UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

______________________________
)
NEWRIVER, INC., )
Plaintiff )
)
v. ) CIVIL ACTION
) NO. 06-12146-WGY
NEWKIRK PRODUCTS, INC., )
Defendant )
)

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
AND ORDER

YOUNG, D.J. December 16, 2009

“The forms of action we have buried,” wrote

the great legal historian Frederick W.
Maitland. “But,” he added, “they still rule
us from their graves.”1

This case illustrates that, despite the unequivocal command of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2 that “there is one form of action

- the civil action,” there is, for good or ill, another - the

patent case.

I. INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The plaintiff NewRiver, Inc. (“NewRiver”) brought a patent

infringement and breach of contract action against the defendant

Newkirk Products, Inc. (“Newkirk”). NewRiver is the owner and

1
As quoted by Hon. Hiller B. Zobel, Reflections of the
Justices 24 (2009).

1
assignee of the United States Patent No. 6,122,635 (the “‘635

Patent”) for the Mapping Compliance Information Useable Format.

The invention pertains to a computer-assisted method for

manipulating securities information in the United States

Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) Electronic Data

Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system (“EDGAR”) database to

extract only certain information, such as mutual fund prospecti.

See ‘635 Patent col.1 l.6-12 (filed Feb. 13, 1998).

On April 7, 2009, the jury returned a verdict finding that

Newkirk infringed claims 9-11, that its infringement was not

willful, but that certain of the claims in suit, specifically

including the crucial claims 9-11 which had been found infringed,

‘635 Patent claims 1, 3-5, and 8-11, were invalid as obvious.

Jury Verdict (Doc. No. 301). In addition, the jury found that

Newkirk did not breach its contract with NewRiver. Id.

On April 22, 2009, Newkirk, having achieved a clean sweep

with the jury but apparently enamored of a true belt and

suspenders approach, filed a renewed motion for judgment as

matter of law that it did not infringe ‘635 patent claims 9-11

(Doc. No. 305), and filed a motion for judgment as matter of law

that ‘635 patent claims 6, 13-15, and 19-21 are invalid (Doc. No.

308). On April 23, 2009, NewRiver filed three motions: 1) a

motion for judgment as matter of law that ‘635 patent claims 9-11

are valid and not obvious (Doc. No. 312); 2) a motion for

judgment as matter of law that Newkirk infringes ‘635 patent

2
claims 13-15 and 19-21 (Doc. No. 315); and 3) a motion for a new

trial. (Doc. No. 317).

II. BACKGROUND

The ‘635 patent was issued to NewRiver’s predecessor,

InUnity Corp., on September 19, 2000. ‘635 Patent, at [45]

(filed February 13, 1998). The ‘635 patent is a system for

providing access to compliance information acquired from

securities database sources. Id. at [57]. According to the ‘635

patent, compliance information for a mutual fund can include, but

is not limited to, mutual fund prospecti and their supplements,

statements of additional information and their supplements,

annual and semi-annual reports, as well as certain sales and

marketing information. ‘635 Patent col.3 l.2-13.

The patented system extracts compliance information, e.g., a

mutual fund prospectus, from the specific fund, and provides

access through a subsystem to a computer-readable file of the

extracted compliance information. ‘635 Patent, at [57]. The

patented system performs a series of functions. It acquires data

from documents in the database associated with a particular fund

company using a code called a “central index key” (matching funds

to a particular stock ticker or Committee on Uniform Security

Identification Procedures (“CUSIP”) identifier). ‘635 Patent

col.11 l.20-25. The patented system searches the data to

identify and extract compliance information. ‘635 Patent col.11

3
l.27-32. It also determines the operative or “effective” date of

the compliance information and whether it supersedes older

compliance information. ‘635 Patent col.11 l.35-41. The

patented system catalogs the compliance information it has

extracted. ‘635 Patent col.11 l.60-66. The patented system

stores the processed compliance information and makes the

compliance information accessible to users via a network

connection. ‘635 Patent col.13 l.4-10.

Patentee NewRiver alleges that the two parties entered into

a binding contract on January 31, 2001 for NewRiver to provide

certain electronic securities information obtainment and delivery

services. Compl. ¶¶ 6-8 (Doc. No. 1). NewRiver further alleges

that since the contract’s termination, Newkirk has breached the

contract provisions and infringed the ‘635 patent through selling

products and services to third parties that generate filings from

the SEC EDGAR database in violation of the ‘635 patent. Compl.

¶¶ 9-10, 17. Newkirk offers a service called Newkirk Fund

Central which “facilitates access to information filed with the

SEC” but otherwise denies that it infringes NewRiver’s ‘635

patent. Answer ¶ 17 (Doc. No. 11). Newkirk raised affirmative

defenses including non-infringement and invalidity.

III. ANALYSIS

4
 A. Judgment As Matter of Law

The evidence required to sustain a jury verdict is “such

relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate

to support a conclusion.” Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland,

Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

A party requesting judgment as matter of law “must show that

substantial evidence did not support the jury’s findings, where

substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence from the record

taken as a whole as might be accepted by a reasonable mind as

adequate to support the finding under review.’” Koito

Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. Turn-Key-Tech, LLC, 381 F.3d 1142,

1149 (Fed Cir. 2004) (quoting Texas Instruments Inc. v. Cypress

Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).

“Substantial evidence is ‘more than a mere scintilla’ and is

‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as

adequate to support a conclusion.’” Monolithic Power Systems,

Inc. v. O2 Micro Intern. Ltd., 558 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir.

2009) (quoting z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 507 F.3d

1340, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2007)). “The Court must also consider all

the evidence before the jury and draw all reasonable inferences

from the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing

party on that issue, i.e., the non-movant.” Koito, 381 F.3d at

1149.

