Its object must either be itself
thing else. And if it is something else, it must be either always
essence,
the same, or it must be different. Does

it, then, make any or no
difference whether it thinks the beautiful, or anything indifferent
ly ? Is it not rather an absurdity to say that it thinks discursively
a
It is clear, therefore, that it thinks
plurality of things?
that which is most divine and worthy, and that it does not change;
for change would be a change to worse, and such a thing would be
already a motion.
about
In the first place, then, if intellect i6 not thought, but the power
of thought, it is intelligible enough that the continuity of thought
should be painful to it. Further, it is clear that there would be
the object of
something else worthier than the intellect?viz.,
For intellect and the act of intellect would belong to

is lowest. Hence,
if the worst
thinks that even which
is to be avoided (and it is better not to see some things than to see
It follows from this
them), thought would not be the best thing.
that the intellect, if it is to think the noblest thing, thinks itself,
and thus thought is a thought of thought.
Science, on the other
thought.
him who
hand, and perception, and opinion, and reasoning seem always to

have an object different from themselves, and to have themselves
only as a kind of accessory.
if to think and to be thought are different, to which of
Again,
It is plain, indeed, that
the two does the intellect owe its worth?
are
not
and
the same.
The fact
being-thought-ness
thinking-ness
are
some
cases
same.
and
the
known
in
the
science
that
is,
thing
In the case of the creative sciences, the essence and the self-realizing
in that of the theoretic
end, without the matter, are the object;
the
the
and
sciences,
Since, then, in all things
thinking.
object
no
no
is
difference
between the object of
matter there
that have
the intellect and the intellect itself, the two must be the same,
and thinking is one with its object.
there remains one other difficulty, as to whether the
Finally,

Aristotle's
Metaphysics.
241
If itwere, then change from part

object of thought is compound.
But the fact is that every
to part of the whole might take place.
no matter is indivisible.
has
which
For, just as the human
thing
an
is
of
which
intellect,
compound
intelligence
things, is related
to a certain time (for it has not its good in this or that particular
time, but its best in a whole time, which good is something dif
ferent from itself), so likewise this self-intelligence is related to the
whole
of eternity.
Chapter
We
nature
must
X.
now consider in which
of the universe
of the two (possible) ways the

and the Best, whether
and
self-existent, or as order.
(transcendent)
contains
the Good
as something separate
answer is, itmust possess it in both ways, as an army does.
lies in order and in the
The truth is, that in an army the Good
more in the latter than in the former.
and
For the
general,
to
to
not
due
the
the general.
But
order, but the order
general is
all things are ordered together in a certain way, but not all in the
The
same way?fishes,
the arrangement is not such
birds, plants?and
that one has no relation to another, but there is some relation.
For all things are ordered with reference to one. But, just as in
a household
the free members are least permitted to do as they
their
sphere of action being completely or nearly systema
please,
whereas
the slaves and domestic animals have but a small
tized,
in
the
share
system, and a great deal is left to their individual
pleasure (for their nature is just such an individual principle?I
mean a principle such as must segregate each of them from other
so there are some things in which all things
things in all ways),
to
constitute a whole.
share, in order
now
We must
pass on to consider the impossibilities and ab
surdities in which those involve themselves who profess differ
ent views?first,
those who put forward somewhat specious argu
ments, and, second, those who involve themselves in the lesser
difficulties.
All [these men of divergent views] construct all things out of

-contraries. But [they fail in three respects] : they neither define
"
"
out of contraries"
the term all things," nor the phrase
correctly,
nor do they tell us just in what things contraries exist, nor do
they
in which things arise from contraries.
define the manner
The
1 6 * XXII?16

242
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy.
truth is that contraries are not affected by each other. This diffi
culty we get over successfully by positing' a third something.
Some philosophers [hold that this third thing is unnecessary and]
make one of the contraries matter [to the other]?e. g., the uneven
to the even, the many to the one. But this objection is answered
in the same way.
The one [primal] matter has no contrary; and
furthermore [if all things were composed of contraires], everything
share in the evil, except the one. For the evil, as such, is
would
one of the elements.
The others hold that the good and evil are
not principles;
nevertheless, in all things the good is a principle
more
truly than anything else.

