G.R.No.

74869 July 6, 1988

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
vs.
IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI, defendant-appellant.

plaintiff-appellee,

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Herminio T. Llariza counsel de-officio for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:
The accused-appellant claimed his business was selling watches but he was nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty of illegally
transporting marijuana. The trial court, disbelieving him, held it was high time to put him away and sentenced him to life imprisonment plus a
1
fine of P20,000.00.

Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9 at about
8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for
investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of
the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him. 2 Later, the information was amended to include Farida Ali
y Hassen, who had also been arrested with him that same evening and likewise investigated. 3 Both were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. 4 Subsequently, the fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the charge against Ali
on the basis of a sworn statement of the arresting officers absolving her after a 'thorough investigation." 5
The motion was granted, and trial proceeded only against the accused-appellant, who was eventually
convicted . 6
According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their informers that the
accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was carrying marijuana. 7 He was
Identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and
approached him as he descended from the gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They
detained him and inspected the bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later
analyzed as marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding, the corresponding
charge was then filed against Aminnudin.
In his defense, Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was arbitrarily arrested and
immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a search warrant. At the PC headquarters, he
was manhandled to force him to admit he was carrying the marijuana, the investigator hitting him with a
piece of wood in the chest and arms even as he parried the blows while he was still handcuffed. 12 He
insisted he did not even know what marijuana looked like and that his business was selling watches and
sometimes cigarettes. 13 He also argued that the marijuana he was alleged to have been carrying was not
properly Identified and could have been any of several bundles kept in the stock room of the PC
headquarters. 14
The trial court was unconvinced, noting from its own examination of the accused that he claimed to have
come to Iloilo City to sell watches but carried only two watches at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not to mention his other expenses. 15 Aminnudin testified that he
kept the two watches in a secret pocket below his belt but, strangely, they were not discovered when he

was bodily searched by the arresting officers nor were they damaged as a result of his manhandling. 16
He also said he sold one of the watches for P400.00 and gave away the other, although the watches
belonged not to him but to his cousin, 17 to a friend whose full name he said did not even know. 18 The trial
court also rejected his allegations of maltreatment, observing that he had not sufficiently proved the
injuries sustained by him. 19
There is no justification to reverse these factual findings, considering that it was the trial judge who had
immediate access to the testimony of the witnesses and had the opportunity to weigh their credibility on
the stand. Nuances of tone or voice, meaningful pauses and hesitation, flush of face and dart of eyes,
which may reveal the truth or expose the lie, are not described in the impersonal record. But the trial
judge sees all of this, discovering for himself the truant fact amidst the falsities.
The only exception we may make in this case is the trial court's conclusion that the accused-appellant
was not really beaten up because he did not complain about it later nor did he submit to a medical
examination. That is hardly fair or realistic. It is possible Aminnudin never had that opportunity as he was
at that time under detention by the PC authorities and in fact has never been set free since he was
arrested in 1984 and up to the present. No bail has been allowed for his release.
There is one point that deserves closer examination, however, and it is Aminnudin's claim that he was
arrested and searched without warrant, making the marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even discuss this point.
For his part, the Solicitor General dismissed this after an all-too-short argument that the arrest of
Aminnudin was valid because it came under Rule 113, Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on warrantless
arrests. This made the search also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the prosecution, that they
had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag he was carrying. Their only justification
was the tip they had earlier received from a reliable and regular informer who reported to them that
Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo by boat with marijuana. Their testimony varies as to the time they
received the tip, one saying it was two days before the arrest, 20 another two weeks 21 and a third "weeks
before June 25." 22 On this matter, we may prefer the declaration of the chief of the arresting team, Lt.
Cipriano Querol, Jr., who testified as follows:
Q You mentioned an intelligence report, you mean with respect to the coming of Idel Aminnudin
on June 25, 1984?
A Yes, sir.
Q When did you receive this intelligence report?
A Two days before June 25, 1984 and it was supported by reliable sources.
Q Were you informed of the coming of the Wilcon 9 and the possible trafficking of marijuana
leaves on that date?
A Yes, sir, two days before June 25, 1984 when we received this information from that particular
informer, prior to June 25, 1984 we have already reports of the particular operation which was
being participated by Idel Aminnudin.
Q You said you received an intelligence report two days before June 25, 1984 with respect to the
coming of Wilcon 9?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you receive any other report aside from this intelligence report?

A Well, I have received also other reports but not pertaining to the coming of Wilcon 9. For
instance, report of illegal gambling operation.
COURT:
Q Previous to that particular information which you said two days before June 25, 1984, did you
also receive daily report regarding the activities of Idel Aminnudin
A Previous to June 25, 1984 we received reports on the activities of Idel Aminnudin.
Q What were those activities?
A Purely marijuana trafficking.
Q From whom did you get that information?
A It came to my hand which was written in a required sheet of information, maybe for security
reason and we cannot Identify the person.
Q But you received it from your regular informer?
A Yes, sir.
ATTY. LLARIZA:
Q Previous to June 25, 1984, you were more or less sure that Idel Aminnudin is coming with
drugs?
A Marijuana, sir.
Q And this information respecting Idel Aminnudin's coming to Iloilo with marijuana was received
by you many days before you received the intelligence report in writing?
A Not a report of the particular coming of Aminnudin but his activities.
Q You only knew that he was coming on June 25,1984 two days before?
A Yes, sir.
Q You mean that before June 23, 1984 you did not know that minnudin was coming?
A Before June 23,1984, I, in my capacity, did not know that he was coming but on June 23, 1984
that was the time when I received the information that he was coming. Regarding the reports on
his activities, we have reports that he was already consummated the act of selling and shipping
marijuana stuff.
COURT:
Q And as a result of that report, you put him under surveillance?
A Yes, sir.
Q In the intelligence report, only the name of Idel Aminnudin was mentioned?
A Yes, sir.
Q Are you sure of that?
A On the 23rd he will be coming with the woman.

Q So that even before you received the official report on June 23, 1984, you had already
gathered information to the effect that Idel Aminnudin was coming to Iloilo on June 25, 1984?
A Only on the 23rd of June.
Q You did not try to secure a search warrant for the seizure or search of the subject mentioned in
your intelligence report?
A No, more.
Q Why not?
A Because we were very very sure that our operation will yield positive result.
Q Is that your procedure that whenever it will yield positive result you do not need a search
warrant anymore?
A Search warrant is not necessary.

23

That last answer is a cavalier pronouncement, especially as it comes from a mere lieutenant of the PC.
The Supreme Court cannot countenance such a statement. This is still a government of laws and not of
men.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after personal
determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the averments of the government,
the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a crime about to be committed or had just
been committed to justify the warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even
expediency could not be invoked to dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v.
Arca, 24 for example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and
seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved out of the locality
or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC witnesses, it is
clear that they had at least two days within which they could have obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was
Identified. The date of its arrival was certain. And from the information they had received, they could have
persuaded a judge that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they
did nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored altogether because
the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had determined on his own authority that a
"search warrant was not necessary."
In the many cases where this Court has sustained the warrantless arrest of violators of the Dangerous
Drugs Act, it has always been shown that they were caught red-handed, as a result of what are popularly
called "buy-bust" operations of the narcotics agents. 25 Rule 113 was clearly applicable because at the
precise time of arrest the accused was in the act of selling the prohibited drug.

In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing a crime nor
was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he was doing was descending
the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was
only when the informer pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The Identification by the
informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest him.
Now that we have succeeded in restoring democracy in our country after fourteen years of the despised
dictatorship, when any one could be picked up at will, detained without charges and punished without
trial, we will have only ourselves to blame if that kind of arbitrariness is allowed to return, to once more
flaunt its disdain of the Constitution and the individual liberties its Bill of Rights guarantees.
While this is not to say that the accused-appellant is innocent, for indeed his very own words suggest that
he is lying, that fact alone does not justify a finding that he is guilty. The constitutional presumption is that
he is innocent, and he will be so declared even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not
strong enough to convict him.
Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the prosecution must
fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been considered by the trial court for the
simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally. It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice
Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant
of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was inadmissible.
The Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the
efforts of our law-enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people,
especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than
the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of the liberty of every individual in the realm,
including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent
and the guilty alike against any manner of high- handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy
their intentions.
Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the rights of the individual in
the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. As Justice Holmes, again, said, "I think it
a less evil that some criminals should escape than that the government should play an ignoble part." It is
simply not allowed in the free society to violate a law to enforce another, especially if the law violated is
the Constitution itself.
We find that with the exclusion of the illegally seized marijuana as evidence against the accusedappellant, his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt and he must therefore be discharged
on the presumption that he is innocent.
ACCORDINGLY, the decision of the trial court is REVERSED and the accused-appellant is ACQUITTED.
It is so ordered.
Narvasa, Gancayco and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

SECOND

DIVISION

[G.R.

No.

L-69809.

October

16,

1986.]

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, Petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise
known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is
among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private
conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties
using
a
telephone
line.
The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent courts decision are not
disputed
by
the
petitioner.
"In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel
Montebon were in the living room of complainants residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal
of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).
"That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer to come to his office and
advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon
Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of
Laconico where he was briefed about the problem. (Exhibit D, tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).
"When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for
the settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal
of
the
complaint
for
direct
assault"
"(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00.
A breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00
no longer for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client
to withdraw the case for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscals
Office;
"(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical
High
School;
"(c)

P1,000.00

to

be

given

to

the

Don

Bosco

Faculty

club;

"(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco
Technical
High
School;
"(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against
Manuel Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscals Office, whereas Montebons affidavit of desistance
on the Direct Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;
"(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;
"(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;
"(h) P2,000.00 attorneys fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).
"Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the
conditions. Laconico answered `Yes. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on
where
to
deliver
the
money.
(tsn,
March
10,
1983,
pp.
2-12).
"Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office
of the then Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel
Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he
received the money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine
Constabulary.
"Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand
P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of
appellant to the complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since
appellant listened to the telephone conversation without complainants consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act."
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After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both
Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each
sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs. Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner
appealed
to
the
appellate
court.
On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court,
holding that the communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in
nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such
communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension
telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between
complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device" as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
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In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises
the following issues; (a) whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and
accused Laconico was private in nature; (b) whether or not an extension telephone is covered by

the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c) whether or not the petitioner had
authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep. Act No.
4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.
Section

of

Rep.

Act

No.

4200

provides:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any
private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or
arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie
or
taperecorder,
or
however
otherwise
described;
It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the
next preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any
other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before
or after the effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same
for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person:
Provided, that the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this
prohibition."
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We

virtua1aw

rule

for

library

the

petitioner.

We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of
evidence. The issue is not the admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a
telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the person called over the telephone and
his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison sentences
simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at
extortion.
There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and
accused Atty. Laconico was "private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one
person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public. It is also
undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen to and overhear
the callers message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor,
a member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00
consideration in order to have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico
filed with the Cebu City Fiscals Office if he knew that another lawyer was also listening. We
have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that
a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene,
criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listeners.
Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the
extra heavy loads which telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users
often encounter what are called "crossed lines." An unwary citizen who happens to pick up his

telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if
he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly
overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never
intended
for
such
mischievous
results.

chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the
phrase "any other device or arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or
arrangement as would subject the user to imprisonment ranging from six months to six years
with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a public officer or
deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses telephones are
sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations between
a boss and another businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss
be a proscribed offense? Or for that matter, would a "party line" be a device or arrangement
under
the
law?
The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the
enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the
same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964,
when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered in the Senate, telephones
and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly
known
communication
device.
Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the
floor of the Senate. Yet, when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of
telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph,
detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described." The omission
was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of
the
Act.
The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term
"device" within the context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a
complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a separate device and distinct set of a movable
apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming part of a main
telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to
another and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication
coming
from
the
other
party
or
end.
The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the
purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be
either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.
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library

red

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the
other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as
"tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not
installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in

statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular
clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but
the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts.
(see Commissioner of Customs v. Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113, 120).
In the case of Empire Insurance Company v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that `however general the terms of a contract
may be, they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are
different from those upon which the parties intended to agree. Similarly, Article 1374 of the
same Code provides that the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together,
attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.
x

"Consequently, the phrase `all liabilities or obligations of the decedent used in paragraph 5(c)
and 7(d) should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be
construed as to comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that `particularization
followed by a general expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former is based on the fact
in human experience that usually the minds of parties are addressed specially to the
particularization, and that the generalities, though broad enough to comprehend other fields if
they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon which the minds of the parties are
centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603, 607; 115 NW 383, cited in
Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed., pp. 180-181."
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Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive
to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or
similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line
of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the
party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and
their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.
An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the
extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved
from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should safely presume that
the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension telephone and he
runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which
shares its line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2
L
Ed
2d
137-138):
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"Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to
ring in more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes
the risk that the other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear
the conversation. When such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the
parties may complain. Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred."
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In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if
instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and
that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an
extension
telephone
for
the
same
purpose.
Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the
accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is
included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not
including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA 542, 562, we
explained
the
rationale
behind
the
rule:

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"American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be `the tenderness of the law of the
rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind
would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L
Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531,
69 NE2d 549; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109 VA 821, 63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d
452.) The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through a technicality
but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in
Martins Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184)."
cralaw

virtua1aw

library

In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that in the construction or interpretation of a
legislative measure, the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the
law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will show that not only did our lawmakers
not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited "device or arrangement"
but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than
the act of merely listening to a telephone conversation.
x

Senator Taada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly

objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may introduce.
Senator Diokno. Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the
amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment would only
consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant. With this amendment,
they would have the right, and the government officials and the person in fact would have the
right
to
tape
record
their
conversation.
Senator

Taada.

In

case

of

entrapment,

it

would

be

the

government.

Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and, therefore,
the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police officers or the
defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the Court go with the peace
offices.
(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).

Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent outside
listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if you allow
him to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the chances of
falsifying
the
evidence
is
not
very
much.
Senator Taada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false
testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape record
and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will be used in
court.
(Congressional

Record,

Vol.

III,

No.

33,

March

12,

1964,

p.

629).

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons
such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in
order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted
advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be
punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of
similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or
arrangements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court dated August 16, 1984 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the AntiWiretapping
Act.
SO

ORDERED.

Feria, Fernan, Alampay and Paras, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 108179. September 6, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MANOLITO MALAZARTE alias
Nolly, defendant-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Appellant Manolito Malazarte with Arnold Morales were charged with the crime of murder in
the following information filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City:

That on or about the 14th day of April, 1991, at about 11:30 P.M., in the City of Cebu,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping each other, with deliberate intent, with intent to kill
and with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there suddenly and unexpectedly
attack, assault and shot one Jimmy Balansag [1] with handgun hitting the latter upon vital parts of
his body and inflicting upon him the following physical injuries:
i

HEMORRHAGE INTRABANIAL (sic), EXTENSIVE,

GUNSHOT WOUND OF THE HEAD, LEFT SIDE

SEVERE,

SECONDARY TO

and as a consequence of said injuries Jimmy Balansag died few minutes later.
CONTRARY TO LAW. [2]
ii

A warrant for the arrest of the two accused was issued on May 2, 1991.

iii

[3]

On May 6, 1991, counsel for accused Morales filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation and
Reconsideration assailing the inclusion of the said accused in the information despite the
admission of Malazarte that he alone planned and perpetrated the killing. The motion also
alleged that the supporting affidavits of the witnesses were not sufficient to establish a prima
facie case of conspiracy between the two accused. [4] The trial court granted the motion. [5]
iv

In his reinvestigation report, Assistant Prosecutor Rodolfo V. Perez recommended the dismissal
of the case as against accused Morales as there is no sufficient evidence to engender a wellfounded belief that accused Arnold Morales connived and conspired with Manolito Malazarte in
the killing of Jimmy Balansag. [6] The report was with the express approval of City Prosecutor
Jufelinito R. Pareja. [7] On June 3, 1991, the trial court ordered the dismissal of the case with
respect to accused Morales. [8]
vi

vii

viii

During the hearing on July 25, 1991, appellant Malazarte manifested willingness to plead guilty
to the lesser offense of homicide, but the widow of the victim opposed the manifestation. Hence,
a plea of not guilty was entered on behalf of appellant. [9]
ix

The facts as established by the record are as follows:

Aileen Balanzar [10] was with her husband, victim Jimmy Balanzar, on the night of April 14, 1990
at the Abellana basketball court, at Sitio Abellana, Barrio Luz, Cebu City. Jimmy was the coach
of the Sto. Nino team which was to play at the second game. Aileen was seated behind her
husband, who was standing and cheering. Appellant who was wobbling and appeared to be
high on drugs, was standing at Aileens left side. Suddenly, appellant shot Jimmy with a .38
caliber handgun. The victim fell and died instantaneously. As appellant was leaving, he fired
two more shots.
x

The medico-legal report prepared by Dr. Tomas P. Refe showed that 23-year-old Jimmy Balanzar
died of a single gunshot wound in the head. The bullet entered the left side of the occipital

region, proceeded forward and upward through the skin and soft tissues, lacerated the brain and
lodged underneath the fractured frontal bone. [11]
xi

Dr. Refe testified that the assailant must have fired the gun from behind the victim at a distance
beyond 24 inches because there was no evidence of near contact firing, like gun powder tattooing
and burning. Based on the trajectory of the bullet and the fact that the victim was standing, the
assailant must have been standing also. [12]
xii

Aileen Balanzar was presented by the defense as a hostile witness to prove that she did not
witness the actual shooting and that appellant was under the influence of liquor. [13] Aileen
testified that as early as seven oclock in the evening of April 14, 1990, she and her husband
were in the Abellana basketball court. The first game, which was between the Abellana and the
New Era teams, started at 7:30 and lasted until nine oclock in the evening. The second game
between the Lambag and the Sto. Nino teams started at 9:30 p.m. A lot of people were at the
game but she noticed appellant and Arnold Morales who arrived together. She was about a meter
away from them when she heard Morales ask appellant in the vernacular, Shall we do it now?
The latter answered, No, later on. [14] Morales gave something to appellant and went to the
gate about five meters away. Appellant then took the seat to Aileens left. Thirty minutes later,
appellant shot her husband.
xiii

xiv

Prior to the incident, Aileen did not know the names of the two accused although appellant lived
in their neighborhood. She came to know appellants name only after the incident as he lived a
bit far from their place. As to Arnold Morales, Aileen came to know his name through a certain
Atil who told her that, earlier that day, Morales was looking for Arnel Balansag (sic), the brother
of her husband. [15]
xv

The defense also presented Antonio Cadungog, a Social Security System pensioner who sold
cigarettes to earn additional income. He claimed to be the friend of appellants father and had
known appellant since he was a child. [16] On the night of April 14, 1990, Cadungog passed by
appellants house on his way to the Abellana basketball court to sell cigarettes. Hence,
appellants mother knew that he witnessed the incident and requested him to testify.
xvi

According to Cadungog, at about eleven oclock that night, he saw two men grappling for
possession of a firearm. The people around scampered because of fear but he stayed to watch.
One of the men got the gun and shot the other one as the latter was running away. Upon inquiry,
he learned that the victim was Jimmy Balansar while the assailant was Arnold Morales.
Cadungog did not see appellant when the shooting occurred but he knew that appellant appeared
later probably to ask about the incident. He did not have the chance to talk to appellant that
night as appellant later left with Morales. [17]
xvii

On February 28, 1992, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision
the crime of murder. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

xviii

[18]convicting

appellant of

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, this Court finds the accused Manolito Malazarte guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined and penalized in accordance with
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby imposes upon him the penalty by way of

imprisonment, of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the surviving spouse and the heirs the amount
of P50,000.00 and finally with costs against him.
SO ORDERED.
Appellant contends that the trial court erred in giving full credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses and disregarding that of the defense. He asserts the trial court erred in
convicting him of the crime of murder despite the failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
Appellant points out that Aileen Balanzar, in paragraph 3 of her affidavit, made a categorical
declaration that she and her husband were sitting on the bench of the Sto. Nio team, but she did
not declare that she saw him shoot her husband from behind.
He stresses that during Aileens testimony in court, she contradicted her affidavit by saying that
while watching the basketball game, she was standing behind her husband with him on her left
side and, for no apparent reason, appellant shot her husband.
He further claims that Aileens declaration in her affidavit that she was beside her husband when
he was shot is more realistic and consistent with human experience because a wife always wants
to be by her husbands side. In such a position, appellant contends, it was impossible for her to
identify the people standing or sitting behind her or notice what they were doing, without turning
her head.
Appellant concludes that Aileen did not see the assailant fire the shot which killed her husband.

xix

[19]

Appellant asserts that, on the contrary, the testimony of Antonio Cadungog is more credible as
this does not suffer from any inconsistencies. Furthermore, Cadungogs testimony that appellant
was not the assailant is of the highest degree of sincerity and honesty as it was not motivated by
any ill feeling towards the prosecution.
Appellants arguments hinge primarily on the issue of credibility of witnesses.
This Court has held in a long line of cases that the findings of the trial court on the issue of
credibility of witnesses should not be disturbed on appeal, as the trial court is in a better position
to decide the question, having observed the deportment of the witnesses and their manner of
testifying during the trial, unless certain facts of value have been plainly overlooked, which, if
considered, might have affected the outcome of the case. [20] We do not see any reason to depart
from this well-entrenched rule.
xx

There is actually no discrepancy between Aileens affidavit and her testimony in court. They can
be reconciled. In paragraph 4 of her affidavit, [21] she said she saw two persons conspiring with
each other, shoot her husband once, hitting him on the back of his head, although she did not
mention who actually pulled the trigger. Perhaps, because of the existence of conspiracy
between the two accused, she believed, it was not particularly important to point out who of them
xxi

actually shot her husband. Assuming that there is such a discrepancy, the same does not destroy
Aileen Balanzars credibility. This Court has consistently held that:
The general rule has always been that discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his
affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since exparte affidavits are generally incomplete. Affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to
open court declarations because they are oftentimes executed when an affiants mental faculties
are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which
has transpired. Further, affidavits are not complete reproductions of what the declarant has in
mind because they are generally prepared by the administering officer and the affiant simply
signs them after the same have been read to them. [22]
xxii

As regards the circumstances of the crime, testimonial evidence carries more weight than
affidavits. [23]
xxiii

Furthermore, Aileens testimony in court is consistent with that of Dr. Tomas P. Refe, the
medico-legal officer who autopsied the victim. [24] Her testimony that as she was standing
behind her husband, and that appellant, who was on her left side, shot her husband, dovetails
with Dr. Refes finding that, based on the trajectory of the bullet, the assailant must have been
behind the victim who must have been standing like the assailant.
xxiv

Appellants allegation that it is unbelievable for him to have committed the crime considering
that, as Aileen herself admitted, no bad blood existed between him and the victim, simply does
not hold water. Lack of enmity or bad blood between the culprit and the victim prior to the
incident does not affect the credibility of the prosecution evidence. [25] Crimes have been
attributed to persons who appear to have no reason for committing them as long as they have
been clearly identified as the offenders. Motive gains importance only when the identity of the
culprit is suspect. Such is not the case here. [26]
xxv

xxvi

On the other hand, it was not established that the sole prosecution witness had a motive to testify
against appellant. Absent evidence to show any reason or motive why witnesses for the
prosecution should have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive
exists and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit. [27]
xxvii

We agree with the trial court that the crime committed is murder qualified by treachery. There is
treachery when the offender commits any crime against a person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and especially to insure its execution, without
risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [28] As found by
the trial court, appellant strategically positioned himself behind the victim and aimed the fatal
shot at his head at the time when the victims attention was on the basketball game. [29] Such
mode of attack deliberately resorted to by the appellant did not give the victim any opportunity to
defend himself.
xxviii

xxix

Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. In the absence of any mitigating or generic

aggravating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period

perpetua.

xxx

[30]

or reclusion

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City finding appellant
Manolito Malazarte guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and imposing upon
him the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the payment to the heirs of Jimmy Balanzar the
indemnity of P50,000.00, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 110290 January 25, 1995
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, WILFREDO "SONNY QUIAO, MANUEL "JUN" ABENOJA, JR., and FREDDIE "BOY" CARTEL, accused.
JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In five separate informations filed on 22 May 1987 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 3, Baguio City, the accused were charged
with murder in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 4649-R, and with attempted murder in
Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R. The crimes were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 in Baguio City and resulted in the
deaths of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco and the wounding of Anthony Bayquen, Dominic Bayquen, and Danny
Ancheta.
The informations in the murder cases charged that the accused acted in conspiracy and alleged the presence of the qualifying circumstance
1
of treachery and the ordinary aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price.

