Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Synopsis
A. Scope Object and Applicability . . . . . . . . . . 2287
FI. Chapter VA not a complete code in itself on lay off
compensation hence compensation is payable even
in establishments to which neither Chapter VA
nor Standing Orders are applicable (S.C.2J) . . . 2287
2258
Synopsis
iii) Preceding twelve months how to compute . . . 2305
F a) To be counted backwards just preceding the
relevant date (S.C.2J) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2305
2259
r) All days when employee was in employment
and paid wages as per statute/contract
/Standing Orders (MP.DB) . . . . . . . . . . 2311
2260
Synopsis
2261
2262
Synopsis
Fa) When there are justifiable reasons for lay-off
(S.C.2J) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2370
VIII. Remedy for recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2371
2263
2264
Synopsis
ii) Notice has to specifically indicate that termination
is due to retrenchment failing which termination
becomes termination simpliciter (Bom.HC) . . . 2397
iii) It is mandatory but not directory to mention
reasons for termination in the notice (Ori.DB) . . 2397
2265
1. Attributes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2402
F i) Compliance of Clause (b) mandatory since
retrenchment means ending, concluding and
cessation of employment and failure to pay
renders retrenchment illegal (S.C.3J). . . . . . . 2402
ii) Payment of dues was a condition precedent
(Raj.DB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2404
2266
Synopsis
2267
2268
Synopsis
2269
2270
Synopsis
i) High Court can directly entertain writ over matters
falling under Chapter V-A since it does not contain
disputes referable to Labour Court or Tribunal
u/s. 10 (All.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2489
2271
a) Not a proper remedy to decide questions of
appointment on vacancy and violation of rules
and benefits u/s. 25F (MP.DB) . . . . . . . . 2495
j) Prosecution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2495
ii) High Court can entertain dispute of termination if
Sec. 25F is violated since it amounts to violation
of natural justice (Mad.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . 2489
vi) High Court can modify the relief granted u/s. 25F
if industry is closed or is in severe financial
condition (Bom.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2490
2. When cannot be . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2490
i) High Court cannot interfere where no
jurisdictional error/procedural irregularity is
committed (Guj.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2490
ii) High Court cannot decide questions of fact like
whether or not the workman completed 240 days
of service (All.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2490
iii) When alternate remedy is available under Industrial
Disputes Act (All.DB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2491
iv) Writ not maintainable in case of non-compliance
of Sec. 25F unless there is proof of legal injury
or infringement of legal right of the employee
(Pat.HC). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2491
F v) When writ involves pure question of facts like
whether employee worked for 240 days
(S.C.2J) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2492
2272
Synopsis
xii) Reinstatement cannot be of daily wagers though
terminated in violation of Sec. 25F since the posts
they worked on were not sanctioned (Mad.HC) . . 2515
xiii) Reinstatement cannot be if there was unexplained
delay of 13 years on the part of workman
(Mad.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2516
xiv) If termination is by way of acceptance of
voluntary resignation (Bom.HC) . . . . . . . . . 2516
xv) When workman abandons service of his own
volition (Raj.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2516
xvi) Reinstatement cannot be awarded on the ground
of workman completing 240 days without
discussing the evidence on record (P&H.HC). . . 2516
xvii) Reinstatement not proper when employment
is for fixed period (Raj.HC). . . . . . . . . . . . 2517
F xviii) When retrenchment is valid on facts though
Sec. 25F violated as retrenchment compensation
was not paid (S.C.2J) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2517
d) Relief of back wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2518
1. General principles to determine quantum of
back wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2518
F i) There is no starightjacket formula to grant
back wages and Labour Court has discretion
to decide the qunatum on facts and circumstances
(S.C.3J) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2518
F ii) No law in absolute terms can be laid down to
grant full back wages but it is not automatic
since industry cannot be compelled to pay for the
period during which the employee contributed
nothing (S.C.2J). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2519
iii) Quantum of back wages to be determined on the
basis of nature of work, employment and
appointment (Raj.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2519
iv) Quantum of back wages to be determined having
regard to financial implications on public
functionary (All.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2520
F v) Quantum of back wages to be determined on the
basis of apportionability of burden due to delay
not attributable to either party (S.C.2J) . . . . . . 2520
vi) Labour Court to record the basis of evidence for
granting back wages and mere absence of plea
of employer raising objection to back wages does
not entitle workman to back wages (Del.HC) . . . 2520
F vii) Reinstatement entitles employee to wages of the
post from which he was terminated but not of
fresh post to be considered (S.C.3J) . . . . . . . . 2521
viii) Back wages to be at the rate commensurate
to the status of a daily rated workman but not
at the scale of the post i.e. driver (Gau.HC) . . . . 2521
F ix) The factor of gainful employment of the
workman to be considered while examining the
admissibility of back wages or deciding
quantum of back wages (S.C.3J) . . . . . . . . . 2521
x) The factor of delay to be considered in determinig
the quantum of back wages (Guj.HC) . . . . . . . 2523
xi) The principle of no work-no pay to be considered
to decide the quantum of back wages (Ori.HC) . . 2523
2273
2274
Synopsis
2275
a) Includes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2557
b) Excludes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2557
2276
Synopsis
Fe) Employee opting to serve transferee is bound by
transferees service conditions (S.C.3J) . . . . . . . 2574
f) In the absence of uninterrupted service, employees
terminated by transferor cannot claim reinstatement
or compensation from transferee (AP.DB). . . . . . 2575
g) Workmen of transferor company have no claim barring
right to compensation u/s. 25FF when services
terminated prior to transfer (Mad.DB) . . . . . . . . 2576
h) The employee becomes entitled for retrenchment
compensation and need wait for the formal orders
of termination (All.HC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2576
Fi) Compensation at the rate provided in Sec. 25F is
payable when conditions of Proviso not satisfied as
service conditions of transferee are less favourable
(S.C.2J) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2576
Fj) Compensation under the section is payable by the
transferor only when employees are reemployed
afresh by transferee (S.C.2J) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2577
Fk) Compensation payable is as per Sec. 25F and not
u/s. 25FF or 25FFF when the illegally terminated
employee was either transferred to the Electricity
Board as employee of the transferor or the company
never closed down but continued on transfer
(S.C.CB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2578
2277
2278
a) Excludes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2601
1. Scheme of leasing (Mad.DB) . . . . . . . . . . . 2601
b) Effect of absence of notice on validity of
termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2601
1. Absence of notice does not affect validity of
termination (Raj.DB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2601
c) When notice is required . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2601
1. When Chapter V-A is applicable to the workman
he is entitled to one months notice & not 3
months notice on closure (P&H.DB) . . . . . . 2601
2. Notice of closure required even in case of
closure due to Force Majeure (Ker.HC) . . . . . 2602
VII. Compensation on closure . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2602
Synopsis
2279
2280
Synopsis
2281
2282
1. Is on employer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2656
Synopsis
2283
IX. Last come first go (Sec. 25G) when not violated . . 2662
a) When there is no proof that juniors were continued
in service (Ori.DB) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2662
2284
Synopsis
2285
2286
Temporary employees rights not to prevail over public service commission recruits
2287
IV. Rights of temporary employees under Chapter V-A cannot prevail over the
rights of Public Service Commission recruits as it violates Art.16 and 320
(Ker.DB)
5A.3 Though the employees appointed under Rule 9 of the Kerala State and Subordinate
Service Rules on a temporary basis are entitled to the protection of Chapter V- A of the
Industrial Disputes Act their rights cannot defeat the rights of Public Service Commission
recruits as this will be violative of Art. 16 and Art. 320. Hence their appointments cannot be
2288
perpetuated since this would nullify the Constitutional protection with regard to public service
appointment. The petition of the workmen referred by the single judge being without merits is
dismissed by the division bench.
O.M. Viswambharan & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors., 1983 II LLJ 309 : 1983 II LLN 428 : 1983 LIC 369
(Ker.DB)
The State.eligibility. (Page: 312, Para: 6)
The problem.the applicants. (Page: 312, Para: 7)
To perpetuate.Act. (Page: 313, Para: 8)
Therefore.in limine. (Page: 313, Para: 9)
Note: Also refer to sections .25A to 25E for more elaborate under standing of the scope of the
Chapter VA
VI. Chapter V-A will prevail over service regulations entitling a budli worker to
retrenchment compensation terminated for unsatisfactory work without
enquiry (Karn.HC)
5A.4 The services of conductors working as badlis under corporation were terminated on
grounds of unsatisfactory work and unsuitability, without holding any enquiry and their names
were removed from the Badli list. The High Court held that badli conductors are workman u/s. 2(s)
and if retrenchment is effected in violation of provisions of Sec. 25F, Chapter V-A would be
applicable as Sec. 25-C provides that badli workmen are covered under the said Chapter V-A. The
workmen are thus entitled to retrenchment compensation if they satisfy requirement of Sec. 25
B(2)(a)(ii). The regulations relating to service conditions will have to make way for the provisions
of Chapter V-A in view of the provisions of Sec. 25J. The calculation of 240 days be done by
including the days of rest and compensatory holidays as they could have availed under the
settlement.
Mukunda v. Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C., 1986 I LLJ 470 (Karn.HC)
VIII. Provisions of chapter VA prevail over Sec. 7 of Andhra Pradesh Act, 1994 in
the matter of regularization hence daily wage workman who is protected
u/Chapter VA cannot be terminated u/ A.P. Act 1994 though the latter bars
regularization (AP.DB)
Maize Beedar Agriculture Research Station Hyderabad & Anr. v. Smt. Silar Bee, 1996 LIC 1776
(AP.DB)
2289
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in Sec. 25J
X. Chapter V-A applicable to lay-off though initiated under State law (All.HC)
5A.5 A dispute regarding lay-off though initiated under a State law and pending before a forum
constituted under the Sate law shall be adjudicated in accordance with the provisions of Chapter
V-A. Thus, the workers are entitled to favourable benefits in addition to lay-off compensation as
per Sec. 25J and the proviso and Chapter V-A.
Hind Lamps Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1988 (57) FLR 703 (All.HC)
XI. Chapter V-A applicable to badli workmen since covered under Sec. 25C
(Karn.HC)
Mukunda v. Managing Director, K.S.R.T.C., 1986 I LLJ 470 (Karn.HC)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section (supra)
XIII. Section when not applicable workmen entitled to full wages for lay off as per
contract of service (Mad.DB)
5A.7 The Labour Court has jurisdiction to decide u/s. 33C(2), the amount of compensation
which workers are liable to get and in the instant case it held that since Sec. 25A is not attracted as
the number of employees are less than 50, nor reasons for lay off are covered under Standing
orders, hence the workmen are entitled to full wages as per contract of service.
Tansi Leather Works, Madras (by Superintendent) v. G. Gowri & Ors., 1986 II LLJ 263 : 1986 II LLN
594 (Mad.DB)
Mr. M. R. Narayanaswamy learned.under the Standing Order. (Page: 264, Para: 5)
When the matter.wages of compensation.(Page: 266, Para: 9)
2290
Sec. 25A
month.section
25-A(1)(a).25C
Sec. 25A
Seasonal establishment
2291
the
contact.
2292
Sec. 25A
c) Excludes
1. Sugar Factory when it engages itself in permanent activities though its
crushing activity is seasonal (Guj.DB)
5A.14 In view of the fact that Government had ignored significant number of permanent
employees and the permanent nature of work in different sections of the sugar factory while
declaring it as establishment of seasonal character and had only considered seasonal activity of
crushing department, order of the Government was held as patently wrong which could be
interfered with and set aside u/Art. 226 and also considering delay that would result the matter was
not remanded.
Saurashtra Majoor Mahajan Sangh v. Union of India & Ors., 1994 I CLR 518 (Guj.DB)
While considering the.the Government. (Page: 523, Para: 19)
.In the instant.be in operation. (Page: 527, Para: 22)
.However, while.all other sections. (Page: 525, Para: 25)
.If the quasi.of the, constitution. (Page: 526, Para: 27)
.we do not.to be adopted. (Page: 526, Para: 28)
.The impugned decision.and set aside. (Page: 526, Para: 30)
Sec. 25A
Seasonal establishment
2293
2294
Sec. 25B
Sec. 25B
Applicability
2295
II. Applicability
a) Applicable if workman has actually worked for 240 days in a period of twelve
months (S.C.CB)
F 5A.22
It is not necessary to read the definition of continuous service u/s. 2(eee) into Sec. 25-B
because the fiction envisaged u/s. 25-B converts the service of 240 days in a period of 12 calendar
months into continuous service for one complete year therefore Sec. 25-F can be invoked even if
workmen has actually worked for 240 days during a period of 12 calendar months.
Employers in relation to the Digwadih Colliery v. Their Workmen, 1965 II LLJ 118 : 1964-65 (27) FJR
364 : 1965 (11) FLR 99 : 1966 AIR (SC) 75 (S.C.CB)
The definitions in S. 2 of the Act do not apply if there is anything repugnant in the subject or context and
the question is whether the definition of continuous service can at all apply in considering S. 25F when
what is meant by the expression one year of continuous service in S. 25F is, by S. 25B, specially stated.
If S. 25B had not been enacted the contention of the Employers would have been unanswerable for the
words of S. 25F would then have plainly meant that the service should be for a period of 12 months
without interruptions other than those stated in S. 2 (eee) itself. But S. 25B says that for the purpose of S.
25F a workman who, in a period of twelve calendar months has actually worked for not less than 240 days
shall be deemed to have completed one year of continuous service. Service for 240 days in a period of
twelve calendar months is equal not only to service for a year but is to be deemed continuous service even
if interrupted. Therefore, though S. 25F speaks of continuous service for not less than one year under the
employer, both conditions are fulfilled if the workman has actually worked for 240 days during a period
of twelve calendar months. It is not necessary to read the definition of continuous service into S. 25B
because the fiction converts service of 240 days in a period of twelve calendar months into continuous
service for one complete year. (Page: 120, Col.: II)
Note: Sec. 2(eee) omitted by Act 36 of 1964 w.e.f. 19-12-1964.
2296
Sec. 25B
.In the year 1986, appellant engaged the respodents for the work of preparing certificates to be
issued by the appellant to the successful candidates at the examinations conducted by it.It would
appear that there was a back-log of certificates to be cleared and the services of the respondents were
engaged to clear that back-log on payment ad quantum.of the back-log for a period ranging from
one to two years before the assignment was discontinued. (Page: 977, Para: 2)
.The High Court was persuaded to the view that respondents were casual workmen who had
completed 240 days of work.Accordingly, the High Court directed the appellant to take
respondents back to service as casual workers and continue their service upon payment of wages
admissible to the regular employees doing similar work. (Page: 978, Para: 3)
.The assignment was an ad hoc one which anticipatedly spent itself out. It is difficult to envisage
for them the status of Workmen on the analogy of the provisions of Industrial disputes Act. 1947,
importing the incidence of completion of 240 days work. The legal consequences that flow from work for
that duration under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 are entirely different form what, by way of analogy.
The completion of 240 days work does not under that law import the right to regularisation. It merely
imposes certain obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the service. It is not appropriate
to import and apply that analogy, in an extended or enlarged from here. (Page: 978, Para: 4)
.the orders of the High Court under appeal are set aside. (Page: 978, Para: 7)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2297
.In other words, the expression continuous service may be statutorily defined in which case the
definition will prevail. An award using the said expression may itself give a definition of that expression
and that will bind parties in dealing with claim arising from the award. Where, however, the award does
not explain the said expression and statutory definitions contained in other Acts are of no material
assistance it would be necessary to examine the question on principle and decide what the expression
should mean in any given award; and that is precisely what the tribunal had to do in the present case.
(Page: 1569, Para: 5)
Note: The definition of continuous service in this case was u/s. 2(eee) which was omitted by Act 36 of
1964 w.e.f. 19-12-1964 and incorporated for academic interest
3. Need not necessarily mean completion of one year of service but covers
service of 240 days in any particular year of 12 calendar months (Bom.DB)
5A.28 The word Continuous Service in Sec. 25F read with Sec. 25-B, means continuity of
service but does not necessarily mean that he must have completed one year of service but it is
sufficient if he completes 240 days in any particular year of 12 calendar months to be deemed as
continuous service within the meaning of the section and hence the period from the date of
recruitment i.e. 24th January 1945 to the date of retrenchment i.e. 15th October 1954 which
includes the period of illegal strike from 6th October 1951 to 24th November 1951 was held to be
taken into account for computing retrenchment compensation as the employee did not suffer
dismissal on that account and therefore the period of strike despite interruption in service is
deemed to have been continuous by virtue of the definition as enumerated in categories of cases in
the second part of the said definition, so long as the viniculam juris is not severed on that account.
Jairam Sonu Shogale v. New India Rayon Mill Co., Ltd. 1958 I LLJ 28 : 1958-59 (14) FJR 371 (Bom.DB)
The petitioner was.with effect from 15th October 1954. (Page: 28, Para: 2)
On this petition.claimed by him. (Page: 29, Para: 2)
2298
Sec. 25B
4. Interruption is not relevant when employee has worked for 240 days
(S.C.CB)
F 5A.29
Interpreting the expression one year of continuous service Apex Court held that the
person who has worked for 240 days during the period of twelve months is entitled to the benefit of
Sec. 25-F of the Act even though his work during the twelve months was interrupted hence upheld
the order of Tribunal in awarding relief for the non-compliance of Sec. 25-F in terminating the
workmen and even now after amendment of 1964, situation has not changed except the change that
the service must be during a period of 12 calendar months preceding the date with reference to
which the calculation is to be made.
Employers in relation to the Digwadih Colliery v. Their Workmen, 1965 II LLJ 118 : 1964-65 (27) FJR
364 : 1965 (11) FLR 99 : 1966 AIR (SC) 75 (S.C.CB) CA 43 of 1964 dt.22 -3 -1965.
.But S. 25B says that for the purpose of S. 25F a workman who, in a period of twelve calendar
months has actually worked for not less than 240 days, shall be deemed to have completed one year of
continuous service. Service for 240 days in a period of twelve calendar months is equal not only to service
for a year but is to be deemed continuous service even if interrupted. Therefore, though S. 25F speaks of
continuous service for not less than one year under the employer, both conditions are fulfilled if the
workman has actually worked for 240 days during a period of twelve calendar months. It is not necessary
to read the definition of continuous service into S. 25B because the fiction converts service of 240 days in
a period of twelve calendar months into continuous service for one complete year.
(Page: 120, Para: Last)
The explanation to S. 25 B is the same, mutatis mutandis as before. Sri Sen contended that the change in
the law brought out his contention. We do not agree. The amended S. 25B only consolidates the previous
S. 25B and 2(eee) in one place, adding some other matters which are not relevant to the present purpose;
but the purport of the new provisions is not different. In fact the amendment of S. 25F of the principal Act
by substituting in Cl. (b) the words for every completed year of continuous service for the words for
every completed year of service now removes a discordance between the unamended S. 25B and the
unamended Cl. (b) of S. 25F. Neither before these several changes nor after these in uninterrupted service
necessary if the total service is 240 days in a period of twelve calendar months. The only change in the
new Act is that this service must be during a period of twelve calendar months preceding the date with
reference to which calculation is to be made. The last amendment now removes a vagueness which
existed in the unamended S. 25B. (Page: 121, Para: Last)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2299
would be a travesty of law to say that if a person is given work for one or for a few days in a year by
an employer, either as a leave substitute or to meet the extra work, the rest of the days on which no
work is given amounts to cessation of employment within the meaning of Sec. 25B(1). In order to
attract Sec. 25B(1) the person must have been in service during the period i.e. not only on days
when he actually worked, but also on days he could not work under circumstances set out in Sec.
25B(1). Petition dismissed. Therefore to be in employment is sine qua non for the application of the
provision.
Honnayya & Ors. v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Anr., 1985 II LLJ 487 : 1985 (66)
FJR 293 : 1985 I LLN 669 (Karn.HC)
iii) If workman was in continuous service for one year in terms of Sec. 25B(1)
uninterrupted by the employer, it is immaterial whether he completed 240
days in a particular year (Guj.HC)
5A.32 The workmen who were working for over 12 years as daily wagers were terminated
without notice and for which Labour Court awarded reinstatement with back wages for violation
of Sec. 25F of the Act. The award was challenged by filing a writ petition in the High Court
contending that the workmen did not complete 240 days in one year. The High Court held that the
question is whether the said workmen had put in continuous service in one year as Sec. 25B(1)
contemplates. Once it is proved that the workman is in continuous service for more than one year
and the service is not interrupted by employer during this period and even if interrupted, it is not
due to the fault of the employee, it is wholly immaterial that they had not worked for 240 days in
some years. And so there is no infirmity in the award of the Labour Court.
Moti Ceremic Industries v. Jivuben Rupabhai, 2000 II LLJ 735 : 2000 LIC 1921 : 2000 II CLR 156
(Guj.HC)
2300
Sec. 25B
.The phrase Continuous Service for a period occurring in sub section (1).sub section
(1) therefore has no application to the appellants case. (Page: 188, Para: 6)
ii) When employee has worked for not less than 240 days in a period of twelve
months (S.C.3J)
F 5A.36
Workmen who has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days
during the period of twelve months shall be deemed to have been in continuous service for a period
of one year u/s. 25B by virtue of Act 36 of 1964 whether or not he has in fact been in such continuous
service for a period of one year and as in the instant case appellants were in employment from May
4, 1974 to Jan. 29, 1975 have completed more than 240 days during the period of 12 months and are
entitled for reinstatement with full back wages for violation of Sec. 25F.
Surendra Kumar Verma etc. v. The Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, New
Delhi & Anr., 1981 I LLJ 386 : 1980 (57) FJR 67 : 1980 II LLN 456 : 1980 LIC 1292 : 1981 SCC (L&S)
16 : 1981 AIR (SC) 422 : 1980 (4) SCC 443 (S.C.3J)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2301
.It appears that Usha Kumari and Madhu Bala were in the employment of the Bank from May 4,
1974 to January 29, 1975 and had worked for 258 and 266 days respectively during that period. As the
period from May 4, 1974 to January 29, 1975 was not one year, it was conceded before the Labour Court
that there was no violation of the provisions of S. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
(Page: 390, Para: 8)
Act 36 of 1964 has drastically changed the position. Section 2(eee) has been repealed and S. 25 B(2)
now begins with the clause where a workman is not in continuous service.for a period of one
year. These changes brought about by Act 36 of 1964 appear to be clearly designed to provide that a
workman who has actually worked under the employer for not less than 240 days during a period of
twelve months shall be deemed to have been in continuous service for a period of one year whether or not
he has in fact been in such continuous service for a period of one year. It is enough that he has worked for
240 days in a period of 12 months; it is not necessary that he should have been in the service of the
employer for one whole year. We hold that Usha Kumari and Madhubala are in the same position as the
other appellants. (Page: 391, Para: 9)
In the result, all the appeals are allowed and the workmen-appellants are directed to be reinstated with
full back wages. (Page: 391, Para: 10)
iii) When employee completed 240 days though he is not in service for a period
of twelve months (S.C.2J)
F 5A.37
Negativing managements contention that concerned workmans case is not satisfied
by Sec. 25B Apex Court held that for the purpose of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 25B it is not necessary that a
workman should have been in service for a period of one year as it provides that a workman shall
be deemed to be in continuous service for a period of one year if in a period of twelve calendar
months just preceding the relevant date with reference to which calculation is to be made, the
workman has rendered service for a period of 240 days and hence in instant case since the
workman has worked for more than 240 days from his appointment date i.e. 8th Dec. 1973 till his
termination on 19th Oct. 1974 his termination without compliance of Sec. 25F is illegal.
Mohan Lal v. The Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics, Ltd., 1981 II LLJ 70 : 1981 (58) FJR 467 :
1981 (42) FLR 389 : 1981 II LLN 23 : 1981 LIC 806 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 478 : 1981 AIR (SC) 1253 : 1981
(3) SCC 225 (S.C.2J)
.It is not necessary for the purposes of sub-section (2) (a) that the workman should be in service
for a period of one year. If he is in service for a period of one year and that if that service is continuous
service within the meaning of sub-section (1) his case would be governed by sub-section (1) and his case
need not be covered by sub-section (2). Sub-section (2) envisages a situation not governed by sub-section
(1). And sub-section (2) provides for a fiction to treat a workman in continuous service for a period of one
year despite the fact that he has not rendered uninterrupted service for a period of one year but he has
rendered service for a period of 240 days during the period of 12 calendar months counting backwards
and just preceding the relevant date being the date of retrenchment. (Page: 77, Para: 12)
Reverting to the facts of this case, admittedly the appellant was employed and was on duty from
December 8, 1973 to October 19, 1974 when his service was terminated. The relevant date will be the
date of termination of service, i. e. October 19, 1974 Commencing from that date and counting
backwards, admittedly he had rendered service for a period of 240 days within a period of 12 months and,
indisputably, therefore, his case falls within Section 25B (2) (a) and he shall be deemed to be in
continuous service for a period of one year for the purpose of Chapter VA. (Page: 78, Para: 15)
Appellant has thus satisfied both the eligibility qualifications prescribed in Section 25F for claiming
retrenchment compensation. He has satisfactorily established that.he has rendered continuous
service for one year. Therefore, termination of his service would constitute retrenchment. As
precondition for a valid retrenchment has not been satisfied the termination of service is ab initio void,
invalid and inoperative. He must, therefore, be deemed to be in continuous service. (Page: 78, Para: 16)
Accordingly, this appeal is allowed and the Award of the Labour Court dated may 31, 1980, is set
aside. (Page: 79, Para: 18)
2302
Sec. 25B
iv) When workman rendered 240 days service though not continuously but in
a period of preceding twelve months or 365 days (Bom.HC)
5A.38 The period of 240 days may not be a period of continuous 240 days and it is sufficient if
total number of 240 days is calculated with reference to a period of 12 months. In other words, an
employee should render a service for total number of any 240 days in a period of continuous 365
days.
Union of India through Divisional Railway Manager, Mumbai v. Jairaj N. Shetty, 2003 (99) FLR 671 :
2003 LLR 1142 : 2003 III CLR 374 (Bom.HC)
5A.39 On termination, matter referred to Labour Court. It held that since the workman not
completed 240 days of continuous service, he is not entitled to any relief. On being challenged, High
Court held that continuous service as per Sec. 25B of Industrial Disputes Act means 240 days of
employment preceding twelve months to the date of termination and on the basis of evidence it is
clear that the employee in the twelve months preceding to the termination worked for a period of
more than 240 days. It is not the requirement of law that a person has to work continuously for a
period of 240 days in a calendar year. Hence award of Labour Court liable to be set aside and he is
entitled to reinstatement without back-wages.
Rajeev Sinha v. Sardar Vallab Bhai Government Polytechnic College, Bhopal & Anr., 2006 (111) FLR
571 : 2006 III CLR 1034 : 2007 I LLJ 577 : 2007 II CLR 47 : 2007 LLR 44 (MP.HC)
On the basis of the.Industrial Dispute Act, 1947. (Page: 572, Para: 5)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2303
wages to temporary employee in view of judgement of State Bank of India v. N. Sundara Money.
But since he was not in continuous service for 240 days as per Sec. 25-B he was held to be not
entitled to back wages.
State Bank of India v. Presiding officer & Anr., 1999 III LLJ 320 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 1725 : 1998 (8) SCC
576 (S.C.2J)
This fact is not disputes by Respondent 2. This shows that Respondent 2 had admittedly not worked for
more than 240 days continuously in a year as required under section 25-B of the Act. The Tribunal has
proceeded in he basis that the benefit of the settlement dated August 22, 1977 was available to all
temporary employees irrespective of the fact whether they had put in 240 days continuous service or not
and has directed the payment of back wages to Respondent 2 on the view that Respondent 2 had worked
for more than 90 days in a year. This view of the Tribunal cannot be upheld because, as a pointed out
earlier, Para 1 of the settlement dated August 22, 1977, clearly refers to temporary employees
concerned and temporary employees concerned are only those who satisfy the requirements of the
section 25-B of the Act having worked for more than 240 days continuously in a year so as to take the
benefits of the decision in Sundara Money case. Since Respondent 2 did not put in 240 days service in any
year, he cannot be regarded as a temporary employee concerned and he could not be extended the benefit
under Para 1 of the settlement dated August 22, 1977. The order passed by the Tribunal cannot, therefore,
be upheld and has to be set aside and for the same reason the impugned order of the High Court dismissing
the write petition field by the appellant has also to be set aside. (Page: 321/322, Para: 6)
ii) When intervening breaks given to a daily wager were not malafide
(Raj.DB)
5A.42 Breaks given to daily wager, whose appointment is made when shortage of staff arises or
seasonal increase of work, being not malafide, employee was held to be not in continuous
employment and hence termination was not in violation of Sec. 25F.
Pali Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., Pali v. Sunil Kumar Sharma., 1994 LIC 1370 (Raj.DB)
From.the Act. (Page: 1373, Para: 8)
It is thus.this case. (Page: 1374, Para: 9)
2304
Sec. 25B
The Workmen of American Express International Banking Corporation v. The Management of American
Express International Banking Corporation, 1985 II LLJ 539 : 1985 (67) FJR 189 : 1985 (51) FLR 481 :
1985 II LLN 817 : 1986 LIC 98 : 1985 II CLR 269 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 940 : 1986 AIR (SC) 458 : 1985 (4)
SCC 71 (S.C.2J)
.According to the workman excluding the breaks in service, he actually worked under the
employer for 275 days during the period of 12 months immediately preceding October 31, 1975 whereas
according to the employer he actually worked for 220 days only. (Page: 540, Para: 2)
.In the present case, the provision which is of relevance is S. 25B(2)(a)(ii) which to the extent
that it concerns us, provides that a workman who is not in continuous service for a period of one year shall
be deemed to be in continuous service for a period one year if the workman, during a period of twelve
calendar months preceding the date with reference to which the calculation is to be made, has actually
worked under the employer for not less than 240 days. The expression which we are required to construe
is actually worked under the employer. This expression, according to us, cannot mean those days only
when the workman worked with hammer, sickle or pen, but must necessarily comprehend all those days
during which he was in the employment of the employer and for which he had been paid wages either
under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute, standing orders, etc. The learned
counsel for the Management would urge that only those days which are mentioned in the Explanation to
S. 25B(2) should be taken into account for the purpose of calculating the number of days on which the
workmen had actually worked though he had not so worked and no other days. We do not think that we
are entitled to so constrain the Construction of the expression actually worked under the employer. The
explanation is only clarificatory, as all explanations is only clarificatory, as all explanations are, and
cannot be used to limit the expanse of the main provision. If the expression actually worked under the
employer is capable of comprehending the days during which the workman was in employment and was
paid wages and we see no impediment to so construe the expression there is no reason why the
expression should be limited by the explanation. To give in any other meaning then what we have done
would bring the object of S. 25F very close to frustration. (Page: 542, Para: 5)
On our interpretation of S. 25F read with S.25B, the workmen must succeed. The workman Shri. B.
Ravichandran is therefore directed to be reinstated in service with full back wages.
(Page: 543, Para: 7)
F 5A.45
Sundays and paid holidays should be included in determining the number of days on
which a workman has actually worked under the employer for the purpose of computing
continuous service.
Management of Standard Motor Products of India Ltd. v. A. Parthasarathy & Anr., 1985 (67) FJR 417 :
1985 (51) FLR 459 : 1985 II LLN 830 : 1985 II CLR 274 : 1986 LIC 101 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 934 : 1986
AIR (SC) 462 : 1985 (4) SCC 78 (S.C.2J)
.submission of Shri Pai that the number of days on which the workmen actually worked under
the employer would be less than 240 days if Sundays and other holidays for which the workmen were
paid wages were excluded has already been answered by us in the case of The Workmen of American
Express International Banking Corporation v. The Management of American Express International
Banking Corporation (Reported in 1986 Lab IC 98) in which judgment has just been pronounced by us.
In the circumstances, both the appeals are, dismissed with costs. (Page: 419, Para: 1)
Note: Also refer to the following cases
State of Uttaranchal, Through Collector v. Bhajan Singh, 2004 (102) FLR 283 (Uttar.HC)
Pawan Kumar Srivastava v. Municipal Corporation, 1999 II LLJ 21 : 1999 III LLN 266 (MP.DB)
Note: Please also refer to the case of
A. Parthasarathi & Anr. v. Management of Standard Motors Products of India Ltd. & Anr., 1979 LIC
(Sum) 136 (Mad.DB) where in it was held by some Madras High Court that Sundays and holidays for
which no wages paid are to be excluded while computing 240 days
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2305
2306
Sec. 25B
5A.48 When the Supreme Court says that employee has to prove that he had worked for 240 days
during the period of twelve calendar months counting backward and just preceding the relevant
date, then there is no scope to hold that the words, just preceding, are otiose or superfluous or
have no importance. A judgment is a judgment for what it decides. Since, in the instant case, the
employee has not completed 240 days in just preceding twelve calendar months, he would not be
entitled to any benefits u/s. 25F r/w. Sec. 25B of the Industrial Dispute Act.
Executive Engineer (Mechanical) v. Chetan P. Oza, 2006 I LLJ 213 : 2005 (107) FLR 797 : 2006 II LLN
476 : 2005 III CLR 333 : 2006 LLR 864 (Guj.DB)
5A.49 Workman raised an industrial dispute alleging that he had served from the year 1990 and
his services terminated in 1999 illegally. Labour Court held that the workman had not completed
240 days of service in the twelve preceding months. He has failed to prove that any worker junior to
him was retained or fresh recruitment made by the department, hence dismissed the claim. High
Court held that, the period of twelve months to be counted from the date of termination and if the
workman completed 240 days it will have to be assumed that the workman is in continuous service,
but in the present case workman has not completed 240 days of continuous service preceding 12
months, Sec. 25F of the Act does not come to his rescue.
Waryam v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Ors., 2007 (112) FLR 261 : 2007 II LLJ 157 : 2007 II LLN
937 : 2007 LLR 236 : 2007 I CLR 70 (P&H.DB)
.The petitioner, at one.were denied. (Page: 262, Para: 1)
In order to qualify.come to his rescue. (Page: 262, Para: 6)
Note: Also refer to the following case
Logaiyan v. First Additional Labour Court, Madras, & Anr., 1988 I LLN 695 (Mad.HC)
Shri Pal S/o Chander Bhan v. P.O. Industrial-cum-Labour Court & Anr., 2002 (95) FLR 401 : 2002 II
LLN 667 : 2002 LLR 371 : 2002 LIC 227 (P&H.HC)
Eicher Goodearth Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal Haryana, & Anr., 1986 (68) FJR 73 : 1986 (52) FLR 441 :
1986 I LLN 219 (P&H.HC)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2307
.Section 2(g) of the UP Act does not require a workman, to avail the benefit of the deeming
provision of completion of one year of continuous service in the industry, to have worked for 240 days
during preceding period of 12 calendar months. The word preceding has been used in S. 25-B of the
ID Act as incorporated in the year 1964. Section 2(g) does not use the word preceding..
(Page: 51, Para: 10)
c) All those days for which wages paid under express or implied contract
of service (MP.HC)
5A.54 Employees services were terminated without following the provisions of Sec. 25F of the
Act and it was found by the Labour Court that the employee had not worked for 240 days in a year.
But High Court held that working for 240 days does not mean only those days during which he was
in employment and working with pen, hammer or sickle but also includes all those days for which
he was paid wages under express or implied contract of service or by compulsion of statute or
standing order. Therefore the matter is remanded.
R.K. Shrivastava v. P.O. Labour Court & Anr., 1999 (82) FLR 429 : 1999 III LLN 1114 : 1998 LLR 802
(MP.HC)
2308
Sec. 25B
e) The period of service rendered under different schemes under the same
employer (Bom.HC)
5A.56 Workman raised industrial dispute for illegal termination without complying with Sec.
25F and for contravention of Sec. 25G as his juniors were retained. Labour Court awarded
reinstatement with 15% back wages on the ground that the workman was in continuous
employment for more than 240 days after taking into account days when he was paid by employer
and when he was paid from Employment Guarantee Scheme Fund. It was upheld by High Court
and it held that for the purpose of determining continuous employment it makes no difference if
during the period in contemplation the workman was paid from the Employment Guarantee
Scheme Fund as long as he is under the same employer.
Executive Engineer, Irrigation Division, Gondia & Ors. v. Anandroa Ramchandra Khobragade, 2004
LIC 1034 (Bom.HC)
The petitioners who are.back wages. (Page: 1034, Para: 2)
The condition.employer. (Page: 1035, Para: 7)
.Therefore in the.same employer. (Page: 1036, Para: 10)
Hence in view.unimpeachable. (Page: 1036, Para: 11)
g) The period between the date on which he was terminated and the date of
his reinstatement if he is reinstated as per terms of settlement
(P&H.HC)
5A.58 Workman joined service on 25.9.1986 and was not allowed to work from 1.10.1987 and
finally after a settlement he was reinstated on 9.2.1988 with continuity of service but he was again
terminated on 30.3.1988. It was held that the period between 1.10.1987 to 9.2.1988 would be
counted towards his service and ordered reinstatement as the workman thus completed 240 days of
service.
State of Punjab & Anr. v. Chhedi Lal & Anr., 1995 (86) FJR 663 : 1996 (72) FLR 407 : 1995 II LLN 433
:1995 LLR 513 (P&H.HC)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2309
h) Service of 20 days rendered every month by workman when paid for the
whole month (Ker.HC)
5A.59 Bus driver on an average worked for 20 days in a month but was paid for whole month. It
was held that workman worked for more than 240 days.
C.K. Kumaran v. Idukki Jilla Motor Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) & Anr., 1995 I LLJ 323 : 1994 (85) FJR 340 :
1995 (70) FLR 113 : 1994 LLR 528 (Ker.HC)
l) Paid holidays such as public festival holidays, Sundays and leave with
pay (Raj.DB)
5A.63 While calculating 240 days, Holidays and Sundays shall be considered for calculating
working days.
Babulal Sharma v. University of Ajmer & Anr., 1990 LLR 211 (Raj.DB)
.This is a.writ petition. (Page: 212, Para: 9)
5A.64 For calculating 240 days of continuous service Sundays should be considered as actual
working days.
Ram Kishan Gurjar v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2006 LIC 56 : 2006 I CLR 607 : 2006 LLR 301
(Raj.DB)
Note: The High Courts in recent cases (see below) ruled that Sundays and holidays for which wages are
not paid are not to be included for computing continuous service
2310
Sec. 25B
n) Service with the same employer though not in the same capacity (Raj.DB)
5A.66 A workman who has worked as Lower Division Clerk (LDC) and later as peon and has
rendered 240 days service, his termination was held as invalid on the basis that he has worked
continuously with the same employer although he may not have worked in same capacity.
Hardeo Lal Jat v. Alwar Sahakari Bhumi Vikas Bank Ltd. & Anr., 1990 (61) FLR 264 : 1990 LLR 576
(Raj.DB)
The definition of.at his credit. (Page: 266, Para: 4)
Admittedly, the provisions.not complied with. (Page: 267, Para: 1)
In the result.reinstate the petitioner. (Page: 267, Para: 2)
Sec. 25B
2311
Continuous service
casual
basis.The
period.assessing
r) All days when employee was in employment and paid wages as per
statute/contract/Standing Orders (MP.DB)
5A.70 The expression actually worked under the employer not only includes those days where
the workman worked with hammer, sickle and pen but all those days during which he was in the
employment of the employer and paid wages as per contract of service, statute or standing orders
and hence Sundays and paid holidays to be counted to determine 240 days.
Pawan Kumar Srivastava v. Municipal Corporation, 1999 II LLJ 21 : 1999 III LLN 266 (MP.DB)
In view.standing orders. (Page: 25, Para: 10)
2312
Sec. 25B
The petitioner was.with effect from 15th October 1954. (Page: 28, Para: 2)
On this petition.claimed by him. (Page: 29, Para: 2)
The Second question.compensation.then section 25-F also refers.compensation.
(Page: 30, Para: 2)
.one has to.six months.so that.than one year.But this
is.Industry.it is sufficient.service.the principal.12 Calendar
months.and where.for 240 days. (Page: 31/32, Para: 2)
In other words.set aside. (Page: 32, Para: 2)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2313
the two sub-divisions as they are separate and distinct and wrongly granted the reliefs. Hence the
award was set aside and employer was directed to pay an amount of Rs. 25000 only.
Haryana Urban Development Authority v. Om Pal, 2007 II LLJ 1030 : 2007 (113) FLR 831 : 2007 II
LLN 995 : 2007 II CLR 856 : 2007 LLR 582 : 2007 (2) SCC (L&S) 255 : 2007 (5) SCC 742 (S.C.2J)
The Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court unfortunately did not go into the said question at all. If both
the establishments are treated to be one establishment, for the purpose of reckoning continuity of service
within the meaning of Section 25B of the Act, as was held by the Tribunal, a person working at different
point of time in different establishments of the statutory authority, would be entitled to claim
reinstatement on the basis thereof. However, in that event, one establishment even may not know that the
workman had worked in another establishment. In absence of such a knowledge, the authority
retrenching the workman concerned would not be able to comply with the statutory provisions contained
in Section 25F of the Act. Thus, once two establishments are held to be separate and distinct having
different cadre strength of the workmen, if any, we are of the opinion that the period during which the
workman was working in one establishment would not enure to his benefit when he was recruited
separately in another establishment, particularly when he was not transferred from one Sub-Division to
the other. In this case he was appointed merely on daily wages. (Page: 1031/1032, Para: 4)
Respondent worked for a very short period. He only worked, as noticed hereinbefore, in 1994-95. The
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, therefore, in our opinion committed an illegality, while passing
an award in the year 2003, directing the reinstatement of the respondent with full back-wages. Although
we are of the opinion that the respondent was not entitled to any relief, whatsoever, we direct the
appellant to pay him a sum of Rs. 25,000/-. (Page: 1032, Para: 7)
5A.76 Workman had worked from 1.11.1990 to 31.12.1992 in different units of PWD and
department contended that he worked in different units which is independent and separate and
seniority of workman is maintained unitwise. So he has not completed 240 days of continuous
service in each department. Labour Court however awarded reinstatement on the ground that
termination was in contravention to Sec. 25-F. High Court held that evidence on record proves that
units though under the same department cannot be said to have any integrality with one another
and the employee was agitating the same without evidence so award of Labour Court cannot be
sustained and period of employment under different units cannot be clubbed together for the
purpose of completion of statutory period of 240 days.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Arun Kumar & Ors., 2000 III LLJ 1439 : 2000 (87) FLR 501 (Raj.HC)
2314
Sec. 25B
We are of the opinion that the judgement of the learned Single Judge is correct and the learned judge is
right in placing reliance upon the decision rendered in Workmen of Straw Board Manufacturing
Company Ltd., v. Straw Board Manufacturing Company Ltd., (1974 (2) LLN 102) where in applying the
test of functional integrality while considering the provisions relating to retrenchment in the context of
two factories situated in the same compound and owned by the same company were held to be distinct
Separate establishments notwithstanding unity of the employer and unit of financial management
because of absence of functional integrality in the sense functioning or working of one was not dependent
on the other notwithstanding unity of ownership and unity of Management. There is no dispute before us
that if different sub-divisions of the Irrigation Department are considered to be separate establishment the
appellant workman does to fulfil the criteria of continuous employment for one year or more on an
establishment under an employer for the purpose of invoking the provisions of S. 25-F of the Act.
(Page: 1233, Para: 9)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2315
contrary view holding that the employee had worked continuously for 240 days under the same
employer. The appeal against this order also came to be dismissed. On appeal by the employer, the
Supreme Court finally concluded that the Industrial Tribunal was correct in that the employee
went in search of employment at different places and wherever temporary employment was
available he accepted the employment. The records also showed that the employee was not
qualified for a permanent job. Hence, the Supreme Court held that the number of days of work put
in by the employee in broken periods cannot be taken as continuous employment for the purpose of
Sec. 25F of the Act and hence allowed the appeal.
DGM., Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. & Anr v. Ilias Abdulrehman, 2005 I LLJ 554 : 2005 (104)
FLR 300 : 2005 I LLN 659 : 2005 I CLR 488 : 2005 (2) SCC 183 : 2005 AIR (SC) 660 : 2005 SCC (L&S)
195 (S.C.2J)
A perusal of the evidence adduced by the workman himself shows that he went in search of employment
to different places and whenever there was a temporary employment available in different Departments
of the appellant-Corporation; be it the field work or the work in the Chemistry Department, he accepted
the employment and worked in these Departments not in one place alone but at different places like
Baroda and Mehsana. It has come on record that the Management did try to accommodate the appellant in
a permanent job but could not do so because of lack of qualification. In such circumstances we think the
Industrial Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the number of days of work put in by the
respondent in broken periods, cannot be taken as a continuous employment for the purpose of section 25F
of the Act, as has been held by this Court in the case of Indian Cable Co. Ltd. (supra). We are aware that
the judgment of this Court in Indian Cable Co. Ltd (supra) was rendered in the context of section 25G of
the Act, still we are of the opinion that the law for the purpose of counting the days of work in different
Departments controlled by an apex Corporation will be governed by the principles laid down in the
judgment of Indian Cable Co. Ltd (supra), and the Industrial Tribunal was justified in dismissing the
Reference. (Page: 556, Para: 8)
g) Sundays and holidays in case of daily wager for which no wages paid
(P&H.HC)
5A.83 Where the Labour Court excluded Sunday and other holidays to determine continuous
service and held that the daily wagers not entitled to any retrenchment compensation, the
workman moved High Court, which upheld the Labour Courts order and held that the Sunday
and other holidays for which no wages paid could not be counted for the purpose of determining
continuous service of 240 days.
Malkiat Singh v. Labour Commissioner & Anr., 1997 I CLR 524 (P&H.HC)
2316
Sec. 25B
5A.84 The services of a Clerk were terminated on which dispute was raised. On reference,
Tribunal held that workman had rendered continuous service of more than 240 days inclusive of
Sundays and Holidays, also held the order of termination was bad as having not issued
charge-sheet, hence granted reinstatement with full back wages. High Court held that unpaid
Sundays and Holidays cannot be taken into account while calculating actual working days in a
calendar year. It was also held that payment of bonus, provident fund scheme, cannot be treated as
relevant factors, Labour Court made wrong calculation of actual working days. Order cannot be
sustained in law.
Balmer Lawrie & Co. Ltd. v. First Industrial Tribunal of West Bengal & Ors., 2007 I CLR 110 : 2007 II
LLJ 81 : 2007 (112) FLR 787 : 2007 III LLN 761 : 2007 LLR 260 (Cal.HC)
The respondent.for adjudication. (Page: 111, Para: 2)
While considering.other benefits. (Page: 112, Para: 5)
In my view.sustained in law. (Page: 113, Para: 12)
Note: Also refer to the following case/s
Karnal Co.op. Sugar Mill Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Panipat & Anr., 2007 I CLR 976
(P&H.DB)
h) Holidays and Sundays even if paid since the words actually worked
exclude it (Mad.DB)
5A.85 The words actually worked were not held to include holidays or even Saturdays and
Sundays which were paid holidays and days provided the explanation can be included while
calculating 240 days in addition to the actual working days.
A. Parthasarathi & Anr. v. Management of Standard Motors Products of India Ltd. & Anr., 1979 LIC 136
(Sum) (Mad.DB)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2317
2318
Sec. 25B
Pleadings are no substitute for proof. No workman, thus, took an oath to state that they had worked for
240 days. No document in support of the said plea was produced. It is, therefore not correct to contend
that the plea raised by the Respondents herein that they have worked continuously for 240 days was
deemed to have been admitted by applying the doctrine of non-traverse. It any event the contention of the
Respondents having been denied and disputed, it was obligatory on the part of the Respondents to add
new evidence. The contents raised in the letters of the Union dated 30th May, 1988 and 11th April, 1990
containing statements to the effect that the workmen had been working continuously for 240 days might
not have been replied to, but the same is of no effect as by reason thereof, the allegations made therein
cannot be said to have been proved particularly in view of the fact that the contents thereof were not
proved by any witness. Only by reason of non-response to such letters, the contents thereof would not
stand admitted. The Evidence Act does not say so. (Page: 1073, Para: 18)
We have noticed hereinbefore that the Appellant herein raised a specific plea denying or disputing the
claim of the Respondents that they had completed 240 days of work. Such a plea having been raised both
before the Industrial Tribunal as also before the High Court, we cannot accept that the Appellant had
abandoned such a plea. Even in this Special Leave Petition, it is contended:
(3)For that the High Court ought to have held that the disengagement of the Ticca Mazdoors
(Respondents), who were daily wage casual workers, did not involve any retrenchment and as such there
was no question of reinstatement of Respondents will full backwages from 23.7.1993.
(Page: 1081, Para: 59)
The contention of Mr. Phadke that they have abandoned the said plea cannot be accepted. Similarly, the
contention of Mr. Phadke raised before us that the order passed by the Division Bench was a consent
order is unacceptable. The Division Bench does not say so. Such a contention has been raised only on the
basis of a statement made by the Respondents in the Counter-affidavit wherein the reference had been
made to one order of the Division Bench asking the parties to make endeavour for settlement. The
Respondents contend that the order of the Division Bench is virtually a consent order. No settlement
admittedly had been arrived at. A party to the lis, in absence of a statutory interdict, cannot be deprived of
his right of appeal. The High Court has passed the judgment upon consideration of the rival contentions
raised at the Bar. It arrived at specific findings on the issues framed by it. It has, for the reasons stated in
the impugned judgment, affirmed the findings of the Industrial Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge.
The impugned order of the Division Bench, in our opinion, by no stretch of imagination, can be said to
have been passed with consent of the parties. However, we agree with the opinion of the Tribunal that the
plea of abandonment of service by the Respondents in the facts and circumstances of the case was wholly
misconceived. (Page: 1081, Para: 60)
Note: As regards the question on whom lies the burden to prove 240 days of service, the three Judge
Bench of the Apex Court in the above case and other cases referred here settle as of to-day the legal
position on the question as to on whom the burden to prove 240 days of service lies as of to-day
F 5A.91
Claimant workman unless proves in evidence that he has worked for 240 days in
preceding year to his termination, no onus of proof lies on employer to prove that he has not
worked for 240 days.
Range Forest Officer v. S. T. Hadimani, WITH State of Karnataka & Anr. v. S. T. Hadimani, 2002 AIR
(SC) 1147 : 2002 I LLJ 1053 : 2002 (100) FJR 397 : 2002 (93) FLR 179 : 2002 (94) FLR 622 : 2002 II
LLN 391 : 2002 LLR 339 : 2002 LIC 987 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 367 : 2002 (3) SCC 25 (S.C.2J)
.In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the Management without first
determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the
year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was
denied by the Appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked
for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his
favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the
conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the
workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. (Page: 1148, Para: 3)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2319
F 5A.92
The workman was reinstated by Labour Court as Sec. 25F was not followed and
employer did not produce attendance register to prove that the workman did not complete 240
days service. High Court upheld Labour Courts order. On appeal, Supreme Court held that
burden of proof to establish completion of 240 days of work within a period of 12 months preceding
the termination as well as the burden of proof that he was not gainfully employed after the
termination was on the workman and not an the management.
Municipal Council, Sujanpur v. Surinder Kumar, 2006 II LLJ 768 : 2006 (110) FLR 198 : 2006 III LLN
806 : 2006 II CLR 643 : 2006 LLR 662 : 2006 (5) SCC 173 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 967 (S.C.2J)
The Labour Court and the High Court also proceeded wrongly on the premise that the burden of proof to
establish non-completion of 240 days of work within a period of twelve months preceding the
termination, was on the management. The burden was on the workman. (Page: 770, Para: 12)
Equally well settled is the principle that the burden of proof, having regard to the principles analogus to
Section 106 of the Evidence Act that he was not gainfully employed, was on the workman.
(Page: 770, Para: 13)
Apart from the aforementioned error of law, in our considered opinion, the Labour Court and
consequently the High Court completely misdirected themselves insofar as they failed to take into
consideration that relief to be granted in terms of Section 11A of the said Act being discretionary in
nature, a Labour Court was required to consider the facts of each case therefor. Only because relief by
way of reinstatement with full back wages would be lawful, it would not mean that the same would be
granted automatically. (Page: 770, Para: 15)
F 5A.93
The services of a daily wage employee was terminated upon reference of the dispute,
the Labour Court held that the termination was illegal for non-compliance of Sec. 25F of the Act.
By an award, it set aside the termination, reinstated him with full back-wages. The Single Judge set
aside the award on the ground that the workman had not discharged the initial onus of proving
that he had worked for more than 240 days. The Division Bench however allowed the appeal of the
workman and restored the award setting aside the judgment of Single Judge. The Supreme Court
setting aside the award of Labour Court and the judgment of Division Bench held that the High
Court proceeded on the basis as if the period of employment of workman has to be established by
the employer. The Court emphasized the repeated view taken that the burden of proof is on the
claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year.
Krishna Bhagya Jala Nigam Ltd. v. Mohammed Rafi, 2006 IV LLN 208 : 2006 (110) FLR 1212 : 2006
LLR 1080 : 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 679 (S.C.2J)
.According to the learned single Judge, the workman had not discharged the initial onus of
proving that he had worked for more than 240 days with the Jala Nigam and therefore the award directing
his reinstatement was illegal. The writ petition was allowed and the award of the Labour Court set aside. It
is against this order of the learned single Judge that a writ appeal was filed before the Division Bench. By
the impugned judgment, the writ appeal was allowed. (Page: 209, Para: 2)
In R.M. Yellatti v. The Asst. Executive Engineer MANU/SC/1607/2005, the decisions referred to above
were noted and it was held as follows:
Analyzing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do
not apply to the proceedings under section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon
the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of
daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or
proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to
produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or
termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately
would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere
affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of
discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a
2320
Sec. 25B
given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se
without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw
an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle,
namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon
facts of each case. (Page: 211, Para: 6)
The above position was again re-iterated in ONGC Ltd. and Anr. v. Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik
MANU/SC/2039/2005 and Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam and Anr. v. Sham Lal, 2006 AIR SCW
3574.
Above being the position, impugned order of the High Court cannot be maintained and is set aside.
(Page: 211, Para: 7)
F 5A.94
The services of the employees were terminated by oral intimation on the ground that
they were daily wagers and there was no work. The employees challenged it as illegal since they
claimed to have worked for 240 days in each of the years right from the beginning. The Labour
Court set aside the termination as violative Sec. 25F on the basis of the zerox copies of attendance
and salary register produced by the employer holding that the burden of proof lies on the
employer. Rejecting the orders of the Labour Court and High Court, the Apex Court held that the
burden of proof lies on the employee that he worked for 240 days for the preceding one year and he
must adduce evidence apart from examining himself to prove the said factum and since the
workmen have not adduced any evidence except making oral statements that they worked for more
than 240 days, the award and judgement of High Court are set aside.
Surendranagar Distt. Panchayat & Anr. v. Gangaben Laljibhai & Ors., 2006 III LLJ 320 : 2006 (110)
FLR 548 : 2006 LLR 887 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1623 (S.C.2J)
In a recent judgment in R.M. Yellatti v. The Asst. Executive Engineer MANU/SC/1607/2005, the
decisions referred to above were noted and it was held as follows:
Analyzing the above decisions of this Court, it is clear that the provisions of the Evidence Act in terms do
not apply to the proceedings under Section 10 of the Industrial Disputes Act. However, applying general
principles and on reading the aforestated judgments, we find that this Court has repeatedly taken the view
that the burden of proof is on the claimant to show that he had worked for 240 days in a given year. This
burden is discharged only upon the workman stepping in the witness box. This burden is discharged upon
the workman adducing cogent evidence, both oral and documentary. In cases of termination of services of
daily waged earner, there will be no letter of appointment or termination. There will also be no receipt or
proof of payment. Thus in most cases, the workman (claimant) can only call upon the employer to
produce before the Court the nominal muster roll for the given period, the letter of appointment or
termination, if any, the wage register, the attendance register etc. Drawing of adverse inference ultimately
would depend thereafter on facts of each case. The above decisions however make it clear that mere
affidavits or self-serving statements made by the claimant/workman will not suffice in the matter of
discharge of the burden placed by law on the workman to prove that he had worked for 240 days in a
given year. The above judgments further lay down that mere non-production of muster rolls per se
without any plea of suppression by the claimant workman will not be the ground for the tribunal to draw
an adverse inference against the management. Lastly, the above judgments lay down the basic principle,
namely, that the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution will not interfere with the concurrent
findings of fact recorded by the Labour Court unless they are perverse. This exercise will depend upon
facts of each case. (Page: 323, Para: 9)
It was held in all these cases that the burden of proof lies on the workman to show that he had worked
continuously for 240 days for the preceding one year and it is for the workman to adduce evidence apart
from examining himself to prove the factum of being in employment of the employer.
(Page: 323, Para: 11)
In the instant case the Labour Court and the High Court also lost sight of the fact that the zerox copies of
the appellants attendance and salary registers were produced. The respondents have not adduced any
evidence except making oral statement that they had worked for more than 240 days.
(Page: 323, Para: 12)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2321
F 5A.95
The services of the employee was terminated on 13.11.1990. The employer contended
that he did not complete 240 days immediately preceding termination. The Labour Court held that
the termination was illegal holding that the burden of proof that the employee did not work for 240
days was on the employer which was confirmed by the High Court. The Apex Court holding that
the burden of proof that he worked for 240 days lies on the employee, set aside the order of the High
Court.
Chief Engineer, Ranjit Sagar Dam & Anr. v. Sham Lal, 2006 III LLJ 326 : 2006 (110) FLR 552 : 2006 III
LLN 751 : 2006 LIC 3048 : 2006 LLR 881 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1617 : 2006 AIR (SC) 2682 (S.C.2J)
In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the management without first
determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the
year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was
denied by the appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked
for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his
favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or tribunal to come to the
conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the
workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. (Page: 327/328, Para: 2)
F 5A.96
The burden to prove that the employee has completed 240 of days service is on the
workman and having failed to do so his termination without compliance of Sec. 25F was valid,
hence reversal of the order of Labour Court by the High Court was held to be manifest error and
was set aside.
M/s. Essen Deinki v. Rajiv Kumar, 2002 III LLJ 1111 : 2002 (95) FLR 949 : 2002 IV LLN 1176 : 2002
LIC 3563 : 2002 III CLR 943 : 2003 LLR 113 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 13 : 2003 AIR (SC) 38 : 2002 (8) SCC
400 (S.C.2J)
.The requirement of the Statute of 240 days cannot be disputed and it is for the employee
concerned to prove that he has in fact completed 240 days in the last preceding 12 months period. As
noticed hereinbefore, it has been the definite case of the workman concerned whilst at the stage of
evidence that he has not worked for 240 days, as noticed hereinbefore in this judgment more fully. And it
is on this score Mr. Ranjit Kumar has been rather emphatic that the High Court has thus fallen into a grave
error in reversing the order of the Labour Court. It is a finding of fact which the High Court cannot
possibly overturn without assailing the order of the Labour Court as otherwise perverse. The High Court
unfortunately has not dealt with the matter in that perspective. (Page: 1114/1115, Para: 14)
.The High Court, in our view, has thus committed a manifest error in reversing the order of the
Labour Court. (Page: 1115, Para: 16)
5A.97 The burden of proof is on the workman to establish before the Court that he has worked
for the required number of days to attract the section, hence in absence thereof Tribunal has
erroneously held it as retrenchment.
Employers in Relation to the Management, Kuya Colliery of M/s. Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. P.O.
Central Government Industrial Tribunal 2, Dhanbad & Ors., 2003 (98) FLR 718 : 2004 LIC 947 : 2003
LLR 954 (Jhar.DB)
We find that.the year 1976.In the face.the muster rolls.
(Page: 719, Para: 2)
.In our view.to be quashed. (Page: 720, Para: 3)
2322
Sec. 25B
5A.98 Workman challenged his termination since Sec. 25F was not complied with Labour Court
refused to grant any relief because workman failed to prove that he had worked for 240 days in the
year preceding his termination. Labour Courts order upheld by Division Bench holding that once
the workman fails to lead any cogent evidence to prove the continuous service then management
cannot be burdened with any liability to prove the same.
Babu Ram v. Divisional Forest Officer, U.T. Chandigarh, & Anr., 2006 II LLJ 486 : 2005 IV LLN 725
(P&H.DB)
5A.99 The workman was appointed against leave vacancy. On termination, he moved Labour
Court which reinstated him as Sec. 25F was not followed. Single Judge set aside Labour Courts
order since workman did not adduce any evidence before Labour Court to prove his 240 days
service and Labour Court wrongly shifted the burden on employer to prove that workman did not
work for 240 days.
Smt. Kanta (Deceased) through LRS. v. MTNL, 2006 I LLJ 573 : 2005 LLR 1110 (Del.DB)
5A.100 The services of workman was terminated. She contested the termination in a writ petition
before High Court alleging that the termination was illegal in violation of Sec. 25F of the Act,
having worked continuously for 240 days in terms of Sec. 25B(1). The High Court dismissing the
petition upheld the termination and held that she miserably failed to discharge her burden of proof
that she worked for 240 days. The employer cannot be held to have deliberately withheld the
relevant documents sought by the employee due to transfer of his company.
Smt. Shakuntala Pravinbhai Saraiya v. Union Carbide India Ltd. (Now known as Eveready Industries
Ltd.) & Ors., 2006 (110) FLR 1060 : 2006 LLR 1012 : 2006 II CLR 1082 (Bom.DB)
Note: Also refer o the following case
N.S. Ravichandran v. Management of Thanthai Periyar Transport Corpn. & Ors., 2003 I LLJ 1015 :
2003 (102) FJR 53 : 2003 I LLN 415 : 2003 LLR 380 (Mad.HC)
Daji Dada Pawar & Ors., Umapati Chauhan of Mumbai v. Ornate Multi-Model Carriers Pvt. Ltd., 2003
(103) FJR 810 : 2003 III CLR 307 (Bom.HC)
Note: Also refer to the following case/s
Burden to prove that whether workman has completed 240 days is on the workman.
Pramod Kumar v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2001 (91) FLR 824 (Pat.HC)
Goutam Chatterjee v. State of West Bangal & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 282 : 2001 (89) FLR 181 : 2001 III LLN
1021 : 2001 I CLR 781 : 2001 LLR 431 (Cal.HC)
Bharatiya Dak Tar Mazdoor Manch (through its President) v. General Manager, Kalyan Telecom
District, & Anr., 2003 (99) FLR 457 : 2003 III LLN 612 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2323
2324
Sec. 25B
2. Is on the employer
i) As per the doctrine of Non est factum and res ipsa loquitor (AP.DB)
5A.104 Applying the doctrine of Non est factum and res ipsa loquitor in case of illiterate
sweeper woman who was terminated, the burden of proof that she had not worked for 240 days lies
on employer.
K. Chandramma v. Labour Court-I, Hyderabad & Ors., 1997 (77) FLR 538 : 1997 II LLN 685 : 1997
LLR 811 (AP.DB)
.Courts in India.illiterate women.even though.non est factum.
(Page: 539, Para: 3)
.The learned single.Act without help. (Page: 542, Para: 4)
.another principle.res ipsa loquito. (Page: 542, Para: 5)
The above two.to be reinstated. (Page: 543, Para: 2)
Note: The Apex Court in recent judgments (supra) has fixed the burden on the workman
ii) Burden of proof on the employer would arise subsequently after workman
discharging his burden (Bom.DB)
5A.105 Burden to prove that workmen worked for a shorter period will arise only subsequent to
the discharge of burden of proof by workman about his employment for minimum period of 240
days, even if it is framed as an additional issue.
Indian Silk Manufacturing Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Gamprasad R. Jaiswal & Ors., 1997 IV LLN 718 : 1997
II CLR 468 : 1997 LLR 1126 (Bom.DB)
Thus it.appellant company. (Page: 719, Para: 8)
Note: Also refer to the following case
Keshod Nagar Palika v. Pankajgiri Javergiri, 2000 (85) FLR 488 : 2000 III LLN 724 : 2000 I LLR 416
(Guj.HC)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2325
2326
Sec. 25B
in the face of the fact that even if the period mentioned in the affidavit and days for non production
of muster roll are taken into account the requirement prima facie does not appear to be fulfilled.
Rajasthan State Ganganagar S. Mills Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2004 III LLJ 832 : 2004 (107)
FJR 264 : 2004 (103) FLR 192 : 2004 IV LLN 845 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 1055 : 2004 (8) SCC 161 (S.C.2J)
Though specific direction was given to the employer to produce the muster roll for the period from
17.6.1991 to 12.11.1991, the same was not produced. Accordingly it was held that the sanctioned days
and the days covered by the muster roll, which was not produced, taken together indicated that the
workman had worked for more than 240 days. Accordingly direction was given to reinstate the workman
and for paying 30% of the back wages. (Page: 833, Para: 1)
It was the case of the workman that he had worked for more than 240 days in the concerned year. This
claim was denied by the appellant. It was for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact
worked up to 240 days in the year preceding his termination. He has filed an affidavit. It is only his own
statement which is in his favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or
Tribunal to come to the conclusion that in fact the claimant had worked for 240 days in a year.No
proof of receipt of salary or wages for 240 days or order or record in that regard was produced. Mere
non-production of the muster roll for a particular period was not sufficient for the Labour Court to hold
that the workman had worked for 240 days as claimed. Even if that period is taken into account with the
period as stated in the affidavit filed by the employer the requirement prima facie does not appear to be
fulfilled. (Page: 833, Para: 5)
We, therefore, remit the matter to the Labour Court to consider the evidence and come to a definite
conclusion as to whether the workman had worked for 240 days during the period claimed..
(Page: 834, Para: 7)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2327
.As noticed hereinbefore, the burden of proof was on the workman. From the award it does not
appear that the workman adduced any evidence whatsoever in support of his contention that he complied
with the requirements of section 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act. Apart from examining himself in
support of his contention he did not produce or call for any document from the office of the appellant
herein including the muster rolls. It is improbable that a person working in a local authority would not be
in possession of any documentary evidence to support his claim. (Page: 252, Para: 11)
.Presumption as to adverse inference for non-production of evidence is always optional and one
of the factors which is required to be taken into consideration in the background of facts involved in the
lis. The presumption, thus, is not obligatory because notwithstanding the intentional non-production,
other circumstances may exist upon which such intentional non-production may be found to be justifiable
on some reasonable grounds. In the instant case, the Industrial Tribunal did not draw any adverse
inference against the appellant. It was within its jurisdiction to do so particularly having regard to the
nature of the evidence adduced by the respondent. (Page: 253, Para: 12)
.The High Court, therefore, proceeded to pass the impugned judgment only on the basis of the
materials relied on by the parties before the tribunal. The High Court, in our opinion committed a
manifest error in setting aside the award of the tribunal only on the basis of adverse inference drawn
against the appellant for not producing the muster rolls. (Page: 254, Para: 17)
For the foregoing reasons the impugned judgments are not sustainable in law and they are set aside
accordingly. (Page: 254, Para: 18)
F 5A.113 The workmen made application for production of muster rolls for the period 1987-92 to
prove their continuous employment for 240 days and the employer produced muster rolls for the
period 1987-90 and when the workmen were not able to establish that they worked continuously
for 240 days during the period 87-90 it was held not proper for the Industrial Court and High
Court to draw an adverse inference against the employer to the effect that the workmen were
employed for 240 days continuously during the period 1990-92 for which the muster rolls were not
produced especially in the absence of specific pleading by them and such adverse inference was
held to be erroneous and hence the orders of the Industrial Court and High Court being based on
the said erroneous adverse inference were held not sustainable and set aside especially because the
factum of the burden rests not on the employer but on the workmen.
M.P. Electricity Board v. Hariram, 2004 (8) SCC 246 : 2004 IV LLN 839 : 2004 LIC 4041 : 2004 SCC
(L&S) 1092 (S.C.2J)
Facts necessary for the disposal of these appeals are as follows :
2.1 The respondents herein were engaged by the appellant-Board on daily wages for the purpose of
digging pits for erecting electric poles. It is the case of the appellant that on completion of the said project
of drawing electric lines from point to point, the employment of the respondents was terminated and
whenever a similar occasion arose for digging pits they were re-employed on daily wages. Hence their
employment was not permanent in nature nor in any one of the cases the respondents had completed 240
days of continuous work in any given year. The said project jobs have come to an end in 1991 and
respondents were never re-employed by the Board. (Page: 247, Para: 2)
Being aggrieved by the said non employment, the respondents herein filed applications.before
the Labour Court, Bhopal seeking permanent employment .on the ground that they have completed
240 working days in a year and their discontinuation of service amounted to retrenchment without
following the legal requirements. (Page: 247, Para: 3)
..The Labour Court after examining the entries in the Muster Rolls came to the conclusion that the
respondents-applicants had not worked for 240 days continuously in any given year, hence, they cannot
claim permanency nor could they term their non-employment as a retrenchment. On the said basis, it
rejected the applications of the respondents. (Page: 247/248, Para: 4)
Being aggrieved by the said rejection of their application, the respondents preferred an appeal before the
Industrial Court at Bhopal Bench. The Industrial Court noticing the fact that though the application for
production of the Muster Rolls was for the years 1987 to 1992, the appellant had only produced the
Muster Rolls for the year ending 1990. Therefore, an adverse inference against the appellant was drawn
2328
Sec. 25B
and solely based on the said adverse inference it accepted the case of the respondents that they had
worked for 240 days continuously in a given year, hence, proceeded to grant relief, as stated herein
above. (Page: 248, Para: 5)
However, while considering the case of grant of back wages both the Industrial Court as well as the High
Court came to the conclusion that the respondents had not worked continuously at any given point of time
and were not engaged on all working days and their employment was punctuated by short periods when
they had not been engaged. Hence, it confined the back wages to 50% only and with the above
modification reinstatement of the respondents was ordered. (Page: 248, Para: 7)
In these appeals, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant-Board contended that the Courts
below could not have drawn any adverse inference against the Board lor not having produced the Muster
Rolls for the year 1990-1992. (Page: 248, Para: 8)
.It is an accepted finding of the Courts below that the employment of the respondents have been
discontinuous and intermittent during the period from 1982 till their employment was
discontinued.Therefore, employment of people in that local area for the limited job cannot be
construed as an employment for a continuous and regular work of the Board.This clearly shows
the fact that the employment of the respondent was on a job required basis and was not for any continuous
services required by the Board. The appellant, therefore, cannot claim either permanency or
regularisation since there is no such permanent post to which he could stake his claim nor could he claim
the benefit of completion of 240 days.that the respondents whose particulars are referred to herein
above or the other respondents for that matter have worked for 240 days. In such a factual background, in
our opinion, the Industrial Court or the High Court could not have drawn an adverse inference for the
non-production of the Muster Rolls for the years 1990 to 1992 in the absence of specific pleading by the
respondents-applicants that atleast during that period they had worked for 240 days continuously in a
given year. The application calling for the production of the documents was for the years 1987 to 1992.
As stated above, between the period 1987 to 1990, as a matter of fact, till end of the year 1990 the
respondents have not been able to establish the case of continuous work for 240 days. Considering these
facts in our view drawing of an adverse inference for the non-production of the Muster Rolls for the years
1991-92, is wholly erroneous on the part of the Industrial Court and the High Court. We cannot but bear
in mind the fact that the initial burden of establishing the factum of their continuous work for 240 days in
a year rests with the applicants-respondents. (Page: 249/250, Para: 10)
For the reasons stated above, these appeals succeed. The impugned orders of the High Court as well as
the Industrial Court are set aside and that of the Labour Court is restored. (Page: 251, Para: 13)
iii) When workman engaged is a daily wager and dispute raised after two years
(Del.HC)
5A.114 Mali/ Beldar was employed as daily wager and worked as and when work was available.
He raised dispute on his disengagement. Tribunal directed reinstatement drawing adverse
inference on failure of employer to produce muster roll holding that the workman completed 240
days but denied back wages as dispute was raised after two years. On being challenged, High Court
held that as dispute was raised after two years employer was not supposed to retain muster rolls of
employee who was engaged from time to time in perpetuity. Court should not encourage back door
entry. The order of Labour Court was perverse liable to be set aside.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Krishna Pal, 2007 (112) FLR 984 : 2007 LLR 76 (Del.HC)
Briefly the facts.in following terms. (Page: 985, Para: 1)
Tribunal observed.has worked for 240 days. (Page: 985, Para: 3)
In this case.in perpetuity. (Page: 986, Para: 6)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2329
2330
Sec. 25B
vi) Workmans assertion that he had worked for 240 days in each of ten years
though not corroborated is sufficient to grant absorption (P&H.DB)
5A.120 The statement of the workman that he worked for 240 days in every year during the
period of ten years though not corroborated by the employee or rebutted by the employer and in
view of the Apex Courts decision in Dharma Pals case and Sec. 25B is sufficient to grant
absorption as per Government policy.
Gurmail Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2003 I LLN 502 (P&H.DB)
No particular.petition. (Page: 503/504, Para: 4)
Sec. 25B
Continuous service
2331
2. What cannot be
i) Affidavit by workman is insufficient to prove continuous service of 240
days (S.C.2J)
F 5A.121 Filing of affidavit by workmen being a statement in favour of his own that he has worked
for 240 days in preceding year to his termination cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence to
arrive at conclusion unless the claimant-workmen proves with other material in support and it was
held that tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the Management without any cogent
evidence from workmans side.
Range Forest Officer v. S. T. Hadimani, WITH State of Karnataka & Anr. v. S. T. Hadimani, 2002 AIR
(SC) 1147 : 2002 I LLJ 1053 : 2002 (100) FJR 397 : 2002 (93) FLR 179 : 2002 (94) FLR 622 : 2002 II
LLN 391 : 2002 LLR 339 : 2002 LIC 987 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 367 : 2002 (3) SCC 25 (S.C.2J)
.In our opinion the Tribunal was not right in placing the onus on the Management without first
determining on the basis of cogent evidence that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in the
year preceding his termination. It was the case of the claimant that he had so worked but this claim was
denied by the Appellant. It was then for the claimant to lead evidence to show that he had in fact worked
for 240 days in the year preceding his termination. Filing of an affidavit is only his own statement in his
favour and that cannot be regarded as sufficient evidence for any Court or Tribunal to come to the
conclusion that a workman had, in fact, worked for 240 days in a year. No proof of receipt of salary or
wages for 240 days or order or record of appointment or engagement for this period was produced by the
workman. On this ground alone, the award is liable to be set aside. (Page: 1148, Para: 3)
ii) Bonus register and attendance certificate since secondary evidences and
cannot be proof of the date of entry into service (Bom.HC)
5A.122 A workman appointed on daily wages was terminated. The High Court upheld the
decision of the Labour Court that the employer despite his contention that the workman has not
worked for 240 days has failed to prove it by production of attendance register and that the bonus
register and attendance certificate are only secondary evidence and cannot be conclusive to prove
the date of entry. Also the Labour Court has satisfied itself from other records that the employee
has worked for 240 days. Hence, the writ petition was dismissed.
Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Neelkanth Kawadooji Gire & Anr., 2005 LIC 3225 (Bom.HC)
2332
Sec. 25B
1. When can be
i) When employer terminates services without complying Sec. 25-F (P&H.DB)
5A.125 Although workman was employed for fixed period of 89 days with break of 6 or more days
intermittently each time but since he had completed 240 days of work and also his work was found
satisfactory as per his experience certificate, award of the Labour Court reinstating him with back
wages on account of non-compliance with Sec. 25-F was upheld.
The Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development Authority, Manimajra Chandigarh & Anr. v.
P.O. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, & Anr., 1994 (84) FJR 428 : 1994 (69) FLR 35 :
1994 LLR 454 : 1995 LLR 54 (P&H.DB)
.there is no.for 265 days.Admittedly the workman.according to
law. (Page: 431/432, Para: 1)
.the respondent workman.of this Court. (Page: 434, Para: 1)
5A.126 Court held that mistake was made by management in calculating continuous service of
workmen and as per facts 240 days of service was rendered and hence termination in violation of
Sec. 25F was illegal.