Theoretically, each of the cases cited above ought stand for

5
the same proposition. In practice, they may not, though the

distinction is subtle and unacknowledged. The distinction

appears to have crept in since the Federal Circuit has concluded

that general and conclusory testimony “does not suffice as

substantial evidence of invalidity.” Koito, 381 F.3d at 1152.

B. Infringement of Claims 13-15 & 19-21

1. Standard for Infringement

Infringement analysis requires two steps. First, the court

must construe the claims to determine their scope and meaning.

Markman v. Westview Instr., Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 976, aff’d, 517

U.S. 370 (1996). “It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that

‘the claims of a patent define the invention to which the

patentee is entitled the right to exclude.’” Phillips v. AWH

Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Innova/Pure

Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Systems, Inc., 381 F.3d

1111, 1115 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). This Court construed the ‘635

patent claims in related litigation and issued its Markman Order

on March 21, 2007. NewRiver, Inc. v. Mobular Technologies, Inc.,

478 F. Supp. 2d 158, 162-64 (D. Mass. 2007). On May 28, 2008,

the Court ruled that its March 21, 2007 NewRiver v. Mobular claim

construction would govern. “Once a district court has construed

the relevant claim terms, and unless altered by the district

court, then that legal determination governs for purposes of

trial.” Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 575 F.3d 1312,

6
1321 (Fed. Cir. 2009).

Next, the analysis compares the properly construed claims to

the accused product or process to assess whether each of the

claim limitations is met, either literally or equivalently, in

the alleged infringing invention. CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick

Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Patents may be

infringed either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents.

Carnegie Mellon University v. Hoffmann-La Roche Inc., 541 F.3d

1115, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2008). NewRiver’s expert testimony fell

short of the evidentiary requirements for proof of infringement

under the doctrine of equivalents and the Court thus removed the

doctrine of equivalents from the jury’s consideration. Compare

this case with Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 581 F.

Supp. 2d 160, 205 (D. Mass. 2008), where this Court followed

precisely the same procedure for precisely the same reason. The

Federal Circuit approved.2 Thus, in this case, the jury only

2
As the Federal Circuit held:

[T]he district court excluded . . . proffered expert

testimony on equivalents because it lacked a limitation-
by-limitation comparison.

. . . .

To support a finding of infringement under [the

doctrine of equivalents, the patent holder] must have
presented, on a limitation-by-limitation basis,
“particularized testimony and linking argument as to the
‘insubstantiality of the differences’ between [the
devices] . . . with respect to the function, way, result
test.” Texas Instruments v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp.,
90 F.3d 1558, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1996). “[E]vidence and

7
considered literal infringement and found challenger Newkirk

infringed on ‘635 Patent claims 9-11, albeit not willfully.

2. The Jury’s Verdict of Non-Infringement of ‘635

Patent Claims 13-15 and 19-21 is Supported by
Substantial Evidence

NewRiver moved for judgment as matter of law that Newkirk

infringes ‘635 patent claims 13-15 and 19-21. The limitations in

claims 13-15 are related to NewRiver’s computer-readable data

storage device comprising computer executable instructions which

assist a human operator in performing a series of steps including

identifying a subset of recently submitted filing documents and

extracting compliance information from the EDGAR database.

Claim 13 recites:

A computer-readable data storage device comprising

computer executable instructions for execution on a
computer to cause the computer to aid an operator in

argument on the doctrine of equivalents cannot merely be

subsumed in plaintiff’s case of literal infringement.”
Lear Siegler, Inc. v. Sealy Mattress Co., 873 F.2d 1422,
1425 (Fed. Cir. 1989); see also Texas Instruments, 90
F.3d at 1567 (“Generalized testimony as to the overall
similarity between the claims and the accused infringer’s
product or process will not suffice.”). But see Paice
LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“Our ‘particularized testimony’ standard does not
require [the expert] to re-start his testimony at square
one when transitioning to a doctrine of equivalents
analysis.”). These requirements “ensure that a jury is
provided with the proper evidentiary foundation from
which it may permissibly conclude that a claim limitation
has been met by an equivalent.” Comark Communications,
Inc. v. Harris Corp., 156 F.3d 1182, 1188 (Fed. Cir.
1998).

Amgen Inc. v. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1382 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).

8
 performing the steps of:

identifying a subset of filing documents that were

recently added to a regulatory filing document database;
searching each of the subset of documents for compliance
information; recording document identifiers for any of
the subset of documents containing the compliance
information; extracting the compliance information from
each of the subset of documents containing the compliance
information by (i) marking the lines of text in the
document containing the compliance information,(ii)
identifying a start line and an end line of the
compliance information, and (iii) copying the compliance
information starting at the start line and ending at the
end line; and storing the extracted compliance
information.

Newkirk presented evidence that its system does not

literally meet each of the claim limitations. There is

undisputed testimony that compliance information in the Newkirk

system resides in the system’s random access memory (“RAM”) on a

temporary basis. Trial Tr. vol. 7, 837:10-18, 845:11-15,

899:24-900:5, 901:9-15, Mar. 24, 2009; Trial Tr. vol. 8,

978:23-979:25, Mar. 25, 2009. This RAM is not accessible to

other computers and the information residing in Newkirk system’s

RAM is lost when new information is brought in, the browser is

closed, the computer is turned off, or power is interrupted.

Trial Tr. vol. 7, 838:11-18, 901:9-15, Mar. 24, 2009; Trial Tr.

vol. 8, 940:3-8, Mar. 25, 2009. NewRiver nonetheless contends

that this temporary depositing of information into RAM

constitutes storage and thus meets the “storing the extracted

compliance information” limitation of claim 13.