Others, again, admit correctly
a
that the Good
is
principle, but do not tell us how it is so,
whether it be final, efficient, or formal. The view of Empedocles
it is
is also absurd, for he makes the good to be friendship. And
a principle both as moving (for it
as
and
brings things together),
matter (for it is a part of the mixture).
But even if it does hap
pen that the same thing is a principle both as matter and as mov
In which respect,
ing, still their ideal essence is not the same.
is
it
is
the notion that
then,
friendship ? Absurd, furthermore,
strife should be incorruptible;
nature of the evil.
for it is this very thing that is the
sets down the good as principle in the sense of a

Anaxagoras
The intellect [he says] imparts motion; but it
power.
moving
does so for the sake of something, and this is, therefore, something
he holds the same view that we do ; for
different from it?unless
a certain sense, health.
in
It is absurd,
the art of medicine
is,
no
to
to
to Intellect.
have
assumed
Good
the
and
contrary
however,
all those thinkers who assume contraries as first principles
use of these contraries, unless they are reminded
neglect to make
of them. And why some things are corruptible, and others incor
none of them informs us, for they make all things that
ruptible,
are out of the same principles.
But
class of thinkers that make all existent

things out of the non-existent; while others, -in order that they
may not be forced to do this, make all things one.
cause of gen
Again, why generation is eternal, and what is the
assume
one
no
us.
two princi
who
tells
And
for
those
eration,
one
is
to
of
these
admit
that
it
is
necessary
superior to the
ples,
assume
to
who
another
and
those
for
ideas,
other,
place
principle
There
is still another

Aristottfa Metaphysics.
243
Otherwise, how is it that things did or do partici

pate in them ? The others also are forced to admit that to wisdom
and the noblest science there must be some contrary, while we are
forced to no such admission.
For there is nothing contrary to the
First.
For all contraries have matter, and exist as potentialities.
a
Hence
ignorance, which is contrary [to wisdom], goes over into
its contrary. But to the first there is no opposite.
above
them.
If, now, there exist nothing else beside the things of sense, there
will be neither principle, nor order, nor generation, nor heavenly
things, but every principle will have another principle behind it,
as is the belief of all the theologians and
physical philosophers.
And, even if the existence of ideas or numbers be admitted, they
will not be the causes of anything, or, at all events, not of motion.
Further still, how out of unextended
elements can we get the
extended and the continuous ? For number will produce nothing
But the same
continuous, either as moving or as formal principle.
thing is true of opposites, even ifwe grant them formative and
It is not neces
moving power ; for they might possibly not be.
to
sary to remark that action is subsequent to power.
According
this, existences would not be eternal; but they are. One of these
must therefore be cancelled.
The manner of this has been already
stated.
Furthermore, no one tells us whereby the numbers are one,

why the soul is one with the body, and, generally, why the form
is one with the thing ; and, indeed,it is impossibleto tell,without
holding, as we do, that the moving cause is form-giving. Those,

number as their first prin
however, who lay down mathematical
one
essence
and
thus
have
ciple,
always following another, and
different principles for each, make the essence of the whole epi
sodic (for the one exerts no influence upon the other, either by
its existence or non-existence),
and the principles many.
But
the commonwealth
of existences refuses to be misgoverned:
"
Never a good is the rule of themany; let One be the ruler! "
Vocabulary.
(ahiov, atria).?u
By cause is meant:
(1) That internal
of
is
which
made.
For
(matter)
anything
example, bronze is the
cause of the statue. ...
The
form
and
the model.
And this
(2)
is the concept of the self-realizing end and all its genera.
For ex
Cause