Only the appellant and Wilfredo Quiao were arrested. However, before Quiao could be arraigned, he
escaped on 12 July 1987 while under the custody of the Philippine Constabulary/PNP Regional
Command I at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet. 2 The cases, which were consolidated and jointly
tried, proceeded only against the appellant.
After the appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 4 September 1987, trial on the merits was
held on various dates from 11 May 1988 until 10 January 1990.
On 30 May 1990, the trial court promulgated its decision 3 in the consolidated cases acquitting the
appellant in Criminal Case No. 4649-R (frustrated murder) and Criminal Cases Nos. 4650-R and 4651-R
(attempted murder) for insufficiency of evidence but convicting him in the two murder cases, Criminal
Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance. 4 It also ruled that the
aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and price had been duly established. It then
sentenced the appellant as follows:
Upon these premises, the accused Jaime Agustin is found GUILTY of two (2) counts of
murder, the prosecution having proven his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In each of the
criminal cases aforesaid, he should be sentenced to the maximum penalty of Death,
there being two aggravating circumstances. However, since the death penalty is not
imposable at this time, the accused is sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua. He is further
ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victims; Anna Theresa Francisco the sum of sixty
Three Thousand Pesos (P63,000.00) as actual damages (Exhibits "F," "I" and "G"); and
Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00). With costs
against the accused, Jaime Agustin.

SO ORDERED. 5
The version of the prosecution is based on the testimonies of (1) Isidoro Magpantay, a member of the
Baguio City Police Force, who identified the initial report (Exhibit "A"); (2) Christie Napeas, a
stenographic reporter in the Office of the City Fiscal of Baguio City, who took down the stenographic notes
of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia's investigations of accused Wilfredo Quiao (Exhibit "D") on 30 January
1987 and of the appellant on 10 February 1987, and who identified her stenographic notes containing the
statement of the appellant (Exhibit "B") and the transcript of said stenographic notes (Exhibit "C"); (3)
Dominic Bayquen, the victim in Criminal Case No. 4650-R, who testified on how they were shot; (5)
Eulogio Francisco, the father of Anna Theresa Francisco, who identified her death certificate (Exhibit "I")
and testified on the list of expenses (Exhibit "G"); (6) Rogelio Mumar, a supervising ballistics expert, who
declared that the fourteen shell recovered from the scene of the crime were not fired from any of the three
armalite rifles submitted to him; (7) Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, who testified that he was the lawyer who
assisted the appellant and accused Wilfredo Quiao while they were being investigated by City Fiscal
Balajadia; and (8) Lilian San Luis Bayquen, wife of Dr. Napoleon Bayquen and mother of Dominic
Bayquen, who testified on what she did after Dominic informed her by telephone about the shooting
incident.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts. At past 7:30 p.m. of 6 September 1986
in Baguio City, Dr. Napoleon Bayquen, a dentist, together with his son, Anthony; Anthony's girlfriend, Anna
Theresa Francisco; his daughter, Dominic; and Danny Ancheta, a family friend, were on their way aboard
their Brasilia to the doctor's residence at Trancoville at 21-D Malvar Street, Baguio City, from his driving
the car. While they were cruising along Malvar Street and nearing the Baptist church, a man came out
from the right side of a car parked about two meters to the church. The man approached the Brasilia,
aimed his armalite rifle through its window, and fired at the passengers. The Brasilia swerved and hit a
fence. The gunman immediately returned to the parked car which then sped away.
All those in the car were hit and Dr. Bayquen and Anna Theresa died on the spot. Dr. Bayquen's head
was blown off. Dominic was bale to get out of the Brasilia to run to the Alabanza store where she
telephoned her mother and told her what had happened. Later, she and her mother brought her father
and Anthony to the hospital. 6 Danny Ancheta went home and was then brought to the Notre Dame
Hospital for treatment. 7 Anna Theresa Francisco was brought to the funeral parlor. 8 The police later
arrived at the crime scene and conducted an investigation. they recovered some empty shells of an
armalite rifle. 9
On 30 January 1987, accused Wilfredo "Sonny" Quiao, an alleged former military agent or "asset" who
had been picked up in La Union by the police authorities, confessed during the investigation conducted by
Baguio City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia in his office that he was the triggerman in the fatal shooting of Dr.
Bayquen and Anna Theresa Francisco. He implicated Manuel "Jun" Abenoja, Jr., allegedly a fellow
military agent and the "bagman" who engaged him to kill Dr. Bayquen for a fee, Freddie "Boy" Cartel, who
provided the armalite, and a certain "Jimmy." During the investigation, Wilfredo Quiao was assisted by
Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, a representative of the Integrated bar of the Philippines (IBP). Ms. Christie
Napeas, a stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. 10 Thereafter, she transcribed
the notes and the transcription became the sworn statement of Wilfredo Quiao which he signed, with the
assistance of Atty. Cajucom, and swore to before City Fiscal Balajadia. 11
In the morning of 10 February 1987, "Jimmy," who turned out to be appellant Jaime Agustin, was picked
up in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan, by military personnel and brought to Baguio city. At 4:00 p.m. of that date,
he was taken to the office of City Fiscal Erdolfo Balajadia where he was investigated in connection with
the crime. Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom assisted the appellant during the investigation. Ms. Christie Napeas
took down stenographic notes of the proceedings during the investigation. The stenographic notes
consisted of 22 pages (Exhibit "B"), each of which was signed afterwards by the appellant and Atty.
Cajucom. Ms. Napeas subsequently transcribed these notes which the prosecution marked as Exhibit
"C." The appellant narrated therein his knowledge of the shooting of Dr. Bayquen and revealed the

identities of his cohorts in the crime. In a confrontation two days later, he identified Quiao as "Sony," the
triggerman.
The defense presented the appellant and his wife, Elizabeth Agustin. The appellant, who is a farmer and
whose highest educational attainment was grad four, impugned the validity of his extrajudicial statement.
he alleged that in the morning of 10 February 1987, he went to Carmen, Pangasinan, to buy some
fertilizer and upon his return he was met by two armed men who took him to their car where two other
companions, armed with armalites, were waiting. They then brought him out of Pangasinan. He later
learned that they were on their way to Baguio City.
Inside the car, he was asked if he knew Boy and Jun, and he answered that he did not. Along Kennon
Road, he was made to stoop down at the back seat whenever they would reach a toll booth, and then
brought out three times near the ravines and made to kneel at gunpoint in order to force him to admit his
involvement in the shooting, which he finally did out of fear. Then he was brought to the Office of the City
Fiscal of Baguio City.
While he was giving his statement at the fical's office, the armed men stayed with him and their presence
deterred him from telling the investigating fiscal that he was being threatened. He further declared that
although he was given a lawyer, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, to assist him, he, nevertheless, asked for his
uncle who is a lawyer, Atty. Oliver Tabin, and that Atty. Cajucom interviewed him from only two minutes in
English and Tagalog but not in Ilocano, the dialect he understands. Then later, at Camp Dangwa to where
he was taken, he told his wife to get in touch and talk with Atty. Tabin. Finally, he asserted that he was
promised by his captors that he would be discharged as a state witness if he cooperates, but the plan did
not push through because his co-accused, Quiao, escaped. 12
Elizabeth Agustin corroborated her husband's story that he went to Carmen in the morning of 10 February
1987 to buy some fertilizer and that he failed to return. Her efforts to locate him proved futile until days
later when she finally learned that he was detained at Camp Dangwa. 13
The trial court admitted the appellant's extrajudicial statement and gave scant consideration to his claim
of force, intimidation, and other irregularities because of the following reasons: (a) the presence of
material improbabilities in his tale of when and how he was allegedly taken at gunpoint from his
hometown in Pangasinan; (b) it was improbable that he was made to kneel thrice at gunpoint along
Kennon Road considering the vehicles which were passing along that road; (c) it was unbelievable that
when he was in the Fiscal's Office he asked for his uncle, Atty. Tabin if he could not go home for a period
of one month; (d) no less than the city Fiscal of Baguio City interrogated him and yet he did not tell the
fiscal that he was being forced to give a statement; (e) the fiscal even provided him with a lawyer who
conferred with him and apprised him of his rights; (f) he signed each and every page of the stenographic
notes of his statement and this was witnessed by no less than the City Fiscal of Baguio and the lawyer
who assisted him; and (g) he disclosed in his statement that he voluntarily gave it because of his ill feeling
against his co-accused who did not give him any money.
The trial court then concluded that "[t]here was conspiracy and the accused was a direct participant in the
crime," and that while he tried to minimize his culpability, his "extrajudicial confession" shows that "he was
in on the plan," and even "expected to be paid, to be rewarded monetarily"; and that he "decided to give a
statement only when he was not given the money." Since the proof of corpus delicti required in Section 3,
Rule 133 of the Rules of Court was established by the prosecution's evidence, it found his conviction for
murder inevitable.
The appellant filed a notice of appeal. In this brief, he imputes upon the trial court the commission of this
lone error:

THE COURT A QUO COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CONSIDERING

ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S
EXTRAJUDICIAL
CONFESSION
AS
ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM. 14
The appellant insists that his extrajudicial confession was taken in violation of his rights under Section 11,
Article III of the constitution. He argues that the lawyer who assisted him, Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom, was
not of his own choice but was foisted upon him by the city Fiscal. Worse, the said lawyer is a law partner
of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur Galace, and conferred with him in English and Tagalog although he
understood only Ilocano. Moreover, when Atty. Cajucom briefly conferred with him and when the city
Fiscal interrogated him, his military escorts were present.
He stresses that the lawyer "who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of the latter's
choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigator or other parties," 15 and that where there are
serious doubts on the voluntariness of the extrajudicial confession, the doubts must be resolved in favor
of the accused. 16 He then concludes that his extrajudicial confession is inadmissible and his conviction
cannot stand, there being no other evidence linking him to the crimes charged.
In its brief, 17 the appellee, reiterating the reasons of the trial court in upholding the validity of the
confession, prays for the affirmance of the appealed decision.
After a careful study of the records of Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 4648-R and a painstaking
evaluation of the evidence, we find this appeal to be impressed with merit. Indeed, the extrajudicial
admission not extrajudicial confession of the appellant, which is the only evidence of the
prosecution linking him to the commission of the crime charged, is wholly inadmissible because it was
taken in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution. We also see in these cases a blatant
disregard of the appellant's right under Section 2 of Article III when he was unlawfully arrested.
Before we go any further, it should be pointed out that, contrary to the pronouncement of the trial court
and the characterization given by the appellant himself, the assailed extrajudicial statement is not
extrajudicial confession. It is only an extrajudicial admission. We take this opportunity to once more
distinguish one from the other. Sections 26 and 33, rule 30 of the Rules of
Court 18 clearly show such a distinction.
In a confession, there is an acknowledgment of guilt of the accused or of the criminal intent to commit the
offense with which he is charged. 19 Wharton 20 defines a confession as follows:
A confession is an acknowledgment in express terms, by a party in a criminal case, of his
guilt of the crime charged, while an admission is a statement by the accused, direct or
implied, of facts pertinent to the issue, and tending, in connection with proof of other
facts, to prove his guilt. In other words, and admission is something less than a
confession, and is but an acknowledgment of some fact or circumstance which in itself is
insufficient to authorize a conviction, and which tends only to establish the ultimate fact of
guilt.
We have examined the assailed extrajudicial statement of the appellant, and we are satisfied that nothing
therein indicates that he expressly acknowledged his guilt; he merely admitted some facts or
circumstances which in themselves are insufficient to authorize a conviction and which can only tend to
establish the ultimate fact of guilt. Nevertheless, when what is involved is the issue of admissibly in
evidence under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, the distinction is irrelevant because Paragraph 3
thereof expressly refers to both confession and admission. Thus:
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him.

The first two paragraphs of Section 12 read:

Sec. 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the
free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or
other similar forms of detention are prohibited.
These first and second paragraphs are taken from Section 20, Article IV (Bill of Rights) of the 1973
Constitution which read:
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to
counsel, and to be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any
other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
The first two paragraphs of Section 12, Article III of the present Constitution have broadened the aforesaid
Section 20 in these respects: (1) the right to counsel means not just any counsel, but a "competent and
independent counsel, preferably of his own choice"; (2) the right to remain silent and to counsel can only
be waived in writing and in the presence of counsel; and (3) the rule on inadmissibility expressly includes
admissions, not just confessions.
In Morales vs. Enrile, 21 this Court, applying Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, laid down the
duties of an investigator during custodial investigation and ruled that the waiver of the right to counsel
would not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel:
At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of
the reason for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be
informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the
right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone he chooses by the most
expedient means by telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial
investigation shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be
waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory of
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
We reiterated the above ruling in People vs. Galit, 22 People vs. Lumayok, 23 People vs. Albofera,
People vs. Marquez, 25 People vs. Penillos, 26 and People vs. Basay, 27 among other cases.

24

The right to be informed of the right to remain silent and to counsel contemplates "the transmission of
meaningful information rather than just the ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle." 28 It is not enough for the investigator to merely repeat to the person under
investigation the provisions of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution or Section 12, Article III of the
present Constitution; the former must also explain the effects of such provision in practical terms, e.g.,
what the person under investigation may or may not do, and in language the subject fairly understands.

The right to be informed carries with it a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain,
and contemplates effective communication which results in the subject understanding what is conveyed.
Since it is comprehension that is sought to be attained, the degree of explanation required will necessarily
vary and depend on the education, intelligence, and other relevant personal circumstances of the person
undergoing the investigation.
In further ensuring the right to counsel, it is not enough that the subject is informed of such right; he
should also be asked if he wants to avail of the same and should be told that he can ask for counsel if he
so desires or that one will be provided him at his request. If he decides not to retain counsel of his choice
or avail of one to be provided for him and, therefore, chooses to waive his right to counsel, such waiver, to
be valid and effective, must be made with the assistance of counsel. That counsel must be a lawyer. 29
The waiver of the right to counsel must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. 30 Consequently, even if the
confession of an accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance off counsel, it is
inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. 31
The extrajudicial admission of the appellant, 32 contained in twenty-two pages of yellow pad, does, indeed,
appear to be signed by him and Atty. Reynaldo Cajucom. what we find in these yellow pads are
stenographic notes. these were transcribed by the stenographer who took down the stenographic notes,
but for reasons not explained in the records, the transcript of the notes (Exhibit "C"), which consists of
twelve pages, 33 was not signed by the appellant since it does not indicate any jurat. On the other hand,
the same stenographic reporter, who took down the stenographic notes when accused Wilfredo Quiao
was being investigated by City Fiscal Balajadia, transcribed the notes, and the transcription 34 was
subscribed and sworn to by the accused before City Fiscal Balajadia and also signed by Atty. Cajucom,
who represented the accused in the investigation.
Since we cannot even reads or decipher the stenographic notes in the yellow pads, we cannot expect the
appellant, who is a farmer and who reached only the fourth grade, to read or decipher its contents. We
have to rely solely on the transcript and presume its accuracy. A perusal of the transcript convinces us
that the appellant was not given a fair deal and was deprived of his rights under Section 12(1), Article III of
the Constitution. Firstly, he was not fully and properly informed of his rights. The transcript (Exhibit "C")
shows the following preliminary questions of the City Fiscal and the answers of the appellant:
01. QUESTION Mr. Jaime Agustin, I am informing you that
you
are
under
investigation
in
connection
with
the
death
of
Dr.
Nap
Bayquen
of
which
you
are
one
of
the
principal
suspects.
I
am
informing
you
of
your
constitutional
rights
before
you
give
any
statement.
First,
you
have
the
right
to
remain
silent
meaning,
you
may
give
a
statement
or
you
may
not
give
any
statement.
If
you
will
not
give
a
statement,
you
will
not
be
forced
to
do
so,
do you understand this right?
ANSWER I understand, sir.
02.
Q

If
you
will
give
a
statement,
you
have
the
right
to
be
assisted
by
a
lawyer
of
your
own
choice,
if
you
cannot
afford
to
secure
the
services
of
a
lawyer
the
government
will
provide
a
lawyer
for
you,
do
you
understand
this right?

A I understand, sir.
03.
Q
lawyer?

Now,

do

you

want

to

be

assisted

by

A Yes, sir.
04.
Q

I
am
now
person
of
Atty.
present
in
this
wish
to
avail
of
with this investigation?

informing
you
that
a
lawyer
in
the
Reynaldo
Cajucom
is
now
investigation
room,
do
you
his
assistance
in
connection

A I want, sir.
05.
Q

I
am
also
informing
you
that
whatever
you
say
in
this
investigation
can
be
used
as
evidence
in
your
favor
and
it
can
also
be
used
as
evidence
against
you
in
any
criminal
or civil case, do you understand that?
A Yes, sir, I understand.
06.
Q
rights,
statement?

are

After
you

informing
now

you
of
willing

your
to

constitutional
give
a

A Yes, sir, I agree.

Investigator

Atty.
Reynaldo
respondent
Jaime
Agustin
give
him
assistance
in
you willing to assist him?

Cajucom,
the
witness
or
has
chosen
you
to
this
investigation,
are

Answer I am willing, fiscal, to assist the witness.

Investigator

constitutional rights?

Have

you

appraised

[sic]

him

of

his

Answer Yes, fiscal.

Investigator

Do
you
know
or
not
he
is
giving
statement
of
his
own
intimidation or force exerted on him?
A

As
stated
a
free
and
what really happened.

by
him,
voluntary

after
examining
him
whether
a
free
and
voluntary
volition
without
any

fiscal,
he
statement

is
in

willing
to
relation

give
to

It is at once observed that the appellant was not explicitly told of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel of his choice, specifically asked if he had in mind any such counsel and, if so,
whether he could afford to hire his services, and, if he could not, whether he would agree to be assisted

by one to be provided for him. He was not categorically informed that he could waive his rights to remain
silent and to counsel and that this waiver must be in writing and in the presence of his counsel. He had, in
fact, waived his right to remain silent by agreeing to be investigated. Yet, no written waiver of such right
appears in the transcript and no other independent evidence was offered to prove its existence.
Secondly, Atty. Cajucom can hardly be said to have been voluntarily and intelligently "accepted" by the
appellant as his counsel to assist him in the investigation. Atty. Cajucom's presence in the Office of the
City fiscal at the time the appellant was brought there for investigation is unclear to us. At least two
possibilities may explain it: it was a mere coincidence in the sense that he happened to be attending to
some professional matter, or he was earlier called by the City Fiscal for the purpose of giving free legal
aid to the appellant. These possibilities are not remote but whether it was one or the other, it is clear to us
that Atty. Cajucom was in fact foisted upon the appellant, for as shown in the above-quoted portion of
Exhibit "C," the city fiscal immediately suggested the availability of Atty. Cajucom without first distinctly
asking the appellant if he had a counsel of his own choice and if he had one, whether he could hire such
counsel; and if he could not, whether he would simply exercise his right to remain silent and to counsel. In
short, after the appellant said that he wanted to be assisted by counsel, the City fiscal, through suggestive
language, immediately informed him that Atty. Cajucom was ready to assist him.
While it is true that in custodial investigations the party to be investigated has the final choice of counsel
and may reject the counsel chosen for him by the investigator and ask for another one, 35 the
circumstances obtaining in the custodial interrogation of the appellant left him no freedom to intelligently
and freely do so. For as earlier stated, he was not even asked if he had a lawyer of his own choice and
whether he could afford to hire such lawyer; on the other hand, the city Fiscal clearly suggested the
availability of Atty. Cajucom. then too, present at that time were Capt. Antonio Ayat and Sgt. Roberto
Rambac, military officers of RUC I, who brought him to the City Fiscal's Office for investigation in the
afternoon of the day when he was unlawfully arrested in Sto. Tomas, Pangasinan. Along Kennon road, on
the way to Baguio City, he was coerced and threatened with death if he would not admit knowing "Jun"
and "Sonny" and hi participation in the crime. This testimony was unrebutted by the prosecution. The
presence of the military officers and the continuing fear that if he did not cooperate, something would
happen to him, was like a Damocles sword which vitiated his free will.
Why it was the City Fiscal who had to conduct the custodial investigation is beyond us. Nothing in the
records shows that at that time the criminal cases against the culprits had already been filed with the City
Fiscal's Office for preliminary investigation and had, therefore, ceased to be a police matter. If they had
been so filed, then the City Fiscal should have followed the usual course of procedure in preliminary
investigations. It appears, however, from the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 4647-R and 46648-R
that it was Assistant City Fiscal Octavio M. Banta who conducted the preliminary investigation and who
prepared, signed, and certified the informations. city Fiscal Balajadia merely approved them and
administered the jurat in the certification. the conclusion then is inevitable that he did not conduct the
preliminary investigation.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the appellant voluntarily agreed to be assisted by Atty.
Cajucom, we doubt it very much if he was an independent counsel. While we wish to give him the benefit
of the doubt because he is an officer of the court upon whose shoulders lies the responsibility to see to it
that protection be accorded the appellant and that no injustice be committed to him, 36 and, moreover, he
generally has in his favor the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duties, 37 there are
special circumstances in these cases which convince us that he was unable to assist the appellant in a
satisfactory manner. For one, he admitted on cross-examination that at that time, and even until the time
he took the witness stand, he was an associate of the private prosecutor, Atty. Arthur Galace, in these and
the companion cases. Thus:
Q Mr. Witness, at the time you assisted the accused you belonged to the
office of Atty. Galace, you were an associate at the time when you
assisted the accused?

A I was represented [sic] then as IBP Legal Aid.