Challenger Newkirk provided expert testimony, however, that

9
would support a jury finding that its system does not store

compliance information. Dr. Szymanski, Newkirk’s expert witness,

testified that the system does not perform the storing limitation

because putting information in RAM does not constitute “storing.”

Trial Tr. vol. 8, 978:23-979:25, Mar. 25, 2009. Dr. Szymanski

further testified that Newkirk’s system does not infringe on

NewRiver’s claims because its system’s Segment Analyzer does not

extract compliance information from EDGAR as provided by the

extracting limitation of claim 13. Id. at 973:9-15.

The Court is not to evaluate whether or not it might have

reached a conclusion contrary to that of the jurors, but rather

to focus on whether the outcome is against the clear weight of

the evidence such that upholding the verdict would result in a

miscarriage of justice. Conway v. Electro Switch Corp., 825 F.2d

593, 598-99 (1st Cir. 1987). Under this standard, Newkirk’s

evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion that it

did not infringe on claims 13-15 and 19-21 and NewRiver’s motion

to rule to the contrary is denied.

3. The Jury Verdict of Infringement of the‘635 Patent

Claims 9-11 is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Newkirk asserts that no reasonable jury could conclude that

it infringes claims 9-11, either literally or under the doctrine

of equivalents. Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding

that Newkirk infringes claims 9-11. Newkirk’s own witnesses and

documents acknowledge that Newkirk provides users with access to

10
prospecti and other items of compliance information obtained from

the SEC database. Newkirk’s own expert conceded that Newkirk’s

system: (1) sends a user Newkirk software and data over the

Internet, (2) derives the desired compliance information from the

raw EDGAR filing on the user computer using Newkirk software, and

(3) displays the derived compliance information to the user.

Trial Tr. vol. 8, 987-992, Mar. 25, 2009. Newkirk’s own

promotional materials advertise its ability to extract compliance

information from the SEC, providing circumstantial evidence

supporting a finding of infringement of the disputed claim

limitations. Further, NewRiver submitted expert testimony that

indicated how Newkirk’s system infringes each of the disputed

claim limitations. Trial Tr. vol. 7, 790-797, Mar. 24, 2009.

The evidence on record is sufficient to maintain the jury’s

verdict that claims 9-11 were infringed. Liquid Dynamics Corp.

v. Vaughan Co., Inc., 449 F.3d 1209, 1220 (Fed. Cir. 2006)

(affirming trial court’s denial of defendant’s JMOL of

non-infringement where “the jury could have reasonably inferred

from the evidence submitted that each of the tanks infringed the

claims”). Circumstantial evidence from defendant’s own

promotional materials also supports the jury’s verdict. Snuba

International, Inc. v. Dolphin World, Inc., No. 99-1357, 2000 WL

961363, at *5-6 (Fed. Cir. July 11, 2000) (given circumstantial

evidence which included statements from defendant’s own

promotional materials, court held reasonable jury could find

11
infringement).

Newkirk’s motion for a required finding of non-infringement

is therefore denied.

C. Invalidity

1. Standard for Invalidity Based on Obviousness

A patent may be invalidated for obviousness under 35 U.S.C.

§ 103.3 In Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1,

17-18 (1966), the Supreme Court established the framework for

determining obviousness under the section 103 analysis. The

Court conducts the following analysis to determine invalidity

under section 103: 1) it determines the scope and content of the

prior art; 2) ascertains the differences between the prior art

and the claims at issue; 3) assesses the level of ordinary skill

in the pertinent art; and 4) determines whether a person with the

ordinary skill in the pertinent art would have found the patent

obvious in context of the prior art references. KSR

International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406-07 (2007).

The Federal Circuit utilizes the “teaching, suggestion, or

motivation” (“TSM”) test to streamline analysis of patent

3
35 U.S.C. § 103 provides:

A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not

identically disclosed or described as set forth in
section 102 of this title, if the differences between the
subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art
are such that the subject matter as a whole would have
been obvious at the time the invention was made to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.

12
invalidity based on obviousness. Id. at 399. Under the TSM

test, a patent claim is only proven obvious “if the prior art,

the problem’s nature, or the knowledge of a person having

ordinary skill in the art reveals some motivation or suggestion

to combine the prior art teachings.” Id. A patent consisting of

multiple elements is not invalidated as obvious merely because

each of those elements were known individually in prior art. Id.

at 418.

Persons of ordinary skill frequently combine the insights of

previous patents, including uses beyond the patents’ stated or

primary purposes. “If a person of ordinary skill can implement a

predictable variation, § 103 likely bars its patentability.” Id.

at 417. Therefore, a patent claim can be proved obvious by

demonstrating that the combination of elements in the claim would

have been sensible for a person of ordinary skill based on

preexisting prior art. “In determining obviousness, the

invention must be considered as a whole without the benefit of

hindsight, and the claims must be considered in their entirety.”

Rockwell International Corp. v. United States, 147 F.3d 1358,

1364 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

A patent challenger must demonstrate that both independent

and dependent claims are invalid. “Because dependent claims

contain additional limitations, they cannot be presumed to be

invalid as obvious just because the independent claims from which

they depend have properly been so found.” Sandt Technology, Ltd.

13
v. Resco Metal and Plastics Corp., 264 F.3d 1344, 1356 (Fed. Cir.

2001).