Chief Administrator, Haryana Urban Development Authority, Chandigarh v. P.O. Labour Court,
Gurgaon & Anr., 2001 II LLJ 12 : 2001 III LLN 1142 : 2001 LIC 837 (P&H.DB)
The mistake.instead of Mahabir. (Page: 13, Para: 6)
Considering the date.25F of the Act. (Page: 13, Para: 7)
5A.127 Once it was shown that workman had actually worked for 240 days during period of 12
calendar months, both conditions u/s. 25B i.e. service for 240 days and employment for 12 months
were fulfilled and also the employer failed to prove the special circumstances as claimed by him in
which principle of last come first go u/s. 25G was not required to be adhered and it was held that
even if appointment was de hors the Act, termination must conform to the law and hence
termination in violation of Sec. 25F was rightly set aside by Labour Court and Single judge and
reinstatement with 40% back wages was upheld.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Mahendra Joshi & Anr., 2003 I LLJ 256 : 2002 (95) FLR 595 : 2003 III LLN
484 (Raj.DB)
.the termination was.Industrial Disputes Act 1947. (Page: 257, Para: 4)
Sec. 25B
2333
2. When cannot be
i) When employee had not completed 240 days and failed to prove violation of
Sec. 25G & 25H (Raj.DB)
5A.128 As employee had worked for less than 240 days and failed to prove violation of Sec. 25H
and 25G employee was not held to be entitled for any relief.
Ram Gopal Saini v. Labour Court No. II, Jaipur & Ors., 2001 I LLJ 1230 : 2001 (89) FLR 778 : 2001 LIC
610 : 2001 I CLR 907 : 2001 LLR 747 (Raj.DB)
In this.employee. (Page: 1230, Para: 2)
We are.the purpose. (Page: 1231, Para: 8)
2334
Sec. 25B
c) Relief of regularisation
1. Regularization means
i) The expression regular and regularisation does not imply
regularization but meant only to cure defects of procedural irregularities
(S.C.3J)
F 5A.133 The expression regular and regularisation does not imply regularization but meant
only to condone and cure defects of procedural irregularities and defects attributable to
methodology in making appointments and thus deal with methods of appointment.
B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka, 1979 II LLJ 209 : 1979 LlC 1206 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 : 1979 AIR
(SC) 1676 : 1979 (4) SCC 507 (S.C.3J)
.The argument however is unacceptable to us for two reasons. Firstly the words regular or
regularisation do not connote permanence. They are terms calculated to condone any procedural
irregularities and are meant to cure only such defects as are attributable to the methodology followed in
making the appointments. They cannot be construed so as to convey an idea of the nature of tenure of the
appointments. (Page: 214, Para: 4)
Note: Also refer to the case of
State of Uttaranchal v. Prantiya Sinchai Avam Bandh Yogana Sharamik Mahaparishad, 2007
SCCL.Com. (S.C.2J)
Sec. 25B
2335
2336
Sec. 25B
According to the Tribunal, on scrutiny, out of 104 casual workmen, only 74 of them in Repairs and
Maintenance (Civil) Section of Bhurkunda Colliery of M/s CCL could justify their claim. As such, the
management was directed to enlist those 74 workers as casual workmen and be provided with different
jobs in Category-I and they may be regularized after they have fulfilled the condition of attendance in a
year. The Award of the Tribunal was challenged. The management filed C.W.J.C. No.1175 of 1989 and
labour union filed C.W.J.C. No.1083 of 1991 and Koyla Mazdoor Sabha on behalf of 51 persons, who
were not granted any relief in the award, also filed C.W.J.C. No.680 of 1999 and all the three writ
petitions were heard together by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge, who heard these
three writ petitions did not interfere with the Award of the Tribunal. The Division Bench of the Jharkhand
High Court upheld the judgment of the Learned Single Judge and consequently as directed by the
Tribunal, cases of 74 workmen were required to be considered for regularization of their services after
they have fulfilled the condition of attendance in a year. (Page: 25, Para: 7)
When we modulate our thinking process and attitude according to the underlying philosophy of
industrial and labour jurisprudence and apply the laws meant for industrial peace and harmony, then the
conclusion becomes irresistible that the employees who have been working since 1973-74 required to be
regularized as expeditiously as possible. (Page: 28, Para: 20)
Both employers and employees have their respective obligations. They must have the appreciation of
each others responsibilities, duties and obligations. The trade union and labour union should understand
and appreciate the fact that labour is not a commodity nor is it a mere supply of labour force at the
managements disposal. Essentially, labour is the real basis that underlines the production of goods and
services. Through the work should the human personality and its sense of responsibility be able to unfold,
the management should appreciate this and always attribute its success to the trained and effective labour
force. It must be understood by all concerned that both the employees and employers are vital for any
industry and unless there is proper co-ordination, the smooth functioning of any industry would be
difficult. (Page: 28, Para: 21)
Note: Also refer to the following case
Gujarat State Road Transport Corporation v. A.M. Shaikh, 2002 III CLR 581 (Guj.HC)
Satrughana Mishra & Anr. v. Water & Land Management Institute (WALMI), Cuttack, & Anr., 2001 III
LLN 699 : 2001 LIC 1195 : 2001 II CLR 498 : 2001 LLR 713 (Ori.HC)
Sec. 25B
2337
iv) When workmen rendered service for longer period ranging from seven
years to 15 years service on contingent basis and service rules contained
clause regarding absorption (Karn.DB)
5A.140 As the workmen had been working as Ticca Mazdoor for long period of time ranging
from seven to thirteen years and this fact was not disputed by the Bank, Tribunal is justified for
awarding regularisation of them and failure by the Bank to regularise them as permanent
Mazdoor will amount to unfair labour practice.
Chief General Manager, Reserve Bank of India v. P.O. & Anr., 2002 (101) FJR 849 : 2000 III LLJ 6 :
2001 (88) FLR (Sum) 13 (Karn.DB)
.The Tribunal.workmen. (Page: 860, Para: 1)
.It is further.now. (Page: 860, Para: 1)
.at paragraph 13.ULP. (Page: 861, Para: 1)
.it has.respective posts. (Page: 862, Para: 1)
5A.141 Workmen who were engaged for 10 to 15 year continuously on casual and contingent
basis and was in continuous service, they could not be denied regularization on the ground that
there was no post under recruitment rules since the same amounts to unfair labour practice and
was violative of Certified Standing orders which itself contained the regulations regarding
regularization of employees.
O.N.G.C. Mazdoor Union & Ors v. Oil & Natural Gas Commission & Ors., 2000 III LLJ 192 : 2000 LIC
2571 (Cal.HC)
Note: Also refer to the following case
Keshav Tripathi & Ors. v. District Judge, Faizabad & Ors., 2006 (108) FLR 436 (All.HC)
Union of India & Anr. v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Anr., 2001 I LLJ 1557 : 2001 II LLN
290 (Cal.HC)
v) Can be granted from initial date of appointment since there was no dispute
regarding appointment (Ori.HC)
5A.142 The workman was working as a casual employee from 1985. He was terminated without
following Sec. 25F, however, on 1990 he was reinstated by employer as per the award of Labour
Court. As the employer ignored the initial appointment of the workman in the gradation list and
regularized services of some juniors, the workman moved High Court. Employer contended that
regularisation of the workman from back date would affect seniority of those who were regularly
appointed and regularized. High Court directed employer to calculate seniority of workman from
initial date of appointment and directed workmans regularization, as a regular employee since
there was no dispute regarding initial appointment.
Mahendra Kumar Sahoo v. Orissa Lift Irrigation Corporation Ltd. & Ors., 2002 I LLJ 1150 (Ori.HC)
The petition in.since 1985. (Page: 1150, Para: 1)
The case of the.has been filled. (Page: 1150, Para: 2)
A counter has.as claimed. (Page: 1151, Para: 3)
From the averments.N.M.R workers. (Page: 1151, Para: 4)
.in the event.and not retrospectively. (Page: 1152, Para: 5)
From the decision.be regularised.there being no.by corporation. (Page: 1152, Para: 6)
2338
Sec. 25B
viii) When workmen engaged through contractor have completed 240 days and
the contract is sham (Jhar.HC)
5A.145 Workmen were employed for water supply through contractor by management and
dispute regarding regularization was raised. Tribunal held workmen were employed for more than
240 days under direct control and supervision of management. Their work was of continuous
Sec. 25B
2339
nature and employment of contractor- supplier is not permissible under Contract Labour
(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970. It directed reinstatement and regularisation with arrears of
back wages from the date of issuance of reference with 40% back wages and other benefits as
engagement of contractor was paper arrangement which was a camouflage done by the
management to deprive the workmen from their due wages. The said order was upheld by High
Court.
Employees in Relation to the Management of Kunju Pundi Project of M/s. C.C.L., Dhanbad v. Presiding
Officer, Central Government Industrial Tribunal No. 1 & Ors., 2004 (102) FLR 117 : 2004 LLR 775
(Jhar.HC)
The learned Tribunal.due wages.The action of the management.and other
benefit. (Page: 118, Para: 6)
The aforesaid.has been challenged. (Page: 119, Para: 7)
The Tribunal has.claim. (Page: 119, Para: 12)
.Accordingly.is dismissed. (Page: 119, Para: 13)
Note: Also refer to the following case/s
Swapan Mondal & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1995 II LLJ 153 : 1994 LIC 2548 (Cal.HC)
2340
Sec. 25B
and was certified as physically fit for duty. However the Corporation deleted by notice his name
from the selection panel which was challenged by him by writ petition. Negativing the contention of
the employer that the workman is certain to deteriorate in health progressively and thus certainly
cannot be fit to perform duties over a span of time, the High Court considering the medical opinion
that the workman does not incur symptoms immediately, that he is fit to work and that the
government guidelines are not for sacking a workman for his HIV status, set aside corporations
order and directed the corporation to consider his employability on the basis of medical test again
and pay the wages due to him in the intervening period.
MX of Bombay Indian Inhabitant v. M/S ZY & Anr., 1997 AIR (3) Bom 406 : 1997 (3) BCR 354 : 1997 (2)
Bom LR 504 (Bom.DB)
Sec. 25B
2341
the Government is making an effort to present a revival proposal, the order to continue the
workmen and to pay wages till superannuation would be unjustifiable and hence orders of Labour
Court and High Court were set aside.
Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals, Ltd. v. Workmen, Indian Drugs and Pharmaceuticals, Ltd., 2007 (112)
FLR 474 : 2007 I LLN 37 : : 2007 I CLR 48 : 2007 SCC (L&S) 270 : 2007 (1) SCC 408 (S.C.2J)
We have heard the learned Counsel for the parties and perused the record.
The facts of the case are that the appellant is a Public Sector Undertaking which has a plant in Rishikesh
where it was manufacturing pharmaceuticals. The present dispute relates to the ten concerned employees
who were appointed as casual workers on daily rate basis for the reason that they were dependants of
employees dying in harness. Such appointments were made by the appellant due to the persistent and
prolonged agitation by the trade union since the appellant wanted to maintain industrial harmony,
although there was no rule/policy for such compassionate appointment in the service of the appellant
company, which was already over-staffed. As against 1049 sanctioned posts, there were already 1299
employees working in the company at the relevant time. (Page: 477, Para: 2)
Before the Labour Court, only 10 out of the 22 workmen appeared and filed written statement and
therefore the award was passed only in respect of the said ten persons. The Labour Court held that
although the said persons were employed as casual daily rated employees by the company, yet in view
of their having continued for a long time, they were entitled to regularization and the action of the
management in not regularizing them was unjustified and consequentially they should be paid the wages
and benefits as given to other regular employees from the date of the award i.e. 25.7.1996.
(Page: 478, Para: 5)
In the present case it is relevant to state that the Government in effort to revive the company drastically
reduced the manpower of the appellant-company from 1991 onwards and the petitioner which at one
point of time had a total of about 13000 employees in all its units in India, have at present, in total, only
about 9 employees at the Hyderabad plant i.e. supervisors and managers, 29 at Gurgaon in which there are
only 4 in the workers category, 15 employees at the Bihar plant i.e. only supervisors and managers, 30
employees at the Tamil Nadu plant i.e. supervisors and managers and about 200 odd employees at the
Rishikesh plant including only about 39 regular workers. It is relevant to state the Government is still
pursuing the plans of reduction in manpower under a VRS Scheme. Thus, in the scenario as stated above,
the impugned directions of the Courts below were, in our opinion, wholly uncalled for and in violation of
settled legal principles. (Page: 479, Para: 10)
In view of the above discussion, we are of the opinion that the orders of the Labour Court as well as the
High Court were wholly unjustified and cannot be sustained for the reasons already mentioned above.
The appeal is, therefore, allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court and the Labour Court are set
aside and the Reference made to the Labour Court is answered in the negative. There shall be no order as
to costs. (Page: 489, Para: 35)
iv) When workmen appointed under contract without sanction of posts and
compliance of selection procedures (Cal.DB)
5A.150 Since appointment was on contract basis only for particular purpose, without any
compliance with selection process under Municipal Act and in absence of sanction of posts by state
it was held that merely rendering 240 days service will not entitle workmen to regularisation and
they cannot continue to work on completion of purpose.
Chairman, Midnapore Municipality v. Prabir Kumar Nag & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 1153 : 2001 LIC 1946
(Cal.DB)
The writ petitioners.any such post. (Page: 1156, Para: 11)
The appellant is.employed is completed. (Page: 1156, Para: 12)
2342
Sec. 25B
Sec. 25B
2343
that Courts are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we set
aside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases for
regularization. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was
regularization or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. In such a situation,
the direction in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that
extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for
filling those posts by a regular process of selection. (Page: 742/743, Para: 46)
Note: The above case settles the legal position as of to-day on the rights of temporary, casual or adhoc
workmen to regularization in Government employment or its instrumentalities despite completing 240
days by disentitling them to the same
2344
Sec. 25B
.when the conditions of service are governed by two statutes; one relating to selection and
appointment and the other relating to the terms and conditions of service, an endeavour should be made to
give effect to both of the statutes; (2) A daily wager does not hold a post as he is not appointed in terms of
the provisions of the Act and Rules framed thereunder and in that view of the matter he does not derive
any legal right; (3) Only because an employee had been working for more than 240 days that by itself
would not confer any legal right upon him to be regularized in service; (4) If an appointment has been
made contrary to the provisions of the statute the same would be void and the effect thereof.
(Page: 217, Para: 16)
F 5A.154 Regarding regularization of the services of contract workers are concerned, it has been
reiterated by Supreme Court citing the case of secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi
Ors. (2006 II LLJ 722) that absorption, regularization or permanent continuance of temporary,
contractual, casual, daily wage or adhoc employees de hors the rules and constitutional scheme of
public employment can not be granted by the Courts. Even if the contract labour or casual workers
or adhoc employees have worked for a long period they cannot be regularized de hors the rules for
selection, and the impugned judgements of Division Bench and Single Judge are set aside.
APSRTC & Ors. v. K.V. Ramana & Ors., 2007 I LLJ 1042 : 2007 LLR 338 (S.C.2J)
In our opinion these appeals have to be allowed. It has been held by a Constitution Bench of this Court in
Secretary, State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Uma Devi (3) and Ors. MANU/SC/1918/2006 that absorption,
regularization or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily-wage or ad hoc
employees dehors the rules and constitutional scheme of public employment cannot be granted by the
Courts. As regards the circular dated 31.3.1998 the same cannot override Article 16 of the Constitution,
and hence regularization cannot be granted under the said circular. Even if the contract labourers or
casual workers or ad hoc employees have worked for a long period they cannot be regularized dehors the
rules for selection, as has been held in Uma Devis case. (Page: 1043, Para: 9)
Note : Also refer to the following case
Contract Laghu Udyog Kamgar Union v. S.N. Saundankar, 2007 LIC 283 : 2007 LLR 782 (Bom.HC)
F 5A.155 In the absence of any service rules entitling the employees recruited on daily wages to the
status of regular employees with pay scale from the date of joining or any finding that daily wage
employment was a ploy or a colourable exercise, no proposition of service law entitling them to the
status of regular employees can be laid down.
Divisional Manager, Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, and Ors. v. P. Lakshmoji Rao
and Ors., 2004 I LLN 1154 : 2004 I LLJ 1045 : 2004 (100) FLR 951 : 2004 LIC 893 : 2004 SCC (L&S)
416 : 2004 AIR (SC) 1503 : 2004 (2) SCC 433 (S.C.2J)
Thus, the performance of duties carried out by regular employees, was taken to be the basis for directing
regularization. The fact that they underwent a process of selection was also relied on. Insofaras the
decision purports to lay down a proposition of service law that the employees selected on dailywage
basis after selection automatically become regular employees from day one if they perform the duties
similar to regular employees, it is utterly untenable. In the absence of any service rules entitling the
employees recruited on daily wages to get the status of regular employees with pay scale form the very
date of joining, it would be difficult to countenance such proposition especially when there is no finding
that the daily wage employment was a ploy or a colourable device to postpone regularization
indefinitely. (Page: 1158, Para: 8)
vii) When claimants are contract workers though contract labour system is
abolished (Mad.HC)
5A.156 There is no express provision in the Act for absorption of contract workers whose
contract labour system stood abolished by way of publication of notification u/s. 10(1) of Contract
Labour Act. Hence the principal employer cannot be forced to absorb the employees from the date
on which the contractor has employed him. Moreover, the provisions of Sec. 25FF of Industrial
Sec. 25B
2345
viii) When workmen are seasonal employees and can not be fitted into
permanent employment or it would be iniquitous to perennial employees
(S.C.2J)
F 5A.157 Apex Court set aside the Industrial Courts order affirmed by High Court directing the
employer to absorb and make permanent seasonal employees completing 240 days of service in
compliance with Patankar Award, since under Patankar Award directions were issued to confirm
temporary perennial employees as permanent who have put in 240 days of continuous service and
made no reference to seasonal employees and the issue regarding permanency of seasonal
employees was never called upon for adjudication, also such a direction would have been highly
inequitous and discriminatory to perennial employees hence aforesaid direction issued under
Patankar Award was held to be inapplicable to seasonal employees.
Maharashtra State Co-operative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Ltd. & Anr. v. Maharashtra
State Co-operative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Employees Union & Anr., WITH State of
Maharashtra v. Maharashtra State Co-operative Cotton Growers Marketing Federation Employees
Union & Anr., 1995 I LLJ 53 : 1994 (84) FJR 454 : 1994 (68) FLR 579 : 1994 LIC 959 : 1995 SCC (L&S)
36 : 1994 AIR (SC) 1046 : 1994 (3) SCC 385 (Suppl.) (S.C.2J)
.an industrial dispute having arisen between the employees and the Marketing Federation, the
same was referred by the State Government for adjudication to the Industrial Tribunal consisting of Shri
G. K. Patankar by the reference order of May 30, 1973.None of the demands referred to the.
Tribunal including the aforesaid demand No. 4 suggested that they related to the seasonal employees. All
the demands were in relation to the perennial employees. The statement of claim filed in the Reference by
the Union on behalf of the workmen did not also refer anywhere to the seasonal employees. On the other
hand, in relation to the aforesaid demand for permanency, it referred to all temporary workmen.
(Page: 55, Para: 3)
.There is also no dispute that as per the Patankar Award, the temporary perennial employees
were made permanent but the seasonal employees on the date of the award continued as such without
demur. (Page: 56, Para: 5)
.The grievance made in the complaint was that those seasonal employees who had worked for
240 days in 1982-83 and 1983-84 were not made permanent and inasmuch as the Patankar Award had
directed the Marketing Federation to make permanent seasonal employees who had completed 240 days
of service.The Industrial Court by its impugned order of 14-9-1990 (i) allowed the said
complaint.directed the appellants to absorb and make permanent the said employees in
compliance with the provisions of the Patankar Award. (Page: 59, Para: 11)
.The learned single Judge dismissed the petition holding that the Patankar Award had become
final and since it had given the direction to make permanent even the seasonal employees who had put in
more than 240 days of service, the writ petition had no merit. (Page: 59, Para: 12)
.Award does not even refer to the seasonal employees. It also does not make any distinction
between the two and give reasons either to accept or reject the contentions of the parties. it merely
summarises the arguments of the parties and gives a direction which is quoted above. The operative
portion reads considering, therefore, the arguments advanced on both sides, it appears that it would be
proper to direct that those employees who have put in 240 days of continuous service be treated as
permanent employees. The direction can be read either as a direction to make the temporary perennial
employees and temporary seasonal employees as permanent perennial employees and permanent
2346
Sec. 25B
seasonal employees respectively or as a direction relating only to the temporary perennial employees. But
in no case, it can be read as a direction to make seasonal employees as permanent employees as in the
nature of things such a direction could not have been given. There are other reasons why the Tribunal
could not have given such a direction and if such a direction was given, it would have been highly
inequitous and discriminatory to the perennial employees whether temporary or permanent. On the
undisputed fact, that the procurement and processing operations under the Cotton Scheme do not last for
more than 4 to 6 months and in any case not more than 8 months, to make the seasonal employees
permanent and give them all the benefits of the perennial employees would mean that they would get the
salary and all other benefits throughout the year as the perennial employees do, without putting in work
throughout the year as the latter have to do. (Page: 62, Para: 16)
.we allow the appeals and set aside the decisions of the Industrial Court and of the High
Court. (Page: 66, Para: 25)
F 5A.158 The public sector undertaking was recruiting casual workmen for specified period and
was terminating their services at the end of the field season. Union of workmen raised industrial
dispute for regularization of casual workmen. In considering the question who would be eligible to
be considered for appointment to the regular posts, Tribunal held that a casual workman who has
put in attendance of 180 days or more in 12 consecutive months would automatically become a
temporary workman who would after completion of 240 days of attendance in any period of 12
consecutive months and possessing requisite qualifications, be considered for conversion as a
regular employee. Single judge modified the decision and extended the benefits given by the
Tribunal even to persons who were not parties before the Tribunal while Division Bench directed
that the workman concerned should be notionally treated as regularized, appeal was filed before
Supreme Court. It was held that having regard to the nature of employment and the period during
which field workers were employed, it would create difficulty if seasonal workmen were treated at
par with regular employees. It would be even more difficult to adjust workmen in permanent
employment when need for them was only seasonal. Tribunals order restored and it was directed
to management not to make any recruitment from outside till all those who figured in the list put up
before the Tribunal are regularized.
Oil & Natural Gas Corporation, Ltd. v. Engineering Mazdoor Sangh, 2007 I LLN 85 : 2007 I CLR 61 :
2007 SCC (L&S) 157 : 2007 AIR (SC) 920 : 2007 (1) SCC 250 (S.C.2J)
In view of the aforesaid phenomenon relating to employment of seasonal workers, the Engineering
Mazdoor Sangh on behalf of its members who had been recruited as such casual/contingent/temporary
workmen, raised an industrial dispute in the form of a demand for regularization of such
workmen. (Page: 87, Para: 3)
On the basis of the above, the Tribunal held that a casual workman who put in attendance of 180 or more
days in 12 consecutive months automatically became a temporary workman who could after completion
of 240 days of attendance in any period of 12 consecutive months and possessing qualifications be
considered for conversion as a regular employee. (Page: 88, Para: 7)
Having regard to the nature of employment and the period during which these field workers are
employed, it would create various difficulties if the seasonal workmen were to be treated at par with
regular employees as directed by the learned Single Judge. It would be even more difficult for the
appellant to adjust the workmen in permanent employment when the need for them was only seasonal.
Admittedly, these workmen who are employed for field survey work are employed for about six months
in a year between November and May. If at all they are to be regularized, the appellant will have to find
work for them during the months when their services would otherwise have not been required. As pointed
out by Mr. Salve, previously the appellant had monopolistic control over geological survey work for oil
and natural gas but today the scene had changed and it is just another competitor along with others,
notwithstanding the fact that they are a Government company. The appellant is now required to compete
with others in securing exploration work and can only recruit field workers as and when required. Even
then the learned Tribunal found a via media in directing that Page 5129 the 153 workmen who had
admittedly completed 240 days and had acquired a temporary status be regularized against vacancies as
and when such vacancies became available. (Page: 90, Para: 14)
Sec. 25B
2347
We are of the view that the directions given by the learned Tribunal are reasonable and should be
allowed to stand as against the directions given by the High Court, firstly to treat the said 153 workmen at
par with the regular employees and thereafter to treat their services as having been notionally regularized
from 1st May, 1999. We can, of course, add a few further safeguards in order to protect the interests of the
said 153 workmen so that they are assured of employment as before. (Page: 90, Para: 15)
ix) When workman is the casual employee though completed 240 days since
recruitment is to be through Public Service Commission or Employment
Exchange as per stipulated procedure (Cal.DB)
5A.159 Zilha Parishad being State under Art. 12 is bound to comply with State Government
circular which stipulates that all recruitments to local bodies should be made either through Public
Service Commission or through Employment Exchange, therefore a casual employee who has
competed 240 days of service is not entitled for absorption but to only benefits of Sec. 25F.
Birmhum Zila Parishad & Ors. v. Nitya Hari Chaterjee & Ors., 1997 (75) FLR 482 : 1997 III LLJ 1293 :
1996 II LLN 906 (Cal.DB)
As State.employment. (Page: 482, Para: 1)
5A.160 The fact that casual workmen had completed 240 days of continuous service would not
entitle them to any right of regularisation, such workmen have right to claim only retrenchment
compensation u/s. 25F and hence claim of workmen for regularisation was refused by Court.
Sarama Das & Ors. v. The Superintendent, Durgapur Sub-divisional Hospital & Ors., 1997 (75) FLR
945 (Cal.DB)
.There cannot be.permanently in service. (Page: 947, Para: 3)
Note: Also refer to the following case
Prakash Chandra Panda v. Institute of Life Science & Ors., 2003 LIC 1048 (Ori.HC)
2348
Sec. 25B
As noticed hereinbefore, the High Courts observation remained unchallenged, that the project was to be
financed by ODA. The project was indisputably to be executed by the Indore Development Authority;
and for the implementation thereof, the appointments had to be made by it. If the Appellants were
appointed for the purpose of the project, they would be deemed to have been appointed therefor and only
because such appointments had been made by the Respondent would by itself not entitle them to claim
permanency. The life of the project came to an end on 30.6.1997. The maintenance job upon completion
thereof had been taken over by Indore Municipal Corporation. The Appellants were aware of the said fact
and, thus, raised an alternative plea in their statements of claims. The Labour Court could not have
granted any relief to them as prayed for, as Indore Municipal Corporation is a separate juristic person
having been created under a statute. Such a relief would have been beyond the scope and purport of the
reference made to the Labour Court by the State Government. Furthermore, the Indore Municipal
Corporation was not a party and, thus, no employee could be thrust upon it without its consent.
(Page: 166/167, Para: 37)
It is furthermore evident that the persons appointed as daily wagers held no posts. The appointments,
thus, had been made for the purpose of the project which, as indicated hereinbefore, came to an end. The
plea of Dr. Dhawan to the effect that the Appellants in Civil Appeal No. 337 of 2002 were asked to
perform other duties also may not be of much significance having regard to our foregoing findings.
However, it has been seen that even services of one of them had been requisitioned only for the project
work. The High Court, in our opinion, was right in arriving at the conclusion that the Appellants were not
entitled to be regularized in service. (Page: 167, Para: 39)
The Appellants having been employed on daily wages did not hold any post. No post was sanctioned by
the State Government. They were not appointed in terms of the provisions of the statute. They were not,
therefore, entitled to take the recourse of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work as adumbrated in
Articles 14 and 39(d) of the Constitution of India. The burden was on the Appellants to establish that they
had a right to invoke the said doctrine in terms of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. For the purpose
of invoking the said doctrine, the nature of the work and responsibility attached to the post are some of the
factors which were bound to be taken into consideration. Furthermore, when their services had not been
regularized and they had continued on a consolidated pay on ad hoc basis having not undergone the
process of regular appointments, no direction to give regular pay scale could have been issued by the
Labour Court. (Page: 168/169, Para: 43)
Note: This arose under M.P. Industrial Employment Standing Orders Act
Sec. 25B
2349
2350
Sec. 25B
to give a final opportuntiy to the respondent to produce the original or authenticated certificate issued by
the competent authority of Sri Aurobindo International Centre, Pondicherry. For this purpose, two
months time is granted to the respondent to produce the same. On approach being made by the
respondent, we do hope that the authorities of Sri Aurobindo International Centre would take expeditious
steps to verify the concerned record and issue the certificate in original or a certified copy
thereof.As the respondent has to partly blame himself for the situation in which he is placed, we
are not inclined to grant the benefit of retrospective regularisation from an earlier date or to award any
backwages. (Page: 2629, Para: 5)
The impugned order of the High Court is set aside. (Page: 2629, Para: 6)
Sec. 25B
2351
Therefore, in the light of discussion made above, we are of the opinion that the view taken by the Full
Bench is correct. The petitioners are not entitled to be regularise their services in the Company and they
are not employees of Company. They are only entitled to compensation as indicated above. The above
appeals and writ petitions filed by workers are dismissed. (Page: 789, Para: 28)
5A.169 Plea of workman for regularization was dismissed on the ground that there was
overwhelming evidence to show that the workman was appointed on a fixed term of one year on
contract basis on a temporary appointment, which could be terminated without assigning any
reason. An agreement was also executed between the parties stating the nature of appointment
hence, the contention that having completed 240 days of service he is entitled to be considered, as a
permanent employee cannot be accepted.
Group General Manager, O.N.G.C. Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Manilal Parmar & Anr., 2001 LIC 2619 : 2002
II LLJ 494 : 2002 LLR 840 (Guj.HC)
.The petitioner was.the interview. (Page: 2620, Para: 5)
There is thus.is disclosed.If this is so.permanent employee.
(Page: 2622, Para: 14)
2352
Sec. 25B
25FFF etc. Where notice or wages in lieu and compensation is given and hence regularization or
permanency is not contemplated under the Act.
Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. v. Dan Bahadur Singh & Ors., 2007 LIC 3209 : 2007 (2) SCC (L&S) 441 :
2007 AIR (SC) 2733 : 2007 (6) SCC 207 (S.C.2J)
The legal position is that identity of the Government Company remains distinct from the Government.
The Government Company is not identified with the Union but has been placed under a special system of
control and conferred certain privileges by virtue of the provisions contained in Sections 619 and 620 of
the Companies Act. Merely because the entire share holding is owned by the Central Government will not
make the incorporated company as Central Government. It is also equally well settled that the employees
of the Government Company are not civil servants and so are not entitled to the protection afforded by
Article 311 of the Constitution (See Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director MANU/SC/0428/1989).
An employee working in an industrial establishment enjoys a limited kind of protection. He may lose his
employment in various contingencies which are provided under the Industrial Disputes Act such as lay
off as provided in Section 25C, retrenchment as provided in Section 25F, transfer of industrial
establishment or management of an undertaking as provided in Section 25FF, closure of undertaking as
provided in Section 25FFF. He may be entitled to notice or wages in lieu of notice and monetary
compensation depending upon the length of service put in by him. But the type of tenure of service
normally enjoyed by a permanent employee in Government Service, namely, to continue in service till the
age of superannuation, may not be available to an employee or workman working in an industrial
establishment on account of various provisions in the Industrial Disputes Act where his tenure may be cut
short not on account of any disciplinary action taken against him, but on account of a unilateral act of the
employer. Therefore, the claim for permanency in an industrial establishment has to be judged from a
different angle and would have different meaning. (Page: 3213, Para: 17)
The next question which requires consideration is whether completion of 240 days in a year confers any
right on an employee or workman to claim regularization in service. In Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v.
Anil Kumar Mishra and Ors. MANU/SC/0390/1994 it was held that the completion of 240 days work
does not confer the right to regularization under the Industrial Disputes Act. It merely imposes certain
obligations on the employer at the time of termination of the services. In M.P. Housing Board & Anr. v.
Manoj Shrivastava MANU/SC/8059/2006 (paragraph 17) after referring to several earlier decisions it
has been reiterated that it is well settled that only because a person had been working for more than 240
days, he does not derive any legal right to be regularized in service. This view has been reiterated in
Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens Ltd. MANU/SC/8652/2006. The same question has been examined in
considerable detail with reference to an employee working in a Government Company in Indian Drugs
and Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workman, Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. MANU/SC/4993/2006
and paragraphs 34 and 35 of the reports are being reproduced below:
Thus, it is well settled that there is no right vested in any daily wager to seek regularization.
Regularization can only be done in accordance with the rules and not de hors the rules. In the case of E.
Ramakrishnan and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. MANU/SC/1651/1996 this Court held that there can
be no regularization de hors the rules. The same view was taken in Dr. Kishore v. State of Maharashtra
MANU/SC/1090/1997 and Union of India and Ors. v. Bishambar Dutt MANU/SC/1734/1996. The
direction issued by the Services Tribunal for regularizing the services of persons who had not been
appointed on regular basis in accordance with the rules was set aside although the petitioner had been
working regularly for a long time. (Page: 3213, Para: 33)
xx) When claimants are empanelled to meet temporary requirement and such
panel is in force only for one year (S.C.2J)
F 5A.172 For recruitment of Attenders, eligible candidates were empanelled by getting sponsored
names from Local Employment Exchange for their temporary recruitment. The panel will be in
force for one year. The candidates so empanelled cannot claim as right to seek permanent
appointment in the service of Bank.
Syndicate Bank & Anr. v. Shankar Paul & Anr., 1997 II LLJ 814 : 1997 LIC 2913 : 1997 AIR (SC) 3091 :
1997 (6) SCC 584 (S.C.2J)
Sec. 25B
2353
The Deputy General Manager in charge of Calcutta Zone of the appellant bank wrote to the
Sub-Regional Employment Exchange, North Calcutta, sometime in July, 1986, to send a list of
candidates for selection arid empanelment for the post of attenders for some of its branches in Calcutta.
The empanelled candidates were to be appointed in the temporary vacancies which were likely to arise on
account of absence of or casual leave taken by the regular attenders. (Page: 816, Para: 3)
.Considering the object with which the panel was prepared and the fact that it was an yearly panel
expiring on 6.2.1988, we are of the opinion that the respondents did not get any right, because of
inclusion of their names in the said panel, for permanent absorption in the service of the Bank. Whatever
conditional right they had came to an end with the expiry of the panel. (Page: 817, Para: 7)
Note: Also refer to the following cases in the above context
Heavy Engineering Mazdoor Union v. State of Bihar & Anr., 1969 II LLJ 549 : 1969 (19) FLR 27 : 1970
LIC 212 : 1970 AIR (SC) 82 : 1969 (1) SCC 765 (S.C.2J)
B.N. Nagarajan v. State of Karnataka, 1979 (4) SCC 507 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 4 (S.C.3J)
Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director, 1989 (3) SCC 448 : 1989 SCC (L&S) 484 (S.C.2J)
Dr. Surinder Singh Jamwal v. State of J&K, 1996 II LLJ 795 : 1996 II CLR 956 : 1996 (9) SCC 619 : 1996
SCC (L&S) 1296 : 1996 AIR (SC) 2775 (S.C.2J)
E. Ramakrishnan v. State of Kerala, 1997 I LLJ 1215 : 1996 (10) SCC 565 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 331
(S.C.2J)
Union of India v. Bishamber Dutt, 1997 II LLJ 381 : 1996 (11) SCC 341 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 478 (S.C.2J)
Dr. Kishore v. State of Maharashtra, 1997 (3) SCC 209 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 779 (S.C.2J)
P.U. Joshi v. Accountant General, 2003 (2) SCC 632 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 191 (S.C.2J)
A.K. Bindal v. Union of India, 2003 II LLJ 1078 : 2003 (5) SCC 163 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 620 (S.C.2J)
Madhyamik Shiksha Parishad v. Anil Kumar Mishra, 2005 (5) SCC 122 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 628 (S.C.3J)
Union Public Service Commission v. Girish Jayanti Lal Veghela & Ors., 2006 (2) SCC 482 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 339 (S.C.2J)
Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi (3) & Ors., 2006 II LLJ 722 : 2006 (109) FLR 826 :
2006 III LLN 78 : 2006 II CLR 261 : 2006 (4) SCC 1 : 2006 AIR (SC) 1806 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753
(S.C.CB)
M.P. Housing Board & Anr. v. Manoj Shrivastava, 2006 II LLJ 119 : 2006 (109) FLR 194 : 2006 II LLN
84 : 2006 (2) SCC 702 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 422 (S.C.2J)
Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. Workman, Indian Drugs & Pharmaceuticals Ltd., 2007 (112)
FLR 474 : 2007 I LLN 37 : 2007 I CLR 48 : 2007 SCC (L&S) 270 : 2007 (1) SCC 408 (S.C.2J)
Gangadhar Pillai v. Siemens, Ltd., 2007 I LLJ 717 : 2007 I LLN 139 : 2007 LIC 590 : 2007 II CLR 139 :
2007 LLR 325 : 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 346 : 2007 (1) SCC 533 (S.C.2J)
d) Relief of pension
1. Not available to daily wagers who had not completed 240 days in any of the
10 years they had worked (Guj.DB)
5A.173 As the daily wage employees engaged for cleaning canals had not worked for more than 10
years and more than 240 days in a year, they were not entitled to benefit of pension as per the
Government resolution.
Shankerji Cheljaji Thakor v. State of Gujarat, 2000 II LLJ 239 : 2000 III CLR 86 : 2000 III CLR 86
(Guj.DB)
Looking.resolution. (Page: 243, Para: 9)
Looking to the aforesaid.to get certain benefit. (Page: 243, Para: 10)
Locking to.benefits. (Page: 243, Para: 10)
.It is very.dismissed. (Page: 245, Para: 19)
2354
Sec. 25B
Sec. 25B
2355
g) Service benefits
1. Workman entitled to pay scale and other allowances when granted under
Government resolution (Guj.HC)
5A.178 The Government by Resolution granted benefits of pay scale and other allowances to the
daily wagers working continuously within the meaning of Sec. 25B of the Industrial Disputes Act.
But the workman was not given the benefit of the said two circulars in spite of working for 20 years,
though other similarly situated employees were getting the benefits. On representation the
authority rejected the request. On appeal, Division Bench held that workman was entitled to all the
benefits under resolution dated 17.10.1988, 19.9.1991, 24.4.1998, and 24.3.2006 as permanent
employee on par with Government employee.
Devraj Punjabhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 2006 LIC 3619 (Guj.HC)
The State of Gujarat.benefit of both the circulars. (Page: 3619/3620, Para: 3)
Ultimately, Division Bench.21 years service. (Page: 3627, Para: 12)
3. Back wages admissible to daily wagers from the date of regularization but
not from the date of initial engagement (S.C.CB)
F 5A.180 The Supreme Court not only set aside the judgement of Division Bench to regularize the
daily wage workers appointed in Commercial Taxes Department in deficiency of the rule, but also
modified the order as to the effective date at the most of making payment of wages equal to the
salary that are being paid to regular employees that also not from date of engagement but from the
date of judgement of High Court.
Secretary, State of Karnataka & Ors. v. Umadevi (3) & Ors., 2006 II LLJ 722 : 2006 (109) FLR 826 :
2006 III LLN 78 : 2006 II CLR 261 : 2006 (4) SCC 1 : 2006 AIR (SC) 1806 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 753
(S.C.CB)
2356
Sec. 25B
In cases relating to service in the commercial taxes department, the High Court has directed that those
engaged on daily wages, be paid wages Page 1951 equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid
to the regular employees of their cadre in Government service, with effect from the dates from which they
were respectively appointed. The objection taken was to the direction for payment from the dates of
engagement. We find that the High Court had clearly gone wrong in directing that these employees be
paid salary equal to the salary and allowances that are being paid to the regular employees of their cadre in
Government service, with effect from the dates from which they were respectively engaged or appointed.
It was not open to the High Court to impose such an obligation on the State when the very question before
the High Court in the case was whether these employees were entitled to have equal pay for equal work so
called and were entitled to any other benefit. They had also been engaged in the teeth of directions not to
do so. We are, therefore, of the view that, at best, the Division Bench of the High Court should have
directed that wages equal to the salary that are being paid to regular employees be paid to these daily wage
employees with effect from the date of its judgment. Hence, that part of the direction of the Division
Bench is modified and it is directed that these daily wage earners be paid wages equal to the salary at the
lowest grade of employees of their cadre in the Commercial Taxes Department in Government service,
from the date of the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court. Since, they are only daily wage
earners, there would be no question of other allowances being paid to them. In view of our conclusion,
that Courts are not expected to issue directions for making such persons permanent in service, we set
aside that part of the direction of the High Court directing the Government to consider their cases for
regularization. We also notice that the High Court has not adverted to the aspect as to whether it was
regularization or it was giving permanency that was being directed by the High Court. In such a situation,
the direction in that regard will stand deleted and the appeals filed by the State would stand allowed to that
extent. If sanctioned posts are vacant (they are said to be vacant) the State will take immediate steps for
filling those posts by a regular process of selection. But when regular recruitment is undertaken, the
respondents in C.A. No. 3595-3612 and those in the Commercial Taxes Department similarly situated,
will be allowed to compete, waiving the age restriction imposed for the recruitment and giving some
weightage for their having been engaged for work in the Department for a significant period of time. That
would be the extent of the exercise of power by this Court under Article 142 of the Constitution to do
justice to them. (Page: 742/743, Para: 46)
Coming to Civil Appeal Nos. 1861-2063 of 2001, in view of our conclusion on the questions referred to,
no relief can be granted, that too to an indeterminate number of members of the association. These
appointments or engagements were also made in the teeth of directions of the Government not to make
such appointments and it is impermissible to recognize such appointments made in the teeth of directions
issued by the Government in that regard. We have also held that they are not legally entitled to any such
relief. Granting of the relief claimed would mean paying a premium for defiance and insubordination by
those concerned who engaged these persons against the interdict in that behalf. Thus, on the whole, the
appellants in these appeals are found to be not entitled to any relief. These appeals have, therefore, to be
dismissed. (Page: 743, Para: 47)
Sec. 25B
2357
d) High Court cannot grant interim relief directing the employer to consider the
case of the workman by creating supernumerary post since it is in the nature of
final relief (S.C.2J)
F 5A.184 A writ petition was filed by a daily wager for his regularization. The Single Judge passed
interim order to consider the case of workman and to create supernumerary post till regular posts
fall vacant which was affirmed by Division Bench. Supreme Court held that Single Judge granted
interim relief on very first day which was not justified. Relief which was required to be granted
only at the final hearing of the matter, should not ordinarily be granted by way of an interim order.
It is also doubtful as to whether the impugned direction could have been issued even at the final
hearing of the matter which would amount to creation of supernumerary post in purported
compliance with the regularization rules because under the settled law as laid down in secretary,
State of Karnataka and Ors. v. Umadevi and Ors. (2006 II LLJ 722) it is impermissible to regularize
in derogation to the statutory or constitutional scheme. Hence the said orders were set aside.
State of U.P. & Ors. v. Desh Raj, 2007 I LLJ 616 : 2007 (112) FLR 456 : 2007 (1) LLN 585 : 2007 SCC
(L&S) 163 (S.C.2J)
A writ petition was filed by the respondent herein, inter alia, praying for his regularisation. A learned
Single Judge of the Lucknow Bench of the Allahabad High Court on the day of preliminary hearing while
issuing rule passed the following order:
In the meantime, the opposite parties No. 3 to 5 shall examine the petitioners claim for regularization
under the Regularization Rules 2001 and pass appropriate orders. However his claim shall not be rejected
on the ground of the post being not available. Supernumerary posts have to be created to comply with the
provisions of the Regularization Rules and kept alive until regular posts fall vacant. Till a decision is
taken, the petitioner shall be paid wages equivalent to the minimum of pay scale admissible to a Mate
working in the department with effect from 1st January, 2004. (Page: 617, Para: 4)
2358
Sec. 25B
A bare perusal of the impugned order could show that the learned Single Judge for all intent and purport
had allowed the writ petition on the very first day, which in our opinion, was not justified. It is now
well-settled that a relief which can be granted only at the final hearing of the matter, should not ordinarily
he granted by way of an interim order. It is also doubtful as to whether the impugned directions could
have been issued even at the final hearing of the matter which would amount to creation of supernumerary
post in purported compliance of the regularisation rules. (Page: 617, Para: 4)
Sec. 25C
2359
2360
Sec. 25C
b) Secs. 25C and 25F are independent and Sec. 25F can be invoked without
recourse to lay-off (Bom.DB)
5A.186 Secs. 25C and 25F are independent and resorting to lay-off is not a condition precedent to
attract provisions of Sec. 25F.
Bhartiya Kamgar Sena v. Indabrator Ltd. & Anr., 1987 (55) FLR 615 : 1987 II LLN 648 (Bom.DB)
It must be.by the employer. (Page: 616, Para: 2)
e) Lay off compensation ranks in priority over the claim of secured creditor like
bank (Karn.DB)
5A.189 A sick company is liable to pay lay-off compensation to the workers who have priority
over the claim of the Bank which is a secured creditor. Even the remaining amount cannot be paid
over to the Bank as claim of workmen, for lay-off compensation is a recurring claim in case of a
sugar factory.
Siruguppa Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. Gauribidanur v. Commissioner of Labour, Government of
Karnataka & Ors., 2002 (101) FJR 430 : 2002 (95) FLR 171 : 2002 II CLR 668 (Karn.DB)
Sec. 25C
2361
b) Seasonal workers since not granted under Industrial Disputes Act (MP.DB)
5A.193 If under Industrial Disputes Act lay-off compensation cannot be granted to workers in
seasonal industry on grounds of social justice or any other description such as retention
allowance.
Harris Mineral Supply Co. & Ors. v. Salim M. Merchant & Ors., 1965-66 (29) FJR 420 (MP.DB)
2362
Sec. 25C
In directing that those.is not applicable to it.If under section 25A read.workers
cannot be sustained. (Page: 427/428, Para: 2)
b) When his name is found in the muster roll and completed one year of service
(Mad.HC)
5A.195 A worker whose name is found in the muster roll as badli worker and who has
completed one year of continuous service was held entitled to lay-off compensation because Sec.
25C provides that a workman is entitled to lay-off compensation if his name is found in the muster
rolls and the manner in which the name is described does not affect the right.
Vijayakumar Mills Ltd. v. Labour Court, Madurai & Anr., 1960 II LLJ 567 : 1960-61 (18) FJR 286 (Mad.HC)
b) Last drawn wages is proper when lay off is not authorized or justified and
Sec. 25C is not applicable (Gau.DB)
5A.197 As the number of workmen employed was less than fifty, Sec. 25C was not applicable to
them. The employer was not authorised to lay off employees as there were no standing orders or
terms of contract to that effect and illness of the Assistant Managing Director is not a ground for
lay off u/s. 2(kkk) and hence Labour Court finding that lay off is not justified and its award of
wages at the rates prevailing at the time of lay-off for the period in which they remained
unemployed by way of compensation, is proper.
Management of Gauhati Press Pvt. Ltd. v. P.O. Labour Court, Gauhati, & Ors., 1983 II LLN 105 : 1983
LIC 824 (Gau.DB)
Sec. 25C
Quantum of Compensation
2363
e) Lay-off compensation u/s. 25C to be given but not as per Standing Orders since
the Central Act prevails over Standing Orders (All.HC)
5A.199 The High Court held that the workmen are entitled to only compensation as per the
provisions of Sec. 25C which has already been paid because Sec. 25-J provides that Sec. 25C
supersedes the standing orders of the establishment.
British India Corporation, Ltd., Kanpur v. B.P. Singh, P.O. Labour Court, Kanpur, & Ors.,1964 I LLJ
601 : 1964 (8) FLR 256 (All.HC)
Note: Also refer to Sec. 25-J for additional ratios on lay-off compensation
f) Burden of proof
1. Is on the employer to produce muster rolls to prove status of workmen
(Karn.DB)
5A.200 It is open to the employer to produce muster rolls to substantiate its case regarding
workers to be badli or casual, but since in this case evidence regarding the same was not produced,
the workmen were held entitled to lay-off compensation u/s. 25C of the Act.
Siruguppa Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. Gauribidanur v. Commissioner of Labour, Government of
Karnataka & Ors., 2002 (101) FJR 430 : 2002 (95) FLR 171 : 2002 II CLR 668 (Karn.DB)
2364
Sec. 25C
V. When payable
Note: Also refer to Sec. 25J for additional ratios on lay-off compensation
Sec. 25C
When payable
2365
2366
Sec. 25C
e) Payable only for 45 days even though lay off is continuous by single notification
(S.C.3J)
F 5A.205 Continuous lay off under a single notification cannot be split into first period of 45
days covered by proviso (a) and the remaining period by proviso (b) and hence the demand of
employees that they should also be paid for remaining period as per proviso (b) in addition to
compensation offered by employer for first 45 days as per proviso (a) was rejected and hence
Tribunals order granting compensation for entire lay off period was set aside.
Modi Food Products & Co. Ltd. v. Faquir Chand Sharma & Ors., 1956 I LLJ 749 : 1956-57 (10) FJR 391
: 1956 AIR (SC) 628 (S.C.3J)
.there is no dispute that the compensation payable for the first 45 days has to be determined in
accordance with proviso (a) to S. 25-C. The dispute is only as to whether for the rest of the period of lay
off the workmen are entitled to compensation under proviso (b) to S. 25-C. That proviso would apply
only if the workmen had been paid compensation for 45 days were again laid off for further periods of
more than one week at a time. On the wording of the section, it is clear that the lay off which falls within
the proviso (b) to S. 25-C must be distinct from that for which compensation had been paid in accordance
with proviso (a) to S.25-C and subsequent thereto in point of time. And as, in the present case there was
one continuous lay off for the entire period, proviso (b) could have no application. (Page: 752, Para: 2)
.in the present case, there was only one notification, and the period specified therein was up to
the next season. By no straining of the language of proviso (b) to S. 25-C can such a lay off be brought
within its purview.We are accordingly of opinion that the respondents are entitled to
compensation only for the 45 days as provided in proviso (a), and that as the appellant had offered to pay
Sec. 25C
When payable
2367
the same by its notice dated 12-7-1954, there was no alteration of the conditions of the service within S.22
of the Act, and that, in consequence, the petition of the respondents was liable to be rejected.
(Page: 752, Para: 2)
We accordingly allow the appeal, set aside the order of the Tribunal. (Page: 752, Para: 3)
2368
Sec. 25C
in the other sections could not be carried on; and, as the management were not sure whether the workmen
would turn up for work, lay-off, in the circumstances, was justified. We are not inclined to accept this
contention advanced on behalf of the management. We have already referred to the finding of the
Tribunal that twenty-seven factory workmen alone went on strike on November 30, 1961, and the entire
body of workmen presented themselves for work on December 1, 1961, but they were declined work by
the management on the ground of lay-off. The plea of the management that they suffered loss, on account
of the half a days strike on November 30, 1961, justifying the lay-off, has not been accepted by the
Tribunal. In fact the Tribunal has accepted the plea of the workmen that the effect of the three hours
token strike on November 30, 1961, would not have resulted in any loss to the management, if they had
allowed the workmen to do work on December 1, 1961. The Tribunal has also held that the lay-off, by the
management, was as a retaliatory or vindictive measure against the factory workers, who went on strike
on November 30, 1961. We are in agreement with the findings, recorded by the Tribunal in this behalf
and the award by the Tribunal of wages to the workmen for this period is justified.
(Page: 1004, Para: 26)
h) Can not be avoided on the ground that company incurred losses on account of
half days strike (S.C.3J)
F 5A.208 Management laid off all the workmen who presented themselves for work subsequent
to half days protest strike by 27 workers. It was held that Managements plea of incurring losses as
a result of half day strike did not justify lay off for about 8 days and Sec. 25E(iii) was inapplicable
hence lay off being retaliatory and vindictive in nature workmen are entitled to claim wages for lay
off period.
Management of Churakulam Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. v. Workmen & Anr., 1969 AIR (SC) 998 : 1969 II LLJ
407 : 1970 (37) FJR 202 : 1969 (19) FLR 203 : 1969 LIC 1396 (S.C.3J)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
i) When workmen could not be given work due to dismantling of machines and
installation of the same (Mad.HC)
5A.209
Workmen who were not given work in a textile mill owing to dismantling of the
preparatory machines and installation of the same were held to be entitled to lay-off compensation
as there was inability on the part of the employer to provide work to the workmen.
R. Narayanaswami v. The P.O. Labour Court, Coimbatore & Anr., 1965 II LLJ 677 : 1966-67 (30) FJR
341 : 1968 LIC 509 (Mad.HC)
Sec. 25C
2369
b) If amenities like quarters and medical relief are provided during the
suspension (S.C.CB)
F 5A.212 As amenities like undisturbed possession of quarters, khet lands, medical relief, fuel
and forest produce were given during suspension, employees were held to be not entitled for lay off
compensation and for those employees on short work hours, ex-gratia payment was held to be
sufficient and since error of law or legal principle in deciding compensation amount was not shown
the Apex Court refused to interfere with the computation.
Cachar Chah Sramik Union, Silchar, Assam v. The Management of Tea Estate of Cachar Assam & Anr.,
1966 AIR (SC) 987 : 1966 I LLJ 420 : 1965-66 (28) FJR 320 : 1966 (12) FLR 153 (S.C.CB)
As regards the compensation to retrenched workmen, the Tribunal has stated in para 185 of the Award
that the amenities granted to them included undisturbed possession of residential quarters and khet lands.
They were also granted medical relief, fuel and other forest produce even during the period of suspension
of work. The Tribunal did not attempt to evaluate accurately the pecuniary value of all these concessions
but it has expressed the view that the value of these concessions would be roughly equal to one weeks
wages for every four months of unemployment and therefore the retrenched workmen were not entitled to
any compensation in cash apart from any right to wages in lieu of a weeks notice under Cl. 9 of the
Standing Orders. On behalf of the appellant Mr. Aggarwala said that the retrenched workmen were
entitled to get a larger amount of compensation than that awarded by the Tribunal. The quantum of
compensation is, however, a matter primarily for the Tribunal to estimate and it is not open to this Court to
go into this question unless it is shown that Tribunal has committed any error of law or legal principle in
deciding it. As regards the workmen who were subjected to short hours of work, the Tribunal has
observed that they have been granted ex gratia payments which were, in several cases in excess of the
total loss of wages by reason of the revision of the daily wages under the notification of February 9, 1953
under the Minimum Wages Act. On behalf of the appellant reference was made by Mr. Aggarwala to the
deposition of Mr. R. M. Bipan at page 97, Part-I that the ex gratia payment compensated merely for the
minimum wages cut and not the loss to labour by the short work-week. But the Tribunal having examined
the entire evidence reached the conclusion that the ex gratia payment was in several cases in excess of
total loss of remuneration on account of the notification under the Minimum Wages Act. There is also
2370
Sec. 25C
undisputed evidence in this case to show that even in normal times short hours had to be imposed by
employers upto a period of three days in a week in Cachar tea gardens. In this state of facts it is not
possible for us to hold that the Tribunal was in error in holding that the ex gratia payment made by the
management was sufficient compensation to the workmen who were not retrenched outright but who
were put on short hours of work. (Page: 991, Para: 7)
Note: Judgment before introduction of Ch. VA
c) Not payable beyond 45 days when there is agreement regarding payment of lay
off compensation to that effect (S.C.2J)
F 5A.213 In the event the workmen are laid off for more than 45 days during the period of 12
months and if there is an agreement u/s. 12(3) r/w. Sec. 18(3) between the employer and the
workmen that the workmen are not entitled to layoff compensation for more than 45 days such an
agreement will have binding effect on all the workmen even though some of the workmen are not
members of the said union.
P. Virudhachalam & Ors. v. The Management of Lotus Mills & Anr., 1998 I LLJ 389 : 1998 (92) FJR 562
: 1998 (78) FLR 107 : 1998 I LLN 977 : 1998 LIC 834 : 1998 I CLR 1 : 1998 LLR 240 : 1998 SCC (L&S)
342 : 1998 AIR (SC) 554 : 1998 (1) SCC 650 (S.C.2J)
.Learned Counsel for the appellants submitted that for attracting the first proviso to Section
25-C(1), there should be independent agreement between the workman and the employer to that effect
agreeing not to demand lay-off compensation beyond 45 days of the starting of the lay-off period. It is
difficult to appreciate this contention. An agreement restricting the claim of lay-off compensation beyond
the available period of 45 days can be said to be arrived at between the workman on the one hand and the
employer on the other as there is such an agreement embedded in a binding settlement which has a legal
effect of binding all the workmen in the institution as per Section 18(3) of the Act. Such binding effect of
the embedded agreement in the written settlement arrived at during the conciliation proceedings would
get telescoped into the first proviso to Section 25-C(1) and bind all workmen even though individually
they might not have signed the agreement with the management or their union might not have signed such
agreement with the management on behalf of its member workmen. The first proviso to Section 25-C(1)
clearly lays down that if there is an agreement for not paying any more lay-off compensation beyond 45
days between the workman and the employer, such an agreement has binding effect both on the employer
and the workman concerned. Such binding force gets clearly attracted in the case of the appellants by
virtue of operation of section 12(3) read with Section 18 of the Act emanating from the settlement arrived
at during the conciliation proceeding as aforesaid. (Page: 397, Para: 12)
Sec. 25C
2371
b) Recovery certificate obtained under the Industrial Disputes Act will prevail
over SICA. (Karn.DB)
5A.216
Recovery certificate in respect of lay off compensation issued against a Sick Company
is enforceable and provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act will prevail over SICA as the said Act is
a special enactment.
Siruguppa Sugars & Chemicals Ltd. Gauribidanur v. Commissioner of Labour, Government of
Karnataka & Ors., 2002 (101) FJR 430 : 2002 (95) FLR 171 : 2002 II CLR 668 (Karn.DB)
2372
Sec. 25E
Sec. 25E
2373
d) When lay-off in cement factory is due to strike in limestone quarry since both
constitute one establishment due to functional integrality though the
Appropriate Governments are separate for both of them (S.C.3J)
F 5A.222 The company runs a cement factory for which raw material was supplied by quarry
located adjacent to it. There is common accounts and employees were transferable between the two
units though the Appropriate Government for cement factory is State Government and that for
limestone quarry is Central Government. No provision of Industrial Disputes Acts says that
existence of two jurisdictions in an establishment would make them two separate establishments
for purpose of Sec. 25E and hence such an implication or inference would be at variance with the
scheme and object of unemployment compensation as provided in Chap. VA of the Act. and hence
the Apex Court held that cement factory and quarry constitute same establishment and
consequently the workmen are not entitled to lay-off compensation for the lay-off in cement factory
declared due to strike in limestone quarry.
Associated Cement Companies, Ltd.(Chaibasa Cement Works, Jhinkpani) v. Their Workmen, 1960 I LLJ
1 : 1959-60 (17) FJR 166 : 1960 AIR (SC) 56 (S.C.3J)
.It is indeed true that in the matter of constitution of boards of conciliation, Courts of inquiry,
Labour Courts and Tribunals and also in the matter of reference of Industrial Disputes to them, and
perhaps for certain other limited purpose, the Act gives jurisdiction to two distinct authorities, the Central
Government in respect of the limestone quarry and the State Government in respect of the factory. The
Short question is does this quality of jurisdiction, dichotomy one may call it, necessarily imply that for all
purpose of the Act, and particularly for payment of unemployment compensation as per the provision in
Chap VA, the factory and the quarry must be treated as separate establishment. We are unable to find any
such necessary implication. There is no provision in the Act which says that the existence of two
jurisdiction has the consequence contended for by learned counsel for the respondent; nor do we find
anything in the provision creating two jurisdiction which by reasons of the principle underlying them or
by their very nature give rise to an implication in law that the existence of two jurisdiction means the
existence of two separate establishments. On the contrary, such an implication or inference will be at
variance with the scheme and object for by the provisions in chap. VA of the Act.
(Page: 11, Para: 2)
2374
Sec. 25E
followed from the go-slow move adopted by the workmen in the warping section. However, the
High Court rejected the contention and upheld the award of Tribunal because the management
has not proved their allegation in regard to go-slow move adopted by workmen in warping section.
Lord Krishna Sugar Mills, Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal (Textiles) & Ors., 1962 II LLJ 708 (All.HC)
Sec. 25F
2375
.We must have regard to the provision of the statute under which the question falls to be
considered; if the statute itself says what is one establishment, then there is no difficulty. If the statute
does not, however, say what constitutes one establishment, then the usual tests have to be applied to
determine the true relation between the parts, branches etc., namely, whether they constitute one
integrated whole or not. (Page: 12/13, Para: 3)
The Act not having prescribed any specific tests for determining what is one establishment, we must
fall back on such consideration as in the ordinary Industrial or business sense determine the unity of an
Industrial establishment. (Page: 8, Para: 2)
.The quarry is indeed a feeder of the factory and without limestone from the quarry, the factory
cannot function. Ours is a case where all the tests are fulfilled, as shown from the evidence given on
behalf of the appellant to which we have earlier referred. There are unity of ownership, unity of
management, supervision and control, unity of finance and employment, unity of labour and condition of
service of Workmen, functional integrality, General unity of purpose and geographical
proximity. (Page: 9, Para: 2)
.We are of the view that the learned chairman of the Industrial Tribunal wrongly held that the
limestone quarry at Rajanka and the factory at Jhinkpani were separate establishment. In our view, they
constitute one establishment within the meaning of Cl. (iii) of S. 25E of the Act...
(Page: 13, Para: 2)
Note: For additional ratios on functional integrality, please refer to Sec. 2(ka)
2376
Sec. 25F
d) Standing Order cannot be inconsistent with Sec. 25F and termination based on
it is not valid (Bom.HC)
5A.230
Services of an employee were terminated after one year without any notice or without
following any procedure of law. The High Court held that a badli workman if works for more than
240 days in a preceeding year, Sec. 25F needs to be complied with before termination of his services.
Mere failure to mention provision of Sec. 25F in an application by employee, does not amount to
improper pleading. Standing Order which is inconsistent with the provisions of Sec. 25F does not
have any force in law and termination effected based on provisions of such order is not proper.
Such employee be reinstated and back wages are to be paid after deducting the amount earned by
him during the period of forced unemployment.
The Raymond Woollen Mills Ltd. v. C.S. Sonawane & Anr., 1993 I LLJ 1162 : 1993 (67) FLR 94 : 1993
LIC 1494 : 1993 II CLR 112 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25F
2377
g) Provisions of the section are mandatory and prevail over the conditions in
appointment letter that provide for termination of service of workman by one
month wages (P&H.DB)
5A.233
Conditions in the appointment letter contrary to the provisions of Sec. 25F Act can not
debar the rights of workman hence appointment letter providing termination of service of
workman by one month wages was held to be unsustainable.
District Red Cross Society, Hisar v. P.O. Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,hissar, & Anr., 2001 II
LLN 554 (P&H.DB)
Regarding the.be accepted. (Page: 556, Para: 9)
2378
Sec. 25F
i) Conditions under clause (a) and (b) are obligatory and are conditions
precedent to retrenchment while that under clause (c) is not obligatory
(Pat.DB)
5A.236
While conditions u/Cl. (a) and (b) of the Section are obligatory and are conditions
precedent to retrenchment, issuing notice u/Cl. (c) to Appropriate Government is not a condition
precedent to retrenchment and not obligatory and hence retrenchment order passed by the railway
was held illegal for not complying with condition u/Cl. (b) as to payment of retrenchment
compensation but not for non-service of notice on Appropriate Government.
Somu Kumar Chatterjee & Anr. v. District Signal Tele-Communication Engineer & Anr.,
179 : 1970 (21) FLR 37 : 1970 LIC 629 (Pat.DB)
1970 II LLJ
k) Sec. 25F & 25C are independent and resorting to lay-off is not a condition
precedent to attract Sec. 25F (Bom.DB)
5A.238
Sec. 25C and 25F are independent and resorting to lay-off is not a condition precedent
to attract provisions of Sec. 25F.
Bhartiya Kamgar Sena v. Indabrator Ltd. & Anr., 1987 (55) FLR 615 : 1987 II LLN 648 (Bom.DB)
It must be.by the employer. (Page: 616, Para: 2)
Sec. 25F
Applicability of sections
2379
l) Probationary period cannot be for two years as it defeats the object of Sec. 25F
(Karn.HC)
5A.239
Management discharged employee and justified the discharge on the ground that the
service conditions governing its employees provided for a probation of two years and therefore,
discharge of the workman in question was in accordance with the stipulation in the contract of
employment and therefore, fell into the exempted category u/s. 2(oo)(bb) of the Industrial Dispute
Act. However, in reference, Labour Court passed an award in favour of workman, which was
challenged in High Court by management. High Court relied upon the judgment of 1986 II LLN
355 and observed that if the contention of the management is accepted it would enable
unscrupulous employer to provide a stipulation in the contract of service for terminating the
employment of employees to avoid the rigour of Sec. 25F of the Act resulting in the conferment of
arbitrary powers on the employers which would be destructive of the protection granted by the Act
to the employees and dismissed the writ of the management upholding the impugned award of
Labour Court.
Karnataka State Tourism Development Corp. v. T. Narayana Bhat & Ors., 1987 (55) FLR 223 : 1987 II
LLN 170 (Karn.HC)
m) Benefits u/s. 25F can be claimed by employees against the company even
though the unit is sold by previous owner to the company (MP.HC)
5A.240
Sale of a unit by earlier owner to company is of no consequence so far as right of
workmen are concerned, they continue to be in employment of the unit. Labour Court was justified
in holding termination as an illegal retrenchment.
Kuber Extrusions Pvt. Ltd. v. Laxminarayan Bhailal & Anr., 2003 (97) FLR 351 : 2003 II LLN 662 : 2003
LLR (Sum) 508 (MP.HC)
b) Applicable to daily rated employee who had completed more than 240 days of
service (S.C.2J)
F 5A.242 Termination of employee was set aside as he had rendered more than 240 days of
service and therefore was held to be entitled to protection u/s. 25F even though he was a daily rated
employee.
Rattan Singh v. Union of India & Anr., 1998 III LLJ 714 : 1998 SCC (L&S) 170 : 1997 (11) SCC 396
(S.C.2J)
.From the dates mentioned in the judgement of the first Appellate Court dated January 22, 1985,
it appears that the appellant had continuously worked for more than 240 days in a year. Since he was a
Workmen, he was entitled to the protection of Section 25-F of the Act and the said protection could not be
denied to him on the ground that he was a daily-rated worker. It is not the case of the respondents that the
provisions of Section 25-F of the Act were complied with while terminating the services of the appellant.
In these circumstances, the termination of services of the appellant cannot be upheld and has to be set
aside. (Page: 715, Para: 3)
2380
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
Applicability of sections
2381
Due to the reduction in the volume of business of the company as a result of the recession in (sic)
services will not be required by the company after the 14th October, 1967, and this may be treated as
statutory notice of one month of termination of your service. (Page: 234, Para: 1)
.The question, however, is whether the learned Single Judge, who interfered with the award of
the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the case was one of closure covered by
S.25FFF or the Industrial Tribunal was right in holding that it is a case of retrenchment covered by S.25F
of Industrial Disputes Act. This point can be answered by mere reference to the notice served by the
appellant-company on the respondent intimating to him that his services will no more be required
effective from October 14, 1967. The notice as a whole recites that as a result of recession in the volume
of work of the company, services of the respondent would no more be required by the company after
October 14, 1967 and this notice may be treated as a statutory notice as contemplated by S.25F(a). There
is not even a whisper in the notice that as the Delhi office is being closed down, the services of the
respondent would not be required. (Page: 234, Para: 2)
.The recitals and averments in the notice leave no room for doubt that the service of the
respondent was terminated for the reason that on account of recession and reduction in the volume of
work of the company, respondent has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of service for
the reasons mentioned in the notice is not covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of S.2(oo) which
defines retrenchment and it is by now well-settled that where the termination of service does not fall
within any of the excluded categories, the termination would be ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even
attempted to be urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of the excluded categories. It is
there indisputably a case of retrenchment (Page: 236, Para: 2)
e) Applicable to workmen in coal units though can relocate but opted for closure,
as they are deemed to have been retrenched (S.C.2J)
F 5A.247 Workmen employed in 292 coke/coal using industries located in Agra who do not
intend to relocate/ obtain natural gas necessary to prevent degradation of Taj Mahal and opted for
closure, shall be deemed to have been retrenched subject to their being in continuous service of one
year as per Sec. 25B and will be paid compensation u/s. 25F(b) and in addition six year wages as
additional compensation.
M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors., 1997 LIC 667 : 1997 AIR (SC) 734 : 1997 (2) SCC 353 (S.C.2J)
The workmen employed in the above-mentioned 292 industries shall be entitled to the rights and
benefits as indicated hereunder :(a) The workmen shall have continuity of employment at the new town and place where the industry is
shifted. The terms and conditions of their employment shall not be altered to their detriment.
(b) The period between the closure of the industry in Agra and its restart at the place of relocation shall be
treated as active employment and the workmen shall be paid their full wages with continuity of service.
(c) All those workmen who agree to shift with the industry shall be given one years wages as shifting
bonus to help them settle at the new location. The said bonus shall be paid before January 31, 1998.
(Page: 696, Para: 13)
The workmen employed in the industries who do not intend to relocate/obtain natural gas and opt for
closure, shall be deemed to have been retrenched by May 31, 1997, provided they have been in
continuous service (as defined in Section 25-B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947) for not less than one
year in the industries concerned before the said date. They shall be paid compensation in terms of Section
25-F(b) of the Industrial Disputes Act. These workmen shall also be paid, in addition, six years wages as
additional compensation. (Page: 696, Para: 13(d))
2382
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
Applicability of sections
2383
.It is conceded that if the retrenchment is held to be effected by the Vendee, it has not complied
with S. 25F or S. 25G of the Act, and there can be little doubt that failure to comply with S. 25F would
make the retrenchment invalid, and so would the failure to comply with S. 25G, because no reasons have
been recorded by the Vendee for departing from the rule prescribed by S. 25G.
(Page: 341, Para: 3)
h) Applicable to a daily rated workman who worked for 240 days in a year
(Guj.DB)
5A.250
A daily rated workman who worked for 240 days in a year is entitled to the benefits of
Sec. 25F and hence reinstated.
Rajiben Prabhatbhai v. Executive Engineer, Una Irrigation Project Division, 1999 II LLJ 158 (Guj.DB)
When the matter.implemented. (Page: 159, Para: 2)
5A.251
Whose appointment was not on a particular job and who has worked for 240 days in
preceding 12 month is entitled for retrenchment compensation.
State of Haryana & Anr. v. P.O. Labour Court, Rohtak & Anr., 2000 I LLJ 66 : 2000 I LLN 713
(P&H.DB)
According to. of Service. (Page: 68, Para: 6)
We are.his Service. (Page: 68, Para: 8)
.In the Present.be accepted. (Page: 69, Para: 12)
2384
Sec. 25F
k) Applicable to workmen even though they did not complete 240 days in the
immediate preceding 12 months when his past service is also considered
(Karn.DB)
5A.254
Workmans service rendered in the past because of which he would be entitled to
notice and pay prescribed u/s. 25F would not be wiped out by mere fact that in the year immediate
preceding to date of his termination he had not worked for 240 days.
Hutchiah v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., 1983 I LLJ 30 : 1982 (61) FJR 207 :
1983 I LLN 205 (Karn.DB)
Another submission.wiped out. (Page: 43, Para: 22)
Sec. 25F
Applicability of sections
2385
2386
Sec. 25F
s) Not applicable to workmen who did not complete 240 days (S.C.2J)
F 5A.262 As the order of the Labour Court, upholding the termination was based on facts and
on the employees statement that he did not complete 240 days in service, it was not perverse and
therefore the High Court was held to have exceeded its jurisdiction by interfering with the same.
U.P. Avas Evam Vikas Parishad v. Kanak & Anr., 2003 I LLJ 497 : 2003 (96) FLR 492 : 2003 I LLN 834 :
2003 LLR 1 (S.C.2J)
.The requirement of the Statute of 240 days cannot be disputed and it is for the employees
concerned to prove that he has in fact completed 240 days in the last preceding 12 months period. As
noticed hereinbefore, it has been the definite case of the workman concerned whilst at the stage of
evidence that he has not worked for 240 days, as noticed hereinbefore in this judgment more fully. And it
is on this score Mr. Ranjit Kumar has been rather emphatic that the High Court has thus fallen into a grave
error in reversing the order of the Labour Court. It is finding of which the High Court cannot possibly
overturn without assailing the order of the Labour Court as otherwise perverse. The High Court
unfortunately has not dealt with the matter in that perspective (Page: 500, Para: 15)
Having regard to the opinion of this Court in the last noted decision, question of affirmance of the
impugned judgment cannot and does not arise more so by reason of the fact that even this Court searched
in vain in regard to the availability of such an evidence. The High Court, in our view, has thus committed
a manifest error in reversing the order of the Labour Court (Page: 501, Para: 17)
5A.263
Workman who had worked for not more than 89 days claimed retrenchment
compensation since they were not in continuous service of 240 days, as per Sec. 25B were held not
entitled to retrenchment compensation and benefit of Sec. 25H.
Indian Airlines v. Sebastian., 1994 III LLJ 498 : 1991 (62) FLR 755 : 1991 I LLN 247 : 1991 I CLR 43 :
1991 LLR 488 (Ker.DB)
Thus it is.S. 256. (Page: 503, Para: 8)
In our opinion.unsustainable. (Page: 506, Para: 15)
5A.264
Order of reinstatement was not sustainable as employee who was on ad-hoc basis had
put in only 60 days of service, therefore Sec. 25F was not held to be applicable.
State Bank of India v. Industrial Tribunal, Hyderabad & Anr., 2002 (94) FLR 1030 : 2002 LLR 890 :
2002 IV LLN 909 (AP.DB)
.The reason.be sustained. (Page: 1033, Para: 8)
Sec. 25F
Applicability of sections
2387
Sec. 25F
Applicability of sections
2389
Once it is held that Section 25F will have no application in a case of transfer of an undertaking or closure
thereof as contemplated in Section 25F and 25FFF of the 1947 Act, the logical corollary would be that in
such an event Section 25H will have no application. (Page: 859, Para: 25)
Note: Also refer to the following case/s
Sathiarthy v. New Era Manufacturing Co. Ltd., 1971 (39) FJR 457 (Ker.HC)
J.K. Hosiery Factory v. Labour Appellate Tribunal of India and Ors., 1956 II LLJ 04 : 1956-57 (11) FJR
67 (All.HC)
Ratnam & Company v. Their Workmen & Anr., 1957-58 (12) FJR 156 (Mad.HC)
Retrenchment is on account of closure.