244
...
(3)
ample, the cause of the octave is the relation of 2 to 1.
The firstprinciple of change or rest. For example, the man who
a
the father is the cause of the child. . . .
gives counsel is cause;
(4) The end or aim. And this is the purpose for which anything
For example, the purpose of walking is health."
These
is done.
to
causes are called, respectively, (1) Material
e? ov); (2)
(y\n,
Formal
(eZSo?,to efc o); (3) Efficient
(p6ev f)apxv rf? Ktvqaem^ to
kwovv, to v<f> ov); (4) Final
(to aya06v, to ov eve/co). In God, the
last three are one. He is the Form of forms, the Prime Mover,
and the Good, and all three in the same sense.
iv,
(Cf.Metaph.,
'
[J] 2.) See Principle.
"
(ivavrla) is meant
(1) the things different in
By Contraries
genus which cannot coexist in the same subject;
(2) the things
the
most widely different in the same genus;
(3)
things most
same
in
the
the
different
receptive subject;
(4)
widely
things most
same potentiality;
the
the
different
under
(5)
things whose
widely
difference is greatest, either absolutely, or in genus, or in species;
some are said to be contraries because they
(6) of other things (a)
contain these, (5) others because
they are capable of admitting
or undergo
them, (c) others because they are capable of making
or
undergo them, (e)
ing them, (d) others because they do make
others because they are losings or gainings, possessions or priva
tions of them; (7) since One and Being are used in many senses,
it necessarily follows that the same must be true of what is used
'
so that each
in reference to them, as 'same,'
other,'contrary;
of these must be different for each category."
(Metaph., iv, 10).
Cf.
Opposites.
(ovala) is meant?
By Essence
"
The
simple bodies, as fire, earth, water, and the like, and,
(1)
and their compounds?animals,
bodies
demons, and the
generally,
of
these.
parts
41
is the cause of being, because immanent in such
(2) Whatever
as
are
not
of a subject; etg., the soul is the
predicated
things
essence of the living thing.
"
immanent parts of such things which define them
(3) Those
and mark them as individuals, and whose removal removes the
For example, as some say, the solid (body) is the essence
of the surface, and the surface of the line. And, indeed, number
some to be an essence in this sense.
generally is held by
whole.

Aristotle's
245
Metaphysics.
The self-realizing end, the concept of which is the defini

and
this is called the essence of the individual.
tion,
"
is used in two senses (a) as the
It thus appears that essence
not
is
ultimate substratum, which
predicated of anything else, and
as
that which is individual and separable, such as are the form
(b)
"(4)
and species of the particular."

Eternal
(a/S?x>).?Synonyms
mutable
(ccklvvtos), Separable
(Metaph., iv, 8.)

of this word are Immovable, Im
or Separate
(^copioTo^), Ungen
erated
and
Indissoluble
(ayevrjros),
(acfrOapros). Aristotle distin
are purely
two
kinds
of
eternal
guishes
things: (1) Those which
intellectual (vorjrd) and which are entirely independent of time;
(2) those which are sensible (alo-drjrd) and whose action measures
as the Sempiternal
and the
They might be distinguished
to
it
all intellects
To the former belongs God, and
Everlasting.
tend ; to the latter belong the stars or movers of the different
time.
heavens, whose number he estimates at 47 (see chapter viii).

God does not move, though he is the cause of all motion ; the stars
move, but with a perfectly changeless motion, which the circular
Though these may be said to. have matter, it is different from

other matter, being subject to no change save locomotion
(irodev irol), which, when perfectly uniform, may be called change
less. The opposite of eternal is, of course, Transient
(klvt)t6s).
terms may be con
Form and Matter
(eZSo? kcli vXtj).?These
sidered together, since they are, for the most part, correlatives.
is.
all
never exists without
Matter
never
exists
without
matter.
form, and,
Indeed,
in sensible
matter,
taken
things, form
as
whole,
potentially all forms (except one, as we shall see), al

of them may be
in
any particular case only a minimum
though
At the same time it is not true that every portion of
actualized.
matter contains every form. Aristotle
is so well aware of the
contains
qualitative difference between matter and matter that he makes

matter the principle of individuation.
(See chapter iii, ad fin.
is
Form
the principle of all the
Cf. Dante, Parad.,
i, 109, sgq.).
one
It is
material
distinguish
phenomena*hat
thing from another.
says :
actuality and, therefore, something divine. Thomas Aquinas
"Forma nihil aliud est quam divina similitudo participate in re
bus."
(Contra Gent., i, 3, 97.) Matter is the same thing, only in
Thus matter is related to form as potentiality to
potentiality.
own forms, but must wait
actuality. Matter cannot actualize its