2. The Verdict on the Nonobviousness of Claims 6, 13-

15, and 19-21 is Supported by Substantial Evidence

Newkirk moves for judgment as matter of law that ‘635 patent

claims 6, 13-15, and 19-21 are invalid as obvious. Newkirk

asserts that based on the evidentiary record and the prior art no

reasonable jury could conclude that claims 6, 13-15, and 19-21

are valid. The prior art references submitted into evidence at

trial include: NYU Filing Retrieval Toolkit (Heslin Decl., Ex. E,

Trial Ex. 198); LookSmart Document (Heslin Decl., Ex. D, Trial

Ex. 199); Word Perfect Mini-Manual (Heslin Decl., Ex. F, Trial

Ex. 200); Google Book Search (Heslin Decl., Ex. I, Trial Ex.

201); EDGAR Today Article (Heslin Decl., Ex. K, Trial Ex. 202);

Edgar to Word Perfect Wizard (Heslin Decl., Ex. G, Trial Ex.

204); and the ‘635 Patent (Heslin Decl., Ex. H, Trial Ex. 1). In

addition, Newkirk relies primarily on the trial testimony of Dr.

Mark Ginsburg, and its validity expert, Dr. Boleslaw Szymanski.

Newkirk contends that the prior art references and testimony

demonstrate that various entities, including publicly available

sources, offered search tools that provided users the ability to

search within the EDGAR database for specific filings and custom

extraction of the data into word processing formats.

The prior art references teach elements of the disputed

claim limitations. The prior art teaches that methods for

14
searching the EDGAR database were publicly available before the

patented invention. Web users could filter the data on the NYU

index using various criteria including the name of the company,

date range, or the form type, e.g., annual report. Trial Tr.

vol. 2, 81:13-19, Mar. 17, 2009. The testimony of Dr. Ginsburg

combined with the NYU Filing Retrieval Toolkit (Heslin Decl., Ex.

E, Trial Ex. 198) and the EDGAR Today Article (Heslin Decl., Ex.

K, Trial Ex. 202) make clear that users could search the EDGAR

database using a variety of key words or targets including name

of company, date range of filing, and type of form, including

prospectuses. Notably, NYU offered public users the ability to

search exclusively for prospecti. Trial Tr. vol. 2, 83:12-14,

Mar. 17, 2009. Moreover, the prior art references and testimony

demonstrate that users could access specific forms and filings,

including prospecti, via computer communications links, such as

hyperlinks. These links would send users directly to the

specified forms or data within the EDGAR database.

“The scope and content of the prior art are factual

questions to be determined by the jury.” Kinetic Concepts, Inc.

v. Blue Sky Medical Group, Inc., 554 F.3d 1010, 1019 (Fed. Cir.

2009). The jury verdict’s finding of nonobviousness for claims

6, 13-15, and 19-21 is supported by substantial evidence. None

of the prior art references supply the key limitations found in

the disputed claim limitations, namely, none of the prior art

references disclose or practice the extraction, cataloguing, sub-

15
splitting, or determining the effectiveness date of compliance

information from EDGAR. Moreover, none of the witnesses provided

by Newkirk, including Ginsburg and their validity expert,

Szymanski, testified that the prior art disclosed the limitations

of claims 6, 13-15, and 19-21. When he testified about the

invalidity of claims 6, 13-15, and 19-21, although Dr. Szymanski

concluded that in his opinion each of these claims were obvious

in light of prior art for persons of ordinary skill in the art,

he neglected to point to specific prior art references, discuss

how these references differed from the disputed claim limitations

or explicate how the combination of these references would have

rendered the claimed method obvious to a person of ordinary skill

in the art. “[M]ere identification in the prior art of each

element is insufficient to defeat the patentability of the

combined subject matter as a whole.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977,

986 (Fed. Cir. 2006).

Furthermore, the jury’s finding of nonobviousness for claims

6, 13-15, and 19-21 is supported by the secondary considerations.

NewRiver offered sufficient evidence of each aspect of secondary

considerations, especially the long-felt need and commercial

success of the product that embodies the patented invention. See

Trial Tr. vol. 4, 376-79, 395-96, Mar. 18, 2009.

3. The Verdict on the Invalidity of Claims 9-11.

While the jury’s findings of non-obviousness for claims 6,

13-15, and 19-21 are amply supported by the evidentiary record,

16
the invalidity findings for claims 9-11 present a much closer

question. Challenger Newkirk contends that the prior art

references’ scope and content make it apparent that the

limitations of the ‘635 patent claims 9-11 were disclosed or made

obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art.

The ‘635 Patent claims 9-11 center on the creation of an

obtainment subsystem and accessing subsystem for the extraction

and delivery of compliance data from the EDGAR securities

database. Newkirk contends that besides the expert testimony,

the jury verdict is supported by substantial evidence that the

limitations of claims 9-11 are disclosed by NewRiver’s

predecessor product Digital Direct. NewRiver however, presented

evidence that Digital Direct did not disclose the disputed claim

limitations. NewRiver’s witnesses provided undisputed testimony

that Digital Direct included compliance information from its

clients and did not derive such data from EDGAR at all. Trial

Tr. vol. 3, 330:6-11, Mar. 18, 2009.

NewRiver’s argument for judgment as matter of law on the

non-obviousness of claims 9-11 rests primarily on the testimony

of the challenger’s validity expert. The expert testimony

regarding claims 9-11 is sparse in detail. For each of these

claims, Dr. Szymanski merely reads the claim into evidence and

concludes that in his opinion, the claims would have been obvious

to a person skilled in the art. Szymanski’s testimony regarding

claim 9 is particularly illustrative:

17
 Q: Dr. Szymanski, please read claim 9.

A: This is the independent claim. It states: A system

for providing access to mutual fund compliance
information comprising: An obtainment subsystem for
acquiring securities information from one or more
database sources and for extracting compliance
information from at least two documents each comprising
compliance information for a particular mutual fund. And
the second restriction reads: An accessing subsystem for
providing access to extracted compliance information for
at least two mutual funds offered to investors by
different fund issuers of a computer communication link.