Ramesh S/o. Pandharinath Taharabadkar v. Executive Engineer, Jayakwadi Project Stage No. 2
Division No. 1, Beed & Ors., 2001 III LLJ 889 : 2001 LIC 1255 : 2000 (86) FLR 885 : 2000 IV LLN 986 :
2000 III CLR 92 : 2000 II LLR 1156 (Bom.HC)
2390
Sec. 25F
grounds of health. As we understood Mr. Jha, he fairly conceded that he could not press the case of any
workman excepting these ten. (Page: 216, Para: 1)
.The award has first to be read along with the dispute referred in connection with which it had
been made. That dispute concerned payment of bonus to workmen as discharged as being no longer
required. It therefore clearly contemplated workmen who were surplus but who were otherwise fit and
willing to continue in service if their service had been needed. The award settled this dispute. Therefore it
seems to us that the company agreed by it to pay gratuity only to workmen who had been discharged on
the ground that their services were no longer required and not to any whose services had been terminated
for any other reason. Now when a workman is discharged on the ground that he is medically unfit as
happened in the case of the ten workmen with whom alone we are concerned in this appeal, it cannot be
said that they had been discharged on the ground that their services were no longer required; on the
contrary they were not in a fit condition of health to continue in service at all. Their physical condition
prevented them from rendering the service for which they had been employed. The reason for their
discharge was that they could not render the services required of them and which under the contracts of
service they were bound to render. Their services cannot be said to have been terminated on the ground
that such services were not required. (Page: 216, Para: 3)
We therefore think that the ten persons who had been discharged on grounds of health-and as to this
there does not appear to be any dispute-were not persons who were entitled to any payment under
Ordinance No. 5 of 1953. (Page: 217, Para: 2)
za) Not applicable to seasonal employees on daily wage basis even if they complete
240 days (MP.HC)
5A.274
The daily wager seasonal employee, who worked for more than 240 days in the
preceding year, was terminated. Labour Court ordered employees reinstatement, as Sec. 25F was
not followed. High Court held that employee was employed on seasonal basis and not against any
clear vacancy. Therefore, could not claim permanency even if he worked for more than 240 days.
Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti, Dabra & Anr. v. P.O. Labour Court No.1, Gwaliar, & Ors., 2001 II LLN 1093
: 2001 LIC 3032 : 2001 LLR 708 (MP.HC)
Sec. 25F
Applicability of sections
2391
zc) Not applicable to workmen whose names were struck off the rolls on the
dismissals of their applications challenging their termination effected after
complying with the section (Pat.DB)
5A.276
When the workmen who were terminated from service in accordance with Sec. 25F
were retained on the rolls in deference to a High Court order maintaining status quo and their
names were subsequently struck off the rolls on dismissal of their applications, it does not amount
to fresh retrenchment and compliance with Sec. 25F again, is not required.
Parsuram Mishra & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1979 II LLJ 117 : 1979 II LLN 347 : 1979 LIC 776
(Pat.DB)
But in the.absolutely irrelevant. (Page: 119, Para: 5)
It is therefore.be rejected. (Page: 122, Para: 10)
zd) Not applicable to termination of workmen employed for less than 12 calendar
months (Pat.DB)
5A.277
The workmen who had been terminated from service had been employed for less than
12 calendar months and since they were not in continuous service as per Sec. 25B, the Tribunal has
rightly denied the retrenchment benefits claimed by them.
Workmen of Pure Kustore Colliery (represented by Khan Mazdoor Congress) v. Central Government
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur & Anr., 1969 I LLJ 126 : 1969 (18) FLR 297 (Pat.DB)
.the approach.years service. (Page: 128, Para: 1)
.before the workmen.rightly failed. (Page: 128, Para: 1)
5A.278
The retrenched workmen who had not been employed for 12 calendar months will not
be entitled for compensation u/s. 25F even though they had worked for 240 days, as they were not in
continuous service within the meaning of Sec. 25B.
General Manager, K.S.R.T. Corpn. Trivandrum v. C. Sundra Raj Trivandrum & Ors., 1976 (33) FLR 303
(Ker.DB)
He must.Court. (Page: 308, Para: 8)
These appeals.compensation. (Page: 309, Para: 11)
Note: However Supreme Court in the case of Mohanlal v. Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics Ltd.,
1981 II LLJ 70 held that the employee need not be in service for 12 months if he completion 240 days in a
lesser period for Ratio Sec. 25B
2392
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
Applicability of sections
2393
The State thereafter filed a writ petition questioning the said award before the Punjab and Haryana High
Court on 2-6-1999. The High Court by reason of its impugned judgment dated 7-12-2000 allowed the
writ petition in part to the limited extent that instead and place of full back wages, the workman was held
to be entitled to 60% of the back wages. (Page: 614, Para: 3)
It is not in dispute that the workman did not perform any duty since 2-5-1979. The Labour Court made
its award only on the ground that before issuing the order of termination dated 3-8-1979, no disciplinary
proceeding was held in terms of the Punjab Civil Services (Punishment and Appeal) Rules and
furthermore the mandatory requirements of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 were not
complied with. The findings of the Labour Court are inconsistent and self-contradictory. If the services of
the workman were terminated for misconduct, the question of payment of any retrenchment
compensation or service of any statutory notice would not arise. The question of compliance with the
provisions of Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act would arise, if the services of the workman
concerned were terminated on a ground other than misconduct. (Page: 615, Para: 9)
Note: Also refer to the following case
F.A. Ahmedababi v. Dharam Estates & Investments Ltd., 2006 (110) FLR 327 : 2006 III LLN 534 : 2006
LLR 902 : 2006 (3) BCR 618 (Bom.HC)
zh) Not applicable to a case of refusal by employer to allow employee to rejoin duty
after unauthorised absence (MP.HC)
5A.282
Refusal by the employer to allow employee to rejoin the post after being
unauthorisedly absent, cannot be held to be a case of retrenchment to attract provisions of Sec. 25F
of Industrial Disputes Act.
Ramashanker Srivastava v. State Industrial Court & Ors., 1999 (82) FLR 348 (MP.HC)
2394
Sec. 25F
zl) Not applicable to an apprentice appointed under Apprentices Act since not a
workman (Ker.DB)
5A.285
Registration of contract of apprenticeship was not necessary for the purpose of Sec. 18
of the Apprentice Act, therefore as the apprentices who were not registered were covered under it
were not workman under the Act and hence Sec. 25F of Industrial Disputes Act was not
attracted.
Bhaskaran v. Kerala State Electricity Board, 1986 II LLJ 346 (Ker.DB)
.On a plain reading.not illegal. (Page: 348, Para: 5)
zn) Not applicable to casual employees who are not recruited as per recruitment
rules (S.C.2J)
F 5A.287 The statute does not envisage application of the provisions of Industrial Dispute Act
and the Rules where both recruitment and termination is uncertain or when the workmen are not
required to be recruited category wise in service e.g. skilled, semiskilled or unskilled etc. such as a
casual employee who is not in continuous employment but keeps on coming and going having not
been appointed in accordance with recruitment rules.
Jaipur Development Authority v. Ram Sahai & Anr., 2007 I LLJ 429 : 2006 (111) FLR 1178 : 2007 I LLN
78 : 2007 LIC 274 : 2007 I CLR 221 : 2007 LLR 92 : 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 518 (S.C.2J)
.The statute does not envisage application of the provisions of the Act and Rule where both
recruitment and termination is uncertain or when the workmen are not required to be recruited in a
category-wise service, e.g., skilled, semi-skilled or unskilled, etc. (Page: 431, Para: 15)
Before the Labour Court, muster rolls were produced by Appellant. It was noticed that in July, 1985
Respondent had worked regularly. He did not work in August, 1985. He worked for 25 days in
September, 1985, whereas, again in October, 1985 he did not work at all. He, however, worked regularly
in November and December of 1985. But in January, 1986 he worked only for 9 days. Again in February,
1986 he did not work at all. Yet again, in March, April, May and June of 1986, he worked for 26 days, 26
days, 27 days and 25 days respectively. In the months of July, August, September and October of 1986 he
did not work at all. Thereafter, in November, 1986, he worked for 27 days. (Page: 431, Para: 16)
Sec. 25F
2395
2396
Sec. 25F
1. Workman to be in continuous service though less than one year but should
have worked atleast for 240 days in a calendar year preceding his
termination (AP.DB)
5A.290
Though a casual worker was employed from 1969 to 1979 but since it was not proved
that he had worked for period of 240 days in any year it was held that Sec. 25B(2) was not
applicable hence disentitling him to claim any retrenchment compensation but considering the fact
that worker had met with an accident resulting in amputation of his right leg which led to his
termination company was directed to pay Rs. 10,000 on humanitarian grounds.
G. Yadi Reddy v. Brooke Bond India Ltd., Ghatkesar & Anr., 1994 (69) FLR 25 : 1994 (68) FLR (Sum) 44
: 1994 I LLN 282 : 1994 LIC 186 : 1994 I CLR 207 : 1994 LLR 328 (AP.DB)
.The appellant claimed.him employment. (Page: 26, Para: 2)
.The Learned Presiding.by the company. (Page: 26, Para: 4)
As regards the.and forty days. (Page: 28, Para: 4)
During the course.of the case.we direct.by the management.
(Page: 29, Para: 2)
5A.291
As long as an employee has worked for 240 days in any calendar year preceeding his
termination the employee would be entitled to the benefit of Sec. 25F.
Suraj Pal Singh & Ors. v. P.O. Labour Court No. III & Anr., 2002 III LLJ 885 : 2002 (95) FLR 521 : 2002
IV LLN 735 : 2002 III CLR 158 : 2002 LLR 975 : 2002 LIC 2897 (Del.HC)
2. Workman has to put in 240 days of service in the immediate preceding year
though in spells (AP.DB)
5A.292
If the workman merely put in more than 240 days of service is several spells during
several years but not in the immediately preceding previous year, it is held that fact itself would not
attract the petition Sec. 25F of the Act. It will attract only when it is established that on the date of
removal of the workman from service, if workman had put in 240 days of continuous service in the
pervious year.
Deputy Executive Engineer, I & P. RC Department, Vijayawada & Anr. v. Padamati Balaramiah & Anr.,
2003 LIC 574 : 2003 II LLJ 396 (AP.DB)
.therefore.negative.Ex W1.previous year. (Page: 575, Para: 4)
Sec. 25F
2397
iii) It is mandatory but not directory to mention reasons for termination in the
notice (Ori.DB)
5A.295
Mentioning of reasons of termination in a notice of termination of service is
mandatory and not directory hence notice issued in absence thereof being invalid was quashed.
Dhruba Singh v. Union of India & Anr., 1970 LIC 349 (Ori.DB)
The question.Section 25F(a). (Page: 350, Para: 5)
iv) Notice under Clause (a) of Sec. 25F to precede termination (All.HC)
5A.296
Retrenchment compensation is to be paid to a probationer also. A notice or salary in
lieu of notice is to be paid before the order of termination is passed therefore, termination of
chowkidar who was on probations without complying Sec. 25F of Industrial Disputes Act is illegal.
Zila Sahkari Bank Ltd. & Ors. v. P.O. Labour Court & Ors., 1994 (68) FLR 386 : 1994 II LLJ 941
(All.HC)
2. Service of Notice
i) Notice pasted on notice board is not a substitute for individual notice
u/s. 25F(a) (Ori.DB)
5A.297
Retrenchment notice pasted on notice board is not a substitute for individual notice
hence in such case it was held that one months pay in lieu of retrenchment notice as required
u/s. 25-F is necessitated.
Alumina Mazdoor Sangh Etc. v. Ratna Construction Co. & Ors., 2003 I LLJ 793 : 2003 (96) FLR 944 :
2002 LIC 3693 (Ori.DB)
2398
Sec. 25F
vi) Notice given even before two days instead of one month in advance as per
Rule 77(1) of W.B. I.D Rules is sufficient service since the employees were
put on notice (S.C.3J)
F 5A.302 Where notice of retrenchment u/s. 25F was given 2 days before the actual
retrenchment, it was held that it was substantial compliance of Rule 77(1) of West Bengal
Industrial Dispute Rules, 1958 although neither one months notice to commissioner and
conciliation officer before retrenchment nor with one months wages and a notice to the said
authorities given in as much as the object of the Rule was complied with.
M/s. Parry and Co., Ltd. v. P.C. Pal, Judge on the Second Industrial Tribunal, Calcutta & Anr., 1970 II
LLJ 429: 1970 (38) FJR 164 : 1970 (21) FLR 266 : 1970 LIC 1071 : 1970 AIR (SC) 1334 (S.C.3J)
Sec. 25F
2399
Equally the Tribunals decision on Rule 77 was contrary to its provisions. The Rule by sub-clause (1)
provides that when an employer finds it necessary to retrench any workman he shall at least one month
before the date of actual retrenchment give notice thereof to Labour Commissioner and to the
Conciliation Officer. The proviso to it states that where an employer retrenches any workman with
immediate effect by paying him wages in lieu of notice he shall immediately after such retrenchment give
notice thereof to the said officers. Obviously, sub-clause (1) did not apply to the facts of this case. It is true
that the notice was given two days before the actual retrenchment and was not given immediately. But
the Tribunal could not conclude that since the notice immediately after retrenchment the proviso did not
apply, and therefore, it would be sub-clause (1) which would be applicable and since one months notice
was not given the retrenchment was invalid. In our view such a conclusion was not only incorrect but
contrary to the very object of the rule. We are in agreement with the earned Single Judge that though the
notice was not given immediately after the retrenchment but two days before it, the company had
substantially complied with the requirements of the proviso. The object of the proviso clearly is that
where it is not possible for an employer to give one months notice to the two authorities concerned by
reason of his retrenching the employees with immediate effect, information should be supplied to the two
officers immediately after such retrenchment. It instead of giving such information after the retrenchment
it is given two days before the retrenchment takes place it is hardly possible to say that the requirement of
the proviso was not carried out. So long as the object underlying the proviso was satisfied it did not make
any difference that information was given a little earlier than the date when retrenchment took place.
(Page: 439/440, Para: 17)
2400
Sec. 25F
proviso would have been quite unnecessary if retrenchment as defined in Section 2(oo) was intended not
to include termination of service by efflux of time in terms of an agreement between the parties. This is
one more reason why it must be held that the Court Court was right in taking the view that the respondents
were retrenched contrary to the provisions of Section 25F. (Page: 3, Para: 3)
Note: Section amended by insertion of Sec. 2(oo)(bb) Proviso omitted by Act 49 of 1984
ii) When the discharge of employees took place more than one month after the
order of winding up was passed since the order itself operated as notice
(Ker.DB)
5A.304
When the winding up order was passed the business of the bank was stopped and the
order operated as a notice of discharge of employees u/s. 445(3) of the Companies Act. The winding
up work carried on under the liquidator was not a continuation of the business of the Bank nor did
it constitute a fresh employment in the absence of any agreement to that effect. Hence the
employees are not entitled to notice pay u/s. 25F(a) for their discharge, which had taken place more
than a month after the winding up order was passed.
Palai Central Bank Employees Union (by general secretary) v. Palai Central Bank, Ltd. (by Official
liquidator), 1966 I LLJ 533 (Ker.DB)
The third ground.is continued. (Page: 534, Para: 3)
.when the winding up.fresh employment. (Page: 534, Para: 4)
There is no evidence.also fails. (Page: 535, Para: 1)
Sec. 25F
2401
ii) To be paid time of termination when employee was asked to leave forthwith
(S.C.3J)
F 5A.308 Workman was served with notice of termination on 15th November stating that their
services will be terminated from 17th November and in lieu of notice one month wages would be
paid and he was asked to collect the same on or after 20th November and it was held that u/s. 25F
when employer pays wages in lieu of notice he has to pay at the time when the employee is asked to
leave forthwith and not afterwards therefore in instant case as Sec. 25F was not complied
retrenchment was illegal or non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
M/s. National Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Anr., 1967 II LLJ 23 : 1966-67 (31)
FJR 425 : 1967 (14) FLR 356 : 1967 AIR (SC) 1206 (S.C.3J)
The third point raised by the Additional Solicitor General is also not one of substance. According to him,
retrenchment could only be struck down if it was mala fide or if it was shown that there was victimisation
of the workman etc. Learned counsel further argued that the Tribunal had gone wrong in holding that the
retrenchment was illegal as S. 25 F of the Industrial Disputes Act had not been complied with.The
notice in this case bears the date November 15, l958. It is to the effect that the addressees services were
terminated with effect from the 17th November and that he would get one months wages in lieu of notice
of termination of his service. The workman was further asked to collect his dues from the cash office on.
November 20, 1908 or thereafter during the working hours. Manifestly, S. 25 F, had not been complied
with under which it was incumbent on the employer to pay the workman, the wages for the period of the
notice in lien of the notice. That is to say, if he was asked to go forthwith he had to be paid at the time
when he was asked to go and could not be asked to collect his dues afterwards. As there was no
compliance with S. 25F, we need not consider the other points raised by the learned counsel.
(Page: 29, Para: 1)
iii) Worker held to be terminated on the date when wages paid in lieu of notice
(S.C.3J)
F 5A.309 If one months notice of termination is given then termination of service is effected on
the expiry of notice period but in case of termination made by payment of one month salary in lieu
of notice, his service will come to an end on the date on which his service is terminated. In the
instant case workman was terminated on 30th September 1953 with notice pay, it is not correct to
pay him compensation u/s. 25F as if the employee continued in service as has been done by Labour
Court since Sec. 25F had not come into operation when his services were terminated and it came
into force w.e.f. 24.10.1953 only hence the award of reinstatement made by Labour Court was set
aside since he was retrenched prier to coming into force of Sec. 25F.
Management of M/s. May & Baker India Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1967 AIR (SC) 678 : 1961 II LLJ 94 :
1961-62 (20) FJR 147 : 1961 (2) FLR 594 (S.C.3J)
.Iqbal Singh who has been awarded retrenchment compensation as well as gratuity. So far as
retrenchment compensation is concerned, the tribunal has held that Iqbal Singh was entitled to
retrenchment compensation under S. 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. This view of the tribunal is in
2402
Sec. 25F
our opinion incorrect. Section 25-F came into force on October 24, 1953, while the services of Iqbal
Singh were terminated on September 30, 1953. He was informed that his service would be terminated
after September 30, 1953, and he was directed to take one months salary in lieu of notice, as he was
surplus. The tribunal was not right in holding that this meant that Iqbal Singh continued in service till
October 30, 1953, and was, therefore, entitled to the benefit of S. 25-F. This is a case where the services
were terminated from September 30, 1953, on payment of one months salary in lieu of notice. In such a
case the service comes to an end on the date from which it is terminated. The matter would be different if
one months notice had been given to Iqbal Singh and after that month his services had been terminated.
In that case he would be actually working for the month of notice and his services would have terminated
after the notice period. In the present case, however, he was not given one months notice; what was done
was that his services were terminated from September 30 and he was given one months pay in lieu of
notice. But, though the tribunal was wrong in holding that S. 25-F applied to Iqbal Singh, we see no
reason to interfere with the order allowing one months average pay as retrenchment compensation to
Iqbal Singh, for it is not disputed that industrial tribunals use of to give retrenchment compensation even
before S. 25-F was enacted and that Section merely standardised the practice which was generally
prevalent. In the circumstances, the order as to payment of one months average salary as retrenchment
compensation to Iqbal Singh must stand. (Page: 680, Para: 10)
5. Wages for one month does not always mean wages for 30 days and wages
for the month of February to be computed on the basis of 28 days but not 30
days (Bom.HC)
5A.310
In this case the employer in lieu of notice for the month of February made payment of
wages for 28 days. The employee submitted that retrenchment is illegal for want of wages of 30
days. The High Court held that when retrenchment had taken place on 30.1.1985 it would be the
duty of the employer to give notice on 30.1.1985 allowing the workman to work for the succeeding
month of February and to earn wages for 28 days and if holidays are not counted then for 24 days.
But in this case 28 days wages are paid in lieu of notice, hence, the company has paid wages of 4days
in excess. Therefore, it cannot be accepted that the company has violated Sec. 25F(a) of the Act.
Janata Mazdoor Union v. Tas Engineering Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2002 (95) FLR 739 : 2002 IV LLN 772 :
2002 LIC 2873 : 2003 LLR (Sum) 107 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25F
2403
2404
Sec. 25F
.When there is such a controversy and when no such list was maintained by the company
although maintaining of such list can be said to be a compulsory compliance of the rules framed under the
Industrial Disputes Act on the part of the Company (vide Rule 77-A of the West Bengal Industrial
Disputes Rules) it must be held that the retrenchment was illegal. (Page: 972, Para: 16)
For the reasons aforementioned, the impugned judgment of the Division Bench cannot be upheld. It is
set aside accordingly and the judgment of the learned single Judge upholding the award passed by the
Industrial Tribunal is restored. (Page: 973, Para: 18)
iii) Similar payment on closure does not bring closure within ambit of
retrenchment (S.C.CB)
F 5A.315 Mere payment of compensation on closure as per Sec. 25F does not bring closure
within the purview of retrenchment since it is awarded as an equitable relief adopting the simple
yardstick of length of service to standardize the amount of compensation.
Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla & Anr. v. A. D. Divelkar & Anr., AND Barsi Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. K.
N. Joglekar & Anr., 1957 I LLJ 243 : 1956-57 (11) FJR 317 :1957 AIR (SC) 121 (S.C.CB)
.Retrenchment means discharge of surplus workmen in an existing or continuing business; it had
acquired no special meaning so as to include discharge of workmen on bona fide closure of business,
though a number of Labour Appellate Tribunals awarded compensation to workmen on closure of
business as an equitable relief for a variety of reasons. It is reasonable to assume that in enacting S. 25-F,
the legislature standardised the payment of compensation to workmen retrenched in the normal or
ordinary sense in an existing or continuing industry; the legislature did away with the perplexing variety
of factors for determining the appropriate relief in such cases and adopted a simple yard stick of the length
of service of the retrenched workmen. If the intention of the legislature was to given statutory effect to
those decisions which awarded compensation on real and bona fide closure of business, the legislature
would have said so instead of being content by merely adding a definition clause, every requirement of
which is fulfilled by the ordinary, accepted meaning of the word retrenchment. (Page: 250, Para: 1)
iv) Gratuity is not substitute for retrenchment compensation since the objects
of both are different (S.C.3J)
F 5A.316 Since the object of granting gratuity is different from granting retrenchment
compensation and as claims for both the benefits are for entirely different reasons, there is no
conflict between the two and hence grant of one will not exclude the claim for grant of another and
the fact that they appear to constitute double benefit is immaterial.
Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Its workmen & Anr., 1959 II LLJ 830 : 1959-60 (17) FJR 273 : 1960 AIR
(SC) 251 (S.C.3J)
Sec. 25F
2405
.In fact the whole object of granting retrenchment compensation is to enable the workman to
keep his gratuity safe and unused so that it may be available to him after his retirement. Thus the object of
granting retrenchment compensation to the employee is very different from the object which gratuity is
intended to serve. That is why on principle the two schemes are not at all irreconcilable nor even
inconsistent; they really complement each other; and so, on considerations of social justice there is no
reason why both the claims should not be treated as legitimate. The fact that they appear to constitute a
double benefit does not affect their validity. (Page: 833, Para: 2)
.The claims for retrenchment compensation and gratuity proceed on different considerations and
it would be impossible to hold that the grant of one excludes the claim or grant of the other.
(Page: 835, Para: 2)
5A.317
Gratuity is a kind of retirement benefit like provident fund or pension and is intended
to help workmen after retirement, whether the retirement is the result of rules of superannuation
or physical disability. On the other hand, retrenchment compensation is a compensation paid to a
workman who has suddenly and without his fault to face unemployment on account of
retrenchment. The concept of retrenchment compensation is essentially different from gratuity.
They do not overlap but are really complementary and there is no reason why workmen should not
be entitled to the benefits. Therefore, merely because certain workmen are entitled to the benefit of
gratuity under their service regulation, it cannot be contended that they should not be entitled to
retrenchment compensation as provided in Sec. 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
M. Venkata Buchi Babu & Ors. v. Chief Engineer, Nagarjuna Sagar Dam & Anr., 1972 (41) FJR 602 :
1972 LLN 158 : 1972 LIC 383 (AP.HC)
v) Retrenchment compensation need not be paid again u/s. 25F(b) when the
same is paid in the name of gratuity under the scheme of the company
(S.C.3J)
F 5A.318 Where the company has already provided a scheme of compensation by name
gratuity to the retrenched employees, it is held that merely because of introduction of Sec. 25F
under Chapter V-A, the employees are not supposed to get the compensation once again and what
Sec. 25J has prescribed is a mere advantageous benefit either under the Act or by the companys
own gratuitous gesture and not both.
M/s. The Brahmachari Research Institute, Calcutta v. Their workmen, 1959 II LLJ 840 : 1959-60 (17)
FJR 282 : 1960 AIR (SC) 257 (S.C.3J)
It will be seen that the Award is a composite scheme providing for what is termed gratuity therein under
three conditions, namely, (I) where there is retrenchment, (ii) where there is termination of service for any
reason other than misconduct, and (iii) where there is resignation with the consent of the management.
Though the word gratuity has been used to cover all these three cases, it is clear that cases of
retrenchment as such are also covered by the Award and payment to workmen retrenched has been called
gratuity. The name given to the payment is, however, not material and it is the nature of the payment
that has to be looked into.on a fair and reasonable construction of the Award, what the retrenched
workman got is only compensation for retrenchment and not any amount by way of gratuity properly so
called. (Page: 842, Para: 3)
.it must be held that gratuity provided therein on retrenchment is nothing more nor less than
retrenchment compensation provided under S. 25F of the Act, and the workmen are only entitled to one or
the other, whichever is more advantageous to them in view of S. 25J.We therefore allow the
appeal, set aside, the decision of the Appellate Tribunal and restore that of the Industrial Tribunal in this
matter. (Page: 844, Para: 1)
2406
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2407
Joginder Kumar Gautam & Anr. v. State Bank of India & Ors., 2003 LIC 503 : 2003 II LLJ 401 (HP.DB)
Learned.of the Act. (Page: 507, Para: 21)
xi) Retrenchment compensation cannot be set off against gratuity since the
two benefits arise under two different laws (Mad.DB)
5A.325
Retrenchment compensation due to a workman cannot be set off against gratuity
payable as the entitlement to the two benefits arise on satisfaction of requirements under two
different laws and hence cannot be destructive of each other.
K. Subba Rao v. Deputy Dommissioner of Labour & Anr., 1998 II LLN 914 : 1998 (92) FJR 174 : 1998
(79) FLR 64 (Mad.DB)
Retrenchment.Payment of Gratuity Act. (Page: 917, Para: 6)
xii) Not payable in case of simple discharge for loss of confidence (Bom.HC)
5A.326
Workman was discharged without any enquiry as he failed to give explanation about
the money, which he had with him during duty hours. On reference, Labour Court awarded Rs.
1,50,000 in lieu of reinstatement as no enquiry was held nor the employee was charge sheeted.
Before High Court it was contended by the employer that the workman failed to show any reason
for such amount with him. High Court set aside the award of Labour Court on the ground that the
charge was admitted by workman and employer proved the charge before Labour Court and it
was also held that where the employer discharged the workman for loss of confidence, it would be a
case of simple discharge and employer was only required to justify the termination before Labour
Court and compliance of Sec. 25F was not required.
Hotel Horizon Pvt. Ltd. v. Bhartiya Kamgar Karmachari Mahasangh & Anr., 2002 I LLJ 186 : 2001 III
LLN 1003 (Bom.HC)
2408
The
determinative
factor
is.37(1).Payment
far.actual payment. (Page: 591, Para: 5)
Sec. 25F
of.liability.So
xv) Recovery of loan amount from the legal dues such as retrenchment
compensation permissible (Bom.HC)
5A.329
There is no illegality in recovering the loan amount given to workman by deducting
the same from legal dues at the time of his retrenchment.
Engineering & Ancilliary Manufacturers v. Salim Khan., 2004 (102) FLR 194 : 2003 IV LLN 261 : 2004
II CLR 309 : 2004 LLR 685 (Bom.HC)
xvi) There cannot be settlement for lesser amount of compensation than that
provided under Industrial Disputes Act (Guj.HC)
5A.330
Retrenchment compensation cannot be a contracted for lesser amount between union
and employer than provided under the statute. It has to be worked as per the provisions of
Industrial Dispute Act.
Petlad Bulakhidas Mill Company Ltd., Petlad, Petitioner v. Ramabhai Bhikhabhai, Respondent, 1995 II
LLJ 1240 : 1995 (87) FJR 158 : 1995 II LLN 219 :1995 LIC 675 : 1995 II CLR 494 : 1995 LLR 1069
(Guj.HC)
Sec. 25F
2409
2410
Sec. 25F
termination of his services, there was no hope left for payment of salary in future. The retrenchment
compensation paid to him, which was only a meagre amount of Rs. 6,350/- was utilised by him to sustain
himself. This does not mean that he had surrendered all his constitutional rights in favour of the
respondents. Fundamental Rights under the Constitution cannot be bartered away. They cannot be
compromised nor can there be any estoppel against the exercise of Fundamental Rights available under
the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, the termination of the appellant from service was punitive in
nature and was in violation of the principles of natural justice and his constitutional rights. Such an order
cannot be sustained. (Page: 1392, Para: 13)
Sec. 25F
2411
case has not been pleaded or established. Hence, we do not think that the line upon which the High Court
has proceeded is correct. The order made by the High Court deserves to be set aside and the award made
by the Tribunal will have to be restored. (Page: 1997, Para: 9)
2412
Sec. 25F
compensation, he was required to be paid Rs. 1642 as retrenchment compensation. The University gave
him a cheque for Rs. 1642/- at the time of his retrenchment and, therefore, there was full compliance of
Section 25F(b) of the Act. (Page: 1010, Para: 10)
.Therefore, there is no warrant or justification for importing the principle of 26 working days for
determining the compensation which is payable in terms of Section 25F(b) of the Act.
(Page: 1012, Para: 13)
There is another important feature which deserves notice. Subsequent to the decision of this Court in
Jeevanlal (supra) an explanation has been added after second proviso to Section 4(2) of the Payment of
Gratuity Act, by Act No. 22 of 1987, which reads as under:Explanation:- In the case of a monthly rated employee, the fifteen days wages shall be calculated by
dividing the monthly rate of wages last drawn by him by twenty-six and multiplying the quotient by
fifteen.
By adding the explanation, the legislature has brought the statute in line with the principle laid down in
the case of Jeevanlal (supra) and has given statutory recognition to the principle evolved, viz. that in case
of monthly rated employee the fifteen days wages shall be calculated by dividing the monthly rate of
wages by twenty six and multiplying the quotient by fifteen. But, no such amendment has been made in
the Industrial Disputes Act. If the legislature wanted that for the purposes of Section 25F(b) also the
average pay had to be determined by dividing the monthly wages by twenty-six, a similar amendment
could have been made. But the legislature has chosen not to do so. This is an additional reason for holding
that the principle of twenty-six working days is not to be applied for determining the retrenchment
compensation under Section 25F(b) of the Act. (Page: 1012/1013, Para: 14)
5A.338
For assessing retrenchment compensation, average monthly wages divided by 30
instead of by 26 and multiplied by 15 but for assessing 15 days wages, monthly wages need not be
divided by 26.
Parrys (Cal) Employees Union & Anr. v. Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 39
: 2001 (89) FLR 192 : 2001 LLR 462 : 2001 II LLN 743 : 2001 I CLR 777 (Cal.HC)
Note: The following cases are based on computation of compensation on the basis of 26 days. The issue is
now settled by Apex Court in
Guru Jambeshwar University, Hisar v. Dharam Pal, 2007 I LLJ 1006 : 2007 (112) FLR 880 : 2007 I LLN
740 : 2007 LIC 956 : 2007 I CLR 931 : 2007 LLR 297 : 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 792 : 2007 AIR (SC) 1040 :
2007 (2) SCC 265 : 2007 (3) Mah.LJ 63 : 2007 SCCL.COM 59 (S.C.2J)
ii) In the case of wages paid per working day the computation shall be as per
provisions of Sec. 2(aaa)(iii) on the basis of 26 days (Mad.HC)
5A.339
Where wages are fixed per working day, retrenchment should be calculated by
applying provisions of Sec. 2(aaa)(iii) of the Act, and such workman held entitled to 26 days wages
by way of notice pay u/s. 25F(a) of the Act and not for 30 days wages.
K. Palaniswami v. India Hume Pipe Company, Ltd., & Ors., 1965 II LLJ 541 (Mad.HC)
iii) A month is to be taken as 26 days for calculating one day wages (Pat.DB)
5A.340
In accordance with the industrial law applicable to mines, a month is calculated on a
26 day basis and so leave salary and retrenchment compensation is to be calculated on this basis.
The award of the Labour Court allowing the claims of the workman is not assailable.
M/s. Khas Joyrampur Colliery Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Kailash Nath Shrivastava & Anr., 1969 LIC 1166
(Pat.DB)
Lastly I take.also not assailable. (Page: 1171, Para: 21)
Sec. 25F
2413
Note: Refer to Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. etc v. Appellate Authority, Payment of Gratuity Act & Ors. etc.,
1984 AIR (SC) 1842 : 1984 (4) SCC 356 : 1984 II LLJ 464 (S.C.3J)
v) Computation shall be on the basis of 15 days wages but not half months
wages for each completed year of service (Pat.DB)
5A.344
Payment of compensation under the section has to be calculated at 15 days wage and
not half month and one days wages shall be determined on basis of 26 days and not 30 days.
Bennet Coleman & Co. Ltd. v. P.O. Labour Court, Patna & Ors., 2003 (98) FLR 1032 : 2003 III LLJ 981
(Pat.DB)
The said decision.Calendar month. (Page: 1042, Para: 26)
Note: As observed from the above decisions from some High Courts, there is no unanimity as to the
number of days to be considered to arrive at one day wage for the purpose of computing retrenchment
compensation. However the Apex Court in the recent case of Guru Jambeshwar University, Hisar v.
Dharam Pal, 2007 I LLJ 1006 : 2007 (112) FLR 880 : 2007 I LLN 740 : 2007 LIC 956 : 2007 I CLR 931 :
2007 LLR 297 : 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 792 : 2007 AIR (SC) 1040 : 2007 (2) SCC 265 : 2007 (3) Mah.LJ 63
: 2007 SCCL.COM 59 (S.C.2J) has settled the issue by holding that the number of working days to be
considered is 30 days but not 26 days
2414
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2415
2416
Sec. 25F
2. When sent by bank drafts through registered post though the workman
avoids receipt of the same (Raj.HC)
5A.352
The workman by avoiding to take the requisite amount through bank drafts, which
was sent by registered post, cannot contend that there was no tender of notice pay and
retrenchment compensation u/s. 25F(b).
Dinesh Kumar v. Union of India & Ors., 1993 (66) FLR (sum) 43 : 1993 LIC 678 (Raj.HC)
3. When demand draft and retrenchment notice were sent on the same day
though served three days after retrenchment (P&H.HC)
5A.353
The workman was a daily wager and his services were terminated and the
retrenchment compensation along with termination notice could be served only after 3 days of
termination. The Labour Court held the delay as non-compliance of Sec. 25F. The High Court in its
decision held that as the employer had tendered the amount by obtaining D.D. on the same date as
the notice, there is sufficient compliance of Sec. 25F and also, since, the workman is a daily wager,
his disengagement cannot be treated as being under the Industrial Disputes Act 1947. Also, the fact
that he had made a back door entry into the services it further disentitles him as it is in
contravention of Arts. 14 and 16 of the Constitution.
Hoshiarpur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. Hoshiapur v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Jalandhar &
Ors., 2005 I LLJ 800 : 2005 (104) FLR 574 : 2005 I LLN 940 (P&H.HC)
Note: Refer to the following case
Anand Pandurang Mhaskar v. Eastern Engineering Works., 2003 (96) FLR 673 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25F
2417
2418
Sec. 25F
10. When sent by money order though workman refused to receive notice and
compensation personally (Del.HC)
5A.360
Workman refused to receive personally notice of retrenchment and offer of
compensation so the employer sent notice by registered post and compensation by money order. It
is held to be sufficient compliance with requirement of payment before retrenchment.
The Management of Indian Compressors New Delhi v. D.D. Gupta, & Ors., 1977 LIC 694 (Del.HC)
Sec. 25F
2419
11. When sent prior to termination though received after termination by the
employee (Bom.HC)
5A.361
Notice pay and retrenchment compensation was sent on 8.11.1983 and was received
on 23.11.1983. Services were terminated with effect from 10.11.1983. It was held that Sec. 25F is
sufficiently complied and termination would be with effect from 23.11.1983.
G.D. Shinde v. Associated Cement Co. Ltd, & Ors., 1995 I LLJ 1245 : 1995 (70) FLR 541 : 1995 I LLN
235 : 1995 I CLR 157 : 1995 LLR 234 (Bom.HC)
13. When employee asked by letter to collect his dues from office after striking
his name from muster roll (AP.HC)
5A.363
When the employer offers the workman to collect retrenchment compensation and
one months notice pay, it cannot be taken to mean that the employer has not complied with Sec.
25F, keeping such an amount ready in the office is sufficient compliance of Sec. 25F of the Act. In
the instant case, workman raised the dispute alleging that retrenchment compensation and notice
pay was not paid with the notice of retrenchment. Labour Court rejected the plea and held that the
offer was made by the employer. High Court also upheld the award of the Labour Court.
Narayan Poojari v. The Labour Court, Ilnd Floor, Chandra Vihar & Anr., 2002 LLR 1213 : 2002 LIC
2762 (AP.HC)
5A.364
Where the workman assailed the termination on the ground that the employer has
asked the workman to collect the notice pay and compensation from the office instead of sending it
by money order, the Court setting aside the Labour Court order, held that Sec. 25F does not state
that compensation is only to be made through Money order and if that be the case then payment by
cheque and- Bank draft is to be ruled out as he has to approach the Bank. Hence asking the
employee to collect the dues from office is sufficient compliances Sec. 25F.
Ramesh Hydromachs, Udayambag, Belgaum v. Labour Court, Hubli & Anr., 1986 I LLJ 334 : 1985 (66)
FJR 468 : 1985 (51) FLR 88 : 1985 I LLN 940 : 1985 LIC 1806 : 1985 II CLR 48 (Karn.HC)
Note: also refer to the following cases
Ramesh v. Executive Engineer, Jayakwadi Project & Ors., 2001 III LLJ 889 : 2001 LIC 1255 : 2000 (86)
FLR 885 : 2000 IV LLN 986 : 2000 III CLR 92 : 2000 II LLR 1156 (Bom.HC)
Engineering & Ancilliary Manufacturers v. Salim Khan., 2004 (102) FLR 194 : 2003 IV LLN 261 : 2004
II CLR 309 : 2004 LLR 685 (Bom.HC)
Hari Singh v. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak & Anr., 1993 II LLN 245 : 1993 LLR 385
(P&H.HC)
Ramesh Hydromachs, Udayambag, Belgaum v. Labour Court, Hubli & Anr.,1986 I LLJ 334 : 1985 (66)
FJR 468 : 1985 (51) FLR 88 : 1985 I LLN 940 : 1985 LIC 1806 : 1985 II CLR 48 (Karn.HC)
Dabhoi Nagarpalika v. Omkarbhai Somabhai Patel & Ors., 2000 III LLJ 461 (Guj.HC)
2420
Sec. 25F
15. Deemed paid even if the word gratuity was mistakenly written in place of
retrenchment compensation in the receipt (Raj.HC)
5A.366
A writ petition was preferred against the order of Labour Court holding the
retrenchment to be illegal and directing reinstatement with back wages. It was contended by the
workman that since the retrenchment compensation was not paid at the time of retrenchment, the
Labour Courts order should be upheld. The High Court rejected the plea on the ground that in the
receipt, the word gratuity was written instead of retrenchment compensation was only by
mistake and hence, it cannot be held that retrenchment compensation was not paid to the
workman.
Manager, M/S. Jai Drinks Pvt. Ltd. v. P.O. Labour Court No. 1, Jaipur & Ors., 2002 (95) FLR 931 : 2002
IV LLN 606 : 2002 LIC 2062 : 2002 III CLR 314 (Raj.HC)
16. Deemed paid when the same is paid in the name of gratuity under the
scheme of the company (S.C.3J)
F 5A.367 Where the company has already provided a scheme of compensation by name
gratuity to the retrenched employees, it is held that merely because of introduction of Sec. 25F
under Chapter V-A, the employees are not supposed to get the compensation once again and what
Sec. 25J has prescribed is a mere advantageous benefit either under the Act or by the companys
own gratuitous gesture and not both.
M/s. The Brahmachari Research Institute, Calcutta v. Their workmen, 1959 II LLJ 840 : 1959-60 (17)
FJR 282 : 1960 AIR (SC) 257 (S.C.3J)
.We cannot agree with the Appellate Tribunal that the payment of gratuity in the event of
retrenchment has nothing to do with the compensation payable to a workman under s. 25F of the Act. The
Appellate Tribunal seems to have been carried away by the word gratuity used in the Award and it
seems to think that gratuity on retrenchment is something different from compensation on retrenchment.
We are of opinion that this is not correct. Whether it is called gratuity or compensation, it is in
substance a payment to the workman on account of retrenchment; and if a scheme like the present
specifically provides payment for retrenchment as defined in s. 2(oo), we see no justification for
compelling that payment twice over, once under s. 25F and again under the scheme in force in the
concern. (Page: 843/844, Para: 4)
.it must be held that gratuity provided therein on retrenchment is nothing more nor less than
retrenchment compensation provided under s. 25F of the Act, and the workmen are only entitled to one or
the other, whichever is more advantageous to them in view of s. 25J. (Page: 844, Para: 1)
Sec. 25F
2421
17. When money and ex-gratia paid in lieu of notice and retrenchment
compensation (Cal.DB)
5A.368
Even though the employer paid money in lieu of notice and ex-gratia to the employees
not purporting them to be workman, the mandatory conditions of notice and retrenchment
compensation under Clause (a) and (b) were held to be complied with and hence their termination
was valid.
Guest Keen Willams Ltd. v. The Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal & Ors., 1996 III LLJ 825 : 1996 I
LLN 106 : 1995 LIC 1687 : 1995 II CLR 485 : 1996 LLR 64 (Cal.DB)
.Now the question.service. (Page: 833, Para: 23)
.It therefore.employees. (Page: 833, Para: 24)
.As we have.award. (Page: 834, Para: 27)
18. Though work man collects dues on 8.8.1972 i.e. Monday instead of 7.7.1972
i.e. Sunday (All.DB)
5A.369
Collection of dues by workmen on 8th August 1972 instead of 7th August 1972 being
Sunday is substantial compliance with the Sec. 6N(b) of U.P. Act and would not result in
invalidating the termination order dt. 6th August 1972 and, hence, the Labour Court order of
reinstating retrenched employees was set aside.
Swadesh Press v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 1980 I LLN 330 : 1980 LIC 878 (All.DB)
The petitioners gave.6 August 1972.The workmen were.on 8 August.The
Labour Court.retrenchment became effective.On this finding.full back
wages. (Page: 331, Para: 1)
.In the present.very following day.the delay of.invalidating the order.
(Page: 333, Para: 7)
.the award of.accordance with law. (Page: 333, Para: 9)
2422
Sec. 25F
Secondly, he contended that the termination of services of the respondent was in terms of Section 25-F
of the Act as the order of termination discloses that it is open to the respondent to collect the dues before
leaving and in this context he relied upon two decisions of this Court in Straw Board Manufacturing Co.
Ltd. Saharanpur v. Govind AIR 1962 SC 1500 : 1962 I LLJ 420 and Management of Delhi Transport
undertaking v. Industrial Tribunal, Delhi and Anr., AIR 1965 SC 1503 : 1965-I-LLJ-458, to contend that
even an offer of payment is as good as payment itself in terms of Section 25-F of the Act. However, a
reading of the letter dated September 8, 1995 on which reliance is placed, it is clear that all that is stated is
to ask the respondent to collect whatever is due to him but it does not spell out whether it included the
amount as contemplated under Sec. 25-F or not. In these circumstances, we cannot take this sentence to
be making an offer in terms of Sec 25-F of the Act to comply with the terms therof. Hence the view taken
by the Labour Court as affirmed by the High Court stands to good reason and it does not call for any
interference at our hands. (Page: 1346, Para: 3)
Considering the fact that the respondent has not been in employment of the appellant since 1975 for well
over quarter of a century we do not think it appropriate to put him back in service of the appellant. It
would be proper that some reasonable compensation be paid to him in lieu of back wages and
reinstatement. We think, in the circumstances of the case, appropriate relief to be granted is a sum of
Rs.50,000 which shall be paid to the respondent period of one month from today to be drawn by the
respondent. (Page: 1346, Para: 4)
Note: also refer to the following case
Kailash Parshad Sharma v. Labour Court & Anr., 1998 III LLJ (Sum) 4 : 1996 (88) FJR 461 : 1996 (73)
FLR 1181 : 1996 II LLN 741 (P&H.HC)
R.D. Pillay v. Indian Dyestuff Industries Ltd., 1993 III LLJ (Sum) 671 : 1992 (65) FLR 977 : 1992 I CLR
1005 : 1992 LLR 636 (Bom.HC)
Feb.April
1973.
Sec. 25F
2423
4. Deemed not paid by showing mere readiness to pay unless there is an offer
or tender or actual payment (Raj.HC)
5A.373
For payment of compensation on retrenchment, there must be either an offer or
tender or actual payment. Mere readiness to pay was not sufficient.
Moinuddin & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1981 LIC 697 (Raj.HC)
Note: also refer to the following case
Rajasthan Canal Project, Vijayanagar Circle, through State of Rajasthan v. Rajasthan Canal Rastriya
Mazdoor Union, Suratnagar & Anr., 1976 II LLJ 25 : 1976 II LLN 73 (Raj.HC)
8. When compensation was paid on the basis of wages drawn prior to earlier
retrenchment (MP.HC)
5A.377
Service of the workman was terminated but he was reinstated under the order of
Court. Later he was again retrenched after paying retrenchment compensation, which was
challenged. Labour Court rejected the claim of workman but on appeal Industrial Court allowed
workmans claim and ordered reinstatement and held that Sec. 25F was not complied with since
compensation was paid on the basis of wage, which the workman was drawing prior to his earlier
termination. High Court upheld the order of Industrial Court.
Shaw Wallace Gelatines Ltd. Jabalpur v. Om Prakash Singh & Anr., 2001 (90) FLR 945 : 2001 IV LLN
503 : 2002 I CLR 250 (MP.HC)
2424
Sec. 25F
10. When compensation offered not at the time of termination but subsequent
to it (Del.HC)
Kanti Weekly v. D.D. Gupta & Ors., 1983 I LLN 771 (Del.HC)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
12. When notice to collect it was sent first and money order was sent later
(P&H.DB)
Mani Ram v. The P.O. Labour Court, Ambala, 1997 II LLJ 519 : 1997 (75) FLR 132 : 1996 (89) FJR 673 :
1996 LLR 615 : 1997 IV LLN 361 : 1997 II CLR 868 (P&H.DB)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
13. When there is mere recital in notice of termination that efforts will be made
to pay retrenchment compensation (Bom.DB)
The P.W.D. Mazdoor Union & Anr. v. The Executive Engineer, P.W.D. & Anr., 1997 (77) FLR 76 : 1997
LLR 1027 (Bom.DB)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
Sec. 25F
2425
17. When the offer is made at the close of the day or bit earlier since the offer
cannot be said to be genuine (AP.HC)
5A.378
It is a settled principle of law that an offer may be as good as payment, but it must be
genuine and bonafide. But if the offer is made at the close of the day or even a bit earlier it can never
be said that the offer was genuine and bonafide more so if the office from which the amount is to be
collected is at a place away from the place of work.
Superintending Engineer, R & B Dept., Warangal & Anr. v. D. Sambaiah & Anr., 2002 LIC 2124
(AP.HC)
2426
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2427
l) Recovery of compensation
1. Can be recovered u/s. 33C(2) (Pat.DB)
5A.384
Individual workman can claim retrenchment compensation u/s. 33C(2) although he
can claim the same by raising an industrial dispute u/s. 10 and hence grant of the same by Labour
Court under the section was upheld.
Management Navashakti Publishing Company, Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., 1964 II LLJ 198 : 1964 (9)
FLR 351 (Pat.DB)
.petitioner has moved.of that Act. (Page: 198, Para: 1)
2428
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2429
2430
Sec. 25F
ii) Notice u/s. 25F(c) is only directory and not mandatory, hence
non-compliance is not fatal (S.C.3J)
F 5A.391 The requirement of sending notice u/s. 25F(c) to Labour Department by registered
post is held to be only directory and not mandatory and a notice sent through peon book duly
acknowledge of held to be sufficient compliance with Sec. 25F(c) and the statute.
Gurmail Singh & Anr., etc.etc. v. State of Punjab & Anr., 1991 II LLJ 76 : 1993 (82) FJR 332 : 1991 (62)
FLR 458 : 1991 I LLN 587 : 1993 LIC 428 : 1991 I CLR 637 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 147 : 1993 AIR (SC)
1388 : 1991 (1) SCC 189 (S.C.3J)
.High Court was satisfied that the requisite notice in the prescribed form P was sent to the
Secretary to Government, Labour Department and the Employment Exchange concerned by personal
delivery duly acknowledged in the peon book of the Department. Pointing out that the requirements of
Clause (c) of Section 25-F were only directory and not mandatory, the High Court was of the opinion that
the notices were not vitiated due to non-compliance with Clause (c) of Sec. 25F. (Page: 80, Para: 2)
The contention base on Clause (c) of Section 25.F is equally baseless..the suggestion is that they
should have been sent by registered post. As rightly pointed but by the High Court, such a requirement
can be treated only as directory and not mandatory and it would be erroneous to hold that, unless sent by
registered post, the notices cannot be treated as complying with the statute.. (Page: 84, Para: 10)
5A.392
Non-compliance with Sec. 25F(c) is only an irregularity and does not make
retrenchment illegal as it is only a mere condition but not condition precedent to retrenchment.
Bombay Union of Journalists & Ors. v. State of Bombay & Anr., 1961 II LLJ 727 (Bom.DB)
5A.393
As the workmen were retrenched by giving one months salary in lieu of notice, notice
should have been given to the Government under Rule 79 within 3 days of payment. But as this
point regarding non-compliance of Rule 79 was not raised before the Labour Court, it could not be
taken up in writ proceedings. The workmen had accepted the payment made to them and were not
prejudiced in any way. Hence the provisions regarding notice to the Government were not really
mandatory.
Workmen of Shillong Hydro-Electric Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors., 1965 II LLJ 619 (Ass.DB)
If however it is.rule 79. (Page: 622, Para: 1)
The Point not.before us. (Page: 622, Para: 2/3)
But so long as.really mandatory. (Page: 622, Para: 3)
5A.394
Considering retrenchment notice of casual workers of Railways, High Court held that
even though grounds for retrenchment were not specifically mentioned it cannot be said that the
same resulted in contravention of Clause (a) of Sec. 25F, also compliance with Rule 76 requiring
notice to be served on Appropriate Government and prescribed authorities is not condition
precedent for valid order of retrenchment and hence petition filed by the workers was dismissed.
Dhirendra Kumar Vidyarthi & Ors. etc. v. Union of India & Ors., 1982 LIC 1680 (Pat.DB)
.In the notice.work/work load.it would have.of the Act. (Page: 1682,
Para: 6)
It was then.of the Act.any non compliance.order of retrenchment.
(Page: 1683, Para: 8)
This writ application.it is dismissed. (Page: 1684, Para: 11)
Sec. 25F
2431
5A.395
Non-compliance of notice to Government is not fatal, because notice u/s. 25F(c) of
Industrial Disputes Act only directory in nature and not mandatory.
Jagan Singh v. Canara Bank & Anr., 1994 II LLJ 1184 : 1994 I CLR 899 : 1994 LLR 495 : 1994 (68) FLR
648 (All.HC)
Note: also refer to the following cases
Manohar Lal v. Central Warehosing Corporation & Anr., 1995 (87) FJR 494 : 1996 (72) FLR (Sum) 29
(P&H.HC)
2432
Sec. 25F
iv) Notice to Government required u/s. 25F(c) is not an empty formality and
non-compliance results in vitiating termination (Ker.HC)
5A.397
The Labour Court ordered reinstatement of workman as his termination was illegal
in an ex-parte award and application for setting aside the ex-parte award was rejected on the
ground of insufficient cause being shown. The High Court held that conditions precedent to
retrenchment given u/s. 25-F are mandatory. The issue of notice to the Government as required
under the Act cannot be said to be an empty formality and thus non-compliance with the provisions
entitles workman to reinstated.
Ollur Regional Imitation Diamond Manufacturers Industrial Co-op. Society Ltd. v. Labour Court &
Anr., 1993 II LLJ 174 : 1993 (82) FJR 426 : 1993 (66) FLR 1056 : 1993 II CLR 312 : 1993 LLR 553
(Ker.HC)
Note: Refer to the decisions of Apex Court given above holding contrary view
a) When a daily wage worker who failed to establish that he worked for 240 days
and employer refused to employ him can be terminated (S.C.2J)
F 5A.399 Daily rated workman who failed to establish that he had worked for 240 days and on
the contrary evidence proved that he did not report for duty and it was not the employer who
refused to give work to him and thus there was no act on the part of the employer, therefore the
Labour Court erroneously held that he was illegally retrenched and Apex Court held there was no
violation of Sec. 25F and not entitled to any relief.
State of Haryana v. Om Prakash & Anr., 1999 SCC (L&S) 262 (S.C.2J)
.The authority below has come to the conclusion that he had worked for a period from 10-8-1985
to 30-6-1986 which would be less than one year. Therefore, the authority was wrong in concluding that
he had worked for 240 days during 12 months immediately preceding the date of cessation of work.
Besides no information was laid before the authority as to how many days during that period he had
worked for, but in any case, he had not worked for 12 calendar months. There is also no evidence that he
had worked for 240 days to satisfy Section 25-B of the Act. Therefore, the authority was wrong in coming
to the conclusion that there was a violation of Section 25-F of the Act besides, as stated earlier, he himself
voluntarily ceased to report for duty and there was no act on the part of the employer nor is there anything
on record to suggest that the employer had refused work to him. Retrenchment within the meaning of
Section 2(oo) means termination by the employer of the service of the workman for any reason
whatsoever. Therefore it contemplates an act on the part of the employer which puts an end to service to
fall within the definition of the expression retrenchment in Section 2(oo) of the Act. There was nothing
of the sort in the instant case. It was the workman who ceased to report for duty and even after he ceased to
report for duty, it is not his case that at any point of time he reported for duty and he was refused work. He
straightaway proceeded to invoke the provisions of the Act and, therefore, this is a case in which the
Sec. 25F
2433
employer has done nothing whatsoever to put an end to his employment and hence the case does not fall
within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act. Therefore, the case does not attract Section 2(oo), nor
does it satisfy the requirements of Section 25 F. (Page: 264, Para: 3)
5A.400
Daily wager was employed on leave vacancy from 30.1.1984 to 30.11.1984 and his
services were terminated w.e.f. 1.12.1984. Subsequently he was appointed on 1.7.1985 to 31.3.1986
and he was terminated on 1.4.1986 thereby he worked for 226 days including holidays. The
Tribunal clubbing two periods of services held that he is entitled for reinstatement with full back
wages for non-compliance of Sec. 25F of Industrial Disputes Act. High Court over ruling held that
he being a daily wager and specifically employed on leave vacancy his first period can not be
counted and hence his termination for not having worked for 240 days for subsequent period is
legal and proper. Besides it held that as the reference was for the dispute of termination from
1.4.1986, the Tribunal while clubbing the previous services has exceeded its jurisdiction as it
cannot proceed to adjudicate dispute not referred to it.
Management of Divisional Engineer, Telecommunications, Mahaboobnagar District v. Venkataiah &
Anr., 2006 LIC 3395 : 2007 (112) FLR 24 : 2007 II LLN 298 : 2007 LLR 334 (Sum) (AP.HC)
Note: also refer to the following cases of daily wagers/temporary employees/employees appointed on
adhoc basis whose termination either for unsatisfactory work or for unauthorized absence or for service
of short period was held not violative of Sec. 25F
The Management, of M/s The Hindu Ins.Building v. The P.O. Industrial Tribunal No.II, Delhi & Anr.,
2002 II CLR 227 : 2002 LLR 151 (Del.HC)
Ad hoc employee can be terminated without complying Sec. 25F.
Teja Singh v. Punjab Water Supply & Sewerage Board & Ors., 1994 II LLJ 1111 (P&H.HC)
Termination of daily wager in violation of Sec. 25F was held proper.
Sunil Kumar Shukla v. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-Cum-Labour Court Pandu Nagar,
Kanpur & Ors., 2006 (108) FLR 390 (All.HC)
Adhoc employees termination by paying wages in lieu of notice is proper since no malafide on part
of employer.
Narmada Building Materials Pvt. Ltd. v. Devassy & Anr., 1999 I LLJ 142 : 1993 III LLJ (Sum) 463 : 1991
(79) FJR 591 (Ker.HC)
Daily wager who hardly worked for considerable period can be terminated for unauthorized
absence without following Sec. 25F.
Kanda Swami & Anr. v. P.O. Industrial Tribunal No. III & Anr., 2001 III LLJ 396 : 2000 III LLN 960 :
2000 I LLR 327 (Del.HC)
Employee is a daily wage workman and not completed for 240 days.
Jaipur Development Authority v. Ram Sahai & Anr., 2007 I LLJ 429 : 2006 (111) FLR 1178 : 2007 I LLN
78 : 2007 LIC 274 : 2007 I CLR 221 : 2007 LLR 92 : 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 518 (S.C.2J)
Ajay Kumar Sharma v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. VI, Tis Hazari & Anr., 2006 LLR 1228
(Del.HC)
Daily wage worker not entitled to benefits of the provisions under the Act.
D. Mohan, v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Indl. Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Chennai, 2006
III LLJ 912 : 2007 I LLN 314 (Mad.HC)
Sec. 25F not contravened when an employee who worked for 93 days
Raj Vimal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2003 III LLJ 86 : 2003 (97) FLR 1199 (Raj.DB)
Sec. 25-F not violated by termination of workman since he did not complete 240 days.
Udai Ram Sharma v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, 2006 (108) FLR 726 (Raj.DB)
Termination without enquiry was held proper since appointment was on ad-hoc basis on a
temporary project.
Chief Project Officer & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2000 III LLJ 960 : 2000 LIC 3143 (All.HC)
2434
Sec. 25F
c) When workman was retired for disablement due to electric shock and received
adequate compensation and pensionary benefits (MP.HC)
5A.402
The workman was retired form service, since on account of electric shock he was
seriously injured and was not able to discharge his normal duties. On reference, Labour Court
granted reinstatement but Industrial Court reversed the order. Being aggrieved, workman moved
High Court, which upheld Industrial Courts order because workman received compensation as
per Workmens Compensation Act, gratuity and other pensionary benefits and he was terminated
only for his disablement. Hence, Sec. 25F is not attracted.
Ramesh Gonekar v. Member Judge, State Industrial Court & Ors., 2005 IV LLN 277 : 2005 LIC 2127 :
2005 LLR 855 (MP.HC)
d) When appointment order itself was forged and fabricated and void ab-initio
(Raj.DB)
5A.403
Where the appointment order itself was found forged and fabricated, compliance of
Sec. 25F cannot be insisted upon because one of the requisite conditions of compliance of this
provision is the genuine appointment with the employer. The award of Labour Court reinstating
with 25% back wages, held, suffers from the error apparent on the face of record in that it has
failed to correctly apply the law while making adjudication of industrial law.
Rajasthan State Granite & Mars Mazdoor Sangh v. Rajasthan Mines & Minerals Ltd. & Ors., 2007 (112)
FLR 1236 : 2007 LIC 905 : 2007 I CLR 1049 : 2007 LLR 558 (Raj.DB)
Sec. 25F
2435
regular basis by following statutory recruitment, it was interim arrangement made by State
authority, therefore the appointment came to an end automatically after completion of the period.
Court cannot extend contract of employment which was for 11 months. Workers have no legal
right, statutory right or constitutional right to challenge any of the conditions mentioned in the
appointment order. And they are also not entitled to regularization in service because their
appointments are void ab initio and de hors the statutory rules. No relief can be granted.
Arunaben Atmaram Dudhrejiya & 16 Ors. v. Union of India & 4 Ors., 2007 I CLR 513 (Guj.HC)
2436
Sec. 25F
i) Termination of apprentice held valid since 240 days service was not rendered
by him (Mad.HC)
5A.409
The workman was appointed as apprentice. On termination he moved Labour Court
contending that he was a workman under Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, therefore entitled to take
benefit of Sec. 25F. Labour Court upheld the order of termination since workman did not render
240 days of service and held that apprentice being a workman as per Sec. 2(s), thus in order to take
the benefit of Sec. 25F he was required to render continuous service as per Act. High Court upheld
the order of Labour Court.
R. Rajendra v. Principal Labour Court, Madras, & Anr., 1992 II LLN 91 : 1992 LIC 1421 : 1992 LLR
703 (Mad.HC)
Note: please refer to the following cases also where the termination was held valid since the employees
did not complete 240 days
Dilbagh Singh v. Union of India., 1997 (91) FJR 409 : 1998 (78) FLR 43 : 1997 LIC 1555 (Del.HC)
Life Insurance Corporation of India v. Santosh Kumar Sharma & Anr., 2004 (103) FLR 963 : 2004 LIC
3396 (MP.HC)
Sec. 25F
2437
Government Servants Co-op. Soc. Ltd., Wadakkamcherry, Thrissur District v. Industrial Tribunal,
Alappuzha & Anr., 2003 I LLJ 236 : 2003 LLR 169 (Ker.HC)
Daji Dada Pawar & Ors. v. Ornate Multi Model Carriers (P) Ltd. AND Umapati Chauhan of Mumbai v.
Ornate Multi-model Carriers (P). Ltd., 2003 (103) FJR 810 : 2003 (99) FLR 989 : 2004 I LLN 187 : 2003
III CLR 307 (Bom.HC)
Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation through Divisional Manager, Gwalior & Anr. v.
Indra Bahadur Singh & Ors., 2002 II CLR 1001 : 2002 LLR 723 (MP.HC)
Municipal Counsil, Erandol, Jalgaon v. Ramesh Mukund Lokhande, 2005 (105) FLR 565 : 2005 LLR
621 (Bom.HC)
Motila Nehru Farmers Training Institute (Cordet) v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Allahabad & Ors.,
2005 (105) FLR 386 : 2005 LLR 565 (All.HC)
Hemalata Sahoo v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneswar, & Anr., 2005 IV LLN 693 (Ori.HC)
Punjab State Electricity Board v. P.O. Labour Court, Bhatinda & Anr., 1997 LLR 54 (P&H.HC)
Karnal Central Co-Operative Societies Bank Ltd. v. State Of Haryana & Ors., 1995 (86) FJR 223
(P&H.HC)
Management, Vikas Vidyalaya, Newri, Ranchi v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi & Anr., 2007
(112) FLR 79 : 2007 III LLN 745 : 2007 LLR 208 (Jhar.HC)
2438
Sec. 25F
workman in order to amount to retrenchment as defined in the Industrial Dispute Act, must be
due to discharge of surplus labour or staff in a continuing or running industry. Any other mode of
termination will not amount to retrenchment merely because he had reached the age of
superannuation and was given notice by employer to that effect; it will not amount to
retrenchment and will not entitle the workman to any retrenchment compensation.
SH. Parsidh Singh v. State of Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., 1965-66 (28) FJR 89 (J&K.HC)
l) Even though workman who is terminated completed 240 days but not in the
preceding year (Bom.HC)
5A.412
Services of the workman were terminated on 1.7.1994. Tribunal held that workman
had completed 240 days from 7.8.1988 to 14.5.1989 and therefore he was entitled to the benefit of
Sec. 25F. Management challenged the award. Held that completion of 240 days has to be in a year
preceding termination of services which in this case was 1.7.1994 and not in earlier years to avail
benefit of Sec. 25F. In this case relevant period of 1year is 1.7.1993 to 30.6.1994 in as much as his
service were terminated on 1.7.1994. Award of Tribunal was set aside.
Union of India (THROUGH Divisional Railway Manager) v. Jairaj N. Shetty., 2004 I LLN 658
(Bom.HC)
Note: For contrary view, see Mohan Lal v. The Management of M/s. Bharat Electronics, Ltd.,1981 II LLJ
70 : 1981 (58) FJR 467 : 1981 (42) FLR 389 : 1981 II LLN 23 : 1981 LIC 806 : 1981 SCC (L&S) 478 :
1981 AIR (SC) 1253 : 1981 (3) SCC 225 (S.C.2J)
m) When appointment is not consistent with standing orders and service was less
than 240 days (Cal.DB)
5A.413
When the services of an employee who had joined duty on 5.11.1981 was terminated
on 30.3.1982, all forums up to Single Judge held that the termination was illegal in violation of
Sec. 25F of the Act, but the Division Bench upheld the termination on the ground that he had not
been issued any appointment letter and he had worked for less than 240 days in a year, his
appointment was inconsistent with Standing Orders and that his termination was termination
simpliciter.
Calcutta Jute Mfg. Co. Ltd. & Anr. v. First Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 2006 III CLR 739 : 2006 (111)
FLR 1158 : 2007 I LLN 526 (Cal.DB)
The issue before.writ petition /appellant. (Page: 741, Para: 2)
It appears from the.of his services. (Page: 747, Para: 21)
n) When employee terminated is not employed in industry and has not completed
240 days of service (Karn.HC)
5A.414
High Court held that, the termination of the employee was not in contravention of Sec.
25F as he could not discharge his burden that he was a workman employed in the bank is no proof
that he had completed 240 days of continuous service.
Karur Vysya Bank Employees Union Bangalore v. P.O. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bangalore, & Anr., 1988 (73) FJR 93 : 1989 (59) FLR 157 : 1988 II LLN
794 : 1988 LIC 1746 (Karn.HC)
Note: Also refer to the following case
Delhi Agricultural Marketing Board v. Satya Pal Singh Dabas & Anr., 2003 (99) FLR 719 : 2003 IV LLN
313 : 2003 LLR 1035 (Del.HC)
Sec. 25F
2439
Karur Vysya Bank Employees Union Bangalore v. P.O. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bangalore, & Anr., 1988 (73) FJR 93 : 1989 (59) FLR 157 : 1988 II LLN
794 : 1988 LIC 1746 (Karn.HC)
q) When probationer whose services were terminated was paid Rs. 5000 as
retrenchment compensation and one month wages (Guj.HC)
5A.417
Court found that termination of services of a probationer was due to his
unsatisfactory work, but taking into consideration the various aspects found that interests of
justice would be served if Rs. 5000 is awarded by way of retrenchment compensation. The
probationer also admitted that 1 months wages were sent to him by money order after the
termination of services. Hence, no case is made out for interference.
Narayan Maganlal Oza v. A.V. Jasani T.B. Hospital Rajkot, 2002 (93) FLR 728 (Guj.HC)
Note: also refer to the following cases
Termination of service On ground of unsatisfactory work was held to be legal and valid.
Mrs. Maria Thomas Gonsalvies v. Concept Pharmaceuticall Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 2001 (90) FLR 412 : 2001
LLR 755 (Bom.HC)
Termination of temporary employee on the basis unsatisfactory service, held valid.
Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation through Divisional Manager, Gwalior & Anr. v.
Indra Bahadur Singh & Ors., 2002 II CLR 1001 : 2002 LLR 723 (MP.HC)
2440
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2441
u) When termination effected falls under the purview of Clause (bb) of Sec. 2(oo)
or on account of expiry of fixed tenure (S.C.2J)
F 5A.422 A person was appointed as a trainer to train weavers for a fixed period after expiry of
which, his services were discontinued. Labour Court passed an award of reinstatement which was
confirmed by Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench but the Apex Court held that since the
appointment was contractual, his appointment stood automatically terminated after the expiry of
the stipulated period and hence not violative of Sec. 2(oo) nor Sec. 25F.
M.D. Karnataka Handloom Development Corporation Ltd. v. Mahadeva Laxman Raval, 2007 I LLJ 696
: 2007 (112) FLR 490 : 2007 I CLR 25 : 2007 LLR 317 (Sum) (S.C.2J)
A careful perusal of the terms and conditions of appointment would go to show that the respondent is not
a worker but employed on contract basis on a time bound specific scheme assigned as weaving trainer.
However, the learned Judges of the Division Bench committed a factual error in holding that the above
letter of appointment does not show that employment was not a contract which stipulated that it comes to
an end with the expiry of project or scheme nor is it the case of the Corporation that the respondent was
made aware of any such stipulation even at the commencement of the employment. The High Court has
failed to notice that the respondent was engaged on contract basis and had been assigned to train weavers
who were lagging in weaving skills in the weaving potential development area working on time specific
short term scheme sponsored by the Corporation. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the respondent is
not a worker for the purposes of Section 25F of the I.D. Act but employed on contract basis only. The
High Court also has not properly appreciated the judgment relied on S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom
District Manager, Karnataka MANU/SC/0261/2003. As the respondent was engaged as trainer for a
specific period under the scheme and was paid a stipend of Rs. 1,000 p.m. from the date of his
appointment and, therefore, Section 2(oo) of the Act is not attracted soon after the expiry of the specific
period the respondents service was discontinued and so it is not a retrenchment as defined under Section
2(oo) of the I.D. Act. On the other hand, the case of the Corporation before the learned Single Judge and
also before the Division Bench was that the respondent was not a workman in the employment of the
appellant and that he was a weaver in the area as another weaver in the area and was getting certain
concessions from the Corporation. (Page: 700, Para: 10)
.The termination of his contract, in our view, does not amount to retrenchment and, therefore, it
does not attract compliance of Section 25F of the I.D. Act at all. (Page: 700/701, Para: 11)
Note: Also refer to the following cases
S.M. Nilajkar and Ors. v. Telecom District Manager, Karnataka, 2003 II LLJ 359 : 2003 (97) FLR 608 :
2003 II LLN 1134 : 2003 LIC 2273 : 2003 II CLR 233 : 2003 LLR 470 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 380 : 2003 AIR
(SC) 3553 : 2003 (4) SCC 27 (S.C.2J)
Kishore Chandra Samal v. Divisional Manager, Orissa State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd.,
Dhenkanal, 2006 I LLJ 685 : 2006 (108) FLR 143 : 2006 I LLN 74 : 2006 I CLR 29 : 2006 LLR 65 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 241 (S.C.2J)
Anil Bapurao Kanase v. Krishna Sahakari Sakhar Karkhana Ltd. & Anr., 1998 I LLJ 343 : 1997 (91) FJR
317 : 1997 (76) FLR 847 : 1997 III LLN 67 : 1997 II CLR 383 : 1997 LLR 701 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1637 :
1997 AIR (SC) 2698 : 1997 (10) SCC 599 (S.C.3J)
5A.423
The workmen terminated from service were not temporary railway servants under
the Railway Establishment Code Rules, as they were employed as casual labourers in work
charged projects and on completion of the work, their services are liable to be terminated in
compliance with Sec. 25F as was done in this case, hence termination is valid.
Ravindra Kumar Srivastava v. Union of India & Ors., 1982 II LLN 427 : 1982 (45) FLR 214 : 1982 LIC
1739 (All.DB)
The services.employees. (Page: 431, Para: 10)
From the.servant. (Page: 431/432, Para: 10)
The petitioners.surplus. (Page: 432, Para: 14)
2442
Sec. 25F
5A.424
The workman was appointed temporarily on ad hoc basis and his services were
terminated after extending twice for brief spells. The Labour Court found that the case of the
workman falls u/s. 2(oo)(bb) but held that the employer violated Sec. 25F and thus directed his
reinstatement with 25% back wages. The High Court held that when the case falls under the
aforesaid Clause (bb), the employer was not required to follow the requirements of Sec. 25F.
Consequently, the award was set aside as being erroneous in law.
Netaji Subhash Institute of Technology v. Dilkhush Bairwa & Anr., 2006 (110) FLR 719 : 2006 LLR 847
(Del.HC)
Note: also refer to the following cases in the above context
Ravindrakumar B. Patel & Anr. v. National Dairy Development Board, 1997 LIC 207 (Guj.HC)
Deputy Executive Engineer, Gujarat Maritime Board v. Hasmukh M. Jasani, 2000 III LLJ 1307 : 2000
(85) FLR 886 : 2000 I CLR 827 (Guj.HC)
Medical Officer, District Health Centre & Anr. v. Savjibhai Trikambhai Kansagra, 2003 (96) FLR 268 :
2002 III CLR 838 : 2002 LIC 2659 (Guj.HC)
v) When notice served on the workman indicating that pay and other dues would
be paid to him on the same day but he failed to collect the same (Bom.HC)
5A.425
Employee was retrenched from his service and a notice was served to him. It indicated
that pay and other dues would be paid to him on the same day. Although the payment was ready
with the cashier he failed to collect the same. Therefore, his contention that his termination was in
violation of Sec. 25F was not valid.
Oriental Metal Pressing Works Pvt. Ltd. v. M.M. Kendrekar, 1981 (42) FLR 185 : 1981 I LLN 548
(Bom.HC)
Note: also refer to the following cases similarly decided
Retrenchment valid u/s. 25-F, employer offering the notice pay and retrenchment compensation to
the employee but the employee denying the same.
Frick India Private Ltd. v. Vijay Bahadur Singh & Anr., 2000 II LLJ 120 (P&H.HC)
Retrenchment valid, in compliance with Sec. 25F, notice and payment was given to the employee.
A. Selvam & Ors. v. Management C. Abdul Rahman & Co. & Anr., 2002 II LLJ 188 : 2002 (93) FLR 898 :
2002 II LLN 739 : 2002 LLR 372 : 2002 LIC 185 (Mad.HC)
w) When termination is valid even in the absence of notice u/s. 25F when there is
no work and one month salary paid (Mad.HC)
5A.426
Three employees working as stacking section operators and paid wages as per the law
filed a petition u/s. 2(k) of the Act. They were terminated since there was no further work and were
paid one month salary and compensation through a registered letter. Conciliation proceedings
failed. They filed a petition u/s. 2A and the same was rejected by the Labour Court. Thereafter they
filed a writ petition. The contention of the workmen was that they were not served notices but High
Court dismissed the petition holding that the letter sent to the workmen along with compensation
can be construed as notice only and further that when retrenchment was bonafide, the absence of
notice u/s. 25F will not invalidate it.
A. Selvam & Ors. v. Management C. Abdul Rahman & Co. & Anr., 2002 II LLJ 188 : 2002 (93) FLR 898 :
2002 II LLN 739 : 2002 LLR 372 : 2002 LIC 185 (Mad.HC)
Note: Refer to Workmen of Coimbatore Pioneer B Mills Ltd. v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court,
Coimbatore and other, 1980 I LLJ 503 : 1982 (61) FJR 180 : 1980 (40) FLR 371 1981 I LLN 561 : 1981
LIC (Sum) 12 : 1980 AIR (SC) 1871 : 1980 (1) SCC 698 (S.C.2J)
Sec. 25F
2443
y) Though notice under Clause 25F(c) is not given since it is only a condition not
condition precedent (Bom.DB)
5A.428
Non-compliance with Sec. 25F(c) is only an irregularity and does not make
retrenchment illegal as it is only a mere condition but not condition precedent to retrenchment.
Bombay Union of Journalists & Ors. v. State of Bombay & Anr., 1961 II LLJ 727 (Bom.DB)
From.at all. (Page: 732, Para: 2)
Note: also refer to the following case
M/s. Utkal Asbestos Ltd. v. Workman, T.S. Rao & Anr., 1993 III LLJ 726 : 1991 (62) FLR 972 : 1991 II
LLN 752 : 1991 II CLR 941 (Ori.DB)
z) When workmen failed to prove that they have worked for 240 days service
(S.C.2J)
F 5A.429 The workman was terminated without following Sec. 25F. Labour Court ordered his
reinstatement accepting workmans contention that he rendered 240 days service. High Court
upheld the order of Labour Court. On appeal, Supreme Court set aside Labour Courts order
since apart from oral evidence, no evidence was produced by workman to show that he had
rendered 240 days service in preceding year before his termination.
Surendranagar District Panchayat v. Dahyabhai Amarsinh, 2006 I LLJ 424 : 2006 (108) FLR 193 : 2005
IV LLN 1007 : 2005 LIC 4308 : 2005 III CLR 892 : 2005 LLR 1222 : 2005 (8) SCC 750 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 38 : 2006 AIR (SC) 110 (S.C.2J)
In the light of the aforesaid, it was necessary for the workman to produce the relevant material to prove
that he has actually worked with the employer for not less than 240 days during the period twelve
calendar months preceding Page 1559 the date of termination. What we find is that apart from the oral
evidence the workman has not produced any evidence to prove the fact that he has worked for 240 days.