Q The question is not answered, we are only requesting him if he was an
associate of Atty. Galace up to the present?
A Yes. 38
Then we have misgivings on whether Atty. Cajucom was in fact understood by the appellant when the
former informed the appellant of his constitutional rights in English and Tagalog considering that the
appellant, a fourth grader and a farmer, could only understand Ilocano. Thus:
ATTY. TABIN:
So in other words when you appraised [sic] him of his constitutional
rights using English Language and Tagalog Dialect you did not have any
Ilocano dialect Interpreter. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
WITNESS:
As far as I can remember, I explained it in Tagalog and English.

39

And when asked whether he was sure if the appellant understood him, Atty. Cajucom merely answered:
A At least I put everything as far as I could give to him to appraise [sic]
him of his constitutional rights. 40
Then too, even if he were fully understood by the appellant, we are not satisfied that his explanations
were adequate. On direct examination, he gave the following answers:
Q Did you explain the constitutional rights of the accused to
caution him of the consequences of his statement?
A I explained to him that he has the right to remain silent, to
confront in person the witnesses against him and that he has
the right to choose a counsel to assist him in the hearing of
the case which was being investigated then.
Q And what was his reply regarding the consequences of this
statement?
A He told me that he is willing to give a truthful statement and
in order to shed light. 41
It appears to us that Atty. Cajucom did not actually impress upon the appellant that he was one of the
accused; rather, Atty. Cajucom made the appellant believe that he was only a witness. Thus:
Q [by the prosecutor]
But, nevertheless,
entitled to any witness?

you

gave

the

precautionary

measure

A Yes, sir.
Q Why do you say that it was given voluntarily?
A Before presenting him to the investigation we were given
time to talk personally without any other people and that
was the time that I explained to him all his rights and
consequences pertaining to him as witness to this case. 42
On cross-examination, Atty. Cajucom also declared:
ATTY. TABIN:
That is why I am requesting him how he explained in that language, Your
Honor.
WITNESS:
I told him that this is a grave case which he would be giving some
narrations as a witness and his involvement would mean the most
grievous offense and if found guilty will bring him for some years in jail
and I told him that I could help him if he will be presenting the truth and
narrate is the truth. This is in combination, English and Tagalog, and
most of the time, I made it in Tagalog. 43
Moreover, considering that the appellant is familiar only with Ilocano, the Court has serious doubts about
his ability to understand Atty. Cajucom's explanation of his constitutional rights since Atty. Cajucom did so
in English and Tagalog.
Finally, Atty. Cajucom knew, as admitted by him on cross-examination, that the appellant was picked up
on 10 February 1987 by military men in Pangasinan without a warrant for his arrest. 44 Since the crimes
with which the appellant was charged were allegedly committed on 6 September 1986 or more than five
months earlier, no arrest without a warrant could have been legally and validly effected. a warrantless
arrest should comply with the conditions prescribed in Section 5, rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Said
section provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
None of these exceptional circumstances were present at the time the appellant was arrested on 10
February 1987. The prosecution did not even insinuate that the crimes were committed in the presence of
the arresting officers (for otherwise they could have arrested the appellant on 6 September 1986 yet) or

that the appellant was a prisoner who had escaped from his place of detention; or that the crimes had just
been committed for they were in fact committed more than five months earlier. Atty. Cajucom knew or
ought to have known that the arrest was unlawful. If he were then truly moved by his duty to fully assist
the appellant, he should have forthwith taken the appropriate measures for the immediate release of the
appellant instead of allowing the City Fiscal to investigate him. Needless to say, the conduct of Atty.
Cajucom under the circumstances only strengthen our belief that the appellant had all the cards stacked
against him.
Thus, we do not hesitate to declare the appellant's extrajudicial statement inadmissible in evidence
because it was obtained in violation of Section 12 (1), Article III of the Constitution. since it is the only
evidence which links him to the crimes of which he was convicted, he must then be acquitted.
His acquittal must not write finis to these murder cases. These crimes must be solved and the triggerman
and the mastermind apprehended. We see in these cases the failure of the Government to exert the
necessary efforts to bring the guilty parties to the bar of justice. Until now, the accused, who were
implicated by the triggerman as having ordered for a price the murder of Dr. Bayquen, remain at large and
the records do not show any diligent effort to effect their arrest. The triggerman escaped while in the
custody of the PC/INP at Camp Dangwa. The City Prosecutor's Office of Baguio City should then use all
the resources at its command, in coordination with the law-enforcement agencies of the Government,
such as the National Bureau of Investigation and the Philippine National Police, to immediately arrest the
other accused.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered REVERSING the challenged judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, branch 3, Baguio City, in Criminal Case No. 4647-R and Criminal Case No. 4648-R, and
ACQUITTING appellant JAIME "JIMMY" AGUSTIN. His immediate release from confinement is hereby
ORDERED unless for some other lawful cause his continued detention is warranted.
Costs de oficio.

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-28355 July 17, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. APOLINARIO LUMANTAS
@ PEOLE, Defendant-Appellant.
Enrique
D.
Tayag
as
counsel
de
officio
for
defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de
Castro and Solicitor Norberto P. Eduardo for plaintiff-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

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Olimpio Badiang and Apolinario Lumantas were convicted of the crime of murder by the
Honorable Mariano A. Zosa of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental (Branch III Oroquieta) and sentenced to different penalties. The dispositive part is phrased as follows:
...; and, pursuant to the provisions of Article 248 taken together with the provisions of
Article 14, paragraphs 9 and 15 and Article 64, paragraph 6 of the same Revised Penal Code, as
to Olimpio Badiang alias Lim, the court sentences him to suffer an imprisonment of
SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS, FOUR (4) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY to TWENTY (20) YEARS

of Reclusion Temporal; and, likewise sentences Apolinario (Peole) Lumantas, who, after having
made a stab wound to the deceased, fleed (sic) from the scene of the crime, to suffer an
imprisonment of one degree lower or TEN (10) YEARS, and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor in
its maximum period, to indemnify the heirs of Laureto Limpahan in the sum of P1,500.00 each,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to pay the proportionate costs of the
proceedings and suffer the accessory penalties provided for by law.
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The instruments exhibited are hereby declared confiscated.

Both accused appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, but the appeal of Olimpio
Badiang was dismissed on 14 September 1965 upon his own petition. The Court of Appeals
found that the imposable penalty upon the remaining appellant, Apolinario Lumantas, is
reclusion perpetua, for which reason it certified the case to the Supreme Court. 1
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The evidence on record shows that many people had gathered in the marketplace of
Mobod, Oroquieta, Misamis Occidental, at about five o'clock in the afternoon of Thursday, 14
November 1963. Although it was not a market day, a fair was being held in extended celebration
of All Saints' Day. There was cockfighting and a "hantak" game was being played. Among the
players in the said game was the late Laureto (or Laurito) Limpahan.
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The principal witness for the prosecution, Francisco Bati-on, who was about two (2)
meters away from where the "hantak" game was being played (t.s.n., page 31), saw accused
Badiang and Lumantas at both sides of the deceased. This witness narrated what happened
moments later, as follows:
Q. - You said that you knew Apolinario Lumantas, do you know what he was doing at that time?

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A. - I saw only Peoley (Apolinario Lumantas) who was standing beside Laurito Limpahan.
Q. - What did Peoley do there?

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A. - When Laurito was in the "hantak" game I saw him stood up and counted his money; and, it
was at that time that this Lim Badiang slapped him with the back of his palm at his face and with
his left hand delivered a thrust to him.
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Q. - What happened next?

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A. - When Laurito was hit (witness was pointing to the left side of his body his hand up; next he
made a motion jerking up) and then Peoley stabbed him at the right side of the body (witness
pointing to the right side of his body below the armpit). When Peoley stabbed him, Lim stabbed
him by the left hand.
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Q. - You said that Apolinario Lumantas stabbed Laurito Limpahan where did that land in the
body of Limpahan? .
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A. - Peoley thrust him to the right armpit of Laurito. (T.S.N., pages 11-12) (sic)

After he was stabbed, Laurito Limpahan ran away, with Badiang and Lumantas in pursuit.
Limpahan collapsed after running a distance of ten meters. Badiang kicked him in the face.
Prosecution witness Bati-on, who was a friend of Badiang, entreated the latter to stop kicking
Limpahan as he was already dead, but Badiang tried to stab Bati-on instead. When Lumantas saw
that Limpahan was dead, accused left the place and went home.
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The people scampered away even as Badiang brandished his bloody bolo and challenged
everyone to a fight. Policeman Hospecio Pausal happened to be in the marketplace at the time,
serving subpoena. He was attracted by the commotion and, seeing Olimpio Badiang carrying a
bolo covered with blood, fired a shot in the air and commanded Badiang to put down his
weapon. Badiang did as commanded. Pausal brought him to the municipal building and turned
him over to the guard on duty.
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Policeman Pausal inspected the body of Laurito Limpahan and found at the left side a
sharp-pointed bolo, with the blade partly drawn from its scabbard about two (2) inches, and an
Indian slingshot in the right pocket.
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The municipal health officer of Oroquieta, Dr. Henry Y. Dullin, performed a post-mortem
examination of the cadaver of Laureto Limpahan at eight o'clock that evening and found the
following:
- wound located over the left chest just below the nipple about 4 inches in length, deep
penetrating which injured the heart, lung and great blood vessels around the heart and lungs;
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- wound located over the right axilla about 2 inches in length, deep;

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- wound located over the right chest about 2 inches in length, deep, situated over the 6 intercostal
space along the right mid-axillary line;
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- wound over the left forearm lateral surface 5 inches in length;

- wound over the right thenar eminence;

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- abrasion over the forehead, bridge of the nose and left cheek. (Exhibit "A")
As this appeal pertains only to Apolinario Lumantas, we shall limit this review to his case,
skipping the version of his co-accused, Olimpio Badiang.
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The appellant's defense is alibi, claiming that at the time of the commission of the crime, in
the afternoon of 14 November 1963, he was not at Mobod but at Upper Lamak, about one and a
half to two kilometers away, to gather tuba from 17 coconut trees.
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Appellant argues that the testimony of prosecution witness Francisco Bati-on is unreliable
because while he recognized the weapon used by Badiang the witness was not clear on the
weapon used by appellant Lumantas. This uncertainty as to the kind of weapon used does not
necessarily impair his reliability. There was a wound just below the left nipple of the deceased,

while two wounds existed at the right side of his body. These wounds tally with Bati-on's
testimony that Badiang inflicted one wound at the left and the knife came out at the right side,
and that the second wound at the right side of the victim was inflicted by Lumantas. Bati-on's
non-recognition of the weapon used by Lumantas did not alter the fact that the latter did use a
weapon to produce the wound described.
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Neither do we find that this eyewitness acted through improper motives, the charge of
personal enmity by the accused not being adequately supported.
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A defense witness, Anselmo Mahawan, testified that, as a member of the police force at the
time of the stabbing, he was designated to look for witnesses. He went to the scene of the crime,
saw the mother of the deceased crying over her son, and asked her about the companion of her
son. The mother pointed to Francisco Bati-on. When Mahawan inquired from Bati-on what he
knew about the incident, Bati-on denied knowledge of anything. This testimony of defense
witness Mahawan was unrebutted; but while the fact that Bati-on denied any knowledge about
the crime soon after its commission before the investigating policeman reduces the credibility of
Bati-on, such diminution is not substantial. It is not unusual for witnesses at first refusing to be
involved in a criminal proceeding. The witness disclosed what he knew about the incident shortly
thereafter, on 16 November 1963, when he signed a statement taken from him by the police at
the municipal building; gave additional answers to interrogations by the municipal judge; and
swore to the truth thereof on 17 November 1963 (CFI Criminal Case Rec. Wrapper, page 7). This
sworn statement was not offered in evidence, but it forms part of the record of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the municipal judge and can be taken judicial notice of by both the
trial court and the Supreme Court. (People vs. Bautista, 60 Phil. 1026)
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Alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused (People vs. De la
Cruz, 76 Phil. 701). To establish it, the accused must show that he was at some other place for
such a period of time that it was impossible for him to have been at the place where the crime
was committed at the time of its commission (U.S. vs. Oxiles, 20 Phil. 587; People vs. Palomos,
49 Phil. 601; People vs. Resabal, 50 Phil. 780). These requisites accused-appellant failed to
establish; he did not even show how long he stayed in Upper Lamak, which was only two
kilometers away from the Mobod market place.
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Appellant Lumantas props his defense of alibi with the fact that prosecution witness,
policeman Hospecio Pausal, did not see said appellant in the market place when he apprehended
Badiang after the stabbing incident. That appellant was not seen by Pausal may be explained by
the fact that appellant Lumantas had left the place when he saw that Limpahan was already dead,
and the patrolman's attention was concentrated on Badiang who was challenging all and sundry
while brandishing a bolo.
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The prosecution did not prove any motive of appellant Lumantas for committing the crime,
but lack of motive does not preclude conviction of the offense when the crime and the
participation of the accused are definitely proved, as was done in this case (People v. Tanco, 58
Phil. 255; People v. Reyno, L-19071, 30 April 1965; People v. Villalba, L-17243, 23 August
1966, 17 SCRA 948).
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The crime committed is murder, qualified by treachery, established by the sudden and
unexpected attack upon the victim by the two accused, who situated themselves on both sides of
the deceased and rendered the victim unable to defend himself (U.S. vs. Castellon, 2 Phil. 160;
People vs. Macarinfas, 40 Phil. 1). Abuse of superior strength also attended the commission of
the crime, but this circumstance is absorbed in treachery (People v. Limaco, 88 Phil. 35; People
v. Ruzol, et al., 100 Phil. 537).
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The Solicitor General admits that the prosecution failed to prove evident premeditation
(Brief, page 10). We agree; and we, likewise, find no mitigating circumstance.
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Murder is penalized by "reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death" (Article 248,
Revised Penal Code). Since there is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty
should have been imposed in its medium period, which is reclusion perpetua.
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The errors of the trial court in the imposition of the penalties, based on its own findings,
are at once noticeable; for, having declared Olimpio Badiang 2 guilty of murder, with the
aggravating circumstances of recidivism and superior strength (Nos. 9 & 15, Article 14, Revised
Penal Code), without any mitigating circumstance, the court imposed the minimum penalty for
murder, reclusion temporal, instead of the maximum, which is death, and misapplied Article 64,
paragraph 6, 3 of the code, on the wrong assumption that the maximum penalty for murder is the
maximum period of reclusion temporal. As for Apolinario Lumantas, the court imposed upon
him a penalty one degree lower because, after stabbing the victim, he fled from the scene of the
crime. Flight may indicate guilt, 4 but certainly, it is not a reward for committing a crime nor a
mitigation of criminal responsibility. On the contrary, the simultaneity of the attacks and the
strategy of assailing the deceased from both sides fully establish conspiracy and common
intent.
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Not the least of its error, also on the face of the dispositive portion of its decision, is the
trial court's imposition of compensatory damages in the amount of P3,000.00 for the death of the
victim (P1,500.00 from each of the two accused). The decision was promulgated on 12
December 1964, but the then existing jurisprudence (since 1948, People vs. Amansec, 80 Phil.
424) fixed the amount of indemnification at P6,000.00. The amount was later raised to
P12,000.00 in People vs. Pantoja, L-18793, 11 October 1968.
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Normally, co-conspirators of a crime are held jointly and severally liable in the amount of
P12,000.00, by way of indemnification for the death of their victim. But here, the trial court
condemned Olimpio Badiang to pay only P1,500.00, and the decision with respect to him has
become final when his appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeals at his own request. The
question, therefore, arises: how much should the co-conspirator, Apolonio Lumantas, the herein
remaining appellant, be made to pay? We believe that, in justice to the heirs of Laurito
Limpahan, he should pay an indemnity of P12,000.00, but with the right to demand contribution
from his co-accused in the sum of P1,500.00. While it may appear that this award is to some
extent unfair to this appellant, it is a necessary consequence of the withdrawal of Badiang's
appeal, which rendered final the low indemnity awarded by the court below (erroneous though it
should be), and above all, to the need of doing justice to the heirs of the victim, whose right to
adequate indemnification is paramount.
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FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the appealed decision, insofar as Apolinario

Lumantas is concerned, is hereby modified to the effect that he shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua, with its accessory penalties, and to pay the heirs of Laurito Limpahan the
amount of P12,000.00, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
proportionate share of the costs; but with a right to demand contribution from his co-accused
Olimpio Badiang, in the sum of P1,500.00, to the payment of which said Badiang was sentenced
by the court below.
Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Fernando, Capistrano,
Teehankee, and Barredo, JJ., concur.
Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC
G.R. No. 6817

July 31, 1958

ESTEFANIA
R.
VDA.
DE
PIROVANO,
vs.
DE LA RAMA STEAMSHIP CO., INC., defendant-appellee.
Angel
S.
Del Rosario and Garcia for appellee.

Gamboa

plaintiff-appellant,

for

appellant.

PADILLA, J.:
Plaintiff seeks to recover from the defendant the sum of P221,975.45, the balance of the amount
of dividends at P100 per share, declared by Resolution No. 50-127 of 29 December 1950, to
which she is entitled as the registered owner of 3,424 shares of stock in the defendant
corporation, after deducting the sum of P120,424.55 she had withdrawn or received from the
defendant for advances made to her after the death of the late Esteban de la Rama, 20 per cent of
the sum sought to be recovered for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation by way of damages,
and costs.
Answering the complaint, the defendant avers that although the plaintiff is entitled to the
dividends claimed in the complaint, yet she is indebted to the defendant as of 29 December 1950
in the sum of P444,202.52, and that by reason of the unnecessary commencement of the suit, the
defendant suffered damages in the sum of P100,000. Upon the foregoing allegations the
defendant asks for the dismissal of the complaint and prays that judgment rendered condemning
the plaintiff to pay the amount of damages it has suffered and costs.
After hearing, the Court dismissed both the complaint and the counterclaim without
pronouncement as to costs. The plaintiff has appealed.

Appellant's theory is that the cash advances to her in the United States during the Pacific War for
her personal expenses and for the support and education of her children were assumed by
Esteban de la Rama, as set forth in his letter dated 5 May 1947 (Exhibit B) to the appellee and
the Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc., consented to and approved by both corporations. She
claims that the advances made to her by the appellee were debited against the account of Hijos
de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc., another corporation practically owned by Esteban de Ia Rama; that
the only sum the appellee corporation may deduct from the amount of dividends to which she is
entitled is P120,424.55 which she received after the death of her father Esteban de la Rama and
was not assumed by him; and that as a matter of fact in special proceedings No. 401 of the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo for the administration and settlement of the estate of the late Esteban de
la Rama, the Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc., filed a claim charging the estate with the
aforesaid advances for expenses of the appellant and of her children which had been assumed by
the deceased in his lifetime, a claim which, although reduced to P26,000 as per Ballentyne
schedule of monetary value, was approved by the Court of First Instance of Iloilo on 27
September 1950, and the executor of the estate of the late Esteban de la Rama was directed to
pay the claim thus allowed (Exhibit O).
The appellee resists appellant's claim upon the ground that the assumption by Esteban de la
Rama of the total sum of withdrawals by the appellant for her expenses and of her children was
never consented to by the appellee and hence not binding upon it; and that the accounting
method by which the withdrawals were charged against the Hijas de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc.
was to circumvent the prohibition imposed upon the appellee to declare dividends, agreed upon
in the deed of trust executed by the appellee and the National Development Company, a
prohibition which lasted from 26 February 1940 to 23 September 1949 (Exhibit 7).
There is no dispute that the appellant is the registered owner of 3,424 shares of stock in the
appellee corporation; that on 29 December 1950 the appellee by Resolution No. 50-127 declared
a dividend of P100 for each share of stock; that the appellee further resolved that the personal
accounts of the stockholders of the De la Rama Steamship Co., Inc., which include that of the
appellant in the sum of P444,202.52 set up in the books of De la Rama Steamship Co., Inc.
against the Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc., be credited to the account of the last named
corporation and debited to accounts receivable from the stockholders; and that from the amount
of dividends, the personal account of each and every stockholder be deducted (Exhibit A-1).
The determination of the controversy hinges on whether the assumption made by the late Esteban
de la Rama in his lifetime of all the advances made by the appellee to the appellant was binding
upon it. There is no doubt that because of the prohibition agreed upon in the deed of trust to the
effect that no dividends could be declared by the appellee during the period of time already
stated, advances to the stockholders would constitute a violation of section 12 of the deed of
trust. For that reason it was made to appear that such advances were made to the Hijos de I. de la
Rama & Co., Inc. and debited the same against the latter in the books of the appellee, and in the
books of the Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc. the said advances were debited against the
individual the stockholders, the stockholders of both corporations being the same. The pivotal
point is whether the assumption by Esteban de la Rama of the advances made to the appellant by
the appellee, as stated in his letter of 5 May 1947, was consented to by the appellee to constitute
a novation. Express sent by the creditor is necessary to substitute another for the debtor. 1 Such

consent does not appear to have been given by the board of directors of the appellee. Corporate
acts of a corporation must appear in its books or records. No such consent appears in the books
or records of the appellee.
The appellant does not dispute the total sum of her withdrawals which is P444,202.52 as claimed
by the appellee.
Aside from the letter of 5 May 1947 of Esteban de la Rama, the appellant relies upon the
financial statements and books of the appellee where the withdrawals by the appellant were
entered in the account of Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc. or transferred to the account of
Esteban de la Rama. The entries on the withdrawals by the appellant entered in the account of
Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc. or transferred to the account of Esteban de la Rama have
already been explained satisfactorily. They were done so in order to circumvent the prohibition
referred to above. As a matter of fact the withdrawals made by the appellant were made by her
and not by the Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc. Nor is there any evidence that those advances
were used by the Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc.
As to the inclusion of the withdrawals made by the appellant in the claim of the Hijos de I. de la
Rama & Co., Inc. filed against the estate of the late Esteban de la Rama in special proceedings
No. 401 of the probate court of Iloilo and allowed by the court although in a reduced amount,
suffice it to say that such act of the Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc. cannot and does not bind
the appellee. Its appearance in the probate court was by order of that court of 19 June 1950
(Exhibit M), and in its pleading the appellee disclaimed any interest in the claim filed by the
Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc. against the estate of the late Esteban de la Rama (Exhibit N).
Resolution No. 50-127 of the board of directors of the appellee of 29 December 1950, whereby a
cash dividend of P2,000,000 was declared in favor of stockholders of record as of 1 December
1950, or at the rate of P100 per share, subject to the conditions already stated, does not suffer
from any legal infirmity. The segregation from the account of Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc.
and the setting up in the books of the De la Rama Steamship Co., Inc. of withdrawals made by
the stockholders of the appellee as accounts receivable due from said stockholders was even
suggested by the President of Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc. in a letter dated 9 April 1945,
addressed to the De la Rama Steamship Co., Inc. (Exhibit A-1).
There is no room for the application of the in pari delicto principle to the instant case, because
the appellee corporation and the Hijos de I. de la Rama & Co., Inc. have committed no crime or
violation of law, but a violation of section 12 of the deed of trust by the appellee corporation
which gave rise to a cause of action by the National Development Company, the injured party,
against the appellee corporation. However, the National Development Company chose not to
avail itself of its right.
The appellant must answer for the personal advances made to her by the appellee corporation
and the latter may set off the total sum of such advances against the amount of dividends to
which she is entitled.