Q: Do you have an opinion as to the validity of that

claim?

A: Yes, I do.

Q: And what is your opinion?

A: My opinion that it would be obvious for the person of

ordinary skill in the art, this invention would be
obvious to the person of ordinary skill in the art.

Trial Tr. vol. 3, 217:9-218:2, Mar. 18, 2009.

Dr. Szymanski failed to identify any art that rendered

claims 9-11 obvious, to point out where any of the claims’

limitations are disclosed in the prior art, or to show how the

prior art references in combination would make the claim obvious

to a person of skill in the art at the relevant time. General

and conclusory testimony “does not suffice as substantial

evidence of invalidity.” Koito, 381 F.3d at 1152.

“If, ‘after reviewing all of the evidence in a light most

favorable to the prevailing party, this court is convinced that a

reasonable jury could not have found in that party’s favor, we

must reverse the denial of a motion for judgment as a matter of

18
law.’” The Johns Hopkins University v. Datascope Corp., 543 F.3d

1342, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Akamai Technologies, Inc. v.

Cable & Wireless Internet Servs., Inc., 344 F.3d 1186, 1192 (Fed.

Cir. 2003) (internal citation omitted)). NewKirk’s evidence as

to the obviousness of the claims 9-11 may not surpass the

required threshold.

D. Motion for a New Trial

When considering a motion for a new trial in a patent case,

this Court must follow the First Circuit standards. DePuy Spine,

Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed.

Cir. 2009) (citing Lucent Technologies, Inc. v. Gateway, Inc.,

543 F.3d 710, 717 (Fed. Cir. 2008)) (reviewing decisions on

motions for a new trial under the regional circuit standard).

The district judge “‘cannot displace a jury’s verdict merely

because he disagrees with it or would have found otherwise in a

bench trial.’” Ahern v. Scholz, 85 F.3d 774, 780 (1st Cir. 1996)

(quoting Milone v. Moceri Family, Inc., 847 F.2d 35, 37 (1st Cir.

1988)). A trial judge may set aside a jury verdict “only if he

or she believes that the outcome is against the clear weight of

the evidence such that upholding the verdict will result in a

miscarriage of justice.” Cigna Insurance Co. v. Oy Saunatec,

Ltd., 241 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) (quoting England v. Reinauer

Transp. Cos., 194 F.3d 265, 270) (internal citation omitted).

1. This Court Did Not Err in its Ruling As Matter of

Law That Doctrine of Equivalents Infringement Had

19
 Not Been Proven

There are “long-standing evidentiary requirements for proof

of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.”

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Mustek Sys., Inc., 340 F.3d 1314, 1322-23

(Fed. Cir. 2003). The party asserting infringement is “required

to provide evidence ‘on a limitation-by-limitation basis.’” Id.

at 1323 (quoting Texas Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor

Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996)). The evidence must

include “particularized testimony and linking argument.” Id.

(internal citations omitted). “Generalized testimony as to the

overall similarity between the claims and the accused infringer's

product or process will not suffice.” Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor

Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (quoting Texas

Instruments, 90 F.3d at 1567).

Where the expert testimony fails to provide the above

requirements and, moreover, does not even address the issue of

equivalence of function, the evidence proffered fails to support

a verdict in its favor under the doctrine of equivalents. Id.

NewRiver claims that it is entitled to a new trial because

the Court erred in precluding the jury from considering whether

Newkirk infringed under the doctrine of equivalents. Trial Tr.

vol. 10, 1326:9-1328:25, Apr. 1, 2009. NewRiver asserts that its

expert testimony was sufficient to establish infringement under

the doctrine of equivalents.

Although NewRiver’s expert, Dr. Lynn Andrea Stein, discussed

20
how specific claim limitations were met, she failed to provide

the “particularized testimony” required to support a

determination of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents.

Trial Tr. vol. 7, 796:15-803:11, Mar. 24, 2009. Where, as here,

the evidence presented at trial does not suffice, as matter of

law, to support a jury verdict under the doctrine of equivalents,

judgment could properly be entered. Hewlett-Packard, 340 F.3d at

1323 (quoting Exxon Chemical Patents v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d

1553, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (internal citation omitted). “A new

trial on the issue of infringement under the doctrine of

equivalents as to the . . . patent, therefore, is unwarranted.”

Id.

2. Prejudicial References

Additionally, NewRiver argues that it is entitled to a new

trial on the basis of the jury’s verdicts on invalidity and

infringement. For the aforementioned reasons, this motion is

denied. NewRiver also posits that it is entitled to a new trial

based on challenger Newkirk’s expert witness’s improper

references to its patent reexamination during the trial.

NewRiver maintains that these references created a manifestly

unfair trial by undermining the ‘635 Patent’s presumption of

validity.

Although the Court acknowledged that Newkirk had initiated

an ongoing examination process with the Patent Office, it clearly

indicated that the ongoing reexamination process was separate

21
from the trial, the ‘635 Patent was presumed valid, and that

Newkirk bore the burden at trial to prove invalidity by clear and

convincing evidence. Jury Instructions, Trial Tr. vol. 11,

1424:14-17, Apr. 2, 2009. Moreover, the Court ruled that neither

Newkirk nor its expert were permitted to mention the

reexamination process. Trial Tr. vol. 3, 228-29, Mar. 18, 2009.

Any prejudicial effect on the jury could and was alleviated by

the appropriate jury instructions. See Fresenius Medical Care

Holdings, Inc. v. Baxter Intern. Inc., No. 03-1431, 2006 WL

1330003, at *4 (N.D. Cal. May 15, 2006) (holding that appropriate

jury instructions may sufficiently take care of any prejudicial

effect of introducing documents to a jury that refer to the

disputed patent’s reexamination).