No proof of receipt of salary or wages or any record or order in that regard was produced; no co-worker
was examined; muster roll produced by the employer has not been contradicted. It is improbable that
workman who claimed to have worked with the appellant for such a long period would not possess any
documentary evidence to prove nature of his engagement and the period of work he had undertaken with
his employer. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the workman has failed to discharge his burden that he
was in employment for 240 days during the preceding 12 months of the date of termination of his
service. (Page: 430, Para: 19)
Note: also refer to the following case
Not violative of Sec. 25F when no evidence that workman has worked for 240 days
Bhaskar Chandra Sahoo v. Chairman, Cuttack Gramya Bank, Cuttack & Anr., 2003 II LLJ 957 : 2003
LIC 1030 (Ori.DB)
2444
Sec. 25F
zc) When workers did not opt for alternative employment and accepted
compensation u/s. 25F (Cal.HC)
5A.432
The employer provided an option to its senior security guards to join CISF in view of
the enactment of C.I.S.F. Act, 1968 which provided that C.I.S.F would protect industrial
establishments of the country. But, the security guards did not exercise the said option and as a
result the employers terminated them as per Sec. 25F and sent notice to State Government u/s.
25F(c). However, the Government referred the dispute of termination to Labour Court which held
that the termination was illegal and ordered absorption of the workmen. Being aggrieved,
employer moved High Court, which set aside Labour Court order on the ground that the workmen
failed to exercise the option of alternative employment and they were terminated in due compliance
with Sec. 25F and hence it is legal and valid.
Steel Authoritsy of India Ltd. v. The Ninth Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 1997 (76) FLR 4 : 1997 LIC 1247 :
1997 I CLR 737 (Cal.HC)
Sec. 25F
2445
zd) When money and ex-gratia paid in lieu of notice and retrenchment
compensation (Cal.DB)
5A.433
Even though the employer paid money in lieu of notice and ex-gratia to the employees
not purporting them to be workman, the mandatory conditions of notice and retrenchment
compensation under Clause (a) and (b) were held to be complied with and hence their termination
was held valid.
Guest Keen Willams Ltd. v. The Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal & Ors., 1996 III LLJ 825 : 1996 I
LLN 106 : 1995 LIC 1687 : 1995 II CLR 485 : 1996 LLR 64 (Cal.DB)
.Now the question.service. (Page: 833, Para: 23)
.It therefore.employees. (Page: 833, Para: 24)
.As we have.award. (Page: 834, Para: 27)
ze) When services of trainee who was not in regular employment were terminated
(Bom.DB)
5A.434
Termination of services of a trainee who was not in regular employment of the bank
was held not to be retrenchment under the section.
Anthony Olinto Silva v. S.V. Nevaji & Ors., 1989 (59) FLR 309 : 1989 I LLN 869 : 1990 LLR 191
(Bom.DB)
The petitioner was.a trainee officer.The bank held.bad in law.
(Page: 311, Para: 3)
zg) When employer issued notice and paid compensation and interim relief on
terminating a probationer for unsuitability and thus complied with Sec. 25F
(Karn.DB)
5A.436
Where the employer complied with legal requirements of notice and compensation
while terminating the services of a probationer and also paid the interim relief of more than
Rs. 50,000 and the workman was not found suitable for employment, it was held unjust to penalise
employer with more damages and hence the award of reinstatement with 50% back wages was
quashed.
M/s. Karnataka Handloom Development Corporation Ltd. v. D.L. Nanjundaswamy & Anr., 2002 (95)
FLR 626 : 2003 LLR (Sum) 105 (Karn.DB)
.the above memo.clauses 2 & 3. (Page: 628, Para: 4)
Any how in the.undertaking. (Page: 632, Para: 14)
So far as back.petitioner. (Page: 632, Para: 15)
2446
Sec. 25F
zh) When Clauses (a) and (c) of Sec. 25F complied with one months salary in lieu
of notice paid despite error in the date of notice (Ass.DB)
5A.437
The workmen were paid one months salary in lieu of notice as per Sec. 25F(a) and
since the Statutory provisions were complied with, the defect in the date of notice erroneously
stating it as 1st Oct. 1960 instead of 1st Nov. 1960 would not vitiate the notice. Nor does this error in
the date of retrenchment, invalidate the notice to the Government in Form P.
Workmen of Shillong Hydro-Electric Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors., 1965 II LLJ 619 (Ass.DB)
In the present caseof Service. (Page: 621, Para: 2/3)
The next point is.a valid notice. (Page: 621, Para: 4)
zi) When the letter offering him to collect his compensation and notice pay is
definite & genuine (Del.DB)
5A.438
The offer made by the Employer whose services were terminated through a letter
offering him to collect his compensation and notice pay was held to be definite, genuine and
sufficient compliance of the section and hence the contention of the workman that Sec. 25F was
violated since the offer was vague, was set aside.
Suresh Kumar v. Band Box Pvt. Ltd., 1982 I LLJ 362 : 1981 (42) FLR 276 : 1981 I LLN 657 (Del.DB)
The Learned Single Judge.follow.
This is to writ.due. (Page: 363, Para: 5)
The learned Single Judge.dismissing him. (Page: 364, Para: 8)
zj) When employee terminated completed 240 days of service due to interim order
of Writ Court (HP.DB)
5A.439
Termination of employees completing more than 240 days of service only due to
interim order of writ Court but not in regular course of engagement is not violative of Sec. 25F.
Amit Bhardwaj v. H.P.S.E.B. & Ors., 2001 I LLJ 241 : 2001 LLR 244 : 2000 LIC 2990 (HP.DB)
Felling.Sec. 25 F Act. (Page: 244, Para: 8)
zk) When notice of termination served on the workmen on 15.4.1982 and dues
were not accepted (All.DB)
5A.440
The notice of termination served on the workmen on 15.4.1982 was not accepted by
them on the date it was served, and they had continued to work on the 15th and 16th but Court held
that they cannot contend that it was illegal as they had not accepted the notice and dues offered to
them and so could not be permitted to argue otherwise and hence termination of service from date
of notice was not illegal.
Ravindra Kumar Srivastava v. Union of India & Ors., 1982 II LLN 427 : 1982 (45) FLR 214 : 1982 LIC
1739 (All.DB)
The petitioner.above. (Page: 434, Para: 20)
Sec. 25F
2447
zl) When workman offered compensation and one month wages though arrears of
wages not paid as demanded since it has no relationship with compliance of
Sec. 25F (Cal.DB)
5A.441
Employer by its letter requested the workman who was sought to be retrenched, to
collect the retrenchment compensation along with wages in lieu of notice which was denied by the
workman, on the ground that he was not paid arrears of wages of 3 months, it was held that
payment of arrears of wage have no connection with compliance of Sec. 25F(a) and 25F(b) hence
compliance was held to be justified.
Chandra Kumar Dutta v. Secretary, Messrs. Frank Ross & Co. Ltd, & Ors., 1971 LIC 790 (Cal.DB)
It is evident.of the Act. (Page: 791, Para: 5)
zm) When employer terminated is a daily wager not entitled to regular post and
there is delay of 8-9 years in raising dispute (Bom.DB)
5A.442
The daily wager worked continuously for 240 days but did not report for work
allegedly due to oral termination of his services. After 6 years, he raised a dispute and after
conciliation proceedings failed, the Labour Court, upon reference held that it is not a case of
voluntary abandonment of service and yet rejected the reference, he being a casual daily wager.
The Single Judge set aside the award and reinstated him with continuity of service relying on his
service of 240 days applying Sec. 25F of the Act. The Division Bench set aside the order of Single
Judge and held that it was a case of voluntary abandonment of service as the worker failed to
ventilate his grievance for 8-9 years apart from being a daily wager, not holding a post, the
employer is not obliged to issue any notice or to comply with Sec. 25F of the Act.
Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. v. Balasabeb Maruti Poojari & Anr., 2006 (111) FLR 204 : 2007 I LLN 193 :
2006 III CLR 82 : 2007 I LLJ 88 (Bom.DB)
zo) When service rendered by a daily wager in two spells cannot be clubbed to
arrive at 240 days (AP.HC)
5A.443
Daily wager was employed on leave vacancy from 30.1.1984 to 30.11.1984 and his
services were terminated w.e.f. 1.12.1984. Subsequently he was appointed on 1.7.1985 to 31.3.1986
and he was terminated on 1.4.1986 thereby he worked for 226 days including holidays. The
Tribunal clubbing two periods of services held that he is entitled for reinstatement with full back
wages for non-compliance of Sec. 25F of Industrial Disputes Act. High Court held that he being a
daily wager and specifically employed on leave vacancy his first period cannot be counted and
hence his termination for not having worked for 240 days for subsequent period is legal and
proper. Besides it held that as the reference was for the dispute of termination from 1.4.1986, the
tribunal while clubbing the previous services has exceeded its jurisdiction as it cannot proceed to
adjudicate dispute not referred to it.
Management of Divisional Engineer, Telecommunications, Mahaboobnagar District v. Venkataiah &
Anr., 2006 LIC 3395 : 2007 (112) FLR 24 : 2007 II LLN 298 : 2007 LLR 334 (Sum) (AP.HC)
Facts to the extent.to the Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. (Page: 3397, Para: 2)
The Tribunal held that.such reinstatement. (Page: 3397/3398, Para: 5)
2448
Sec. 25F
Since the 1st respondents.Industrial Dispute Act. (Page: 3405, Para: 23)
In view of breaks.ab initio void. (Page: 3407, Para: 31)
Thus mere completion.to be set aside. (Page: 3410, Para: 45)
zq) When pleadings of employer that workman is a daily wager is not controverted
by workman (P&H.DB)
5A.445
Since an inference is deducible if a pleading by one party is not specifically
controverted by the other party, the workman appointed on daily wages was held to have been
appointed for a specific period as per the pleadings of the employer which was not controverted by
the workman and hence the order of the Labour Court holding the termination illegal, having been
oblivious of the above fact was set aside and matter remanded to it for fresh consideration.
Haryana Board of School Education v. Industrial Tribunal, Hissar, 1994 I LLJ 1123 (P&H.DB)
After.Disputes Act. (Page: 1123, Para: 2)
The Management.February 191985. (Page: 1123, Para: 3)
The services of the workman.nature. (Page: 1123, Para: 4)
The workman.sustained. (Page: 1124, Para: 5)
zr) When discharged due to medical unfitness since it does not amount to
retrenchment (S.C.3J)
The Workmen of Bangalore Wollen, Cotton & Silk Mills Co. Ltd. v. Bangalore Woollen, Cotton & Silk
Mills Co. Ltd., 1962 I LLJ 213 : 196162 (21) FJR 538 : 1962 (4) FLR 298 : 1962 AIR (SC) 1363 (S.C.3J)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
Sec. 25F
2449
zs) When workman appointed for 88 days on temporary basis was terminated
since banks policy forbids appointment for 90 days (S.C.2J)
F 5A.446 The workman was appointed for 88 days on temporary basis as regard to Banks
policy of appointment to maximum for 90 days. On termination of his services and on reference
Labour Court awarded reinstatement with full back wages on writ petition, High Court modified
award for reinstatement only. On appeal Supreme Court held that temporary service of
workman for 88 days only does not attract reinstatement, full back wages nor Sec. 25H is
applicable.
Regional Manager, SBI v. Mahatma Mishra, 2007 I CLR 594 : 2007 I LLJ 424 : 2007 (112) FLR 338 :
2007 I LLN 32 : 2007 LIC 270 : 2007 LLR 98 (S.C.2J)
.Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act confers a discretionary power in the Industrial
Tribunal or the Labour Court, as the case may be. Although in a given case, the Industrial Tribunal or the
Labour Court may grant appropriate relief, its discretion should be exercised judiciously. An employee
after termination of his services cannot get a benefit to which he was not entitled to if he remained in
service. (Page: 598, Para: 11)
.Even in a case where service of an employee is terminated in violation of Section 25F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, he would not be entitled to grant of a permanent status. Regularisation does not
mean permanence. (Page: 598, Para: 11)
a) When Termination is effected without compliance of any of the Clauses (a) (b)
& (c) are not complied since they are all independent (S.C.3J)
F 5A.447 The Supreme Court in this case has held that failure to comply with the provisions of
Sec. 25F especially Sec. 25F(b) renders the orders of termination invalid and inoperative.
State of Bombay & Ors. v. Hospital Mazdoor Sabha & Ors. 1960 I LLJ 251 : 1959-60 (17) FJR 423 : 1960
AIR (SC) 610 (S.C.3J)
On a plain reading of S. 25F (b) it is clear that the requirement prescribed by it is a condition precedent
for the retrenchment of the workman. The section provides that no workman shall be retrenched until the
condition in question has been satisfied. It is difficult to accede to the argument that when the section
imposes in mandatory terms a condition precedent, non-compliance with the said condition would not
render the impugned retrenchment invalid. The argument which appealed to Tendolkar, J., however, was
that the consequence of non-compliance with the requirement of S. 25F (b) was not to render the
impugned retrenchment invalid, because he thought that by S. 25-I a specific provision has been made for
the recovery of the amount prescribed by S. 25F (b). Section 25-I provides for the recovery of monies due
from employers under Ch. V, and according to Tendolkar J. this provision covers the amount due to the
workman by way of compensation under S. 25F (b). In our opinion, this view is untenable. Having regard
to the fact that the words used in S. 25F (b) are mandatory and their effect is plain and unambiguous it
seems to us that the Court of Appeal was right in holding that S. 25-I covered cases of recovery of monies
other than those specified in S. 25F (b), and it is obvious that there are several other cases in which monies
become due from the employers to the employees under Ch. V; it is for the recovery of these monies that
S. 25-I had been enacted. Therefore, we see no substance in the argument that the Court of Appeal has
misconstrued S. 25F (b). That being so, failure to comply with the said provision renders the impugned
orders invalid and inoperative. (Page: 255, Para: 2)
2450
Sec. 25F
5A.448
When amounts due to the retrenched employees u/s. 25F(a) and 25F(b) have not been
fully paid, retrenchment is void and reinstatement with full back wages is ordered.
Hanuman Singh v. Municipal Council, Jaipur., 1989 II LLJ 138 : 1989 (58) FLR 392 : 1989 II LLN 1010
(Raj.DB)
There cannot.before us. (Page: 139, Para: 2)
5A.449
Termination of employee without paying retrenchment compensation was held to be
invalid and therefore he was awarded reinstatement without back wages in facts of case and
probability of gainful employment for the period in question.
Braja Kishore Pradhan v. Tribal Development, 1992 LIC 1831 : 1993 LLR 15 (Ori.DB)
.even if the.the petitioner. (Page: 1831, Para: 3)
.yet we would think.petitioner. (Page: 1832, Para: 6)
5A.450
Workman employed in a bank for a fixed term was terminated and it was held that,
since sub-Sec. (a), (b), (c) of the section is independent, violation of any of the clause will make the
termination illegal hence retrenchment of workmen having completed 240 days though in
compliance of Clause (a) but not by Clause (b) and hence was held to be illegal.
State Bank of India v. Union of India & Ors., 1996 III LLJ 1191 : 1995 LIC 1668 : 1995 LLR 890
(Pat.DB)
It has been.be illegal. (Page: 1670, Para: 20)
5A.451
The contention of the management that the provisions of Sec. 25F have been
substantially complied with by paying one months salary in lieu of notice was held to be not
proper. The High Court held that all the provisions of Sec. 25F need to be complied with as a whole
and non-compliance would make termination of service liable to be considered as retrenchment
u/s. 2(oo). Thus, the management did not have the right to terminate the services under College
rules and regulation.
Raj Kumar College Karmachari Union v. Raj Kumar College, Raipur & Anr., 1987 (55) FLR 93 : 1987 II
LLN 573 (MP.HC)
Note: The following cases may also be referred in the above context
M/s. Jodhpur Sahkari Upbhokta Wholesale Bhandar Ltd. v. State of Rajasthan, 2006 (111) FLR 892
(Raj.HC)
Non-compliance of Sec. 25F, workman neither regularized nor was compensation given,
termination illegal.
Pratap Singh v. Panchayat Samiti, Shahpura, 1995 II LLJ 206 (Raj.HC)
Retrenchment invalid, when retrenchment compensation is not paid.
District Red Cross Society, Silas v. Krishna Kumari & Ors., 2003 (98) FLR 919 : 2004 LIC 172 : 2003
LLR (Sum) 1021 (P&H.HC)
Termination without notice, without compensation was held bad.
State of Rajasthan v. Labour Court & Anr.,1994 (85) FJR 384 : 1995 (70) FLR 463 (Raj.HC)
Termination illegal, only notice pay but no retrenchment compensation u/s. 25F given.
Ashok Kumar Gupta & Ors. v. State of Jharkhand & Ors., 2003 (98) FLR 852 : 2003 LIC (Sum) 210
(Jhar.HC)
Retrenchment without paying compensation, is bad.
Prabh Dayal v. Pepsu Road Transport Corpn., 1997 (91) FJR 570 : 1998 (78) FLR 150 :1998 I LLN 309 :
1998 LLR (Sum) 4 (P&H.HC)
Sec. 25F
2451
Retrenchment compensation if not paid and employee completed 240 days, retrenchment bad.
Jagannath Prasad Yadav v. Deoria Kasiya Sakhari Bank, 1988 (57) FLR 298 (All.HC)
Termination held bad retrenchment compensation not paid.
Cuttak Municipal Council v. Presiding Officer Labour Court, 1988 (57) FLR 157 (Ori.HC)
Termination-was set aside since Sec. 25F was not followed.
Roy Brother v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court - VIII & Ors., 2005 (105) FLR 1196 (Del.HC)
b) If one month notice or one month salary in lieu of notice is not given (S.C.2J)
F 5A.452 Where neither one months notice nor in lieu of notice, one months salary was given,
it was clearly a non-compliance with Sec. 25F and therefore order of termination was illegal since
the workman by producing muster roll had established the 240 days service and the employer
failed to lead any evidence to rebut the same and reinstatement with back wages was directed.
Executive Engineer, Punjab v. Pargat Singh, 2006 SCC (L&S) 95 (S.C.2J)
By the impugned order the High Court has upheld the award made by the Labour Court directing the
reinstatement of the respondent workman with back wages. The Labour Court came to the conclusion
that the appellant while issuing the notice of retrenchment as contemplated under Section 25F of the
Industrial Disputes Act neither gave one months notice nor in lieu of the notice gave one months salary
which has been upheld by the High Court. Learned counsel for the appellant is not able to satisfy us how
the impugned orders of the Labour Court Court as well as the High Court are contrary to the law.
(Page: 95, Para: 2)
5A.453
Termination of services without any notice pay or retrenchment compensation is in
violation of the provisions of Sec. 25F of the Act when an employee had worked from 5.3.1985 to
26.6.1987, more than 240 days in a year and upheld the award of Labour Court.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Kumar & Anr., 2006 (111) FLR 1077 (Del.DB)
The facts leading.to the Labour Court. (Page: 1078, Para: 1)
On the basis of.50% back wages. (Page: 1081, Para: 7)
Even on merits, we.not more than 30.9.2006. (Page: 1083/1084, Para: 19)
Note: also refer to the following cases
Bombay Leprosy Project v. Vishnu B. Chavan & Anr., 2002 (94) FLR 789 : 2002 LLR 994 (Bom.HC)
Sita Ram Pareek v. Judge, Labour Court & Anr., 2006 (110) FLR 877 : 2006 LLR 1092 : 2007 I LLJ 264
(Raj.HC)
Sarjug Prasad v. State of Bihar, 1985 (51) FLR 620 : 1984 II LLN 630 : 1984 LIC 1264 (Pat.DB)
Kanti Weekly v. D.D. Gupta & Ors., 1983 I LLN 771 (Del.HC)
Non-compliance of Sec. 25F, if notice of retrenchment not served.
Ramjee Jaisingh & Co. v. R.K. Meshram & Anr., 1995 (70) FLR 122 : 1994 II CLR 780 (Bom.HC)
Notice if not given, workman terminated, held illegal.
Executive Engineer, PWD & Anr. v. Labour Court Jaipur & Anr., 1995 II CLR 393 (Raj.HC)
Retrenchment-invalid, when notice/notice pay was not given.
Divisional Railway Manager, Southern Railway Palghat v. General Secretary, Dakshina Railway
Casual Labour Union, Ernakulam & Ors., 1996 LIC 718 (Ker.HC)
Notice by registered post, if one month not lapsed on date of termination it is illegal.
Bhanwar Lal v. Municipal Board, Nagpur, & Ors, 1988 (57) FLR (Sum) 19 : 1988 LIC 1265 (Raj.HC)
2452
Sec. 25F
Dismissal of workman with one year service without show cause notice nor notice or pay in lieu
thereof held bad.
Coal India Ltd. v. P.O. (Labour Court-3) & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 45 : 2001 (89) FLR 929 : 2001 II LLN 314 :
2001 LIC 2243 : 2001 II CLR 502 : 2001 LLR 460 (Del.HC)
Retrenchment of an employee in contravention of Sub-Sec. (a) or (b) was null and void and was
liable to be quashed.
Om Prakash v. Registrar Co-OPerative Societies, 1980 (40) FLR 38 (Raj.HC)
c) When notice was served fifteen minutes before closing of work (Bom.HC)
5A.454
Where notice of termination is served on employee 15 minutes before the closing of the
working day and asking the workman to collect his dues immediately, it is not a genuine offer and
held that Sec. 25F is not complied with.
Bengal Chemicals & Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v. General Secretary, Dyes & Chemical Workers Union, &
Ors., 1988 (57) FLR (Sum) 13 : 1988 II LLN 40 : 1988 I CLR 439 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25F
2453
months notice or payment in lieu of notice, management cannot take advantage of it in view of
Sec. 25F. He is entitled to back wages for the period he was unemployed without deducting pension,
amount of such back wages has to be decided by Labour Court afresh.
Beco Engineering Co. Ltd v. State of Punjab & Ors.,
f) Termination of service for any reason in violation of Sec. 25F prior to March 2,
1982 is void ab initio (P&H.DB)
5A.458
Before introduction of Clause (bb) in 1984 termination of service for any reason was
covered by retrenchment, therefore non-compliance with Sec. 25F in case of termination prior to
August 18, 1984 would render it void ab initio.
Administrator, Municipal Committee v. P.O. Labour Court Patiala & Ors., 1999 II LLJ 14 : 1998 III
LLN 526 (P&H.DB)
.Definition of retrenchment.contact of employment. (Page: 18, Para: 12)
.We hold that.of section 25F. (Page: 21, Para: 18)
.In the present.of that clause. (Page: 21, Para: 19)
Note: This position is prior to introduction of Clause (bb) of Sec. 2(oo)
2454
Sec. 25F
Termination of workmen on the oral orders of the president in non-compliance of Sec. 25F
amounts to illegal retrenchment.
Chief Officer, Municipal Council Akot & Anr. v. Smt. Shantabai Kisan & Ors., 1976 (33) FLR 96 : 1976
LIC 660 (Bom.DB)
When services were verbally terminated without complying with section.
T.A. Benny v. Rajasthan Co-op., Dairy Federation Ltd., 1994 III LLJ (Sum) 336 : 1991 (63) FLR 52 :
1991 II LLN 218 : 1991 I CLR 460 (Raj.HC)
i) When appointment letter mentions only the words contract basis without
mentioning the period and nature of work (P&H.DB)
5A.461
Where the employer merely mentions in the appointment letter the word contract
basis without stipulating the period of contract and nature of work whether fixed or temporary,
his termination, it is held violates the provisions of Sec. 25F of the Act which led the Labour Court
to set aside the termination ordering his reinstatement with 50% back wages which was upheld by
the Division Bench of the High Court.
Municipal Counsil, Quadin through its Executive Officer v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur
& Anr., 2007 (113) FLR 179 : 2007 I CLR 650 (P&H.DB)
k) When the workman who had worked for 240 days is terminated (S.C.3J)
Note: A long list of additional cases is given at the end of the heading on violation of this section given
below in which termination of workmen whether daily wagers/casual labour/temporary
employees/probationers who completed 240 days was held illegal for non compliance of Sec. 25F
F 5A.463 Employer moved Supreme Court against the order of Division Bench which upheld
the order of Labour Court and ordered reinstatement of the workman in view of the
non-compliance of Sec. 25F. Supreme Court affirmed the order of Division Bench since the
workman by producing muster roll had established the 240 days service and the employer failed to
lead any evidence to rebut the same.
Executive Engineer & Anr. v. Lekh Raj & Anr., 2006 SCC (L&S) 650 (S.C.3J)
Sec. 25F
2455
We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant in this appeal and perused the award as well as the
judgment of the High Court. From the award we notice that so far as the workman is concerned he has
produced muster rolls for the relevant period which indicated that the workman did work continuously
from 1.2.1994 to 31.8.1995 and the appellant management did not produce any material from its side to
rebut the same on such factual background we find no reason to interfere with the impugned order. Hence
this appeal fails and the same is dismissed. (Page: 650, Para: 2)
5A.464
Neither notice nor compensation was paid to terminated employee who had rendered
245 days of service therefore Court upheld decision of Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court that
his termination was null and void and he was entitled to be reinstated with back wages.
Municipal Board, Marwar Mundwa v. Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 1989 (58) FLR 469 (Raj.DB)
.The total number.with back wages. (Page: 471, Para: 1)
5A.465
Discontinuance of an employee completing 240 days service in violation of Sec. 25F is
unlawful and hence order was unsustainable.
Managing Director Rajasthan Small Industries Corporation & Anr. v. Faily Ram, 1997 I LLJ 817 : 1996
(74) FLR 2459 : 1996 II LLN 1261 : 1996 500 : 1996 LLR 645 (Raj.DB)
Since the respondent.in the matter. (Page: 818, Para: 6)
5A.466
Termination without notice of services of a workman re-employed after his
resignation is bad as he completed 240 days since then.
F.R.P. Moulding Company Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Wet Bengal & Ors., 2001 III LLN 158 : 2001 LLR 1089
(Cal.DB)
In such circumstances.resignation. (Page: 160, Para: 16)
In view of the above.April 4, 1987.(Page: 160, Para: 17)
5A.467
Termination of person who worked for more than 240 days in preceding 12 months in
violation of Sec. 25F is invalid.
Divisional Engineer, Telecom, Coaxial Cable Project, Rajahmundry v. Mamidi Venkata Ramana & Anr.,
2003 II LLJ 907 : 2003 (97) FLR 1132 : 2003 III LLN 764 : 2003 LLR 803 (AP.DB)
.The learned single.respondent is invalid. (Page: 911, Para: 11)
5A.468
The workman was terminated without complying Sec. 25F. On reference, Tribunal
held that workman completed 240 days service and ordered reinstatement. Single Judge set aside
Tribunals order since workman was not in continuous service preceding the date of termination.
On appeal, Division Bench set aside Single Judges order since workman was in continuous service
as he had worked for 240 days in earlier year or years though not in the year immediately
preceding termination and held that Sec. 25F was applicable in the case.
Jairaj N. Shetty v. Union of India, 2006 I LLJ 206 : 2005 IV LLN 537 : 2005 III CLR 106 : 2005 LLR
1095 (Bom.DB)
Note: also refer to the following case
If employee terminated after 240 days of service.
Ram Niwas & Anr. v. P.O. Labour Court, Faridabad & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 1164 : 2001 (91) FLR 1037 :
2001 II LLN 1169 : 2001 LLR 846 (Sum) 3 (P&H.DB)
2456
Sec. 25F
1. In respect of apprentice
i) If apprentice who was continued beyond the initial period of appointment
and worked for 240 days as staff reporter terminated (Guj.HC)
5A.469
Workman was appointed as an apprentice and he continued in employment for about
8 months after training was over. Held that as he remained in service after completion of training
and during that service he completed 240 days of continuous service and Sec. 25F of the Act was not
followed when he was terminated, he is entitled to reinstatement with back wages.
Textile Traders co-operative Bank, Ltd. v. Jagdishbhai Natwarlal Patel, 2001 I LLJ 235 : 2000 III LLN
766 : 2000 II CLR 503 : 2002 (93) FLR 9 (Guj.HC)
Note: also refer to the following case
Surat Mahila Nagrik Sahakari Bank, Ltd., Surat v. Mamtaben Mahendrabhai Joshi., 2000 III LLJ 1082 :
2000 II CLR 603 : 2001 III LLN 444 : 2001 LIC 222 (Guj.HC)
M. Raghuram v. Labour Court, Hyderabad & Ors., 1994 (69) FLR 329 : 1994 I CLR 1089 (AP.HC)
H.B. Vinobha & 39 Ors. v. Hindustan Photo Films, & Ors., 1999 III LLJ (Sum) 60 : 1998 (93) FJR 326 :
1998 (78) FLR 857 : 1998 I LLN 744 : 1998 LLR 391 (Mad.HC)
Management, Vikas Vidyalaya, Newri, Ranchi v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Ranchi & Anr., 2007
(112) FLR 79 : 2007 III LLN 745 : 2007 LLR 208 (Jhar.HC)
Sec. 25F
2457
.his services were put to an end by an oral order on the ground that the Helper / Nakedar post
stood abolished. Aggrieved by that action the respondent raised a dispute under section 10(1) of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which was referred to the Labour Court. The Labour Court, however, did
not interfere with the action of the appellant having taken the view that the Helper / Nakedar post stood
abolished.It was made clear that the respondent was working as a Helper / Nakedar and his
services were orally terminated. When the fact that the respondent had worked for more than 240 days in
a year could not be disputed and it was not clearly established that it was on account of closure of Nakedar
system, the High Court took the view that the finding recorded by the Labour Court was perverse and,
therefore, interfered with the order and held that the respondent was entitled not only to retrenchment
compensation but also shall get Rs. 30, 000 (Rupees thirty thousand) or in the alternative he shall be
employed in some other vacancy. (Page: 1121, Para: 1)
.we think the order made by the High Court is just and proper and we decline to interfere with the
same. (Page: 1121, Para: 2)
Note: also refer to the following cases
Shashikant Govind Malgaonkar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2003 (98) FLR 20 : 2004 LIC 273 : 2003
II LLN 1023 : 2003 II CLR 342 (Bom.HC)
Executive Engineer (Construction Division), Co-operative Department v. P.O. & Anr., 2002 (100) FJR
120 (Mad.HC)
A. Ilango & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1996 LIC 2362 (Mad.HC)
2458
Sec. 25F
4. In respect of probationer
i) When probationer with continuous service of one year or more terminated
(Karn.DB)
5A.475
Probationer who had put in continuous service of one year or more, his Termination
without complying with requirements of Sec. 25F was held to be illegal and void.
Hutchiah v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., 1983 I LLJ 30 : 1982 (61) FJR 207 :
1983 I LLN 205 (Karn.DB)
Once it is.in law. (Page: 37, Para: 2)
5A.476
Termination of probationer for unsatisfactory work which did not carry any stigma
as per regulations amounts to retrenchment and hence non compliance of Sec. 25F renders it void
and illegal and the Division Bench awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement holding that
reinstatement is not the inevitable consequence of illegal retrenchment following the decision of the
Constitution Bench in the case of Punjab Land Development Reclamation Corporation 1990 (77)
FJR 17.
Delhi Transport Corporation v. P.O. & Anr., 2000 II LLN 231 : 2001 (98) FJR 424 : 2001 (90) FLR 418 :
2000 I CLR 557 : 2000 I LLR 136 : 2002 I LLJ 457 (Del.DB)
The workman.assigned. (Page: 232, Para: 2)
.as regards.not. (Page: 236, Para24)
The decision.back wages. (Page: 236, Para: 27)
5A.477
Employee who was appointed on probation of 6 months, was continued after expiry of
6 months and had also completed 240 days hence termination in violation of the section was held to
be illegal and reinstatement with back wages were granted.
Wazir Singh. v. Managing Director of Tarn Taran Co-operative Sugar Mills Ltd., Amritsar & Anr., 2001
LIC 1227 (P&H.DB)
.Moreover, according to the cross-examination of MW1 read with the appointment letter Ex.
M1, the petitioner had worked from November, 1989 upto October, 1990 and his services were
terminated on 22-10-1990. In this position, both because the petitioner had worked for more than 240
days and because even after the expiry of the service period of six months, the petitioner was allowed to
continue, the petitioners appointment cannot be said to be for a particular period. Therefore, we do not
agree with the Labour Court which upheld termination. (Page: 1228, Para: 3)
The Labour Court has held that the petitioner has not completed 240 days of service in a calender year
and his appointment was for a fixed period and was not extended further and that provision of section
2(oo) (bb) of the Industrial Disputes Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act) will be applicable.
(Page: 1228, Para: 3)
Note: also refer to the following case
Termination for unsatisfactory work in violation of Sec. 25F illegal.
Branch Manager, Commercial Clearing Agnecies (P.) Ltd. v. Manibhai D. Bhojani, 2004 (105) FJR 604 :
2004 (102) FLR (Sum) 50 : 2004 (105) FJR 609 (Guj.HC)
Sec. 25F
2459
2460
Sec. 25F
alter, charge or have any effect on the status of the afore-mentioned 464 workmen who had become the
workmen of the Corporation. (Page: 11, Para: 17)
the award of the Tribunal rejecting the reference and denying the benefit must be quashed and set
aside and an award be made that the aforementioned 464 workmen who had become the workmen of the
Corporation continued to be the workmen employed by the Corporation and shall be entitled to all the
rights, liabilities, obligations and duties as prescribed for the workmen by the Corporation. A formal
award to that effect shall be made by the Tribunal. (Page: 13, Para: 22)
Sec. 25F
2461
.It is useful to note that this Memorandum does not contain any terms that a Tikka Mazdoor will
be struck off the rolls once he passed the matriculation examination. (Page: 130, Para: 7)
. Striking off the name of a workman from the rolls by the employer amounts to termination of
service and such termination is retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Act if
effected.in violation of the mandatory provision contained in S. 25-F, and is invalid.
(Page: 131, Para: 10)
.We set aside the order of the Industrial Tribunal and hold that the striking off the name of the
appellant from List II amounted to retrenchment under S. 2(oo) of the Act and was in violation of S. 25-F.
We direct the first respondent-bank to enlist the appellant as a regular employee, as Tikka Mazdoor, to
reinstate him and pay him his backwages up-to-date. The appeal is allowed with costs.
(Page: 132, Para: 16)
2462
Sec. 25F
rules of natural justice should be complied with at a pre-decisional stage when the workman is
entitled to submit his explanation but not at a post decisional level and directed his reinstatement
with continuity of service.
Smt. Muththabarabnam v. P.O. Labour Court, Coimbatore, Management of Colacumble Tea
Manufacturers Pvt. Ltd. Colacumby, Nilgiris., 2001 IV LLN 894 : 2002 LLR 202 (Mad.HC)
The arbitrary.Constitution of India. (Page: 895, Para: 2.1)
.The Labour Court.employee. (Page: 896, Para: 5.1)
.The fact that.respondent management. (Page: 900, Para: 9.4)
.I am satisfied.of the Act. (Page: 900, Para: 9.6)
.It therefore, logically.of India. (Page: 902, Para: 11.9)
In this view of the.respondent management.in violation of the.with back wages.
(Page: 903, Para: 12)
5A.485
The services of a workman was terminated without notice or enquiry or compensation
although he had worked continuously for three years. He raised an industrial dispute of which
reference was made to the Tribunal. The Tribunal rejected the contention of the employer that he
had abandoned the duties, as he had issued no notice asking the employee to come and join the
duties. As the workman had rendered continuous services for a period of three years and in the
absence of any other defence the Tribunal also rejected the contention of the employer that the
termination of the services was outside the purview of Sec. 25F of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and
ordered his reinstatement with back-wages and continuity of service. The High Court upheld the
decision of the Tribunal.
Chief Engineer, I.T.D.A. (TW Department), Hyderabad, & Ors. v. Presiding Officer, Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Visakhapatnam, & Anr. 2005 IV LLN 118 : 2005 LLR 1034 (AP.HC)
5A.486
The services of workman were terminated on which Labour Court granted
reinstatement with 25% back wages which was challenged on the ground of delay and
abandonment of service by workman. High Court held that the plea of delay though not raised
before Labour Court is not fatal, unless the dispute ceased to exist due to delay. Labour Court has
to consider delay factor while granting relief. If the workman abandoned the service the principle
of natural justice has to be followed, employer has to serve notice and conduct departmental
enquiry against workman. And even in case of daily wagers, compliance of Sec. 25F may be
required.
Kheda District Panchayat v. Jashubhai Devabhai Gohel, 2007 I CLR 404 (Guj.HC)
Looking to the.rejected. (Page: 405, Para: 5)
As regards.such a situation. (Page: 405/406, Para: 6)
Next contention.award in question. (Page: 406, Para: 7)
Right of daily wager.and illegal. (Page: 407, Para: 9)
q) When employee refuses to work on a lower post in night shift but attends office
during normal hours and employer treats him to have abandoned the service
(P&H.HC)
5A.487
An employee who was appointed as Accounts clerk was transferred to a sister concern
and was asked to work in the night shift as cane clerk which was a lower post in pay scale and
status. The employee refused to work in the night shift but attended the office during normal hours
and signed the attendance register at that time but was not given any work. High Court held that as
Sec. 25F
2463
per contract of service he cannot be made to work at a lower post and thus, award of the Tribunal
passed against him is erroneous. The management did not start proceedings for terminating his
services for absence nor took any action u/s. 25F but assumed that the employee abandoned the
services which is illegal, void and without jurisdiction. Thus, he is entitled to continue in service
with all benefits.
Jai Bhagwan Jain v. M.C. Bharadwaj, P.O. Industrial Tribunal & Anr., 1986 II LLN 634 (P&H.HC)
r) When name was removed for absence as per service rules due to arrest since
conditions u/s. 25F mandatory (All.HC)
5A.488
The workman was on leave but due to his arrest by police he was not able to join duty.
The employer deleted his name from muster roll as per rule. Labour Court upheld the order of
termination, On workmens appeal, High Court set aside the order of Labour Court on the ground
that Sec. 25F was not complied with before termination and it was held that rule could not override
the express provisions of statutory section.
Afsar Mian v. Labour Court, Bareilly & Ors., 1994 III LLJ (Sum) 589 : 1991 (63) FLR 721 : 1992 I LLN
69 : 1992 I CLR 173 : 1992 LLR 221 (All.HC)
Note: Similar view held in the following case
Sohanlal v. Union of India & Ors., 2000 I LLJ 201 : 1999 LIC 1553 (J&K.HC)
petitioner.above.ultimately.writ
(c).Paragraph
521(10)
(c).disciplinary
2464
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2465
and inoperative. In other words, it does not bring about a cessation of service of the workman and the
workman continues to be in service. This was not even seriously controverted before us.
(Page: 75, Para: 9)
Note: also refer to the following case
Probationer continued to be in service even after his period was over, later he was terminated
held bad.
Sharad Hari Deshpande v. India Security Press & Ors., 1988 I LLJ 297 : 1987 II LLN 656 : 1987 II CLR
297 (Bom.DB)
w) When notice to collect retrenchment compensation was sent first and money
order later since Sec. 25F(b) deemed not complied (P&H.DB)
5A.494
Mere notice given to workmen to collect the retrenchment compensation and
subsequently sending the money order on expiry of notice does not exonerate the liability of
employer.
Mani Ram v. The P.O. Labour Court, Ambala, 1997 II LLJ 519 : 1997 (75) FLR 132 : 1996 (89) FJR 673 :
1996 LLR 615 : 1997 IV LLN 361 : 1997 II CLR 868 (P&H.DB)
.The section.the Act. (Page: 521, Para: 4)
2466
Sec. 25F
x) When there is mere recital in notice of termination that efforts will be made to pay
retrenchment compensation since Sec. 25F(b) deemed not complied (Bom.DB)
5A.495
Mere recital in notice of termination that efforts will be made to pay retrenchment
compensation would render termination null and void and of no effect.
The P.W.D. Mazdoor Union & Anr. v. The Executive Engineer, P.W.D. & Anr., 1997 (77) FLR 76 : 1997
LLR 1027 (Bom.DB)
.As far as.full back wages. (Page: 78, Para: 5)
zb) When it was not possible for workmen to be present to receive retrenchment
compensation on the same day on which the letter so requiring, was posted
since Sec. 25F(b) deemed not complied (Cal.HC)
5A.499
Notice was served on the retrenched workmen to receive payment following their
retrenchment. The notice of retrenchment was posted and the retrenched workmen were called for
the payment either on the same day or any subsequent date. As there was very little chance for the
workmen to receive the retrenchment letter on the day when it was posted and present themselves
for payment, the offer was held to be bad and retrenchment order was incompetent.
National Iron & Steel Company, Ltd v. Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, & Ors., 1964 I LLJ 525 :
1964 (8) FLR 24 (Cal.HC)
Sec. 25F
2467
zc) When bank drafts carrying retrenchment compensation were remitted at 6 P.M.
on the date of retrenchment as well as on the next day since Sec. 25F(b) deemed
not complied (Raj.HC)
5A.500
Tribunal directed reinstatement of workmen with back wages as the Works Manger
who passed the retrenchment order was not the appointing authority and therefore, was not
competent to pass such order and provisions of Sec. 25F were not complied with. Thus, the
retrenchment was illegal. High Court held that the Corporation started the process of remitting
dues by mailing the bank drafts at 6 p.m. on the date of retrenchment for only 20 workmen and for
the rest of the 96 workmen on the next day. Thus, it cannot be said that Sec. 25F had been complied
with before or at the time of retrenchment.
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur v. Industrial Tribunal, Jaipur, 1986 (68) FJR 374 :
1986 II LLN 996 (Raj.HC)
zd) When retrenchment compensation falls short at the time of retrenchment due
to non-inclusion of HRA and travelling allowance when paid as part of wages
(Raj.HC)
Girish Kumar Jain v. Union of India & Ors., 1994 (84) FJR 447 : 1994 (69) FLR 31 (Raj.HC)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
Note: also refer to the following cases in the above context
Retrenchment compensation when falls short at the time of retrenchment, retrenchment is
invalid.
Purna Theatre v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1998 III LLJ (Sum) 493 : 1998 (79) FLR 85 : 1997 LIC
997 : 1998 I CLR 912 (Cal.HC)
Compensation paid was not adequate, therefore termination was set aside.
State Bank of India v. Union of India & Ors., 1998 III LLN 499 (Pat.HC)
Termination was held bad due to not non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
Uttar Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., 1987 I LLN 90
(All.HC)
Retrenchment Compensation falls short, termination was set aside.
Ramesh Gonekar v. Member Judge, State Industrial Court & Ors., 2006 (110) FLR 394 : 2006 LLR 901 :
2006 (3) Mah.LJ 534 : 2006 (5) BCR 275 (Bom.HC)
ze) When employee who completes 240 days or more even with artificial breaks
after 89 days or with intermittent breaks, terminated with malafide intention
to deprive workman of benefits u/s. 25F (S.C.2J)
F 5A.501 Where the employer a Government in this case appoints casual labourers on 89 days
basis but terminates the after but reappoints after a day or two and this cycle lasts as many as 4
spells where after the services of said casual labourers were terminated, the High Court held that
the employer has violated Sec. 25F and Sec. 25G of the Act and therefore the said casual labourers
are ordered to be reinstated on 31.3.2001 from 11.1.1995 with full back wages. Supreme Court
confirmed the High Court order except for the fact that the back wages are reduced to 50% only
and held that the employers conduct shows that despite having sufficient work, termination and
reemployment after each spell of 89 days is aimed at to deprive the workmen the benefit of Sec. 25F
and thus ordered their re-employment as aforesaid with in a period of one month.
Union of India & Ors. v. Ramchander & Anr., 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 439 (S.C.2J)
2468
Sec. 25F
The respondents were appointed against casual labourers but nevertheless they continued in service for
four spells and that too their re-appointments were made immediately within a few days of termination on
completion of 89 days. It shows that sufficient work was available with the employer and had there been
no termination on completion of 89 days, they would have completed 240 days of continuous
employment. In that view of the matter the appellants had violated Sec. 25G of the Industrial Disputes
Act. We do not find any error or illegality in the decision rendered by the Division Bench. We direct the
appellants to re-employ the respondents as daily-wagers. However, the direction of the High Court for
payment of entire salaries and allowances for the period they were out of service was not justified under
the circumstances. The termination of the respondents was from 11.1.1995 and now a fairly long period
has passed and in the meantime, the respondents must have been engaged in employment in any other
work. Therefore, we direct the appellants to re-employments to re-employ the respondents with 50%
back wages from the date of termination till their re-employment. The Appellants shall re-employ the
respondents within a period of one month. (Page: 440/441, Para: 4)
5A.502
Termination of services of an employee appointed initially for fixed period of 89 days
but continued for 3 years with intermittent breaks without any notice, despite continuity of work
was held by Court as not covered by Sec. 2(oo)(bb) and violative of Sec. 25F and amounts to unfair
labour practice and hence matter was remanded.
Bhikku Ram Son of Sh. Lalji v. The P.O. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Rohtak, 1996 III LLJ
1126 : 1995 LIC 2448 : 1996 LLR 259 (P&H.DB)
Petitioner was appointed.was finally discontinued. (Page: 1127, Para: 2)
.Only a bona.of the Act. (Page: 1143, Para: 35)
.Admittedly, the petitioner.by the employer.it must be.of Sec.
25-F. (Page: 1143, Para: 36)
5A.503
Termination of casual workers completing 240 days of service in one calendar year
with artificial breaks of a day or two without complying with Sec. 25F and 25G is illegal.
Ram Chandra v. Union of India & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 431 : 2001 (90) FLR 55 : 2001 LLR 1034 : 2002 LLR
(Sum) 104 : 2002 LIC 1077 (Raj.DB)
.facts make it.Industrial Disputes Act. (Page: 433, Para: 8)
.it is declared.of the services. (Page: 433, Para: 16)
5A.504
Termination of service after 89 days and re-employment after one day break and then
termination of service on completion of 232 days denotes malafide intention of the employer to
deprive workman of benefits u/s. 25F.
Estate Officer, Haryana Urban Development Authority, karnal & Anr. v. P.O. Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Panipat & Anr., 2001 II LLJ 120 : 2001 (91) FLR 341 : 2001 III LLN 1139 :
2001 III CLR 77 (P&H.DB)
.after reading the.be set aside.the Labour Court.malafide one.
(Page: 121, Para: 4)
Note: also refer to the following case/s in the above context
Nar Singh v. The P.O. Industrial Tribunal Labour Court & Anr., 1997 LLR 352 (P&H.HC)
Termination of workman, who was repeatedly appointed for small periods, was held bad.
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Digambar G. Pawaskar & Ors., 1997 I CLR 872 : 1997 LLR 589
(Bom.HC)
Sec. 25F
2469
Termination of daily wager who was in service from 1987 till 19.12.1991 with breaks held bad.
Management 0-322 Kovilpatti Co-operative Marketing Society, Kovilpatti v. P.O. Labour Court,
Tirunelveli & Anr., 2001 I LLJ 1516 : 2001 I LLN 542 : 2001 LLR 363 (Mad.HC)
Retrenchment invalid, when employees services are terminated on the ground of breaks.
Union of India v. P.O. C.G.I.T. & Anr., 2002 III CLR 251 : 2002 LIC 2051 (MP.HC)
Termination was held bad as workman was repeatedly appointed for 89 days to avoid compliance
of Sec. 25F.
Ferozepur Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Labour Court, Bhatinda, & Anr., 1985 (67) FJR 367 : 1986
I LLN 204 (P&H.HC)
Termination of a daily wager who completed 240 days, with breaks held bad due to violation of
Sec. 25F.
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Babu Lal Sharma & Anr., 1995 II LLJ 222 : 1994 (85)
FJR 510 : 1995 (70) FLR 241 : 1995 II LLN 491 (Raj.HC)
When workman who is appointed in fixed spells but completing 240 days service in 12 months is
terminated.
Tata Consulting Engineers v. Ms. Valsala K. Nair & Ors., 1998 I LLN 525 : 1998 LLR 66 : 1997 II CLR
1099 (Bom.HC)
2470
Sec. 25F
zh) When surplus railway employee terminated though as per Indian Railway
Establishment Code but in violation of Sec. 25F (Ker.DB)
5A.507
Termination of services of surplus staff made in accordance with Rule 149(1) of the
Railway Establishment Code is retrenchment and compliance of Sec. 25F of the Act was necessary
but as the same was not complied with, reinstatement was awarded.
L. Krishnan & Ors. v. Divisional Personnel Officer, Southern Railway & Anr., 1972 II LLJ 568 : 1973
(43) FJR 129 : 1973 (26) FLR 268 : 1973 I LLN 172 : 1972 LIC 1588 (Ker.DB)
We have.S. 25F. (Page: 575, Para: 13)
It is.unacceptable. (Page: 575, Para: 13)
Nevertheless.respondents case. (Page: 571, Para: 6)
We have.for decision. (Page: 573, Para: 10)
Note: also refer to the following case/s in the above context
Somu Kumar Chatterjee & Ors. v. The District Signal Telecommunicatioin Engineer Construction, N.F.
Railway Katihar (Purnea) & Ors. cases, 1972 II LLJ 462 (Pat.DB)
Union of India & Ors. v. Piru Kisku & Ors., 1977 I LLN 549 : 1977 LIC 1236 (Cal.DB)
Mahabir v. D.K. Mittal, Dy. Chief Mechanical Engineer, N.E. Rly, & Ors., 1979 II LLJ 363 : 1979 (55)
FJR 216 : 1979 II LLN 341 : 1980 LIC 119 (Pat.DB)
Malkhan Singh v. Union of India & Ors., 1981 II LLJ 174 : 1981 (42) FLR 401 : 1981 II LLN 670 : 1981
LIC 1633 (Del.DB)
Shri Rammoo & etc. v. Union of India & Ors., 1988 LIC 1509 (Cat.DB)
zj) When employee with longer tenure of service terminated when the work is of
perennial nature or after a long tenure of service (Guj.HC)
5A.509
The workman was engaged as a daily wager, he worked for 4 years. Thereafter, he was
terminated. Labour Court awarded reinstatement since he was periodically engaged on the same
post and his nature of work was same, which revealed that the work was perennial in nature and he
was terminated in violation to Sec. 25F. High Court upheld the same.
Executive Engineer, District Panchayat, Bharuch v. Shankarbhai Jivabhai Patel, 2006 (111) FLR 164 :
2007 I LLN 922 :2006 LIC 2180 : 2006 II CLR 1027 : 2006 LLR 872 (Guj.HC)
Note: also refer to the following cases where termination was held bad after longer service periods
Sec. 25F violated Termination is bad-two years service.
The Zilla Parihsad, Nagpur & Anr. v. Moreshwar, s/o Vithobaji Mendhekar & Anr., 2004 LIC 2505 :
2004 LLR 957 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25F
2471
Termination of workman in violation of Sec. 25F appointed for 3 years allowed to continue beyond
that period is illegal.
State of U.P. v. P.O. Industrial Tribunal (V), Meerut & Anr., 2003 (98) FLR 473 (All.HC)
Termination illegal, workman completing 2 years of continuous services, in non-compliance of
Sec. 25F.
Jagtar Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., 2003 II LLJ 763 : 2003 (98) FLR 73 : 2003 II LLN 691 : 2003 II
CLR 305 (P&H.HC)
Termination illegal, workman working for long period in non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
Deputy Secretary, Trible Area Development Department & Ors. v. Labour Court, Udaipur & Anr., 2003
(98) FLR 41 (Raj.HC)
Termination of an employee continued for 2 years, violating Sec. 25F, held illegal.
Kukadi Irrigation Project v. Waman & Anr., 1994 (68) FLR 639 : 1994 I CLR 252 : 1994 LLR 381 : 1994
LLR 788 : 1994 II LLN 111 (Bom.HC)
Termination of probationer in violation to Sec. 25F, was held bad since he rendered 22 years
service and ought to be regularized.
Gidderbha Co-operative Marketing-Cum-Processing Society v. Labour Court & Ors.,1996 I LLJ 644 :
1995 (87) FJR 41:1995 (71) FLR 370:1995 II LLN 418:1995 LLR 510 (P&H.HC)
Termination of employees with several years of service without complying Sec. 25F, invalid.
Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Anr. v. Narendra Joshi & Anr., 1998 LIC 3401 (Raj.HC)
Termination of workman engaged for continuous work for number of years illegal.
State Bank of Indore v. Rashtriya Mazdoor Sena & Anr., 2003 LIC 2789 : 2003 LLR 1031 (Bom.HC)
2472
Sec. 25F
zm) When senior was terminated retaining his junior in violation of the principle
of last come-first go u/s. 25G (S.C.2J)
F 5A.512 Workman was working as a Beldar, his services were terminated and dispute was
raised by him. On reference, Labour Court found that there was a breach of Sec. 25G and 25H of
the Act and granted reinstatement with 50% back wages which was affirmed by High Court as well
as Supreme Court except back wages as the finding of the fact that persons juniors to the workman
were still working was not contravened by the management.
State of Haryana v. Dilbagh Singh, 2006 (111) FLR 919 : 2007 I LLJ 8 : 2007 I LLN 120 : 2007 I CLR
550 : 2007 LLR 72 : 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 211 (S.C.2J)
The respondent was serving as a Beldar in PWD (B&R) and his services were terminated on 25.12.1999.
A dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act) was raised
and the matter was referred to Labour Court and the Labour Court after hearing both the parties found that
there is a breach of Sections 25G and 25H of the Act. It was held that person junior to the respondent is
still working whereas the services of the respondent had been terminated. Therefore, the Labour Court
allowed the claim of the respondent and granted reinstatement with continuity of service with 50% back
wages from the date of demand notice i.e. from 1.2.2000. Aggrieved against that order a writ petition was
filed before the High Court and the High Court affirmed the order of the Labour Court. Hence, the present
appeal. (Page: 919, Para: 2)
We have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Learned counsel for the appellant has failed to
substantiate that no person junior to the respondent had been retained in the Department. It is a clear
finding of the Tribunal that a person like Krishan s/o Dharam Singh who is junior to the respondent is still
working with the Management whereas the services of the respondent had been terminated. It is also
alleged that another person named Mahabir who is also junior to the respondent is still working with the
Management. Therefore, the Tribunal has found violation of Sections 25G & 25H of the Act. This finding
of fact has not been controverted by the management and there is no reason to take a different view from
the view taken by the Tribunal which was affirmed by the High Court. Hence, we find no merit in this
appeal and the same is accordingly dismissed. The respondent shall be reinstated but looking into the
peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, he will not be entitled to any back wages. The appellant shall
issue order of appointment of the respondent within one month from the date of receipt of this order.
There will be no order as to costs. (Page: 919/920 Para: 3)
zn) When employee who completes 240 days terminated for not accepting certain
conditions of service (Raj.HC)
5A.513
The workman was appointed for one month and continued to work regularly.
Applications were received for regular appointment and the workman applied for the same. He
was selected and put on probation and continued to work for more than 240 days. He was removed
without complying with the provisions of Sec. 25F because he refused to accept certain conditions
of service. The Labour Court ordered his reinstatement with full benefits. The High Court upheld
the order and dismissed the writ filed by the employer.
Managing Director, Sri Ganganagar Sahakari Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Labour Court, Bikaner & Ors.,
1997 IV LLN 820 : 1998 I LLJ 523 (Raj.HC)
Sec. 25F
2473
zo) When driver terminated while employer maintains three vehicles and employs
a casual driver (Bom.HC)
5A.514
An employee working as driver was terminated on the ground that company was
taking measures of economy and driver was rendered surplus to its requirement. Employer was
still maintaining 3 vehicles and was also employing casual driver on occasion as such the reason for
effecting retrenchment does not seem to be genuine. Labour Court ordered reinstatement with
60% back wages. Even High Court upheld the same.
Bombay Leprosy Project v. Vishnu B. Chavan & Anr., 2002 (94) FLR 789 : 2002 LLR 994 (Bom.HC)
zq) When termination is ostensibly due to closer of one unit since functional
integrality exists between the unit closed and other unit (Del.DB)
5A.516
Dismissing appeal of the management and upholding Labour Courts finding of fact as
affirmed by Single Judge that establishment consisting of letter press and offset press was one
integrated whole because of unity of ownership, control, production, inter changeability of
workmen and location of machines, closure of letter press would not mean closure of undertaking
and hence termination of services of workmen of letter press was invalid retrenchment due to non
compliance with Sec. 25F and hence concerned workers were entitled to reinstatement with full
back wages and continuity of service.
Raj Hans Press v. Labour Court, Delhi & Ors., 1980 I LLN 155 (Del.DB)
.Labour Court found.dismissed the petition. (Page: 157, Para: 3)
The Labour Court.of the undertaking. (Page: 157, Para: 7)
.The Labour Court.placed before it. (Page: 158, Para: 11)
.we find.the same. (Page: 158, Para: 14)
zr) When workmen terminated for pressing their charter of demands since
actuated by victimisation (Karn.HC)
5A.517
The union of workmen challenged the validity of retrenchment as it were actuated by
victimization and unfair labour practice and company had failed to adduce evidence to prove
otherwise, Tribunal on the basis of charter of demands, and other evidence, came to the conclusion
that retrenchments are not proved to be on proper reasons and the same was upheld by High
Court.
Mysore Structurals, Ltd., Bangalore v. Workmen of Mysore Structurals, Ltd., & Anr., 1983 I LLN 441
(Karn.HC)
.In the instant.in this regard.The charter of demands.unfair labour
practice. (Page: 457, Para: 29)
The finding recorded.on record. (Page: 459, Para: 29)
2474
Sec. 25F
zs) When some workmen were terminated in view of proposed closure and others
are retained (Mad.HC)
5A.518
Where a few workmen were retained whereas remaining were terminated from
services in view of proposed closure without complying with provisions of Sec. 25F. The High Court
held that termination of the services of the remaining workmen was illegal because there was
non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
McKenzies, Ltd. Madras v. Labour Court, Madras & Anr., 1960 I LLJ 334 : 1960-61 (18) FJR 7
(Mad.HC)
zu) When workmen terminated for not possessing requisite qualification after
serving more than two years (P&H.DB)
5A.520
Services of nurses cannot be terminated on the ground of not possessing registration
certificate after keeping them on job for a long period of 2 to 12 years and after undergoing
training course and hence termination in violation of the section is illegal.
R.B. Sewak Ram Maternity Hospital v. P.O. Labour Court Jalandhar & Ors., 1999 II LLJ 81 (P&H.DB)
5A.521
The termination of workman in violation of Sec. 25F on the ground of lack of
qualification held bad and the same was held as a case of retrenchment.
Rao Saheb Shripatrao Patil v. Balasaheb Desai Sahakari & Ors.,1995 (71) FLR 384 : 1995 LLR 980
(Bom.HC)
zv) When terminated on the ground of loss of confidence for remaining absent
continuously (MP.HC)
5A.522
The contention of the management was that it lost confidence on the workmen because
of their act of remaining absent continuously for days together and hence, their services were
terminated. The High Court relied on the case of L. Robert DSouza v. The Executive Engineer,
Southern Railway and another, AIR 1982 (SC) 854 and held that even if the management lost
confidence, it has to comply with the provisions of Sec. 25F of the Act.
Raj Kumar College Karmachari Union v. Raj Kumar College, Raipur & Anr., 1987 (55) FLR 93 : 1987 II
LLN 573 (MP.HC)
Sec. 25F
2475
zw) When terminated in the absence of proof of appointment for fixed term
(Del.HC)
5A.523
The workman was reinstated by Labour Court as he has completed 240 days service
and Sec. 25F was not followed. Employer challenged the award contending that workman was
employed for a specific period on compassionate ground. High Court upheld Labour Courts order
since there was no averment that the workman was employed for a specific project or scheme for
temporary duration or that the employment came to an end on the expiry of the specified scheme or
project.
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Ram Pal & Anr., 2005 LLR 392 (Del.HC)
5A.524
It is held that in the appointment letter though the word contract basis is used but it
does not stipulate the period of contract and nature of work whether fixed or temporary. So this
case falls within the term termination of services for any reason whatsoever, thus it is
retrenchment within the meaning of Sec. 2(oo) of the Act. The Labour Court has categorically and
rightly held that the services were terminated in violation of provisions of Sec. 25F of the Act.
Municipal Counsil, Quadin through its Executive Officer v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Gurdaspur
& Anr., 2007 (113) FLR 179 : 2007 I CLR 650 (P&H.DB)
Note: also refer to he following cases in the above context
Termination held illegal, if no record of period of employment available.
Municipal Committee, Gobindgarh v. Labour Court, Patiala., 1994 (85) FJR 161 : 1994 (69) FLR 1002 :
1994 LLR 206 (P&H.HC)
Termination-was held bad since there was no evidence that workman was appointed for a specific
project.
Rajkot District Panchayat & Anr. v. Vajasoor Ala Rathod, 2005 (106) FLR 930 : 2005 LLR 952
(Guj.HC)
2476
Sec. 25F
one year under an employer shall be retrenched by that employer unless he has been given one months
notice or wages in lieu of such notice, has a proviso which says that no such notice shall be necessary if
the retrenchment is under an agreement which specifies a date for the termination of service. Clearly, the
proviso would have been quite unnecessary it retrenchment as denned in Section 2(oo) was intended not
to include termination of service by efflux of time in terms of an agreement between the parties. This is
one more reason why it must be held that the Labour Court was right in taking the view that the
respondents were retrenched contrary to the provisions of Section 25F. (Page: 3, Para: 2)
Note: This is prior to introduction of Clause (bb) to Sec. 2(oo)
zy) Termination not proper if employer fails to disclose grounds and nor is it
examined by the Labour Court (S.C.2J)
F 5A.526 Since there was no material available to show on what grounds workmans services
were terminated by employer and also Labour Court did not examine any of the contentions of the
employee including that the workman had completed 240 days of service at the time of his
termination while dismissing the dispute raised by employee that his termination was in violation
of Sec. 25F, and hence Labour Courts award as affirmed by High Court was set aside, Supreme
Court directed his appointment a fresh in similar employment which he had earlier.
Talwinder Singh v. P.O., Labour Court & Anr., 2004 II LLJ 1050 : 2004 IV LLN 50 : 2003 (10) SCC 283
(S.C.2J)
The grievance of the appellant in this case is that though he had put in 240 days of service, his services
were terminated without observing the due procedure as provided under Section 25F of the Industrial
Disputes Act. He raised a dispute before the Labour Court. Various contentions were raised on behalf of
the parties. The Labour Court did not examine any one of those contentions in the manner in which it
should have been done. However, it dismissed the claim made by the appellant. When the matter was
carried further by way of a writ petition, the High Court also dismissed the same by a cryptic
order. (Page: 1050, Para: 1)
There is no material to show on what ground his services have been terminated. In the circumstances the
award made by the Labour Court, as affirmed by the High Court needs to be set aside. We direct
Respondent 2 to appoint the appellant afresh. (Page: 1051, Para: 4)
zz) When Extra Departmental Branch Post Master was terminated after enquiry
without an opportunity of hearing (CAT)
5A.527
Extra Departmental Branch Post Master was terminated after enquiry without an
opportunity of hearing nor was given one month notice nor wages in lieu thereof in compliance of
provision of Sec. 25F. It was held that such termination was bad in law.
Asoke Kumar Sinha v. Union of India & Ors., 1989 LIC 670 (CAT)
.when the applicant.cannot be sustained. (Page: 672, Pasra: 5)
.we hold that.bad in law. (Page: 673, Para: 6)
.The termination of.from this date. (Page: 673, Para: 7)
Note: In the following cases, termination of employees including daily wagers, casual employees or
probationers or ad hoc held illegal if he completed 240 days and Sec. 25F violated
Casual worker rendered 240 days of continuous service entitled to regularization
Management of Tungabhadra Steel Products Ltd. v. A.B. Patil & Anr., 2000 (96) FJR 278 : 2000 (84)
FLR 565 : 2000 (84) FLR (Sum) 7 (Karn.HC)
M.P. State Tourism Development Corporation v. Smt. Sita Bai Kushwaha, 2002 (94) FLR 425 : 2002 IV
LLN 714 : 2002 LLR 566 (MP.HC)
Parshuram Yallapa Kotekar v. Telecom District Engineer, Ratnagiri & Ors., 2002 (93) FLR 1181 : 2002
II CLR 78 : 2002 LLR 825 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25F
2477
Daily Wager If completed 240 days of service in a year cannot be terminated in violation of Sec.
25F.
Kutch District Panchayat Executive Engineer v. Kishor D. Varu., 1999 I LLJ 973 : 1998 LLR 886
(Guj.HC)
Termination on completing 240 days in a calendar year is in contravention of Sec. 25F.
State of Rajasthan v. Ram Kumar & Anr., 1998 LIC 874 : 1998 LLR 583 (Raj.HC)
Termination Without complying Sec. 25F, invalid as employee completed 240 days of continuous
service.
Executive Engineer, Garhi & Anr. v. Kalia & Anr.,1998 LIC 1078 : 1998 LLR 586 (Raj.HC)
M.P. Text Book Corporation, Bhopal v. S. K. parasar & Anr. And S.K. Parasar v. Managing Director,
M.P. Text Book Corp. & Anr., 2005 LLR 324 (MP.HC)
Nirmal Kumar Sharma v. Municipal Board, Kherthal & Anr., 2003 (96) FLR 877 : 2002 LIC 3329 : 2003
LLR 154 (Raj.HC)
Termination workman completing 240 days, held illegal.
State of Haryana v. Naresh Kumar & Anr., 2001 III LLN 1144 (P&H.HC)
Maheshkumar Jivram Chauhan & Anr. v. Prantij Municipal Borough & Ors., 1996 II LLN 1130 : 1996 II
CLR 189 (Guj.HC)
Causal emolyee, if completed 240 days of service Sec. 25F must mandatorily be followed.
Nagappa Hanumanthappa Lamani v. Management of Sericulture Department, 2002 (101) FJR 581 :
2002 (94) FLR 1183 : 2002 III LLN 1026 : 2002 III CLR 219 : 2002 III CLR 322 : 2002 LLR 1145
(Karn.HC)
Termination of casual labour working for more than 240 days, reinstatement with back wages
follows.
Madhya Pradesh State Tourism Development Corporation v. Smt. Sita Bai Kushwaha, 2002 (94) FLR
425 : 2002 IV LLN 714 : 2002 LLR 566 (MP.HC)
Labour Court Justified in granting reinstatement with back-wages in absence of any rebuttal
evidence
Commissioner, Municipal Corporation, Hyderabad v. Labour Court, Hyderabad & Anr., 2002 (94) FLR
300 : 2002 LLR 957 (AP.HC)
M.P. Rajya Van Vikas Nigam Limited, Balaghat v. Shri Q.M. Qureshi English Coaching Class & Ors.,
2003 (96) FLR 90 : 2003 I LLN 740 : 2003 LIC 1951 (MP.HC)
Sec. 25F must be followed, if casual employee has completed 240 days of service.
S. Ratnakar v. Karnatak State Road Transport Corporation, 1996 (74) FLR 1903 (S.C.3J)
Reinstatement of daily wager who worked for 240 days, non-compliance Sec. 25F, continuity with
full back-wages, held valid.
Gujarat State Land & Development Corpn. Ltd. v. Sompura Dharmendra Hathi c/o. H.D. Rathod, 2002
III CLR 694 (Guj.HC)
Sunil Bhalchandra Jani v. Gujarat Electricity Board, 2002 II LLJ 607 : 2002 (101) FJR 442 : 2002 (93)
FLR 1050 : 2002 LLR (Sum) 955 (Guj.HC)
Termination u/s. 25F valid, does not amount to retrenchment, workman worked for less than 240
days.
Girdhar Gopal Saini v. Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 2002 (94) FLR 905 : 2002 II LLN 692 : 2002 II CLR
1043 : 2002 LLR 685 : 2002 LIC 59 (Sum) : 2003 (99) FLR 25 (Sum) (Raj.HC)
Sec. 25F violated, daily wage employee worked for 240 days, no notice and compensation was
given.
State of Rajasthan v. Kanhaiya Lal & Ors., 2002 (94) FLR 283 : 2002 II CLR 1040 : 2002 LIC 1915
(Raj.HC)
2478
Sec. 25F
480 days, strict rules of evidence are not applicable to the proceedings before Labour Court and
only rules of natural justice are to be followed.
G. Thilagam & Ors. v. The P.O. Labour Court, Salem & Anr., 2002 (93) FLR 518 : 2002 I CLR 876 :
2002 LLR 552 (Mad.HC)
Retrenchment valid, not completed 240 days, workman was an absentee who did not come to join
the job, also employer had not terminated his services.
Modh. Islam v. P.O. Labour Court, Agra & Ors., 2002 (95) FLR 533 (All.HC)
Retrenchment violated, on completion of 240 days provisions of Sec. 25F must be followed.
Municipal Council, Shahpura v. State Labour Court & Anr., 2002 (94) FLR 200 : 2002 IV LLN 708 :
2002 LLR 565 (MP.HC)
Non-compliance of Sec. 25F, employee had worked for more than 240 days he is entitled to a show
cause notice and compliance of the provisions of Sec. 25F of the Act, reinstatement with continuity
of services must be allowed.
R. Poori @ Bhoopathi v. P.O. Labour Court, Vellore & Anr., 2002 (95) FLR 624 : 2002 III LLN 1099
(Mad.HC)
Retrenchment invalid, worker seeking full wages succeeded in proving that he had completed
continuous service of more than 240 days in a year, mere delay in reaching Court, cannot deny
relief to workman u/s. 25F.
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Iqbal Singh & Anr., 2002 I CLR 678 (P&H.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, workman worked for more than 240 days in a
calendar, on account of non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
M.P. Rajya Van Vikas Nigam Limited, Balaghat v. Shri Q.M. Qureshi English Coaching Class & Ors.,
2003 (96) FLR 90 : 2003 I LLN 740 : 2003 LIC 1951 (MP.HC)
Termination valid, workman failing to prove that he has worked for 240 days of continuous
service in a calendar year, not entitled to any benefits u/s. 25F.
Regional Manager, Bank of Baroda v. P.O. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Anr., 2003 III
LLJ 198 : 2004 (106) FJR 509 : 2003 (98) FLR 385 (Raj.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, chowkidar working in service of State
Government for 240 continuous days, on account of non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
State of Madhya Pradesh through Executive Engineer v. Jitendra S/o. Rajendra Rathor., 2003 LLR 556
(MP.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, non-compliance of Sec. 25F, worked for 240 days
but job was abandoned, yet compliance of Sec. 25F is a must.
Nirmal Kumar Jain v. P.O. Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur & Anr.,
2003 (96) FLR 301 : 2003 LIC 403 : 2003 I CLR 547 : 2003 LLR 236 (All.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, on account of non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
Gujarat State Construction Corporation v. Andravadan Ambalal Soni., 2003 LLR 916 (Guj.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, workman worked for more than 240 days in the
preceding year, on account of non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
Municipal Copo of Delhi v. Jai Veer & Anr., 2003 II CLR 886 (Del.HC)
Termination valid, does not amount to retrenchment, workman completed 240 days but not in
the preceding year, hence not entitled to the benefits of Sec. 25F.
Shashikant Govind Malgaonkar v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., 2003 (98) FLR 20 : 2004 LIC 273 : 2003
II LLN 1023 : 2003 II CLR 342 (Bom.HC)
Gujarat Water Supply & Sewg. Board v. Dineshbhai M. Solanki, 2005 LIC 2353 (Guj.HC)
Sec. 25F
2479
Retrenchment u/s. 25F invalid, as the employee had completed 240 days of continuous services.
P.M. More v. P.O. Central Government Industrial Tribunal No.1 & Anr., 2001 III LLJ 689 : 2000 (87)
FLR 228 : 2000 III CLR 113 (Bom.HC)
Smt. Hemalata Sahoo v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bhubaneshwar & Anr., 2005 (106) FLR 732 :
2005 LLR 993 (Ori.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, workman working for more than 240 days, on
account of non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
Sachiv, Krishi Upaj Samiti, Anjad (Barwani) v. Kalyan Singh S/o. Maan Singh Thakur & Anr., 2003 III
LLJ 338 : 2003 (97) FLR 566 : 2003 III LLN 391 : 2003 LLR 489 (MP.HC)
Reinstatement and back wages continuous service of 240 days in a calander year, employers
contention of employment being temporary not supported by evidence.
State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors. v. Vinod Singh Rathur & Ors., 2003 I LLN 135 : 2002 LLR 1093
(MP.HC)
Reinstatement and back wages continuous service of 240 days in a calander year, employers
contention of employment being temporary not supported by evidence.
MCD v. Lekh Ram & Anr., 2004 I LLJ 533 : 2003 IV LLN 1017 : 2004 LLR 62 : 2003 (99) FLR 1209
(Del.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, on account of non-compliance of Sec. 25F, when
workman has completed 240 days of continuous service in a calendar year.
Management of Calcutta, telephone v. P.O & Ors., 2003 III CLR 665 (Cal.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, if workman working for more than 240 days in a
calendar year, claim of employers that the wokman was appointed against Jawahar Yojana
Scheme not supported by evidence.
State of Rajasthan v. Ram Chandra & Anr., 2003 (96) FLR 603 : 2003 I LLN 619 : 2003 LIC 8 (Raj.HC)
Termination illegal, workman working for 240 continuous days in a calendar year, on account of
non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
State of Madhya Pradesh through Conservator of Forest & Ors. v. Ram Prakash Tiwari & Anr., 2003
(96) FLR 9 : 2003 LLR 9 (MP.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, proof of 240 days of continuous service adduced
by employee, on account of non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
Executive Engineer, Gujarat Water Supply & Severage Board, Junagadh v. Makwana Dhirajlal
Dahyalal, 2003 LIC 665 (Guj.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, workman working for 240 continuous days in a
calendar year, on account of non-compliance of Sec. 25F.
State and Others v. Bhopal Singh., 2003 (96) FLR 1144 : 2003 III LLN 492 : 2003 LLR 5494 : 2003 LLR
468 (Raj.HC)
Termination illegal, amounts to retrenchment, after completion of continuous service of 240
days.
High Court in writ petition no jurisdiction to re-appreciate evidence.
Navsari District Panchayat & Anr. v. Sumanbhai Morarbhai Patel & Anr., 2003 I LLN 1071 : 2003 LIC
1088 (Guj.HC)
Termination void ab initio as workman had completed 240 days and Sec. 25F not followed.
Executive Engineer, Power Plant v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, & Ors., 2004 (102) FLR 1122
(Ori.HC)
Shri Pal S/o Chander Bhan v. P.O. Industrial-cum-Labour Court & Anr., 2002 (95) FLR 401 : 2002 II
LLN 667 : 2002 LLR 371 : 2002 LIC 227 (P&H.HC)
John Fernanez & Anr. v. Executive Engineer, P.H. Dvn, Alleppey & Anr., 1979 (38) FLR 287 : 1979 LIC
255 (Ker.HC)
Government Nehru Degree College Sabalgarh Dist. Morena v. Ashok Kumar Verma & Ors., 1995 I LLJ
287 : 1995 (86) FJR 723 : 1995 I CLR 539 : 1994 LLR 857 (MP.HC)
2480
Sec. 25F
Termination illegal, if 240 days completed on re-employment and Sec. 25F not complied.