For the foregoing considerations, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without
pronouncement as to costs.
Paras, C. J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J. B. L.,
Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-20241 November 22, 1974
IN THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION OF ONE PARCEL OF LAND SITUATED AT PANAKAGAN, PATIIS, SAN MATEO, RIZAL.
LUIS
R.
SANTIAGO,
applicant-appellant,
vs.
PACITA V. DE LOS SANTOS and BUREAU OF FORESTRY, oppositors-appellees.
Luna & Manalo for applicant-appellant.
Fortunato de Leon for private oppositor-appellee.

FERNANDO, J.:p
It is an occurrence, not too often repeated, that counsel, either through a display of candor, which is commendable or a failure to appreciate
the untoward consequences, which is something else again, submits a pleading, which on its face demonstrates the lack of merit of the
action he has filed. It did happen here. Plaintiff, now appellant, applied for registration of a parcel of land. In a motion to set the case for
hearing, he attached documents indicative of the land being public in character, thus lending support to the opposition of the Director of
Forestry, the Director of Lands, and a certain Pacita V. de los Santos. The then Judge Cecilia Muoz Palma, now an Associate Justice of this
Court, dismissed the suit. Its reversal is sought in this appeal. It is to be admitted that the brief submitted by new counsel, the firm of Luna
and Manalo, is both thorough and comprehensive. It does not, however, avail. The infirmity of the case for appellant is incurable. We affirm.
The facts of the case and why it should be dismissed are set forth with clarity in the appealed order of the then Judge Muoz Palma. Thus:
"This is an application filed by Luis R. Santiago for registration of his title over a parcel of land containing an area of 1,288,337 sq. meters
located in San Mateo, Rizal. The application is opposed by the Director of Lands, Director of Forestry and by Mrs. Pacita V. de los Santos.
On September 15, 1961, after examination of the records, this Court ordered the applicant to show cause why his application should not be
dismissed outright on the ground that the property applied for is part of the public domain. Subsequently, motions to dismiss the application
were filed by the oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos and the Director of Forestry which motions are principally based on the allegation that the
property applied for is a portion of the public domain which was leased to Mrs. Pacita de los Santos under Pasture Lease Agreement No.
1305. After due consideration of the allegations of said oppositors and taking into account certain documents existing in the records of this
case, we find the Motion to Dismiss to be justified and meritorious. The Court makes reference to the documents attached to applicant's
motion dated August 24, 1961 all of which show that the land object of this registration proceeding is part of the public domain which was
leased under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 1305 to the oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos and which was excluded from said lease
1
agreement only in the month of August this year."

Even the most cursory reading of the order of dismissal can lead to no other conclusion except that it
should be affirmed. It would be an affront to reason if on the undisputed facts, there would be any other
outcome. It does follow therefore that notwithstanding the vigor with which the appeal is prosecuted by
new counsel, it does not and cannot suffice for a reversal.
1. The pleading that left no choice to the then Judge Muoz Palma except to dismiss the case reads thus:
"[Comes now] the Applicant by the undersigned counsel to this Honorable Court respectfully request that
the above-entitled Land Registration Case be calendared for hearing in view of the fact that a portion of
the said parcel of land subject of this registration which was claimed as part of the public forest has
already been released by the Honorable Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural
purposes as evidenced by its order dated August 10, 1961, ... ." 2 Attached to such pleading were the
documents, which, in the language of the then Judge Palma, "show that the land object of this registration
proceeding is part of the public domain ... ." Former counsel ought to have realized the fatal effect on his
client's case of such an admission. If it were his intention to demolish entirely the pretension of plaintiff to
the claim that he had been in open, public, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the
concept of owner from July 26, 1894 up to the present, he could not have succeeded any better. What
was so categorically therein set forth as to such parcel of land being a part of a public forest, although

thereafter released by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources for agricultural purposes, is
conclusive and binding. Our decisions from Irlanda v. Pitargue, 3 announced in a 1912 decision, to De
Borja v. Vda. de Borja, 4 promulgated in 1972, speak to that effect. "It is a familiar doctrine," according to
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Joe's Radio & Electrical Supply v. Alto Electronics Corp., 5 "that an admission
made in the pleadings cannot be controverted by the party making such admission and are conclusive as
to him, and that all proofs submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith, should be ignored,
whether objection is interposed by the party or not ... ." 6 Even if there had been a full hearing on the case,
therefore, the result would not have been any different. There was no choice then for the lower court
except to dismiss the complaint.
2. Laboring under such a handicap, how did the present counsel for plaintiff, the law firm of Luna and
Manalo, seek to extricate him from a predicament of his own making? It would rely on certain procedural
doctrines; more specifically, it would insist on the motion to dismiss of oppositor Pacita V. de los Santos
as not being entitled to recognition as there was a general order of default except as to the Bureau of
Lands and the Bureau of Forestry, not lifted as to her, and that she had no interest to oppose the
application of the registration of her land, although admittedly there was a claim on her part under a
pasture lease agreement in her favor. Hence the plea for the order of dismissal being set aside and
plaintiff being allowed to present evidence. What purpose, it may pertinently be asked, would be served
thereby if, after the time-consuming effort, it would clearly appear that plaintiff could not in truth show that
there was such an open, uninterrupted, peaceful and adverse possession in the concept of owner? Nor is
it to be forgotten that in the motion to dismiss of oppositor de los Santos, it was stated: "That the son of
applicant Luis Santiago, namely Juanito S. Santiago, was one time the Lessee of the aforesaid timber
area sought to be registered by him under Pasture Lease Agreement No. 182 on April 18, 1955, which
Lease Agreement was cancelled by the Government on August 18, 1958 for failure of Lessee Santiago to
make the improvements and comply otherwise with the terms and conditions of the Lease Contract; ... ." 7
There was no denial of such allegation. It is quite obvious then that the facts, no less than the law, call for
precisely the conclusion reached by the then Judge Muoz Palma.
There is here once more an apt illustration of the Moreland dictum in Alonso v. Villamor: 8 "Technicality,
when it deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts." 9 So, too, is this excerpt from an opinion of Chief Justice
Moran in Co Tiamco v. Diaz: 10 "Rules of pleading are intended to secure a method by which the issues
may be properly laid before the court. When those issues are already clear before the court, the
deficiency in the observance of the rules should not be given undue importance. What is important is that
the case be decided upon the merits and that it should not be allowed to go off on procedural points." 11 To
show how committed is this Court to such a doctrine, reference may be made to the opinion in Economic
Insurance
Company,
Inc.
v.
Uy
Realty
Company: 12 "It is understandable for a party in the situation of petitioner to make full use of every
conceivable legal defense the law allows it. In the appraisal, however, of such attempts to evade liability
to which a party like petitioner should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are
intended as an aid to justice, not as a means for its frustration. Even if the petition were impressed with a
greater degree of plausibility, it would be, considering all the circumstances, to crown with success an
unworthy scheme to evade a just obligation by perverting the ends procedural requisites are intended to
accomplish. Not once but several times, from Alonso v. Villamor, we have stressed that we are not to lend
the imprimatur of our approval to any such effort, the result of which would be to render illusory
substantive rights. We do so again. Technicalities, in the appropriate language of Justice Makalintal,
"should give way to the realities of the situation." 13 Well could Justice Cardozo observe: "A system of
procedure is perverted from its proper function when it multiplies impediments to justice without the
warrant
of
clear
necessity." 14
3. The appealed order of dismissal is thus impressed with merit. It has likewise in its favor the soundest
policy considerations, based no less on one of the prime objectives of the fundamental law. Both under
the 1935 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of the natural
resources is ordained. 15 There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary does not

scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they must be grounded
in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof would be forthcoming, there
is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic assumption of our polity that lands of
whatever classification belong to the state. 16 Unless alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights
over the same as dominus. Its disposition is justified only when shown that its utilization promotes the
public welfare. Especially so in case of doubt, considering that our forest resources have been unduly
depleted, courts should not lightly accept claims that a parcel of land no longer can be classified as
forestal. That is certainly one mode of assuring the realization of the national patrimony being held in trust
for future generations. There is thus fealty to the ideal of conservation.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of November 17, 1961 of the then Judge Muoz Palma is affirmed.
Costs against appellant Luis R. Santiago.

G.R. No. L-37420 July 31, 1984

MACARIA
A.
TORRES,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, TOMAS
NARCISO, AMADO NARCISO, SALUD NARCISO, DEMETRIA NARCISO and
ADELINA NARCISO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-37421 July 31, 1984
MACARIA
A.
TORRES,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICENTE SANTILLAN, ALFREDO NARCISO, SALUD
NARCISO, BALDOMERO BUENAVENTURA, DEMETRIA NARCISO, LEONARDO
QUINTO, ADELINA NARCISO, CESARIO PUNZALAN, TOMAS NARCISO and
AMADO NARCISO, respondents.
Juan R. Liwag for petitioner.
Cesar Nocon for respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, treated as a special civil action.

1 prays that the judgment

rendered by the then Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases, CA-G.R. NO. 34998-R entitled "Macaria A. Torres, plaintiff-appellee vs.
Vicente Santillan, et al., defendants-appellants", and CA-G.R. No. 34999-R entitled "Vicente Santillan, et al., plaintiffs-appellants vs. Macaria
A. Bautista, et al., defendants-appellees and the Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration and Petition for New Trial, be set aside;
and that, instead, The Order of the Court of First Instance of August 7, 1963 be affirmed, or, in the alternative, that the case be remanded to it
for new trial.
Involved in this controversy are the respective claims of petitioner and private respondents over Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon
Estate (part of the friar lands) in Tanza, Cavite, with an area of approximately 1,622 square meters. covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-6804 issued in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres.
The facts of the case cover three generations. The propositus, Margarita Torres, during the Spanish regime, was married to Claro Santillan.
Vicente and Antonina were begotten of this union. Claro died leaving Margarita a widow. Antonina married and had six children, namely:
Alfredo, Salud (married to Baldomero Buenaventura), Demetria (married to Leonardo Quinto), Adelina (married to Cesario Punzalan), Tomas
and Amado all surnamed Narciso, who, together with Vicente Santillan, are the private respondents. Antonina died before the institution of

the cases while Vicente died on June 4, 1957,

during the pendency of the cases in the Trial Courts, without

progeny .
After the death of her husband, Margarita Torres cohabited with Leon Arvisu Arbole, without benefit of
marriage. Out of their cohabitation, petitioner Macaria Torres (later married to Francisco Bautista) was
born on June 20, 1898, and baptized on June 26, 1898. In a Certificate of Baptism issued by the Parish
Priest of Tanza, Cavite, Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita Torres were named as father and mother of
petitioner whose name was listed as Macaria Arvisu", (Exhibit "C" Another Baptismal Certificate, however,
listed her name as Macaria Torres, while her father's name was left blank (Exhibit "4"). Subsequently, or
on June 7, 1909, Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres were married (Exhibit "A"). Petitioner lived with and
was reared by her parents. Margarita, the mother, died on December 20, 1931 (Exhibit "D"), while Leon,
the father, passed away on September 14, 1933 (Exhibit " E ").
Lot No. 551, an urban lot with an area of 1,622 sq. ms., more or less, had been leased temporarily by the
Government (Lease No. 17) to Margarita Torres who was the actual occupant of the lot. The date of the
lease cannot be determined with exactitude from the records. On December 13, 1910, the Government,
through the Director of Lands, issued to Margarita Torres, Sale Certificate No. 222 (Exhibit "B") over the
said lot at the price of P428.80, payable in 20 annual installments of P20.00 each. The rental/s previously
paid of P17.40 was credited to the purchase price. Testimonial evidence is to the effect that Leon Arbole
paid the installments out of his earnings as a water tender at the Bureau of Lands, Tanza, Cavite. The last
installment, however, was paid on December 17, 1936, or three (3) years after his death.
On August 25, 1933, twenty (20) days before his death, Leon Arbole sold and transferred in a notarial
deed all his rights and interest to the one-half (1/2) portion of Lot No. 551 in favor of petitioner, for the sum
of P300.00. 3
On June 6, 1953, Vicente Santillan executed an Affidavit claiming possession of Lot No. 551 and asking
for the issuance of title in his name, which he filed with the Bureau of Lands. Based thereon, the Bureau
of Lands issued the corresponding patent in the name of the legal heirs of Margarita Torres. Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-6804 was eventually issued by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on November 7,
1957, also in the name of said heirs.
On June 3, 1954, private respondents filed a complaint against petitioner for Forcible Entry, with the
Justice of the Peace Court of Tanza, Cavite, alleging that petitioner had entered a portion of Lot No. 551
without their consent, constructed a house. and refused to vacate upon demand. For her part, petitioner
claimed that she is a co-owner of the lot in question, being one of the daughters of Margarita Torres. The
ejectment case was decided against petitioner and the latter appealed to the then Court of First Instance
of Cavite, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 5547 (Ejectment Case).
On June 8, 1954, petitioner instituted an action for partition of Lot No. 551 before the then Court of First
Instance of Cavite, docketed as Civil Case No. 5505 (Partition Case), alleging that said lot was conjugal
property of the spouses Margarita Torres and Leon Arbole, and that she is their legitimated child. Private
respondents filed an Answer alleging that the lot belonged exclusively to Margarita Torres; that they are
her only heirs, and that the complaint for partition should be dismissed.
The Ejectment Case and the Partition Case were jointly tried and decided on November 20, 1958 with a
finding that Lot No. 551 is the paraphernal property of Margarita Torres and adjudicating to private
respondents two-thirds (2/3) of the property in equal shares, and to petitioner a one-third (1/3) portion. 4
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, which private respondents opposed. Pending its resolution, the
Provincial Capitol of Cavite was burned, resulting in the complete destruction of the records of the two
cases, which, however, were later partially reconstituted.

On August 7, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch 1, issued an Order granting
reconsideration and amending the Decision of November 20, 1958. The positive portion thereof reads as
follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. .5505:
(1) Declaring Macaria A. Torres as the legitimated child of the spouses Leon Arbole and
Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta. Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(3) Adjudicating four-sixths (4/6th of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria
Torres, and two-sixths (2/6th) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud, Demetria
and Adelina, all surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of the deceased
Antonina Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The parties may make the
partition among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation
by the Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should be alloted that portion
of the lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case
the parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three
commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 5
In concluding that petitioner is a legitimated child, the Trial Court opined:
It is undisputed that when Macaria A. Torres was born on June 20, 1898, her parents,
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, had the capacity to marry each other. There was no
legal impediment for them to marry It has also been established that Macaria A. Torres
had been taken care of, brought up and reared by her parents until they died. The
certificate of baptism (Exh. "G") also shows that Macaria Torres was given the family
name of Arvisu, which is also the family name of her father, Leon Arbole, and that her
father is Leon Arvisu and her mother is Margarita Torres. Such being the case, Macaria A.
Torres possessed the status of an acknowledged natural child. And when her parents
were married on June 7, 1909, she became the legitimated daughter of on Arbole and
Margarita Torres. 6
Private respondents appealed. On April 2, 1973, the then Court of Appeals
sought to be set aside herein, the decretal part of which states:

rendered the judgment

Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in Civil Case No. 5505:

(1) Declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses Leon
Arbole and Margarita Torres;
(2) Declaring that Lot No. 551 of the Sta Cruz de Malabon Estate is a conjugal
partnership property of the spouses Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres; and
(3) Adjudicating one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 551 of S.C. de Malabon Estate to Macaria
Torres, and the other half (1/2) in equal shares to Alfredo, Tomas, Amado, Salud,
Demetria and Adelina, an surnamed Narciso, legitimate children and heirs of Antonina

Santillan, since Vicente Santillan is already dead. The parties may make the partition
among themselves by proper instruments of conveyance, subject to confirmation by the
Court. In fairness, however, to the parties, each party should be alloted that portion of the
lot where his or her house has been constructed, as far as this is possible. In case the
parties are unable to agree upon the partition, the Court shall appoint three
commissioners to make the partition.
As to Civil Case No. 5547, the same is hereby dismissed.
Without costs in both cases. 8
The Appellate Court was of the opinion that:
Macaria A. Torres is not a legitimated daughter of Leon Arvisu Arbole and Margarita
Torres, the former not having been legally acknowledged before or after the marriage of
her parents. As correctly pointed out by the appellants in their brief, the fact that she was
taken cared of, brought up and reared by her parents until they died, and that the
certificate of baptism (Exhibit "C") shows that she was given the family name of Arvisu did
not bestow upon her the status of an acknowledged natural child.
Under Article 121 of the old Civil Code, the governing law on the matter, children shall be
considered legitimated by subsequent marriage only when they have been acknowledged
by the parents before or after the celebration thereof, and Article 131 of the same code
provides that the acknowledgement of a natural child must be in the record of birth, in a
will or in some public document. Article 131 then prescribed the form in which the
acknowledgment of a natural child should be made. The certificate of baptism of Macaria
A. Torres (Exhibit "C") is not the record of birth referred to in Article 131. This article of the
old Civil Code 'requires that unless the acknowledgement is made in a will or other public
document, it must be made in the record of birth, or in other words, in the civil register
(Samson vs. Corrales Tan, 48 PhiL 406). 9
A Motion for Reconsideration and for New Trial, dated April 16, 1973, was filed by petitioner. In support
thereof, petitioner submitted a typewritten Sworn Statement, dated March 5, 1930, of spouses Leon
Arvisu (Arbole) and Margarita Torres, 10 reading in full as follows:
SWORN STATEMENT
We, Leon Arvisu and Margarita Torres husband and wife respectively, of majority age,
and residents of the Municipality of Tanza, Province of Cavite, P.I., after being duly sworn
to according to law depose and say
That Macaria de Torres is our legitimized daughter she being born out of wedlock on the
26 th of June 1898 all Tanza, Cavite, but as stated she was legitimized by our subsequent
marriage.
That at the time of her birth or conception, we, her parents could have married without
dispensation had we desired.
That as natural child our aforesaid daughter was surnamed de Torres after that of her
mother's at the time she was baptized as per record on file in the Church.
That as a legitimized daughter she should now be surnamed Arvisu after her father's
family name.

Wherefore, it is respectfully requested to anybody concerned that proper remedy be

made for the change of the surname of said Macaria de Torres as desired.
In testimony hereof, we hereunto signed out names at Tanza, Cavite, this 5th day of
March 1930.

(Thumbmarked)
LEON ARVISU MARGARITA TORRES

(Thumbmarked)

Signed in the prsence of:

(Sgd.) Illegible (Sgd.) Macaria Bautista
x----------------------------------------------------x
UNITED
STATES
PHILIPPINE
MUNICIPALITY
OF
PROVINCE OF CAVITE )

OF
ISLANDS
TANZA

AMERICA
)

)
)
ss

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5th day of March 1930. The affiant Leon Arvisu
exhibited to me no cedula certificate being exempt on account of going over 60 years of
age and Margarita Torres having exhibited no cedula certificate being exempt on account
of her sex.
Witness my hand and seal of office on the date and place aforesaid.
CONSTANCIO
T.
VELASCO
Notary Public, Cavite
Province
Until Dec. 31, 1930.
Not.
Reg.
P.
Book No. III Series of 1930. 11

No.
No.

56
2

The reason given for the non-production of the notarial document during trial was that the same was only found by petitioner's daughter,
Nemensia A. Bautista, among the personal belongings of private respondent, Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his death and who
may have attempted to suppress it. Private respondents, for their part, argued against new trial, and contended that it is not newly
discovered evidence which could not have been produced during the trial by the exercise of due diligence.
The Decision of the Appellate Court was rendered by a Division of three, composed of Justices Jesus Y. Perez, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B.
Reyes, ponente. When the Motion for Reconsideration and New Trial was considered, there was disagreement, possibly as to whether or not
new trial should be granted in respect of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930. A Special Division of five was then formed, composed of
Justices Antonio Lucero Magno S. Gatmaitan, Lourdes P. San Diego, Jose N. Leuterio and Luis B. Reyes (Justice Perez having retired or
having disqualified himself). In a minute resolution of August 24, 1973, the Division of five, by a vote of three or two, denied both
reconsideration and new trial.
To warrant review, petitioner, has summarized her submission based on two assignments of error. The first was expressed as follows:
Although the Court of Appeals is correct in declaring that Macaria A. Torres is not the legitimated child of the spouses
Leon Arbole and Margarita Torres, it has overlooked to include in its findings of facts the admission made by Vicente
Santillan and the heirs of Antonina Santillan (herein respondents) that Macaria A. Torres and Vicente Santillan and

Antonina Santillan are brother and sisters with a common mother Margarita Torres and they are the legal heirs and
nearest of relatives of Margarita Torres, and as a consequence thereof, the Court of Appeals had drawn an incorrect
conclusion in adjudicating the entire share of Margarita Torres in the conjugal property solely to Vicente Santillan and
the heirs of Antonina Santillan. (emphasis supplied)
As we understand it, petitioner has conceded, with which we concur, that, without taking account of the sworn statement of March 5, 1930,
she cannot be considered a legitimated child of her parents. Continuous possession of the status of a natural child, fact of delivery by the
mother, etc. will not amount to automatic recognition, but an action for compulsory recognition is still necessary, which action may be
commenced only during the lifetime of the putative parents, subject to certain exceptions. 12
The admission adverted to appears in paragraph 3 of private respondents' original complaint in the Ejectment Case reading:
the plaintiffs and the defendant Macaria A. Bautista are the legal heirs and nearest of kins of Margarita Torres, who died
in Tanza, Cavite on December 20, 1931. (Emphasis supplied).
The statement, according to petitioner, is an admission of her legitimation and is controlling in the determination of her participation in the
disputed property.
We are not persuaded. In the Amended Complaint filed by private respondents in the same Ejectment Case, the underlined portion was
deleted so that the statement simply read:
That the plaintiffs are the legal heirs and nearest of kin of Margarita Torres, who died at Tanza, Cavite, on December
20, 1931.
In virtue thereof, the Amended Complaint takes the place of the original. The latter is regarded as abandoned and ceases to perform any
further function as a pleading. The original complaint no longer forms part of the record. 13
If petitioner had desired to utilize the original complaint she should have offered it in evidence. Having been amended, the original complaint
lost its character as a judicial admission, which would have required no proof, and became merely an extrajudicial admission, the
admissibility of which, as evidence, required its formal offer. Contrary to petitioner's submission, therefore there can be no estoppel by
extrajudicial admission made in the original complaint, for failure to offer it in evidence. 14
It should be noted that in the Partition Case private respondents, in their Answer (parag. 4), denied the legitimacy of petitioner.
The second error attributed to the Appellate Court has been pleaded as follows:
Also, the Court of Appeals has gravely abused its discretion when it denied the petition for new trial, knowing as it does
that the judgment is clearly erroneous in view of the evidence which is offered and no amount of diligence on the part of
the petitioner could it be produced in court at any time before it was offered as it was found from the personal
belongings of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party, after his death.
It is our considered opinion that new trial was warranted to prevent a possible miscarriage of justice. Assuming that the genuineness and due
execution of the Sworn Statement of March 5, 1930 is established in accordance with procedural due process, a new trial would resolve such
vital considerations as (1) whether or not said Sworn Statement qualifies as the public document prescribed in Article 131 of the old Civil
Code; 15 (2) whether or not it conforms to an act of acknowledgment by the parents after the celebration of their marriage as required by
Article 121 of the same code; 16 and (3) whether or not petitioner's signature as a witness to said document was the equivalent of the
consent necessary for acknowledgment of an adult person under Article 133 of that Code. 17 Affirmative answers would confer upon
petitioner the status of a legitimated child of her parents, and would entitle her to enjoy hereditary rights to her mother's estate.
Private respondents stress that since petitioner signed as a witness to the document she should be chargeable with knowledge of its
existence, and, therefore, the Sworn Statement was not newly discovered evidence. In our view, the document can reasonably qualify as
newly discovered evidence, which could not have been produced during the trial even with the exercise of due diligence; specially if it really
had been in the possession of Vicente Santillan, an adverse party who, it was alleged, suppressed the document.
In the interest of judicial expediency, the new trial can be conducted by respondent Appellate Court, now empowered to do so under Section
9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
WHEREFORE, this case is hereby remanded to the now Intermediate Appellate Court for new trial, and depending on its outcome, said
Court shall also resolve the respective participation of the parties in the disputed property, inclusive of the estate of the deceased Vicente
Santillan. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., and De la Fuente, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-39013 February 29,1988

FRANCISCO
BUNAG,
petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ESTRUDES BAUTISTA Vda. de BITUIN and BRUNO
BAUTISTA, respondents.