3. The Court Erred in Allowing the Issue of the

Obviousness Vel Non of Claims 9-11 to Go to the
Jury

On this point, NewKirk may yet snatch defeat from the jaws

of victory. If the jury’s obviousness finding as to claims 9-11

is vacated, then its finding that NewKirk infringes claims 9-11

comes into effect and NewKirk plummets from the across-the-board

winner of this case to a loser subject to injunction. For three

reasons, this Court declines to go that far.

a. The Law of Evidence

Formulated under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.A. §§

2071-2077, the Federal Rules of Evidence have the force of

22
statutory law. Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm. Inc., 509 U.S. 579,

587 (1993). As germane here, these are the controlling rules:

Rule 704 . . . testimony in the form of an opinion

or inference otherwise admissible is not
objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue
to be decided by the trier of fact.

Rule 705 . . . The expert may testify in terms of

opinion or inference and give reasons therefor
without first testifying to the underlying facts or
data, unless the court requires otherwise. The
expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination.

Rule 103 . . . (a) Error may not be predicated upon

a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a
substantial right of the party is affected, and (1)
Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting
evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike
appears of record, stating the specific ground of
objection, if the specific ground was not apparent
from the context . . . .

Here, Dr. Szymanski’s testimony fits these rules as the hand

the glove. Dr. Szymanski was a qualified expert who testified

that claims 9-11 were obvious (the ultimate issue). True, he did

not provide any basis for his opinion, but he was not then

required to under Rule 705. What is more, after the obligatory

early skirmishes over Dr. Szymanski, NewRiver made no objection

whatsoever to his opinion testimony on the ultimate issue of

obviousness. One naturally would think (and as a teacher of

evidence I certainly thought) this would be enough to bear the

burden of going forward and to carry NewKirk to the jury.

Koito and the cases cited therein, however, make clear that,

on the issues of anticipation, obviousness, and doctrine of

23
equivalents, the unsupported opinion even of a qualified expert

is simply not “substantial evidence” adequate to support a jury

verdict on those issues. 381 F.3d at 1152.

Yet the central holding of Daubert runs precisely to the

contrary – lower federal courts are not permitted to engraft

additional hurdles on the admissibility of evidence beyond those

found in the Rules themselves. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.

Despite the express teaching of Daubert, this is exactly what

Federal Circuit jurisprudence does, at least on the issues of

anticipation, obviousness, and doctrine of equivalents.4

Notwithstanding Rules 704 and 705, Federal Circuit case law

renders legally inadequate the opinions of qualified experts on

the ultimate issues of anticipation, obviousness, and doctrine of

equivalents unless the bases therefor are spelled out on the

record.5

4
The Federal Circuit surely has this tension in mind, for
it has carefully delineated those areas where the Federal Rules
of Evidence operate in their usual fashion. See Symbol
Technologies, Inc. v. Opticon, Inc., 935 F.2d 1569, 1575 (Fed.
Cir. 1991) (infringement governed by Federal Rules of Evidence).
See also Judge Whyte’s most thoughtful opinion in Hynix
Semiconductor Inc. v. Rambus Inc., No. 00-20905, 2009 WL 230039,
at *18-19 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2009) which gives Koito and the
more recent Cytlogix Corp. v. Ventana Medical Systems, Inc., 424
F.3d 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (written description treated like
anticipation, obviousness, and doctrine of equivalents evidence)
a narrow interpretation since those decisions, unlike Symbol
Technologies, fail to acknowledge the implications of Rule 705.
5
This disconnect between the Federal Rules of Evidence and
the substantive doctrines of patent law seems to have gone
totally unremarked both by the patent bar and evidence scholars.
I have taught evidence for over a quarter century and have

24
 Although the tension between the Federal Rules of Evidence

(with their statutory authority) and the decisions of the Federal

Circuit (with their precedential authority) seems irreconcilable,

it is not open to a district court to chose one in disregard of

the other. Both requirements necessarily must be followed.

b. Waiver

At first glance, NewRiver appears to have waived its present

objection to Dr. Szymanski’s opinion on obviousness. Fed. R.

Evid. 103(a). After all, once the Court disposed of the

obligatory preliminary skirmishes about his qualifications,

NewRiver interposed no objection whatsoever to the question

eliciting his opinion that claim 9 was obvious. Trial Tr. vol.

3, 217:9-281:2, Mar. 18, 2009. Moreover, even when NewRiver

moved for a pre-verdict judgment as matter of law, it simply

noted that Dr. Szymanski’s opinion on the obviousness of claim 9

was unsupported; it never cited Koito or provided any developed

legal arguments.6 Nor did it challenge the Court’s charge in

amassed a considerable library of evidence texts and treatises.

Not one addresses this issue.
Perhaps this is not surprising, for the requirements of the
Federal Circuit for patent cases are both fair and (in ultimate
application) beneficent. While they constitute a very real trap
for the unwary, they serve to elevate expert testimony in patent
cases above mere medieval oath swearing.
6
In fact, NewRiver never challenged the obviousness opinion
as to claims 10 and 11 at all. Since these are dependent claims,
however, were the Court to vacate the verdict only as to claim 9,
the ultimate verdict would find claim 9 infringed but claims 10
and 11 invalid as obvious – a legal impossibility.

25
this regard. It was only after the verdict that NewRiver

provided the Court with the legal authority supporting its

position.

But so what?

Waiver might equally have been argued in Read Corp. v.

Freiday, No. 94-1504, 1995 WL 515227 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 30, 1995)

and Amgen Inc. v. F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 581 F. Supp. 2d 160,

205 (D. Mass. 2008), aff’d on this ground, Amgen Inc. v. F.