246

of some essence
This, in the
already actualized.
but when he has actual
first instance, is God, the Prime Mover;
"
others like it.
Man be
ized one such essence, it can actualize
furnishes
doctrine
This
Aristotle
with
his
chief
man."
argu
gets
ment for the existence of a Prime Mover
in complete actuality,
The doctrine that
and supports the dogma of the Incarnation.
forms are originally immanent in matter, and inseparable from it,
is diametrically opposed to that of Plato, as Aristotle well knows.
for the action
holds that unindividualized

forms have a separate existence,
are
This
and
imparted to matter, like external spirits, by God.
view Aristotle vigorously combats, except in the case of one form
Plato
?namely,
external
the intellect (V0O9),which
to matter.
he admits
It
to be altogether
to say that
is needless
(See Intellect.)
are ungenerated.
both Form and Matter
(See Generation.)
For a clear discussion of Form and Matter, see Knauer, Grund
linien der aristotelisch-thomistischen
Philosophic
(Wien, 1885).
Aristotle's
Curiously
enough, Zeller has entirely misunderstood
so
to
wTith
doctrine
them, and
regard
quite gratuitously charged
him wTith self-contradiction.
(Philos. der Griechen, Bd. iii, S. 802,
sq.). There is not the shadow of truth in the assertion that Aris
"
totle
places form and matter, as originally different, in opposi
tion to each other, without deriving them from a common ground ;
in more nearly determining these two principles he involves him
self in a contradiction by maintaining, on the one hand, that form
is the essence and substance (!!) of things, and, on the other, that
it is at the same time a universal, while the ground of the particu
lar, and therefore also of substantiality, must lie in the matter."

It is sufficient to say that all forms are potentially immanent in
matter from its origin.
It is from matter that the Prime Mover
educes them.
(Compare Genesis, i.)
or Generated
Generable,
Generation,
(yeveais^ yevnros), and
are
and Dissoluble
their contraries, Dissolution
((f>0opd,fydapros),
applied to those things whose forms may pass from potentiality to
Teveais never means
actuality and from actuality to potentiality.
never means Annihilation.
These are processes
Creation,
<j>dopd
of which Aristotle knows nothing.
Form and Matter being eter
the opposite. The
isEvolution, all Dissolution
nal, all Generation
terms Ungenerated
and Indissoluble
(ayivnros, a<f)0apTo<$) are ap
to
Generation
and Dissolution,
which
underlie
those
things
plied

Aristotle's
Metaphysics.
247
viz.:
These cannot be gener

(1) Matter, (2) Form, (3) Intellect.
If it be asked
ated, because they are the conditions of Generation.
in what relation the Intellect stands to Form and Matter, we may
fairly answer that it is the source of both, though not in a tem
Inasmuch as matter cannot exist without a certain
poral sense.
minimum of actualized form, and all actuality is due to the Intel

lect or Prime Mover, this conclusion follows directly.
(See Dante,
xxix, 16, sqq.) Matter and Form are dependent, and de
Parad.,
termined from without;
Intellect alone is self-determined (^copta
If
it
be
asked
whether
Intellect could annihilate Form and
T09).
And the reason is that Intel
Matter, the answer must be, No.
lect, being essentially in actuality (ivepyela), by that very fact holds

them in being. Aristotle, as is well known, held the world to be
eternal.
See the subtle way in which Thomas
tries to
Aquinas
reconcile- thiswith the Christian view of a creation in time.
(Sum.
Theol., i, 46, 1.)
or Intelligence,
Intellect
Intelligible
Intellective^
(vovs,
"
"
discuss
the
Intellect
of Aristotle,
vorjriKos, vorjTos).?To
fully
which carries us into the deepest deeps of his
thought, would re
quire a volume, and, indeed, more than one volume have been writ
ten on it. Only the barest and most necessary
explanation can be
given here.
In the universe things exist in two conditions?one