CORTES, J.:
The core of the controversy in this case is a thumb-marked. non-notarized and non-witnessed deed of sale of a parcel of unregistered land,
which on its face cannot but cause a prudent man to doubt its due execution and authenticity.
The facts are briefly summarized in the decision of the Court of Appeals:
The evidence of the plaintiff consisting of the sole testimony of said plaintiff is to the effect that the property in question
was originally owned by his father Apolonio Bunag Aguas as shown by Tax Declaration Nos. 546 for 1941 and 320 for
1960 (Exhs. B & E), located at San Nicolas, Betis, Pampanga; that he had been living in their house thereon with his
father until 1920 when they transferred their residence to Tarlac; that in 1925 their house thereon was demolished as it
was old; that they planted bamboos on the land; that Jose Bautista Santiago, a nephew-in-law, erected a house on said
lot and lived therein for sometime until he became a widower when he transferred to another house; that said Jose
Bautista Santiago one day accompanied his sister Estrudes Bautista to stay in that house; and that Santiago was
allowed by his father to build a house on said lot on condition that he would pay for the land taxes as compensation for
the use of the land. He admitted, however, that be only learned about this agreement from his father. On September
15,1962, and September 24,1962 he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista, thru his lawyer, to vacate the
lot and remove the houses thereon, (Exhs. A & B). The testimony of the other witness Juan Bunag was stricken from
the records as he failed to return to court for cross-examination.
On the other hand, the evidence for the defendant consist of the testimony of defendant Bruno Bautista who testified
that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale, of January 3, 1941, signed by Apolonio Bunag
with his thumbmark; that Bunag first offered it for sale to his brother Jose Bautista, but as the latter had no money, he
referred the matter to his father; that after he was contacted in Baguio by his father, he sent the P100.00 as
consideration of the sale and so the sale was consummated between his father and Bunag; that he came down from
Baguio and had the house repaired and he stayed there with his family until liberation when they left the house and
allowed his sister Estrudes Bautista to live therein; that he planted bananas, chicos, trees, calamansi, eggplants,
thereon; that he had been paying the land taxes thereon (Exhs. 5 to 5-M); that the property is declared in his name
(Exh. 6); and he denies that her sister Estrudes requested Apolonio Bunag to allow her to stay on the property as her
sister had a house of her own then.
Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said property from Apolonio Bunag and that she was present when
Bunag affixed Ms thumbmark on the document (Exh. 1); that aside from this deed, there were other documents
supporting the sale as the note (Exh. 2) containing the consideration and the parties. Assessor's Field Sheet of the
property (Exh. 3) and the letter of the assessor to Bunag in 1941 informing him of the revision of the assessment.
(Rollo, pp. 15-18).
The trial court decided in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of the decision reading as follows:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants, Bruno Bautista and
Estrudes Bautista vda. de Bituin, are hereby ordered to vacate the property herein described and to deliver possession
thereof to the plaintiff, Francisco Bunag; ordering the said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the land taxes of the
property up to and including the year 1968; and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P15.00 per month as reasonable rentals
thereof from the date of this judgment until the property is delivered to the plaintiff; to pay the plaintiff the sum of
P200.00 as expenses of litigation and costs. For lack of merit, the counterclaim of the defendants are dismiss (Rollo,
pp. 14-15)
The Court of Appeals, finding the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) to have been validly executed and, thus, concluding that "the preponderance of
evidence leans heavily in favor of the claim of the ownership of defendant Bruno Bautista" [Rollo p. 18], set aside the decision of the trial
court and dismissed the complaint. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in a minute resolution
for lack of merit.

Consequently, resolution of the instant petition primarily revolves around the issue of the due execution authenticity of the deed of sale
(Exhibit 1). The petitioner assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT "1") WAS DULY EXECUTED AND
AUTHENTICATED.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSION (SIC) NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was not acknowledged before a notary public and neither are there any
signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of attesting witnesses. The document is typewritten in English and over the similarly
typewritten words "APOLONIO BUNIAG" is a thumbprint.
The deed of sale (Exhibit 1) is not notarized and is, therefore, a private writing (U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596 (1908)], whose due execution and
authenticity must be proved before it can be received in evidence (Nolan v. Sales, 7 Phil. 1 (1906); U.S. v. Evangelists, 29 Phil. 215 (1915);
Antillon v. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148 (1917)].
Proof of the due execution and authenticity of private writings is required under Section 21, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:
Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. Before any private writing may be received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the writing executed;
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or
(c) By a subscribing witness.
To support its conclusion as to the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1), the Court of Appeals relied on the testimony
of Brigida Bautista, a sister of private respondents. She testified as follows:
Q. Who is the owner of the property?
A My brother Bruno Bautista.
Q. Do you know how your brother, Bruno Bautista, came to own the same property?
A. Yes, sir. He bought it from Apolonio Bunag.
Q. Do you know if there is any document evidencing the purchase of the said property from
Apolonio Bunag.?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Showing to you this document already marked as Exhibit 1, do you recognize this?
A. Yes, sir, this is the document showing the purchase and sale of the lot in litigation.
Q. At the bottom portion thereof, appears a thumbmark above the typewritten name Apolonio
Bunag, do you know whose thumbmark this is?
A. That is the thumbmark of Apolonio Bunag, sir, and I know that is his because I saw him affixed
(sic) his thumbmark. TSN, March 25,1967, pp. 1-2).
However, the trial court found proof of the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) wanting, reasoning that:

The testimony of this witness (Brigida Bautista) has to be received with caution, coming as it does from a sister of the
defendants. The circumstances other alleged presence during the "execution" of the deed of sale was not related.
Neither does she give any light as to whether Apolonio Bunag understood the document. It should be noted that
(Exhibit "1") was written in English. Since it appears that said document was merely thumb-marked, it could reasonably
be inferred that Apolonio Bunag, the supposed vendor, was illiterate. Under the stances, the minimum proof necessary
to establish due authenticity should, in the least, include evidence that the document (Exhibit "1") was duly read,
explained and translated to Apolonio Bunag. Unfortunately, no such evidence was presented. Another fact which
compels this Court to proceed with caution is the fact that there are no instrumental witnesses in the document. The
mischief that lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumb-marked. without any witnesses to it,
and not acknowledged before a notary public could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules on
evidence that a private writing must be shown to be duly executed and authenticated. The probative value of the
testimony of Brigida Bautista, who did not furnish us with any details surrounding the execution of Exhibit "l," coming as
it does from a person whose partisanship can not, and should not, be overlook (sic), fags short from (sic) the minimum
requirements of credibility. Indeed it has been said that the testimony of an eye-witness as to the execution of a private
document must be positive. He must state that the document was actually executed by the person whose name is
subscribed thereto. It is not sufficient if he states in a general manner that such person made the writing (Nolan vs.
Salas, Bail. More so if the document was merely thumb-marked.
Regretably, this Court can not accept, for failure of proof as to its due execution and authenticity, the probative value of
Exhibit "1". (Record on Appeal, pp.38-39).
The Court sustains and adopts the trial court's findings and its conclusion that private respondents have failed to prove the due execution
and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1).
The due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale, (Exhibit 1) not having been satisfactorily proven, such private document should be
excluded [Paz v. Santiago, 47 Phil. 334 (1925); Alejandrino v. Reyes, 53 Phil. 973 (1929); Chapman v. Garcia, 64 Phil. 618 (1937); General
Enterprises v. Lianga Bay Logging Co., G.R. No. L-18487, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 733].
2. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in arriving at a conclusion not supported by the record, when it said:
The pretension of the plaintiff that the defendant bound himself to pay the taxes for the use of the land is belied by the
fact that the defendant paid the taxes in his own name and not in the name of Bunag, and the defendant kept the
receipts of payment and did not deliver even one of those receipts to Bunag. (Rollo, p. 19.)
Petitioner argues that this finding is grossly erroneous, considering that in the stipulation of facts submitted by both parties before the trial
court, it is expressly provided:
3. That the parties hereto hereby stipulate and agree that the defendant, Bruno Bautista, has been paying the land
taxes due on the aforesaid property, personally or thru his wife, Consolacion Capati, for the period from 1940 to 1964,
as shown by the corresponding official land tax receipts duly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Guagua, Pampanga;
however, under the column NAME OF DECLARED OWNER thereof, the name Bunag Aguas Apolonio is written.
As this fact was stipulated by the parties, it need not be proven, it cannot be contradicted by evidence to the contrary, and it is conclusive
upon the parties, unless it is shown that the admission was made through a palpable mistake [Irlanda v. Pitargue, 22 Phil. 383 (1912); Board
of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration v. Agcaoili, G.R. No. L-38129, July 23,1974, 58 SCRA 72].
There being no allegation of a palpable mistake that would relieve private respondents from the stipulation of facts, the stipulated fact abovequoted is conclusive upon the parties.
The Court of Appeals cannot arbitrarily disregard the statement of facts agreed upon by the parties [Siping v. Cacob, 10 Phil. 717 (1908)]. It
is duty bound to render judgment strictly in accordance with the stipulation of facts [Cabrera v. Lacson, 71 Phil. 182 (1940)].
It may also be added that, indeed, in the Real Estate Tax Receipts (Exhibits 5-5-M) covering the years 1947 to 1964 presented by private
respondents as their evidence, under the column entitled "NAME OF DECLARED OWNER" the name "Bunag Aguas Apolonio" is written.
This assumes greater significance considering that the payors in these receipts were either private respondent Bruno Bautista, his wife
Consolacion Capati or Ambrosio Bautista.
Thus, this Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals's conclusion is not supported by the record, for said conclusion
is contrary to the stipulated fact and the evidence offered by private respondents, which support petitioner's contention that his father did not
sen the disputed property to private respondents' father, but merely allowed their brother to build a house on the land on the condition that
the latter would pay for the realty taxes due.
With the exclusion of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1), the conclusiveness of the stipulation regarding the payment of realty taxes and the
declaration of Apolonio Bunag Aguas as the owner in the Real Estate Tax Receipts (Exhibits 5-5-M) it becomes apparent that petitioner's
father never ceased to own the disputed property.

At this juncture, it would be opportune to address private respondent's submission that the questions raised in petitioner's petition for review
are questions of fact and not of law and, therefore, this Court should not disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. While the Court
agrees with private respondents that, ordinarily, the Supreme Court should not review questions of fact in appeals of this nature, the Court
finds, however, that an exception obtains in the instant case, for clearly evident is a misapprehension of facts [De la Cruz v. Sosing, 94 Phil.
26 (1953); Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 1,48290, September 29, 1983, 124 SCRA 808]. As summarized by the Court in a recent
decision:
The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) is
limited to the review of errors of law, said appellate court's findings of fact being conclusive upon us except (1) when
the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4)
when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; and (6)
when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee ... [Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-30272, February 28, 1985,
135 SCRA 151].
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the decision of the trial court is
affirmed in toto. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

Republic
SUPREME
Manila

of

the

Philippines
COURT

EN BANC

G.R. No. 79269 June 5, 1991

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C.
SALAS, alias Commander Bilog, respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo
Salas.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p

The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge
Advocate General, filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/preliminary injunction, to set aside
the order of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No.
1
86-48926 for Rebellion, and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987 granting the motion for reconsideration

of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's
supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17, 1987 which asked the court to allow petitioner to
present evidence in support of its prayer for a reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may, under certain circumstances, be
denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable offense, and whether such right may be
waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:

In the original Information 2 filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, later amended in an Amended Information 3 which was filed on 24 October 1986, private
respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of
rebellion under Article 134, in relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as
follows:
That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously thereafter
until the present time, in the City of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippines, the
Communist Party of the Philippines, its military arm, the New People's Army, its mass
infiltration network, the National Democratic Front with its other subordinate organizations
and fronts, have, under the direction and control of said organizations' leaders, among
whom are the aforenamed accused, and with the aid, participation or support of members
and followers whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen publicly and
taken arms throughout the country against the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat of which is
in the City of Manila, or of removing from the allegiance to that government and its laws,
the country's territory or part of it;
That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as leaders of
the aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of the cause of, the
organizations aforementioned, engaged themselves in war against the forces of the
government, destroying property or committing serious violence, and other acts in the
pursuit of their unlawful purpose, such as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before and after February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in military custody
following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had
earlier escaped from military detention and a cash reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his
capture. 4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition for habeas corpus for
private respondent and his co-accused was filed with this Court 5 which, as shall hereafter be discussed in
detail, was dismissed in Our resolution of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the parties
under which herein private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court
having custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed recalled
and they shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over
their person.
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to Quash the Information
alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal
action or liability has been extinguished, 6 to which petitioner filed an Opposition 7 citing, among other
grounds, the fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986, in G.R. No. 76009,
private respondent categorically conceded that:
xxx xxx xxx
Par. 2 (B) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the
court having custody over his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987, 8 respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.

Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May 1987 a petition for
bail, 9 which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27 May 1987 10 on the ground that since
rebellion became a capital offense under the provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those
who promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled to bail as evidence of his
guilt is strong.
On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among others, P.D. Nos. 1996,
942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code as it existed
before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to
exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue (Vol. 83, No. 24)
which was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 1987 11 respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive Order No. 187,
granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at P30,000.00 and imposed upon private
respondent the additional condition that he shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the
first ten (10) days of every period thereof. In granting the petition respondent Judge stated:
. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive Order No. 187, the
offense of rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is now
punishable with the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00, which
makes it now bailable pursuant to Section 13, Article III, 1986 Constitution and Section 3,
Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unlike the old rule, bail is now a matter of
right in non-capital offenses before final judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of
Section 3, Rule 114, aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same rule. In view,
therefore, of the present circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant is now
entitled to bail as a matter of right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion ceased to be a
capital offense.
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to private respondent
considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate and overriding goal is to wipe out all
vestiges of our democracy and to replace it with their ideology, and that his release would allow his return
to his organization to direct its armed struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes
his constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:
True, there now appears a clash between the accused's constitutional right to bail in a
non-capital offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to quote again the
prosecution, "the existence of the government that bestows the right, the paramount
interest of the state." Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights, one of which is the right to
bail, is a "declaration of the rights of the individual, civil, political and social and economic,
guaranteed by the Constitution against impairment or intrusion by any form of
governmental action. Emphasis is placed on the dignity of man and the worth of
individual. There is recognition of certain inherent and inalienable rights of the individual,
which the government is prohibited from violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine
Constitutional Law, 1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in case of such conflict as now
pictured by the prosecution, the same should be resolved in favor of the individual who, in
the eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under the Bill of Rights as
against the State. Anyway, the government is that powerful and strong, having the
resources, manpower and the wherewithals to fight those "who oppose, threathen (sic)
and destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and political institutions." The
prosecution's fear may or may not be founded that the accused may later on jump bail
and rejoin his comrades in the field to sow further disorders and anarchy against the duly
constituted authorities. But, then, such a fear can not be a reason to deny him bail. For

the law is very explicit that when it comes to bailable offenses an accused is entitled as a
matter of light to bail. Dura est lex sed lex.
In a motion to reconsider 12 the above order filed on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the court to increase
the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per Department of Justice Circular No. 10
dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the, provisional release of an accused should be in an amount computed at
P10,000.00 per year of imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable for the offense and
explaining that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the private respondent "had in the past escaped
from the custody of the military authorities and the offense for which he is charged is not an ordinary
crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the commission, the perpetrator has achieved his
end" and that "the rebellious acts are not consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the
government through armed struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology is
attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration 13 indirectly asking the court to
deny bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present evidence in support thereof considering the
"inevitable probability that the accused will not comply with this main condition of his bail to appear in
court for trial," a conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts which are widely known by
the People of the Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have judicial notice of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an escapee from
detention when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his arrest and
presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner whose
identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of P250,000.00
was offered and paid for his arrest,
which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest intention to appear in court for
trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is the Chairman of the Communist Party
of the Philippines and head of its military arm, the NPA, together with his followers, are now engaged in
an open warfare and rebellion against this government and threatens the existence of this very Court from
which he now seeks provisional release," and that while he is entitled to bail as a matter of right in view of
Executive Order No. 187 which restored the original penalty for rebellion under Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code, yet, when the interest of the State conflicts with that of an individual, that of the former
prevails for "the right of the State of self-preservation is paramount to any of the rights of an individual
enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the United
States of America holding "that there is no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of potentially
dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings, 14 and that an arrestee may be incarcerated
until trial as he presents a risk of flight; 15 and sustaining a detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with
serious felonies who are found after an adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to
the community which no condition of release can dispel. 16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order
this decision the dispositive portion of which reads:

17

adverted to in the introductory portion of

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
"supplemental" motion for reconsideration to be without merit and hereby denies it but
finds the first motion for reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as the amount of
bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987 only to increase the
amount of bail from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the approval of this Court, and
with the additional condition that accused Rodolfo Salas shall report to the court once
every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every period thereof (Almendras vs.
Villaluz, et al., L-31665, August 6, 1975, 66 SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent Judge took into account the
"sudden turn-about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed a motion for reconsideration
wherein it conceded the right of the private respondent to bail but merely asked to increase the amount of
bail; observed that it is only a reiteration of arguments in its opposition to the petition for bail of 25 May
1987; asserted that the American precedents are not applicable since the cases involved deportation of
aliens and, moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not contain a proviso on the right of an accused
to bail in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against excessive bail; and quoted the concurring
opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez
vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs. Abaya, L-5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition submitting therein the following
issues:
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION, AND IN
TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER
TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS
OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION WHEN HE
GRANTED BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking his right to bail,
having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to "remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody of his person" in consideration of the recall of the warrant of arrest for his
co-petitioners Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-capital offenses, is
not absolute when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious threat to the very existence
of the State, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to present evidence for the denial of bail.
Consequently, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion when he did not allow petitioner to
present all the evidence it may desire to support its prayer for the denial of bail and when he declared that
the State has forfeited its right to do so since during all the time that the petition for bail was pending, it
never manifested, much less hinted, its intention to adduce such evidence. And that even if release on
bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00
only), failed to take into account the lengthy record of private respondents' criminal background, the
gravity of the pending charge, and the likelihood of flight. 18
In Our resolution of 11 August 1987 19 We required the respondents to comment on the petition and
issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to cease and desist from implementing
his order of 30 July 1987 granting bail to private respondent in the amount of P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987, 20 private respondent asks for the outright dismissal of the
petition and immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order on the following grounds:

I
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS PETITIONER
WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR THE FIRST TIME ON
APPEAL.
II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE (RECLUSION
PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS MANDATED BY THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
IS NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE VIOLATES
NOT ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private respondent.
September 1987. 22

21

The reply was filed on 18

In Our resolution of 15 October 1987 23 We gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file
simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November 24 and 23 November 1987 25 petitioner
and private respondents asked to be excused from filing their Memoranda and that the petition and reply
be considered as the Memorandum for petitioner and the Comment as the Memorandum for private
respondent, which We granted in Our resolution of 19 November 1987 26 and 1 December 1987, 27
respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor General to express his stand on the
issues raised in this petitions, 28 which he complied with by filing his Manifestation on 30 May 1990 29
wherein he manifests that he supports the petition and submits that the Order of respondent Judge of July
7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should be annulled and set aside asserting that private respondent had
waived the light to bail in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail to him is accepting
wide-eyed his undertaking which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the primary consideration is to
insure the attendance of the accused at the trial of the case against him which would be frustrated by the
"almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump bail of whatever amount"; and application of the
guidelines provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on the amount of
bail dictates denial of bail to private respondent. The Solicitor General likewise maintains that the right of

the petitioner to hearing on the application of private respondent for bail cannot be denied by respondent
Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and the application for
bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the offense for which the private
respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death. During the pendency of the application for bail
Executive Order No. 187 was issued by the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as
originally provided for in Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the
governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent for he is charged
with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code to which is attached the
penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding P20,000.00. 30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under
Section 13 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution which provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:
Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons in custody shall, before final conviction,
be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital offense or an
offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the
application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the
offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion perpetua. 31 To that extent the right is
absolute. 32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515, despite the fact that the
accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by the trial court for the complex crime of rebellion
with multiple murders, arsons and robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, We granted bail in the
amount of P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous stand of
the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the security of the State so requires, and
because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates that the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is
strong, We held:
. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a
republican state, like ours, to be derived upon mere general principles and abstract
consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such a major
preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing its enjoyment in
the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the framers of our Constitution
devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11), (12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18),
and (21) of said section (1) to the protection of several aspects of freedom.

The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it shall not be
impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. This overturns the Court's
ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra., to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it
the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion
is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the
continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course
thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the
field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the
invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail becomes a matter of
discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The court's discretion is limited to
determining whether or not evidence of guilt is strong. 33 But once it is determined that the evidence of
guilt is not strong, bail also becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We
held:
The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions contained in
the Constitution of the United States and that of many states of the Union. And it is said
that:
The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the many
states provide that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption
of guilt is great, and, under such provisions, bail is a matter of right which
no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases not embraced in the
exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases
of capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption
thereof is great! 34
Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the denial of bail in the
instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the cases where the grant of bail is discretionary,
due process requires that the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable
time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. 35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent court to fix the bond at P30,000.00,
then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of
bail provided for in Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the
discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA, 489, 495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of evidence and
reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it. Among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not
the accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under bond in
other case. . . .
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which necessitate a grant of an
opportunity to be heard for the purpose of determining the amount of bail, but not for the denial thereof
because aforesaid Section 10 of Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.