Hoffman-La Roche Ltd., 580 F.3d 1340, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2009),

where the judicial action that functionally struck the offending

opinion and withdrew the issue of doctrine of equivalents from

jury consideration followed expert testimony to which no

objection had been made. But see Symbol Technologies, 935 F.2d

at 1575 (usual waiver rule of Rule 103(a) applies to infringement

claims).

Still, while a belated waiver argument will not save

NewKirk, it factors into the overall picture here.

c. Erroneous Jury Charge

I told the jury that they were the sole judges of the facts.

I instructed concerning making credibility judgments and told the

jury they could believe (or disbelieve) any witness who had

testified before them. I cautioned the jury as to experts (I

refer to them as “opinion witnesses”) but told them it was open

to them to believe what the experts, including Dr. Syzmanski, had

said. I instructed (accurately) as to the legal concept of

26
obviousness and told the jury to make the determination

concerning whether claims 9-11 were obvious. NewRiver made no

objection to these aspects of the jury charge. Yet, on all of

these matters, the jury charge was palpably wrong. Dr.

Syzmanski’s opinion was fatally flawed since its bases were never

explained and the jury therefore was not entitled to credit it.

Absent Dr. Syzmanski’s opinion, the jury had no basis to resolve

the issue of obviousness as to claims 9-11 and the matter ought

not have been laid before them. In short, I botched the jury

charge.

What of it? argues NewRiver. In the final analysis,

obviousness is matter of law. McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. L. Perrigo

Co., 337 F.3d 1362, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). In a jury case, of

course, this is rarely of any moment beyond ensuring that the

Federal Circuit has the authority for de novo review.7 Unlike a

judge who must make subsidiary factual findings before drawing an

ultimate conclusion as to obviousness, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a)(1),

a jury draws the ultimate conclusion and the trial judge and

reviewing court are to determine the legal issue on the factual

7
This is not the only area where, notwithstanding the fact
intensive nature of the inquiry, the Federal Circuit simply
announces that an issue is matter of law to insure de novo
review. It has followed an identical approach with respect to
file wrapper estoppel. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku
Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2003). See
also Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 2d
126, 134-36 (D. Mass. 2003) (criticizing Festo).

27
record, drawing all inferences in favor of the verdict. Upjohn

Co. v. Mova Pharmaceutical Corp., 225 F.3d 1306, 1310 (Fed. Cir.

2000). It is, therefore, rare for a trial judge to vacate a jury

verdict on obviousness, having already implicitly ruled that the

record is sufficient to support the ultimate finding.

Here, my mistake was more fundamental. I did consider the

record sufficient to support the jury’s finding of obviousness.

It never occurred to me that patent law trumped the Federal Rules

of Evidence on the issue of obviousness. Now, recognizing my

error, it is clear that the jury’s verdict cannot stand.

Yet simply to set aside the jury’s verdict will not do.

Here, I failed to appreciate the applicable legal framework and

thus sent the jury off on a wild goose chase. To disregard their

work now and decree a contrary result is to give substance to a

good-natured rebuke I once received from a friend, a

distinguished British jurist. “You Americans are hypocrites,” he

told me. “You praise the jury and do everything you can to keep

it from getting in the way.” Not in this Court.

E. What to Do?

1. Short Range – Further Proceedings in This Case

Upon this botched and murky record, the Court’s duty is

clear. Since the First Circuit standard for granting new trials

governs, DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567

F.3d 1314, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2009), there must be a new trial

28
before a properly charged jury on the issue of the obviousness

vel non of claims 9-11. Likewise, there must be a new trial on

the issue of the infringement of claims 9-11 as well. This is

only fair since the jury here was a fully empowered and engaged

body.8 It well knew that, as to claims 9-11, it was awarding the

ultimate verdict to NewKirk. To insure the requisite degree of

confidence in the overall jury verdict, there must be a new trial

both on the issue of the obviousness of claims 9-11 and on the

issue of the infringement of those claims by Newkirk. In all

other respects, the pending motions are DENIED.

It is so ORDERED.

2. Long Range – Revising This Court’s Procedures

The present situation, born of this Court’s own confusion

about who’s on first, is intolerable. Nevertheless, it is

essential to harmonize the Federal Circuit’s particular rules

governing evidence of obviousness, anticipation, written

description, and doctrine of equivalents with the Federal Rules

of Evidence overall. The appropriate guide is found in Judge

Lungstrum’s thoughtful opinion in Sprint Communications Co. L.P.

v. Vonage Holdings Corp., No. 05-2433, 2007 WL 2572417, at *2 (D.

Kan. 2007) (making a pretrial9 ruling on the adequacy of the

8
Here the jury was empowered both to take notes and ask
questions, Trial Tr. vol. 11, 1428:12-16, Apr. 2, 2009, and it
did so. See, e.g., Trial Tr. vol. 13, 1523:7-17, Apr. 7, 2009.
9
Judge Lungstrum’s views on case management are especially
pertinent as he is a recognized authority on the matter, having

29
opinion testimony concerning obviousness).

That is the course this Court will steer in the future.