potential
(Bvvdfiec), the other actual (ivepyela). As potential, they are mat
ter (v\rj); as actual, they are form
can ever be
(elSos). Nothing
or
material
but
be
;
purely potential
things may
purely actual.
This is the case with the Supreme Intellect, the Prime Mover. He
is essentially actual and Act, and it is his Act that holds the uni
verse in being (see chap, vii, ix roLavrrj^
r\pTr)Tai6 ovpavos
fcal f) <f)VtTLs).His Intellect is the Form of forms
(eZSo? et&wz/),the
Form which combines into a unitv all other forms, and makes them
a system.
It is God, in whom all forms are actual, and who is
therefore
Separate
But what
or
Independent
or Self-determining
in God
(xcopia
is more or less potential in the

to?).
world ; and the Act of God utters itself in
raising what is poten
tial to actuality.
It does so as a beloved object acts upon a lover
(see chap. vii). This process, which, as such, takes place in the
potential, isMotion
(q. v.), which is always a mark of imperfec
tion. The forms which exist
potentially in matter are actualized,
is actual

248
The Journal of SpeculativePhilosophy.
first into the forms of sense, then into the forms of fancy, and
finally, itmay be, into pure forms. The first are still confined to
particular kinds of matter ; the second to matter in general, and
the third are independent of matter {^opvara).
This independ
ence must not to be taken, in any Platonic
sense, to mean that
means
to
matter.
stand
forms
unrelated
It
pure
only that they
stand in a relation of pure activity (excluding passivity) to it?a
relation of freedom and self-determination. This is a cardinal doc
So long as forms are not completely actual
trine with Aristotle.
are still liable to re
in their purity?they
ized?that
is, actualized
as
we see in the case of plants and animals
vert to potentiality,
in
and
which
live
fancies
memories," Bk. i, 1). No sooner, how
(u
so actualized
than they are a self-determin

Si
De
avrov,
An., iii, 4). This is the way
ing Intelligence
(ivepyel
in which the lower intelligences come into actuality.
So long as
forms are in either of the lower stages of actuality, they ?an pass
from matter to matter, so to speak, and this explains the genera
tion of the animal soul. But the fully actualized form, the Intel
lect, being no longer bound to matter, cannot be so transmitted.
Hence
every intellect owes its actuality directly to the Prime
Mover, and therefore, as actual, is rightly said to come from with
out (\ L7TTai rbv vovv aovov Ovpadev iireicnevai, De Gen. An., ii, 3).
Before it is actual, it is not at all (pi8ev io-riv ivepyeca rcov ovrcov
reason that its
being isAct, im
irp\v voeiv,De An., iii, 4), for the
manent act, not transient activity, which is a very different thing.
an intellect is first actualized, as such, when it "
When
energizes
It can, indeed,
through itself," it is still in a sense potential.
"
think itself," which is what is meant by self-determination, but
it does so only formally, abstractly, ideally. The forms whose ac
tualized unity compose it have still to be filled, through actual ex
ever, do they become
perience, with the fullness which belongs to them.. This experi

ence it gains, not through passivity
(irdaxecv) but through action
"
"
in
becomes
which
it
individual
(eKaara, De
{evepyelv),
things
An.,*\\\, 4), that is, descends more and more into the actual es
sences {ovalai) which are implicit in its universal forms. Such an
"
intellect
when separated, is only that which is and this alone is
immortal and eternal. And we have no memory, because this is
impassive, whereas the passive (i. e., sensitive) intellect is dissolu
In
ble, and without this thinks nothing" (De An., iii, 5 ad fin.).

Aristotle's
249
Metaphysics.
other words, the imperfect which moves and is sensible (see Sense)
is cognized by an intellect which moves and is sensitive, whereas
the eternal and immovable, of which there can be no memory, is
we may say, the eter
cognized by something that is eternal; or,
"
that which is."
nal cognizes itself, and this self-cognition is
:
this passage
Dante has paraphrased
"
By reason that, approaching its desire,

Our intellect so dives into itself
That
after
it the memory
cannot
go."
Parad.,
i, 7, sqq.
thus see why Aristotle holds the divine energy to be a

of
thinking
thinking, and the highest life to consist in the vision
divine
of
things (Oecopla, see chap. vii).
Motion or Movement
(tclvrjais;).?To explain all that is meant
this
word
would
Space permits only
by
require a small volume.
a bare outline. Motion,
in its most general sense, is the action
We
can
as such.
Such action is in
(ivepyeia, ivreXexeia) of the potential,
to
is
and
what
incomplete. All motion
belongs
complete (areXr)*;),
a
from
expresses
potentiality and incompleteness,
tendency away
to actuality and completeness.
It implies two things: (1) an actual
is always an individ
by which the motion is aroused, and which
ual and complete (reXeiov) ; (2) a potential which, as such, is capa