It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is no longer punishable by
prision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00. Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990
and which took effect after publication in at least two newspapers of general circulation, amended, among
others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty for rebellion such that, as
amended, it now reads:
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. Any person who
promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion or
insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
xxx xxx xxx
This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly committed prior to its
effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the
person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of
this Code, although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and
the convict is serving the same. 36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in Criminal Case No. 8648926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for herein private respondent, and his co-accused
Josefina Cruz and Jose Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza and
Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen.
Ramon Montao, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among others, that the petition be given due course and a
writ of habeas corpus be issued requiring respondents to produce the bodies of herein private respondent
and his co-accused before the Court and explain by what authority they arrested and detained them. The
following proceedings took place thereafter in said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas corpus, required respondents to make a
return of the writ on or before the close of office hours on 13 October and set the petition for hearing on
14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed a Return To The Writ
of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that private respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado", and
Jose Milo Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the military on September 29, 1986
in the evening at the Philippine General Hospital Compound at Taft Ave., Mangga being leaders or
members of the Communist Party of the Philippines, New People's Army and National Democratic Front,
organizations dedicated to the overthrow of the Government through violent means, and having actually
committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. After their arrest
they were forthwith charged with rebellion before Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Region in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their arrest were issued and
respondents continue to detain them because of the warrants of arrest and the pendency of the criminal
cases against them. Respondents further allege that, contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein
private respondent was not a member of the NDF panel involved in peace negotiations with the
Government; neither is he and his companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe conduct pass
issued by competent authorities.

3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the Court of certain agreements reached
between them. We issued a resolution reading as follows:
When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V.
Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan, Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and
William Chua appeared for the petitioners with Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and
Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with Solicitor General
Ordoez arguing for the respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in open Court that in conformity
with the agreement reached with the government, the petition for habeas corpus will be
withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas to remain under custody, whereas his codetainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, also in open Court, confirmed the foregoing
statement made by petitioners' counsel regarding the withdrawal of the petition for
habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be interposed to the immediate release of
detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, and that no bond will be required of
them, but they will continue to face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that
they will not be rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by the trial court provided
that they manifest in open Court their willingness to subject themselves to the jurisdiction
of the Court and to appear in court when their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with petitioners' counsel today relative to
the compromise agreement that they have previously undertaken to submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on his oath as
member of the Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion have agreed
to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the Court ordered their
immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations and statements and required
both parties to SUBMIT to the Court their compromise agreement by 4:00 o'clock this
afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties submitted a Joint Manifestation and
Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for petitioners, and Solicitor General Sedfrey
Ordoez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel
for respondents, which reads as follows:
COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by their respective counsel, and
to this Honorable Tribunal respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel, and Solicitor
General Sedfrey A. Ordoez on October 13, 1986 exploratory talks were conducted to
find out how the majesty of the law may be preserved and human considerations may be
called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the following terms of agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners and
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released

but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for rebellion (People v.
Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886 [should be 86-48926],
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region) filed against them
under their personal recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial
before the court having custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of formal manifestation
before the Supreme Court that they will submit themselves to the court
having jurisdiction over their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to obtain the conformity of the
Government to the foregoing terms which were likewise accepted by petitioner (sic) and
their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation during the hearing on October
14 and the present manifestation in compliance with the resolution announced in court
this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of Rodolfo Salas,
Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V.
Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao and Col. Virgilio
Saldajeno] considering the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed
by Attorneys Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo
Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordonez and
Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva
as counsel for respondents which states that they have entered into an agreement
whereby: [a] the petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners, and Josefina
Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately released but shall appear at the trial
of the criminal case for rebellion [People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No.
4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XII, Manila], filed
against them, on their personal recognizance; [b] petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in
legal custody and face trial before the court having custody over his person; and [c] the
warrant of arrest for the person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby
deemed recalled in view of the formal manifestation before this Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person and in view of the said
agreement, the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed, the Court Resolved to DISMISS
the petition for habeas corpus but subject to the condition that petitioners' lead counsel,
Atty. Capulong, upon his oath as member of the Bar, shall abide by his commitment to
ensure the appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee, C.J., is on official leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal custody even during
the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly waived his right to bail." 37 Upon the other
hand, private respondent asserts that this claim is totally devoid of factual and legal basis, for in their
petition for habeas corpus they precisely questioned the legality of the arrest and the continued detention
of Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not resolved by this Court or by
the compromise agreement of the parties but left open for further determination in another proceeding.

Moreover, the matter of the right to bail was neither raised by either party nor resolved by this Court, and
the legal steps promptly taken by private respondent after the agreement was reached, like the filing of
the motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were clear and
positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional rights to be granted not only provisional but final and
permanent liberty. Finally, private respondent maintains that the term "legal custody" as used in the Joint
Manifestation and Motion simply means that private respondent agreed to continue to be in the custody of
the law or in custodia legis and nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is also
defined as the detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the "care and
possession of a thing or person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed, Vol. I, pp. 741-742
citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa. 306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and settled jurisprudence,
the "constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the person applying for admission to bail
should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty." 38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before the court
having custody over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical custody of the
court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the stipulation concerning his copetitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of the warrants of arrest against them; they
agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should
be made of the deliberate care of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal custody and court
having custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over the persons
of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to emphasize the agreement that
Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or
had this been unclear to private respondent and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a
clearer language. It must be remembered that at the time the parties orally manifested before this Court
on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their agreement and prepared and signed the Joint
Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had already been issued by the trial court against private
respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation that only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled and that only they shall be released, further confirmed the
agreement that herein petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.
In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or interpretation for the term
"in custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 39 It presupposes that the
person applying for it should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty. 40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private respondent had
unequivocably waived his right to bail.
But, is such waiver valid?

Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by
law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal
right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed;
the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the
intent that such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such
conduct as warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act
inconsistent with claiming it." 41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and, since the
word "waiver" covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that a person may
waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right or privilege of which
he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is legally entitled, whether
secured by contract, conferred with statute, or guaranteed by constitution, provided such
rights and privileges rest in the individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe
on the rights of others, and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not
forbidden by law, and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized
that everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule
made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity, if it can
be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right, and without
detriment to the community at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute or guaranteed
by constitution may be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory right is not favored,
and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the rights of others, or would be
against public policy or morals and the public interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute and
guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that constitutional
provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even some of the
constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of waiver. 42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo, 43 it was held:
Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a) those in
which the state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those which are personal to
the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges. Those of the first class cannot
be waived; those of the second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to consent to action
which would be invalid if taken against his will." 44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures; 45 the right to counsel and to remain silent; 46 and the right to be
heard. 47

Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its Bill of Rights.
Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent
counsel, preferably of his own choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless, clearly suggests
that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner provided such waiver will not offend
Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be waived. It is a right
which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private
respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in Criminal Case No.
86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C. Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina
Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion, are hereby
NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 96251 May 11, 1993
THE
PEOPLE
OF
vs.
DANIEL C. NAVARRO, accused-appellant.

THE

PHILIPPINES,

plaintiff-appellee,

NOCON, J.:
A picture speaks a thousand words, it has been said. The prosecution presented a Polaroid picture of accused-appellant Daniel C. Navarro
with his sexual organ halfway inside his daughter's private part. His daughter, then eleven years old, testified that it was painful when her
1
father inserted his organ inside her private part. His wife, who took the picture with a Polaroid camera given by one Robert Tanner,

testified that she took the picture when her husband's sexual organ had already penetrated her daughter's
private part and was on the verge of completely being inserted, as this was the instruction of said Robert
Tanner. Accused-appellant waived his right to present evidence on his behalf even if his Demurrer to
Evidence would be denied. He now appeals his conviction for rape.
Accused-appellant Daniel C. Navarro was charged with the crime of rape alleged to have been committed
as follows:
That in or about September 1989, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully arid feloniously, have
carnal knowledge of . . . ANGELITA NAVARRO y CRUZ, his daughter, a girl 11 years of age. 2
As found by the trial court, the antecedents of this case are, as follows:
Angelita Navarro is a pretty Grade IV pupil at Immaculate Concepcion Elementary School
at Tetuan, Zamboanga City. She is called An-An by her parents and by the kids in their
neighborhood. She testified that she is eleven years old. She was born on April 28, 1978.
This fact was indubitably established by her Certificate of Birth marked as Exhibit "F".

She resided with her parents, Daniel and Elizabeth Navarro, and her brothers Dennis, 17
yrs. old, and Robert, 4 years old, at their house at Gov. Alvarez St., Camino Nuevo,
Zamboanga City.
When she was five (5) years old, her father, accused Daniel Navarro, took her to Lantaka
Hotel where he was then working as waiter and introduced her to an American named
Robert Tanner who used to come to Zamboanga City every year. When she was eight (8)
years old, her father again took her to Tanner's room at Lantaka Hotel. Her father had
conversation with Tanner and then left her inside Tanner's room. When she was alone
with Tanner in the room, the latter took her pictures while she was naked. Then Tanner
asked her to pose with her legs apart and took her pictures while she was in that position.
...
Angelita calls Tanner "Papa Bob". Tanner calls her "Bobbi". Tanner calls Daniel Navarro
"Boone", "Osi-san", "old Dan", and Elizabeth Navarro "Beth", and "Beautiful Girl" (tsn, p.
34, id). Tanner gave Angelita a wrist watch, magazines and toys. He gave to her father
two Polaroid cameras which she identified in court. (Exh. "I") A picture taken with a
Polaroid camera develops in itself in a few seconds (tsn, pp. 60-61, id). With a Polaroid
camera, "Pictures are taken, developed and printed in less than a minute" (Merit
Students Encyclopedia, Vol. 4, p. 69). Angelita's father and mother used the Polaroid
cameras to take her nude pictures which were sent to Tanner in the United States. In
return, Tanner sent dollars to her father. Tanner was the one paying for the tuition fees of
Angelita and for her school uniforms and other needs since 1985. Angelita said: "It is just
like paying me because he used to have pictures coming from me" (tsn, p 67, id).
From 1985 to 1986, many pictures were sent by her parents to Tanner. In all the pictures,
she was naked. Tanner does not like pictures with her clothes on. In some pictures, she
was lying down with her legs spread apart and her vagina exposed. On one occasion
twenty (20) pictures were taken. Sixteen (16) were sent to Tanner and the four were left
behind. The pictures were taken by her father or by her mother on orders of her father
(tsn, pp. 55-57, 76, 81, id). When Tanner's money arrive, her parents play mah-jong.
Angelita joins her mother in playing mahjong using Tanner's money (tsn, p. 79, id).
xxx xxx xxx 3
Sometime in the month of September or October, 1989, while Angelita was inside a room
in their house at Governor Alvarez, her father asked her to undress in the presence of her
mother who was also in the room. It was about 4:30 in the afternoon. Angelita just came
from school. When she was already naked, her father ordered her mother to take several
pictures with the use of a Polaroid camera. One picture shows Angelita standing,
completely naked, wearing a hat, with her private parts exposed (Exh. "A"). Another
picture shows Angelita with her open mouth and tongue a few centimeters below her
father's bared penis (Exh. "C"). A picture was taken while she was actually sucking inside
her mouth her father's penis; another with her legs spread apart. On this occasion, her
father inserted his penis inside her vagina while her mother took pictures of the sexual
connection (Exh. "B"). All the pictures, including one with her father's penis lodged inside
her vagina, except the three (3) pictures marked as Exhibits "A", "B" and were sent to
Robert Tanner in the United States (tsn, pp. 10-11, 15-20, 23, 76-77, April 16, 1990).
Angelita testified that it was painful when her father pushed his erected penis into her
sexual organ because his penis was able to penetrate inside her vagina. She said: ". . .
My father just inserted his penis. When I felt the pain, I told my father that it is painful.
According to my, father, never mind" (tsn, p. 76, id) . . .
xxx xxx xxx

Elizabeth Cruz Navarro 38 years old, is the wife of accused Daniel Navarro and mother of
Angelita Navarro. She testified that one afternoon in the month of October, 1989, she was
commanded by her husband to take pictures with the use of a Polaroid camera while he
was having sexual intercourse with their daughter, Angelita, then eleven (11) years old,
inside a room in their house located at Governor Alvarez, Camino Nuevo, Zamboanga
City. One of the pictures taken by her of the sexual act which is marked as Exhibit "B"
shows a mans penis inserted in the vagina of a woman.
xxx xxx xxx
After trial, the lower court found accused-appellant guilty as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay Angelita Navarro the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity and
P30,000.00 moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and the costs. 4
Hence, this appeal.
The Court clarifies for the record that G.R. Nos. 96250-51 correspond to Criminal Case No. 9779, entitled
"People vs. Navarro and Tanner," for Corruption of Minor, and Criminal Case No. 9761, entitled "People
vs. Navarro," for Rape, which cases were jointly decided by the trial court. After the decision of conviction,
the trial court directed accused-appellants Navarro and Tanner to filed separate Notice of Appeal with the
Court of Appeals for Criminal Case No. 9779. 5 This decision reviews only the appeal of accusedappellant Daniel Navarro with respect to Criminal Case No. 9781 for Rape.
Accused-appellant claims error on the part of the lower court in convicting him of the crime of rape as his
penis was not erect during the supposed intercourse, thereby negating any assertion by the prosecution
that his penis had been inserted inside his daughter's vagina. He claims that it is impossible to insert and
lodge a soft, flaccid and limp penis between the lips of his daughter's private part; as his penis was just
"attached" to the labia. 6
Accused-appellant's arguments are fallacious in the face of the damaging evidence of the Prosecution
showing how he raped his daughter, to wit: the testimonies of both the victim and accused-appellant's
wife narrating how the accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with Angelita, the medical report on the
condition of the victim's private part after the rape showing lacerations on the victim's hymen and the
actual picture of the rape. 7 At any rate, there is consummated rape where the penis of the accused
touched the middle part of the vagina, having penetrated the labia of the pudendum; full penetration or
rupture of the hymen is not essential. 8
The accused-appellant's pretension of innocence is utterly devoid of merit.
To understand, why such a heinous and shocking incident could have happened, this Court quotes, with
approval, the following finding of fact by the trial court, as follows:
The uncontradicted evidence of the prosecution established that accused Daniel Navarro
facilitated or promoted the corruption of his eleven-year old daughter by leaving her to
sleep alone in the hotel room of Robert Tanner; allowing her to go with Tanner to Manila
where she slept in the same bed in a hotel with Tanner; taking nude pictures of his
daughter in different obscene poses and forcing his wife to do so; inserting his penis
inside his daughter's vagina and asking his wife to take pictures of the sexual act;
sending the obscene picture of his minor daughter to Tanner in the United States to
satisfy the lust of Tanner, all because of the dollars he received and expected to receive
every month from Tanner as requital of his daughter's loss of innocence.

Moreover, there is proof that Tanner received the salacious, naked pictures of Angelita
sent to him by Daniel Navarro. Thus, in a letter postmarked in San Francisco, California
on October 6, 1988, addressed to the "NAVARROS", Tanner said:
"Folks: Thank you MUCHO for the picture of My Daughter's beautiful
Cunt. She is a big girl. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
I hope your Polaroid film has not increased like mine has those pics I just
sent you come to P27.85 per picture. I expect 20 pictures of only sex, no
other nonsense . . . When I say sex, I mean with the "LOVE JUICES"
flowing
FROM
SNAKE
AND
BOBBI'S
CUNT"
. . . I have enough pictures of the others.
Beth, find some of Bobbi's friends for pictures, because as I said, they
are the same as Bobbi, only no one gives them the opportunity to show it
and admit it . . . Bobbi is not different. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
ALL OF YOU, My Daughter included, DON'T send me "HOWDY" letters,
send interesting letters and INTERESTING pictures-or-NOTHING!
xxx xxx xxx
I like sex, albeit, fucking, sucking, etc. but jou have been very minimal in
your response . . ."(Exh. "T"; "T-1", "T-2", "T-3")." 9
Accused-appellant's daughter, Angelita, positively declared that she was the girl in the picture and her
father as the man in the picture who inserted his erect penis inside her private part causing her to cry in
pain. Her testimony is as follows:
FISCAL NUVAL:
Q. What relation has this picture with the picture you said that was taken
when your father was having sexual intercourse with you?
A. This is the one already.
Q. Who is this man with his exposed penis which is inserted in the vagina
of a woman?
A. That is my father.
Q. Who is this woman with whom he is having sexual intercourse?
A. Its me.
Q. Who took this picture?
A. My mother.

Q. What kind of camera was used in taking this picture?

A. Polaroid.
Q. When for the first time did you see this picture?
A. The time he took the picture.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT:
Q. You said that when he inserted his penis, you complained to your
father that it was painful?
A. Yes your Honor.
Q. Why was it painful?
A. Because your Honor, his penis was being inserted inside.
Q. You mean his penis was hard and erected?
A. Yes your Honor.
Q. And it entered your vagina?
A. Yes your Honor.
Q. That is why you felt pain?
A. Yes your Honor.
Q. So this post was just to take the picture as declared by your father?
A. Yes. 10
Accused-appellant's wife testified that she took the picture while her husband was having sexual
intercourse with Angelita, as follows:
Q. I show you another picture which was previously marked as Exh. "B",
what relation is this to that picture you said that you took?
A. This is the picture.
Q. Where did you take this picture?
A. In the house.
Q. What part of the house?

A. In the room.
Q. Who took this picture?
A. I was the one who took this picture.
Q. Who is this man having sexual intercourse with the woman?
A. It was Daniel Navarro.
Q. Who was this woman?
A. Angelita my daughter.
Q. When for the first time you saw this picture?
A. Yes. I saw this.
Q. When?
A. The time when I took the picture.
Q. What kind of camera did you use?
A. Polaroid.
Q. At the back of this picture is a signature above the date 2/9/89, whose
signature is this?
A. My signature. 11
Dr. Ma. Socorro R. Galvez, who physically examined Angelita, corroborated the fact of rape with her
testimony that Angelita's hymen had a healed incomplete laceration at 3 o'clock and healed complete
lacerations at 6 o'clock and 8 o'clock, and that the lacerations could have been caused by the penetration
of a male organ. 12
A close examination of the picture presented by the prosecution 13 indeed shows the actual sexual
intercourse between accused-appellant and his daughter, Angelita, with the former's penis almost
completely inserted in Angelita's vagina.
Against these four (4) pieces of evidence for the People, accused-appellant's assertion of the impossibility
of rape being committed as his penis was just "attached" to his daughter's labia is plain nonsense. His
daughter would NOT have cried out in pain IF it were otherwise. Denial is the weakest defense and will
not prosper against a positive testimony identifying accused-appellant as the person who had sexual
intercourse with the victim. 14
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code states that the crime of "Rape" is committed by having Carnal
knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstance:
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.

It appearing from the evidence on record that accused-appellant had sexual intercourse with his daughter,
Angelita, who was then 11 years old on September 1989 when the alleged offense was committed, having
been born on April 28, 1978 as shown by her birth certificate, Exhibit "F", there is no question of accusedappellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
In line with current policy for the indemnity
P50,000.00. 16

15

imposed on rape cases, the same is increased to

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. With the modification that the
indemnity is increased to P50,000.00, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. 108280-83 November 16, 1995

ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

SANTOS,

and

JOSELITO

TAMAYO,

petitioners,

G.R. Nos. 114931-33 November 16, 1995

THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANNIE FERRER, accused, ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and JOSELITO TAMAYO,
accused-appellants.

PUNO, J.:
The case before us occurred at a time of great political polarization in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution. This was the time when
the newly-installed government of President Corazon C. Aquino was being openly challenged in rallies, demonstrations and other public fora
by "Marcos loyalists," supporters of deposed President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Tension and animosity between the two (2) groups sometimes
broke into violence. On July 27, 1986, it resulted in the murder of Stephen Salcedo, a known "Coryista."
From August to October 1986, several informations were filed in court against eleven persons identified as Marcos loyalists charging them
with the murder of Salcedo. Criminal Case No. 86-47322 was filed against Raul Billosos y de Leon and Gerry Nery y Babazon; Criminal
Case No. 86-47617 against Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe and Joel Tan y Mostero; Criminal Case No. 86-47790 against Richard
de los Santos y Arambulo; Criminal Case No. 86-48538 against Joselito Tamayo y Ortia; and Criminal Case No. 86-48931 against Rolando
Fernandez y Mandapat. Also filed were Criminal Cases Nos. 86-49007 and 86-49008 against Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega as well as
Annie Ferrer charging them as accomplices to the murder of Salcedo.
The cases were consolidated and raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX, Manila. All of the accused pleaded not guilty to the charge
and trial ensued accordingly. The prosecution presented twelve witnesses, including two eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato
Banculo, and the police officers who were at the Luneta at the time of the incident. In support of their testimonies, the prosecution likewise
presented documentary evidence consisting of newspaper accounts of the incident and various photographs taken during the mauling.
The prosecution established that on July 27, 1986, a rally was scheduled to be held at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Earlier, they
applied for a permit to hold the rally but their application was denied by the authorities. Despite this setback, three thousand of them
gathered at the Rizal Monument of the Luneta at 2:30 in the afternoon of the scheduled day. Led by Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega,
both members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the loyalists started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and delivered
speeches in between. Colonel Edgar Dula Torres, then Deputy Superintendent of the Western Police District, arrived and asked the leaders
for their permit. No permit could be produced. Colonel Dula Torres thereupon gave them ten minutes to disperse. The loyalist leaders asked
for thirty minutes but this was refused. Atty. Lozano turned towards his group and said "Gulpihin ninyo ang lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators."
Atty. Nuega added "Sige, sige gulpihin ninyo!" The police then pushed the crowd, and used tear gas and truncheons to disperse them. The
loyalists scampered away but some of them fought back and threw stones at the police. Eventually, the crowd fled towards Maria Orosa
1
Street and the situation later stabilized.