Specifically, at the earliest possible moment when an expert

opinion is proffered on the issues of obviousness, anticipation,

written description, or doctrine of equivalents, the Court sua

sponte, will rule on its adequacy. The Court will interpose its

ruling even in the absence of objection.10 This approach both

fully vindicates Federal Circuit jurisprudence and does no

violence to Federal Rule of Evidence 705 which expressly permits

the judge to require that the bases for a proffered expert

opinion be laid out before the opinion is received. In this way,

only appropriately supported opinion testimony will ever get

before the fact-finder (jury or judge). While the proactive

judicial screening of such expert opinions in patent cases will

previously served as Chair of the Judicial Conference Committee

on Court Administration and Case Management.
10
Usually, of course, the law of evidence operates in the
shadows. It plays no role until an objection is made. Without
objection, the proffered evidence is received for its full
probative value. See Peterson v. Gaughan, 404 F.2d 1375, 1380
(1st Cir. 1968) (noting that although appellant had right to move
to strike testimony presented in district court that was
permeated with hearsay, counsel did not make motion; evidence was
therefore received, and counsel had “intelligently relinquished
that right”). I can think of but three instances where a judge
is expected to intervene sua sponte. These are questions of
witness competence, Rule 601 (because no incompetent testimony
may be received), application of the rape shield rule, Rule 412
(because prompt judicial action is thought necessary to protect
the putative victim of sexual assault), and the parol evidence
rule in contract actions (because it is a substantive rule of
commercial transactions and not part of the shadow law of
evidence).

30
no doubt make them more difficult to try, the ultimate result

will exclude junk opinions (the most necessary and salutary goal

of the particularized restrictive Federal Circuit jurisprudence)

and thereby enhance the centrality and importance of the jury’s

fact-finding function (rather than marginalizing the jury in the

midst of a succession of arcane judicial opinions). The word

ought go out to every American juror that “[one Court] at least

thy rights shall guard, here faithful hearts still praise

thee.”11

By the Court,

/s/ William G. Young

WILLIAM G. YOUNG
DISTRICT JUDGE

11
With apologies to Thomas Moore, The Minstrel Boy. See
The Clancy Brothers & Tommy Makem, The Minstrel Boy, on The
Rising Moon: Irish Songs of Rebellion (Tradition Records 1959).

31
 Publisher Information
Note* This page is not part of the opinion as entered by the court.
The docket information provided on this page is for the benefit
of publishers of these opinions.

1:06-cv-12146-WGY Newriver, Inc., v. Newkirk Products, Inc.,

William G. Young, presiding
Date filed: 11/30/2006
Date terminated: 04/08/2009
Date of last filing: 12/16/2009

Attorneys

Michael A. Albert Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, PC 600 representing Newriver, Inc., (Plaintiff)
Atlantic Avenue Boston, MA 02210 617-720-3500
617-720-2441 (fax) malbert@WolfGreenfield.com
Assigned: 11/30/2006 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY
TO BE NOTICED
Newriver, Inc., (Counter
Defendant)
Ilan N. Barzilay Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, PC 600 representing Newriver, Inc., (Plaintiff)
Atlantic Avenue Federal Reserve Plaza Boston, MA
02210 617-720-3500 617-720-2441 (fax)
ibarzilay@wolfgreenfield.com Assigned: 11/30/2006
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Newriver, Inc., (Counter
Defendant)
Edward J. Dailey Sunstein Kann Murphy & Timbers representing Newkirk Products, Inc.,
LLP 125 Summer Street Boston, MA 02110-1618 (Defendant)
617-443-9292 617-443-0004 (fax)
edailey@sunsteinlaw.com Assigned: 08/01/2007
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Robert E Heslin Heslin, Rothenberg, Farley, & Mesiti representing Newkirk Products, Inc.,
P.C. 5 Columbia Circle Albany, NY 12203 518-452- (Counter Claimant)
5600 518-452-5579 (fax) reh@hrfmlaw.com
Assigned: 04/18/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY
TO BE NOTICED
Newkirk Products, Inc.,
(Defendant)
Brett M. Hutton Heslin Rothenberg Farley & Mesiti representing Newkirk Products, Inc.,
P.C., 5 Columbia Circle Albany, NY 12203 518-452- (Counter Claimant)
5600 518-452-5579 (fax) bh@hrfmlaw.com Assigned:
03/31/2008 LEAD ATTORNEY PRO HAC VICE
ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Newkirk Products, Inc.,
(Defendant)
Robert L. Kann Sunstein Kann Murphy & Timbers LLP representing Newkirk Products, Inc.,
125 Summer Street Boston, MA 02110 617-443-9292 (Defendant)
617-443-0004 (fax) rkann@sunsteinlaw.com Assigned:
03/30/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE
NOTICED
Lee Palmateer Heslin, Rothenberg, Farley, & Mesiti representing Newkirk Products, Inc.,
P.C. 5 Columbia Circle Albany, NY 12203 518-452- (Counter Claimant)

32
5600 518-452-5579 (fax) lp@hrfmlaw.com Assigned:
04/18/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE
NOTICED
Newkirk Products, Inc.,
(Defendant)
Kimberly J. Seluga Sunstein Kann Murphy & Timbers representing Newkirk Products, Inc.,
LLP 125 Summer Street Boston, MA 02110 617-443- (Defendant)
9292 617-443-0004 (fax) kseluga@sunsteinlaw.com
Assigned: 03/30/2007 LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY
TO BE NOTICED
Newkirk Products, Inc.,
(Counter Claimant)
John L. Strand Wolf, Greenfield & Sacks, PC 600 representing Newriver, Inc., (Plaintiff)
Atlantic Avenue Boston, MA 02210 617-720-3500
617-720-2441 (fax) jstrand@wolfgreenfield.com
Assigned: 02/08/2008 ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Kerry L. Timbers Sunstein Kann Murphy & Timbers representing Newkirk Products, Inc.,
LLP 125 Summer Street Boston, MA 02110-1618 (Defendant)
617-443-9292 617-443-0004 (fax)
ktimbers@sunsteinlaw.com Assigned: 03/30/2007
LEAD ATTORNEY ATTORNEY TO BE NOTICED
Newkirk Products, Inc.,
(Counter Claimant)

33