The former puts forth an act (ivepyeca),
ble of being actualized.
which results as motion in the latter. The potential and imper
fect by itself is incapable of action, and can only be roused to im
It follows that the mover
perfect action (/elvno-is)by an actual.
(to klvovv kcll to klvov/jlvov) can never be one being;

in other words, that nothing can move itself, except accidentally,
as a rower rows himself in a boat.
It follows, further, that the
cannot
Prime Mover
be inmotion. The power
(to irpwrov klvovv)
to exert energy and cause motion is the mark of the perfect being.
A condition of all motion is contact between the mover and the
and the moved
Even
the Prime Mover
is in contact with the world.
That which moves may be regarded as form (eZSo?), that which is
moved as matter (v\rj); and, since the two are eternal (alSia) and
in contact, motion is eternal. Hence
the world is eternal. Motion
are
the characteristics of the physical, just as immobility
and rest
moved.

250
In enumerating
of the metaphysical.
the kinds
is not always consistent with himself.
Some
times he makes motion synonymous with change (jierafioXr)), some
is characteristic
of motion, Aristotle
times he gives the latter the wider signification.

In the former
case he admits four kinds ofmotion : (1) essential (rj /car ovalav or
Kara to
(rj KaTa
t/), origination and destruction ; (2) quantitative
to ueyeOos or to
and
diminution
; (3) qualitative
iroaov), increase
rj KaTa to ttclQos or to ttoiov), transmutation ; (4) local (rj KaTa tov)
tottov or to ttov), locomotion.
In the latter case he omits the first
of these, and calls it change, of which he admits three kinds : (1)
from an existent to an existent, (2) from an existent to a non-ex
existent, (3) from a non-existent to an existent (viro/celuevov). The
primitive form of motion is the local, from which all the others,
The perfect local
except, to some extent, the first, are derivative.
motion is the circular, because it is uniform and complete, that is,
it returns upon itself. We might sum up Aristotle's
view of mo
tion thus : All movement is evolution.
"
in its primal and proper signification, is the
Nature
essence of things which have in themselves a principle of move
is called nature, be
ment, as being what they are. The material
cause it is receptive of this essence, while developments and growth
are so called because they are movements proceeding from it. And
in all natural products, being
this is the principle of movement
somehow immanent in them, either potentially or actually (ivT of
\e;?e/a) (Metap., iv, 4). Aristotle distinguishes five meanings
: (1) the development of things that grow (</>0<m) ; (2) the
first immanent matter out of which that which grows grows ; (3)
cause in any individual product of nature, in so
the firstmoving
nature
far as
it is ; (4) that first something out of which any

nature
is
of
made, and which is incapable of being shaped
product
or changed by any power of its own ; (5) the essence of natural
it is what
(Ibid.)
products."
"
mean : (1) Contradiction
Opposites
(avTuceiueva) is used to
(avTfyaais), (2) contraries (ivavTta), (3) correlatives (tcl 7to6? ),
(o-Teprjo-isical ?^9), (5) the ultimate
(4) privation and possession
From-what and To-what of certain processes?e.
g., generation and
a subject capable of
(6) things that cannot coexist in
are
said to be opposites,
Not
these
either
itself.
only
by
admitting
and gray cannot
but also the things from which they are. White
dissolution,

251
coexist in the same thing, hence the things from which they are
are opposites."
(Metaph., iv [J], 10.)
6
Authority
Principle,
Beginning,
principle,'
(apxv)*?" By
set
etc., ismeant (1) that part of a thing from which one would
out to move along it. . . . (2) That from which any particular
in the case of learning, for example,
thing can best arise. Even
we have sometimes to begin, not with what is first and with the
of the subject, but with that from which we can most

easily acquire knowledge.
(3) The internal groundwork upon
which anything is built up?e. g., the keel of a ship. ...
(4)
That external source from which a thing first derives its origin,
beginning
and change naturally first begin.