At about 4:00 p.m., a small group of loyalists converged at the Chinese Garden, Phase III of the Luneta.
There, they saw Annie Ferrer, a popular movie starlet and supporter of President Marcos, jogging around
the fountain. They approached her and informed her of their dispersal and Annie Ferrer angrily ordered
them "Gulpihin ninyo and mga Cory hecklers!" Then she continued jogging around the fountain chanting
"Marcos pa rin, Marcos pa rin, Pabalikin si Marcos, Pabalikin si Marcos, Bugbugin ang mga nakadilaw!"
The loyalists replied "Bugbugin!" A few minutes later, Annie Ferrer was arrested by the police. Somebody
then shouted "Kailangang gumanti, tayo ngayon!" A commotion ensued and Renato Banculo, a cigarette
vendor, saw the loyalists attacking persons in yellow, the color of the "Coryistas." Renato took off his
yellow shirt. 2 He then saw a man wearing a yellow t-shirt being chased by a group of persons shouting
"Iyan, habulin iyan. Cory iyan!" The man in the yellow t-shirt was Salcedo and his pursuers appeared to
be Marcos loyalists. They caught Salcedo and boxed and kicked and mauled him. Salcedo tried to
extricate himself from the group but they again pounced on him and pummelled him with fist blows and
kicks hitting him on various parts of his body. Banculo saw Ranulfo Sumilang, an electrician at the Luneta,
rush to Salcedo's aid. Sumilang tried to pacify the maulers so he could extricate Salcedo from them. But
the maulers pursued Salcedo unrelentingly, boxing him with stones in their fists. Somebody gave
Sumilang a loyalist tag which Sumilang showed to Salcedo's attackers. They backed off for a while and
Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them. But accused Raul Billosos emerged from behind
Sumilang as another man boxed Salcedo on the head. Accused Richard de los Santos also boxed
Salcedo twice on the head and kicked him even as he was already fallen. 3 Salcedo tried to stand but
accused Joel Tan boxed him on the left side of his head and ear. 4 Accused Nilo Pacadar punched
Salcedo on his nape, shouting: "Iyan, Cory Iyan. Patayin!" 5 Sumilang tried to pacify Pacadar but the latter
lunged at the victim again. Accused Joselito Tamayo boxed Salcedo on the left jaw and kicked him as he
once more fell. Banculo saw accused Romeo Sison trip Salcedo and kick him on the head, and when he
tried to stand, Sison repeatedly boxed him. 6 Sumilang saw accused Gerry Neri approach the victim but
did not notice what he did. 7
Salcedo somehow managed to get away from his attackers and wipe off the blood from his face. He sat
on some cement steps 8 and then tried to flee towards Roxas boulevard to the sanctuary of the Rizal
Monument but accused Joel Tan and Nilo Pacadar pursued him, mauling Sumilang in the process.
Salcedo pleaded for his life exclaiming "Maawa na kayo sa akin. Tulungan ninyo ako." He cried: "Pulis,
pulis. Wala bang pulis?" 9
The mauling resumed at the Rizal Monument and continued along Roxas Boulevard until Salcedo
collapsed and lost consciousness. Sumilang flagged down a van and with the help of a traffic officer,
brought Salcedo to the Medical Center Manila but he was refused admission. So they took him to the
Philippine General Hospital where he died upon arrival.
Salcedo died of "hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic." He sustained various contusions, abrasions,
lacerated wounds and skull fractures as revealed in the following post-mortem findings:
Cyanosis, lips, and nailbeds.
Contused-abrasions: 6.0 x 2.5 cm., and 3.0 x 2.4 cm., frontal region, right side; 6.8 x 4.2 cm., frontal region, left side;
5.0 x 4.0 cm., right cheek; 5.0 x 3.5 cm., face, left side; 3.5 x 2.0 cm., nose; 4.0 x 2.1 cm., left ear, pinna; 5.0 x 4.0 cm.
left suprascapular region; 6.0 x 2.8 cm., right elbow.
Abrasions: 4.0 x 2.0 cm., left elbow; 2.0 x 1.5 cm., right knee.
Lacerated wounds: 2.2 cm., over the left eyebrow; 1.0 cm., upper lip.
Hematoma, scalp; frontal region, both sides; left parietal region; right temporal region; occipital region, right side.
Fractures, skull; occipital bone, right side; right posterior cranial fossa; right anterior cranial fossa.
Hemorrhage, subdural, extensive.

Other visceral organs, congested.

Stomach, about 1/2 filled with grayish brown food materials and fluid.

10

The mauling of Salcedo was witnessed by bystanders and several press people, both local and foreign.
The press took pictures and a video of the event which became front-page news the following day,
capturing national and international attention. This prompted President Aquino to order the Capital
Regional Command and the Western Police District to investigate the incident. A reward of ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) was put up by Brigadier General Alfredo Lim, then Police Chief, for persons who
could give information leading to the arrest of the killers. 11 Several persons, including Ranulfo Sumilang
and Renato Banculo, cooperated with the police, and on the basis of their identification, several persons,
including the accused, were apprehended and investigated.
For their defense, the principal accused denied their participation in the mauling of the victim and offered
their respective alibis. Accused Joselito Tamayo testified that he was not in any of the photographs
presented by the prosecution 12 because on July 27, 1986, he was in his house in Quezon City. 13 Gerry
Neri
claimed
that
he
was
at
the
Luneta
Theater
at
the
time
of
the
incident. 14 Romeo Sison, a commercial photographer, was allegedly at his office near the Luneta waiting
for some pictures to be developed at that time. 15 He claimed to be afflicted with hernia impairing his
mobility; he cannot run normally nor do things forcefully. 16 Richard de los Santos admits he was at the
Luneta at the time of the mauling but denies hitting Salcedo. 17 He said that he merely watched the
mauling which explains why his face appeared in some of the photographs. 18 Unlike the other accused,
Nilo Pacadar admits that he is a Marcos loyalist and a member of the Ako'y Pilipino Movement and that
he attended the rally on that fateful day. According to him, he saw Salcedo being mauled and like Richard
de los Santos, merely viewed the incident. 19 His face was in the pictures because he shouted to the
maulers to stop hitting Salcedo. 20 Joel Tan also testified that he tried to pacify the maulers because he
pitied Salcedo. The maulers however ignored him. 21
The other accused, specifically Attys. Lozano and Nuega and Annie Ferrer opted not to testify in their
defense.
On December 16, 1988, the trial court rendered a decision finding Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan,
Richard de los Santos and Joselito Tamayo guilty as principals in the crime of murder qualified by
treachery and sentenced them to 14 years 10 months and 20 days of reclusion temporal as minimum to
20 years of reclusion temporal as maximum. Annie Ferrer was likewise convicted as an accomplice. The
court, however, found that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of the other accused and thus acquitted
Raul Billosos, Gerry Nery, Rolando Fernandez, Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega. The dispositive
portion of the decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered in the aforementioned cases as follows:
1. In "People versus Raul Billosos and Gerry Nery," Criminal Case No. 86-47322, the Court finds that the Prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the two (2) Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them
of said charge;
2. In "People versus Romeo Sison, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-47617, the Court finds the Accused Romeo Sison,
Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan, guilty beyond reasonable doubt, as principals for the crime of Murder, defined in Article 248
of the Revised Penal Code, and, there being no other mitigating or aggravating circumstances, hereby imposes on
each of them an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14)YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS,
of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20) DAYS, of Reclusion Temporal, as minimum, to TWENTY (20)
YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
3. In "People versus Richard de los Santos," Criminal Case No. 86-47790, the Court finds the Accused Richard de los
Santos guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal for the crime of Murder defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and, there being no other extenuating circumstances, the Court hereby imposes on him an indeterminate penalty
of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to
TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal as Maximum;

4. In "People versus Joselito Tamayo," Criminal Case No. 86-48538 the Court finds the Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal, for the crime of "Murder" defined in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
imposes on him an indeterminate penalty of from FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, TEN (10) MONTHS and TWENTY (20)
DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as Minimum, to TWENTY (20) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum;
5. In "People versus Rolando Fernandez," Criminal Case No. 86-4893l, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused for the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt and hereby acquits him of said charge;
6. In "People versus Oliver Lozano, et al.," Criminal Case No. 86-49007, the Court finds that the Prosecution failed to
prove the guilt of the Accused beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged and hereby acquits them of said charge;
7. In "People versus Annie Ferrer," Criminal Case No. 86-49008, the Court finds the said Accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as accomplice to the crime of Murder under Article 18 in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code and hereby imposes on her an indeterminate penalty of NINE (9) YEARS and FOUR (4) MONTHS of Prision
Mayor, as Minimum to TWELVE (12) YEARS, FIVE (5) MONTHS and ELEVEN (11) DAYS of Reclusion Temporal, as
Maximum.
The Accused Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Richard de los Santos, Joel Tan, Joselito Tamayo and Annie Ferrer are
hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of Stephen Salcedo the total amount of P74,000.00 as actual
damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, and one-half (1/2) of the costs of suit.
The period during which the Accused Nilo Pacadar, Romeo Sison, Joel Tan, Richard de los Santos and Joselito
Tamayo had been under detention during the pendency of these cases shall be credited to them provided that they
agreed in writing to abide by and comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail.
The Warden of the City Jail of Manila is hereby ordered to release the Accused Gerry Nery, Raul Billosos and Rolando
Fernandez from the City Jail unless they are being detained for another cause or charge.
The Petition for Bail of the Accused Rolando Fernandez has become moot and academic. The Petition for Bail of the
Accused Joel Tan, Romeo Sison and Joselito Tamayo is denied for lack of merit.
The bail bonds posted by the Accused Oliver Lozano and Benjamin Nuega are hereby cancelled.

22

On appeal, the Court of Appeals 23 on December 28, 1992, modified the decision of the trial court by
acquitting Annie Ferrer but increasing the penalty of the rest of the accused, except for Joselito Tamayo,
to reclusion perpetua. The appellate court found them guilty of murder qualified by abuse of superior
strength, but convicted Joselito Tamayo of homicide because the information against him did not allege
the said qualifying circumstance. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison y Mejia, Nilo Pacadar y Abe, Joel Tan y Mostero and Richard de los Santos are
hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
Reclusion Perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo y Oria is hereby found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength and, as a consequence, an
indeterminate penalty of TWELVE (12) YEARS of prision mayor as Minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion
temporal as Maximum is hereby imposed upon him;
3. Accused-appellant Annie Ferrer is hereby ACQUITTED of being an accomplice to the crime of Murder.
CONSIDERING that the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua has been imposed in the instant consolidated cases, the said
24
cases are now hereby certified to the Honorable Supreme Court for review.

Petitioners filed G.R. Nos. 108280-83 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court inasmuch as Joselito
Tamayo was not sentenced to reclusion perpetua. G.R. Nos. 114931-33 was certified to us for automatic
review of the decision of the Court of Appeals against the four accused-appellants sentenced to reclusion
perpetua.
Before this court, accused-appellants assign the following errors:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT NOTED THAT THE ACCUSED FAILED TO
CITE ANYTHING ON RECORD TO SUPPORT THEIR AVERMENT THAT THERE WERE NO WITNESSES WHO
HAVE COME FORWARD TO IDENTIFY THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEATH OF STEPHEN SALCEDO.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE UNRELIABLE,
DOUBTFUL, SUSPICIOUS AND INCONCLUSIVE TESTIMONIES OF PROSECUTION WITNESS RANULFO
SUMILANG.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THERE
WAS NO EVIDENCE TO PROVE THAT ANY OF THE ACCUSED CARRIED A HARD AND BLUNT INSTRUMENT, THE
ADMITTED CAUSE OF THE HEMORRHAGE RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF THE DECEASED.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE EXISTS CONSPIRACY
AMONG THE PRINCIPAL ACCUSED.
V
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED IS
25
MURDER AND NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY.

In their additional brief, appellants contend that:

I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REACHING A CONCLUSION OF FACT UTILIZING
SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, NON-SEQUITUR CONCLUSIONS, AND EVEN THE DISPUTED DECISION OF THE
TRIAL COURT, TO UPHOLD THE VALIDITY OF THE VERY SAME JUDGMENT, ALL CONTRARY TO THE RULES OF
EVIDENCE.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBITS "D", "G", "O", "P", "V", TO "V-48", "W"
TO "W-13", ALL OF WHICH WERE NOT PROPERLY IDENTIFIED.
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED IN
THE CASE AT BAR DISREGARDING ALTOGETHER THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER.
IV
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME COMMITTED WAS
MURDER, NOT DEATH (HOMICIDE) IN TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY SIDESTEPPING IN THE PROCESS THE FACTUAL
26
GROUNDS SURROUNDING THE INCIDENT.

Appellants mainly claim that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the testimonies of the two in
prosecution eyewitnesses, Ranulfo Sumilang and Renato Banculo, because they are unreliable,
doubtful and do not deserve any credence. According to them, the testimonies of these two
witnesses are suspect because they surfaced only after a reward was announced by General
Lim. Renato Banculo even submitted three sworn statements to the police geared at providing a
new or improved version of the incident. On the witness stand, he mistakenly identified a

detention prisoner in another case as accused Rolando Fernandez. 27 Ranulfo Sumilang was
evasive and unresponsive prompting the trial court to reprimand him several times. 28
There is no proof that Banculo or Sumilang testified because of the reward announced by General Lim,
much less that both or either of them ever received such reward from the government. On the contrary,
the evidence shows that Sumilang reported the incident to the police and submitted his sworn statement
immediately two hours after the mauling, even before announcement of any reward. 29 He informed the
police that he would cooperate with them and identify Salcedo's assailants if he saw them again. 30
The fact that Banculo executed three sworn statements does not make them and his testimony incredible.
The sworn statements were made to identify more suspects who were apprehended during the
investigation of Salcedo's death. 31
The records show that Sumilang was admonished several times by the trial court on the witness stand for
being argumentative and evasive. 32 This is not enough reason to reject Sumilang's testimony for he did
not exhibit this undesirable conduct all throughout his testimony. On the whole, his testimony was
correctly given credence by the trial court despite his evasiveness at some instances. Except for
compelling reasons, we cannot disturb the way trial courts calibrate the credence of witnesses
considering their visual view of the demeanor of witnesses when on the witness stand. As trial courts,
they can best appreciate the verbal and non-verbal dimensions of a witness' testimony.
Banculo's mistake in identifying another person as one of the accused does not make him an entirely
untrustworthy witness. 33 It does not make his whole testimony a falsity. An honest mistake is not
inconsistent with a truthful testimony. Perfect testimonies cannot be expected from persons with imperfect
senses. In the court's discretion, therefore, the testimony of a witness can be believed as to some facts
but disbelieved with respect to the others. 34
We sustain the appellate and trial courts' findings that the witnesses' testimonies corroborate each other
on all important and relevant details of the principal occurrence. Their positive identification of all
petitioners jibe with each other and their narration of the events are supported by the medical and
documentary evidence on record.
Dr. Roberto Garcia, the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, testified that the
victim had various wounds on his body which could have been inflicted by pressure from more than one
hard object. 35 The contusions and abrasions found could have been caused by punches, kicks and blows
from rough stones. 36 The fatal injury of intracranial hemorrhage was a result of fractures in Salcedo's
skull which may have been caused by contact with a hard and blunt object such as fistblows, kicks and a
blunt wooden instrument. 37
Appellants do not deny that Salcedo was mauled, kicked and punched. Sumilang in fact testified that
Salcedo was pummeled by his assailants with stones in their hands. 38
Appellants also contend that although the appellate court correctly disregarded Exhibits "D," "G," and "P,"
it erroneously gave evidentiary weight to Exhibits "O," "V," "V-1" to "V-48," "W," "W-1" to "W-13." 39 Exhibit
"O" is the Joint Affidavit of Pat. Flores and Pat. Bautista, the police intelligence-operatives who witnessed
the rally and subsequent dispersal operation. Pat. Flores properly identified Exhibit "O" as his sworn
statement and in fact gave testimony corroborating the contents thereof. 40 Besides, the Joint Affidavit
merely reiterates what the other prosecution witnesses testified to. Identification by Pat. Bautista is a
surplusage. If appellants wanted to impeach the said affidavit, they should have placed Pat. Flores on the
witness stand.
Exhibits "V," "V-1" to "V-48" are photographs taken of the victim as he was being mauled at the Luneta
starting from a grassy portion to the pavement at the Rizal Monument and along Roxas Boulevard, 41
as he was being chased by his assailants 42 and as he sat pleading with his assailants. 43 Exhibits "W",

"W-1" to "W-13" are photographs of Salcedo and the mauling published in local newspapers and
magazines such as the Philippine Star, 44 Mr. and Ms. Magazine, 45 Philippine Daily Inquirer, 46 and the
Malaya. 47 The admissibility of these photographs is being questioned by appellants for lack of proper
identification by the person or persons who took the same.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the
photographer as to its production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced.
48
The value of this kind of evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the
original, 49 and its admissibility is determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the
crime. 50 The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. 51
The correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved
prima facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after
which the court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. 52 Photographs, therefore, can be
identified by the photographer or by any other competent witness who can testify to its exactness and
accuracy. 53
This court notes that when the prosecution offered the photographs as part of its evidence, appellants,
through counsel Atty. Alfredo Lazaro, Jr. objected to their admissibility for lack of proper identification. 54
However, when the accused presented their evidence, Atty. Winlove Dumayas, counsel for accused
Joselito Tamayo and Gerry Neri used Exhibits "V", "V-1" to "V-48" to prove that his clients were not in any
of the pictures and therefore could not have participated in the mauling of the victim. 55 The photographs
were adopted by appellant Joselito Tamayo and accused Gerry Neri as part of the defense exhibits. And
at this hearing, Atty. Dumayas represented all the other accused per understanding with their respective
counsels, including Atty. Lazaro, who were absent. At subsequent hearings, the prosecution used the
photographs to cross-examine all the accused who took the witness stand. 56 No objection was made by
counsel for any of the accused, not until Atty. Lazaro appeared at the third hearing and interposed a
continuing objection to their admissibility. 57
The objection of Atty. Lazaro to the admissibility of the photographs is anchored on the fact that the
person who took the same was not presented to identify them. We rule that the use of these photographs
by some of the accused to show their alleged non-participation in the crime is an admission of the
exactness and accuracy thereof. That the photographs are faithful representations of the mauling incident
was affirmed when appellants Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan identified themselves
therein and gave reasons for their presence thereat. 58
An analysis of the photographs vis-a-vis the accused's testimonies reveal that only three of the
appellants, namely, Richard de los Santos, Nilo Pacadar and Joel Tan could be readily seen in various
belligerent poses lunging or hovering behind or over the victim. 59 Appellant Romeo Sison appears only
once and he, although afflicted with hernia is shown merely running after the
victim. 60Appellant Joselito Tamayo was not identified in any of the pictures. The absence of the two
appellants in the photographs does not exculpate them. The photographs did not capture the entire
sequence of the killing of Salcedo but only segments thereof. While the pictures did not record Sison and
Tamayo
hitting
Salcedo,
they
were
unequivocally
identified
by
Sumilang
and
Banculo 61Appellants' denials and alibis cannot overcome their eyeball identification.
Appellants claim that the lower courts erred in finding the existence of conspiracy among the principal
accused and in convicting them of murder qualified by abuse of superior strength, not death in tumultuous
affray.
Death in a tumultuous affray is defined in Article 251 of the Revised Penal code as follows:
Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed
the deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or
persons shall be punished by prison mayor.

If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon
the person of the victim.
For this article to apply, it must be established that: (1) there be several persons; (2) that they did not compose groups organized
for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (3) these several persons quarrelled and assaulted
one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (4) someone was killed in the course of the affray; (5) it cannot be ascertained
who actually killed the deceased; and (6) that the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence
62
can be identified.

A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a
confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author
thereof cannot be ascertained. 63
The quarrel in the instant case, if it can be called a quarrel, was between one distinct group and one
individual. Confusion may have occurred because of the police dispersal of the rallyists, but this confusion
subsided eventually after the loyalists fled to Maria Orosa Street. It was only a while later after said
dispersal that one distinct group identified as loyalists picked on one defenseless individual and attacked
him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches, kicks and blows on him. There was no confusion and
tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression at this stage of the incident. 64
As the lower courts found, the victim's assailants were numerous by as much as fifty in number 65 and
were armed with stones with which they hit the victim. They took advantage of their superior strength and
excessive force and frustrated any attempt by Salcedo to escape and free himself. They followed Salcedo
from the Chinese Garden to the Rizal Monument several meters away and hit him mercilessly even when
he was already fallen on the ground. There was a time when Salcedo was able to get up, prop himself
against the pavement and wipe off the blood from his face. But his attackers continued to pursue him
relentlessly. Salcedo could not defend himself nor could he find means to defend himself. Sumilang tried
to save him from his assailants but they continued beating him, hitting Sumilang in the process. Salcedo
pleaded for mercy but they ignored his pleas until he finally lost consciousness. The deliberate and
prolonged use of superior strength on a defenseless victim qualifies the killing to murder.
Treachery as a qualifying circumstance cannot be appreciated in the instant case. There is no proof that
the attack on Salcedo was deliberately and consciously chosen to ensure the assailants' safety from any
defense the victim could have made. True, the attack on Salcedo was sudden and unexpected but it was
apparently because of the fact that he was wearing a yellow t-shirt or because he allegedly flashed the
"Laban" sign against the rallyists, taunting them into mauling him. As the appellate court well found,
Salcedo had the opportunity to sense the temper of the rallyists and run away from them but he,
unfortunately, was overtaken by them. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack
without the slightest provocation on the part of the person being attacked. 66
The qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation was alleged in the information against Joselito
Tamayo. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated in this case because the attack against Salcedo
was sudden and spontaneous, spurred by the raging animosity against the so-called "Coryistas." It was
not preceded by cool thought and reflection.
We find however the existence of a conspiracy among appellants. At the time they were committing the
crime, their actions impliedly showed a unity of purpose among them, a concerted effort to bring about the
death of Salcedo. Where a conspiracy existed and is proved, a showing as to who among the
conspirators inflicted the fatal wound is not required to sustain a conviction. 67 Each of the conspirators is
liable for all acts of the others regardless of the intent and character of their participation, because the act
of one is the act of all. 68
The trial court awarded the heirs of Salcedo P74,000.00 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and one half of the costs of the suit. At the time he died on July 27, 1986, Salcedo
was twenty three years old and was set to leave on August 4, 1986 for employment in Saudi Arabia. 69

The reckless disregard for such a young person's life and the anguish wrought on his widow and three
small children, 70 warrant an increase in moral damages from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00. The indemnity
of P50,000.00 must also be awarded for the death of the victim. 71
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed and modified as follows:
1. Accused-appellants Romeo Sison, Nilo Pacadar, Joel Tan and Richard de los Santos
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Murder without any aggravating or
mitigating circumstance and are each hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua;
2. Accused-appellant Joselito Tamayo is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide with the generic aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior
strength and, as a consequence, he is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of TWELVE
(12) YEARS of prision mayor as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS of reclusion temporal
as maximum;
3. All accused-appellants are hereby ordered to pay jointly and severally the heirs of
Stephen Salcedo the following amounts:
(a) P74,000.00 as actual damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
(c) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the victim.
Costs against accused-appellants.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD
[G.R.

DIVISION
No.

94339.

November

9,

1990.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROLANDO TALINGDAN @

Boyet, RAYMUNDO TIERRA @ Remy, and ALCETO TALLEDO @ Asing, Accused.
ALCETO TALLEDO @ Asing, and ROLANDO TALINGDAN @ Boyet, AccusedAppellants.
The
Rosita

Solicitor
B.

General
Salazar

Eliseo M. Cruz for Rolando Talingdan.

for
for

Plaintiff-Appellee.
Alceto

Talledo.

SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; DYING DECLARATION; DEFINITION AND
REQUISITES THEREOF. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the dying declaration of
the victim, Bernardino Biniegas is admissible in evidence. A dying declaration is made by a
person under a consciousness of impending death concerning the cause and circumstances of the
injury from which he thereafter dies. The requisites for its admissibility are as follows: 1) that the
declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants death; 2)
that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an
impending death; 3) that the declarant is competent as a witness; 4) that the declaration is offered
in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which the declarant is the victim.
(Section
31,
Rule
130,
Rules
of
Court)
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMISSIBLE BEING AN EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. The
contention that Bernardino Biniegas statement is worthless since he can no longer be crossexamined was sufficiently answered by the Court of Appeals. A dying declaration is an exception
to the constitutional right of an accused to confront and cross examine the witness against him. It
is admissible being one of the exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay evidence on grounds of
necessity
and
trustworthiness.
3. ID.; ID.; RES GESTAE; ANOTHER EXCEPTION TO THE HEARSAY RULE. Adelina
Biniegas, wife of the victim testified that her husband revealed to her the identities of his
assailants. The appellants contend that her testimony should not be given credence since she did
not personally see them in the act of shooting. In refutation, the Court of Appeals explained that
the statements made by the victim to his wife are part of the res gestae which is another
exception to the hearsay rule. The victims revelation of the identities of the appellants as the
ones who called him was made before and subsequent to the shooting incident. (People v. Roca,
162 SCRA 696 [1988]). Its admissibility is beyond question. The wifes testimony is therefore
worthy
of
belief.
4. ID.; ID.; ALIBI; PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY TO BE AT THE SCENE OF THE CRIME,
NOT SHOWN IN THE CASE AT BAR. Alibi is a defense easily fabricated. These places
where appellants claimed to have been at the time of the commission of the crime were only
about 2 to 3 kilometers from the scene thereof. The appellants failed to demonstrate or present
clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for them to proceed to the place
of the commission of the crime, commit the crime and immediately return thereafter. The
distance from the place where the appellant was allegedly at the time of the incident to the place
where the incident happened does not certainly preclude that the appellants committed the crime.
(People v. Melicor, 160 SCRA 580 [1988]). The appellants alibi can not overcome the dying
declaration of the victim and the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. (People v.
Orongan, 168 SCRA 586 [1988]; People v. Garcia 141 SCRA 336 [1986])
5. ID.; ID.; PARAFFIN TEST; NEGATIVE RESULT THEREOF, NOT CONCLUSIVE TO
SHOW THAT A PERSON HAS NOT FIRED A GUN. Moreover, the defense also presented

NBI chemist Rolando Vitug who testified that the paraffin test results of his laboratory
examination on the persons of the appellants were found to be negative. This finding, however, is
not conclusive to show that a person has not fired a gun. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals,
it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet be negative for the presence of nitrates, as when
firing while wearing gloves or by washing the hands afterwards. (People v. Roallos 113 SCRA
584
[1982])
6. CRIMINAL LAW; AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; CONSPIRACY AND
TREACHERY, ESTABLISHED IN THE CASE AT BAR. The Court of Appeals correctly
appreciated the presence of the aggravating circumstances of conspiracy and treachery. There is
no doubt that from the circumstances of the case, appellants Talingdan and Talledo, together with
Tierra and a fourth man acted in concert pursuant to the same criminal objective. The prosecution
clearly established that all these four men went to the victims house at nighttime. Talingdan and
Talledo posted themselves below the house of Biniegas, Tierra near the post of the house and the
fourth man, under a nearby acacia tree, acting as look out. After Tierra and Talingdan shot
Bernardino Biniegas, all the four fled toward the same direction. There was deliberate, sudden
and unexpected attack on the person of Bernardino Biniegas who merely responded to the call of
Tierra. And when the victim pushed the window, he was immediately met by a volley of shots.
Bernardino Biniegas had no opportunity whatsoever to defend himself or repel the assault.
7. ID.; MURDER; RECLUSION PERPETUA, IMPOSABLE PENALTY IN THE ABSENCE
OF ANY MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE. The trial court correctly convicted the appellants
but erred in the imposition of the penalty. The Court of Appeals then made the following
corrections: ". . . [U]nder Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. The imposable penalty which has three
periods, namely, minimum (reclusion temporal), medium (reclusion perpetua) and the maximum
(death), makes Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code applicable. In this case, the prosecution was
able to establish the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior
strength and the ordinary aggravating circumstance of nighttime. However, abuse of superior
strength and nighttime or nocturnity are absorbed by treachery. (People v. dela Cruz, 147 SCRA
359) In the absence of any mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty should be reclusion
perpetua, the medium period of the penalty pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code."
DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
In the information filed with the then Court of First Instance of Abra Rolando Talingdan (alias
Boyet), Raymundo Tierra (alias Remy) and Alceto Talledo (alias Asing) were charged with the
crime
of
murder
committed
as
follows:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1975, in Cabaruan, Dolores, Abra, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the three above-named accused, conspiring and
confederating with each other and helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully

and feloniously, with treachery and taking advantage of nighttime, shoot and kill Bernardino
Biniegas."
(Rollo,
p.
6)
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment finding the three accused guilty of the crime
charged.
The
dispositive
portion
of
the
decision
reads
as
follows:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered that there being a prima facie case beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused are guilty of the crime of murder as charged they are hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death as defined
under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code or a period of SEVENTEEN (17) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY as minimum to TWENTY (20) YEARS as maximum by applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law and to indemnify the heirs of the late Bernardino Biniegas in the sum of TWELVE
THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and
to
pay
the
cost.
"In case of appeal, the bailbond fixed without any reduction for each of the accused is
P40,000.00."
(CA-Record,
p.
37)
Thereafter, the three accused elevated their case to the Court of Appeals.

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On October 12, 1978, the Court of Appeals issued a resolution certifying the case to the Supreme
Court for final determination considering that in the courts opinion, the imposable penalty is
reclusion
perpetua.
On October 27, 1985, Raymundo Tierra, one of the accused, filed a motion to withdraw his
appeal which was granted by the Second Division of the Supreme Court in a resolution dated
November
25,
1985.
On November 7, 1988, the Supreme Court resolved to return the case to the Court of Appeals for
proper disposition pursuant to the courts ruling in People v. Daniel, (86 SCRA 511, 540 [1978]).
Finally on July 23, 1990, the Court of Appeals made its own findings and affirmed the conviction
of the appellants. It then certified this case to the Supreme Court for final determination.
As to how the crime was committed, and the events immediately preceding and following the
commission thereof, the prosecutions version is presented in the Peoples Brief as follows:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"On August 2, 1975, between 7:30 to 8:30 p.m. m Cabaruan, Dolores, Province of Abra, the
victim Bernardino Biniegas a member of the police force of that town and his wife, Adelina,
were inside their house conversing with each other. As they were about to sleep they heard a
voice calling Pari, pari. Consequently, the victim stood up, peeped through a slit in the window
and saw four persons. His wife then asked him who were the persons outside and the victim
identified them as Leonico Talingdan and accused-appellants Rolando Talingdan, Raymundo
Tierra, and Alceto Talledo. Thereafter, the victim pushed the window and was met by a volley of
shots inflicting wounds on him. As the victim told his wife went to his aid. The victim told his
wife that the aforenamed persons were the ones who fired at him (pp. 81-84, tsn, May 11, 1976).

"Meanwhile, Honorata Biniegas, the victims mother who was living in the next house, upon
hearing the shots, went down her house and saw the appellants and a fourth man who,
henceforth, ran away from the scene of the crime. Appellants Talingdan and Tierra were armed
with rifles (pp. 147-151, 154, tsn, June 14, 1976). Thereafter, the victims neighbor came to his
aid and brought him to a place called Talogtog. Later, the mayor and others arrived at Talogtog,
loaded the victim in their jeep and brought him to the Abra Provincial Hospital for treatment (pp.
101-102,
tsn,
May
11,
1976).
"At the hospital, at about 3:00 a.m. of the following day (August 3, 1975), PC CIC Josefino
Valencia arrived and took the ante-mortem statement of the victim identifying appellants and
Leonico Talingdan as the perpetrators (pp. 4-10, tsn, December 11, 1975) the contents of which
are
as
follows:
chanrob1es

1.

virtual

Whats

A
Q

name?

Biniegas,

What

sir.

happened

to

was

shot,

3.

Who

shot

Asing

Barbosa,

Talingdan,
4.
A

Boyet

were

Because

5.

Talingdan,
the

Q
a

What

7.

Q
At

At
8:00
Q

A
8.

and

Leonico

saw,

sir.

shoot

wanted

to

be

did

you?
settled,

they

what
p.m.

on

How

time
the

2nd
are

sir.
did

Can

they

day

of

you

Very
Q

shoot
August,
feeling

critical,
you

sir.
use?

Carbine,

6.
A

they

gun

you?

Tierra

they

suit

you?
sir.

did

criminal

Remie
ones

Why
of

library

your

Bernardino

2.

1aw

sign

you?

1975,

sir.
now?
sir.

your

statement?

No,

sir.

BLOOD
THUMBMARK
(Record,

OF
p.

PAT.

10,

Exh.

BINIEGAS

"A"

Translation)

"As a result of the above shooting, the victim suffered the following injuries which subsequently
caused his death on August 3, 1975 at about 11:00 p.m.:
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This is to certify that Mr./Mrs./Miss PATROLMAN BERNARDINO BINIEGAS Male/Female

26 years of DOLORES, ABRA was examined/treated in this Hospital from on 8/2/75 at 11:00
p.m.,
19
___
to
___
for
the
following:
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Circular wound 8th intercostal space left, parasternal line, directed posteriorly upward, thru
and thru. Wound of entrance measures 1/2 inch in diameter; wound of exit 1 x 1 inch in
diameter,
infra
scapular
region,
left.
Circular wound, lumbar region left about 2 inches above the anterior superior iliac spine, nonpenetrating directed posteriorly downward. Wound of entrance measures 5 mm. in diameter;
wound of exit measures 1/2 inch in diameter, about 2 inches posterior to the wound of
entrance.
Circular wound, wrist, exterior aspect radial side, penetrating the bone of the index finger.
Wound of entrance measures 5 mm. diameter; wound of exit measures 7 mm. in diameter.
Exploratory

Laparotomy

Findings:

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Perforating wound, stomach thru and thru measuring 1 1/2 x 1 1/2 inch in diameter;
Lacerated wound involving the left lobe of liver and anterior surface of the spleen.
Perforating injury diaphragm inferior portion right about 1 1/2 inch in diameter.

Fracture

costochondral

junction

9th

rib.

left.

Note: Distal portion of fractured ribs perforated the superior aspect of diaphragm, left.
Cause

of

Death:

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Irreversible shock, secondary to gunshot wound involving the diaphragm stomach, spleen and
liver.
(Record,
p.
3,
Exhibit
"G")
"Previous to the incident, the victim, who was a member of the police force of Dolores, Abra was
investigating a case involving a theft of large cattle where the appellants were the suspects. The

appellants were then persuading the victim to drop the case or settle the matter amicably but the
latter refused to accede to their demands (p. 54, tsn., January 21, 1976; pp. 99-101, tsn., May 11,
1976,
p.
158-161,
tsn.,
June
14,
1976).
"At the scene of the crime the investigators found eleven shells of a .30 caliber carbine on the
ground, around four meters from the house of the victim, and immediately below the window
where he had peeped. They also found bullet holes on the said window and at the adjoining wall
(p. 14, tsn., December 11, 1975, p. 12-14, tsn, January 19, 1976)." (Peoples Brief, pp. 3-7)
In their appeal, the appellants made the following assignment of errors:

chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I
"THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ARE
THE AUTHORS OF THE CRIME.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING FAITH AND CREDIT TO THE
TESTIMONIES OF THE ACCUSED AND THEIR WITNESS.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS."
(Rollo,
pp.
151-152)
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the appellants are indeed guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged. They were identified as two of the perpetrators of the crime through
the dying declaration of the victim, Bernardino Biniegas and the testimonies of PC CIC Josefino
Valencia, Adelina Biniegas, the victims wife and Honorata Biniegas, the victims mother.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the dying declaration of the victim, Bernardino
Biniegas is admissible in evidence. A dying declaration is made by a person under a
consciousness of impending death concerning the cause and circumstances of the injury from
which he thereafter dies. The requisites for its admissibility are as follows:
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1) that the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarants
death;
2) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an
impending
death;
3)

that

the

declarant

is

competent

as

witness;

4) that the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide, in which
the declarant is the victim. (Section 31, Rule 130, Rules of Court)
In the case at bar, the requisites were all satisfied. When Bernardino Biniegas made his
statement, he was still in full possession of his mental faculties, although he was then weak due
to his wounds. He declared with clarity and certainty that he was shot with a carbine by Asing
Barbosa, Boyet Talingdan, Remie Tierra and Leonico Talingdan because of a criminal case his
assailants
wanted
him
to
drop.
Asing Barbosa is the same Alceto Talledo alias "Asing", one of the appellants in this case and
Boyet Talingdan is none other than Rolando Talingdan, the other appellant.
chanrobles

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chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

When asked how he was feeling, Biniegas replied that he was very critical which just shows that
he was conscious of the fact that his death, which occurred a day after, was imminent.
The contention that Bernardino Biniegas statement is worthless since he can no longer be crossexamined was sufficiently answered by the Court of Appeals. A dying declaration is an exception
to the constitutional right of an accused to confront and cross examine the witness against him. It
is admissible being one of the exceptions to the rule excluding hearsay evidence on grounds of
necessity
and
trustworthiness.
PC CIC Josefino Valencia who conducted the investigation of the shooting incident was the one
who took the ante-mortem statement of Bernardino Biniegas. He testified that the victim was
already in serious condition when his statement was taken. He then requested Dr. Herminio B.
Venus and Estrella Damian, two of the people who were present when Biniegas made his dying
declaration
to
sign
the
statement
as
witnesses.
Adelina Biniegas, wife of the victim testified that her husband revealed to her the identities of his
assailants.
The
pertinent
portions
of
her
testimony
are
as
follows:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A For the length of time that we have been conversing with my husband that night, there was
somebody who uttered, pari, pari from the ground under the floor of the house, sir and my
husband having heard the voice stood up and went to peep thru a space created by the bamboo
split and after having peeped thru, he said, they are Remy, Boyet, Asing and Leonico
Talingdan,
he
said.
Q And after your husband has said those words to you, what transpired next, if any?
A He again peeped looking thru the window shutter and after that, that was the time when a gun
detonated,
sir.
A
gun
detonation
occurred.
Q

How

did

your

husband

open

your

window?

A He did not open, sir. He merely pushed it like this. (The witness demonstrating an act of
pushing
forward
with
her
left
hand,
putting
the
shutter
forward)

Q And the moment your husband has opened your window by pushing forward-upward with his
left
hand,
what
transpired
next?
A That was the time there was a gun detonation; that guns were fired and after the firing, he fell
and lost his balance and fell to the place where we were lying down already wounded.
Q

And

when

your

husband

fell

already

wounded,

what

did

you

do?

A At that moment I asked repeatedly, Who are those who are those, I said and he said, they are
Remy,
Boyet,
Arsing
and
Leonico."
(Rollo,
pp.
159-160)
The appellants contend that her testimony should not be given credence since she did not
personally see them in the act of shooting. In refutation, the Court of Appeals explained that the
statements made by the victim to his wife are part of the res gestae which is another exception to
the hearsay rule. The victims revelation of the identities of the appellants as the ones who called
him was made before and subsequent to the shooting incident. (People v. Roca, 162 SCRA 696
[1988]). Its admissibility is beyond question. The wifes testimony is therefore worthy of belief.
Honorata Biniegas, the victims mother also testified that she recognized three of the four
assailants
on
the
night
of
the
shooting
as
she
testified,
to
wit:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Q On the night of August 2, 1975, between the hour of 7:30 and 8:30 where were you?
A

was

in

our

house,

sir.

Q While you were in your house at that hour, do you recall if there was anything unusual that
happened?
A

There

was,

sir.

Q Will you please tell the Honorable Court what is that unusual incident that happened on that
night
of
August
2,
1975?
A I heard gun reports and on the second time that I heard gun reports, I went down our house.
Q From what direction did you hear the gun reports coming from in relation to your house?
A According to my hearing, the gun detonations took place in front of the house of my son,
Bernardino,
sir.
Q Now, upon hearing the gun detonation coming from the direction of the house of Bernardino
Biniegas,
what
did
you
do?
A I took the light and match and walked towards the house of Bernardino Biniegas and while I
was walking I saw that there was also a lamp on the window of Bernardino Biniegas and where
were
persons
that
were
lighted
by
that
lamp,
sir.

Q When you saw that there were persons lighted by that lamp in the house of Bernardino
Biniegas, what did you do with the match and the light that you were then holding?
INTERPRETER
The witness answered the questions of the Fiscal without first being interpreted and the answer
was:
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A I lighted the lamp and the lamp that I lighted is a kerozene lamp which is made of a bottle and
had
a
wick.
Q After you have lighted that lamp which is made of bottle with a wick as you said, what did you
do
next?
A I ran to the place along side the window where there were persons, sir.
Q And what happened or what did you do when you were at that place near the window?
A I saw that there were four male persons, one of whom was under the acacia tree; two were just
under the window of the house and the one was under the house, sir.
Q Now, you mentioned four male persons that you saw after you lighted your lamp. Were you
able
to
recognize
any
of
these
four
persons?
ATTY.

BLANCO

We

object,

very

leading,

Your

Honor.

COURT
Next

question.

FISCAL
Q

Now,

PAREDES
do

you

know

who

were

COURT
Q Who was that person under the acacia tree if you recognized him really?
A I was not able to recognize the person under the acacia tree because he ran away, sir. The other
three
were
the
ones
I
was
able
to
recognize.
FISCAL

PAREDES

Q And who are these three persons you said whom you were able to recognize?

A Rolando Talingdan, Remy Tierra and Asing Talledo, sir. They are the ones whom I recognized.
Q Now, you mentioned three persons and three names and you mentioned Rolando Talingdan.
Where
was
Rolando
Talingdan
when
you
saw
him?
A He was on the place just below the window of the house of Bernardino Biniegas but at that
time
they
were
already
attempting
to
run
away,
sir.
Q How about Reynaldo Tierra alias Remy Tierra, where was he at the time you saw him?
A He was near the post of the house of Bernardino Biniegas under the house, sir.
Q How about Alceto Talledo alias Asing Talledo, where was he at the time you saw him?
A

He

was

with

Talingdan

sir.

You

He

was

there

mean

side

by

side

with

Rolando

Talingdan.
Talingdan?

Yes,

sir.

Q Now, when you saw and recognized these four male persons you mentioned and you named,
how
far
were
you
from
them?
A

Maybe

five

meters

or

more,

sir.

Q And how were you able to recognize these three persons at that distance?
A I lighted the bottle and after having lighted it, I did like this. (The witness raises her right hand
as if raising a lamp) and upon raising the lamp like this, I saw their figures and I saw their faces,
that
is
why
I
recognized
them,
sir."
(Rollo,
pp.
160-164)
The witness was very certain on direct and cross-examinations that she recognized three of the
four assailants as she identified them to be Rolando Talingdan, Remy Tierra, and Asing Talledo.
She was not very sure of the fourth man but this uncertainty is not enough to overthrow her
whole
testimony.
On the other hand, the defenses presented by the appellants are weak as against the clear and
positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses as the perpetrators of the crime.
(People
v.
Pineda,
157
SCRA
71
[1988])
The

main

thrust

of

the

defense

of

the

appellants

is

alibi.

Appellant Talledo claimed that he was in the house of Honorata Timbuga in Kinalaba, Dolores,
Abra from 7:30 to 8:00 oclock that night listening to a radio program "Crisanta." Thereafter, he
went to a dance nearby and stayed there until 11:00 oclock. He declared that after the dance, he

went home in the company of Danila Barber and Mazareno Talledo and slept in his house until
6:00 oclock the following morning. Appellant Talingdan, meanwhile alleged that from 7:00 to
9:00 oclock in the evening of August 2, 1975, he and Raymundo Tierra were in the house of Mr.
and Mrs. Modesto Alcantara in Talogtog, Dolores, Abra listening to the radio program "Crisanta"
together
with
Purisimo
Viloria
and
Flomio
Valera.
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Alibi is a defense easily fabricated. These places where appellants claimed to have been at the
time of the commission of the crime were only about 2 to 3 kilometers from the scene thereof.
The appellants failed to demonstrate or present clear and convincing evidence that it was
physically impossible for them to proceed to the place of the commission of the crime, commit
the crime and immediately return thereafter. The distance from the place where the appellant was
allegedly at the time of the incident to the place where the incident happened does not certainly
preclude that the appellants committed the crime. (People v. Melicor, 160 SCRA 580 [1988]).
The appellants alibi can not overcome the dying declaration of the victim and the positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. (People v. Orongan, 168 SCRA 586 [1988]; People v.
Garcia
141
SCRA
336
[1986])
Moreover, the defense also presented NBI chemist Rolando Vitug who testified that the paraffin
test results of his laboratory examination on the persons of the appellants were found to be
negative. This finding, however, is not conclusive to show that a person has not fired a gun. As
pointed out by the Court of Appeals, it is possible for a person to fire a gun and yet be negative
for the presence of nitrates, as when firing while wearing gloves or by washing the hands
afterwards.
(People
v.
Roallos
113
SCRA
584
[1982])
The Court of Appeals correctly appreciated the presence of the aggravating circumstances of
conspiracy
and
treachery.
There is no doubt that from the circumstances of the case, appellants Talingdan and Talledo,
together with Tierra and a fourth man acted in concert pursuant to the same criminal objective.
The prosecution clearly established that all these four men went to the victims house at
nighttime. Talingdan and Talledo posted themselves below the house of Biniegas, Tierra near the
post of the house and the fourth man, under a nearby acacia tree, acting as look out. After Tierra
and Talingdan shot Bernardino Biniegas, all the four fled toward the same direction. There was
deliberate, sudden and unexpected attack on the person of Bernardino Biniegas who merely
responded to the call of Tierra. And when the victim pushed the window, he was immediately
met by a volley of shots. Bernardino Biniegas had no opportunity whatsoever to defend himself
or
repel
the
assault.
The trial court correctly convicted the appellants but erred in the imposition of the penalty. The
Court
of
Appeals
then
made
the
following
corrections:

jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . [U]nder Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable by reclusion temporal
in its maximum period to death. The imposable penalty which has three periods, namely,
minimum (reclusion temporal), medium (reclusion perpetua) and the maximum (death), makes
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code applicable. In this case, the prosecution was able to
establish the qualifying aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength

and the ordinary aggravating circumstance of nighttime. However, abuse of superior strength and
nighttime or nocturnity are absorbed by treachery. (People v. dela Cruz, 147 SCRA 359) In the
absence of any mitigating circumstance, the imposable penalty should be reclusion perpetua, the
medium period of the penalty pursuant to Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code." (Rollo, p. 166)
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the trial court as certified by the Court of Appeals is
MODIFIED. The appellants, are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder
and are hereby SENTENCED to SUFFER the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the
heirs of the late Bernardino Biniegas. In accordance with recent decisions of this Court (see
People v. Alegria, G.R. No. 86455, September 14, 1990; People v. Sazon, G.R. No. 89684,
September 18, 1990), the civil indemnity is increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.

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