Alexandar Yesudas Maikel v. Perfect Oil Seals & Irp & Ors., 1996 I LLJ 533 : 1995 (70) FLR 1086 : 1995
I LLN 1165 : 1995 I CLR 942 : 1995 LLR 777 (Bom.HC)
Krishi Upaj Mandi Samiti Katghora v. Muzahid Hussain & Anr., 1998 III LLJ (Sum) 333 : 1995 (71)
FLR 405 : 1995 LLR 1018 (MP.HC)
Part-time Employee Worked for 240 days, terminated without complying Sec. 25F, illegal.
State of Rajasthan v. Ram Kumar & Anr.,1998 LIC 874 : 1998 LLR 583 (Raj.HC)
Managing Director, Sri Ganganagar Sahakari Spinning Mills Ltd. v. Labour Court, Bikaner & Ors.,
1997 IV LLN 820 : 1998 I LLJ 523 (Raj.HC)
Executive Engineer, Garhi & Anr. v. Kalia & Anr.,1998 LIC 1078 : 1998 LLR 586 (Raj.HC)
State of U.P. v. P.O. Labour Court & Anr., 2003 (96) FLR 317 (Uttar.HC)
Shri Pal Singh v. National Thermal Power Corporation Ltd. C.W.P., 2002 (95) FLR (Sum) 20 : 2002 LIC
1923 : 2002 II CLR 512 : 2002 LLR 529 : 2002 (95) FLR 9 (Del.HC)
Sawai Madhopur & Tonk Dugdhutpadak Sahkari Sangh Ltd.& Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., 2002
(92) FLR 811 : 2002 (94) FLR 151 : 2002 LLR 382 (Raj.HC)
Executive Engineer, Narmada Yojna & Anr. v. Legal Heirs of Bhagwanbhai Khodabhai Algotar & Anr.,
2001 (88) FLR 818 (Guj.HC)
Rameshbhai Nagarbhai Parmar & Anr. v. Halvad Nagarpalika & Ors., 2001 (91) FLR 785 (Guj.HC)
Madan Singh Shekhawat v. Sikar Central Co-operative Bank Ltd., 2001 (91) FLR 1042 (Raj.HC)
Mahindra & Mahindra Ltd. v. Digambar G. Pawaskar & Ors., 1997 I CLR 872 : 1997 LLR 589
(Bom.HC)
Umesh Saxena v. P.O. Labour Court, Agra, The Administrator, Nagar Palika, Fatehpur Sikri, Agra,
Officer-in-charge, Nagar Palika, Fatehpur Sikri, Agra, Water Works Engineer, Nagar palika, Fatehpur
Sikri, Agra, Executive Officer., 1993 (66) FLR 566 : 1993 I LLN 809 : 1993 LLR 118 (All.HC)
Umesh Saxena v. P.O. Labour Court, Agra, The Administrator, Nagar Palika, Fatehpur Sikri, Agra,
Officer-in-charge, Nagar Palika, Fatehpur Sikri, Agra, Water Works Engineer, Nagar palika, Fatehpur
Sikri, Agra, Executive Officer., 1993 (66) FLR 566 : 1993 I LLN 809 : 1993 LLR 118 (All.HC)
Kanhaiya Lal v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1994 (68) FLR (Sum) 33 : 1994 II LLJ 474 : 1993 I CLR 929
(Raj.HC)
Viney Kumar Majoo v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1968 II LLJ 398 : 1970 (37) FJR 22 : 1968 LIC 1180
(Raj.HC)
Jaipur Development Authority v. Suresh Chand, 1999 (83) FLR 224 (Raj.HC)
Goutam Chatterjee v. State of West Bangal & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 282 : 2001 (89) FLR 181 : 2001 III LLN
1021 : 2001 I CLR 781 : 2001 LLR 431 (Cal.HC)
Ram Swaroop Sharma v. Labour Court, Jaipur IInd & Anr., 2000 (85) FLR 102 (Raj.HC)
M.P. Electricity Board, Vidisha v. Hariram & Anr., 2000 (87) FLR 750 (MP.HC)
Gujarat Water Resources Development Corporation Ltd.& Anr. v. Vithalbhai Gambhilrbhai Bariya,
Vadodara, 2001 (89) FLR (Sum) 15 (Guj.HC)
Zonal Manager, Central Bank of India v. Union of India & Ors., 2003 II LLJ 234 : 2003 (96) FLR 842 :
2003 II LLN 108 : 2003 II CLR 437 : 2003 LLR 189 (Pat.HC)
State Bank of India v. Union of India & Ors., 2002 III LLJ 223 : 2002 (94) FLR 633 : 2002 III CLR 427
(Pat.HC)
Sanjay Kumar Jain v. Nagar Palika, Aron through the Chief Municipal Officer, 1998 II LLJ 555 : 1998 I
LLN 629 : 1998 LIC 1198 : 1998 LLR 218 (MP.HC)
Medical Officer, District Health Centre & Anr. v. Savjibhai Trikambhai Kansagra, 2003 (96) FLR 268 :
s2002 III CLR 838 : 2002 LIC 2659 (Guj.HC)
Predyumn Nath Pandey v. Life Insurance Corporation of India & Ors., 1979 LIC 831 (All.HC)
Workman of Municipal Corpn. of Delhi & Anr. v. Management of Municipal Corpn. of Delhi & Anr.,
1987 I LLJ 85:1987 II LLN 118 (Del.HC)
Shri Ram Deen v. State & Ors.,1993 LLR 474 (Raj.HC)
Khadim Ali v. State of Rajasthan., 1993 (67) FLR 345 (Raj.HC)
Norton Engineering Works v. P.O. Labour Court, Amritsar., 1998 (92) FJR 133 : 1997 III LLN 666 :
1997 LIC 2254 (P&H.HC)
The State of Punjab through Exective Engineer Central Works Division, Pathankot v. Bodh Raj S/o
Sunder Das & Anr., 1995 LLR 518 (P&H.HC)
Vinod Kumar v. Market Committee Bhiwanigarh & Ors., 1996 (88) FJR 431 : 1996 (73) FLR 1187
(P&H.HC)
Sec. 25F
2481
Chief Engineer, Irrigation Department, Haryana, & Anr. v. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court &
Anr., 1994 II LLN 663 (P&H.HC)
Shri Kishore B. Dave v. Dean, J.J. Group of Hospitals & Ors., 1994 III LLJ (Sum) 1001 : 1986 (52) FLR
380 : 1986 I CLR 172 (Bom.HC)
The termination of workman in contravention to Sec. 25F was set aside by Labour Court and the
same was upheld by High Court on the ground that workman completed 240 days service.
Block Development Officer & Anr. v. Chhagan Lal & Anr., 2005 LLR 717 (Raj.HC)
Standard Charted Bank, Ltd. v. Sudhakaar D. Khanvilkar & Anr., 2004 II LLN 927 (Bom.HC)
Termination of probationer in violation of Sec. 25F was held bad, since he rendered 240 days
service.
Ranchhodji C. Chauhan v. District Panchayat, through D.D.O. Palanpur & Anr., 2001 III LLJ 829
(Guj.HC)
R. Vijayakumari WITH R. Sivakumar & Ors. v. P.O. & Anr., 2001 III LLJ 833 : 2000 III LLJ 644 : 2001
(98) FJR 27 : 1999 IV LLN 383 : 1999 LIC 3450 (Mad.HC)
Executive Engineer M.P. Housing Board, Indore & Ors. v. Ramesh, 2006 (108) FLR 401 : 2006 LIC
1814 (MP.HC)
Administrative Officer, Municipal School Board & Ors. v. Mohan E. Jagtap, 2006 (110) FLR 265 : 2006
(2) BCR 873 (Bom.HC)
State of Gujarat v. Kiritbhai Somabhai Bariya c/o. Indian Employees Union, 2006 II LLJ 1079 : 2006
(109) FLR 770 : 2006 I CLR 1096 (Guj.HC)
Food Corporation of India v. P.O. & Anr., 2001 III LLJ 959 (Gau.HC)
Mansukhbhai Jivabhai & Ors. v. Bhavnagar Mahanagarpalika, 1997 (76) FLR 508 : 1997 II LLN 942 :
1997 I CLR 948 : 1997 LLR 582 (Guj.HC)
Rajwant Singh Rewat v. The District Foood & Supplies Controller, Ferozepur & Ors., 1996 I LLJ 637
(P&H.HC)
Commissioner, Tirvallur Municipality, Tiruvallur v. P.O. First Additional Labour Court, Chennai, &
Ors., 2002 II LLN 311 (Mad.HC)
C.K. Kumaran v. Idukki Jilla Motor Mazdoor Sangh (BMS) & Anr., 1995 I LLJ 323 : 1994 (85) FJR 340 :
1995 (70) FLR 113 : 1994 LLR 528 (Ker.HC)
Madhya Pradesh State Tourism Development Corporation v. Smt. Sita Bai Kushwaha, 2002 (94) FLR
425 : 2002 IV LLN 714 : 2002 LLR 566 (MP.HC)
Indian Overseas Bank v. Industrial Tribunal, Alapuzha & Anr., 2002 III LLJ 984 : 2003 (102) FJR 903 :
2002 LIC (Sum) 56 (Ker.HC)
Zilla Parishad, Dhule & Ors. v. Rajendra Hiraman Khairnar,. 1995 II LLJ 565 : 1995 (70) FLR 64 : 1994
II CLR 995 : 1995 LLR 183 (Bom.HC)
Ghansham v. Chief Conservator of Forests & Ors., 2000 I LLJ 459 : 1999 LIC 2193 (J&K.HC)
Senior Divisional Mechanical Engineer, Northern Railway, Lucknow v. P.O. Central Government
Labour Tribunal, & Ors., 1992 LIC 1586 (All.HC)
Rajendraprasad Shanklal Purohit v. Executive Engineer, Gramya Marg Vikas Yojna Vibhag, 2002 III
CLR 439 : 2002 LIC 3214 (Guj.HC)
R. Ravichandramoorthy & Ors. v. P.O. Labour Court, Salem & Ors., & Management of Institute of Road
Transport & Tenchology (represented by its Principal), Erode, 2003 I LLJ 729 : 2003 (96) FLR 459 :
2002 IV LLN 465 (Mad.HC)
Bharat Pump & Compressors Ltd. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 2004 (103) FLR 411 (All.HC)
State of Rajasthan v. Smt. Ratni, 2004 (106) FJR 613 : 2005 I LLN 384 (Raj.HC)
Termination is invalid, when employee has completed 240 days of service.
Workmen of Municipal Corp. of Delhi & Anr. v. Mgnt. Of Municipal Corp. of Delhi & Anr., 1986 (53)
FLR 223 (Del.HC)
Retrenchment includes termination of services of a pump assistant on ad hoc basis who has
completed 240 days of service.
Umesh Saxena v. P.O. Labour Court, Agra, The Administrator, Nagar Palika, Fatehpur Sikri, Agra,
Officer-in-charge, Nagar Palika, Fatehpur Sikri, Agra, Water Works Engineer, Nagar palika, Fatehpur
Sikri, Agra, Executive Officer., 1993 (66) FLR 566 : 1993 I LLN 809 : 1993 LLR 118 (All.HC)
2482
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2483
2484
Sec. 25F
b) Legal heirs can enforce the claim for retrenchment compensation and the right
survives even though the workman dies (LAT)
5A.534
The right of workman to receive compensation is a statutory right conferred u/s. 25F.
This right became rested in the workmen on fulfilment of the conditions laid down u/s. 25F. The
said right having been descended upon the heirs-at-law of the said workmen, they are entitled to
enforce the claim to recover the amount from the company and this right cannot be easily
dismissed on the ground that the workmen entitled to it have died. Therefore held that the dues due
to them should be paid to their heirs-at-law.
K.P. Dass and Co Ltd v. Howrah Zila Kharkhana mazdoor Congress, 1956 I LLJ 679 (LAT)
c) Proper forum is under Industrial Disputes Act but not under writ jurisdiction
(All.DB)
5A.535
Where workman alleged that he was illegally retrenched due to contravention of
Sec. 25F and the case of the employer was that the termination was automatic due to efflux of time,
exercising discretion, High Court refused to entertain writ petition filed by worker on the ground
that effective remedy under Industrial Disputes Act was available where Industrial Court could
consider whether termination in question was camouflage, malafide etc. which cannot be possibly
decided u/Art. 226.
Rakesh Kumar v. Uptron India Ltd. & Ors., 1989 (59) FLR 244 (All.DB)
Since the petitioner.into that controversy. (Page: 247, Para: 4)
Whether a writ.speedy and appropriate. (Page: 247, Para: 5)
5A.536
If termination is in violation of principle of natural justice and in non-compliance of
provisions of Sec. 25F, proceedings under Industrial Dispute Act for remedy are maintainable
Nathaniel Masih v. Uttar Pradesh Scheduled Caste Finance & Development Corpn. Ltd. & Ors., 1991 II
LLJ 347 : 1989 (59) FLR 620 : 1989 LIC 2276 : 1990 I LLN 334 : 1990 I CLR 159 (All.DB)
So far as.petition. (Page: 348, Para: 5)
5A.537
Court.
In case of termination of services in violation of Sec. 25F the proper forum is Labour
Wajeeh Ullah v. District Assistant Registrar Coop Societies, Banda & Ors., 1992 (64) FLR 20 (All.DB)
Regarding.Labour Court. (Page: 24, Para: 7)
5A.538
Remedy for temporary workmen appointed on contract basis apprehending their
termination without compliance with Sec. 25F is not a writ application but to raise an industrial
disputes specially when no cause of action has yet arisen.
Chairman, Midnapore Municipality v. Prabir Kumar Nag & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 1153 : 2001 LIC 1946
(Cal.DB)
The writ petitioners.of the programme. (Page: 1156, Para: 11)
Although Mr. Dutta.a writ petition. (Page: 1158, Para: 24)
A disputed question.has yet arisen. (Page: 1158, Para: 25)
Sec. 25F
2485
d) Workman on his reappointment for one month which does not include his
previous service can challenge his previous termination in violation of Sec. 25F
(Raj.DB)
5A.539
Services of Workman were terminated in contravention of Sec. 25F and Tribunal
directed reinstatement with full back wages Court held that since his subsequent reappointment
for one month does not continue his earlier service with out breaks it does not validate termination
and hence which still working under subsequent appointment order it will not estop workman
from challenging his earlier termination.
Rajasthan Rajya Pathya Pustak Mandal, Jaipur v. Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 1990 (60) FLR 250
(Raj.DB)
.the learned Judge.full back wages.The employer has.by the
Tribunal. (Page: 251, Para: 2)
.The clinching.made on 571980. (Page: 251, Para: 3)
2486
Sec. 25F
5A.543
Where a workman has completed 240 days of continuous service in a year, it was held
by the High Court that delay in approaching the Court or making a reference cannot be a ground
to decline the relief to the workman. Therefore, the award passed by the Labour Court granting
lump sum amount of Rs. 15,000 as back wages was modified on the ground that Delay and laches
had to be examined on the facts and circumstances of each case and therefore full back wages with
reinstatement was granted.
State of Punjab & Ors. v. Iqbal Singh & Anr., 2002 I CLR 678 (P&H.HC)
Sec. 25F
2487
8. Labour Court must find out whether employee is a workman and he has
completed 240 days of service to decide the question of retrenchment
compensation (Karn.HC)
5A.549
In a case, where in while terminating the services of a workman retrenchment
compensation was not paid, the task before the Labour Court was to find out whether the employee
was a workman u/s. 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 and whether he has put in continuous
services of 240 days before the day of termination and if these two conditions were fulfilled then he
is entitled to have compliance u/s. 25F of the Act.
Nagappa Hanumanthappa Lamani v. Management of Sericulture Department, 2002 (101) FJR 581 :
2002 (94) FLR 1183 : 2002 III LLN 1026 : 2002 III CLR 219 : 2002 III CLR 322 : 2002 LLR 1145
(Karn.HC)
10. The decision of High Court though was a summary dismissal operates as
res judicata against the same cause of action for the same relief before
Labour Court (P&H.DB)
5A.551
Once the termination order of probationer was held as legal on merits by the High
Court in a writ petition, though it was summary dismissal, principle of resjudicata u/s. 11 of Civil
Procedure Code applies and approaching Labour Court on same cause of action and for same
relief is debarred and hence the order of reinstatement by the Labour Court with 60% back wages
was quashed.
The Punjab State Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. P.O. Labour Court & Ors., 1993 II LLJ 260 (P&H.DB)
.If the High.the Labour Court. (Page: 262, Para: 7)
Since the order.cannot be sustained. (Page: 262, Para: 9)
2488
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2489
ii) High Court can entertain dispute of termination if Sec. 25F is violated since
it amounts to violation of natural justice (Mad.HC)
5A.556
Non-compliance of Sec. 25F would make the order of termination void ab-initio and
the workman could move directly to High Court under Art. 226 instead of approaching forums
constituted under Industrial Disputes Act because violation of the said provision amount to
violation of natural justice.
P.R. Ramachandran & Ors. v. Tamil Nadu Water Supply & Drainage Board & Ors., 1996 I LLJ
823:1996 (89) FJR 678:1996 (73) FLR 1548:1996 I LLN 845:1996 LLR 855 (Mad.HC)
iii) High Court not barred by availability of alternate remedy to grant relief
for retrenchment u/Art. 226 (Cal.DB)
5A.557
A temporary railway servant who had worked for more than one year was retrenched
without paying retrenchment compensation hence order was held to be not sustainable and Writ
Court rejected the ground of alternate remedy, it is not a bar to exercise jurisdiction u/Art. 226 and
allowed the petition.
Union of India & Ors. v. Jaydev Mandal & Ors., 1977 (34) FLR 359 (Cal.DB)
It has.availed of. (Page: 362, Para: 4)
Under.be sustained. (Page: 362, Para: 1)
5A.558
Termination of casual railway employee was held as illegal retrenchment due to
non-compliance of Sec. 25F and it was also held that availability of remedy u/s. 10 will not bar the
petition.
Asst. Personnel Officer, S. Rly Olvakkot v. K.T. Anthony, 1978 II LLJ 254 : 1978 LIC 394 : 1977 (35) FLR
439 (Ker.DB)
Termination in this.illegal, is correct. (Page: 257, Para: 3)
.Reference of industrial.42nd Amendment Act. (Page: 257, Para: 4)
2490
Sec. 25F
iv) When contravention of Sec. 25F is an admitted fact but not a dispute for
adjudication (Ori.DB)
5A.559
Where dispute is not related to adjudication of question of fact but is based on
admitted position as to contravention of Sec. 25F, then High Court can exercise jurisdiction
u/Art. 226.
Rajendra Prasad Jena & Anr. v. Orissa State Electricity Board & Ors., 1993 III LLJ 724 : 1989 LIC
(Sum) 111 : 1989 I CLR 598 (Ori.DB)
.The orders.retrenchments. (Page: 725, Para: 3)
In that case.no substance. (Page: 726, Para: 4)
vi) High Court can modify the relief granted u/s. 25F if industry is closed or is
in severe financial condition (Bom.HC)
5A.561
High Court can modify the relief granted u/s. 25F when the Industry might have
closed down or is in severe financial difficulty or the workman may have secured better
employment then the Court may deny reinstatement with back wages.
Vacuum Plant Kamgar Sanghtana v. Vacuum Plant & Instruments Fanufacturing Co. P. Ltd. & Anr.,
1999 II CLR 530 (Bom.HC)
2. When cannot be
i) High Court cannot interfere where no jurisdictional error/procedural
irregularity is committed (Guj.HC)
5A.562
In the instant case, as Sec. 25B of Industrial Disputes Act had been satisfied but Sec.
25F of the Act was not complied with Labour Court granted reinstatement without back wages to
the workman who had worked for more than 240 days. This award was challenged in the High
Court by filing writ petition. High Court was of the opinion that where there was no jurisdictional
error and no procedural irregularity committed, High Court could not interfere with the award.
Therefore High Court held the award valid and workman was directed to be reinstated with
continuity of service without back wages till the date of the award but with full back wages from
date of award till actual reinstatement.
Gujarat Housing Board, Rajkot v. Meenakshiben Bhanushankar Bhatt, 2002 LLR 793 : 2002 LIC 1546
(Guj.HC)
ii) High Court cannot decide questions of fact like whether or not the
workman completed 240 days of service (All.HC)
5A.563
Employee raised an industrial dispute when his services came to be terminated.
According to him he worked from 24.10.1985 to 31.7.1986 and therefore, termination of his
services without complying with Sec. 25F is illegal. Industrial Tribunal accepted his contention.
Employer-Corporation filed a writ petition submitting that the employee had not completed 240
days of service. High Court held that the Industrial Tribunal has found as a fact that the employee
Sec. 25F
2491
had worked for 240 days and more and that the finding of fact cannot be questioned in the writ
petition, that there is violation of Sec. 25F and as such the findings of the Industrial Tribunal is
upheld.
Senior Branch Manager, Life Insurance Corporation of India, Kanpur v. Central Government Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur & Anr., 1997 I LLN 155 : 1997 I CLR 427 (All.HC)
5A.564
Services of a daily wager, who was in continuous service was terminated without
complying with the provision of Sec. 25F, Labour Court held that the termination was illegal. This
finding of fact based on evidence on record cannot be interfered with by the High Court.
State of M.P. v. Km. Pratibha Badlani & Ors., 2002 (95) FLR 1161 (MP.HC)
Note: also refer to the following cases in he above context
R. Sankaran v. The P.O. Additional Labour Court, Madras & Anr., 1977 (50) FJR 28 : 1977 I LLN 94 :
1977 LIC 1338 (Mad.HC)
Reserve Bank of India v. S. Mani & Ors., 1999 II CLR 1021 (Karn.HC)
iii) When alternate remedy is available under Industrial Disputes Act (All.DB)
5A.565
The workman has been retrenched in violation of Sec. 25F and remedy is available to
him in the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and hence writ jurisdiction of the High Court
cannot be invoked until such remedy has been exhausted.
Divisional Engineer, Head Quarters, N.R. Lucknow v. Durgesh Kumar, 1976 (33) FLR 365 : 1977 I LLN
52 (All.DB)
In our opinion.the Court. (Page: 369, Para: 8)
For the.the Constitution. (Page: 375, Para: 19)
5A.566
Order of termination was challenged by way of a writ petition on the ground that Sec.
25F was not complied with and demanding retrenchment compensation. High Court denied
exercising its discretion, as remedy was available under Industrial Disputes Act.
Mukul Kumar Shukla v. Hindustan Times Ltd., 2002 (95) FLR 944 : 2002 III CLR 677 : 2003 LLR 91
(Del.HC)
Note: also refer to the following case/s in the above context
Moinuddin & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1981 LIC 697 (Raj.HC)
Nazir Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1994 II LLJ 1059 (Raj.HC)
Shanker Lal Mali, Petitioner v. State of Rajasthan and others, Respondents, 1980 LIC 964 (Raj.HC)
iv) Writ not maintainable in case of non-compliance of Sec. 25F unless there is
proof of legal injury or infringement of legal right of the employee (Pat.HC)
5A.567
Daily wage employees were retrenched from service in accordance with Sec. 25F.
They preferred to file writ petition after their case was not accepted favourably by the Labour
Court. The High Court held that when the employees failed to demonstrate any legal injury to
them or any infringement of legal right in them to warrant interference with the impugned order,
the employees cannot prefer an action in exercise of writ jurisdiction.
Ram Chandra Shah & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2001 III LLJ 296 : 2000 (86) FLR 72 : 2000 III LLN
402 : 2000 II LLR 1003 (Pat.HC)
2492
Sec. 25F
v) When writ involves pure question of facts like whether employee worked
for 240 days (S.C.2J)
F 5A.568 Where the Industrial Tribunal had come to a finding that the workman had worked
for 240 days; which was also subsequently upheld by the High Court, the Supreme Court dismissed
the special leave petition holding that since it was a pure question of fact, Supreme Court cant
entertain it.
Processing Manager, Exp. Oriental Handloom v. Madan Gopal, 2006 SCC (L&S) 643 (S.C.2J)
The Tribunal by its award after considering the evidence adduced by the parties, has given specific
finding that the respondent workman has worked for 240 days continuously from 1.5.1986 till
17.12.1987. This finding of fact has been accepted by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division
Bench in the writ petition and the LPA respectively. This being a pure question of fact, we find no merit in
this appeal and the same is dismissed. (Page: 643, Para: 2)
F 5A.569 An employee was terminated from service without following provisions of Sec. 25F.
On writ petition in the High Court, the employee succeeded. On further appeal the Supreme Court
held that there was a dispute whether the employee had worked for more than 240 days in one year
or not which is a question of fact and should not have been entertained by the HighCourt in the writ
petition directly but the proper remedy was to refer it to the Labour Court. It set aside as the
judgment and made a direction to Government to makes a reference to Labour Court.
Chairman, Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Ltd. v. Shyamal Chandra Bhowmik, 2006 I LLJ 419 : 2006 I
LLN 91 : 2006 LIC 130 : 2006 I CLR 18 : 2006 LLR 70 : 2006 AIR (SC) 392 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 113 :
2006 (1) SCC 337 (S.C.2J)
.High Courts should n6t entertain writ petitions directly when claim of service of more than 240
days in a year is raised. Whether a person has worked for more than 240 days or not is a disputed question
of fact which is not to be examined by the High Court. Proper remedy for the person making such a claim
is to raise an industrial dispute under the Act so that the evidence can be analysed and conclusion can be
arrived at. As in the instant case the legal position has not been analysed in the proper perspective, it
would be appropriate if the matter is decided by the forum provided under the Act. (Page: 423, Para: 13)
vi) When fresh issues were raised before High Court but not before Industrial
Tribunal (Guj.HC)
5A.570
Union on behalf of daily wagers made reference. Tribunal granted benefits of
permanency to those who had completed 240 days and also directed employer to make seniority
list. Tribunal rejected all other demands. Employer filed a writ petition on the ground that
Industrial Tribunal did not frame any issue. High Court set aside the petition stating that said issue
couldnt be raised at this stage.
Dy. Conservator of Forest v. Shramjivi General Workers Union 2001 (89) FLR 213 : 2001 II LLN 1054 :
2001 LIC (Sum) 46 (Guj.HC)
vii) Cannot be for contesting ex-parte award when employer failed to contest
the reference before Tribunal (Del.HC)
5A.571
The Industrial Tribunal held that the workman was in continuous services for more
than 240 days and was illegally terminated since he was not given any show cause notice nor any
enquiry was held as required by Sec. 25F of the Act 1947 and the order of reinstatement of the
workman was passed ex-parte accordingly. The High Court dismissed the writ petition filed by the
employer and held that the petitioner was an industry and the respondent was a workman and if
the employer had not contested the reference before the Industrial Tribunal it was at its own peril.
The High Court, therefore, found no scope of interfering with the decision of the Tribunal.
Management of CCW v. Partap Sing, 2005 II LLJ 146 : 2005 (105) FLR 227 : 2005 LLR 230 (Del.HC)
Sec. 25F
2493
viii) When order dismissing the writ against Labour Courts order of
reinstatement operates as resjudicata in the subsequent writ appeal filed by
management against writ for back wages by workman (S.C.3J)
F 5A.572 Labour Court came to the conclusion that termination of service was not in
compliance with Sec. 25F hence granted reinstatement but did not grant other benefits like
back-wages etc. On the writ being filed by both the employee and employer, the employees writ
came to be allowed with all benefits but the employers writ was dismissed. On management filing
appeal it came to be rejected ex-parte at the admission stage itself. The management also filed writ
appeal against the order in the writ by the employee. The Division Bench in their order, unaware of
the dismissal of the writ by management in earlier appeal, reversed the decision of the Labour
Court and also the Single Judge of High Court. Against this order the employee preferred appeal to
Supreme Court, which concluded that it is not necessary to consider the grounds upon which the
High Court held that the employee was not entitled to the benefits u/s. 25F as the issue was already
decided earlier in the dismissed writ petition of the management and that acted as res judicata.
Hence the Supreme Court set aside the impugned order of the Division Bench of High Court and up
held has order of single judge.
Lal Singh Ram Singh Rajput v. Assistant Executive Engineer, 2005 II LLJ 256 : 2005 (105) FLR 376 :
2005 II LLN 991 : 2005 II CLR 116 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 868 (S.C.3J)
The appellant-management filed another writ appeal against the order of the learned Single Judge in the
writ petition filed by the workman seeking enhanced relief. This was done by way of a writ appeal No.
8318 of 1999, very much after its earlier writ appeal had been dismissed. Obviously in the second writ
appeal the management did not disclose the fact that its earlier writ appeal challenging the award had
already been dismissed. This writ appeal which could have been only against the order of the Single
Judge granting continuity of service came to be entertained by another Division Bench of the High Court,
notice of which was issued to the workman who had no knowledge of the earlier writ appeal being
dismissed. In that background, obviously the second Division Bench hearing the second writ appeal of
the management was unaware of the judgment of another Division Bench made in writ appeal No. 4374
of 1998.
In the absence of any such information the Division Bench in the second writ appeal noted that the
challenge in the said writ appeal was against the direction of the learned Single Judge granting
reinstatement of the appellant-workman as also against the benefit of continuity of service and other
consequential benefits granted. This, as stated above, is factually incorrect because the question of any
challenge by the management against the reinstatement order made by the labour court as affirmed by the
learned Single Judge and by the Division Bench by dismissal of appeal, could not have been the subject
matter of a second appeal before the High Court. (Page: 257, Para: 4)
Proceeding on that erroneous basis the Division Bench of the High Court considering the grounds raised
by the appellant afresh and contrary to the view taken by the Division Bench in the earlier writ appeal
reversed the findings of the Labour Court and came to the conclusion that the evidence produced by the
appellant-workman in regard to his continuous work for 240 days in the management establishment was
unacceptable. On the said basis it set aside the award of the Labour Court as well as the order of the
learned Single Judge with a direction that the wages, if any, already paid to the workman should not be
recovered. (Page: 257, Para: 6)
It is against this order of the Division Bench of the High Court the appellant is before us in this appeal.
We do not think it is necessary for us to consider the grounds on which the High Court in the impugned
order came to the conclusion that the appellant is not entitled to the benefit of Section 25(F) of the Act
because the challenge, if any, on this ground by the respondent to the order of reinstatement made by the
Labour Court is hit by the principle of res judicata. As noticed hereinabove that issue stood concluded by
the judgment of the Division Bench made in writ appeal 8794 of 1998 holding that there was no
compliance of Section 25(F) of the Act by the respondent-management when the appellants services
were terminated, and there being no further challenge to the said order, that order being inter parties, the
management was precluded from questioning the said reinstatement in the second writ appeal. It is
because of the fault committed by the management in not bringing to the notice of the second Division
Bench the factum of its earlier appeal being dismissed that misled the High Court in the Second writ
appeal into going to the question of validity of the order of termination, which question as stated above
2494
Sec. 25F
already stood concluded in favour of the workman. Hence, the question whether the workman had
established that he had put in 240 days of continuous work immediately prior to his dismissal, was not a
question available for the second Division Bench to be considered afresh. On that ground alone impugned
order of the High Court is liable to be set aside. (Page: 257, Para: 7)
ix) High Court cannot dismiss a writ on grounds of delay without ascertaining
facts for delay like agitating in wrong forum ignorantly (S.C.2J)
F 5A.573 Some casual labourer had remained absent for a period of six months. On rejoining
they were not given any benefit for past services and they were treated as having joined afresh. The
Labour Court held that this meant that there was in fact, termination since Sec. 25F was not
complied with and awarded reinstatement and back wages. The employer by an error filed an
original application before the Central Administrative tribunal, and when it came to light that it
was wrong forum ordered that the matter be taken up before the right forum. On writ petition the
High Court dismissed the case stating that it was filed belatedly. The Supreme Court held that the
High Court was in error in not taking not of the factual position as was clearly mentioned in the
writ petition and set aside the order of High Court and remitted the same to it for decision on merit.
SubDivisional Officer, Telegraph, Bijnor v. Presiding Officer, Central Government Industrial
TribunalCumLabour Court, Kanpur, 2006 I LLJ 1085 : 2006 (108) FLR 1153 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 420
(S.C.2J)
.By order dated 17.12.1997 CAT disposed of the matter holding that the proceedings before it
were not maintainable. It was, however, inter alia observed as follows:
Nothing in this order shall however, preclude the applicant from seeking redressal of his grievances from
an appropriate forum. (Page: 1086, Para: 5)
The writ application was filed in February, 1998 and has been dismissed as afore-noted by order dated
30.4.1998. (Page: 1086, Para: 6)
A perusal of the factual scenario as noted above clearly indicates that the writ petition was not belated as
was observed by the High Court. It is unfortunate that the High Court did not take note of the relevant
factors and the intervening circumstances and by a cryptic order dismissed the writ application holding
that it was highly belated. Had the High Court applied its mind to the factual background facts it could not
have come to the conclusions as arrived at. It is true, if there is abnormal delay in filing a writ petition and
there is no plausible explanation for the same, the Court can decline to entertain it on the ground of laches.
But the fact situation is entirely different here. In paragraphs 47 to 50 of the writ petition filed before the
High Court, all relevant details were indicated. Unfortunately, the High Court has not taken note of that.
(Page: 1086, Para: 6)
Sec. 25F
2495
j) Prosecution
1. Can be initiated for violation of Sec. 25F (Ori.HC)
5A.577
Employer if does not comply with the provisions of Sec. 25F(b) of the Act can be
prosecuted even before the retrenchment compensation due to the concerned workman is
computed under the provisions of Sec. 33C of the Act.
Mahadev Prasad Gupata & Anr. v. State, 1964 II LLJ 546 (Ori.HC)
2496
Sec. 25F
b) Plea of non-compliance of section to be raised before the lower Courts but not
before Higher Courts (S.C.2J)
F 5A.580 Since the plea of non compliance of section by retrenched workmen was not raised
before High Court nor was it taken even in SLP rather it was sought to be taken only at the time of
hearing before Apex Court it was held as not maintainable on grounds of no requisite pleadings
being raised or documents brought on record and also considering that the controversy was only
confined to 55 workers, submission based on Sec. 25N of the Act for non-compliance was held as
irrelevant.
Pramod Jha and Ors. v. State of Bihar and Ors., 2003 II LLJ 159 : 2003 (97) FLR 110 : 2003 III LLN 34 :
2003 LIC 1449 : 2003 LLR 419 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 545 : 2003 AIR (SC) 1872 : 2003 (4) SCC 619
(S.C.2J)
Faced with this situation, a last effort was made by the learned senior counsel for the appellants urging
for relief being allowed on the ground of non-compliance with the provision of Section 25-N of the Act.
Section 25-N is placed in Chapter V-B of the Act which according to Section 25-K has an application
only to industrial establishment in which not less than 100 workmen were employed on an average
working day for the preceding 12 months. The plea was not raised before the High Court. It is not even
taken in the special leave petitions. It was sought to be taken only at the time of hearing. The plea need not
detain us any longer. The infirmity in retrenchment by reference to Section 25-N cannot be ventured to be
found out without laying factual foundation attracting applicability of the provision. It is basically a
question of fact. In the absence of requisite pleadings having been raised and documents having been
brought on record, we are not persuaded to entertain the plea. On the contrary, Mr. B.B. Singh, the
learned counsel for the State has pointed out that the controversy in this case is confined only to 55
workers and therefore the submission based on Section 25-N of the Act is totally irrelevant and devoid of
any merit. (Page: 163, Para: 16)
Sec. 25F Pleadings by either party-what can be and appropriate forum where can be made
2497
d) Plea of probationer that he was workman and completed 240 days raised for
first time in writ appeal is untenable (AP.DB)
5A.582
Since plea of probationer that he was workman and had completed 240 days and
hence his termination is hit by Sec. 25F was raised for first time in writ appeal and hence it was held
as untenable.
E. Ramesh Kumar v. The Administrative Officer, 1996 LIC 2154 (AP.DB)
The further ground.in the appeal. (Page: 2157, Para: 11)
f) Pleading that employment is tenure based cannot be taken by the employer for
the first time in the appeal before Apex Court (S.C.2J)
F 5A.584 Where a workman was appointed as computer helper, his services were later came to
be terminated upon challenge the Labour Court held that Sec. 25F was violated as no notice or
compensation was paid to him and he was reinstated as a computer programmer with full back
wages and continuity of service. The appeal of the employer before High Court against the decision
was dismissed. Employer moved Supreme Court contending that the workman was appointed
contractual basis for a specific term from July 1st, 1998 to 31.8.1999 and his termination was for
non-renewal of contract. Rejecting the plea, the Supreme Court held that such a contention was
never raised by the employer before Labour Court or High Court and therefore he can not raise
the same before Supreme Court for the first time. The employee also did not plead and prove that
the workman was suitably informed about the contractual nature of service at the time of
appointment and this also can not be raised for the first time. The Supreme Court however
modified the award reinstateting him as computer helper as clerical grade and not as programmer
and upheld the award in all other respects.
Sonepat Co-Op. Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Rakesh Kumar, 2006 I LLJ 688 : 2006 (108) FLR 592 : 2006 I LLN
850 : 2006 I CLR 277 : 2006 LLR 161 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1496 (S.C.2J)
.The appellant never contended before the Labour Court or the High Court that the appointment
was contractual for a specific term from 1.7.1998 to 31.8.1999 and that the termination was on account of
now renewal of such contract. Nor was it pleaded or proved that Respondent was informed at the time of
appointment that appointment was contractual up to 31.8.1999. The appellant can not raise such a
contention for the first time before us. The pleadings and evidence clearly show that the termination is
retrenchment. The first contention is, therefore, rejected. (Page: 689/690, Para: 6)
2498
Sec. 25F
From the evidence led before the Labour Court, the finding recorded by the Labour Court that the
respondent was employed on daily wage basis and had worked for more than 240 days during the period
of 12 months before the date of termination, did not call for interference. The appellant had examined one
Randhir Singh, Time Keeper as MW-2 who had produced the Attendance Register for the period
1.7.1998 to 31.8.1999 and specifically admitted that as per the Attendance Register, the respondent had
worked continuously between the said period and further admitted that the respondent had worked for
more than 240 days in a period of one year prior to respondents termination. In view of it there was a
clear violation of Section 25F and we find no error in the direction for reinstatement.
(Page: 690, Para: 7)
.The Respondent did not produce any document to show that he was appointed as a
Programmer. In the demand notice under Section 2A, he merely stated that he was engaged to work in
the computer department and grayed that he may be reinstated into service. The Labour Court was not
justified in directing that the respondent should be reinstated as a Computer Programmer, as he was
appointed as a Helper in the Computer Department. The reinstatement can, therefore, be only as a helper
and not as Computer Programmer. As the records clearly show that he was appointed in a non-manual
clerical post in the computer department his reinstatement shall be as Helper involving clerical work (not
necessarily in the computer section), but not as a manual labourer. (Page: 690, Para: 9)
h) Plea that department is closed is to be taken before Labour Court but not High
Court (Mad.HC)
5A.586
If a plea of closure of department is not taken before Labour Court then the same
cannot be taken in High Court. Termination of casual workmen amounts to retrenchment. In this
case, termination was unjustified as Sec. 25F was not complied. Thus, the award of reinstatement is
upheld.
The Pilot Pen Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. The P.O. Additional Labour Court, Madras & Anr., 1971 I LLJ 241 :
1971 (22) FLR 337 (Mad.HC)
5A.587
The services of workman were terminated for alleged misconduct. Labour Court held
termination as invalid in the absence of enquiry and granted reinstatement without backwages.
Writ was filed by the employer against reinstatement of the workman as he had not completed 240
days as per Sec. 25B and hence provisions of Sec. 25F were not violated and questioned the
jurisdiction of Labour Court. High Court held that since the above matters were not brought
before competent authority and Labour Court, there is no need to interfere with the said order.
Rahoorianwali Co-operative Agriculture Service Society Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, 2004
(107) FJR 996 (P&H.HC)
Sec. 25F Pleadings by either party-what can be and appropriate forum where can be made
2499
2500
Sec. 25F
wages prevalent at the time of the retrenchment. In the absence of any basis for this new plea we are
unable to reopen an ancient matter of 1966 and, agreeing with the High Court, dismiss the appeal. But the
16 workmen being eligible admittedly for the Wage Board scale, will be paid the difference for the period
between 1-4-1966 to 5-11-1966. (Page: 125, Para: 3)
n) Plea of infirmity in notice to be specific and precise and not in the form of a
general plea (S.C.3J)
F 5A.593 In order to challenge the infirmity in retrenchment notice, it is necessary that grounds
given are not general but specific and precise so as to enable the appellant to meet it.
Management of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Their Workmen & Ors., 1973 (43) FJR 192 : 1973 (26) FLR 136 :
1973 I LLN 208 : 1973 LIC 461 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 195 : 1973 AIR (SC) 878 : 1973 (3) SCC 564 (S.C.3J)
It is also clear that the respondent had not specifically raised any plea of defect in the notice given to Shri
Naidu. The Tribunal, however, allowed the objection of the notice Ex. 7 being conditional to be argued on
the view that the notice was infirm on the face of it and that the objection was covered by the general plea
in the written statement filed on behalf of Shri Naidu, to the effect that the grounds given in the
retrenchment notice were all false and cooked up. On this view the notice was held to be conditional and,
therefore, invalid and Shri Naidu was held entitled to be reinstated. (Page: 199/200, Para: 3)
In our view, Shri Setalvad was fully justified in submitting that the management had been taken by
surprise and that the Tribunal was in error in holding the general ground in the written statement to cover
the specific plea of infirmity of the notice because of its being conditional. The plea of the statutory defect
in the notice should, in our opinion, have been reasonably specific and precise so as to enable the
appellant to meet it. The general plea could not serve the object of putting the appellant on guard about the
precise case to be met at the trial and tell the management the precise nature of the plea with respect to the
defect in the notice, to enable them to meet it. In our view, if Clause (b) of Section 25-F is excluded from
consideration and the plea relating to infirmity of the notice is ruled out, as we hold on these two points in
Sec. 25F Pleadings by either party-what can be and appropriate forum where can be made
2501
agreement with Shri Setalvad, then, the impugned order is clearly insupportable. We are, therefore,
constrained to allow the appeal, set aside the impugned award and hold that the retrenchment of Shri
Naidu was proper and justified. (Page: 200, Para: 1)
2502
Sec. 25F
2. Employees who worked for 240 days during the period of 12 calendar
months preceding termination (Del.HC)
5A.598
Labour Court granted reinstatement with back wages and continuity of service and
the award of the Labour Court was challenged. Held that as per Sec. 25B if the workman had
worked for 240 days during a period of 12 calendar months preceding termination to which the
calculation is made, he would be deemed to be in continuous service and where the workman had
worked for 288 days, he was entitled to benefit of Sec. 25F.
Municipal Copo of Delhi v. Jai Veer & Anr., 2003 II CLR 886 (Del.HC)
Sec. 25F
2503
c) Relief of Reinstatement
1. The expression deemed to be in service in the award means
reinstatement (Ker.HC)
5A.601
The Industrial Court ordered that the employees would be allowed to be in service as
the retrenchment was found to be in violation of Sec. 25F. The employee applied u/s. 17B for
payment of their wages. The High Court held that the order of the Industrial Court though not
explicit, meant that the employees should be reinstated. Since the Tribunal had found that the
workmen were retrenched in violation of Sec. 25F it directed that the workmen would be deemed
to be in service. Hence, the High Court allowed the application u/s. 17B by the workmen and
ordered payment of wages during the pendency of the writ petition.
Transporting & General Worker Union & Ors. v. M/s. La yard Food Ltd., 2006 I LLJ 1152 : 2006 (109)
FLR 686 : 2005 LIC 4030 (Ker.HC)
3. When can be
i) When workman proved having worked 240 days with the help of muster
roll (S.C.2J)
F 5A.603 Reinstatement with full backwages was upheld by Supreme Court as there was non
compliance of the section while terminating the employee who had completed 240 days of service.
Deep Chandra v. State of U.P. & Anr., 2001 I LLJ 742 : 2001 (88) FLR 508 : 2001 III LLN 820 : 2001
LLR 312 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 1010 : 2001 (10) SCC 606 (S.C.2J)
.The High Court lost sight of the point in issue that is, when an employee had put in service for
more than 240 days in each year for several years whether his services can be put to an end to without
following the procedure prescribed under section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act. If there has been
violation thereof in his original service on the same terms and conditions in which he was working earlier.
If this is the position in law, we fail to understand as to how the High Court could have interfered with the
award made by the Labour Court. We set aside the order made by the Labour Court. The appeal is allowed
accordingly. (Page: 743, Para: 2)
ii) When a workman even a casual one worked for 5 years (AP.DB)
5A.604
Casual workman, employed under contract of service, worked continuously for 5
years Sec. 25F was held to be attracted and hence termination in violation thereof was set aside and
reinstatement was granted.
Smt. T. Yadamma v. National Remote Sensing Agency & Anr., 1998 I LLJ 109 : 1998 I LLN 127 : 1998
LLR (Sum) 576 (AP.DB)
The judgement.the award. (Page: 112, Para: 10)
2504
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2505
2506
Sec. 25F
v) When there is violation of the section though the appointment is dehors the
Act (Raj.DB)
5A.612
Once it was shown that workman had actually worked for 240 days during period of
12 calendar months, both conditions u/s. 25B i.e. service for 240 days and employment for 12
months were fulfilled and also the employer failed to prove the special circumstances as claimed by
him in which principle of last come first go u/s. 25G was not required to be adhered and it was held
that even if appointment was dehors the Act, termination must conform to the law and hence
termination in violation of Sec. 25F was rightly set aside by Labour Court and Single judge and
reinstatement with 40% backwages was upheld.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Mahendra Joshi & Anr., 2003 I LLJ 256 : 2002 (95) FLR 595 : 2003 III LLN
484 (Raj.DB)
.the termination was.Industrial Disputes Act 1947. (Page: 257, Para: 4)
The Tribunal found.dispute about that. (Page: 257, Para: 6)
.the workman was.50% backwages. (Page: 257, Para: 10)
The special circumstances.any ground whatever. (Page: 259, Para: 26)
Learned.1947. (Page: 259, Para: 27)
If the.retrenchment. (Page: 260, Para: 29)
Sec. 25F
2507
vii) Reinstatement is the relief for non-compliance of Sec. 25F though services
were terminated under standing orders (Bom.DB)
5A.614
Irrespective of contention of management that dismissal was under Standing Orders
which did not require any opportunity to be given to concerned workman to show cause against his
termination Court held that since observance of requirements of Sec. 25F is a condition precedent
to retrenchment therefore before any action under aforesaid Standing Orders could be taken Sec.
25F had to be complied with and since there was non compliance of the same Court directed
reinstatement of the workman upholding decision of the Tribunal.
Devidayal Nanackchand Sharma v. State Industrial Court, Nagpur & Ors., 1961 I LLJ 167 (Bom.DB)
On behalf of.dismissed from service. (Page: 168, Para: 3)
.section 25F of.conditions are satisfied. (Page: 168, Para: 7)
.the heading of section 25-F.of standing order 23. (Page: 169, Para: 2)
.we allow the.reinstate the petitioner. (Page: 170, Para: 3)
2508
Sec. 25F
award.This
Court
cannot.is
Sec. 25F
2509
xii) Reinstatement proper when one workman not taken back while other
delinquent workmen were taken back after strike (Del.HC)
5A.620
The services of a workman who was appointed as lab technician were terminated as he
participated in the strike. Labour Court quashed the termination as bad since neither chargesheet
was given to the workman nor the conditions of Sec. 25F were complied with and it ordered
reinstatement with full back wages. High Court upheld the said order on the ground that the
workman was not taken back while other delinquent workmen were taken back resulting in
discrimination.
Delhi Jal Board v. Presiding officer and Anr., 2004 II LLJ 569 (Del.HC)
.The respondent.proceeding in CWP No. 2768/986. (Page: 570, Para: 1)
xv) Reinstatement cannot be denied when Labour Court gave a clear finding
that termination was illegal (Del.HC)
5A.623
A writ petition was preferred by the workman against the award, wherein, his claim of
wrongful termination was rejected. The question before the Labour Court was whether employees
services were terminated illegally or whether he had abandoned his services. The High Court held
that when the Labour Court had given a clear finding that the services of the workman was illegally
terminated then the Labour Court should have passed an award of reinstatement with 50% back
wages.
Anil Kumar v. The P.O. Labour Court No. 2 & Anr., 2000 (84) FLR 522 : 2000 LLR 142 (Del.HC)
2510
Sec. 25F
xvii) Reinstatement cannot be denied when termination does not fall within the
purview of exceptions u/s. 2(oo) (All.HC)
5A.625
Where the Labour Court awarded compensation in lieu of reinstatement upon a
finding that the termination of the daily wage workman was void-ab-initio, the High Court in
appeal, held that when the termination does not fall within the exclusive part of the Sec. 2(oo), the
normal relief of reinstatement should be given and quashed the award of Labour Court.
Ahmed Ullah Siddique v. P.O. Labour Court, Lucknow & Ors.,1990 I LLJ 109 : 1989 (59) FLR 265 :
1989 II LLN 564 (All.HC)
xviii) When a workmans services are terminated even after completion of 240
days by oral orders while that of similarly placed employees were
continued (Raj.DB)
5A.626
Ordinarily the order of compensation by Labour Court instead of reinstatement with
back wages is not interfered with but since in instant case a duly appointed employee having
worked for more than 240 days in calendar year was terminated by oral order whereas other
employees appointed along with him were continued, Labour Courts award of only compensation
instead of reinstatement with back wages merely on grounds of delay of 4 years was substituted by
reinstatement without back wages.
Dharamveer Singh v. State of Rajasthan, 2001 II LLJ 1168 : 2001 (89) FLR 994 (Raj.DB)
Ordinarily, when the.of Rs. 20,000. (Page: 1169, Para: 7)
.He is granted.early as possible. (Page: 1170, Para: 12)
Sec. 25F
2511
2512
Sec. 25F
5A.630
The services of Machine operater terminated as per Standing Order on not joining
duty on completion of 5 months after sanctioned leave on which workman raised industrial
dispute. Labour Court held that the termination of the services of the workman amounted to
retrenchment u/s. 2(oo) of the Act and since the retrenchment had been effected without complying
with the provisions of Sec. 25F the termination from service was illegal and directed to reinstate
him with 50% back wages. On being challenged, Single Judge denied back wages but as the
establishment was closed it was held that relief of reinstatement is not warranted in this case and
offer of employer of voluntary retirement benefits should be awarded which is just and proper.
Infomedia India Ltd. v. Suhas Shripad Gadre & Anr., 2007 II LLJ 467 : 2007 (113) FLR 669 : 2007 III
LLN 188 : 2007 I CLR 846 : 2007 LLR 779 : 2007 (1) BCR 188 : 2007 (1) Mah.LJ 193 (Bom.HC)
Note: also refer to the following case
Ravindra Gopal Shinde v. National Textile Corporation (South Maharashtra) Limited & Ors., 2006 III
CLR 813 (Bom.HC)
iv) Reinstatement cannot be when workman did not complete 240 days
(S.C.2J)
F 5A.631 The Labour Court reinstated the workman as Sec. 25F was not complied with. High
Court also dismissed the writ petition filed against the order. On appeal Supreme Court set aside
the award of Labour Court because records revealed that the workman did not complete 240 days
continuous service.
Huda v. Jagmal Singh, 2006 III LLJ 152 : 2006 (110) FLR 767 : 2006 LLR 947 : 2006 (5) SCC 764 : 2006
SCC (L&S) 1193 (S.C.2J)
We are unable to appreciate the approach made by the Labour Court in calculating the statutory period
of 240 days in a year. In our opinion, both the Labour Court and the High Court have failed to appreciate
the fact that the respondent has failed to complete the statutory period of 240 days in a year to entitle him
for claiming any benefits whatsoever. As already noticed, evidence has been led to the said fact before the
Labour Court but still the issue of attendance of the respondent has been decided in his favour. This apart,
the respondent was appointed only as a daily wage earner and not as a permanent employee of the
appellant and hence the respondent cannot claim any right to the post in question and that no right has
accrued to him to claim any benefits from the appellant. This fact has been overlooked by the Labour
Court and also by the High Court. The fact remains that the respondent has not worked for the statutory
period of 240 days which has been clearly established by the appellant. It is settled law that the workman
has to prove that he had worked for 240 days. In the instant case, the workman has not established that he
has served the appellant for the statutory period of 240 days. (Page: 153, Para: 6)
F 5A.632 Workman was reinstated by Labour Court as Sec. 25F was not complied with Single
Judge and Division Bench refused to interfere with the award. Supreme Court set aside the Labour
Courts order since records revealed that workmen completed only 227 days service in a period of 4
years and held the Single Judge and Division Bench committed error of law on the face of the
record in ordering reinstatement.
Rajasthan Tourism Development Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Intejam Ali Zafri, 2006 III LLJ 155 : 2006
(110) FLR 773 : 2006 III LLN 829 : 2006 LLR 942 : 2006 (6) SCC 275 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1314 (S.C.2J)
The respondent has not worked for 240 days in one calendar year which is the condition precedent for
attracting provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. This apart, the workman was a
causal house assistant who never worked for 240 days continuously in one calendar year. As per the
provisions of Section 25(B) of the Industrial Disputes Act, there should be working of 240 days in one
calendar year. Hence, the provisions of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act are not attracted in the
instant case for the reason that the respondent worked only for 227 days in about 4 years period from the
date of his initial appointment i.e. 28.12.1987 to the date of termination i.e. 07.02.1992. In our opinion,
the learned Single Judge as also the learned Judges of the Division Bench of the High Court have
committed a mistake of law in ordering reinstatement with back wages etc. This apart, the order passed by
the Division Bench is also non-speaking. (Page: 153, Para: 3)
Sec. 25F
2513
5A.633
On dismissal, the workman moved Labour Court claiming reinstatement as he
rendered continuous service of 240 days in a year. Labour Court held that he was not entitled to
any relief, because, he did not render service for 240 days, service in the proceeding 12 monhs, and
award was upheld by the High Court.
Suraj Pal Singh v. The Presiding Officer & Anr., 2006 II LLJ 335 : 2006 (108) FLR 865 : 2006 I CLR 217
: 2006 LIC 601 (Del.DB)
Note: Also refer to he following cases in the above context
Reinstatement cannot be granted as it is not established employee worked for more than 240
days.
Management of Connemara Hotel, Spencer International Hotels Ltd. v. P.O. III Additional Labour Court
& Anr.,1998 II LLJ 643 (Mad.HC)
Reinstatement Cannot be granted, if workman has not completed 240 days of service in a year.
Crystal Electrical v. State of Punjab & Ors.,1998 II LLJ 417 (P&H.HC)
Termination As workman absents himself 240 days not completed, not entitled to relief u/s. 25F.
Modh. Islam v. P.O. Labour Court, Agra & Ors., 2002 (95) FLR 533 (All.HC)
v) When termination though violative of Sec. 25F is for loss of confidence that
is justified (Bom.DB)
5A.634
Where the employer loses confidence in his employee he has completed 240 days of
continuous service like the Bus conductor in the present case it is held that there is no fault in
denying reinstatement instead granting compensation only is held not invalid.
Divisional controller, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation Nagpur v. Shrihari Padmakar
Dharmadhikari, 1990 II LLN 462 (Bom.DB)
Shri Dharmadhikari.Regulations. (Page: 463, Para: 1)
The Labour Court.31 March 1979. (Page: 463, Para: 3)
.In the instant case.Disputes Act. (Page: 465, Para: 6)
In this context.similar. (Page: 465/466, Para: 8)
In the circumstances.order. (Page: 466, Para: 9)
2514
Sec. 25F
ix) Reinstatement cannot be granted when workman worked for short period
and attained the age of superannuation on date of retrenchment (Raj.HC)
5A.638
A driver was retrenched without following provisions of Sec. 25F and Labour Court
held that retrenchment was illegal but awarded compensation instead of reinstatement taking into
consideration the fact that he had worked for a very short period and had attained the age of 55
years on the date of retrenchment. Also, he had crossed the age of superannuation and was not
appointed by due process of selection. High Court modified the award by increasing compensation
taking into consideration the fact that 8 years had passed and workman has crossed age of
superannuation long back.
Mubareek Khan v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2004 (106) FJR 682 : 2004 (100) FLR 784 : 2005 I LLN
400 (Raj.HC)
The facts and.this writ petition. (Page: 684, Para: 2)
The Labour Court.and back wages. (Page: 684, Para: 5)
.The order of.No costs. (Page: 686, Para: 12)
Note: also refer to the following cases in the above context
Compensation-was granted instead of reinstatement as workman reached age of superannuation.
Union of India & Ors. v. Lal Chand & Anr., 2006 (108) FLR 1206 (Raj.HC)
R. Nawroji & Co. v. Francis E. Lobo & Anr., 2007 (112) FLR 605 : 2007 II LLN 354 : 2007 LIC 290 :
2007 LLR 305 : 2007 (1) Mah.LJ 63 : 2007 (2) BCR 206 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25F
2515
x) Reinstatement not justified when tribunal did not decide the question of
voluntarily leaving the job when raised by the employer (Raj.DB)
5A.639
Workman raised dispute over termination of his service after 12 years. Tribunal
granted him reinstatement for non-compliance of of Sec. 25F. On writ petition filed by
Management, Single Judge set aside the award, against which a special appeal was filed. Division
Bench held that when the Management had the plea that workman had left the job on his own and
that his services were not terminated, the question of delay definitely becomes relevant and Labour
Court should have gone into this question and therefore, upheld the judgement of Single Judge.
Madan Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2006 III CLR 482 (Raj.DB)
xi) Reinstatement not proper for casual workmen when not entitled to regular
post and not completed 240 days (Bom.DB)
5A.640
The workmen appointed as casual workmen on their simple discharge from service
for their joining union without retrenchment compensation raised a dispute that they were
permanent workmen and Labour Courts order holding termination proper was affirmed by both
Single Judge and Division Bench on the ground that from muster roll it was clear that workmen
had not completed 240 days service and they were terminated before their joining the union and
the workmen though employed in place of regular workmen could not be deemed to be permanent
workmen merely because of their engagement in regular post.
Maharashtra General Kamgar Union v. Raptakos Bratt & Co. Ltd. & Anr., 2006 II LLJ 683 : 2006 (108)
FLR 1182 : 2006 I CLR 312 (Bom.DB)
Note: also refer to he following cases
Compensation granted instead of reinstatement if workmen were casual workers.
Reichold Chemicals India Ltd v. Workemen, Reichold Chemicals India Ltd., Second Additional Labour
Court, Madras, 1997 II LLJ 1008 : 1997 (76) FLR 877 : 1997 II LLN 268 : 1997 LLR 675 (Mad.HC)
Compensation in lieu of reinstatement granted.
Management of Connemara Hotel, Spencer International Hotels Ltd. v. P.O. III Additional Labour Court
& Anr., 1998 II LLJ 643 (Mad.HC)
2516
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2517
xvii) Reinstatement not proper when employment is for fixed period (Raj.HC)
5A.647
awarded.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Richpal Singh & Anr., 2003 IV LLN 946 (Raj.HC)
2518
Sec. 25F
Sec. 25F
2519
The High Court in the matters under appeal did interfere with the order of the Labour Court in a petition
under Article 226 principally on the ground that the Labour Court was in error in the matter of grant of
restricted back wages to the extent of 60% and the High Court has modified the order of the Tribunal and
directed entitlement in its entirety. (Page: 547, Para: 2)
The issue as raised in the matter of back wages has been dealt with by the Labour Court in the manner as
above having read to the facts and circumstances of the matter in the issue upon exercise of its discretion
and obviously in a manner which cannot but be judicious in nature. In the event however the High Courts
interference is sought for there exists an obligation on the part of the High Court to record in the
judgment, the reasoning before however denouncing a judgment of an inferior Tribunal, in the absence of
which, the judgment in our view cannot stand the scrutiny of otherwise being reasonable. There ought to
be available in the judgment itself a finding about the perversity or the erroneous approach of the Labour
Court and it is only upon recording therewith the High Court has the authority to interfere. Unfortunately,
the High Court did not feel it expedient to record any reason far less any appreciable reason before
denouncing the judgment. (Page: 549, Para: 14)
ii) No law in absolute terms can be laid down to grant full back wages but it is
not automatic since industry cannot be compelled to pay for the period
during which the employee contributed nothing (S.C.2J)
F 5A.651 A law in absolute terms cannot be laid down as to in which cases and under what
circumstances full back wages can be granted or denied. For granting any back wages workmen
has to raise a plea in his written statement. That he had been sitting idle or not obtained any other
employment, in the interregnum. Further there has been a fundamental change in the dicta of
recent judgments of Supreme Court in this respect where full back wages upon reinstatement is no
more the rule. But now with the passage of time, it has come to be realized that industry is being
compelled to pay the workman for a period during which he apparently contributed little or
nothing at all, but was spent unproductively. The Court therefore urged that it is necessary to
develop a pragmatic approach to problems dogging industrial relations. No just solution can be
offered but a golden mean may be arrived at.
Allahabad Jal Sansthan v. Daya Shankar Rai & Anr., 2005 II LLJ 847 : 2005 LIC 2030 : 2005 SCC
(L&S) 631 : 2005 AIR (SC) 2371 : 2005 (5) SCC 124 (S.C.2J)
In the very nature of things there cannot be a straitjacket formula for awarding relief of back wages. All
relevant considerations will enter the verdict. More or less, it would be a motion addressed to the
discretion of the Tribunal. Full back wages would be the normal rule and the party objecting to it must
establish the circumstances necessitating departure. At that stage the Tribunal will exercise its discretion
keeping in view all the relevant circumstances. But the discretion must be exercised in a judicial and
judicious manner. The reason for exercising discretion must be cogent and convincing and must appear
on the face of the record. When it is said that something is to be done within the discretion of the authority,
that something is to be done according to the rules of reason and justice, according to law and not humour.
It is not to be arbitrary, vague and fanciful but legal and regular. (Page: 2032, Para: 11)
2520
Sec. 25F
vi) Labour Court to record the basis of evidence for granting back wages and
mere absence of plea of employer raising objection to back wages does not
entitle workman to back wages (Del.HC)
5A.655
Back wages upon reinstatement is not automatic. Merely because the employer did
not plead any thing before the Labour Court so as to debar the workman for his claim for full back
wages, it cannot entitle the workman for full back wages. Although earlier view of Supreme Court
was that it was for the employer to raise the plea of alternative employment but now having regard
to Sec. 106 of Evidence Act or provisions analogous thereto such a plea should be raised by the
workman. Whenever back wages are awarded, the Labour Court is bound to record the basis
Sec. 25F
2521
under which the quantum of back wages was awarded. The matter was remanded back to Labour
Court to decide this issue only by providing opportunities to the parties to adduce evidence so as to
arrive at the quantum of back wages on the basis of evidence and not on the basis of reinstatement.
Mata Sundari College v. Padam Kant Saxena & Ors., 2007 LLR 370 (Del.HC)
vii) Reinstatement entitles employee to wages of the post from which he was
terminated but not of fresh post to be considered (S.C.3J)
F 5A.656 Termination of employee who was working as town-in-charge was held to be invalid
as prequisites for valid retrenchment were not complied with and meanwhile he was appointed
afresh as Sub-station Asst. and for computation of back wages the salary and allowances
applicable to the post of Town in Charge is to be considered and not what was payable for the post
of sub station assistant in which he was employed afresh and accordingly directed to make
payment of back wages upon re-posting him as town-in-charge.
Hari Mohan Rastogi v. Labour Court & Anr., 1984 I LLJ 32 : 1984 (48) FLR 294 : 1984 I LLN 89 : 1983
LIC 1906 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 152 : 1984 AIR (SC) 502 : 1984 Suppl. SCC 428 (S.C.3J)
.the appellant continues to be in service as Town-in charge, he will be entitled to arrears of salary
and other benefits which can be computed in terms of money. One peculiar feature of this case is that the
appellant was re-employed afresh as Sub-station Assistant on December 4, 1968 and was confirmed in
that post. While rendering his service as Sub-Station Assistant he was in receipt of monthly salary.
Therefore, while working out the monetary benefit with regard to the arrears of back-wages and other
monetary benefits, credit will have to be given for what the appellant has received as and by way of salary
and all other allowances. (Page: 33, Para: 3)
We, therefore, direct that the appellant shall be re-posted as Town-in-charge forthwith and not later than
a fortnight from today. We direct the Labour Court to compute the back-wages payable by respondent to
the appellant pursuant to this decision and this computation may be both of monetary benefits and
non-monetary benefits to which the appellant is entitled after giving credit for the amount of Rs. 13,000/which would be paid to the appellant within one month from today (Page: 33, Para: 6)
viii) Back wages to be at the rate commensurate to the status of a daily rated
workman but not at the scale of the post i.e. driver (Gau.HC)
5A.657
Where the services of a permanent daily rated workman was terminated without
holding domestic enquiry and violating the provisions of Sec. 25F, the industrial tribunal held the
termination illegal for violation of the principles of natural justice and for non-compliance of the
provisions of the Act and hence directed his reinstatement with back wages. But the back wages, it
ordered, to be as per scale of a driver. The High Court while upholding the finding and award of
industrial tribunal however held that by directing the employer to pay back wages as per scale of a
driver, the Tribunal exceeded the term of reference and instead ordered to pay the back wages as
admissible to permanent daily rated garden workers.
Manager, Issabheel Tea Estate v. State of Assam & Ors., 2007 I LLJ 838 : 2007 LLR 660 (Gau.HC)
2522
Sec. 25F
As regards the claim for back wages the position was that there was no evidence on either side that for
the period during which they were not employed by the company they found employment elsewhere. The
Appellate Tribunal rightly pointed out, however, that usually workmen in sugar factories are employed in
agricultural operations for portions of off-season. Having regard to this it ordered the payment of 50 per
cent of their wages for the period of their enforced unemployment by the company till their reinstatement.
We do not see any justification to interfere with this order. (Page: 651, Para: 3)
F 5A.659 When an employee, a clerk in the Bank remained absent for a long period of 4 years,
his services were terminated but the High Court reinstated him with full back wages. The Supreme
Court held that while granting full back wages, the High Court, has not considered the question of
his gainful employment and therefore remitted the matter for fresh consideration of High Court
while still upholding the decision of reinstatement.
General Manager, Vijaya Bank & Anr. v. Pramod Kumar Gupta, 2006 (111) FLR 325 : 2006 III LLJ 971
: 2006 IV LLN 780 : 2006 (7) SCC 379 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1659 (S.C.2J)
The appellant before us is the General Manager of Vijaya Bank. The respondent was employed in the
Bank as a clerk. According to the Bank, he abstained from duty without any leave application on
12-9-1991. On 13-5-1992, the Bank issued notice directing him to report for duty in 30 days time. On
11-6-1992, the respondent reported back to duty. Within ten days i.e. on 21-6-1992, the respondent again
abstained from duty without any prior intimation. On 8-9-1992, the Bank issued second notice to the
respondent. A copy of the said notice was also pasted on the notice board. The said notice dated 8-9-1992
was received by the respondent on 14-9-1992. According to the respondent, when he reported for duty on
12-10-1992, he was not permitted by the Bank since he had not joined duty on 8-10-1992 i.e. within 30
days from 8-9-1992. The respondent after four years raised a dispute on 1-4-1996. He protested against
the termination. Thereafter, the matter was referred to the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal in para 12 of
its order has held as under.In these circumstances, the case of the management appears to be
correct that the workman concerned was gainfully employed in other trade or business and had no
intention to join duties of the Bank, and the decision of the Bank that he had relinquished and abandoned
the service of the Bank appears to be fully justified. (Page: 325, Para: 1)
The High Court directed the appellant Bank to reinstate the respondent on the post held by him with
continuity in service and that the respondent shall also be entitled to other consequential benefits to which
he is entitled to in accordance with law. The High Court, in our opinion, without considering the relevant
issue has ordered full back wages with all other consequential benefits which, in our opinion, is not
correct.He has also now shown any acceptable material that he was not gainfully employed and,
under these circumstances, ordering full back wages to the respondent by the High Court without
considering the merits of the claim by the Bank is not correct and that the approach made by the High
Court in ordering full back wages cannot, at all, be countenanced in the facts and circumstances of this
case. (Page: 327, Para: 5)
We, therefore, remit the matter to the High Court to consider the question of payment of back wages for
the period in question. We request the High Court to consider the matter afresh on the question of back
wages only. The appellant Bank is also free to hold any departmental enquiry against the respondent
workman for his absence from duty during the relevant period. Since the matter is remitted to the High
Court on the question of back wages only, the respondent will not be entitled for payment of any back
wages during the period in question. (Page: 328, Para: 9)
5A.660
When the termination of service of a workman who completed 240 days of work is
void ab-initio, he is deemed to be in continuous service from the date of termination without back
wages since it requires enquiry as to his gainful employment by appropriate forum.
Pawan Kumar Srivastava v. Municipal Corporation, 1999 II LLJ 21 : 1999 III LLN 266 (MP.DB)
In view.standing orders. (Page: 25, Para: 10)
As the appellant.appellant. (Page: 25, Para: 11)
Sec. 25F
2523
Deputy Executive Engineer Panchayat Sub-Division 2 v. Jitendrakumar Ranchhodbhai Bhatt, 2002 (95)
FLR 445 : 2002 II LLN 600 : 2002 I CLR 816 : 2002 LLR 429 : 2002 LIC 1598 (Guj.HC)
2524
Sec. 25F
5A.664
Provisions of Sec. 25F are mandatory and their non-compliance by employer would
result in reinstatement with continuity of service and back wages.
Ajit Singh v. P.O. Labour Court, Rohtak Camp Court, Sonepat & Anr., 2002 II LLJ 218 : 2002 (100) FJR
876 : 2002 (94) FLR 446 : 2002 I CLR 681 : 2002 LLR 459 (P&H.DB)
The provisions of.to be mandatory.The Courts have.of section 25F.
(Page: 222, Para: 12)
.we hold that.face of the record. (Page: 224, Para: 10)
.The order of.Court is restored. (Page: 224, Para: 22)
Sec. 25F
2525
iv) Full back wages payable when the Labour Court fails to furnish reasons for
reducing them to 50% (P&H. DB)
5A.669
Termination of workman was held to be unjustified but Labour Court awarded
compensation u/s. 25F and denied reinstatement but single judge set aside the same and granted
reinstatement with full back wages and it was upheld by divisional bench as once termination was
held unjustified necessary corollary is that workman is entitled to reinstatement with full back
wages.
Patiala Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Mehar Chand & Anr., 1998 I LLJ 1142 : 1998 (79) FLR (Sum)
30 : 1998 III LLN 513 (P&H.DB)
.the learned.single judge. (Page: 1143, Para: 3)
2526
Sec. 25F
5A.670
It was held in Hari Palace Ambalo v. Labour Court that full back wages will be the
normal rule and any party contending departure must establish necessary circumstances or
reasons. In this case Labour Court found order of termination in breach of Sec. 25F, and ordered
half back wages without assigning reasons. In absence of reasons, normal rule must be followed.
Baldev Singh v. Labour Court, Chandigarh & Anr., 1991 II LLJ 534 (P&H.HC)
5A.671
Labour Court can not deny back wages without offering cogent reasons and no
material was shown to prove that the employee was gainfully employed and the Labour Courts
direction to adjust his leave against his absence not tenable since the termination is illegal and
hence High Court directed payment of back wages.
Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab & Ors., 1998 (92) FJR 277 (P&H.HC)
Note: For contrary decision refer case of U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Udai Narain
Pandey, 2006 I LLJ 496 : 2006 (108) FLR 201 : 2006 I LLN 125 : 2006 I CLR 39 : 2006 LLR 214 : 2006
(1) SCC 479 : 2006 AIR (SC) 586 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 250 (S.C.2J)
v) Back wages in full payable when the workman even after termination made
a representation to the employer to allow him to work (Bom.DB)
5A.672
When the services of an employee, a monthly rated casual Labourer, was terminated
for absence from duty, he was reinstated without back-wages by the Tribunal, and the High Court
allowed the back-wages on the plea that the workman after termination did represent requesting to
permit him to perform his duties which was not allowed by the employer and therefore, he
deserved to be paid full back-wages.
Chhotelal Badriprasad Yadav, Akola v. Union of India through General Manager, Central Railway,
Mumbai & Ors., 2006 III CLR 946 (Bom.DB)
The instant writ petition.of back wages. (Page: 946, Para: 2)
In the present case.wages to the petitioner. (Page: 947, Para: 9)
For the reasons stated.are hereby confirmed. (Page: 947, Para: 11)
vi) Back wages cannot be denied on the plea that it would affect public
exchequer for payment of back wages (Guj.HC)
5A.673
Services of daily wagers were orally terminated. Labour Court by way of a common
order reinstated them with back wages on the ground that mandatory provision of Sec. 25F was not
complied with and there was nothing to establish that during that time they were gainfully
employed. By rejecting the plea of employer that they being a public body and award of back wages
would affect the public exchequer, High Court held that employer being a public body should act
and behave like a model employer and found no irregularity in the award of Labour Court hence
upheld the same.
Chief Officer Keshad Municipality v. Chandrakant Harilal Rokholiya, 2004 (100) FLR 174 : 2003 III
LLN 1050 (Guj.HC)
.The Labour Court.Common order. (Page: 175, Para: 1)
The law in this.consequential benefit. (Page: 177, Para: 8)
.the workmen have been.is removed.plea that the.therefore rejected.
(Page: 180, Para: 10)
.Ordinarily therefore.normal rule. (Page: 182, Para: 12)
.Accordingly to may.to be dismissed. (Page: 185, Para: 14)
Sec. 25F
2527
viii) 25% granted inspite of gainful employment when the same is not
substantially better (Bom.HC)
5A.675
When the services of an employee was terminated, despite working 240 days in the
previous year Sec. 25F was not complied with. The High Court there upon upholding his
reinstatement with continuity of service by Industrial Tribunal held that 25% of back-wages
instead of full will meet the ends of justice having regard to has gainful employment which may not
be substantially better one.
Goodlass Nerolac Paints Ltd. v. Anand Shivram Samant & Anr., 2006 III CLR 875 : 2007 LIC 301
(Bom.HC)
The claim of the First.unfair labour practice. (Page: 876, Para: 2)
By its order dated.and 4th July 1989. (Page: 876, Para: 3)
The Industrial Court held that.continuity of service. (Page: 876/877, Para: 5)
In the present case.to the aforesaid extent. (Page: 882, Para: 20)
2528
Sec. 25F
ix) 25% garnted since employer cannot be saddled with burden of full back
wages for no work rendered (S.C.2J)
F 5A.676 Where the services of workmen appointed in U.P. state brassware corporation from
23.7.1984 to 8.1.1987 was subsequently got appointed in non ferrous rolling mills from 8.1.1987 to
12/13.2.1987 and was terminated on expiry of tenure giving rise to industrial dispute in which they
got reinstated with full back wages by Labour Court and the petition in challenge before High
Court was also dismissed. The Supreme Court held that merely because the termination is illegal
the employer is not entitled to full back wages. The recent dicta of Supreme Court judgments has
laid down not to saddle the employer with burden of full back wages where the employee rendered
no work. Hence 25% back wages only granted as fair and proper and judgment of Labour Court
and High Court set aside.
U.P. State Brassware Corpn. Ltd. & Anr. v. Udai Narain Pandey, 2006 (108) FLR 201 : 2006 I LLJ 496 :
2006 I LLN 125 : 2006 I CLR 39 : 2006 LLR 214 : 2006 (1) SCC 479 : 2006 AIR (SC) 586 : 2006 SCC
(L&S) 250 (S.C.2J)
A person is not entitled to get something only because it would be lawful to do so. If that principle is
applied, the functions of an industrial Court shall lose much of its significance. (Page: 220, Para: 45)
The changes brought about by the subsequent decisions of this Court probably having regard to the
changes in the policy decisions of the Government in the wake of prevailing market economy,
globalization, privatization and outsourcing is evident. (Page: 220, Para: 46)
The only question is whether the Respondent would be entitled to back-wages from the date of his
termination of service till the aforementioned date. The decision to close down the establishment by the
State of Uttar Pradesh like other public sector organizations had been taken as far back on 17-11-1990
wherefor a GO had been issued. It had further been averred, which has been noticed hereinbefore, that the
said GO has substantially been implemented. In this view of the matter, we are of the opinion that interest
of justice would be subserved if the back wages payable to the Respondent for the period 1-4-1987 to
26-3-1993 is confined to 25% of the total back-wages payable during the said period.