Father
stand in this relation to their child, and so does insult
and from which motion
and mother
to battle.
(5) That according to whose choice the things that
move move, and the things that change change?as,
for example,
...
a
in states the authorities (dpxat).
(6) That from which
thing
.
.
.
for example, the presuppositions
is first known
upon which
'
The term cause5 is used in all the
demonstrations are based.
above significations; for all causes are principles.
The common
element in all principles is that they are the first source fromwhich
or is known.
Some of them are internal,
anything is, becomes,
nature is a principle, and so are element,
others external. Hence
In many cases, indeed, the

thought, choice, essence, and aim.
are
the principles of knowing and mov
Good and the Beautiful
ing." {Metaph., iv [J], 1.)

Sense
or
Sensation,
Sensitive,
Sensible
(atad-qo-is,
alcrdriTL/cos,
stands opposed to Intellect, as the Transient

alo-0rjr6<s).?Sense
It is conversant with what is in motion or
does to the Eternal.
is
itself
and
And,
essentially movable and changeable.
change,
so
as
is
active
Sense
Intellect
essentially
(iroirjTucos, ivepyela),
just
to the sensible.
is essentially passive (iraQy)Tiicr),hwafxei)?passive
sensation consists of particulars, not particular things (ovalaC),
but particular affections. These are felt by different organs, and
All
meet in a common Sensorium (alaOrjrriptov), where, to use a mod

u
ern expression, they form a
This cluster Aristotle calls
cluster."
once the passive or possible Intellect (vovs 7ra0T)Tifc6$,vovs Swdfjuei),
"
u
by
separated
meaning that it is that which, when actualized and
the act of the Divine
Intellect, becomes an intellect proper (1/0O9
"
"
thinks nothing
ivepyeia). Until this takes place, the intellect

252
which it can rise

is, knows no universal?by
(ovhev voel)?that
above time and place.
to
the
limits of Sense, see chap, x,
(As
third paragraph from the end.)
as inves
Theory (0 (opla)h used in two senses by Aristotle:
(1)
tigation, inquiry, in which case it is always followed by a limiting
Cf.
genitive or its equivalent
(rj irepl rfjs akw6elas Oeapla, etc.).
127
Elementa
;
Bonitz, Metaph.
ii,
Log. Aristot.,
Trendelenburg,
p. 82 ; (2) in its literal sense, as the vision of divine things (to
It
opav to, Oela, Alex.), and then has no limiting word or words.
is used in this sense in chap, vii of this book, and inEth. JVicom.,
x, 8, and in both cases is identified with the supreme happiness.
That Aristotle held this happiness to consist in the contemplation
of essences, there can be no doubt.
It is somewhat difficult to say
which meaning
it bears in the opening words of this book, and I
in
that,
rendering it as I have done,-1 am departing from the
of
I think the context
Bonitz, Schwegler, and others.
opinion
version.
justifies my
6
Universal
(to /caOoXov).?" I mean by universal' that which is
capable of being predicated of more than one; by particular
man is a universal; Callias, a
that which is not?e.g.,
particular"
know
toAristotle, universals have no sepa

(De Interp., vi). According
are
rate existence;
they
always combined with matter and par
ticularized by it. Only first essences have a separate existence,
universals
(genera and
species) are second essences
(hevrepai
ovalai, Categ., v). God, of course, is the farthest of all beings

from being universal, as well as from being particular
(tcaO*
eica<TTov). He is the source of both universality and particularity.
Zeller (Die Philosophic
der Griechen, Bd. iii, S. 309, sqq., 802,
me
seems
to
to
have
sqq.)
entirely misunderstood Aristotle's doc
trine of the relation of the universal to the particular, when he
thinks that Aristotle contradicts himself in maintaining
that all
actual existence is particular, and yet all knowledge of the univer
sal. The statements are entirely compatible, and, indeed, are both
true. The universal, as universal?that
is, as something capable
of being predicated of many particulars?exists

only in the mind,
and is by it used as a means of knowing.
it
Outside
the mind
it is an object of knowing.
exists only as particular, as which
There is no contradiction in saying that particulars are known by
a means which is universal, that the quo cognoscimus differs from