(Page: 223, Para: 64)
The judgments and orders of the Labour Court and the High Court are set aside and it is directed that the
Respondent herein shall be entitled to 25% back wages of the total back-wages payable during the
aforesaid period and compensation payable in terms of Section 6-N of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act.
If, however, any sum has been paid by the Appellant herein, the same shall be adjusted from the amount
payable in terms of this judgment. (Page: 223, Para: 65)
x) Back wages to the tune of only 30% payable when project workman
terminated six years before the project came to an end (Guj.HC)
5A.677
Where the workman was terminated when the project was still going on and he has
put up 240 days of continuous work his termination being ab initio void, reinstatement to him
cannot be denied merely because the project being coming to an end during the pendency of the
dispute. The Court held that the fact that the workman was already reinstated pursuant to award
of Labour Court in other Government Department. The Government now connot raise contention
that since the project in which the workman was working has been closed and he can not be
reinstated and that since no written appointment order not he was informed while engaging orally
that his tenure of appointment is limited to project he can not be considered as project employee
and Court reinstated him into 30% back wages in the instant case relying as the case of S.M.
Nilajkar, 2003 (97) FLR 608 (SC).
Rajendra Prasad Shankar Lal Purohit v. Executive Engineer, 2004 (103) FLR 1069 (Guj.HC)
Sec. 25F
2529
1996.considering
the
legal.for
all
xi) Only 50% back wages admissible from the date of filing claim statement till
passing of award in view of delay in raising the dispute (Bom.HC)
5A.678
Workman was employed during 1983-1987 for doing the work of maintenance and
repair of the road. His services were orally terminated and he raised a dispute in the year 1993.
Labour Court came to the finding that termination was in breach of Sec. 25F and 25G of the Act
and granted reinstatement but for delay in filing the application, it denied of back wages. High
Court in the interest of justice granted 50% back wages from the date of filing statement of claim
till pronouncement of award by Labour Court.
State of Maharashtra through Executive Engineer v. Sayyedlal Gani Sayyed AND Sayed Lal v.
Sarvajanik Bankdhkam Vibhag, 2002 LLR 1155 (Bom.HC)
.Writ Petition No. 4759.back wages. (Page: 1156, Para: 2)
The employee was.issuing within under.He chise to.Labour Court.the
Labour Court.to the employer. (Page: 1156, Para: 3)
.Hence in the.statement of claim.in my considered.December
1999. (Page: 1158, Para: 5)
Writ Petition 4759.allowed (Page: 1158, Para: 6)
Note: also refer to the following cases where back wages were reduced or denied on account of delay
Back wages refused as the dispute was raised after 15 years and workman was also occupying the
companys quarter for 15 days.
Shri Khanderao A. Mohite v. New Standard Engg. Co. & Anr., 2000 (86) FLR 18 : 2000 LIC 1331
(Bom.HC)
Back wages claim of the workman allowed, 2 years wages deducted due to delay.
Devendra Pandurang Pandore v. The Chief Executive Officer, Chiplun Municipal Council & Anr., 2005
(104) FLR 536 : 2004 III CLR 666 (Bom.HC)
Employee filing the complaint belatedly, reinstatement with only 50% backwages was granted.
Bhika Ram v. Labour Court, Jodhpur & Anr., 2000 (87) FLR 339 (Raj.HC)
Backwages 50% denied by High Court considering facts and circumstances of case and passage
of time.
N.D.M.C. v. Vijay Pal Singh & Ors., 2004 II LLJ 607 : 2004 V LLN (Sum) 240 (Del.HC)
xii) 50% back wages granted on no work no pay basis though employee was
wrongfully denied work by the employer (All.HC)
5A.679
An employee was working as sheet writing clerk in a seasonal work during the
crushing season 1971-1972, but he was denied work in the crushing season of 1972-1973, unlike
other employees. On reference, the Labour Court considering the pleading of the parties, came to
the findings that the work for which the employee was appointed was not temporary or contingent
2530
Sec. 25F
and provisions of Sec. 25F regarding retrenchment were not complied with. The High Court
dismissed the writ petition filed by the employer stating that it would not interfere with the findings
of the Labour Court but decided to award half the emoluments on the principle of no work no pay
from the date of termination to the date of reinstatement in the coming season and just modified the
award of Labour Court reducing it to the extent of 50%.
M/s. U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. The Labour Court, U.P. & Anr., 2005 LIC 951 (All.HC)
5A.680
The order passed to give full last drawn wages to the workman till final award was
challenged before High Court. High Court held that as workman not rendering service to the
management and even after reinstatement the workman may not be entitled to full back-wages, as
per recent pronouncement of Supreme Court, it would be proper to allow 50% of the last drawn
wages as interim relief.
Chefair Hotel Corporation of India Ltd. v. Om Prakash, 2006 LLR 1066 (Del.HC)
In the present case.wages as interim relief. (Page: 1068, Para: 4)
xiii) Backwages of 50% granted since employer is public instituition and the
employee was not employed after termination (Mad.HC)
5A.681
An Assistant Secretary was terminated as he was not recruited through Employment
Exchange. As he had worked for more than 240 days, he was entitled for show cause notice, Sec.
25F of the Act also should have been complied with. The management shall be liable to pay 50% of
the back wages as it was a public institution and also the secretary had not been working after the
date of termination of service. Therefore, he was reinstated with 50% of back wages.
R. Poori @ Bhoopathi v. P.O. Labour Court, Vellore & Anr., 2002 (95) FLR 624 : 2002 III LLN 1099
(Mad.HC)
xiv) Only 50% backwages granted as the employer being the State cannot be
saddled with full back wages (Guj.HC)
5A.682
Award of Labour Court holding the workmans termination of services valid and
refusing to grant relief holding Sec. 25F is not applicable, was challenged. The High Court found
that Sec. 25F is clearly applicable as workman had put in continuous service of one year, therefore,
order of termination is violative of Sec. 25F and High Court held workman entitled to relief of
reinstatement with back wages up to 50%, as full back wages cannot be granted as the employer
being the State should not be saddled with liability of full back wages.
Rajendraprasad Shanklal Purohit v. Executive Engineer, Gramya Marg Vikas Yojna Vibhag, 2002 III
CLR 439 : 2002 LIC 3214 (Guj.HC)
xv) 60% granted to probationer who was terminated for misconduct without
enquiry and terminated without enquiry (Guj.HC)
5A.683
Workman was retained after completion of the probationary period, thus Sec. 2(oo)
(bb) is not applicable. He was terminated because of misconduct without enquiry and hence
Labour Court was right in setting aside the termination. As regards back wages it was held that
order of full back wages is modified to 60% back wages from date of reference to date of award and
full back wages from then onward till reinstatement.
Deputy Executive Engineer v. Jayantibhai Chhimabhai, 2001 (89) FLR 446 : 2001 II LLN 1077
(Guj.HC)
Note: Other citations where quantum of back wages were reduced are given below
Sec. 25F
2531
xvi) Full back wages from the date of termination to the date of reference not
admissible since not appropriate to burden the exchequer meant for public
benefit and 60% back wages permissible for the period of pendency of
reference since employee is not at fault (Guj.HC)
5A.684
Termination of services of a temporary clerk without complying with Sec. 25F is
illegal and he was entitled to reinstatement, but the High Court found no justification for granting
full back wages, from the date of termination to the date of reference since the employer is a public
body and it is not appropriate to burden Exchequer meant for public benefit with full back wages
and granted 60% back wages from the date of reference to the date of award and disallowed any
backwages from date of termination to date of reference but full backwages from date of award
and till date of reinstatement as the employer is not at fault for pendency of adjudication for 13
years. Labour Courts order grants full backwages was modified accordingly.
Deputy Executive Engineer v. Jiviben V. Pandya, 2000 III LLJ 1066 : 2000 (86) FLR 841 : 2000 II CLR
881 : 2000 LLR 940 (Guj.HC)
2532
Sec. 25F
workman is very small, the award of back wages for the complete period, i.e., from the date of termination
till the date of the award, which our experience shows is often quite large, would be wholly inappropriate.
Another important factor, which requires to be taken into consideration is the nature of employment. A
regular service of permanent character cannot be compared to short or intermittent daily wage
employment though it may be for 240 days in a calendar year. (Page: 8, Para: 8)
In the case in hand the respondent had worked for a very short period with the appellant, which was less
than one year. Even during this period there were breaks in service and he had been given short term
appointments on daily wage basis in different capacities. The respondent is not a technically trained
person, but was working on a class IV post. According to the finding of the Industrial
Tribunal-cum-Labour Court plenty of work of the same nature, which the respondent was doing, was
available in the District of Rohtak. In such circumstances we are of the opinion that the respondent is not
entitled to payment of any back wages. (Page: 9, Para: 11)
ii) Back wages not payable since the employee remained absent without
bonafide reasons though reinstated for non-compliance of Sec. 25F
(Bom.HC)
5A.686
An employee was granted 3 months leave on an undertaking being given that if she
failed to resume work on the said date, the services would be terminated. A request was made for
extension of leave which was not granted and the employee failed to communicate whether she
could resume duty. After repeated communications being sent by the employer, her services were
terminated as no reply was received. After 4 months she returned and claimed that the termination
was illegal and she was not given opportunity of being heard, also the undertaking was detained
under duress. The Labour Court held that she remained absent without bonafide reasons and
therefore is entitled to only reinstatement without wages as provision of Sec. 25F were not complied
with by the employer. The High Court held that employee is not entitled to be reinstated and
provisions of Sec. 25F are not attracted. As the employee has already been reinstated, the Court
would not disturb the status quo and the petitions are disposed off.
Blow Plast Ltd. v. Nafisa Shabbir Hussain Mashraqui & Ors.,1998 I LLJ 463 : 1997 (77) FLR 926 : 1997
IV LLN 430 : 1997 II CLR 926 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25F
2533
iv) Back wages not payable when employee is not joining duty on
reinstatement but working elsewhere (Mad.HC)
5A.688
When the termination order passed by the employer is set aside, it is the duty of the
employee concerned to join the service within a reasonable time or to give a notice that he should be
re-instated, if an employee does not report for duty within reasonable time the Court cannot allow
the claim for back wages especially when that employee is found working elsewhere soon after the
order of re-instatement was passed.
Peer Mohamed & Co. v. Mohamed Hussain & Anr., 1968 LIC 1143 (Mad.HC)
v) Back wages not payable merely on acquittal of criminal charges when they
are fairly serious and employee did not work during pendency of criminal
proceedings (Del.HC)
5A.689
A workman was discharged from service in October 1975 in view of his alleged
involvement in smuggling under the Customs Act. He sought reference of dispute but the same was
rejected by the Delhi Administration. Subsequently, criminal proceedings initiated against the
workman under Customs Act were quashed. He sought reference of dispute for a second time and
the same was allowed. The Labour Court granted reinstatement and back wages to the workman
even though he was superannuated well before the award. The High Court on writ petition held
that the workman cannot be reinstated because he was already superannuated and secondly he was
also denied the backwages on the ground that the allegations were of fairly serious in nature and he
could not have worked with the company during the pendency of the criminal proceedings. Labour
Courts award was set aside accordingly.
Air France v. Government of NCT of Delhi & Ors., 2005 I LLJ 1142 : 2005 II LLN 557 : 2005 I CLR 307
(Del.HC)
The grievance.awarded to him. (Page: 1143, Para: 1)
So far as.for this period. (Page: 1144, Para: 14/17)
vi) Back wages denied for long delay in raising dispute and employee earning
Rs. 800 p.m. (Bom.HC)
5A.690
Labour Court holding termination of services of an employee to be illegal, failed to
grant normal relief of reinstatement and back wages. Hence this writ petition. The High Court
observed that the management has not made out a case for not granting relief of reinstatement with
continuity of service. So the relief was granted to the employee, but back wages were disallowed on
two grounds. (1) long delay in raising the dispute and (2) employee is in employment on salary of
Rs. 800 p.m. from 1988 onwards at Parel.
Parshuram Yallapa Kotekar v. Telecom District Engineer, Ratnagiri & Ors., 2002 (93) FLR 1181 : 2002
II CLR 78 : 2002 LLR 825 (Bom.HC)
2534
Sec. 25F
.This position is now made perfectly clear by the present definition of workmen which
includes a person who had been dismissed, discharged or retrenched. Besides, the definition of the term
industrial dispute is wide enough to justify the Union of which Mr. Guha as well as the propriety of the
appellants conduct in not giving him an opportunity to be re-employed when an occasion for the
employment when an occasion for the employment of an additional clerk arose. That is the view taken by
the Labour Appellate Tribunal and we are not satisfied that the said conclusion is erroneous in law so as to
justify our interference. (Page: 112, Para: 2)
.In our opinion, this argument is misconceived. Even before 25-H was added to the Act industrial
adjudication generally recognised the principle that if an employer retrenched the services of an
employee on the ground that the employee in question had become surplus, it was necessary that
whenever the employer had occasion to employ another hand the retrenched workman should be given an
opportunity to join service. This principle was regarded as of general application in industrial
adjudication on the ground that it was based on considerations of fairplay and justice, vide Shri
Vishuddananda Saraswathi Hospital v. Their Employees, 1949-1 Lab LJ 111: (IT-West Bengal) ; Kilburn
and Co. and MacNeill and Co. v. Their Employees, 1950-2 Lab LJ 125 (IT-West Bengal) and Sri
Annapurna Mil1s v. Certain Workmen, (1953) 1 Lab LJ 43 (L..A.T.I. All). It is true that in the case of
Annapurna Mills the discharge of the workmen was the result of the fact that the employer had closed his
business and it was held that with improvement in circumstances if the employer re-opened his business it
was necessary that he should take back in his employment his old employees. It would be noticed that the
principle which was applied to the case of an employer who re-opened his business which had been
closed by him is substantially the same principle which requires the employer to give an opportunity to
his retrenched workman when he has occasion to engage another servant. That is why the Labour
appellate Tribunal has observed that the principle now statutorily recognised by Section 25-H was, before
the Act was amended, recognised by industrial adjudicators in dealing with such question. Therefore, we
do not think that Mr. Sen is justified in contending that the order passed in the present proceedings against
the appellant is contrary to industrial law. (Page: 112, Para: 1)
Sec. 25F
2535
High Court held that since the continuity of service has been granted which is not only for seniority
but also for the entitlement for intervening period and therefore the workman is entitled for
fixation of pay at least at the minimum of revised pay scales or fixation due from 1.9.1976 and
1.9.1981 during the intervening period of the award. This therefore can be computed u/s. 33C(2) of
the Act.
State of Rajastan & Ors. v. Harish Chandra Sharma & Ors., 2007 (112) FLR 968 (Raj.HC)
Note: also refer the following case
M/s. U.P. State Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.P. Gorakhpur & Ors.,
2005 LIC 2222 (All.HC)
ii) If reinstated pending final result of writ petition, increments falling due
during the period of employment to be paid along with wages (P&H.HC)
5A.694
Workman who was terminated and reinstated by management was entitled to
increments along with wages for the a period during which he would have been entitled to had he
not been out of employment.
Punjab State Electricity Board v. P.O. Labour Court, Bhatinda, 1995 I LLJ 666 : 1995 I LLN 194
(P&H.HC)
2. When can be
i) When retrenchment and suspension are declared void employee entitled to
be in continuous service (P&H.HC)
5A.695
Non-compliance whether with Clause (a) of Sec. 25F or with Clause (b) thereof will
equally render a retrenchment invalid, void and inoperative. A void order has in law to be treated
as having never been passed. The conclusion therefore, is that the workmen, whose suspension and
retrenchment orders are found by a competent Court or Tribunal to be illegal workman entitled to
be treated to be continuing in service.
Workmen of M/s. Kundan Iron & Steel Industries, Chheharta v. The P.O. Labour Court, Jullundur &
Anr., 1972 (25) FLR 50 : 1971 LIC 1213 (P&H.HC)
2536
Sec. 25F
It is now well settled that if the services of an employee are terminated in violation of Section 25(F) of
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the order of termination is rendered ab initio void and the employee
would be entitled to continuity of service along with his backwages, see Gammon India Ltd. v. Niranjan
Dass MANU/SC/0237/1983. We accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the order of the High Court
and modify the Award of the Labour Court and we further direct that the appellant is entitled to
reinstatement with full backwages and other allowances. (Page: 252/253, Para: 3)
5A.698
When termination is violative of Sec. 25F, it is deemed to be non-est and hence the
workman was deemed to be in service on the appointed day i.e. 15.10.1980 and consequently
entitled to continue in service in the Government company after nationalisation.
National Bicycle Corporation of India Ltd. v. Gopal B. Keluskar & Ors., 2002 (95) FLR 751 (Bom.DB)
Note: also refer the following cases where continuity of service was awarded by the Courts
Amalgamated Machines Corporation v. P.O. Industial Tribunal & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 309 : 2002 (92) FLR
211 : 2001 III LLN 1036 : 2001 LLR 1037 (Del.HC)
Rajendra Bhagat & Ors. v. Labour Court, Ranchi, & Anr, 2004 IV LLN 1073 (Jhar.HC)
Sec. 25F
2537
5A.700
The employer calculated retrenchment compensation with divider of 30 instead of 26.
Therefore, Tribunal directed reinstatement of the workman for short payment. Single Judge
dismissed the application filed by employer. Division Bench held that the award by Tribunal was
justified but in view of the closure of establishment granted compensation instead of reinstatement.
DBH International Ltd. v. Their Workmen, rep. By Transport and Dock Workers Union and Anr., 2005
III LLJ 434 : 2005 (106) FLR 735 : 2005 III LLN 414 : 2005 II CLR 679 (Bom.DB)
Note: also refer to the following case in the above context
Shivshankar S. Pathak & etc. v. State of Gujarat & Ors., 1997 LIC 3280 (Guj.HC)
ii) When employee worked only for one year and not appointed as per
recruitment rules (S.C.2J)
F 5A.701 The workman was terminated in violation to Sec. 25F. On raising industrial Dispute in
1986 Labour Court granted reinstatement with full back-wages from the year 1986. High Court
refused to interfere with the award. On employers appeal, Supreme Court set aside the award of
Labour Court and granted compensation instead of reinstatement because the workman was
employed only for a period of one year, there was nothing on record to show that he was employed
in accordance with recruitment rules not any material to show that the post was regular, further
dispute was raised with a delay of twelve years.
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Man Singh, 2006 (111) FLR 323 : 2006 (7) SCC 752 : 2006 III
LLJ 1058 (S.C.2J)
The respondent admittedly raised a dispute in 1986, i.e. after a period of about 12 years. It may be true
that in an appropriate case, as has been done by the Labour Court, delay in raising the dispute would have
resulted in rejection of his claim for back-wages for the period during which the workman remains absent
as has been held by this Court in Gurmal Singh v. Principal. Government College of Education and Ors.
2000 (9) SCC 496. But the discretionary relief, in our opinion, must be granted upon taking into
consideration all attending circumstances. The appellant is a statutory Corporation. Keeping in view the
fact that the respondent was appointed on a temporary basis, it was unlikely that he remained unemployed
for such a long time. In any event, it would be wholly unjust at this distance of time i.e. after a period of
more than 30 years, to direct reinstatement of the respondent in service. Unfortunately, the Labour Court
or the High Court did not consider these aspects of the matter. (Page: 754, Para: 7)
Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that in stead and
place of the direction for reinstatement of the respondent together with back-wages from 1986, interest of
justice would be subserved if the appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to him.
(Page: 754, Para: 8)
iii) When the employee is not interested in continuing the job (S.C.3J)
F 5A.702 The employee working as a typist was discharged from service without payment of
compensation in terms of Sec. 25F despite her working continuously for a period of 240 days
during the relevant year. The Tribunal held her discharge as illegal and ordered her reinstatement
with 50% back-wages. The Single Judge also confirmed her reinstatement but ordered no
back-wages. The appeal before Division Bench against this order is dismissed. The Supreme Court
held that considering the fact that the employee is not interested in continuing the job even after
her reinstatement, she be paid compensation of Rs. 25000 and that it is not mandatory to order
reinstatement in all cases of non-compliance of the conditions prescribed in Sec. 25F of Industrial
Disputes Act.
Employers, Management of Central P & D Inst., Ltd. v. Union of India & Anr., 2005 (104) FLR 373 :
2005 I LLN 653 : 2005 LIC 2251 : 2005 I CLR 494 : 2005 LLR 132 : 2005 AIR (SC) 633 (S.C.3J)
But it is to be noticed that it is not always mandatory for the Courts to order reinstatement in cases where
there has been violation of Section 25F of the Act (Chapter 5 A of the Standing Orders) which can be
substituted for good reasons by awarding compensation. In the normal course we would not have
2538
Sec. 25F
interfered with the order of reinstatement directed by the Industrial Court. In this case we think the
concerned work-person is not interested in going back to her duty on terms and conditions as were
applicable to her on the date of her discharge which according to the record was as a daily wager. From
the material on record and the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant it is clear that the
employee has not joined duty as directed by the Industrial Tribunal probably because she is otherwise
settled in some other job. (Page: 2252, Para: 7)
Be that as it may, non-compliance of the requirement of Chapter 5A of the Standing Orders by the
appellant cannot be condoned. Therefore in substitution of the order of reinstatement directed by the
Industrial tribunal as confirmed by the High Court below we order that the appellant pay a sum of
Rs.25,000 as compensation to the said employee Miss Aleyamma Samuel. (Page: 2252, Para: 8)
vi) When employee does not have prescribed qualification to carry out or
discharge duties of the post (Bom.DB)
5A.706
Reinstatement is not a mandatory relief in case of breach of Sec. 25F and 25G hence
compensation awarded by Labour Court in lieu of reinstatement on finding that employee does not
have prescribed qualification to carry out or discharge duties of the post was held to be justified.
Vishwas Bhimrao Dhumal v. Kopargaon Nagarpalika & Ors., 1993 III LLJ 772 : 1988 (57) FLR 107 :
1988 II LLN 385 : 1988 I CLR 569 (Bom.DB)
Sec. 25F
2539
2540
Sec. 25F
5A.709
The workman worked for 2 years as casual workman followed by 1 year on regular
pay-scale. Employer terminated him as per Sec. 25F taking into account 1 year service of workman
on regular pay-scale. On reference, Labour Court held that the dismissal was bad as two year
service of workman as casual was not taken into consideration while calculating compensation.
Therefore, ordered reinstatement of the workman. Single Judge upheld Labour Courts order. On
appeal, Division Bench modified the order of Labour Court and awarded compensation instead of
reinstatement because termination was set aside on a technical ground and 14 years passed after
termination.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Ramesh Kumar & Anr., 2005 IV LLN 770 (Raj.DB)
Note: also refer o the following case
Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan v. Union of India & Ors., 2001 I LLJ 191 : 2000 (86) FLR 450 : 2000 LIC
2306 : 2000 II LLR 776 (Del.HC)
Dharamveer Singh v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2000 (85) FLR 137 (Raj.HC)
ix) When there is lapse of longer period after retrenchment more so when
work man was appointed on temporary basis/daily wage basis/adhoc basis
and also they can be gainfully employed (S.C.2J)
F 5A.710 Workman was appointed in 1974 on temporary basis. On committing misconduct he
was terminated in 1975. On which Industrial Dispute was raised in 1986. Labour Court found that
employer had not complied with mandatory provision of Sec. 25F and set aside the order of
termination and granted back-wages from 1986. On appeal High Court refused to interfere as
Labour Court has indisputable jurisdiction to grant award but while exercising the power it should
have taken into consideration relevant factors. Keeping in view that reinstatement was granted
after a period of 30 years and back-wages from 1986, High Court held that interests of justice
would be subserved if it is directed to pay him a sum of Rs. 50,000 as it is unlikely that he remained
unemployed for such long period.
U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. Man Singh, 2006 (111) FLR 323 : 2006 III LLJ 1058 : 2006 III
CLR 698 : 2006 LLR 1151 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 1776 : 2006 (7) SCC 752 (S.C.2J)
The appellant before us is a Corporation constituted under the Road Transport Corporation Act. The
respondent was appointed w.e.f. 20.4.1974 on temporary basis. His services were terminated on
23.07.1975. He is said to have been paid one months salary in lieu of notice. Some allegations had also
been made that he committed misconduct. (Page: 324, Para: 1)
On a finding that in retrenching the respondent the appellant failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements of Section 25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the Labour Court although set aside the
order of termination of the services of the respondent but granted back-wages only from 1986. The High
Court in the writ petition filed by the appellant refused to interfere therewith. (Page: 324, Para: 3)
The respondent admittedly raised a dispute in 1986, i.e. after a period of about 12 years. It may be true
that in an appropriate case, as has been done by the Labour Court, delay in raising the dispute would have
resulted in rejection of his claim for back-wages for the period during which the workman remains absent
as has been held by this Court in Gurmal Singh v. Principal. Government College of Education and Ors.
2000 (9) SCC 496. But the discretionary relief, in our opinion, must be granted upon taking into
consideration all attending circumstances. The appellant is a statutory Corporation. Keeping in view the
fact that the respondent was appointed on a temporary basis, it was unlikely that he remained unemployed
for such a long time. In any event, it would be wholly unjust at this distance of time i.e. after a period of
more than 30 years, to direct reinstatement of the respondent in service. Unfortunately, the Labour Court
or the High Court did not consider these aspects of the matter. (Page: 325, Para: 5)
Keeping in view the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, we are of the opinion that in stead and
place of the direction for reinstatement of the respondent together with back-wages from 1986, interest of
justice would be subserved if the appellant is directed to pay a sum of Rs. 50,000/- to him.
(Page: 325, Para: 6)
Sec. 25F
2541
5A.711
The termination of a guard, on daily wages was contested in High Court for
non-compliance of Sec. 25F of the Act as he had continuously worked from 1.2.1990 to 17.5.1994.
The Single Judge allowed the petition. The employer contested the same in Division Bench. The
Division Bench by modification ordered a lump sum payment of Rs. 50,000 in lien of reinstatement
since nine years elapsed and employee will not be benefited, as he will only to be reinstated on daily
wages basis also he may be gainfully employed by now and his reinstatement may create
complications also and hence one time settlement was ordered.
State of Rajasthan & Ors. v. Rashid Mohammed, 2006 (108) FLR 727 (Raj.DB)
5A.712
Considering that the employee had barely worked in the establishment as accounts
clerk for a period of 240 days when his services were terminated in view of his work and conduct as
an ad hoc employee and that his services were not regularised and thirteen years had passed since
his termination Bench held that Single Judge was right in directing payment of compensation
instead of reinstatement with backwages.
Murari Lal Sharma v. Nehru Yuva Kendra Sangathan, 2002 (93) FLR 919 : 2002 II CLR 480 : 2002 LLR
464 (Del.DB)
5A.713
A workman had been terminated without complying with Sec. 25F of the Act, such
termination was held to be illegal and void. Taking into consideration the plea taken by the
Corporation before the Tribunal that only a skeleton consultant office was functioning at Ranchi
and more than 12 years had been passed after the retrenchment, instead of reinstatement, the
workman was allowed 50% of the arrears of wages as lump sum payment.
Sudipta Rai @ S. Roy v. P.O. Labour Court, Ranchi & Ors., 2002 (95) FLR 648 : 2003 LIC (sum) 27
(Jhar.HC)
Note: also refer to the following cases which were similarly decided
When workman terminated is a daily wager and the post was manned by a duly recruited person.
Municipal Board v. Labour Court & Ors., 2004 LIC 1885 (Raj.HC)
Rajinder Singh C/o. Amritsar Transport Workers Employees Union (Regd.) v. State of Punjab & Ors.,
2000 I LLJ 299 : 2000 (96) FJR 23 : 2000 (84) FLR 556 : 1999 II LLN 494 (P&H.HC)
J.N. Bhardwaj v. Hindustan Insecticides Ltd., 1995 LLR 998 (Del.HC)
Lorrik Yadav v. Labour Court & Ors., 2003 (97) FLR 888 : 2003 LLR 722 (Raj.HC)
Lumpsum compensation granted to workman instead of reinstatement and 20% back-wages as
the employee had delayed coming to the Court and there was now a delay of 29 years after his
termination.
State of Rajasthan & Anr. v. Amar Singh & Anr., 2007 LIC 798 : 2007 I CLR 1052 : 2007 LLR 252
(Raj.HC)
Termination occurred 20 year back without complying with Sec. 25F is a fit case for lump sum
compensation instead of reinstatement.
Food Corporation of India v. Union of India & Anr., 2007 (113) FLR 337 : 2007 LLR 591 (Jhar.HC)
Compensation in lieu of reinstatement adequate for violation if dispute is 16 years old.
Pramod Kumar & Anr. v. Presiding Officer & Anr., 2006 I LLJ 158 : 2006 I LLN 254 : 2006 LIC 76 :
2006 LLR 302 (Del.DB)
Workman was terminated 21 years ago, and he was engaged in an independent work, granted
lumpsum compensation of Rs. 1 lac.
M/s. Advance Engineering Corporation v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court No. II & Anr., 2007 (112)
FLR 524 : 2007 LIC 807 : 2007 LLR 198 (Del.HC)
District Red Cross Society v. Surjit Kaur & Anr., 2003 III LLN 1160 (P&H.HC)
The Management of the Chief Engineer Transmission Project Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd. v. State of
Orissa & Ors., 2005 LIC 3441 (Ori.HC)
2542
Sec. 25F
Compensation in lieu of reinstatement is proper when the workman did not serve for 14 years
when the dispute was pending.
Babu Ram Sagar v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Anr., 2006 LLR 1122 (Del.HC)
Compensation in lieu of reinstatement with back-wages may be appropriate, as relief was granted
after a lapse of 25 years.
The Employer, in Relation to the Management of Central Bank of India, Kanpur v. P.O. Central
Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Kanpur & Ors., 2003 (97) FLR 895 (All.HC)
Compensation can be granted in lieu of reinstatement since workman is a daily wager and
worked for four years.
Devi Prasad v. The Sub-Divisional Officer (Land Conversion) & Ors., 2004 (101) FLR 121 : 2004 III
LLN 419 (Raj.HC)
Lala Ram v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., 2002 I CLR 421 : 2001 LLR 802 (Raj.HC)
Nagar Palika, Lalsot v. Babu Lal & Ors., 2002 II CLR 1045 (Raj.HC)
Sushil Kumar Mathur v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2001 III LLJ 286 : 2001 I LLN 429 : 2000 LIC 2756 :
2001 I CLR 214 (Raj.HC)
University of Delhi v. R.K. Sharma & Ors., 2003 LLR 893 : 2003 (99) FLR 303 (Del.HC)
B.N. Elias & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal & Ors., 1965 II LLJ 324 : 1961 II LLJ
14 : 1965-66 (28) FJR 257 (Cal.HC)
Note: also refer to the following case on the above lines in case of casual workers
R. Baskar & Ors. v. M/s. Auto Care Centre, Chennai & Ors., (2) P.O. First Additional Labour Court,
Madras, 2003 I LLJ 700 : 2003 (96) FLR 75 : 2002 IV LLN 518 (Mad.HC)
Compensation in lieu of reinstatement, held proper, casual worker if terminated
L&T. McNeil Ltd., Madras v. P.O. Principal Labour Court, Madras & Anr., 2001 II LLJ 1655 : 2001 III
LLN 807 (Mad.HC)
R. Baskar & Ors. v. M/s. Auto Care Centre, Chennai & Ors., (2) P.O. First Additional Labour Court,
Madras, 2003 I LLJ 700 : 2003 (96) FLR 75 : 2002 IV LLN 518 (Mad.HC)
Reinstatement after a prolonged period of termination is not a suitable relief than lump sum
compensation
Vikash Adhikari & Anr. v. Judge, Labour Court, Bikaner & Anr., 2007 (113) FLR 37 (Raj.HC)
x) When workmen terminated were casual employees and did not work for
240 days (S.C.3J)
F 5A.714 The Supreme Court granted 75% back-wages with benefit of Sec. 25F to 100
permanent workmen who were held illegally terminated but not reinstated in as much as they are
employed elsewhere but ordered 50% back-wages to remaining 239 permanent workmen similarly
terminated but were not employed with orders for their reinstatement. The difference in
back-wages was explained as flowing from the fact of reinstatement or its absence. Similarly casual
employees 74 in number with service more than nine months were reinstated but 57 with less than
240 days of service were not in accordance with the Industrial law but awarded flat rate of
compensation.
Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd., etc. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha & Anr., 1980 I LLJ 137 : 1980 (56)
FJR 137 : 1980 (40) FLR 152 : 1980 I LLN 230 : 1980 LIC 1004 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 197 : 1980 AIR (SC)
1896 : 1980 (2) SCC 593 (S.C.3J)
While reinstatement is refused for these 100 workmen, when shall they be deemed to have ceased to be
in service for drawal of terminal benefits? Their discharge orders having been quashed, they remain in
service until today. We concluded the arguments on Aug. 3, 1979 and on the eve of the closure of
counsels submissions certain inconclusive settlement proposals were discussed. We, therefore, consider
August 3, 1979 as a pivotal point the calendar with reference to which the final relief may be moulded.
We direct that the 100 workmen for whom reinstatement is being refused will be treated as in service until
August 3, 1979 on which date they will be deemed to have been retrenched. We direct this step with a
view to pragmatise the situation in working out the equities. These 100 will draw all terminal benefits
Sec. 25F
2543
plus 75 per cent of the back wages. This scaling down of back pay is consistent with the assumption that
somewhere in the past they had secured alternative employment. The long years and the large sum
payable also persuade us to make this minor cut. Of course, in addition, they will be entitled to
retrenchment benefits under S. 25F of the Act (Page: 175/176, Para: 153)
The remaining 139 will be awarded 50 per cent of the back wages since we are restoring them. The High
Court has adopted this measure and so we do not depart from it. The case of the hundred stands on a
slightly different footing, because some compensation in lieu of refusal of reinstatement is due to them
and that also has entered our reckoning while fixing 75 per cent for them. The computation of the wages
will be such as they would have drawn had they continued in service and on that the cut directed will be
applied. (Page: 176, Para: 154)
We have disposed of the case of the permanent workmen except to clarify that in their case continuity of
service will be maintained and accrual of benefits on that footing reckoned. The next category relates to
casual employees, 131 in number of whom 57 have less than nine months service. the policy of the Act
draws a distinction between those with service of 240 days and more and others with less. The casuals
with less than nine months service are 57 in number and we do not think that this fugitive service should
qualify for reinstatement especially when we find a number intermediate recruits, with longer though
untenable service, have to be baled out.
We decline reinstatement of these 57 hands. The other 74 must be reinstated although notionally but
wrongly they are shown as casual. In the life sense, all mortals are casuals but in the legal sense, those
with a record of 240 days on the rolls, are a class who have rights under industrial law. We direct the 74
long-term casuals aforesaid to be reinstated but not the 57 short-term ones. To this extent, we vary the
High Courts order. (Page: 176, Para: 155)
xi) When employee was a daily wager and the company is engaged in
manufacture of missiles which is a sensitive one requiring verification of
antecedents (AP.HC)
5A.715
The workman was appointed as helper on daily wages. His termination was held bad
by Tribunal since Sec. 25F was not complied with and compensation in lieu of reinstatement
granted to him. Claiming reinstatement workman moved High Court which upheld the order of
Labour Court as the employer engaged in manufacture of missiles which was very much sensitive
and reinstatement would require verification of workmans antecedents.
Md. Hyder & Ors. etc. v. Industrial Tribunal-II, Hyderabad & Anr., 2006 LIC 26 : 2006 I CLR 663
(AP.HC)
2544
Sec. 25F
under the circumstances. Division Bench upheld the order; stated workman would have been
gainfully employed after his services had been terminated. As he has attained the age of
superannuation, the question of reinstatement does not arise. However, increased the amount of
compensation from Rs. 4000 to Rs. 20,000 holding the same clearly inadequate.
Mohinder Singh Sohan Pal v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, U.T. Chandigarh & Anr., 2006 IV LLN
975 : 2006 I LLJ 556 : 2005 III CLR 1036 : 2006 LLR 159 (P&H.DB)
The workman-appellant.learned Single Judge. (Page: 975, Para: 1)
We too are of the opinion.from Rs. 4000 to 20,000. (Page: 975, Para: 3)
xv) When the job performed by employees in fast food centers is such that they
can easily find other jobs (S.C.2J)
F 5A.720 Employee employed in fast food centers and tourist complexes of corporation which
were closed and were handed over to the bus stands of transport dept in compliance of policy
decision of State Government as they were running into loss, Court considered the fact that
retrenched employees were daily wagers not recruited through the employment exchange etc. nor
regularized in service and their work of cooking, cleaning are of such a nature that they can be
easily employed anywhere hence reinstatement after a lapse of some years is unjustified and
ordered the payment of a sum of Rs. 70,000 to each of the workman in lieu of reinstatement
Haryana Tourism Corporation Ltd. v. Fakir chand & Ors., 2004 I LLN 14 : 2004 I LLJ 195 : 2003 (99)
FLR 821 : 2003 LIC 3678 : 2004 SCC (L&S) 36 : 2003 AIR (SC) 4465 : 2003 (8) SCC 248 (S.C.2J)
The respondents herein were engaged to work on dialywage basis. All of them continued as
dailywage employees and their services were terminated as early as 1991. (Page: 15, Para: 4)
Sec. 25F
2545
It is submitted on behalf of the appellant Corporation that some of the fast food centres and tourist
complexes of the appellant Corporation are still being run by incurring losses and that there are a large
number of workers already available for running them. It was submitted that if these respondents are
directed to be reinstated, it would only lead to excess manpower, disproportionate to the actual
requirement. It is, however, to be noted that these respondents had obtained an award for reinstatement as
the appellant Corporation did not raise appropriate contention before the Labour Court. However, it is
clear that in other cases the Labour Court accepted the plea raised by the appellant Corporation. These
respondents, as stated earlier, were mostly working as cook, cleaner, sweeper and gardener etc. and by the
nature of their work, they must have been doing similar work elsewhere if not regularly, at least
intermittently after their services were terminated. (Page: 15, Para: 5)
Having regard to the above facts, we do not think that the direction to reinstate them would be a just and
equitable solution at this distance of time. (Page: 15, Para: 6)
In the above circumstances and taking into account the amount of daily wages that were being paid by
them, we feel that the appellant Corporation can be directed to pay a sum of Rs. 70,000 to each of these
respondents by way of compensation in lieu of reinstatement. (Page: 15, Para: 7)
xvi) Mere compensation for truck driver proper when the truck driven by him
was sold (P&H.DB)
5A.721
Society employed truck driver and terminated his services without compliance of Sec.
25F but the truck which he was driving was sold, the society had no obligation to offer alternate
employment but compensation with interest was payable.
Ranjit Singh v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Anr., 2006 III LLJ 72 : 2006 (110) FLR 412 : 2006 II
LLN 817 (P&H.DB)
2546
Sec. 25F
xxii) Mere compensation proper when appointment itself is not as per relevant
rules (Raj.HC)
5A.727
Workmen who were appointed as part time employees in the class IV group raised
claim for regularization and reinstatement. Labour Court held termination is illegal since
provisions of Sec. 25F is not followed and awarded compensation of Rs. 15,000 to the workman.
High Court held that workmen were appointed as part time employees without following
provisions of relevant rules, it amounted to flagrant violation of rules and procedures.
Appointment on daily wages does not give right of regularization. Thus, Labour Court has not
committed any illegality in denying regularization to workman.
District Education Officer (EE), Banswara v. Bapu Lal & Anr., 2004 (101) FLR 1232 : 2005 IV LLN 787
(Raj.HC)
The facts and.hence the writ petition. (Page: 1232, Para: 2)
There is no.liable to be dismissed. (Page: 1234, Para: 6)
In State of Rajastan.part time employee. (Page: 1235, Para: 11)
In these instant.them compensation. (Page: 1235, Para: 12)
Sec. 25F
2547
xxiii) Proper when only consultant office was functioning at skeletal level
(Jhar.HC)
5A.728
In this case the employer pleaded after 12 years that only its skeletal consultant office
was functioning at Ranchi. The High Court held that the termination of services of the employee in
violation of Sec. 25F to be illegal and allowed 50% of arrears of wages in lieu of reinstatement,
which should be construed to be one time lump sum payment made in his favour in the interests of
justice. Therefore, the petition was dismissed.
Sudipta Rai @ S. Roy v. P.O. Labour Court, Ranchi & Ors., 2002 (95) FLR 648 : 2003 LIC (sum) 27
(Jhar.HC)
xxiv) Proper when workers are not interested to be reinstated to the post last
held (Mad.HC)
5A.729
When the Labour Court ordered reinstatement of workers who were in continuous
service for several years but the workers not interested to be reinstated to the post last held
therefore Labour Court ordered compensation instead of reinstatement, High Court affirmed the
orders of Labour Court and enhanced the amount of compensation in modification of the award.
R. Baskar & Ors. v. M/s. Auto Care Centre, Chennai & Ors., (2) P.O. First Additional Labour Court,
Madras, 2003 I LLJ 700 : 2003 (96) FLR 75 : 2002 IV LLN 518 (Mad.HC)
2548
Sec. 25F
xxix) Mere compensation proper though Sec. 25F was violated if worker
abandons service by not joining at the place of transfer (Mad.HC)
5A.734
Workman working on daily rate basis covered by Sec. 2(s) of the Act was transferred
to another place where he did not join for 8-9 months without giving any justification for not
joining. It was held that worker abandoned services on his own but he was awarded compensation
as Sec. 25F of the Act was not complied with but other benefits were not given.
P. Kalivarthan v. P.O. Second Additional District Judge, Pondicherry, & Anr., 2002 I LLJ 443 : 2002 I
LLN 397 : 2001 LIC 3475 (Mad.HC)
xxx) When employer lost his confidence and termination though violative of
Sec. 25F was as per service rules (S.C.2J)
F 5A.735 The workman was terminated in violation of Sec. 25F but Labour Court held that
workman was terminated as per service rule, hence awarded compensation of one years wages in
lieu of reinstatement. Apex Court held that there is error apparent in award but instead of
reinstatement granted back wages for 12 years i.e. the period during which the workman remained
unemployed and also compensation of Rs. 50,000 since employer lost his confidence on the
workman and reinstatement under an unwilling employer is not desirable.
Sant Raj & Anr. v. O.P. Singla & Anr., 1985 AIR (SC) 617 : 1985 II LLJ 19 : 1985 (67) FJR 89 : 1985 (50)
FLR 452 : 1985 II LLN 42 : 1985 LIC 810 : 1985 I CLR 306 : 1985 (2) SCC 349 (S.C.2J)
The Labour Court while declining to grant the relief of reinstatement which should have ordinarily
followed, consequent upon its finding that the termination of service was bad and illegal, in exercise of its
discretion awarded one years wages as compensation in lieu of reinstatement on the ground that the
termination of service of each of the appellant was bona fide and not a colourable exercise of power in
accordance with service rules. There is thus an error apparent on the face of the record of the case
inasmuch as if the termination of service was according to service rules and was bona fide it could not be
simultaneously held to be illegal and invalid. Therefore the discretion was exercised on irrelevant and
extraneous considerations or considerations not germane to the determination.
(Page: 618, Para: 5)
Sec. 25F
2549
Dr. Chitley, learned counsel who appeared for the respondents attempted to take us through the evidence
with a view to persuading us that the employer even if it acted contrary to law, should not be burdened
with reinstatement because it had lost confidence in the appellants. The employer is a foreign
air-transport company. The workmen were loaders posted at Delhi Airport. In this far-fetched
hierarchical relationship, loss of confidence if it is to be considered a relevant factor would have hardly
impressed us. However, as the workmen are out of job from August 30, 1973 i.e. roughly for a period of
12 years, it is in their own interest, that instead of reinstatement in service under an unwilling if not a
hostile employer, adequate compensation would meet the ends of justice. Therefore, in the special facts
and circumstances of this case, though disagreeing with the reasons given by the Labour Court for
declining to grant the normal relief of reinstatement, we uphold the same but the meagre compensation
awarded by the Labour Court namely one years wages requires to be adequately and properly modified.
(Page: 618, Para: 6)
Dr. Chitley gave us, information about the last wages drawn by each of the workmen. That does not take
care of over-time allowance or bonus or other benefits that they enjoy roughly, the monthly pay packet of
each workman appears to be around Rs. 1,000. Each one of them was a loader which means doing manual
job. Each one of them is entitled to backwages in full for a period of 12 years. Each one was therefore
entitled to get Rs. 1,50,000 towards backwages. Adding to it the compensation in lieu of reinstatement in
the amount of Rs. 50,000, we are of the opinion that a total compensation in the amount of Rs. 2,00,000/to each appellant would meet the ends of justice. (Page: 618, Para: 7)
2550
Sec. 25F
ii) When granted without any cogent reasons by diluting its own findings
(Mad.HC)
5A.740
The workman was retrenched without complying with Sec. 25F. Labour Court held
that the termination was illegal but instead of reinstatement it granted compensation. On
workmans appeal High Court set aside the order of Labour Court and granted reinstatement with
all other consequential benefits because Labour Court tried to dilute its own finding given earlier
and tried to justify the award of compensation in an unreasonable manner.
N. Selvaraj v. Management of Seeranaickenpalayam Weavers Co-op. Production & Sales Soc. Ltd.,
Coimbatore, 1997 I LLJ 830 : 1997 LLR 500 (Mad.HC)
iii) When work man did not complete 240 days (Del.HC)
5A.741
Workmen who did not complete 240 days service could not claim any benefit under
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947.
Raj Rani v. G.T.B.Hospital & Anr., 2005 (105) FLR 187 : 2005 LLR 250 (Del.HC)
Sec. 25F
2551
i) Relief of bonus
1. Can be granted to the retrenched workmen for the period prior to their
retrenchment (Cal.DB)
5A.745
Subsequent to retrenchment of certain workers and dismissal of one workman,
company issued a notification declaring additional profit bonus for financial year prior to such
retrenchment and dispute regarding claim for bonus by retrenched employees was taken up by
other workmen of establishment through their union, Court dismissed challenge to the validity of
reference by the management and held that definition of Industrial Dispute is very wide and as
workmen raising dispute in instant case have community of interest with retrenched workmen in
general interest of labour because they put forward a claim that under circumstances similar to the
present case they are entitled to claim bonus and also since the claim for bonus was not barred by
Sec. 25F or 25H as the relief claimed was not relief under the Act but relief under declaration made
by company and upheld the validity of reference made for the claim of bonus by retrenched
workmen.
East Asiastic & Allied Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal West Bengal & Ors., 1961 I LLJ
720 : 1961-62 (20) FLR 309 (Cal.DB)
.By a notice dated.21 November 1956.upon the appellant.fourth
Industrial Tribunal. (Page: 722, Para: 1)
.By an award published.of the Tribunal. (Page: 722, Para: 2)
.The question of consideration.therefore very wide. (Page: 723, Para: 4)
2552
Sec. 25FF
Sec. 25FF
2553
mills in accordance with the provisions of Section 25F of the I.D. Act as if the workmen were
retrenched. The workmen could not remain in service in continuance of the contract of employment after
the transfer, and in any case not with the appellants. Hence, there was no obligation on the appellants to
continue the services of the workmen after the takeover of the management.
(Page: 957, Para: 11)
.contention which is based on the provisions of Section 25FF of the I.D. Act, we are afraid that
the same proceeds on a wrong presumption of the law. As is clear from the provisions of the said section
which are reproduced above, the section by itself does not put an end to the contract of employment on the
transfer of the ownership or management of the undertaking to the new employer. There is nothing in the
said provisions to indicate such a consequence on the transfer of the undertaking. The section only
provides for compensation to the workmen if such transfer aliunde results in the termination of the
contract of employment. Whether the transfer results in the termination of the contract of employment or
not, will depend upon either the terms of the agreement of transfer or on the provisions of the law which
effects the transfer. The section in terms states that if the terms of the agreement or the provisions of the
law have the effect of terminating the contract of employment, every workman in employment in the
transferor undertaking would be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of
Section 25F as if the workmen had been retrenched.The three conditions under which the
workman becomes ineligible to the notice and retrenchment compensation under Section 25F, further
make it abundantly clear that by itself neither Section 25FF nor the transfer of the undertaking as such,
puts an end to the contract of employment. In fact, the section envisages the continuation of employment,
and makes provision for the compensation, only if the transfer results in the termination of the contract of
employment. These provisions show that where the employment continues in spite of the transfer of the
undertaking, the workmen would not be entitled to notice and retrenchment compensation under Section
25F from the transferoremployer. It is only if there is a transfer of the undertaking and the said three
conditions are not satisfied that a workman would be entitled to such notice and retrenchment
compensation from the transferoremployer. (Page: 959, Para: 15)
It is, therefore, more than clear that neither Section 25FF nor the transfer by itself has the effect of
putting an end to the contract of employment of the workmen. (Page: 959, Para: 16)
b) Inter-departmental transfers are not within the ambit of the section (S.C.3J)
F 5A.748 Transfer of all the workmen of a retail business department to another dept. by a firm
having many combined parts of business at same place, common muster roll for all employees who
were governed by the same service condition and who were liable to be transferred from one
department to another and were treated as one unit for purposes of bonus and were not employed
for any particular branch or line of business, cannot be considered to be a transfer of separate
undertaking or establishment for purposes of Sec. 25FF. The Supreme Court therefore upheld the
contention of Tribunal that transfer does not attract Sec. 25FFand the proviso to it. In other words
to attract Sec. 25FF the entire business requires to be transferred i.e. ownership or management of
the undertaking.
The Management of R.S. Madho Ram and Sons (Agencies) Private Ltd. & Ors. v. The Workmen as
represented by Madho Ram and Sons Employees Union, 1964 I LLJ 366 : 1964 (8) FLR 117 : 196364
(25) FJR 294 : 1964 AIR (SC) 645 (S.C.3J)
.The fact that one undertaking runs these businesses would not necessarily exclude the
application of Section 25FF solely on the ground that all the businesses or industries run by the said
undertaking have not been transferred. (Page: 369, Para: 2)
But where the undertaking runs several allied businesses in the same place or places, different
considerations would come into play. In the present case, the muster roll showing the list of employees
was common in regard to all the departments of business run by the transferor firm. It is not disputed that
the terms and conditions of service were the same for all the employees and what is most significant is the
fact that the employees could be transferred from one department run by the transferor firm to another
department. Though the transferor conducted several branches of business which are more or less allied,
the services of the employees were not confined to any one business, but were liable to be transferred
from one branch to another. In the payment of bonus all the employees were treated as constituting one
unit and there was thus both the unity of employment and the identity of the terms and conditions of
2554
Sec. 25FF
service. In fact, it is purely a matter of accident that the 57 workmen with whose transfer we are
concerned in the present appeal happened to be engaged in retail business which was the subject-matter
of the transfer between the firm and the company These 57 employees had not been appointed solely for
the purpose of the retail business but were in charge of the retail business as a mere matter of accident.
Under these circumstances, it appears to us to be very difficult to accept Mr. Setalvads argument that
because the retail business has an identity of its own it should be treated as an independent and distinct
business run by the firm and as such, the transfer should be deemed to have constituted the company into a
successor-in-interest of the transferor firm for the purpose of S. 25FF. (Page: 369/370, Para: 3)
.we are satisfied that the appellant cannot claim to be a successor-in-interest of the firm so as to
attract the provisions of S. 25FF of the Act. The transfer which has been effected by the firm in favour of
the appellant does not, in our opinion, amount to the transfer of the ownership or management of an
undertaking and so, the Tribunal was right in holding that S. 25FF and the proviso to it did not apply to the
present case. (Page: 370, Para: 1)
c) Sec. 25FF does not compel employees to accept transfer but only ensures
compensation to them (Bom.HC)
5A.749
Employees of transferor undertaking are not compelled u/s. 25FF of the Act to accept
transfer of their services to transferee undertaking, it only ensures payment of retrenchment
compensation in case of transfer of undertaking.
Rallis Group Employees Union v. Rallis India Limited & Ors., 2002 I LLJ 173 : 2001 (91) FLR : 2002 I
LLN 721 : 2001 III CLR 230 : 2002 LLR 52 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25FF
2555
2556
Sec. 25FF
.It is common ground that if a transfer is fictitious or benami, S. 25-FF has no application at all.
In such a case, there has been no change of ownership or management and despite an apparent transfer,
the transferor employer continues to be the real employer and there has to be continuity of service under
the same terms and conditions of service as before and there can be no question of compensation.
(Page: 1495, Para: 18)
Sec. 25FF
Transfer is valid
2557
b) Excludes
1. Joint venture between two companies for better functioning and technical
cooperation (All.HC)
5A.759
The establishment entered into an agreement with other establishment according to
which a joint sector was created for float glass project. The other establishment was to provide the
technical know-how and technical services to joint company. The employees were retrenched as
per Sec. 25FF of the Act and the same was challenged. High Court observed that from the admitted
facts, it was clear that employer has not ceased to operate the business but entered into an
agreement for better functioning of the organization and to avail technical know-how and
expertise in the trade. Thus, the retrenchment in question was illegal and was not consequent upon
transfer. Quashing order of retrenchment it was ordered that the employer is under legal
obligation to regularize and pay the same salary as they have worked for more than 240 days.
Umesh Chandra Pandey & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors., 1991 LIC 1449 : 1991 LLR 638 (All.HC)
V. Transfer is valid
a) When business of transferor and transferee is the same (Bom.DB)
5A.760
In a valid transfer, the identity of business of transferor and transferee company must
not change. In other words the business carried on by transferor must if so facto be carried on by
the transferee.
N.J. Chavan v. P.D. Sawarkar, 1958 I LLJ 36 (Bom.DB)
2558
Sec. 25FF
order as there was nothing in the wording of Sec. 25FF to suggest that consent was a condition
precedent for transfer, nor the workmen had able to establish any element of fraud as they
contended.
Management, Mettur Beardsell Ltd. v. Workmen of Mettur Beardsell Ltd. & Anr., 2006 II LLJ 899 : 2006
(109) FLR 1057 : 2006 III LLN 687 : 2006 LIC 2230 : 2006 LLR 868 : 2006 AIR (SC) 2056 (S.C.2J)
.There is nothing in the wording of Section 25FF even remotely to suggest that consent is a
pre-requisite for transfer. The underlying purpose of Section 25FF is to establish a continuity of service
and to secure benefits otherwise not available to a workman if a break in service to another employer was
accepted. Therefore, the letter of consent of the individual employee cannot be a ground to invalidate the
action.(Page: 902, Para: 10)
5A.762
Denying the contention of workmen it was held that absence of the consent of
workmen does not invalidate transfer of ownership or management of an undertaking.
Spencer Group Aerated Water Factory Employees Union & Anr. v. The P.O. Industrial Tribunal & Ors.,
1997 I LLJ 362 : 1996 (89) FJR 728 : 1997 LLR 189 (Mad.DB)
.we have no hesitation in holding that after the advent of Section 25FF of the I.D. Act there is no
scope for invalidating the transfer of the ownership or management of an undertaking, whether by
agreement for by operation of law, on the ground that consent of the workmen had not been
obtained.Therefore, on the first point framed by us we hold against the workmen that no consent
is necessary for validating the transfer of ownership or management of an undertaking, within the
meaning of Section 25FF of the I.D. Act. (Page: 373, Para: 24)
5A.763
Employee was working as a bus conductor in the transport wing of the Tirumala
Tirupati Devasthanam (TTD), Tirupati. The said transport undertaking was taken over by the
Andhra Pradesh state Road Transport Corporation in pursuance of the agreement dated August 8,
1975. The employee was removed from service after a domestic enquiry for the misconduct of
violating the rule of Issue and Start. Aggrieved, he moved the High Court contending that he was
not the employee of the APSRTC and therefore, not bound by the terms of the agreement between
the APSRTC and TTD because the employees of the erstwhile transport wing are not the parties to
the bipartite agreement dated August 8, 1975. However, the High Court rejected the contention
and upheld the removal on the ground that in case of transfer of undertakings, the workmen
therein can be taken over by the transferee undertaking. In such a case, Sec. 25FF of the Industrial
Disputes Act is attracted. It is not necessary to obtain the consent of the workmen in order to
transfer such undertaking. The rights of the employees of such undertakings are envisaged u/s.
25FF.
G.V.M. Reddy, Conductor, Tirupathi I Depot v. Depot Manager, A.P. State Road Transport Corporatin,
Tirupathi, 1993 I LLJ 549 : 1994 II LLJ 861 : 1993 (66) FLR 782 : 1993 I CLR 948 : 1993 LLR 252
(AP.HC)
Sec. 25FF
2559
Purchaser3rd respondent, to reopen the factory or in the alternative to pay the workmen wages due to
them, was a clear indicator of the fact that the appellantworkmen by their positive conduct did consent to
the transfer of the undertaking by the second respondent to the third respondent. In this view of the matter,
we hold that by their conduct the workmen had tacitly accepted the change in the management.
(Page: 373/374, Para: 25)
2560
Sec. 25FF
Sec. 25FF
2561
2562
Sec. 25FF
VII. Successor-in-interest
a) No single conclusive factor but to be determined by various factors like
whether whole business was purchased or is it a going concern etc. (S.C.CB)
F 5A.771 The question as to whether a purchaser of industrial concern is successor-in-interest
of vendor should be decided considering several relevant facts such as whether whole business was
purchased, was the business purchased a going concern at time of sale transaction, is the business
purchased is the same or similar, nature, reasons and length of any break in continuity of business,
whether good will is purchased, if purchase is only of some parts and purchaser starts new business
similar to old after purchasing some other new parts and such decision cannot be reached by
treating any one fact as of overriding or conclusive significance, neither presence nor absence of
any of them is decisive.
Anakapalle Cooperative Agricultural & Industrial Society Ltd. v. Their Workmen & Ors., 1963 AIR
(SC) 1489 : 1962 II LLJ 621 : 1963-64 (24) FJR 101 : 1963 (6) FLR 1 (S.C.CB)
The question as to whether a purchaser of an industrial concern can be held to be a successor-in-interest
of the vendor will have to be decided on a consideration of several relevant facts. Did the purchaser
purchase the whole of the business? Was the business purchased a going concern at the time of the sale
transaction? Is the business purchased carried on at the same place as before? Is the business carried on
without a substantial break in time? Is the business purchased carried in at the same or similar to the
business in the hands of the vendor? If there has been a break in the continuity of the business, what is the
nature of the break and what were the reasons responsible for it? What is the length of the break? Has
goodwill been purchased? Is the purchase only of some parts and the purchaser having purchased the said
parts purchased some other new parts and started a business of his own which is not the same as the old
business but is similar to it? These and all other relevant factors have to be borne in mind in deciding the
question as to whether the purchaser can be said to be a successor-in-interest of the vendor for the purpose
of industrial adjudication. It is hardly necessary to emphasise in this connection that though all the facts to
which we have referred by way of illustration are relevant, it would be unreasonable to exaggerate the
importance of any one of these facts or to adopt the inflexible dale that the presence or absence of any one
of in them is decisive of the matter one way or the other. (Page: 1492/1493, Para: 9)
Sec. 25FF
Successor-in-interest
2563
2. A new company can be when the same business was carried on by new
company and identity of business is not destroyed by interruption
(Ker.DB)
5A.773
Where the same factories were being worked with same goodwill in discharge of the
obligation to employ workmen who had been thrown out of employment and with loan aid given to
old company, it can be inferred that same business was carried on by new company and identity of
business is not destroyed by interruption or time gap between incoming and outgoing management
and it is immaterial that new management begins to carry on same business on fresh lease, hence
new company will be successor in interest.
Musaliar Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala & Ors., 1960 II LLJ 341 (Ker.DB)
.interruption of or gaps.become its successor.in the case.a fresh lease.
(Page: 347, Para: 10)
2. A transferee company is not when it took over only assets but not liabilities
and sale was free from encumbrances (Bom.DB)
5A.775
The license of the electricity supply undertaking was revoked during the pendency of
adjudication proceedings in regard to disputes with the workmen and substantial portion of assets
was taken over by the State Electricity Board at prices determined under the State Electricity Act
but the liabilities of the company including staff liabilities were not taken over and the undertaking
was sold free from encumbrances. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the Board was a
successor-in-interest of the company. The employees were paid retrenchment compensation u/s.
25FF and 25F on the termination of their services and were not entitled to claim reinstatement
from the transferee board as transfer was not fictitious. Thus the Board is not a necessary party to
the dispute and the order of the Tribunal impleading it as a party is set aside.
Maharashtra State Electricity Board v. Industrial Tribunal & Ors.,1965 II LLJ 458 (Bom.DB)
.the substance of the.of the undertaking. (Page: 466/467, Para: 1)
The Board was not liable.electricity Act, 1910. (Page: 467, Para: 1)
.Once the licence.as a whole. (Page: 468, Para: 1)
2564
Sec. 25FF
4. Purchaser cannot be where the business is not taken over but only land and
buildings were purchased to start a new business (Karn.HC)
5A.777
A purchaser can be called as successor in interest only if the prior business is taken
over as a going concern with all its assets and liabilities. Where the business is not so taken over and
only the land and buildings are purchased for starting together a new business and leaves plants
and machinery to the vendors disposal, the purchaser can not be held to be successor in interest.
PSI Data Systems Ltd. v. Additional Industrial Tribunal, Bangalore & Anr., 1993 I LLJ 73 : 1992 (80)
FJR 281 : 1992 (64) FLR 1162 : 1992 I LLN 817 : 1992 LIC 1127 : 1992 II CLR 252 : 1992 LLR 929
(Karn.HC)
Sec. 25FF
Obligations of Transferor
2565
2566
Sec. 25FF
Sec. 25FF
Rights of Transferee
2567
payable under a contract, instrument or a law it could not have been intended that such a claim for
compensation which is denied on grounds which inevitably would have to be inquired into and which
might entail prolonged inquiry into questions of fact as well as law was one which should be summarily
determined by the Authority under Section 15. Nor could the Authority have been intended to try as
matters incidental to such a claim questions arising under the proviso to Section 25FF. In our view it
would be the Labour Court in such cases which would be the proper forum which can determine such
questions under Section 330(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act which also possesses power to appoint a
commissioner to take evidence where question of facts require detailed evidence.
(Page: 769, Para: 1)
Bhavnagar Municipal Corpn. v. Kumar G. Mehta & Anr., 2001 I LLJ 823 : 2001 (88) FLR 830 : 2000
LIC 3017 : 2001 I CLR 49 (Guj.DB)
.In the instant.the matter (Page: 826, Para: 10)
.In the instant.decisive. (Page: 827, Para: 11)
In view of.allowed. (Page: 827, Para: 12)
Note: The following cases may be referred in the above context
Workmen of Dahingeapar Tea Estate v. Dahingeapar Tea Estate, 1958 II LLJ 498 : 1958-59 (15) FJR 77
: 1958 AIR (SC) 1026 (S.C.CB)
2568
Sec. 25FF
Sec. 25FF
Obligations of transferee
2569
X. Obligations of transferee
a) Undertaking given by transferor company to employees of its subsidiaries are
binding on transferee (Bom.DB)
5A.788
Undertaking given by the transferor company to employees of its subsidiaries will be
binding on transferee company.
Hindustan Lever Employees Union v. Hindustan Lever Ltd. & Ors., 1996 (88) FJR 129 : 1996 I LLN 529
(Bom.DB)
It is pertinenton HLL. (Page: 144, Para: 2)
b) If all the conditions in the proviso to Sec. 25FF complied, transferor stands
absolved of obligations, transferee liable to employees about their conditions of
service (Mad.DB)
5A.789
In instant case of legal transfer as transferor and transferee both had established that
conditions mentioned in proviso to Sec. 25FF were complied, transferor was absolved of any
obligation towards workmen and hence workmen now being transferees employees can claim
regarding conditions of service only from transferee.
Spencer Group Aerated Water Factory Employees Union & Anr. v. The P.O. Industrial Tribunal & Ors.,
1997 I LLJ 362 : 1996 (89) FJR 728 : 1997 LLR 189 (Mad.DB)
.We have noticed.would be adhered to. (Page: 373/374, Para: 25)
..we hold thatthird respondent-Purchaser. (Page: 377, Para: 31)
2570
Sec. 25FF
carry on and conduct the transport undertaking. For that purpose its principal function would be the
administration and management of that undertaking which would necessitate the employment of an
adequate staff of employees. Employment of such a staff and regulating their conditions of service,
including disciplinary action, would clearly be one of the powers or functions of the Rajya Transport
Authority, which power or function was also to be exercised and performed by the appellant corporation
under the said notification. Furthermore, in para 5 of the writ petition filed by the appellant corporation in
the High Court, the corporation in clear terms averred that it had taken over as from May 1, 1959 such of
the employees of the Rajya Transport Authority into its service who were on the rolls of the said
Authority on the date it came into existence. As rightly observed by the High Court, on a proper
construction of the said averment, if the termination of the services of respondent 3 was invalid, it never
became operative and respondent 3, therefore, would be deemed to be continuing in the service of the
Rajya Transport Authority on May 1, 1959, and therefore, on its rolls. In that view, the appellant
corporation must be deemed to have taken over the services of respondent 3. The argument, however, was
that the true meaning of the said averment was that only those of the employees of the Rajya Transport
Authority who were actually on its rolls were taken over and not those who were deemed to be on its rolls.
It is difficult to understand the distinction sought to be made between those whose names were actually on
the rolls and those whose names, though not physically on the rolls, were deemed in law to be on the rolls.
If respondent 3 continued in law to be in the service, it makes little difference whether his name actually
figured in the rolls or not. The expression on the rolls must mean those who were on May 1, 1959 in the
service of the Rajya Transport Authority. By reason of the order discharging him from service being
illegal, respondent 3 was and must be regarded to be in the service of the said Authority, and therefore, he
would be one of those whose services were taken over by the appellant corporation.
(Page: 142, Para: 9)
Apart, therefore, from the question of the appellant corporation being the successor-in-title of the said
Authority, respondent 3, in the absence of any valid termination of his services, continued and still
continues to be in the service of the appellant corporation since May 1, 1959, and therefore, the
corporation was bound to pay his wages including all the emoluments to which he was entitled as from
May 1, 1959. For the period from February to April the Rajya Transport Authority was liable to pay his
wages and other emoluments, if any, to which he was entitled. The corporation, as successor-in-title of
the said Authority, became liable to pay the said wages for the said period and not from February to
September 1959 as directed by the Labour Court. (Page: 142, Para: 10)
Sec. 25FF
Obligations of transferee
2571
2572
Sec. 25FF
Sec. 25FF
2573
2574
Sec. 25FF
Note: The following case may also be referred in the above context
Workmen of Dahingeapar Tea Estate v. Dahingeapar Tea Estate, 1958 II LLJ 498 : 1958-59 (15) FJR 77
: 1958 AIR (SC) 1026 (S.C.CB)
The Management of Puspa Talkies, Tiruppur v. Workers in Puspa Talkies & Anr., 1961 (3) FLR 485
(Mad.HC)
Sec. 25FF
2575
the Kanpur Electricity Supply Corporation Limited.The Member Secretary of the U.P. State
Electricity Board had informed the Government employee, whose services had been lent to the Board on
deputation that their salary, allowances and other conditions of service shall be governed by Regulations
made by the Board under S. 79 (c) of the Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 from time to time. It is not
disputed that the second respondent had thereafter exercised his option to serve in the U. P. State
Electricity Board. The second respondent is, therefore, bound by the Regulation by which the age of
retirement has been fixed in regard to employees like him at 58 years. (Page: 1452, Para: 5)
.In view of the admitted fact that the regulations framed by the Board under S. 79 (c) of the
Electricity (Supply) Act, 1948 have been notified by the Government under S. 13B of the Industrial
Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 we hold that the second respondent is bound by those
regulations in which the age of retirement has been admittedly fixed at 58 years and that the has no reason
to complain against his retirement on that basis with effect from 31-3-1979. The appeal is accordingly
allowed and the order of the appellant retiring the second respondent with effect from 31-3-1979 is
upheld. (Page: 1452, Para: 6)
2576
Sec. 25FF
h) The employee becomes entitled for retrenchment compensation and need wait
for the formal orders of termination (All.HC)
5A.804
As soon as an undertaking is transferred u/s. 25FF, the employee of transferor
company becomes entitled for retrenchment compensation and it is not necessary that they need
wait for the formal orders of termination.
U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. H.V. Bowen & Anr., 1968 LIC 326 (All.HC)
Sec. 25FF
2577
employed by the Company. Similarly, clause (2) of section 15 of the Madras Act.no such liability
of changes conditions of service of the Workmen while they were employed under the company.
(Page: 48, Col.: II)
.Rule 17 of the rule further shows that immediately on the vesting of the undertaking in the State
Government, the service of the Workmen retained by the Government become provisional and the
subsequent permanent employment of those Workmen in the undertaking is dependent on the condition
laid down in that rule. This liability imposed on the Workmen is clearly disadvantageous to those
Workmen who were in the permanent employ of the Company . The same rule also show that the
employees would not be entitled to bonus or other concessions not allowed to be servants of the
Governments, even if the Workmen were entitled to the bonus and the concessions from the Company.
The Workmen also became liable to transfer to any other place or post in the Government Electricity
Department depending on exigencies of service. These are instances of a number of condition of service
which become less favorable to the Workmen on their becoming employees of the State Government
when the undertaking vested in the Government by transfer form the Company In these circumstances,
the requirements of the proviso to section 25-FF of the Act are obviously not satisfied and that proviso
cannot be invoked by the Company for the purpose of defeating the claim made by the Workmen under
the principle clause of that section. Under that principle clause the Workmen become entitled to receive
retrenchment compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act on the basis of
the legal fiction envisaged that those rights would accrue to them as if the Workmen had been retrenched.
The Labour Court and the High Court were, therefore, right in holding that the Workmen were entitled to
claim retrenchment compensation in accordance with the provisions of section 25-F of the Act because of
the right accruing to them under section25-FF of the Act. (Page: 49, Para: 1)
2578
Sec. 25FF
k) Compensation payable is as per Sec. 25F and not u/s. 25FF or 25FFF when the
illegally terminated employee was either transferred to the Electricity Board
as employee of the transferor or the company never closed down but continued
on transfer (S.C.CB)
F 5A.807 When the illegally terminated employee, upon transfer of an undertaking, was neither
listed as one of their employees among the employees of the company for purposes of transfer nor
the transferee company has taken over the said dismissed employee, the compensation payable to
him invariably fall u/s. 25F of the Act and not either u/s. 25FF or 25FFF for that matter because the
company never closed down but continued with transferee company and therefore it is held that
the transferor company is liable to pay compensation that also u/s. 25F only.
Workmen of Uttar Pradesh State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Upper Ganges Valley Electricity Supply Co.
& Ors., 1966 I LLJ 730 : 1966 (12) FLR 231 (S.C.CB)
.The tribunal treats the matter as falling within the proviso to S. 25FFF (1). Sharma, on the other
hand, claims under S. 25 F (1).Both the sub-section and the proviso apply to the undertakings
which close down. If Sharma had continued in service with the company and the undertaking had closed
down, the proviso last quoted would undoubtedly have applied to his case. But the undertaking never
closed down. It continued in the hands of the board. All that happened was that the company having
unlawfully terminated the service of Sharma did not transfer him to the board as one of the employees in
the undertaking and the board also did not accept him on its service rolls. The result was that Sharma
stood retrenched on 5 May 1959 when the undertaking changed hands. He was so retrenched by the
action of the company and his case, therefore, falls squarely within the rule indicated in S. 25F
(b). (Page: 734, Para: 2)
m) No compensation is payable for benefit of earned leave not availed before the
transfer (S.C.2J)
F 5A.809 In absence of any provision in a statute governing the right to compensation for
earned leave not availed of by workmen before closure or transfer of undertaking, such
compensation was not held to be payable after the company closed its business.
U.P. Electric Supply Co. Ltd. (In Voluntary liquidation) v. R. K. Shukla & Anr., 1969 II LLJ 728 : 1969
(36) FJR : 1969 (19) FLR 268 :1970 LIC 276 : 1970 AIR (SC) 237 : 1996 (2) SCC 400 (S.C.2J)
Finally it was contended-and that contention relates only to the cases of 56 workmen in the Lucknow
undertaking-that the workmen who had not availed themselves of earned leave were entitled to
compensation equal to thirty days wages. But we do not think that any such compensation is statutorily
payable. So long as the Company was carrying on its business, it was obliged to give facility for enjoying
Sec. 25FF
2579
earned leave to its workmen. But after the Company closed its business, it could not obviously give any
earned leave to those workmen, nor could the workmen claim any compensation for not availing
themselves of the leave. In the absence of any provision in the statute governing the right to compensation
for earned leave not availed of by the workmen before closure or transfer of an undertaking, we do not
think that any such compensation is payable. (Page: 738, Para: 2)
Note: Provision regarding leave is amended under Factories Act
2580
Sec. 25FF
p) Re-employment u/s. 25H can be sought when employees were retrenched prior
to the transfer and not paid compensation u/s. 25FF but u/s. 25F (S.C.2J)
F 5A.812 Rejecting the contention of the employer that as soon as the transfer had been
effected, all workmen are entitled for compensation u/s. 25FF and since employee who had been
paid the compensation, re-employment u/s. 25H is not allowed, Supreme Court held that they were
retrenched long before the colliery was taken over by the management and they were not paid
u/s. 25FF but u/s. 25F and hence upheld the orders Tribunal directing re-employment when any
re-employment is done.