The Religion of theOld Testament
253
Of course, Aristotle
holds that the first
the quod eognoscimus.
us
in
first
nature
to
is the universal, while the
(and last known to
us) is the particular, which is aireipov.
THE KELIGION
OF THE
TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN OF G. W.
OLD
F. HEGEL'S
TESTAMENT.
" PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION " BY

J.
MACBRIDE STERRETT.*
The Religion of Sublimity.

this religion has in common with
That is, the subjec
the religion of the Beautiful [that of Greece].
tion of the merely natural to the spiritual. Mere nature is ideal
ized, deprived of itsmerely quantitative or external valuation, and
considered the rather as plastic material for the divine artificer or
There
is one element which
In both these religions God is known as free Spirit, as Spirit

artist.
In the religion of the Beau
with rational and ethical attributes.
not
does
God
appear in full independent absolute
tiful, however,
as
is
manifested
He
Being.
having definite limited content. The
is made, in which
beautiful, in which this divine manifestation
the ethical and spiritual attributes of the Divine
appear, is that
of sensuous material and form. At most, the plane on which this
manifestation ismade is that of pictorial thought, of imagination,
and fantasy. The idealization of the natural is thus not yet com
This can only take place where the ground of the Divine
plete.
revelation is spiritual thought.
The delightful, friendly forms of the Greek deities lacked that

absolute and independent character which is essential to the eter
nal Divine
existence.
Religion must rise to sublimer conceptions.
These specialized forms of the Divine must be seen to be phases
of the One Divine
life. An absolute spiritual unity is the ulti
matum
for thought. This the Greeks did not reach, but the Jews
Such a unity, too, must be fully concrete, containing all
did.
particular ethical and spiritual forms in itself. It is only thus
* The
abstruse
17
translator
technique
frequently resorts to paraphrasing

of the original.
in order to avoid

the continuous

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ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

Author(s): THOMAS DAVIDSON

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Mon, 12 Aug 2013 10:48:03 AM

A TRANSLATION OF THE ELEVENTH BOOK, BY THOMAS DAVIDSON.

forms a treatise by itself,

In the following translation, which

tary, which will necessarily be very extensive, I have added, for

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no one of the other categories

is separable [or inde

For genera are universals, and these they hold to

The third, differing from the other two, is immutable and

opposites indiscriminately (for sound is not-white), but between

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contrariety, for the contraries

If, as we have maintained,

there are four^sorts of changes?in

Everything that changes has matter, though all things

One might be in doubt about what sort of non-being it is from

two of them form

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must next show that neither form nor matter

show that every essence is generated by an

tact and not by concretion are matter and substance;

house except that due to art. Nor is there any generation or de

products, since indeed it is clear that

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Mon, 12 Aug 2013 10:48:03 AM

In the case of certain forms

In one respect different things have different causes and

it would be strange if all had the same; for then

None of them, therefore, can be either an essence or a relation, and

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Mon, 12 Aug 2013 10:48:03 AM

and in this way

source of motion, is different for

the criterion of separateness and inseparateness,

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and potence is different in the case of things whose matter is not

Again, we must see that some things must be called universal,

in general, to be sure, is the principle of

are forms. But, as ha^ been said, different

not, indeed, in species, but because of their individuality?0.

vious that, if we consider the different significations in which the

same," I mean by analogy : matter, form, privation, motor, and,

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Since there are, as we have seen, three essences?two

exists only in potence may conceivably not be. It fol

lows from all

to act] begin, unless

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of a house does not move itself, but has to wait for

is the primal motion ?

quent to, and coeval with, the heavens.

assume the eternity of motion.

something e4se; in other words, therefore, either in reference to a

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then seek for any other principles

Since, now, this is a possible explanation, and there is no other

This result becomes plain not only

imparts motion is a middle [something], it

the beautiful and the self-eligible are in the same

This content downloaded from 168.176.5.118 on Mon, 12 Aug 2013 10:48:03 AM

entity, being in act, this cannot in