Workmen (represented by Akhil Bhartiya Koyla Kamgar Union) v. Employers in relation to Management
of Industry colliery of Bharat Coking Coal, Ltd. & Ors., 2001 I LLJ 1400 : 2001 (98) FJR 652 : 2001 (89)
FLR 552 : 2001 II CLR 1 : 2001 II LLN 819 : 2001 LIC 1397 : 2001 SCC (L&S) 641 : 2001 AIR (SC)
1994 : 2001 SCC (4) 55 (S.C.2J)
Shri Sinha submitted that as soon as transfer had been effected under section 25-FF of the Act all the
employees became entitled to claim compensation will not be entitled to claim re-employment under
section 25-H of the Act as the same would result in double benefit in the form of payment of
compensation and immediate re-employment and, therefore, fair entitled to such conferment of double
benefit. It is no doubt true that this argument sounds good, but there has been no retrenchment as
contemplated under Section 25-FF of the Act in the present case. The workmen in question have been
retrenched long before the colliery was taken over by the respondents and, therefore, the principle stated
in Anakapalle Co-operative Agricultural and Industrial Society Ltd., (surpa) in this regard cannot be
applied at all. The workmen had been paid compensation only under section 25-F and not under section
25-FF of the Act on transfer of the colliery to the present management. That case has not been pleaded or
established. Hence, we do not think that the line upon which the High Court has proceeded is correct. The
order made by the High Court deserves to be set aside and the Award made by the Tribunal will have to be
restored. (Page: 1403, Para: 9)
Sec. 25FF
2581
2582
Sec. 25FF
Sec. 25FF
2583
On August 31, 1959, Mr. Hammond, the Manager of the Vendor Company served notices on the 8
employees in question intimating to them that their services would be terminated with effect from
October 1. 1959.In pursuance of these notices, the eight employees were paid retrenchment
compensation due to them on August 31, 1959. On September 1, 1959. the Union representing the said
employees protested against the retrenchment in question. (Page: 335, Para: 2)
Shri Sastri for the vender.His case is that the transfer which is evidenced by the conveyance
executed between the parties on December 28, 1959 clearly shows that it was subject to two C0nditions; it
had to receive the sanction of the Reserve Bank and the Vendee held made it clear that the staff whom the
Vendee regarded as surplus had to be retrenched by the Vendor before the Vendee could take over the
undertaking as an owner. Since these two conditions can be treated as conditions precedent to the transfer
there can be no question of the transfer of the undertaking having taken place before the date of
retrenchment. (Page: 339, Para: 3)
.It is common ground that on July 15, 1959, the approval of the Reserve Bank was obtained, and
so, there can he no doubt whatever that as from July 15, 1959, the essential condition precedent having
been satisfied, the Vendee became the owner of the property. We have already noticed that the main
stipulation in the conveyance was that whenever the conveyance may be actually registered, it was agreed
to take effect from January 1, 1959. Even taking into account the fact that the approval of the Reserve
Prank was a condition precedent, there can be no escape from the conclusion that after the approval was
obtained, the operative clause in the conveyance came into play and the Vendee who had already
obtained possession of the estate became the owner of the property and his possession became the
possession of the owner. Therefore, whatever may be the character of the Vendees possession from
February 17, to July 15, 1959, as from the latter date it would be impossible to accept the Vendees case
that it continued manage the property as the Agent of the Vendor. That is one important point which
cannot be ignored. (Page: 340, Para: 3)
.We are therefore, satisfied that at least from July 15, 1959, the tea estate was in the possession
and management of the Vendee as an owner and that the conduct of the parties clearly shows that the
Vendee was the employer and the workmen working in the garden including the 8 retrenched workmen
were the Vendees employees. If that be so, whether or not the transfer of management took place on
February 17, 1959, there can be little doubt that after July 15, 1959 the Vendee accepted the employees as
its workmen and became answerable to them in that character. The impugned retrenchment cannot,
therefore, be taken to attract the operation of S. 25FF at all. It is not retrenchment consequent upon
transfer; it is retrenchment effected after the transfer was made. (Page: 341, Para: 1)
.It is conceded that if the retrenchment is held to be effected by the Vendee, it has not complied
with S. 25F or S. 25G of the Act, and there can be little doubt that failure to comply with S. 25F would
make the retrenchment invalid, and so would the failure to comply with S. 25G, because no reasons have
been recorded by the Vendee for departing from the rule prescribed by S. 25G.
(Page: 341, Para: 3)
2584
Sec. 25FF
In this connection, an additional point urged by Mr. Gupte was that the principal clause of Section
25-FF of the Act does not lay down which of the two employers mentioned therein is liable to pay the
retrenchment compensation and, consequently, where there is a dispute between the two employers,
an application for computation of the benefit under Section 25-FF of the Act cannot be competently
entertained and decided by a Labour Court. It appears to us that the language of that principal clause
makes it perfectly clear that, if the right to retrenchment compensation accrues under it, it must be a
right to receive that compensation from the previous employer who was the owner up to the date of
transfer. It is implicit in the language of that clause. The clause lays down that every workman
mentioned therein shall be entitled to notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of
Section 25-F as if the workman had been retrenched. Obviously, in such a case, the date of the deemed
retrenchment would be the date when the ownership or management of the undertaking stands
transferred to the new employer. In the present case, that date would be the 1st of June, 1957, when the
undertaking of the company was taken over by the Government of Madras under the Madras Act. If
the workmens services are to be deemed to be retrenched on that very date, it is clear that, for
purposes of determining who has retrenched the workmen and who is liable to pay the retrenchment
compensation, the workmen could not become the employees of the new employer. The employment
under the new employer could only commence from the time when the ownership or the management
of the undertaking vested in the State Government; but, simultaneously with this vesting, the
workmen had to be deemed to be retrenched from service. That retrenchment could, therefore, be
deemed to have been made only by the previous employer. Further, it would be that previous employer
who would be competent to give the notice in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the
Act. The notice of retrenchment, which has to be deemed to have become effective on the date of
vesting of the undertaking in the State Government, could not possibly be given by the State
Government. In these circumstances, the conclusion is irresistible that the claim under Section 25-FF
of the Act to compensation accrues to the workmen against the previous employer under whom he was
employed until the date of transfer. (Page: 49, Para: 2)
Sec. 25FFA
2585
Besides, the failure to pay compensation on the ground of such a plea cannot be said to be either a
deduction which is unauthorised under the Act, nor can it fall under the class of delayed wages as
envisaged by Ss. 4 and 5 of the Act. (Page: 769, Para: 1)
.we agree with the High Court that the Authority had no jurisdiction under Section 15 (2) of the
Act to try these applications. (Page: 769, Para: 2)
.In our view it would be the Labour Court in such cases which would be the proper forum which
can determine such questions under Section 33C(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act.
(Page: 768/769, Para: 3)
b) Provisions of Sec. 25FFA and 25-O since imposed in public interest, are not
unconstitutional (Bom.DB)
5A.823
While Sec. 25FFA merely requires 60 days notice for closure, 25O requires
Appropriate Governments permission for closure and such restriction being imposed in the
interests of general public, is not violative of Art. 19(1) (g) or 14.
Bamwari Lolya S/o.Radhakisan Lolya v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors., 1994 III LLJ 306 : 1989 (58)
FLR 902 : 1989 I LLN 345 : 1989 I CLR 147 (Bom.DB)
There is no.public. (Page: 308, Para: 3)
We are.involved. (Page: 309, Para: 4)
2586
Sec. 25FFA
II. Applicability
a) Applicable only to establishments employing less than 100 employees
(Jhar.DB)
5A.825
Since a provision for reference with regard to justifiability is made u/s. 25-O which
only applies to establishments employing 100 or more workmen and since the establishment in the
instant case employed less than 100 workmen, only Sec. 25FFA is attracted which requires the
employer to serve only 60 days notice but not to seek any permission from the Government for
closure, the reference by the Government about the justifiability of the closure was held bad and
hence the order of the Single Judge directing the Tribunal to adjudicate on the reference was
quashed.
Management of BASF India Ltd. v. State of Bihar & Ors., 2002 I LLJ 389 : 2002 (93) FLR 1019 : 2001 III
CLR 1034 (Jhar.DB)
.Section 25-K.attracted.The only.closure.the appellant.
Circumstances.workman doubtedly.25-O Act.It means.Tribunal of
therefore.Act. (Page: 394, Para: 8)
Viewed from.and patently. (Page: 397, Para: 13)
Note: also refer to the case of Bamwari Lolya v. State of Maharastra & others 1989 (58) FLR 902 Bom
HC 1989 I LLN 345
Sec. 25FFA
Notice of closure
2587
complete code in itself where special definition has been given of the Appropriate Government.
Therefore, in the present case Chapter VB is applicable and S. 25-FFA has no application whatsoever. As
such the argument is totally misconceived. The cases cited by the learned counsel with reference to
S. 25-FFA has no relevance as far as this submission is concerned. (Page: 584, Para: 19)
b) Notice u/s. 25FFA mandatory failing which closure becomes invalid (Bom.HC)
5A.828
The language of Sec. 25FFA is clearly mandatory. There is a clear violation in the
instant case by the employer of the requirements contemplated by Sec. 25FFA and the employer
has rendered itself liable for the penalty contemplated by Sec. 30A.
Maharashtra General Kamgar Union v. Glass Containers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr., 1983 I LLJ 326 : 1983 I LLN
157 (Bom.HC)
c) Though notice was issued closure will not be justified when it results in the
unemployment to sizeable number of workmen and affects producers of
Sugarcane (S.C.3J)
F 5A.829 Although closure notice u/s. 25FFA of a sugar factory was held justified and valid by
the tribunal and yet it was refused by the Tribunal on grounds that closure would adversely affect
not only a large number of workmen but also producers of sugarcane thereby bringing
unemployment to a sizeable population in the locality and holding that with 925 workers and staff,
2588
Sec. 25FFA
the unit can be viable and factory can run Supreme Court directed the company to create a fund
for the rehabilitation of workmen, rendered surplus and jobless and gave other directions to
strengthen the company and for the progressive welfare of the workmen and the staff.
E. I. D. Parry (India) Ltd. & Anr. v. State of T.N. & Anr., 1985 AIR (SC) 753 : 1985 (51) FLR 231 : 1985
II LLN 58 : 1985 LIC 887 : 1985 Suppl. SCC 31 (S.C.3J)
In course of hearing we were impressed by the fact that the factory was almost a century and a half old
and appeared to be the most ancient as also the premier industry of the area. In view of the fact that the
factory required a sizeable quantity of sugarcane for its business, people in the locality had been growing
sugarcane and the Tribunal had found that a lot of sugarcane was standing in the fields. Closure of the
factory was not only going to affect adversely the workmen but also the producers of sugarcane and was.
therefore, likely to bring about unemployment to a sizeable population in the locality. Though the
Tribunal came to hold that the closure notice was valid and justified, it also recorded a finding pursuant to
the direction of this Court dated August 10, 1983, that with a viable unit of 925 workers, including staff,
the factory could run. We found that if the factory was not closing down and was to operate, apart from
providing a ready market for the sugarcane growers, provision for employment of at least 925 people
would be made. (Page: 754, Para: 5)
.we record our appreciation of the co-operation shown by counsel for all the parties in the matter
of keeping the Factory going. (Page: 756, Para: 8)
c) Does not render closure illegal but workman is entitled to 60 days wages
(Bom.HC)
5A.831
Employer effected closure without giving notice of 60 days of the intended closure to
the Government. The workmen claimed reinstatement alleging that the closure was not valid. It
was held that due to non-compliance of intended notice to be served u/s. 25FFA of Industrial
Disputes Act it cannot be held that closure is illegal, but it only entitles the workmen to 60 days
wages and not reinstatement.
Poonvasi & Ors. v. Crown Silk Weaving Industries & Ors., 1994 (69) FLR 341 : 1994 I LLN 126 : 1994 I
CLR 1047 : 1994 LLR 888 (Bom.HC)
Note: Authors comments on the notice u/s. 25FFA
Sec. 25FFA calls up on an employer who intends to close down his undertaking to serve a notice of sixty
days before the intended closure in the prescribed format on the Appropriate Government. The section is
applicable to undertakings employing not less than fifty workmen in the preceding twelve months. Since
the provisions relating to closer u/s. 25-O are applicable to industrial establishments as defined in Sec.
25-L, it has largely been the view of the employers, professionals and even practitioners of labour laws
that the service of notice of closure u/s. 25FFA is imperative only in case of factories employing between
fifty and less than hundred workmen. However it is to be noted that the section used the expression
Sec. 25FFA
2589
undertaking but not industrial establishment. An undertaking is defined u/s. 2(ka) of the Industrial
Disputes Act as one in which any industry is carried on. Then the expression industry u/s. 2(j) is wide
enough to include any business trade undertaking manufacture or calling of employers.
Thus while Chapter VB is applicable only to factories (or industrial establishments u/s. 25-L) employing
not less than one hundred workmen, Sec. 25FFA is applicable to every undertaking whether or not it is a
factory and employs not less than fifty workmen. The only instance where an undertaking falls outside
the purview of Sec.25FFA is where such an undertaking is a factory (or industrial establishment u/s.
25-L) and employs not less than 100 workmen in which case it is governed by Sec.25-O or where it
employs less than fifty workmen. Thus in authors opinion, the scope Sec. 25FFA is wider than Sec. 25-O
as the former covers undertakings other than factories.
It is therefore prudent for every business employing not less than fifty workmen to serve a sixty day
notice as per Sec. 25FFA on the Government failing which the employer is likely to run the risk of closure
being declared illegal as was held in the case of Maharashtra General Kamgar Union v. Glass
Containers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.,1983 I LLJ 326 : 1983 I LLN 157 (Bom.HC) or the termination of workmen
consequent up on closer being declared void as in the case of D.S. Vasavada, Textile Labour Association,
Ahmedabad v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Gujarat State, Ahmedabad, 1985 I LLJ 263 :
1985 (51) FLR 308 : 1985 I LLN 629 (Guj.DB) notwithstanding the decision of the Bombay High Court
in Poonvasi & Ors. v. Crown Silk Weaving Industries & Ors., 1994 (69) FLR 341 : 1994 I LLN 126 : 1994
I CLR 1047 : 1994 LLR 888 (Bom.HC) that payment of sixty fays wages in lieu of notice saves the
closure from becoming illegal.
b) Workman not entitled to any other relief u/s. 25-N once Sec. 25FFA complied
since termination due to closure excludes retrenchment (S.C.2J)
F 5A.833 Company decided to close down due to continuous loss suffered by it and State
Government granted exemption from complying with the provision of Sec. 25FFA of the Act.
Company issued order for closure and services of employee were terminated giving one months
wage in lieu of notice. Union raised industrial dispute on which Tribunal held that Sec. 25N is
attracted and workmen are entitled for another two months wages. Aggrieved, petition filed in
High Court by both the parties. High Court setting aside order held that Sec. 25N is not applicable
and workmen were only entitled for protection u/s. 25FFA and 25FFF which are complied with by
the company, hence workmen are not entitled to any relief. Supreme Court upholding the order
stated that retrenchment u/s. 2(oo) does not cover retrenchment due to closer or transfer of an
undertaking and since Sec. 25FFA and 25FFF were already complied with, workmen are not
entitled to any relief.
H.P. Mineral and Industrial Development Corporation Employees Union v. State of H.P. and Ors., 2001
III LLJ 1413 : 1996 SCC(L&S) 470 : 1996 (7) SCC 139 (S.C.2J)
2590
Sec. 25FFA
From the aforementioned observations, it is evident that the definition of retrenchment as defined in
Section 2(oo) of the Act has to be read in the context of Section 25-FF and 25-FFF of the Act and if thus
read retrenchment under Section 2(oo) does not cover the service as a result of closure or transfer of an
undertaking though such termination has been assimilated to retrenchment for certain purposes, namely,
the compensation payable to the workmen whose services are terminated as a result of such closure. In
that view of the matter Section 25-N which deals with retrenchment cannot apply to the present case
where termination of the services of the workmen was brought about as a result of the closure of the
undertaking. (Page: 1415/1416, Para: 6)
There is one more reason why Section 25-N cannot be made applicable to the workmen in the present
case. Section 25-N and 25-O were inserted in the Act by Act. No. 32 of 1976 whereby Chapter V-B was
introduced in the Act. Section 25-N imposed restriction in the matter of retrenchment of workmen
employed in large undertakings while Section 25-O deal with the procedure for closing down such
undertaking. Section 25-O was held to be unconstitutional by this Court in Excel Wear case (supra). The
striking down of Section 25-O would not ipso facto, result in enlargement of the ambit of Section 25-N so
as to cover termination of services of workmen as a result of closure which was otherwise outside the
ambit of Section 25-N. We are, therefore, unable to uphold the contention of Shri Sharma that Section
25-N was applicable in the present case and was obligatory for the Management of the
respondent-Company to give three months notice as required by Section 25-N. Since Section 25-O was
not available on account of the said provision having been struck down by this Court the only protection
that was available to the workmen whose services were terminated as a result of closure was that
contained in Sections 25-FFA and 25-FFF of the Act. It is not disputed that both these provisions have
been complied with in the present case. (Page: 1416, Para: 7)
Sec. 25FFF
2591
2592
Sec. 25FFF
completed even before the date on which the Act is enacted does not appear to be
restricted.Article 14 strikes at discrimination in the application of the laws between persons
similarly circumstanced; it does not strike at a differentiation which may result by the enactment of a law
between transactions governed thereby and those which are not governed thereby. If the argument that
discrimination results when by statute a civil liability is imposed upon transactions which were otherwise
subject to such liability be accepted, every law which imposes civil liability will be liable to be struck
down under Art. 14 even if it comes into operation on the date on which it is passed, because immediately
on its coming into operation, discrimination will arise between transactions which will be covered by the
law after its coming into force and transactions before the law came into force which will not naturally be
hit by it. (Page: 11, Para: 4)
Sec. 25FFF
2593
The appellant before us was a trading agency being managed under the name and style of Gordon
Wardrobe Agencies P. Ltd. at the then Madras now known as Chennai. Said company came to be closed
w.e.f. 31.5.1984 because it had incurred heavy losses in its business. At that time the appellant had less
than 50 workmen. It is also the case of the appellant that the closure being genuine, it offered to all its
workmen, closure compensation as prescribed by law and other legal entitlements like provident fund,
gratuity etc. due to the workmen.However, the respondent workmen herein alone chose not to
receive the same, primarily contending that they were entitled to alternate employment in a sister
concern.The appellant in regard to this claim of the respondent workmen had contended that
Gordon Woodrofe Ltd. was a separate company and the question of providing alternate employment in
the said company.they were only entitled to the closure compensation and.
(Page: 904/905, Para: 1)
.Principal Labour Court, Madras, which by its order dated 18.3.1985 came to the definite
conclusion that the closure of the appellants establishment cannot be held to be invalid or unjustified. In
other words, the Labour Court held that the closure was genuine and justified in law.
(Page: 905, Para: 3)
Having come to the above conclusion, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that on the facts of this
case, there was substantial ground for awarding enhanced compensation to the respondent workmen on
compassionate grounds by applying the principle of social justice which according to the Labour Court is
linked with industrial adjudication. Therefore, it directed the appellant-management, apart from the
closure compensation and other legally payable amounts offered to the workmen, to pay to the
respondent-workmen ex gratia amounts in addition to closure compensation and other legal entitlements
to which they are entitled, at the rate of 15 days wages on the last drawn salary for the remaining years of
service till the date of superannuation by treating 6 months or more as one year of service. Over and above
this, the Labour Court directed a consolidated sum of Rs. 3,000 payable as solatium to each one of them.
(Page: 905, Para: 4)
In our opinion, the ratio laid down in the above case clearly applies to the facts of this case. In the instant
case also, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the closure of the establishment was legally
justifiable and the management had as required under the law, offered apart from the compensation
payable for the closure, all other statutory dues which some of the employees collected without demur
and in the case of respondent-workmen even though the same were offered on time, they did not accept it,
therefore, the question of paying any additional ex gratia compensation which is not contemplated under
the statute, does not arise. This Court in the case of N.S. Giri (supra) held : An award under the Industrial
Disputes Act cannot be inconsistent with the law laid down by the Legislature or by the Supreme Court
and if it does so, it is illegal and cannot be enforced. Thus, it is clear from the pronouncements of this
Court that the Labour Court or for that matter the High Court had no authority in law to direct payment of
any additional sum by way of ex gratia payment otherwise than what is provided under the statute when
the act of the management in closing down the establishment is found to be valid and all legally payable
amounts have been paid or offered in time. In such a situation, contrary to the statute, the principle of
social justice cannot be invoked since the Legislature would have already taken note of the same while
fixing the compensation payable. (Page: 907, Para: 13)
2594
Sec. 25FFF
.Whether an impugned provision imposing a fetter on the exercise of the fundamental right
guaranteed by Art. 19 (1) (g) amounts to a reasonable restriction imposed in the interest of the general
public must be adjudged not in the background of any theoretical standards or predeterminate patterns,
but in the light of the nature and incidents of the right, the interest of the general public sought to be
secured by imposing the restriction and the reasonableness of the quality and extent of the fetter upon the
right. (Page: 7, Para: 1)
By Act 40 of 1957, employers who close their undertakings after November 27, 1956, are made liable to
pay compensation under S. 25FFF (1) at the prescribed rates, and this liability evidently arises even in
respect of undertakings closed before the date of the enactment of the impugned section. A law which
creates a civil liability in respect of a transaction which has taken place before the date on which the Act
was enacted does not per se impose an unreasonable restriction. (Page: 7, Para: 2)
Sec. 25FFF
Applicability
2595
g) Restrictions u/s. 25FFF on the right of employer to close down his business are
not unreasonable nor violative of Constitution (MP.DB)
5A.844
Dismissing the petition filed by employer challenging constitutional validity of the
section, Court held that restrictions imposed on the fundamental right of employer to close down
business under the section are neither unreasonable so as to violate Art. 19(1)(g) nor classification
involved in provisions of the section is arbitrary so as to violate Art. 14 of constitution considering
that object of legislation is for benefit of workman and balances the right of labour and obligation
of industry.
Rajkumar Singh v. Payment of Wages Authority, Ujjan & Anr., 1960-61 (19) FJR 77 : 1960 II LLJ 543
(MP.DB)
The only question raised.as section 25-FFF. (Page: 78, Para: 2)
.the object of all.be as indicated above.the proportion of.need not
interfere. (Page: 86, Para: 1)
for these reasons.upon that right. (Page: 87, Para: 3)
The petition is.hereby dismissed. (Page: 87, Para: 4)
III. Applicability
a) Applicable to cases where there is closure of independent undertaking
(Del.HC)
5A.845
For a case to fall within the jurisdiction of Sec. 25FFF, the closure even though a
partial closure must be of such part of undertaking as is independent.
Raj Hans Press v. Labour Court, Delhi & Ors. & K.S. Sidhu & Ors., 1977 II LLJ 524 : 1977 (51) FJR 184
: 1978 (36) FLR 53 : 1977 II LLN 513 : 1977 LIC 1633 (Del.HC)
2596
Sec. 25FFF
d) Not applicable when notice indicating termination cites recession and not
closure as reason (S.C.3J)
F 5A.848 The Supreme Court held that the notice mentioned the cause of termination as due to
recession in volume of work, and no where in the notice, it is shown or even a word there of was
mentioned stating that the termination was occasioned due to the closure of one unit of business,
the Court held that such termination is deemed to fall u/s. 25F as if retrenchment of surplus Labour
and therefore held that Sec. 25FFF meant for closure is not attracted to the case in point.
M/s. Gammon India Ltd. v. Sri Niranjan Dass, 1984 I LLJ 233 : 1984 (64) FJR 60 : 1984 (48) FLR 310 :
1984 I LLN 90 : 1983 LIC 1865 : 1984 SCC (L&S) 144 : 1984 AIR (SC) 500 : 1984 (1) SCC 509 (S.C.3J)
.Respondent continued to serve in that capacity when on September 14, 1967, he was served
with a notice terminating his services. The notice reads as under:
Due to the reduction in the volume of business of the company as a result of the recession in (sic)
services will not be required by the company after the 14th October, 1967, and this may be treated as
statutory notice of one month of termination of your service. (Page: 234, Para: 1)
.The question, however, is whether the learned Single Judge, who interfered with the award of
the Tribunal was justified in coming to the conclusion that the case was one of closure covered by SEC.
25FFF or the Industrial Tribunal was right in holding that it is a case of retrenchment covered by S.25F of
Industrial Disputes Act.The notice as a whole recites that as a result of recession in the volume of
work of the company, services of the respondent would no more be required.There is not even a
whisper in the notice that as the Delhi office is being closed down, the services of the respondent would
not be required. (Page: 234, Para: 2)
Sec. 25FFF
2597
.The recitals and averments in the notice leave no room for doubt that the service of the
respondent was terminated for the reason that on account of recession and reduction in the volume of
work of the company, respondent has become surplus. Even apart from this, the termination of service for
the reasons mentioned in the notice is not covered by any of the clauses (a), (b) and (c) of S.2(oo) which
defines retrenchment and it is by now well-settled that where the termination of service does not fall
within any of the excluded categories, the termination would be ipso facto retrenchment. It was not even
attempted to be urged that the case of the respondent would fall in any of the excluded categories. It is
there indisputably a case of retrenchment (Page: 236, Para: 2)
(All.HC)
2598
Sec. 25FFF
There is between the text of S. 25F and SEC. 25FFF (1) a significant difference in phraseology. Whereas
by S. 25F the constitution validity whereof does not fall to be determined in these petitions certain
conditions precedent to retrenchment of workmen are prescribed, SEC. 25FFF (1) merely imposes
liability to give notice and to pay compensation on closure of an undertaking which results in termination
of employment of the workmen.By the plain intendment of SEC. 25FFF (1), the right to notice
and compensation for termination of employment flows from closure of the undertaking; the clause does
not seek to make closure effective upon payment of compensation and upon service of notice or payment
of wages in lieu of notice. An employer proposing to close his undertaking may serve notice of
termination of employment and if he fails to do so, he becomes liable to pay wages for the period of
notice. On closure of an undertaking, the workmen are undoubtedly entitled to notice and compensation
in accordance with S. 25F as if they had been retrenched, i.e. the workmen are entitled beside
compensation to a months notice or wages in lieu of such notice, but by the use of the words as if the
workman had been retrenched the legislature has not sought to place closure of an undertaking on the
same footing as retrenchment under S. 25F. By S. 25F, a prohibition against retrenchment until the
conditions prescribed by that section are fulfilled is imposed; by SEC. 25FFF(1), termination of
employment on closure of the undertaking without payment of compensation and without either serving
notice or paying wages in lieu of notice, is, not prohibited. Payment of compensation and payment of
wages for the period of notice are not therefore conditions precedent to closure. (Page: 6/7, Para: 3)
Note: also refer to the following case
Sunder Singh & Anr. v. Beas Construction Board. New Delhi & Ors.,1978 (52) FJR 484 : 1978 (37) FLR
187 : 1979 LIC 12 (Pat.FB)
5A.853
In matters of paying compensation, upon closure of an undertaking the settled
position of law as laid down by the Constitution Bench in the case of Hathi Singh Manufacturing
Co. Ltd. is that the requirement of paying compensation and issuing notice or wages in lieu there of
under sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 25FFF as if the workmen had been retrenched cannot be placed on the
same footing as the requirement u/s. 25F. The observance of the requirement is not a condition
precedent to a valid action of closure of an establishment u/s. 25FFF. In the instant case, in the
matter of termination it was also intimated to the workmen that the compensation together with
one months salary in lieu of notice had been kept ready together with other legal dues and the legal
dues were collected subsequently. Hence it is held that no breach of Sec. 25FFA and 25FFF
occasioned merely because the dues were collected subsequently.
Lal Bavta Hotel Aur Bakery Mazdoor Union v. Ritz Private Ltd. & Anr., 2007 III LLJ 201 : 2007 (113)
FLR 568 : 2007 II LLN 810 : 2007 I CLR 907 : 2007 LLR 637 : 2007 (3) Mah.LJ 426 (Bom.DB)
Sec. 25FFF
2599
Umrigar contends that it is erroneous. We do not consider it necessary to decide this question as the
definition of retrenchment in S. 2 (00) of act, 14 of 1947 and S. 25-F therein were inserted by the
Industrial Disputes (Amendment) Act, 1953 (43 of l953) and we have held in Burn and Co. Ltd., Calcutta
v. Their Workman (C) (supra) that this Act has no retrospective operation. The rights of the parties to the
present appeal must, therefore, be decided in accordance with the law as it stood on 21-3-1951 when the
workmen were discharged. (Page: 241/242, Para: 2)
We are unable to agree with these observations. Though tree is discharge of workmen both when there is
retrenchment and closure of business, the compensation is to be awarded under the law, not for discharge
as such but for discharge on retrenchment, and if, as is conceded, retrenchment means in ordinary
parlance, discharge of the surplus, it cannot include discharge on closure of business. .
(Page: 242, Para: 2)
Note: This case arose prior to the amendment of Sec. 2(oo) by the amending Act XLIII of 1953
2600
Sec. 25FFF
Sec. 25FFF
2601
could.they
are
2602
Sec. 25FFF
Sec. 25FFF
Compensation on closure
2603
3. Payment is not a condition precedent to closure u/s. 25FFF and need not be
paid with discharge notice (Pat.FB)
5A.867
Payment of retrenchment compensation is not a condition precedent for invoking
Sec. 25FFF and it need not be paid along with discharge notice given by employer on completion of
work undertaken by them.
Sunder Singh & Anr. v. Beas Construction Board. New Delhi & Ors., 1978 (52) FJR 484 : 1978 (37) FLR
187 : 1979 LIC 12 (Pat.FB)
In my view.discharge notice. (Page: 489, Para: 2)
We are not.the project. (Page: 489, Para: 1)
5A.868
In case of retrenchment, payment of compensation is condition precedent whereas in
case of closure it is not a condition precedent but can be made after closure.
Rajasthan Small Scale Industries Employees union v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1993 III LLJ 361 : 1990
(61) FLR 157 : 1990 II LLN 888 : 1990 LIC 1668 : 1990 II CLR 485 (Raj.DB)
There is.the closure. (Page: 366, Para: 22)
5A.869
On issuance of notification regarding imposition of liquor prohibition, the
establishment sought to close its unit in accordance to Sec. 25-O and Government granted
permission on terms and condition that the workmen be given compensation and in the event of
restarting the unit the workers who were in employment will be given preference. Thereafter the
workmen were paid compensation. But workmen raised dispute and one of their grievances was
that they have not been paid compensation on closure date but paid subsequently which is in
violation of Sec. 25F of the Act. On failure of conciliation proceeding the failure report was sent to
Government, in the meantime the factory re-opened and it published notice in the newspaper
about re-opening of the factory but the workmen were not taken back by the management because
none of the workers came forward for re employment and it is held that individual in termination
by Regd. A.D. is not required. The claim of the workmen have been dismissed by the Labour Court
which was challenged in writ. High Court held that, from the language of the section it is clear that
the payment of compensation was not a condition precedent to closure as contained in Sec. 25F.
There was no stipulation that the payment of compensation would be a condition precedent to the
closure. Hence it was held that the did not violate any of the provision of Sec. 25FFF.
Ombir Singh & Ors. V. Haryana Breweries Ltd. & Anr., 2007 LLR 257 : 2007 (112) FLR 256 (P&H.DB)
2604
Sec. 25FFF
Sec. 25FFF
Compensation on closure
2605
2606
Sec. 25FFF
Sec. 25FFF
2607
2608
Sec. 25FFF
b) Payable as per first part of Sec. 25FFF but not as per proviso where
establishment is not closed for circumstances beyond the control of employer
(Mad.DB)
5A.886
The employer closed the company as the financing bank stopped giving money to him
and for accumulation of stocks. No notice of closure nor any compensation paid to workmen as per
Industrial Disputes Act. On workmens application Single Judge ordered the employer to pay
compensation to the workmen as per first part of Sec. 25FFF but not as per proviso. Being
aggrieved, employer appealed to Division Bench contending that second part of Sec. 25FFF would
apply. Division Bench upheld the order of Single Judge since the reasons of closure were not due to
unavoidable circumstances which was beyond the control of employer.
S. Anthony Raj & Anr. v. A Shanmugam & Ors., 1995 II LLJ 1208 : 1995 (70) FLR 508 (Mad.DB)
The learned.as prayed for. (Page: 1209, Para: 2)
The case on.of the employer. (Page: 1222, Para: 26)
In the circumstances.of the Act.when we.to receive. (Page: 1222, Para: 27)
Sec. 25FFF
2609
2610
Sec. 25FFF
e) If workman has worked for 240 days of service and after deducting illegal
strike period (S.C.2J)
F 5A.889 If a workman who was on illegal strike, worked for 240 days preceding the date of
closure even after deducting the period of illegal strike, he was held to be entitled to closure
compensation.
The Management of Standard Motors Products of India Ltd. v. Shri A. Parthasarathy & Anr., 1986 I LLJ
34 : 1985 (67) FJR 417 : 1985 (51) FLR 459 : 1985 II LLN 830 : 1986 LIC 101 : 1986 AIR (SC) 462 :
1985 (4) SCC 78 (S.C.2J)
.In the present case, even if the period of illegal strike is excluded, the number of days during
which the workman actually worked under the employer would be found to be more than 240 days. That
being so it has to be held that the workmen were in continuous service for a period of one year
immediately before the date of closure. (Page: 35, Para: 2)
Sec. 25FFF
2611
When the matter was taken up today, learned Counsel for respondent No. 3 stated that respondent No. 3
is agreeable to pay 3 months salary to each of the appellants within a period of 3 months from today,
which is acceptable to the appellants. (Page: 1683, Para: 7)
Note: the following cases may also be referred in this context. For ratios and text Please see related ratio/s
under the above citation in this section
Said & Son Pvt. Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 1966 II LLJ 59 : 1965-66 (29) FJR 447 : 1966
(12) FLR 69 (Cal.DB)
John v. Coir Yarn Textiles, Ltd., Alleppey., 1960 I LLJ 304 (Ker.HC)
Trisul Biri Factory v. Their Workmen., 1960 II LLJ 140 (IT)
Daya Shankar Pandey v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1964 I LLJ 137 : 1963 (7) FLR 18 (Cal.HC)
Bhattacharjee Rubber Works Pvt. Ltd v. Bhattacharjee Rubber Works Workers Union & Ors., 1960 II
LLJ 198 : 1960-61 (18) FJR 215 (Cal.HC)
Presidency Jute Mills Co. Ltd. v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 1994 II LLJ 564 : 1993 (66) FLR 815 :
1992 II LLN 658 : 1993 II CLR 99 (Cal.DB)
Ramchandra Keshav Gadhave & Ors. v. Belapur Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anr. AND Ramchandra Tukaram
Jadhav & Ors. v. Belapur Sugar Mills Ltd. & Anr., 1980 (40) FLR 298 : 1982 LIC 27 : 1981 I LLN 87
(Bom.DB)
Haji Ismail Said & Son Pvt. Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 1966 II LLJ 59 : 1965-66 (29) FJR
447 : 1966 (12) FLR 69 (Cal.DB)
h) Payable even in the absence of provision for closure compensation in the State
Act by virtue of Sec. 25J (S.C.3J)
F 5A.892 Workmen whose services were terminated consequent upon the closure of a unit are
entitled to compensation u/s. 25FF F which section has supplied the lacuna for absence of similar
provision under U.P. Act and therefore there is no repugnancy between U.P. Act and Central Act
in view of Sec. 25J of Industrial Disputes Act and hence it was held that it was not correct for the
tribunal to hold that workmen were not entitled to compensation u/s. 25FFF and therefore the
matter was remanded back to the Tribunal for adjudication of applicability of sub-Sec. (1) of Sec.
25FFF or the proviso there to so as to determine the quantum of compensation including the onus
on employer to justify payment of lesser compensation under the proviso to Sec. 25FFF(1).
Workmen of the Straw Board Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. M/s. Straw Board Manufacturing Co., Ltd.,
1974 I LLJ 499 : 1974 (28) FLR 357 : 1974 (45) FJR 266 : 1974 II LLN 102 : 1974 LIC 730 : 1974 SCC
(L&S) 406 : 1974 AIR (SC) 1132 (S.C.3J)
The next crucial question that will then arise for consideration is whether the concerned employees are
entitled to relief under Section 25-FFF of the Central Act since there is no similar provision in the U.P.
Act.Since the U.P. Act does not make any provision for compensation in the case of closure and
the Central Act has supplied the lacuna, there is no repugnancy between the U.P. Act and the Central Act
and the beneficent provisions of the latter Act can be availed of by labour even in their absence in the U.P.
Act. The Central Act applies to the whole of India, including U.P. Even if there may be the slightest doubt
in the matter, Section 25-J of the Central Act advisedly leaves no scope for controversy in the
matter. (Page: 510/511, Para: 32)
Section 6-N of the U.P. Act is identical with S. 25-F of the Central Act.Act by virtue of the
provisions of S. 25-FFF(1) of the Central Act. The Tribunal was, therefore, not correct in holding that S.
25-FFF did not apply to the employees concerned. Indeed the management has paid, as already noted,
compensation to their employees under S. 25-FFF (1) of the Act. (Page: 511, Para: 33)
2612
Sec. 25FFF
Sec. 25FFF
2613
k) Payable even if single unit is closed since the word undertaking covers even
closure of a single unit (S.C.3J)
Management of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Their Workmen & Ors., 1973 (43) FJR 192 : 1973 (26) FLR 136 :
1973 I LLN 208 : 1973 LIC 461 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 195 : 1973 AIR (SC) 878 : 1973 (3) SCC 564 (S.C.3J)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
2614
Sec. 25FFF
Sec. 25FFF
2615
e) Though Letter Press Section was closed since it is not an independent part of
the establishment as workmen were interchangeable between Letter Press
section and Offset Press unit (Del.HC)
Raj Hans Press v. Labour Court, Delhi & Ors. & K.S. Sidhu & Ors., 1977 II LLJ 524 : 1977 (51) FJR 184
: 1978 (36) FLR 53 : 1977 II LLN 513 : 1977 LIC 1633 (Del.HC)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
2616
Sec. 25FFF
compensation to the Badli workmen in place of certain categories of regular employees. We fail to
understand how the Industrial Court can direct payment of compensation to the Badli workmen when,
admittedly, such Badli workmen, as noticed already, have no right to be employed. It may be that the
Company may not have to pay closure compensation to the three categories of employees, as mentioned
by the Industrial Court, but that does not mean that the Company has to pay compensation to the Badli
workmen in place of these categories of employees. In this connection, we may refer to Section 25C of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 which excludes a Badli workman or a casual workman from the benefit of
compensation in the case of layoff. (Page: 101, Para; 14)
In the circumstances, although we uphold the order of the Industrial Court for payment of compensation
to the regular employees of the appellant at the rate fixed by it, we are unable to subscribe to the view that
the compensation which would have been payable to the three categories of employees, should be paid to
the Badli workmen. In other words, we hold that Badli workmen have no right to claim compensation on
account of closure. (Page: 101/102, Para: 15)
XIII. Whether any other compensation can be set off against closer compensation
a) Employer can set off any compensation paid to workman against closure
compensation (Ker.HC)
5A.903
The employer issued one months notice for retrenchment as it was decided to close
down the business on account of accumulation of stock and financial difficulties. The Tribunal
passed an award directing the management to pay retrenchment compensation at the rate of 15
days average pay for every completed year of service together with one months notice pay. It was
challenged on the ground that the State Government did not have power to make reference
because, it was a dead industry. The High Court held that it cannot be said to be a dead industry
because employer-employee relationship existed and the management has been taking the position
that they were retrenching workmen by giving one months notice u/s. 25F. The employer was
liable to pay retrenchment compensation as per Sec. 25FFF even in case of closure of business.
Also, the employer has right to set off any compensation paid to a workman for having been laid off
during the preceding 12 months as against the retrenchment compensation payable as per Sec. 25C.
Ravikrishna Weaving Mills Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Kerala & two Ors., 1959 II LLJ 760 (Ker.HC)
Sec. 25FFF
2617
2618
Sec. 25FFF
financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed of stocks may justify the view that the closure is due
to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer, and attract the application of the
proviso notwithstanding the explanation. (Page: 10, Para: 1)
By the explanation, certain persons may, because of persistent losses or accumulation of stocks find
themselves unable to carry on the business, and may still not be entitled to the benefit of the proviso, but
that will not be a ground for holding that the explanation is unreasonable. The tribunal called upon to
decide whether the case of an employer is covered by the proviso will certainly be entitled to look into the
causes which led to the financial losses or the accumulation of stocks and ascertain whether the closure
was merely on account of financial losses or accumulation of stocks or was on account of circumstances
beyond the control of the employer, and in assessing whether the circumstances were beyond the control
of the employer, the fact that the employer has suffered financial losses or there is accumulation of stocks
is not required by the legislature to be excluded from consideration. (Page: 11, Para: 1)
Note: Section is amended by Act 45 of 1971 w.e.f. 15-12-71
Sec. 25FFF
2619
After considering the entire facts and circumstances of the present case we are not satisfied that the
closure of the undertaking was due to unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the appellant.
Thus compensation would be payable as if the undertaking was closed down for any reason whatsoever
within section 25-FFF (1) of the Act. (Page: 567, B.L.: 10)
5A.909
The burden of proving that the closure is due to unavoidable circumstances to attract
the proviso is on the employer and mere financial difficulties or accumulation of undisposed stocks
cannot be treated as unavoidable circumstances within the purview of the proviso and there shall
be other circumstances independent of the cause of financial difficulties and they shall be beyond
the control of the employer and hence the workers trouble and indiscipline, delayed deliveries and
defective workmanship which led to decline in orders, finally leading to accumulation of loss were
held only as contributory causes to the financial difficulties but not causes independent of it and
therefore the employer was held not entitled to invoke the proviso.
Bharat Collieries Ltd. Owners of Ekra Enineering Works, Bansjora v. P.O. Labour Court, Chota
Nagpur, Ranch & Ors., 1969 LIC 1424 (Pat.DB)
I now take up.explanation. (Page: 1427, Para: 10)
.The burden.stocks.If the employer.to be a bar. (Page: 1428, Para: 10)
The contention.workmen. (Page: 1428, Para: 11)
There are.jurisdiction. (Page: 1429, Para: 13)
Secondlyclosure. (Page: 1429, Para: 14)
In reply.workers.the workshop.resources.contents.explanation.
(Page: 1429, Para: 14)
2620
Sec. 25FFF
when bonafide attempts made by employer to run business failed, would not amount to
retrenchment and even in case it was retrenchment proviso to sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 25FFF would
have applied and hence award of retrenchment compensation by Tribunal was set aside.
Haji Ismail Said & Son Pvt. Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal & Ors., 1966 II LLJ 59 : 1965-66 (29) FJR
447 : 1966 (12) FLR 69 (Cal.DB)
.The Tribunal appears.all the workers (Page: 62, Para: 3)
.the learned Judge.Industrial Disputes Act. (Page: 63, Para: 1)
In the instant.unfair Labour practice. (Page: 63, Para: 2)
.Here the notice.Industrial Dispute Act (Page: 67, Para: 5)
If we had come.Sub Sec. (1) there of. (Page: 69, Para: 6)
For these reasons.the Industrial Tribunal. (Page: 70, Para: 7)
Note: The following case may also be referred
Venkatarama Naidu v. Labour Court, Madurai & Anr., 1979 (54) FJR 364 : 1980 LIC 923 : 1979 I LLN
504 (Mad.DB)
Sec. 25FFF
2621
2622
Sec. 25FFF
Sec. 25FFF
2623
2624
Sec. 25FFF
Sec. 25FFF
2625
The appellant will not therefore be entitled to claim the benefit of the proviso to sub-s. (1) of Sec. 25FFF.
If so, it follows that the award of the Industrial Tribunal holding that the appellant is liable to pay
compensation, under the principal part of sub-s. (1) of Sec. 25FFF, is correct.(Page: 554, Para: 24)
F 5A.926 Financial impossibility to carry on business citing Government notification on
minimum wages as excessive and unworkable by the management excludes the proviso to Sec.
25FFF(1).
Ramakrishna Ramnath v. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Nagpur & Anr., 1970 II LLJ 306 : 1972
(41) FJR 209 : 1970 (21) FLR 159 : 1973 LIC 87 : 1970 (3) SCC 67 (S.C.2J)
The minimum rate/rates of wages made payable as from 1st July, 1958 are so excessive and unworkable
that it is impossible for any employer to give effect to them. This is so particularly in relation to clause 6 of
the notification. Thus the changes introduced by the notification ..... regarding wages, chhat and other
matters are such as to attract the provisions of cl. 11 of the Standing Orders. (Page: 308, Para 3)
On the facts of this case we find ourselves unable to hold that the undertaking was closed down on
account of the unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of the employer within the meaning of
S. 25-FFF. (Page:314, Para 1)
6. Serious illness since it is not a reason connected with the running of the
business (Bom.HC)
5A.927
Closure of an undertaking must be for unavoidable circumstances which must have
nexus with the functioning of the undertaking, therefore, employer suffering from a disease due to
which he is unable to run business is not contemplated by Sec. 25FFF(1) and hence liability to pay
compensation would not be limited to 3 months wages but should be in accordance with Sec. 25F of
the Act.
Shyamsunder v. P.O. Labour Court, Amravati & Ors., 1986 LIC 767 (Bom.HC)
5A.928
In order to fall within the proviso of Sec. 25FFF (1) the closure must be on account of
unavoidable circumstances beyond the control of employer. However affliction from Tuberculosis
is a circumstance not connected with the functioning of the undertaking. It is only his personal
difficulty. Therefore such personal disease not a reason connected with the business and therefore
the proviso is not attracted and therefore the workmen are entitled to full compensation upon
closure.
Kuttancherry Ouseph Antony v. P.V. Kumaran & Ors.,1979 I LLJ 406 : 1979 (54) FJR 404 : 1979 (38)
FLR 285 : 1979 (39) FLR 86 : 1979 I LLN 470 : 1979 LIC 1165 (Ker.HC)
2626
Sec. 25FFF
XV. Rights of workmen to dues over those of other creditors of the company
whether protected in the absence of liquidation proceedings
a) Rights of pledgee/pawnee of goods of sugar mill will prevail over rights of
workmen u/s. 33C since they rank as secured creditors in the absence of
liquidation proceedings (S.C 2J)
5A.932
Where a sugar mill obtained credit from a Bank and pledged its goods as security, it is
well settled that such lender or pledgee has a right to retain the chattel until a proper tender of the
amount due is made. u/s. 173 of Contract Act, the right of the pawnee is safeguarded to retain the
goods for payment of debt and interest and for other expenses. However disregarding these laid
down and settled law, the Cane Commissioner on behalf of Sugar Cane growers and Labour
Commissioner u/s. 33C on behalf of workmen employed in the sugar mills passed orders for
recovery of amount due leading to take possession of stock of sugar by recovery authority forcibly
when the writ petition against the orders of Labour and Cane Commissioners was pending. The
High Court by interim order directed to sell the sugar stocks and disburse out of proceeds of Rs.
1,53,50,400 a sum of Rs 4,30,000 to Labour Commissioner for dues of workmen and Rs. 6,00,000 to
Cane Commissioner and only the balance to the Pawnee Bank, that also subject to sanction of
BIFR. Therefore orders are challenged before Supreme Court. The Supreme Court setting aside
the order of High Court held both the Cane Commissioner and Labour Commissioner or for that
matter workmen in the absence of liquidation stand only as unsecured creditors and their rights
can not prevail over the rights of pawnee of the goods so long as his claim is not satisfied, no other
creditor of the pawnor has any right to take away the goods or its price. The Government was
bound to reimburse the pawnee the amount to which he was entitled to by realization in ordinary
course. The Cane Commissioner and workman are only, at the most to be regarded as unsecured
Sec. 25FFF
2627
creditors. Where no liquidation of the company had taken place the right of cane growers and
workmen cannot precede the pawnee to appropriate the sale proceeds. They become secured
creditors only when there is winding up.
Central Bank of India v. Siriguppa Sugars and Chemicals Ltd. & Ors., 2007 (2) SCC (L&S) 919 (S.C 2J)
The right of the lender, or pledgee, is to retain the chattle until a proper tender of the amount due is made.
(See The Law of Mortgages by Edward F. Cousins) Under Section 173 of the Contract Act, a pawnee has
the right to retain the goods pledged for payment of the debt including interest on the debt and all
necessary expenses incurred by the pawnee in respect of the possession or for the preservation of the
goods pledged. (Page: 922, Para: 7)
In our judgment the High Court is in error in considering that the rights of the pawnee who had parted
with money in favour of the pawnor on the security of the goods can be defeated by the goods being
lawfully seized by the Government and the money being made available to other creditors of the pawnor
without the claim of the pawnee being fully satisfied. The pawnee has special property and a lien which is
not of ordinary nature on the goods and so long as his claim is not satisfied no other creditor of the pawnor
has any right to take away the goods or its price. After the goods had been seized by the Government it
was bound to pay the amount due to the plaintiff and the balance could have been made available to
satisfy the claim of other creditors of the pawner. But by a mere act of lawful seizure the Government
could not deprive the plaintiff of the amount which was secured by the pledge of the goods to it. As the act
of the Govenrment resulted in deprivation of the amount to which the plaintiff was entitled it was bound
to reimburse the plaintiff for such amount which the plaintiff in ordinary course would have realized by
sale of goods pledged with it on the pawnor making a default in payment of debt. (Page: 923, Para: 6)
Thus, going by the principles governing the matter, propounded by this Court there cannot be any doubt
that the rights of the appellant-bank over the pawned sugar had precedence over the claims of the Cane
Commissioner and that of the workmen. The High Court was, therefore, in error in passing an interim
order to pay parts of the proceeds to the Cane Commissioner and to the Labour Commissioner for
disbursal to the cane growers and to the employees. There is no dispute that the sugar was pledged with
the appellant bank for securing a loan of the first respondent and the loan had not been repaid. The goods
were forcibly taken possession of at the instance of the revenue recovery authority from the custody of the
pawnee, the appellant-bank. In view of the fact that the goods were validly pawned to the appellant bank,
the rights of the appellant-bank as pawnee cannot be affected by the orders of the Cane Commissioner or
the demands made by him or the demands made on behalf of the workmen. Both the Cane Commissioner
and the workmen in the absence of a liquidation, stand only as unsecured creditors and their rights cannot
prevail over the rights of the pawnee of the goods. (Page: 925/926, Para: 17)
We are also of the view that pending the writ appeals, the High Court ought not to have passed such an
interim order of consequence especially in the light of the legal principles settled by this Court. The order
of the High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained and calls for interference. (Page: 926, Para: 18)
2628
Sec. 25FFF
The discussion of the above decisions yields the result that the entire set of circumstances and facts have
to be taken into account while endeavouring to find out if, in fact, there has been a closure and the
Tribunal or the Court is not confined to any particular fact or set of facts or circumstances. In one case the
Management may decide to close down an undertaking because of financial or purely business reasons.
In another case it may decide in favour of closure when faced with a situation in which it is considered
either dangerous or hazardous from the point of view of the safety of the Administrative staff or members
of the Management or even the employees themselves to carry on the business. The essence of the matter
therefore, is the factum of closure by whatever reasons motivated. (Page: 563, Para: 2)
b) Closure is valid when effected due to gherao endangering the safety of the staff
continued for several hours (S.C.3J)
F 5A.934 Factum of the closure by whatever reason motivated is essential to determine whether
there was a closure or not hence considering the facts of the case in the instant case where workmen
staged a gherao in administration building for several hours which was dangerous to the safety of
the staff and management, Supreme Court held that the danger and hazard associated with such
type of activity is also a ground which renders the closure justified.
Kalinga Tubes, Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1969 I LLJ 557 : 1968 (34) FJR 393 : 1968 (17) FLR 311 : 1969
LIC 90 : 1969 AIR (SC) 90 (S.C.3J)
The discussion of the above decisions yields the result that the entire set of circumstances and facts have
to be taken into account while endeavouring to find out if, in fact, there has been a closure and the
Tribunal or the Court is not confined to any particular fact or set of facts or circumstances. In one case the
Management may deride to close down an undertaking because of financial or purely business reasons. In
another case it may decide in favour of closure when faced with a situation in which it is considered either
dangerous or hazardous from the point of view of the safety of the Administrative staff or members of the
Management or even the employees themselves to carry on the business. The essence of the matter
therefore, is the factum of closure by whatever reasons motivated. (Page: 563, Para: 1)
There can be no manner of doubt from what has been found by the Tribunal itself that a large number of
workers about 150 of them virtually staged a gherao during the several hours preceding the declaration of
closure. (Page: 563, Para: 4)
.It is not possible to say in categorical terms that closure in the aforesaid background and
circumstances would not be genuine or that a great deal of suspicion would attach to the action taken
simply because the Company was a profitable and going concern. There are a number of supplement facts
which show that the Management was faced with a situation in which it could well take a decision to close
down the undertaking. (Page: 564, Para: 2)
c) Closure is valid even if a single unit is closed since the word undertaking
covers even closure of a single unit (S.C.3J)
F 5A.935 The expression Undertaking in Sec. 25FFF of the section was held to cover not just
the entire undertaking but also any work, enterprise, project or business undertaking and hence
closure of even a single unit would be covered under the section therefore as the employee who was
employed on a project and terminated on completion of the project can seek compensation nothing
more than that in terms of the provision of Sec. 25FFF only.
Management of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. Their Workmen & Ors., 1973 (43) FJR 192 : 1973 (26) FLR 136 :
1973 I LLN 208 : 1973 LIC 461 : 1973 SCC (L&S) 195 : 1973 AIR (SC) 878 : 1973 (3) SCC 564 (S.C.3J)
The word undertaking as used in SEC. 25FFF seems to us to have been used in its ordinary sense
connoting thereby any work, enterprise, project or business undertaking. It is not intended to cover the
entire industry or business of the employer as was suggested on behalf of the respondents. Even closure
or stoppage of a part of the business or activities of the employer would seem in law to be covered by this
sub-section. The question has indeed to be decided on the facts of each case. In the present case the
Ranchi Housing Project was clearly a distinct venture undertaken by the appellant and it had a distinct
beginning and an end. Separate Office was apparently set up for this venture and on the completion of the
project or enterprise that undertaking was closed down. The Tribunal has actually so found. Its
Sec. 25FFF
2629
conclusion has not been shown to be wrong and were have no hesitation in agreeing with its view. There
is no cogent ground for reopening the Tribunals conclusion under Article 136 of the
Constitution. (Page: 199, Para: 1)
Now, under Sec. 25FFF (1) which creates a statutory fiction, all that Shri Naidu was entitled to, was
notice and compensation in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-F as if he had been retrenched.
Retrenchment notice, Ex. 7, dated June 29, 1968, quite clearly complies with this requirement. On behalf
of the respondent, as already noticed, it is not disputed that there has been no failure to give notice as
required by Section 25F, in case Clause (b) is held inapplicable. (Page: 199, Para: 2)
d) Closure is valid though all branches are not closed down (S.C.2J)
F 5A.936 To effect closure it is not necessary that management should close down all the
branches of the business.
Isha Steel Treatment, Bombay v. Association of Engineering Workers, Bombay & Anr., 1987 I LLJ 427 :
1987 (71) FJR 11 : 1987 (54) FLR 454 : 1987 I LLN 741 : 1987 LIC 1028 : 1987 I CLR 232 : 1987 SCC
(L&S) 91 : 1987 AIR (SC) 1478 : 1987 (2) SCC 203 (S.C.2J)
It is not necessary that in order to effect closure of business the management should close down all the
branches of its business. In Management of Hindustan Steel Ltd. v. The Workmen, (1973) 3 SCR 303:
(AIR 1973 SC 878) this Court has held that the word undertaking used in S. 25-FFF seems to have been
used in its ordinary sense connoting thereby any work, enterprise, project or business undertaking. It is
not intended to cover the entire industry or business of the employer. Even the closure or stoppage of a
part of the business or activities of the employer would seem in law to be covered by the said provision. In
deciding the above case this Court relied upon its earlier decision in Workmen of the Indian Leaf Tobacco
Development Co. Ltd., Guntur v. Management of the Indian Leaf Tobacco Development Co. Ltd.,
Guntur (1969) 2 SCR 282: (AIR 1970 SC 860). In that case the Court observed that a genuine closure of
depots or branches, even though it did not amount to closure of the business could not be interfered with
by an Industrial Tribunal. It further held that the closure was stoppage of part of the activity or business of
the management and such stoppage is an act of management which is entirely in the discretion of the
management. The Court further observed that no Industrial Tribunal could interfere with the discretion
exercised in such a matter. (Page: 432, Para: 8)
2630
Sec. 25FFF
any manufacturing business at all since 22nd April, 1962. The closure was bona fide in the sense that the
Company in fact ceased to carry on that industry & the step taken of the closure was not a cloack for a
lock-out or for carrying on the business under some other disguise. (Page: 574, Para: 6)
f) Closure is valid even though the same activity is resumed after some time
(S.C.2J)
F 5A.938 Resumption of publication of newspapers subsequent to award and after lapse of four
years cannot be made a basis to carry out a probe as to whether prior closure was real or a mere
devise to coerce and intimidate employees.
The Andhra Prabha Ltd., & Anr. v. The Secretary, Madras Union of Journalists & Ors., 1968 I LLJ 15 :
1967-68 (33) FJR 318 : 1967 (15) FLR 435 : 1967 AIR (SC) 1869 (S.C.2J)
On behalf of the employees an application has been made for leading additional evidence. In this
application events which took place after the publication of the award are relied on as going to show that
the discontinuance of the Publications from Madras was a mere ruse and a device adopted by the
company to coerce and intimidate the employees and that publication of the newspapers had been
commenced soon after the publication of the award. We do not think it necessary to go into this matter at
any length because a break of over four years had intervened in between and what the company does after
the lapse of this long period cannot and ought not to be taken into consideration in order to find out
whether the closure was a real one or was a mere device as suggested by the employees. The evidence on
record shows that Ramnath Goenkas plan was not to give up the business of newspaper publications
altogether but he wanted to distribute his business to different places. Whatever may be the motive behind
such plan, he had only carried out that plan into effect after the publication of the award and this cannot
lead us to the conclusion that the closure was an assumed one. (Page: 25, Para: 1)
Sec. 25FFF
2631
2632
Sec. 25FFF
k) When employer was unable to produce goods that can be marketed (Mad.HC)
5A.943
When an employer closed down an undertaking paying closure compensation to the
workman as it was unable to produce articles which could be marketed in accordance with the
standard specification, tribunal held that the matter had gone beyond the employers hand and as
such he was justified in closing the undertaking and awarding closure compensation which was
upheld by High Court as well as Supreme Court.
Jeewanlal (1929) Ltd. v. Industrial Tribunal, Madras & Ors., 1975 (48) FJR 212 : 1975 (31) FLR 329 :
1975 II LLN 413 (Mad.HC)
m) Closure of maternity hospital run by Red Cross society valid despite running
other centres like Family Planning and Vikalang Centre when there is no
functional integrality among them (S.C.2J)
F 5A.945 Red Cross Society was running a maternity hospital on the basis of donations without
the help of any grant from Government unlike its other units such as drug de-addication centre,
family planning centre and Vikalang centre which run on Government aid. The Maternity
Hospital was then closed due to depletion of donations, resulting in the termination of services of a
nurse who contended that the closure is not legal as other units are functioning. Apex Court held
that there is no functional integrality among the units and the word undertaking is not to cover
the entire business/industry of the employer but can even cover an independent unit of it, hence
closure is held valid.
District Red Cross Society v. Babita Arora & Ors., 2007 III LLJ 777 : 2007 (114) FLR 1040 : 2007 IV
LLN 199 : 2007 III CLR 325 : 2007 LLR 1125 : 2007 (2) SCC (L&S) 631 : 2007 AIR (SC) 2879 (S.C.2J)
The position in law is, therefore, well settled that if the entire establishment of the employer is not closed
down but only a unit or undertaking is closed down which has no functional integrity with other units or
undertaking, the provisions of Section 25FFF of the Act will get attracted and the workmen are only
entitled to compensation as provided in Section 25FFF of the Act which Page 3283 has to be calculated in
accordance with Section 25F of the Act. The Tribunal and also the High Court clearly erred in holding
that as other units of the appellant Red Cross Society like Drug De-Addiction-cum-Rehabilitation Centre,
Family Planning Centre and Viklang Kendra were functioning, the termination of services of the
respondent would amount to retrenchment. The Maternity Hospital was functioning as a distinct entity. It
was not receiving any grant from the Government and was being run entirely on charitable basis from
donations received from public. Due to financial stringency, the Maternity Hospital had to be closed
down. The other three units, viz., Drug De-Addiction- cum-Rehabilitation Centre, Family Planning
Centre and Viklang Kendra are receiving grants from Government and are functioning as separate
entities and the mere fact that they have not been closed down, cannot lead to the inference that the
termination of services of the respondent was by way of retrenchment which was illegal on account of
non-compliance of the provisions of Section 25F of the Act (Page: 778, Para: 9)
Sec. 25FFF
2633
In view of the findings recorded above, the respondent would be entitled to compensation only in
accordance with Section 25FFF of the Act and the award for reinstatement in service with back wages
passed by the Tribunal which was affirmed by the High Court cannot be sustained and must be set aside.
(Page: 778, Para: 10)
n) Closure of unit of an establishment which is distinct from and does not enjoy
functional integrality with other units is valid (S.C.3J)
F 5A.946 Where the company is undertaking construction work spread all over India, may be
all over the world there is no proximity between the several units and therefore each unit is distinct
establishment and merely because the management reserved the liberty of transferring employees
from one place to another it will not make all the units into a single establishment. Mere unity of
ownership management and control are not of much significance and that by the facts the
Hyderabad Unit was held to be a separate unit with no functional integrality with other units and
therefore upon closure of the same the employees had no right to demand absorption in other unit
except compensation in terms of Sec. 25FFF.
Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd. & Ors. v. Hindustan Steel Workers Construction Ltd.
Employees Union Hyderabad & Anr., 1995 LIC 1590 : 1995 (70) FLR 946 : 1995 I LLN 792 : 1995 SCC
(L&S) 702 : 1995 AIR (SC) 1163 : 1995 (3) SCC 474 (S.C.3J)
It has been held repeatedly that all the tests evolved in the several decisions of this Court need not all be
satisfied in every case. One has also to look to the nature and character of the undertaking while deciding
the question. The tests evolved are merely to serve as guidelines. Now, let us look at the
appellant-Company. It is a Government company wholly owned and controlled by the Government of
India. Its job is to undertake construction works both in India and abroad. The construction works are not
permanent works in the sense that as soon as the construction work is over, the establishment comes to an
end at that place. In such a case, functional integrality assumes significance. The nature of the
construction work may also differ from work to work or place to place, as the case may be. It is not even
suggested by the respondent-Union that there is any functional integrality between the several units or
several construction works undertaken by the appellant. It is not suggested that closure of one leads to the
closure of others. There is no proximity between the several units/works undertaken by the appellant;
they are spread all over India, indeed all over the world. It would thus appear that each of the works or
construction projects undertaken by the appellant represent distinct establishments and did not constitute
units of a single establishment. The Division Bench, however, was influenced by the fact that (i) when the
workers are transferred from one unit to other unit they carried their seniority with them; (ii) the orders of
appointment say that the employees are liable to be transferred to one place to other; that indeed, forty
three out of hundred workers concerned herein were brought to Hyderabad on transfer from other places
and (iii) initially, Hyderabad and Visakhapatnam were under the same administrative control and that
when they were separated the workers were not asked to exercise their option to remain in one or the other
unit. In our opinion, however, the fact that the Management reserved to itself the liberty of transferring
the employees from one place to another did not mean that all the units of the appellant constituted one
single establishment. In the case of a construction company like the appellant which undertakes
construction works wherever awarded, does that work and winds up its establishment there and
particularly where a number of local persons have to be and are appointed for the purpose of a particular
work, mere unity of ownership, management and control are not of much significance. Having regard to
the facts and circumstances of this case and the material on record, the conclusion is inevitable that the
units at Hyderabad were distinct establishments. Once this is so, workmen of the said unit had no right to
demand absorption in other units on the Hyderabad units completing their job. (Page: 1603, Para: 16)
2634
Sec. 25FFF
p) Closure valid despite fraught with malafides since it does not render the
closure unreal (S.C.2J)
F 5A.948 The two judge bench of S.C has held that the observation made by the Constitution
Bench in the case of Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. (1957 I LLJ 253) that if there is no real closure but of a
mere pretence of closure or if it is malafide, there is no closure in the eye of law, can not be said as
laying down an unqualified and categorical propostion of law that wherever a closure is malafide, it
must be deemed to be unreal or non existent & held that in the instant case, when the two Branch
offices are closed, the finding of malafides can not justify conclusion that branches should be
deemed to continue.
Tea Districts Labour Association, Calcutta v. Ex-employees of Tea Districts Labour Association & Anr.,
1960 I LLJ 802 : 1960-61 (18) FJR 298 : 1960 AIR (SC) 815 (S.C.2J)
As we have already indicated the conclusion of the tribunal on this point is based on the observations of
this Court in the case of Banaras Ice Factory Ltd. v. Its Workmen ((1957) S.C.R. 143). It will, therefore,
be necessary to examine those observations and decide whether they really justify the conclusion of the
tribunal. In that case this Court was dealing with the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal on a
complaint filed before it under s. 22 of the Industrial Disputes (Appellate Tribunal) Act (Act No. XLVIII
of 1950), hereafter called the Act. It appears that during the pendency of an appeal before the Labour
Appellate Tribunal the appellant Company decided to close down its business and gave notice to all the
workmen that their services would be terminated upon the expiry of 30 days from July 16, 1952. That led
to the complaint under s. 23 of the Act on the allegation that s. 22 of the said Act had been contravened.
The Labour Appellate Tribunal had found that the closure was bona fide. It conceded that the appellant
had the right to close its business for bona fide reasons; but nevertheless it took the view that permission
should have been obtained before the said closure. That is why according to it the appellant was guilty of
contravening s. 22(b) of the Act. This decision was reversed by this Court. In doing so, the true scope and
effect of S. 22 and 23 of the Act were considered and it was held that if the impugned closure was bona
fide then neither of the two sections came into operation. Thus the position was that the closure was bona
fide and that the appellant had committed no breach of s. 22(b) of the Act. In dealing with the scope and
effect of s. 23 this Court observed : There is hardly any occasion for praying for permission to lift the ban
imposed by s. 22, when the employer has the right to close his business and bona fide does so, with the
result that the industry itself ceases to exist. Then it was added : If there is no real closure but a mere
pretence of a closure or it is mala fide, there is no closure in the eye of the law and the workmen can raise
an industrial dispute and may even claim under s. 23 of the Act. It is on this latter observation that the
Tribunal has founded its decision. With respect we do not read the observations as laying down an
unqualified and categorical proposition of law that wherever a closure is mala fide it must be deemed to
be unreal and non-existent. What this Court has said is that in cases of pretence of closure no closure in
fact has taken place and for the purpose of s. 23 of the Act with which the Court was dealing a mala fide
closure may conceivably be treated as falling in the same class as a pretence of closure. But in the present
case the facts are not in dispute. There has been a closure and the agencies have been closed and their
business had been wound up. If it is found that the closure was not bona fide the consequences would be
the liability of the employer to pay the higher compensation under Sec. 25FFF of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. But is difficult to see how when the two agencies have in fact been closed the finding about
mala fides can justify the conclusion that the said two agencies should be deemed to continue and how the
award can make an order on that basis. Besides, as we have already indicated even the finding about the
mala fides of the closure is itself open to serious doubt. In our opinion the said finding is based on mere
surmises and is entirely opposed to the weight of evidence adduced in this case. (Page: 806, Para 4)
Sec. 25FFF
Closure excludes
2635
the case was not of closure but of transfer of undertaking by operation of law u/s. 25FF and granted
full compensation claimed; which was upheld by the Court which opined that Labour Court could
award retrenchment compensation u/s. 33C(2) which was payable u/s. 25F.
Central India Electric Supply Co. Ltd. Bilaspur v. P.O. District Labour Court, Gorakhpur Ward,
Jabalpur, & Ors., 1969 I LLJ 840 : 1969 (18) FLR 22 : 1969 LIC 1204 (MP.DB)
The company was ..under S. 25F (Page: 841, Para: 2)
Lastly it is.under S. 25F. (Page: 844, Para: 2)
.We have.Labour Court. (Page: 843, Para: 1)
2636
Sec. 25FFF
b) When branch retail outlet which is functionally integral with head office and
other branches is closed (Del.DB)
5A.953
Considering established facts that there was common recruitment to the head office
and other retailing branches of whole sale cooperative stores as well as common conditions of
service, common joint seniority list of all the staff, there were inter transfers between various
branches and head office which were made by General Manager and work at the branches was
same, Court refused the contention of the Management that a branch retail outlet was a separate
distinct undertaking and upheld the award of Labour Court that it is an integral whole and
therefore the employer has to abide by the provision of Sec. 25F and since Sec. 25FFF is not
attracted and Sec. 25F is violated, the award of reinstatement with back wages was upheld and
hence upon its closure, workmen would be retrenched so as to attract provisions of Sec. 25F.
Delhi Consumers Co-operative Wholesale Stores Ltd. v. Secretary, Labour & Ors., 1983 (63) FJR 14 :
1983 II LLN 552 : 1983 LIC 1652 (Del.DB)
.the recruitment was.for each Coop. (Page: 21, Para: 3)
There were inter.Office and branches.The work at.of the stores.
(Page: 22, Para: 1)
In the present.not complied with. (Page: 22, Para: 3)
Sec. 25FFF
2637
2638
Sec. 25FFF
b) Closure is not lock-out when board of directors ratified notice of closure and
employees discharged in large numbers retaining a few permanent employees
and no orders executed in the matter of sales (S.C.3J)
F 5A.959 There is no point in the contention of the employees and the finding of the Tribunal to
pinpoint to the conclusion that what had actually happened was a mere lock out in the guise of
closure and not a real closure because there was no evidence that the action taken in issuing a notice
of closure by Manager (Admn.) was not ratified or accepted by the Board of Directors or any other
officer who was competent to accord approval and all evidence strengthens the act of closure like
termination of all staff even in the branches except a few and no orders were obtained or executed
in the matter of sales and that the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary that company should
be wound up and machinery of the company should be transferred for an effective closure. The
Supreme Court therefore overruled the Tribunals contention that it is a lock out in the guise of
closure but held that it is a closure within Sec. 25FFF(1) for whatever reason.
Kalinga Tubes, Ltd. v. Their Workmen, 1969 I LLJ 557 : 1968 (34) FJR 393 : 1968 (17) FLR 311 : 1969
LIC 90 : 1969 AIR (SC) 90 (S.C.3J)
.It must be remembered that the notice which was served by the Management in the matter of
closure contained an affirmative declaration not only about the closing down of the factory but also that
compensation would be payable under the proviso to Section 25-FFF (1). It was open to the respondents
to ask for production of any resolution passed the Board of Directors or other form decision taken by the
Management and if any such attempt had been made and the necessary documents had not been produced
adverse inferences could have been legitimately drawn against the Company. There is no evidence that
the action taken by the Manager (Administration) was not ratified or accepted by the Board of Directors
or any other officer who was competent to accord approval. As a matter of fact, it appears that a large
Sec. 25FFF
2639
number of employees at Calcutta and Madras offices as also at the Choudwar Office had been discharged
from service or notices of termination of service had been served on them (vide Ex. 29 and the statement
of Management witness No. 4 G. C. Rath, page 164 of the printed record). It appears from Ex. 33 that only
a very small staff of officers and workers had been retained in service out of the permanent cadre. There is
no indication that after the closing down of the factory, any orders were being obtained or executed in the
matter of sales. It is difficult to accede to the contention of Mr. Govind Das that the Company must be
wound up or that there should have been a transfer of the machinery or the factory before it could be said
that the undertaking had been closed down. (Page: 564, Para: 2)
XX. Closure and its effect on workmans right to re-employment u/s. 25H
a) Retrenched workers though after a valid closure are entitled to be re-employed
if the same employer restarts manufacturing activity even after a lapse of
thirteen years (Bom.HC)
5A.960
The employer was a manufacturer of rubber products and issued notice of closure in
November 1980 due to bad financial condition. The union filed a complaint for unfair labour
practice which was dismissed by the Industrial Court holding that the closure is legal and valid.
After majority of workmen accepted the dues and compensation in 1982, the validity of closure was
agitated by the union again in the Industrial Court, High Court and finally by an SLP in Supreme
Court between 1982 to 1995. The Apex Court upheld the validity of closure. Subsequently, union
filed a complaint in the Court alleging that the employer restarted manufacturing activity at Pune
employing some previous employees and the respondent workmen too similarly be employed. The
complaint was allowed which was challenged in the High Court. The workman sought
re-employment u/s. 25H which was opposed by the employer. The High Court held that where the
same company which was closed, had started its manufacturing activities at a different place (at
Pune) more so during the pendency of SLP on the question of validity of closure and the legal entity
which existed at the time of closure continuous to be in existence when the manufacturing activity
restarted, the employer is under an obligation to offer re-employment u/s. 25H. However the order
of reinstatement of the complaints with 50% back wages was set aside as Sec. 25H does not confer
automatic employment on the complaint.
Oriental Rubber Industries Ltd., Pune v. Somayya S. Bhandari & Ors., 2007 II CLR 637 : 2007 AIR
(Bom.HC) 95 (Bom.HC)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in Sec. 25H
Note: Also refer to the case of
Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal & Ors., 2005 I LLJ 853 : 2005 (104) FLR 820 : 2005 I LLN 1033 : 2005
LIC 864 : 2005 I CLR 964 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 308 : 2005 AIR (SC) 851 : 2005 (2) SCC 638 (S.C.2J)
2640
Sec. 25FFF
We may now deal with another submission of Mr. Chitaley. According to the learned counsel, the
question of compensation cannot be gone into by the Tribunal on account of closure of the Mill as found
by the Tribunal. We are not impressed by this argument. (Page: 512, Para: 35)
.Indeed on the explicit terms of the reference, it is not possible to contend that the subject-matter
referred to is not an industrial dispute. Apart from that there is no legal bar to refer to the Tribunal to
determine the compensation on closure of an undertaking. The scheme of Chapter V-A or even the
language of S. 25-FFF, does not necessarily indicate that a claim under the said section can be made only
under S. 33-C of the Central Act and that the Industrial Tribunal, in a reference, has no jurisdiction to
grant appropriate relief in that behalf, as urged by the learned counsel. The submission of the learned
counsel is devoid of substance. (Page: 512, Para: 37)
.The Tribunal, however, did not address itself to this aspect of the matter as according to it since
it was a legitimate closure the question of compensation could not be determined by it. The matter,
therefore, was not at all considered by the Tribunal and the parties were also not allowed to adduce any
evidence with regard to the applicability or otherwise of the said proviso before the Tribunal.The
Tribunal committed a clear error of jurisdiction in not undertaking that enquiry.It will now,
therefore, be the duty of the Tribunal to afford adequate opportunity to the parties to establish their
respective pleas on the point, which appertains to the domain of the second issue in the reference.
(Page: 512, Para: 38)
.The reference stands restored to the file of the Tribunal for adjudicating only the question of
applicability or non-applicability of the proviso to Section 25-FFF (1) of the Central Act.
(Page: 512/513, Para: 39)
c) Closure cannot be challenged, after accepting the dues and compensation since
employer-employee relation comes to an end (Cal.HC)
5A.963
The employer was compelled to close his undertaking as there was devastating fire.
The employees after accepting the dues and all claims of closure still raised the dispute that the
closure was not genuine. The High Court held the Tribunals order favouring the employees was
not correct as the employees cannot challenge the closure after accepting the dues and
compensation under closure and that the employer-employee relation ceased to exit after
acceptance of compensation under Sec. 25FFF and that the employees should have challenged the
closure immediately on receipt of notice of closure. The High Court also held that the Limitation
Act though not applicable as far as writ petition is concerned the period fixed by the particular Act
for filing a suit for corresponding relief should be considered and also though it was not possible to
interfere with the order of the Tribunal it was possible to examine whether the award was based on
any evidence or not and whether all issues were addressed. Hence, the order of the Tribunal was
quashed.
Waxpol Industries Ltd. v. State of West Bengal Ors., 2006 (111) FLR 732 : 2006 III CLR 298 (Cal.HC)
Sec. 25FFF
2641
d) Discharged workmen can apply to Labour Court u/s. 33C(2) for compensation
without raising dispute (Pat.DB)
5A.964
Workman discharged on closure of undertaking can directly apply to Labour Court
u/s. 33C(2) for determination of closure compensation without raising industrial dispute and Court
while determining the same can incidentally determine in which part of the Sec. 25FFF the case
falls.
Management of Junkundar Colliery of M/s. D. Mandal & Co. v. Sahdeo Thakur & Ors., 1973 (27) FLR
460 : 1974 LIC 417 (Pat.DB)
I have no.of the Act. (Page: 462, Para: 4)
2642
Sec. 25FFF
Sec. 25FFF
2643
In the circumstances, it is clear that the respondent No. 2 started a fresh career under the appellant on
being appointed with effect from December 18, 1981. He may have been given benefit of certain
increments with higher start of salary but that circumstances would not confer any right upon him to make
any claim for any advantage for period of service rendered in the erstwhile employment from which he
was retrenched. Therefore the Labour Court could not order payment of three additional increments. In
that view of the matter the order made by the Labour Court shall stand quashed to that extent only.
However, since Responded No. 2 has retired form service now, whatever payments may have been made
to him need not be recovered. (Page: 232, Para: 7)
2644
Sec. 25FFF
Under the Industrial Disputes Act if an Industry is closed the employees thereof are entitled to
compensation as provided u/s. 25FF F of the Industrial Disputes Act. During the pendency of this appeal
on behalf of the Union a Scheme has been framed seeking 100 months full pay as compensation,
..On the admitted position that the Dandakaranya Project has been completely wound up since 1990
and these N.M.R. workers would have been otherwise retrenched but the for the interim order of this
Court in consequence of which the project authorities have been paying every month to these workers to
the tune of Rs. 1.50 lacs without getting them engaged in any work, we think that any direction to pay
compensation in terms of the Scheme will not be in the interest of justice. But, however, the workers
would be entitled to their rightful dues on account of closure of the project as envisaged u/s. 25FF F of the
Industrial Disputes Act. (Page: 837, Para: 12)
In the circumstances we hold that the direction issued by.The award of the Industrial Tribunal, so
far as it relates to 425 N.M.R. workers is accordingly set aside and we hold that these N.M.R. workers
should be entitled to compensation as provided u/s. 25FF F of the industrial Disputes Act. The interim
order passed by this Court in relation to these N.M.R. workers stands vacated. The appeal is accordingly
allowed. (Page: 837/838, Para: 13)
m) Principle of last come first go of Sec. 25G not applicable to termination due to
closure since it is not retrenchment (Ker.DB)
5A.973
The termination of the services of the employees was held not retrenchment but
termination of services on the closure of the Industry and the principle last come first go of Sec.
25G has to be followed by the official liquidator as a general rule emphasizing the principle of
justice equity and good conscience. However an inefficient unreliable a habitually irregular
employee, merely he is senior, cannot assert his right in preference to his efficient juniors. Hence
the official liquidator was directed to look in the justifiability of the departure and remove in
justice if any done to their if the past record was clean.
Chandrasekharan v. Official Liquidator & Anr., 1966 I LLJ 844 (Ker.DB)
.the termination of the services.he adjusted accordingly. (Page: 844/845, Para: 1)
n) Sec. 25G is not applicable when closure of a unit was genuine having no
functional integrality to other units (S.C.2J)
F 5A.974 In instant case since closure of one unit which did not have any functional integrality
with the II unit, was held bonafide, the principle of first come last go u/s. 25G which is applicable
to a case of retrenchment was held to be inapplicable.
Isha Steel Treatment, Bombay v. Association of Engineering Workers, Bombay & Anr., 1987 I LLJ 427 :
1987 (71) FJR 11 : 1987 (54) FLR 454 : 1987 I LLN 741 : 1987 LIC 1028 : 1987 I CLR 232 : 1987 SCC
(L&S) 91 : 1987 AIR (SC) 1478 : 1987 (2) SCC 203 (S.C.2J)
.The question of application of S. 25-G of the Act arises only when the services of the workmen
are retrenched.Hence if the case is one of genuine closure then the question of applying S. 25-G of
the Act which is applicable to a case of retrenchment would not arise. (Page: 432, Para: 7)
.the Tribunal had reached the conclusion that the closure of the I Unit was bona fide, that it did
not have any functional integrality with the II Unit and that there was no victimisation of workmen for
their trade union activities. On going through the award passed by the Tribunal we feel that it had not
committed any error in recording the said findings. (Page: 432, Para: 10)
We, therefore, set aside the judgments of the Division Bench and of the learned single Judge and restore
the award passed by the Tribunal. (Page: 433, Para: 11)
Sec. 25G
2645
Note: Please also refer to the following cases of closure of establishments in the context of functional
integrality
Hotel Mahaveer v.RPF Commissioner, 2002 I LLJ 224 (Karn.HC)
District Transport manager (Admn.) O.S.R.T.C., Orissa v. Dilip Kumar Nayak & Anr., 1997 II LLJ 382 :
1997 (90) FJR 289 : 1997 II LLN 10 : 1997 I CLR 354 : 1997 (9) SCC 296 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1297 : 1997
(10) SCC 260 (S.C.2J)
Aditya Synthetics v. Union of India, 1994 II LLJ 76 (Raj.HC)
U.P. Hotels v. State of Rajasthan, 1998 (2) WLC (Raj.HC)
Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, Jaipur v. M/s. Naraini Udyog & Ors., 1996 II LLJ 1063 : 1996
(5) SCC 522 (SC)(S.C.2J)
Rajasthan P.K. Goods Transport Co. v, RPF Commissioner, 1997 AIR (SC) 58 : 1996 (4) SCC 454 :
1996 II LLJ 662(S.C.2J)
Pai Sales Corporation v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner, 1996 (88) FJR 323 (Ker.HC)
Workmen of the Straw Board Manufacturing Co., Ltd. v. M/s. Straw Board Manufacturing Co., Ltd.,
1974 I LLJ 499 : 1974 (28) FLR 357 : 1974 (45) FJR 266 : 1974 II LLN 102 : 1974 LIC 730 : 1974 SCC
(L&S) 406 : 1974 AIR (SC) 1132 (S.C.3J)
Sadhana Lodh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., 2003 AIR (SC) 1561 : 2003 (3) SCC 524
Times publishing House Ltd. v. Regional Provident Fund commissioner and others 2007 III LLJ 1068
(Raj.HC)
b) Sec. 25G and 25F are regarding statutory rights & right to livelihood u/Art. 21
(Cal.DB)
5A.976
Disputes about termination of service in violation of Sec. 25F and 25G are not cases to
enforce private rights or contractual rights or obligations but statutory rights and also right to
livelihood u/art. 21 and hence the writ Court cannot decline to interfere with them on the ground
that they are domestic disputes under private law.
Pancha Mayurakashi Cotton Mills Employees Union & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1995 I LLN
1222 : 1996 LIC 328 : 1995 LLR 749 (Cal.DB)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
2646
Sec. 25G
c) Sec. 25G & 25F form implied part of Contract of Service (Bom.DB)
5A.977
Sec. 25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act would form implied terms of contract
of service of the appellants and failure to comply with the same amounts to breach of agreement
within the meaning of item 9 of Sch. IV of MRTU and PULP Act 1971.
Dattatraya Shankarrao Kharde, Arun Tukaram Wankhede v. Executive Engineer, Chief Gate Erection
Unit No.2, Nagpur, & Anr., 1994 I LLJ 395 : 1994 I LLN 297 (Bom.DB)
Turning then.Act also. (Page: 400, Para: 17)
It is thus clear.accepted. (Page: 411, Para: 54)
It has.under appeal. (Page: 412, Para: 57)
Sec. 25G
2647
Note: The Apex Court in Hariprasad Shivshankar Shukla & Anr. v. A. D. Divelkar & Anr., AND Barsi
Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. K. N. Joglekar & Anr., 1957 I LLJ 243 : 1956-57 (11) FJR 317 :1957 AIR (SC)
121 (S.C.CB) held that the principle is applicable only to continuing industry and hence not applicable to
industry in case of closure
2648
Sec. 25G
6. Sec. 6P of U.P. I.D. Act which is pari materia to Sec. 25G is applicable
though the workman is not in a continuous service within the meaning of
Sec. 6N of U.P. I.D. Act (S.C.2J)
F 5A.983 Since Sec. 6P (corresponding to Sec. 25G of Central Act) is not subject to any
conditions as to length of service contained in Sec. 6N (corresponding to Sec. 25F of the Central
Act) it does not become applicable only on completion of any particular period of continuous
service and hence it was held that High Court was erroneous in rejecting relief to a worker
terminated in violation of last come first go principle on the ground that only three and half
months service was rendered
Samishta Dube v. City Board, Etawah & Anr., 1999 I LLJ 1012 : 1999 (81) FLR 746 : 1999 II LLN 1 :
1999 LIC 1125 : 1999 I LLR 460 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 592 : 1999 AIR (SC) 1056 : 1999 (3) SCC 14
(S.C.2J)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation u/s. 25F
F 5A.984 Continuous work in terms of Sec. 25B of the Act is not necessary before he was
retrenched so far as statutory requirements u/s. 25G and 25H are concerned Sec. 6P which is pari
materia to Sec. 25G does not require any particular period of continuous service as required by
Sec. 6N of U.P. Act. Hence, Supreme Court held that the High Court was wrong in relying on the
fact that the appellant had put in only 3 months of service and in denying relief u/s. 25G and High
Court also was wrong when it held that no rule of seniority was applicable to daily wagers.
Jaipur Development Authority v. Ram Sahai & Anr., 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 518 : 2007 I LLJ 429 : 2006
(111) FLR 1178 : 2007 I LLN 78 : 2007 LIC 274 : 2007 I CLR 221 : 2007 LLR 92 (S.C.2J)
Mr. Jain appears to be right when he submits that continuous work in terms of Section 25B of the Act is
not necessary in so far as statutory requirements under Sections 25G and 25H are concerned. The said
question appears to have been considered by this Court in some decisions (Page: 524, Para: 24)
We shall next deal with the point whether, in case employees junior to the appellant were retained, the
directions issued by the Labour Court could be treated as valid. Section 6-P of the U.P. Act (which
corresponds to Section 25G of the Central Act of 1947) states that where any workman in an industrial
establishment is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that
establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workmen in this behalf the
employer shall ordinarily retrench the workmen who was the last person to be employed in that category,
unless for reasons to be recorded, the employer retrenches any other person. Now this provision is not
controlled by conditions as to length of service contained in Section 6-N (which corresponds to Section
25F of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947). Section 6-P does not require any particular period of
continuous service as required by Section 6-N. In Kamlesh Singh v. Presiding Officer in a matter which
arose under this very Section 6-P of the U.P. Act, it was so held. Hence the High Court was wrong in
relying on the fact that the appellant had put in only three and a half months of service and in denying
relief. (Page: 524, Para: 26)
Nor was the High Court correct in stating that no rule of seniority was applicable to daily-wagers. There
is no such restriction in Section 6-P of the U.P. Act read with Section 2(z) of the U.P. Act which defines
workman. (Page: 524, Para: 26)
Sec. 25G
2649
2650
Sec. 25G
question of integrating workmen retrenched in one branch to another branch and, in consequence, the
establishment in each branch must be treated as a separate entity. (Page: 418, Para: 3)
The appellant also contends that each branch has its own labour union, maintains its own accounts and
has its own banking accounts and that those facts go to show that each branch is a distinct Industrial
establishment. (Page: 419, Para: 1)
.And in this case the branches are located in different places and there is also a lack of functional
intergrality. We are of opinion that each branch is a separate Industrial establishment.
(Page: 419, Para: 1)
5A.988
Since there was no unity of employment and conditions of service between four
departments i.e. (1) clearing and shipping Agency (2) Insurance Agency (3) Godown keeping and
(4) Cotton supervisors and controllers and they were distinct and complete units carrying on
different lines of business, having separate and independent management, each department
employed its own staff, employees belonged exclusively to that staff and as rule not transferable
and seniority of employees being department wise, it was held that for retrenchment of employees
of one department all the departments cannot be treated as one single establishments for purpose
of applying Sec. 25G and hence tribunals award holding so was set aside.
Tulsidas Khimji v. F. Jeejeebhoy., 1961 I LLJ 42 : 1960-61 (19) FJR 396 (Bom.DB)
The petitioners are a.the said respective departments. (Page: 43, Para: 2)
The Tribunal held.Industrial establishment and.the retrenchment was.to be
reinstated. (Page: 44, Para: 4)
.the four departments of.against the respondents. (Page: 49, Para: 5)
.the contention urged.passed by respondent. (Page: 49, Para: 6)
Note: for more ratios on functional integrality, see Section 2(ka) and 25FFF
10. All units to be considered as one entity for the purpose of applicability of
Sec. 25G when functional integrality exists among them (AP.DB)
5A.989
After considering the fact that accounts of all units of the Company i.e. Hyderabad,
Vizag etc. though separately prepared were consolidated in corporate office and were published
and put before the Board of Directors, that the Balance Sheet of the Company was consolidation of
accounts of all the units together, that conditions of service, pay scales, gratuity etc. in all the units
were uniform, that workmen were transferred freely from one unit to another and their seniority
at new unit was fixed as per length of service in old unit and as per their appointment order,
workers were liable to serve in any part of India, High Court held that there was functional
integrality between workmen at Vizag unit and units at Hyderabad and hence setting aside order
of Single Judge which affirmed decision of Tribunal, retrenchment of workmen of Hyderabad unit
in violation of Sec. 25G by retaining workmen junior to them at Vizag unit was held illegal and void
Hindustan Steel Works Construction Ltd., Secunderabad & etc. v. Hindustan Steel Works Construction
Ltd., Employees Union, Hyderabad & Anr., 1986 LIC 107 (AP.DB)
From the evidence.the said order. (Page: 115, Para: 32)
From the foregoing.govern the situation. (Page: 116, Para: 37)
Viewed from any.Tribunal is confirmed. (Page: 116, Para: 38)
Sec. 25G
2651
5A.990
In the instant case since there was unity of management, supervision and control,
unity of finance and employment, labour, conditions of service, functional integrality and general
unity of purpose and geographical proximity between activity of flavour branch which was closed
and the establishment (Tocklai Experimental Station), the decision of the Labour Court that
Flavour branch was not a separate industrial establishment but a department of Tocklai
Experimental Station was upheld and thus in not considering service of other people in the
establishment while retrenching the biochemist of the Flavour branch,the rule of first come last
go u/s. 25G was violated in relation to whole establishment and followed only in relation to flavour
branch and thus the retrenchment of flavour branch scientist was unjustified.
Tocklai Experimental Station v. Labour Court, Assam & Ors., 1966-67 (30) FJR 311 (Ass.DB)
.Mr. Goswamis contention is.Tocklai Experimental station. (Page: 315, Para: 1)
.There is unity of management.in the present case. (Page: 317, Para: 2)
In our opinion.was not justified. (Page: 319, Para: 2)
Note: for more ratios on functional integrality, see Section 2(ka) and 25-FFF
2652
Sec. 25G
On this finding it follows that the dispute of the respondents in an Industrial Dispute as defined in Sec.
2(k), as that has been raised by the majority of the workmen of the Ambala branch which is an Industrial
establishment. But as the establishment has been closed and the closure itself is no impugned as bad on
the ground that it is colorable and not bonafide, Sec. 25G has no application and the respondents,
therefore, are not entitled to any relief under that Section. (Page: 419, Para: Last)
Sec. 25G
2653
Mallaiah Pvt. & Ors. v. Andhra Bank (by Assistant General Manager), Hyderabad, 1983 I LLN 613
(AP.HC)
b) Seniority List to be common for workers of both the yards when they have
same pay scales and their services were transferable between the two (Pat.DB)
5A.998
In view of the fact that the casual labour at Siliguri yard have come from Katihar yard
where they were working previously and some of the workmen on completion of the work at
Siliguri Yard, were transferred back to Katihar Yard and also, of the fact that the pay scales of the
casual workmen at both the yards were same, the two yards could be regarded as one establishment
though seperated by distance and hence the retrenchment by Railways, of workmen of the Siliguri
yard due to its closure on account of completion of work without adhering to the principle of last
come first go on the basis of common seniority list for both the yards was held violative of the
mandatory provision of the Section and hence illegal.
Somu Kumar Chatterjee & Anr. v. District Signal Tele-Communication Engineer & Anr.,
179 : 1970 (21) FLR 37 : 1970 LIC 629 (Pat.DB)
In the present.struck down. (Page: 193, Para: 26)
Note: please refer to Sec. 2(ka) and 25-FFF for ratios on functional integrality
1970 II LLJ
2654
Sec. 25G
e) Reason for departure of seniority principle must be shown on the face of order,
mere recording reason in the file of employer is not sufficient (Ker.HC)
5A.1001 Retrenchment not following rule stated in Sec. 25G must be shown on the face of order
and merely presence of reasons in the file of employer is not sufficient.
Abdul Rahiman & Ors. v. The Divisional Supdt., Southern Rly. Olavakode & Ors., 1980 II LLN 392 :
1981 LIC 217 (Ker.HC)
Sec. 25G
2655
2656
Sec. 25G
f) When there is lack of efficiency on the part of employee and loss of confidence
in him (S.C.2J)
Samishta Bube v. City Board, Etawah & Anr., 1999 I LLJ 1012 : 1999 (81) FLR 746 : 1999 II LLN 1 :
1999 LIC 1125 : 1999 I LLR 460 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 592 : 1999 AIR (SC) 1056 : 1999 (3) SCC 14
(S.C.2J)
Note: for Text and RatioPlease see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section and also refer to
the following case
Tamilnad Transports, Coimbatore Pvt. Ltd. v. M. Mariappan & Ors. 1970 I LLJ 90 (Mad.HC)
g) When special skills, aptitude and specific experience justify deviation (S.C.3J)
M/s. Om Oil and Oil Seeds exchange, Ltd., Delhi v. Their Workmen, 1966 II LLJ 324 : 1965-66 (29) FJR
69 : 1966 (13) FLR 7 : 1966 AIR (SC) 1657 (S.C.3J)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
h) When female workers in mines are terminated due to working conditions &
statutory provisions (MP.DB)
Nowrozabad Colliery Mazdoor Sangh v. F. Jeejeebhoy & Anr., 1970 (37) FJR 225 : 1970 (20) FLR 284
(MP.DB)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
Sec. 25G
2657
It is then urged that in entertaining the grievance of the respondents against their order of retrenchment
the Labour Appellate Tribunal has exceeded its jurisdiction.that retrenchment is and must be held
to be a normal management function and privilege.In holding an enquiry about the validity or
reasonableness of retrenchment of certain specified persons the appellate tribunal has trespassed on the
management function and as such has exceeded its jurisdiction.We must, however, add that when
it is stated that other things being equal the rule last come first go must be applied, it is not intended to
deny freedom to the employer to depart from the said rule for sufficient and valid reasons. The employer
may take into account considerations of efficiency and trustworthy character of the employees, and if he
is satisfied that a person with a long service is inefficient, unreliable or habitually irregular in the
discharge of his duties, it would be open to him to retrench his services while retaining in his employment
employees who are more efficient, reliable and regular though they may be junior in service to the
retrenchment workmen.It is not as if industrial tribunals insist inexorably upon compliance with
the industrial rule of retrenchment; what they insist on is on their being satisfied that wherever the rule is
departed from the departure is justified by sound and valid reasons.In dealing with case of
retrenchment it is essential to remember that the industrial rule of last come first go is intended to afford
a very healthy safeguard against discrimination of workmen in the matter of retrenchment, and so, though
the employer may depart from the rule, he should be able to justify the departure before the industrial
tribunal whenever an industrial dispute is raised by retrenched workmen on the ground that their
impugned retrenchment amounts to unfair labour practice of victimisation. (Page: 765/766, Para: 9)
.In fact it is clear from the record that at the original enquiry no evidence has been led by the
appellant to justify the departure from the rule even though it was conceded that the rule had not been
followed.This evidence consists of the testimony of Mr. Lakshminarasimhan.He works as
an Assistant Editor.He stated that he was having a personal supervision of the entire work and that
when retrenchment was actually effected a committee was appointed consisting of himself, the Manager
Mr. Ayyangar and the Press Manager Mr. Rajagopala Ayyangar. At the time of the enquiry the Manager
was dead.The witness gave evidence about the defects in the cases of the 39 workmen who were
retrenched; and in support of his oral testimony he filed two statements T-1 and T-2 giving material
particulars in respect of all the said workmen. It is admitted that no records were made at the time when
the cases of these workmen were examined, and so the witness was driven to give evidence merely from
memory. The tribunal has held that having regard to the nature of the defects attributed to the several
workmen to which the witness deposed it was impossible to accept his testimony as satisfactory, and the
tribunal was also not satisfied that it was likely that the witness should have any personal knowledge in
regard to the said defects.In such a case we do not see how in the present appeal the appellant can
successfully challenge the correctness of the conclusion that in substance the retrenchment of the 15
workmen amounts to an unfair labour practice and victimisation. (Page: 767, Para: 12)
Note: The case of Swadesamitran Limited settles the issue of burden of proof in case of deviation of the
principle of last come-first go.
2658
Sec. 25G
Sec. 25G
2659
5A.1012 Retrenchment of the workman while retaining his juniors in service, without proper
reasons is in violation of Sec. 25G and hence invalid.
Management of Industrial Chemicals Ltd. v. P.O. Labour Court, Madras & Ors., 1977 II LLJ 137 : 1977
(34) FLR 403 : 1977 I LLN 607 (Mad.DB)
.We are.is invalid. (Page: 143, Para: 19)
5A.1013 Services of Temporary employees can be terminated at any time but not arbitrarily,
such as keeping junior employees without giving reasons while terminating senior employees.
Wajeeh Ullah v. District Assistant Registrar Coop Societies, Banda & Ors., 1992 (64) FLR 20 (All.DB)
The petitioners.Sustained. (Page: 24, Para: 7)
5A.1014 The workman was terminated as per Sec. 25F but the principle of last come first go
was not followed. Labour Court ordered reinstatement of workman with back wages but Single
Judge set aside Labour Courts order. Being aggrieved, workman moved Division Bench which
upheld Labour Courts order since it was clear from the record that workman was senior to two
other workmen.
Mohanbhai Ramjibhai Keratra v. Surendranagar District Panchayat, 2005 III LLJ 1070 : 2005 LLR
1209 (Guj.DB)
Note: also refer to the following case/s
Satya Pal & Anr. v. State of Haryana, 1997 I LLN 457 (P&H.HC)
Ishwar Chand and Ors. v. Manager Dalmia Dairy Industries AND Management M/s. dalmia Dairy
industries Ltd v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 1997 LLR 366 (Raj.HC)
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Khacheru & Anr., 1993 I LLJ 351 : 1993 I LLN 370 : 1994 (84) FJR
196 (Del.HC)
Alok Kumar Pathak & Anr., Rajnish Kumar Tripathi & Omprakash Yadav v. Vice Chancellor, Rani
Durgawati Vishwavidyalaya, Jabalpur, 2002 III LLN 983 : 2002 LLR 658 (MP.HC)
R. Sankaran v. The P.O. Additional Labour Court, Madras & Anr., 1977 (50) FJR 28 : 1977 I LLN 94 :
1977 LIC 1338 (Mad.HC)
b) When casual workers completing 240 days service with artificial breaks
terminated in violation of principle of last come first go (Raj.DB)
5A.1015 Termination of casual workers completing 240 days of service in one calendar year
with artificial breaks of a day or two without complying with Sec. 25F and 25G is illegal.
Ram Chandra v. Union of India & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 431 : 2001 (90) FLR 55 : 2001 LLR 1034 : 2002 LLR
(Sum) 104 : 2002 LIC 1077 (Raj.DB)
.facts make it.Industrial Disputes Act. (Page: 433, Para: 8)
.it is declared.of the services. (Page: 433, Para: 16)
2660
Sec. 25G
d) When casual labour employed in normal course were retrenched and those
employed out of turn were retained without valid reasons (Ker.HC)
5A.1017 Casual labour with same terms of employment were employed in normal course
while their juniors were recruited out of turn and form a separate class and were preferred over
the casual labour employed in normal course for the purpose of regularisation. Order retrenching
labourers engaged in normal course and retaining out-of-turn labourers though junior to those
retrenched without stating reasons violates rule u/s. 25G.
Abdul Rahiman & Ors. v. The Divisional Supdt., Southern Rly. Olavakode & Ors., 1980 II LLN 392 :
1981 LIC 217 (Ker.HC)
e) If one employee retrenched and other retained when both were doing clerical
job and not having technical skill (Cal.HC)
5A.1018 The employer contended that the store keeper and stock clerk belong to different
categories to avoid applicability of Sec. 25G of the Act to one of them. Industrial Tribunal was
justified in holding that the two workmen who were retrenched belong to the same category as both
their functions were clerical and required no technical skill, hence Sec. 25G of the Act was
applicable.
B.N. Elias & Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal , West Bengal & Ors., 1965 II LLJ 324 : 1961 II LLJ
14 : 1965-66 (28) FJR 257 (Cal.HC)
g) When junior most employee spared on the ground of being in a different grade
when the employees placed in different grades only on the basis of pay scales do
the same work (S.C.2J)
Workmen of Sudder Workshop of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd. v. The Management of Jorehaut Tea Co. Ltd.,
Respondent and vice versa, 1980 II LLJ 124 : 1980 (56) FJR 513 : 1980 (40) FLR 474 : 1980 II LLN 151 :
1980 LIC 742 : 1980 SCC (L&S) 427 : 1980 AIR (SC) 1454 : 1980 (3) SCC 406 (S.C.2J)
Note: Please see related ratio/s under the above citation in this section
Sec. 25G
Effect of violation
2661
2662
Sec. 25G
b) When reasons for deviation from the principle are recorded (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1025 It was held that when Sec. 25G introduced the rule of last come-first go, it is not a rule
imperative in nature and the said rule would be applicable when a workman belonged to a
particular category of workmen. However the employer may retrench any other workman in
departure of the rule by recording reasons.
Jaipur Development Authority v. Ram Sahai & Anr., 2006 (111) FLR 1178 : 2007 I LLJ 429 : 2007 I LLN
78 : 2007 LIC 274 : 2007 I CLR 221 : 2007 LLR 92 : 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 518 (S.C.2J)
Appellant herein is a State within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India. It is created
under the Jaipur Development Authority Act. Respondent was appointed on daily-wage basis from
September, 1986 to June, 1987. His services were dispensed with, with effect from 1.7.1987. He raised an
industrial dispute and on receipt of failure report dated 26.4.1988 of the Conciliation Officer, the
Government of Rajasthan made a reference for adjudication of the following dispute to the Presiding
Officer, Labour Court at Jaipur, in exercise of its power under Section 10(1)(c) of the Industrial Disputes
Act, 1947. (Page: 1179, Para: 1)
By reason of an Award dated 22.3.1999, the Presiding Officer, Labour Court held that the termination of
services of the workman was not legal. He was directed to be reinstated in service with full back-wages. It
was held:
The termination of workman Ramsahai son of Shri Chhotu Ram by the respondents w.e.f. 1.7.87 is not
reasonable and legal. He is reinstated back in service. His continuity in service is maintained, and from
the date of his termination till the date of award he is awarded all back wages along with other benefits
which he would have received while in continuous service and from the date of award the workman shall
receive the wages and other benefits which other similarly situated workmen junior to him are receiving
today. (Page: 1180, Para: 2)
The fact that Respondent was appointed on daily wages and he has not completed 240 days, is not in
dispute. Retrenchment of Respondent by Appellant, therefore, did not require compliance of the
provisions of Section 25F of the Act.
Section 25G introduces the rule of last come first go. It is not a rule which is imperative in nature. The
said rule would be applicable when a workman belongs to a particular category of workman. An
employer would, in terms thereof, is ordinarily required to retrench the workman who was the last person
to be employed in that category. However, for reasons to be recorded, the employer may retrench any
other workman.
Section 25H provides for re-employment of retrenched workman, which will apply in case where the
employer proposes to take into employment any person, an opportunity has to be given to him to offer
himself for re-employment. (Page: 1180/1181, Para: 4)
Sec. 25G
2663
d) When list is prepared category-wise and not for whole project (All.DB)
5A.1027 Even though the seniority list for the project has been prepared category wise, there is
no breach of Rule 77 regarding seniority list and the principle of last come first go has been
followed and the Court rejected employees contention that seniority list should have been for the
whole project.
Ravindra Kumar Srivastava v. Union of India & Ors., 1982 II LLN 427 : 1982 (45) FLR 214 : 1982 LIC
1739 (All.DB)
Rule 77.argument. (Page: 434, Para: 19)
e) When Seniority list of only the division closed is considered since it is separate
from other division having no functional integrality (AP.DB)
5A.1028 When two establishments of Hyderabad division of Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. have
different trades are separate, there is no functional integrality between them and thus there cannot
be any violation of Sec. 25G if workmen were terminated on the basis of seniority list of the Begum
Pet establishment that was closed and some of them having requisite qualifications subject to
vacancy position in Hyderabad division were also absorbed
Mohammed Yousuf & Ors. v. The Industrial Tribunal & Anr., 1978 II LLJ 329 : 1978 LIC (Sum) 55
(AP.DB)
Having regard.closure. (Page: 332/333, Para: 6)
Having gone.seniority. (Page: 334, Para: 10)
Before any.before it. (Page: 336, Para: 12)
Note: for additional ratios on functional integrality, see Section 2(ka)
2664
Sec. 25G
retrenched in preference to Ram Singh I. Evidence show that both Budhram and Bhagat Singh were
drawing time, and so, what applies to Budhram applies equally to Bhagat Singh. In our opinion, this
contention is well-founded and must be upheld. (Page: 88, Para: 2)
.The tribunal, in fact, has found that in addition to their other work Budhram and Bhagat Singh
are now doing the work which the retrenched workmen used to do before, and it has held that since
Budhram was a senior employee, it could not be said that the appellant was in error in retaining him in
preference to the three retrenched employees. It, however, held that Bhagat Singh might have been
retrenched and not Ram Singh I. It is on this ground that the tribunal has directed the reinstatement of
Ram Singh I. (Page: 88, Para: 2)
Mr. Janardhan Sharma for the respondents attempted to support the finding of the Tribunal that the
appellant had acted improperly in not applying the principle of S. 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 (Act 14 of 1947) Section 25 G requires that the retrenchment should be effected category-wise; and
that in effecting retrenchment, the principle of the last come first go must be applied. The difficulty in
accepting this arguments, however, is that in the present case the appellant has altogether closed the
special department for painting, whitewashing and polishing upholstering work, and it is not possible to
find fault with the appellant because one of the ways in which economy in expenditure could be effected
obviously was to close this department and distribute the work of the said department among some of the
pre-existing employees. That being so, it is not possible to hold that S. 25G has been contravened. Once it
is conceded that there was an occasion for effecting economy, the conclusion is inescapable that the
conduct of the appellant in closing the department and dividing its work amongst its other employees
cannot be reasonably characterized as improper, or as amounting to an unfair labour practice.
(Page: 88, Para: 3)
g) When there is lack of efficiency on the part of employee and loss of confidence
in him (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1030 Employer can deviate from the principle of first come last go by virtue of use of word
ordinarily in the Section in case of lack of efficiency or loss of confidence etc. and burden is on
him to justify such deviation.
Samishta Bube v. City Board, Etawah & Anr., 1999 I LLJ 1012 : 1999 (81) FLR 746 : 1999 II LLN 1 :
1999 LIC 1125 : 1999 I LLR 460 : 1999 SCC (L&S) 592 : 1999 AIR (SC) 1056 : 1999 (3) SCC 14
(S.C.2J)
It is true that the rule of first come, last go, in Section 6-P could be deviated from by an employer
because the Section uses the work ordinarily. It is, therefore, permissible for the employer to deviate
from the rule in cases of lack of efficiency or loss of confidence etc. as held in M/s. Swadesamitran
Limited, Madras v. Their Workmen, (1960 I LLJ 504) (SC). But the burden will then be on the employer
to justify the deviation. No such attempt has been made in the present case. Hence, it is clear that there is
clear violation of Section 6-P of the U.P. Act (Page: 1015, Para: 9)
h) When special skills aptitude and specific experience justify deviation (S.C.3J)
F 5A.1031 Though the principle of first come last go should be generally followed in ordering
retrenchment, it is not immutable and can be departed from for valid reasons, in the instant case
where management retained clerks for their special skills and aptitude besides experience in a
particular branch of business and passed resolution setting out reasons for retention, it was held
that Labour Court was wrong in reinstating employees after inferring that for mere departure
from the rule retrenchment was malafide and unjustified.
M/s. Om Oil and Oil Seeds exchange, Ltd., Delhi v. Their Workmen, 1966 II LLJ 324 : 1965-66 (29) FJR
69 : 1966 (13) FLR 7 : 1966 AIR (SC) 1657 (S.C.3J)
It is an accepted principle of Industrial law that in ordering retrenchment, ordinarily, the management
should commence with the latest recruit, and progressively retrench employees higher up in the list of
seniority. But the rule is not immutable, and for valid reasons may be departed form.The Tribunal
has to determine in each case whether the management has in ordering retrenchment acted fairly and
properly and not with any ulterior motive: It cannot assume from the rule that the management was
Sec. 25G
2665
actuated by improper motive or that the management was actuated had acted in a manner amounting to an
unfair labour practice. Nor has the Tribunal authority to sit in appeal over the justifiable reasons the
management if for valid and justifiable reasons the management has departed form the rule that the senior
employee may be retrenched before his junior in employment. (Page: 327, Para: 2)
The management of the appellant has recorded a resolution which sets out the reasons for retention of
the employees.The rule has to be applied where other things are equal. The management of the
business must Act fairly to the employees; where however the management bona fide retains staff
possessing special aptitude in the interests of the business, it cannot be assumed to have acted unfairly
merely because the rule first come, last go is not observed. (Page: 327/328, Para: 2)
In the present case the four clerks retained had, beside, experience, special skill and aptitude in the
particuar branch of the business of the appellant they were attending to and the management had retained
them because of that skill or aptitude. The Labour Court inferred mala fides merely because the
management departed from the rule first come, last go. Whether the management in departing from the
rule has acted mala fide, must depend upon the circumstances of the case; it cannot be inferred merely
from departure from the rule. (Page: 329, Para: 2)
.The order of reinstatement of Tara Shanker and Om Prakash will stand vacated.
(Page: 329, Para: 1)
Note: also refer to the following case
Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Shri Khacheru, Through Municipal Employees Union & Ors., 1993
(66) FLR 42 : 1993 I CLR 357 : 1993 LLR 5 (Del.HC)
j) When workman terminated was due to his appointment being void ab initio
though other illegal appointees retained (Jhar.HC)
5A.1033 The employee was terminated from service on the ground of illegal appointment. On
reference, Labour Court held termination as illegal and awarded reinstatement with full back
wages, which was challenged in High Court. High Court held that since illegal appointment is void
abinitio, workman cannot claim any benefit merely because other appointees were retained in
service though their appointment is also illegal and quashed the impugned award.
Mineral Area Development Authority v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court & Ors., 2006 (110) FLR 270 :
2006 LLR 737 (Jhar.HC)
2666
Sec. 25G
k) If employee terminated was selected not through regular selection process and
the junior employee retained was appointed through selection process
(Raj.HC)
5A.1034 Termination of service of a person was on the ground that he is neither selected
through regular selection nor through the test held for regularization. A plea was raised by the
person for violation of Sec. 25G of Industrial Disputes Act and the principle of retaining a person
junior in service while dispensing with services of seniors which was contended to be arbitrary and
discriminatory. It was held that Sec. 25G of Industrial Disputes Act will not be attracted as person
who has been retained in service, have been selected through selection process.
Dilip Bhatnagar & Ors.etc. v. Rajasthan Agriculture University., 1994 LIC 1914 (Raj.HC)
n) When seniority list is prepared as per grades and not as per category but in
accordance with the settlement with the union and accepted by the employees
(Bom.HC)
5A.1037 Employees grievance was that there is violation of Sec. 25G as the seniority list was
prepared in accordance with the grades and not in accordance with the category which resulted in
retaining a junior workman while retrenching a senior. The High Court observed that the said list
was prepared on the basis of both the category and the grade within the category. It was not the
basis of only grade or only category. Also the seniority list was prepared in accordance with the
settlement with the union and was displayed 23 days in advance from the date of retrenchment and
it was not alleged that such a list was wrong, therefore, in such cases Sec. 25G cannot be held to be
violative.
Janata Mazdoor Union v. Tas Engineering Pvt. Ltd. & Ors., 2002 (95) FLR 739 : 2002 IV LLN 772 :
2002 LIC 2873 : 2003 LLR (Sum) 107 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25G
2667
o) If terminated on the basis of seniority list published if its correctness was not
disputed by union (Cal.HC)
5A.1038 Principle of last come first go was not followed after retrenchment. Correctness of
seniority list published by the company was not disputed by the employees-union. It was held that
as the correctness of seniority list was not disputed, the said rule may be departed from.
Parrys (Cal) Employees Union & Anr. v. Third Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal & Ors., 2001 II LLJ 39
: 2001 (89) FLR 192 : 2001 LLR 462 : 2001 II LLN 743 : 2001 I CLR 777 (Cal.HC)
p) When the departure is made for the sake of efficiency and trustworthy
character of the employee (Mad.HC)
5A.1039 The onus is on the employer to satisfy the Labour Court or Tribunal that the
departure from the principle last to come, first to go was justified when a retrenched workman
raises an industrial dispute. The employer may take into account considerations of efficiency and
trustworthy character of the employee.
Tamilnad Transports, Coimbatore Pvt. Ltd. v. M. Mariappan & Ors., 1970 I LLJ 90 (Mad.HC)
q) When establishment was closed some juniors were retained as caretaker staff
since they have knowledge of different activities (P&H.DB)
5A.1040 When workmen raised dispute that their juniors are retained in service, it was held
that this plea does not stand to reason. There was a closure in the unit pursuant to the permission
granted by the Appropriate Government and in that situation there was no need or requirement to
continue with the workers. And if care taker staff retained in these circumstances the management
was within their right to avail the services of such persons who had the working knowledge of
different activities irrespective of their seniority.
Ombir Singh & Ors. V. Haryana Breweries Ltd. & Anr., 2007 LLR 257 : 2007 (112) FLR 256 (P&H.DB)
The petitioners.of employment. (Page: 258, Para: 1)
This plea.25F of the Act. (Page: 260, Para: 8)
2. Employee who had failed to prove violation of Sec. 25H and 25G (Raj.DB)
5A.1042 As employee had worked for less than 240 days and failed to prove violation of Sec.
25H and 25G employee was not held to be entitled for any relief.
Ram Gopal Saini v. Labour Court No. II, Jaipur & Ors., 2001 I LLJ 1230 : 2001 (89) FLR 778 : 2001 LIC
610 : 2001 I CLR 907 : 2001 LLR 747 (Raj.DB)
2668
Sec. 25G
b) Relief of reinstatement
1. When can be granted
i) Reinstatement of workman with 240 days service is justified when principle
is violated (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1044 Supreme Court upheld the Labour Courts order that as the workmen had completed
240 days of service thereby violated Sec. 25F and also as the principle of last come first go was not
followed their termination was held to be bad and were directed to be reinstated.
Incharge Government Hide Flaying Centre & Anr. v. Rama Ram & Anr., 2003 III LLJ 1081 : 2003 (94)
FLR 909 : 2003 SCC (L&S) 1170 : 2003 (9) SCC 163 (S.C.2J)
The appellants are calling in question the award made by the Labour Court-cum-Industrial Tribunal,
Hissar by which the termination of services of certain employees was held to be bad and they were
directed to be reinstated with back wages and continuity of service and all other consequential benefits
arising therein. (Page: 1082, Para: 1)
.each of the employees have worked for more than 240 days and their services were sought to be
put to an end to without following the due procedure under Section 25-F of the Industrial Disputes Act.
This finding of fact cannot be seriously assailed. However, it may be pointed out that in the evidence
adduced before the Tribunal, the claimants before the Tribunal established that they were seniors to those
who have been continued in service and were described to be regular employees and that position is
neither challenged nor rebutted. Thus the principle of last-come-first-go was given a go-by. In these
circumstances we think that the order of the Tribunal, as affirmed by the High Court, is just and
proper. (Page: 1082, Para: 3)
Note: also refer to the following case
Rajkot Municipal Corporation v. Kishor Govind of Sidik Akbar & etc., 1997 III LLJ (Sum) 408 : 1996 II
LLN 1126 : 1996 LIC 1685 (Guj.HC)
Sec. 25G
2669
2670
Sec. 25G
v) Reinstatement with 50% back wages proper even if workmen who refused
to accept new posting on transfer were terminated in violation of the
Section (Guj.HC)
5A.1048 Due to reduction in the work in tracing department workmen were offered alternative
work in the new project department but they refused to work after receiving the order of transfer
to the new department. Labour Court held that termination was not legal and ordered
reinstatement with 50% back wages since the employer had violated Sec. 25G of Industrial
Disputes Act r/w R. 81 of Industrial Disputes (Gujarat) Rules, 1966. High Court upheld the said
order stating that termination order needs to be in consonance with provisions of Sec. 25 F, 25 G
and Rule 18 to make it legal. Sec. 25 G needs to be complied with by the employer before
retrenching any employee and non- compliance with it need not be challenged by such employee.
The grant of 50% back wages is proper since employer has not produced any evidence to show that
workmen were earning during the intervening period. Hence petition is dismissed.
Gurjargruvers (P.) Ltd. v. Akbakhan Havaldarkhan, 2004 (105) FJR 346 : 2004 LLR 524 (Guj.HC)
.Labour Court.by this Court. (Page: 349, Para: 1)
.If the non implementation.bad in law. (Page: 352, Para: 4)
.Thus bare perusal.such findings. (Page: 353, Para: 4)
.Before the Labour Court.Constitution of India. (Page: 354, Para: 7)
ii) Mere violation of Sec. 25G and H of the Act does not warrant reinstatement
in public employment when job was not of perennial in nature (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1050 A mere violation of Sec. 25G and H of the Act does not warrant reinstatement of a
workman who was not employed within the meaning of Art. 12 of the constitution, having regard to
the doctrine of public employment and whose job was not of perennial in nature. The Supreme
Court held that the Labour Court in the instant case should have probed deeper before reinstating
him with full back wages. Therefore compensation of Rs. 75,000 instead of reinstatement was held
proper.
Jaipur Development Authority v. Ram Sahai & Anr., 2007 SCC (L&S) 518 : 2007 I LLJ 429 : 2006 (111)
FLR 1178 : 2007 I LLN 78 : 2007 LIC 274 : 2007 I CLR 221 : 2007 LLR 92 (S.C.2J)
We would, therefore, proceed on the basis that there had been a violation of Sections 25G and 25H of the
Act, but, the same by itself, in our opinion, would not mean that the Labour Court should have passed an
Award of re-instatement with entire back wages. This Court time and again has held that the jurisdiction
under Section 11A must be exercised judiciously. The workman must be employed by a State within the
meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution of India, having regard to the doctrine of public employment. It
Sec. 25G
2671
is also required to recruit employees in terms of the provisions of the rules for recruitment framed by it.
Respondent had not regularly served Appellant. The job was not of perennial nature. There was nothing
to show that he, when his services were terminated any person who was junior to him in the same
category, had been retained. His services were dispensed with as early as in 1987. It would not be proper
to direct his reinstatement with back wages. We, therefore, are of the opinion that interest of justice would
be sub-served if instead and in place of re- instatement of his services, a sum of Rs. 75,000/- is awarded to
Respondent by way of compensation as has been done by this Court in a number of its judgments.
(Page: 525, Para: 28)
iii) When workman was appointed under a scheme and the scheme itself came
to an end (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1051 Even where, there is a violation of Sec. 25G or 25H of the Act, it does not entitle the
Labour Court to direct reinstatement of the employee automatically because here apart from the
appointment being under the scheme, the very scheme had come to an end on completion of the
project.
State of Rajasthan v. Sarjeet Singh & Anr., 2006 (111) FLR 908 : 2007 I LLJ 236 : 2007 I LLN 122 : 2007
I CLR 126 : 2007 LLR 7 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 2032 : 2006 (8) SCC 508 (S.C.2J)
.He was initially appointed for a period of six months. The term of his appointment was extended
from time to time. The total period during which Respondent No. 1 remained employed was from
19.9.1996 to 7.11.1997. The Scheme was to be completed upto 7.11.1997. As the Scheme came to an end,
the services of Respondent No. 1 were terminated. He filed an application for his regularization of his
services as a pump driver before the Labour Welfare and Conciliation Officer, Hanumagarh. In reply to
the notice issued by the said authority, the Public Health & Engineering Department of the State inter alia
contended that Respondent No. 1 had never been appointed by it and in fact was appointed by the
Sarpanch of the Gram Panchayat, Indragarh (Page : 908/909, Para: 1)
In terminating the services of Respondent No. 1, we would assume that violation of Sections 25-G or
25-H occurred (although there is no factual basis therefor), but in any event, the same would not mean
that the Labour Court should have automatically passed an award of reinstatement in service with back
wages. We, however, although ordinarily would have set aside the impugned award and consequently the
judgment of the High Court. (Page: 912, Para: 9)
2672
Sec. 25G
category are to do the same work inasmuch as by the managements own evidence there is no gradewise
allocation of duty within the same category. Although in the evidence the Management wanted to justify
their departure from the principle of last come first go there is nothing to show that such a reason was
recorded for deviating from the principle. In the circumstances of the case it cannot be said that the
managements selection of persons to be retrenched leaving the juniormost in same category was justified
and the reason now adduced for deviating from the principle cannot be accepted in the absence of the
reason being not recorded at the time of retrenchment. Further it will be also noticed that although there is
classification of workmen into grades (?) within the category, there is nothing to distinguish one
workman of one grade from another workman of another grade inasmuch as there is no allocation of
duties amongst the workmen of different grades in the category.It is a confusion or unwarranted
circumvention to contend that within the same category if grades for scales of pay based on length of
service etc., are evolved, that process amounts to creation of separate categories. This fallacy has been
rightly negatived by a detailed discussion in the Award. The High Court has avoided the pitfall and we
decline to accept the submission. The result is that the Award must hold good in regard to the illegally
retrenched seven workmen. (Page: 127, Para: 7)
Counsel contends that the Workshop is not in existence now and reinstatement is physically impossible.
Sri Mridul, for the workmen, states that a just solution by the Court in the given circumstances is
acceptable. We direct that, in lieu of reinstatement, one years wages, calculated on the scale sanctioned
be the Wage Board recommendations, for each such workman be paid. (Page: 128, Para: 10)
XI. Jurisdiction and procedural issues connected with the disputes under the
Section
a) Tribunal to arrive at conclusion on compliance after examining lists and
verifying documentary evidence (Pat.DB)
5A.1054 The Tribunal had rightly concluded that the provisions of Sec. 25G had been complied
with after examining the lists filed by the employer and also verifying other documentary evidence.
Workmen of Pure Kustore Colliery (represented by Khan Mazdoor Congress) v. Central Government
Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Jabalpur & Anr., 1969 I LLJ 126 : 1969 (18) FLR 297 (Pat.DB)
.With respect to.any relief. (Page: 128, Para: 2 & 3)
Sec. 25G Jurisdiction and procedural issues connected with the disputes under the Section
2673
statement of the union and with all respect to the Tribunal it was not competent to go into that question at
all. There is no evidence here as to the terms of employment of the workers in other units of the factory.
The nearest units to the Barakar factory were the one at Konnagore and the other at Patna at a distance of
200 miles from Barakar. The point not having been raised by the union and without going into the
question as to whether it was feasible for the appellant to effect such transfers, the Tribunal should not
have attempted to apply the principle of last come first go. (Page: 246, Para: 1)
d) Retrenchment whether as per Sec. 25F & 25G, can be determined by appellate
authority u/A.P Shops Act (AP.DB)
5A.1057 The Appellate Authority has u/s. 41 of the Andhra Pradesh Shops and Establishments
Act, the jurisdiction to determine whether retrenchment of employees was in accordance with Sec.
25F and 25G of the Industrial Disputes Act and hence retrenchment is set aside and employer is
directed to comply with these provisions.
N.V. Purnachandra Rao & Ors. v. Krishna District Cooperative Marketing Society Ltd., Vijayawada &
Ors., 1987 II LLJ 237 : 1987 I LLN 517 (AP.DB)
In fact.Act. (Page: 238, Para: 5)
e) Writ Court cannot decline to interfere with disputes as to violation of Sec. 25F
& 25G as they are regarding statutory rights and right to livelihood involving
factual investigation (Ori.DB)
5A.1058 Court refused to decide the question as to whether there was any violation of principle
of last come first go by corporation while retrenching employees, since determination of such
question involved factual investigation by adjudicating authority, not possible for Court exercising
writ jurisdiction.
State Transport Accounts Association & etc. v. Orissa State Road, 1992 I LLJ 397 : 1990 LIC 1378
(Ori.DB)
.Is the retrenchment.come first go. (Page: 402, Para: 8)
.No factual investigation.point is warranted. (Page: 411, Para: 22)
2674
Sec. 25G
5A.1059 Disputes about termination of service in violation of Sec. 25F and 25G are not cases to
enforce private rights or contractual rights or obligations but statutory rights and also right to
livelihood u/Art. 21 and hence the writ Court cannot decline to interfere with them on the ground
that they are domestic disputes under private law.
Pancha Mayurakashi Cotton Mills Employees Union & Ors. v. State of West Bengal & Ors., 1995 I LLN
1222 : 1996 LIC 328 : 1995 LLR 749 (Cal.DB)
.In our view.pleases. (Page: 1226/1227, Para: 8)
That apart.writ jurisdiction.. (Page: 1228, Para: 12)
g) Tribunal cannot set aside termination as violative of Sec. 25G when the
reference does not contain the said question (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1062 Where the services of a messenger who worked for a period of 87 days, was terminated
he filed a claim for wages not paid for some holidays and Sundays u/s. 33C(2) which was allowed as
full and final settlement. After a year he raised a dispute alleging illegality in his termination. The
Central Government referred the dispute to Tribunal in which there is only a reference to Sec. 25H
none to 25G. The Tribunal held termination illegal holding violation of Sec. 25G and 25H. The
High Court upheld the award. The Supreme Court set aside the judgments of Courts below for the
reason that the reference was not made for Sec. 25G, nor the employee ever raised a plea of
violation of Sec. 25G nor the Tribunal noticed the fact that the two persons were not appointed
after termination of the respondent for the post of messenger nor the fact that the employee did not
respond to several advertisements offering reemployment to retrenched employees. His only case
Sec. 25G
2675
was that Sec. 25H was violated. Tribunal therefore has no jurisdiction to go on a tangent and
declare violation of Sec. 25G. The view therefore that his services were wrongfully terminated was
set aside on multiple grounds besides that of 25G.
Regional Manager, SBI v. Rakesh Kumar Tewari, 2006 I LLJ 748 : 2006 (108) FLR 733 : : 2006 I LLN
898 : 2006 LIC 883 : 2006 I CLR 395 : 2006 LLR 209 : 2006 (1) SCC 530 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 143 (S.C.2J)
In the first appeal, the respondent had raised no allegation of violation of Section 25-G in his statement
of claim before the Industrial Tribunal. His only case was that Section 25-H of the Act had been violated.
Section 25-H unlike Section 25-G deals with a situation where the retrenchment is assumed to have been
validly made. In the circumstances, if the employer wishes to re-employ any employee, he must offer to
employ retrenched workmen first and give them preference over others. The two Sections viz. Sections
25-G and 25-H therefore operate in different fields and deal with two contradictory fact situations. The
Tribunal ignored the fact that there was no pleading by the respondent in support of an alleged violation
of Section 25-G. Indeed the order of reference by the Central Government did not also refer to Section
25-G but only to Section 25-H. In the circumstances it was not open to the Tribunal to fly off at a
tangent and conclude that the termination of service of the respondent was invalid because of any
violation of Section 25-G by the appellant. (Page: 752, Para: 15)
In the first appeal, the respondent had raised no allegation of violation of Section 25-G in his statement
of claim before the Industrial Tribunal. His only case was that Section 25-H of the Act had been violated.
Section 25-H unlike Section 25-G deals with a situation where the retrenchment is assumed to have been
validly made. In the circumstances, if the employer wishes to re-employ any employee, he must offer to
employ retrenched workmen first and give them preference over others. The two Sections viz. Sections
25-G and 25-H therefore operate in different fields and deal with two contradictory fact situations. The
Tribunal ignored the fact that there was no pleading by the respondent in support of an alleged violation
of Section 25-G. Indeed the order of reference by the Central Government did not also refer to Section
25-G but only to Section 25-H. In the circumstances it was not open to the Tribunal to fly off at a
tangent and conclude that the termination of service of the respondent was invalid because of any
violation of Section 25-G by the appellant. (Page: 752, Para: 15)
Besides, in the second appeal admittedly several persons had been appointed prior to the respondent on a
temporary basis. They would have prior rights to re-employment over the respondent on the basis of the
principles contained in Section 25-G or 25-H. (Page: 754, Para: 26)
The Tribunal also failed to deal with the issue raised by the appellant in the first appeal that no grievance
had been made nor any demand raised by the respondent either in his application under Section 33-C(2)
or otherwise that his services had been illegally terminated. It may be that the principles of res judicata
may not disqualify the respondent from contending that his termination was invalid, nevertheless
non-raising of the issue earlier was a factor which the Tribunal should have taken into consideration in
weighing the evidence. Significantly, the High Court upheld the decision of the Tribunal as if the
Tribunal had proceeded under Section 25-H. As we have said Section 25-H proceeds on the assumption
that the retrenchment has been validly made. Therefore, the High Courts view that the termination was
invalid under Section 25-H cannot in any event be sustained. (Page: 753, Para: 18)
2676
Sec. 25H
Sec. 25H
2677
e) Section does not bar claim by workmen for bonus declared by company after
their retrenchment (Cal.DB)
5A.1067 Subsequent to retrenchment of certain workers and dismissal of one workman,
company issued a notification declaring additional profit bonus for financial year prior to such
retrenchment and dispute regarding claim for bonus by retrenched employees was taken up by
other workmen of establishment through their union, Court dismissed challenge to the validity of
reference by the management and held that definition of Industrial Dispute is very wide and as
workmen raising dispute in instant case have community of interest with retrenched workmen in
2678
Sec. 25H
general interest of labour because they put forward a claim which is similar as in the present case,
they are entitled to claim bonus and also since claim for bonus was not barred by Sec. 25F or 25H as
the relief claimed was not relief under the Act but relief under declaration made by the company.
East Asiastic & Allied Co. (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Fourth Industrial Tribunal West Bengal & Ors., 1961 I LLJ
720 : 1961-62 (20) FLR 309 (Cal.DB)
.By a notice dated.21 November 1956.upon the appellant.fourth
Industrial Tribunal. (Page: 722, Para: 1)
.By an award published.of the Tribunal. (Page: 722, Para: 2)
.The question of consideration.therefore very wide. (Page: 723, Para: 4)
In the case before.the appellant company. (Page: 724, Para: 4)
.I have comeis an Industrial Dispute. (Page: 724, Para: 5)
Sri Chowdhury also argued.of the appeal fails. (Page: 724, Para: 7)
f) Sec. 25H does not prescribe any time limit for employment (Ker.DB)
5A.1068 The question whether the claim of an employee declared surplus and was retrenched
survives for re-employment u/s. 25H of The Industrial Disputes Act after a period of one year,
came for decision in the light of the sub rule (3) of rule 78 of Kerala Industrial Dispute Rules 1957
which does not allow the same beyond a period of one year. Striking down the said rule, the High
Court held that it is ultra vires and void to the parent Act in which Sec. 25H has no such limit, it
being a statutory and substantive right u/s. 25H, it cannot be circunscribed by limiting the liability
of the employer.
M/s. Peirce Leslie India Ltd. & etc. v. The Secretary, Centre of Indian Trade Unions, Kanpur & Anr.,
2006 (109) FLR 929 : 2007 II LLN 955 : 2006 LIC 725 (Ker.DB)
II. Applicability
a) Sec. 25H has only prospective in effect and not applicable to retrenchment
effected prior to introduction of the section (Cal.HC)
5A.1070 Retrenchment of certain workmen was effected prior to introduction of Sec. 25H of
the Act, employer not bound to comply with its provisions, as this section is prospective and not
retrospective. Both retrenchment and re employment of retrenched workmen have to take place
after operation of Sec. 25H of the Act.
West Bengal Metal Workers Union v. Jeewanlal, Ltd. & Ors., 1961 II LLJ 23 : 1960-61 (18) FJR 295
(Cal.HC)
Sec. 25H
Applicability
2679
2680
Sec. 25H
Sec. 25H
Applicability
2681
Chapter V-A providing for retrenchment is not enacted only for the benefit of the workmen to whom
Section 25-F applies but for all cases of retrenchment and, therefore, there is no reason to restrict
application of Section 25-H therein only to one category of retrenched workmen. We are, therefore,
unable to accept the contention of Shri Pai that a restricted meaning should be given to the word
retrenchment in Section 25-H. This contention is, therefore, rejected. (Page: 827, Para: 11)
Note: also refer to the following case/s
Oriental Bank of Commerce v. P.O. Central Government Industrial Tribunal & Anr., 1994 II LLJ 770 :
1993 (66) FLR (sum) 27 : 1993 I LLN 316 : 1993 I CLR 205 (Raj.HC) 4732 of 1991 dt. Sep. 20, 1991
Jaipur Development Authority v. Ram Sahai & Anr., 2007 I LLJ 429 : 2006 (111) FLR 1178 : 2007 I LLN
78 : 2007 LIC 274 : 2007 I CLR 221 : 2007 LLR 92 : 2007 (1) SCC (L&S) 518 (S.C.2J)
2682
Sec. 25H
Once it is held that Section 25F will have no application in a case of transfer of an undertaking or closure
thereof as contemplated in Section 25F and 25FFF of the 1947 Act, the logical corollary would be that in
such an event Section 25H will have no application. (Page: 859, Para: 25)
5A.1077 On closure, workmen were paid statutory compensation under Industrial Disputes
Act, subsequently after 2 years, it was re-started, notification for employment was issued but some
workmen were not employed, it was held that Sec. 25H is not applicable in case of bonafide closure.
Dau Dayal Bhatnagar & Ors. v. Raza Textiles Ltd. & Ors., 1978 (37) FLR 435 : 1979 LIC (Sum) 36
(All.DB)
It is true.workmen. (Page: 436, Para: 2)
.There it was.is incorrect. (Page: 436, Para: 3)
5A.1078 On closure of the undertaking the workmen received compensation as per as Sec. 25FFF
r/w. Sec. 25F. However, later the undertaking started operating under BIFR scheme and the
workmen claimed re-employment in the undertaking. On refusal by employer, matter gone to
Labour Court, which ordered reinstatement of workmen. Single Judge remitted the matter to
Labour Court, directing employer to pay Rs. 10,000 as an adhoc amount to each workmen. On
appeal, Division Bench set aside the order of the Single Judge and Labour Court and held that Sec.
25H would not be applicable since closure was never challenged by workmen and they received
compensation for such closure.
Management of Wavin India Ltd., Chennai v. Presiding Officer, Principal Labour Court, Chennai &
Anr., 2005 III LLJ 152 : 2005 (106) FLR 557 : 2005 III LLN 288 : 2005 LLR 931 (Mad.DB)
5A.1079 So far as reemployment of the workmen retrenched on account of closure of the
establishment is concerned u/s. 25FFF of the Act once such valid closure comes into effect under an
agreement u/s. 18(1) of the Act, the relationship of employer and employee does not survive. Under
such closure they are only entitled for compensation and that Sec. 25H cannot be invoked for
reemployment.
M/s. Peirce Leslie India Ltd. & etc. v. The Secretary, Centre of Indian Trade Unions, Kanpur & Anr.,
2006 (109) FLR 929 : 2007 II LLN 955 : 2006 LIC 725 (Ker.DB)
Note: also refer to the following case
Kalinga Tubes Ltd. Choudwar v. State of Orrisa & Ors., 1972 (42) FJR 450 : 1972 LLN 536 (Ori.DB)
Note: The Bombay High Court held a different view in the case of Oriental Rubber Industries Ltd., Pune
v. Somayya S. Bhandari & Ors., 2007 II CLR 637 : 2007 AIR (Bom.HC) 95 (Bom.HC)
Sec. 25H
Re-employment means
2683
2684
Sec. 25H
on account of the lock-out. The third notice dated September 23, 1953.If the three notices referred
to above are read together against the background of events which had happened prior to August 23,
1953, the only reasonable construction is the one adopted by the Tribunals, viz., that the employees
whose employment had been refused during the lockout were permitted to resume work without any
conditions if they reported for duty by a particular date, and on fulfilment of a condition if they reported
for duty after that date. (Page: 383/384, Para: 1)
Sec. 25H
2685
d) When vacancy arises in other projects for the retrenched project employee and
the same is not offered to him (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1086 By considering the affidavit and submission of the employer the special leave petition
was disposed off by directing the company to offer appointment to the project employee retrenched
due to the closure of the project whose names figured in the panel prepared by company in any
project as and where vacancies arise as per the principle of first come last go.
Sufal Jha & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 2002 SCC (L&S) 1127 : 2002 IV LLJ 1039 : 2002 (9) SCC 693
(S.C.2J)
After considering this affidavit and submission, as noticed hereinabove, learned counsel for the
petitioners submits that this petition may be disposed of as settled with the direction that for considering
the offer of appointments to the petitioners herein, whose names figure in the panel, they may be offered
appointments in any of the projects in Madhya Pradesh, as and when the vacancies arise, of course based
on the date of the retrenchment of the employees concerned. Mr. Pandey, learned counsel appearing for
the respondents does not object to that course being adopted. We record the statements of the learned
counsel for the parties and dispose of the special leave petition in the terms as noticed above.
(Page: 1128, Para: 3)
e) When workmen worked for 240 days terminated and vacancy is available
(MP.DB)
5A.1087
available.
The workmen who worked for 240 days are entitled to reinstatement if vacancy is
Nagar Panchayat, Jaura & Anr. v. Ashok Kumar Gupta & Ors., 2000 (86) FLR 560 : 2000 II LLR 1204
(MP.DB)
Accordingly.reinstatement. (Page: 564, Para: 10)
2686
Sec. 25H
f) Even though the termination of the workmen does not fall under Sec. 25F
(Del.DB)
5A.1088 In view of Supreme Court judgement in Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam & Ors.,
1996 (77) FLR 2063 even the workmen not covered by Sec. 25F were held entitled to benefits of
Sec. 25H.
Government of N.C.T. of Delhi v. Balbir Singh & Ors., 1997 (76) FLR 569 : 1997 II LLN 830 : 1997 II
CLR 509 : 1997 LLR 628 (Del.DB)
.Whether a workman.Section 25-F. (Page: 570, Para: 1)
Pleading as to violation of Sec. 25H even if not made, benefit of section cannot be
Gujarat State Machine Tools Corp. Ltd. v. Deepak J. Desai, 1994 III LLJ 848 : 1987 (55) FLR 527 : 1987
I LLN 714 : 1987 LIC 1361 : 1988 I CLR 24 (Guj.DB)
.That without.Act. (Page: 849, Para: 1)
.The argument.dispute Act. (Page: 850, Para: 5)
h) When employer failed to prove that workmans tenure is fixed and new
appointments were made subsequent to his termination (MP.HC)
5A.1090 The workmen had rendered 5 years of service. On termination, they moved Labour
Court, as others who were terminated were taken back by the employer and new appointments
were made. Employer contended that workmen were appointed for fixed term. Labour Court
awarded reinstatement as fixed term employment was not proved by employer nor any reason was
shown as to why they were not re-employed. High Court upheld the award of Labour Court.
Secretary General, Family Planning Association, & Ors. v. Rajesh Kumar & Anr., 2005 LLR 694
(MP.HC)
Sec. 25H
2687
k) Part-time sweeper who worked for ten years shall have preference in regular
vacancy to the outsiders (AP.HC)
5A.1093 Employment in regular vacancy in preference to outsiders was sought by the
employee (petitioner) who was a part time sweeper working on his job for 10 years. The High Court
held that in view of the provisions of Sec. 25H of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, he is entitled to
have preference over other persons in case of filling up of the future vacancies.
M. Ganga v. Zonal Manager, Indian Bank, Hyderabad & Ors., 2002 (94) FLR 460 : 2002 II CLR 713 :
2002 LLR 709 (AP.HC)
m) When an employee terminated and others were appointed on the same post
subsequently (P&H.HC)
5A.1095 Services of the technical assistant of a Bank was terminated on the ground that there
was no vacant post. Later on, two persons were appointed for the said post on contract basis and
then they were regularized. Held that u/s. 25H of the Act, it is incumbent upon Bank to offer it first
to the employee who was terminated. Direction was given to reinstate the employee.
Sangeet Karla v. State pf Haryana & Ors., 2002 I LLJ 1041 : 2001 LIC 3427 (P&H.HC)
n) When fresh advertisement was issued to recruit fresh hands while temporary
workman was discharged from duty in vioation of section (Guj.DB)
5A.1096 Temporary workman was discharged from duty without complying with statutory
requirement and fresh advertisement was issued to recruit fresh hands, it was held to be in
violation of 25H hence reinstatement was granted.
Gujarat State Machine Tools Corp. Ltd. v. Deepak J. Desai, 1994 III LLJ 848 : 1987 (55) FLR 527 : 1987
I LLN 714 : 1987 LIC 1361 : 1988 I CLR 24 (Guj.DB)
The appellant.in service. (Page: 850, Para: 4)
o) When retrenched workers are not intimated of vacancy and juniors are
employed instead (Guj.DB)
5A.1097 Re-employing juniors and failure to intimate vacancy to the workman retrenched is
violative of Sec. 25H.
Union of India & Anr. v. Bachu Badia, 2002 I LLN 1098 (Guj.DB)
It is evened.re-employed. (Page: 1099, Para: 5)
Note: Also refer to the following case in the above context
When new workmen recruited in place of retrenched workmen.
Indian Refrigeration Industries & Anr. v. R.K. Baweja & Ors., 1981 (42) FLR 381 : 1981 II LLN 177
(Del.HC)
Ram Chandra Yadav & Anr. v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corpn. & Anr., 1990 II LLJ 408 : 1990
(60) FLR 267 (Raj.DB)
2688
Sec. 25H
p) When retrenched workers though after a valid closure were not re-employed
by the same employer when he restarted manufacturing activity even after a
lapse of thirteen years (Bom.HC)
5A.1098 The employer was a manufacturer of rubber products and issued notice of closure in
November 1980 due to bad financial condition. The union filed a complaint for unfair labour
practice which was dismissed by the Industrial Court holding that the closure is legal and valid.
After majority of workmen accepted the dues and compensation in 1982, the validity of closure was
agitated by the union again in the Industrial Court, High Court and finally by an SLP in Supreme
Court between 1982 to 1995. The Apex Court upheld the validity of closure. Subsequently, union
filed a complaint in the Court alleging that the employer restarted manufacturing activity at Pune
employing some previous employees and the respondent workmen too similarly be employed. The
complaint was allowed which was challenged in the High Court. The workman sought
re-employment u/s. 25H which was opposed by the employer. The High Court held that where the
same company which was closed, had started its manufacturing activities at a different place (at
Pune) more so during the pendency of SLP on the question of validity of closure and the legal entity
which existed at the time of closure continuous to be in existence when the manufacturing activity
restarted, the employer is under an obligation to offer re-employment u/s. 25H. However the order
of reinstatement of the complaints with 50% back wages was set aside as Sec. 25H does not confer
automatic employment on the complaint.
Oriental Rubber Industries Ltd., Pune v. Somayya S. Bhandari & Ors.,
(Bom.HC) 95 (Bom.HC)
q) Even though the workman who did not serve for one year since it covers all
cases of retrenchment (Del.DB)
5A.1099 The benefit of re-employment under the section is available in all cases of
retrenchment and not only in case of those covered by Sec. 25F and hence a workman who did not
serve for one year is also entitled to the benefit of re-employment.
Government of N.C.T. of Delhi v. Hospital Employees Union, Delhi, 1997 II LLJ 516 (Del.DB)
.This point.section 25F. (Page: 516, Para: 1)
Note: also refer to Central Bank of India v. S.Satyam & Ors., 1996 II LLJ 820 : 1997 (90) FJR 106 : 1996
(74) FLR 2063 : 1997 II LLN 31 : 1996 LIC 2248 : 1996 II CLR 1095 : 1996 SCC(L&S) 1273 : 1996 AIR
(SC) 2526 : 1996 (5) SCC 419 (S.C.2J) which lays down that Sec. 25H is not restricted to cases falling
u/s. 25F.
Sec. 25H
2689
b) When new persons were appointed as per rules but not to posts identical to that
of daily wagers who were retrenched (Raj.HC)
5A.1101 Fresh recruitment while terminating the services of a workman was challenged and
the Tribunal favoured the bank. The High Court observed that there is no violation of Sec. 25H of
the Act. Termination of daily wagers as a consequence of regular appointment made according to
the rules does not amount to such violation. Therefore, the retrenched workman was held entitled
to opportunity of reemployment only in cases where appointments are made identical to that held
by him.
Union Bank Employees Association v. Union Bank of India, 2003 (96) FLR 48 : 2002 IV LLN 1063 (Raj.HC)
2690
Sec. 25H
Sec. 25H
2691
Note: The Bombay High Court held a different view in the case of Oriental Rubber Industries Ltd., Pune
v. Somayya S. Bhandari & Ors., 2007 II CLR 637 : 2007 AIR (Bom.HC) 95 (Bom.HC) but Apex Court in
the case of Maruti Udyog Ltd. v. Ram Lal & Ors., 2005 I LLJ 853 : 2005 (104) FLR 820 : 2005 I LLN
1033 : 2005 LIC 864 : 2005 I CLR 964 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 308 : 2005 AIR (SC) 851 : 2005 (2) SCC 638
(S.C.2J)held a different view
f) When workmen who had not completed 240 days of service failed to prove
violation of Sec. 25H and 25G (Raj.DB)
5A.1105 As employee had worked for less than 240 days and failed to prove violation of Sec. 25H
and 25G employee was not held to be entitled for any relief.
Ram Gopal Saini v. Labour Court No. II, Jaipur & Ors., 2001 I LLJ 1230 : 2001 (89) FLR 778 : 2001 LIC
610 : 2001 I CLR 907 : 2001 LLR 747 (Raj.DB)
In this.employee. (Page: 1230, Para: 2)
We are.the purpose. (Page: 1231, Para: 8)
5A.1106 Workman who had worked for not more than 89 days claimed retrenchment
compensation since they were not in continuous service of 240 days, as per Sec. 25B were held not
entitled retrenchment compensation and benefit of Sec. 25H
Indian Airlines v. Sebastian., 1994 III LLJ 498 : 1991 (62) FLR 755 : 1991 I LLN 247 : 1991 I CLR 43 :
1991 LLR 488 (Ker.DB)
Thus it is.S. 256. (Page: 503, Para: 8)
In our opinion.unsustainable. (Page: 506, Para: 15)
Note: The following case may be referred in the above context
S. Selvaraj v. Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Trichirapalli & Anr.2006 LIC 4183 (Mad. HC)
Also refer to Central Bank of India v. S. Satyam & Ors., 1996 II LLJ 820 : 1997 (90) FJR 106 : 1996 (74)
FLR 2063 : 1997 II LLN 31 : 1996 LIC 2248 : 1996 II CLR 1095 : 1996 SCC (L&S) 1273 : 1996 AIR
(SC) 2526 : 1996 (5) SCC 419 (S.C.2J) which lays down that Sec. 25H is not restricted to cases falling
u/s. 25F
2692
Sec. 25H
Hutchiah v. Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., 1983 I LLJ 30 : 1982 (61) FJR 207 :
1983 I LLN 205 (Karn.DB)
That being.suitability. (Page: 41, Para: 17)
Pac Workers Union (Regd.) v. Secretary (Labour) & Ors., 2003 II LLJ 966 : 2003 (98) FLR 872 : 2003 II
LLN 961 (Del.HC)
Sec. 25H
2693
2694
Sec. 25H
terms of reference. The issue here is not termination but determination of the violation of Sec. 25H,
only because the employer did not maintain and preserve register it would not mean that the
employee would be entitled to be reinstated without establishing the violation of Sec. 25H of the Act
and in any event Labour Court did not arrive at a finding that the termination of services of the
appellant was illegally and when Sec. 25H was not violated the provisions of Sec. 25 of Industrial
Dispute Act 1947 was not required to be complied with.
State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Om Prakash Sharma, 2006 II LLJ 1046 : 2006 (109) FLR 1203 : 2006
III LLN 766 : 2006 LLR 747 : 2006 (5) SCC 123 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 930 (S.C.2J)
.Rule 77 may be mandatory in character as was urged by Mr. Calla, but, only because the
appellant herein did not maintain the prescribed register, the same by itself would not mean that the
respondent herein would be entitled to be reinstated in service with back wages without establishing that
the provision of Section 25H was violated. The termination of the workman was not in issue. In any event,
the Labour Court did not arrive at a finding that the termination of services of the appellant was illegal. He
had not completed 240 days of service. In that view of the matter, the provisions of Section 25F of the
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 was not required to be complied with. (Page: 1049, Para: 11)
The specific issue which was, therefore, referred for determination by the Labour Court, related to the
dispute as regards violation of Section 25H of the Act. If the said provisions had not been found to be
violated, the question of setting aside the order of termination by the Labour Court did not and could not
arise. The learned Single Judge proceeded on the premise that the High Court, in exercise of its writ
jurisdiction, cannot sit in appeal over the Award of the Labour Court. The learned Single Judge was right,
but then, only because the jurisdiction of the High Court, while exercising of its power of judicial review
was limited, it would not mean that even a jurisdictional error could not have been corrected. The
provisions of Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India would be attracted if the inferior Tribunal
has, inter alia, committed a jurisdictional error. What would be the ground for judicial review, in regard to
the orders passed by an inferior Tribunal is no longer a res integra. (Page: 1049, Para: 12)
In the instant case, the Award of the Labour Court suffers from an illegality, which appears on the face of
the record. The jurisdiction of the Labour Court emanated from the order of the reference. It could not
have passed an order going beyond the terms of the reference. While passing the Award, if the Labour
Court exceeds its jurisdiction, the Award must be held to be suffering from a jurisdictional error. It was
capable of being corrected by the High Court in exercise of its power of judicial review. The High Court,
therefore, clearly fell in error in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction. The Award and the judgment of the
High Court, therefore, cannot be sustained. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the
High Court is set aside. The award is set aside to the extent of order of reinstatement with back
wages. (Page: 1049, Para: 14)
g) Workman need not fulfill age criterion on re-employment if he was within the
prescribed age limit at initial recruitment (AP.HC)
5A.1116 The question of applying for age qualification at the time of re-absorption into service
does not arise if an employee is well within the prescribed age limit at the time of initial recruitment.
B. Ashok Ors. v. The Chairman, Food Corporation of India & Ors., 1996 LIC 2808 (AP.HC)
h) Sec. 25H does not prescribe any order in which the workmen are to be
re-employed and employer not bound to offer re-employment on the basis of
length of the service or seniority of retrenched workmen (IC)
5A.1117 Sec. 25G states that employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last
person to be employed in that category, but does not confer any right upon a worker to get
re-employed according to the length of their service on the date of retrenchment. Also employer is
not bound to offer re-employment according to seniority of retrenched workmen as employer is
under obligation to employ those retrenched workmen who offer them for employment above
other persons. Sec. 25H does not prescrine any order in which the employer is required to offer
employment.
Nurmohmed Ismail v. Calico Mills Company, Ltd, 1957 II LLJ 89 (IC)
Sec. 25H
2695
Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. S.K. Mukhopadhyaya, Arbitrator & Dy. Chief Commissioner (Central)
Dhanbad & Ors., 2003 (98) FLR 1174 : 2003 III LLJ 1082 : 2004 V LLN (Sum) 55 : 2004 V LLN (Sum)
56 : 2004 I CLR 224 (Jhar.DB)
A retrenched employee.equated with reinstatement. (Page: 1178, Para: 14)
2696
Sec. 25H
d) Back wages not admissible when workers refrained from joining work of their
own accord due to lower wages (AP.DB)
5A.1121 In case of re-employment whether workmen are entitled to back wages (for the period
of non-employment) depends on whether employer was in any way responsible for workmen not
joining service and in the instant case, workmen refrained from taking up work on their own
accord because they were offered lower wages than those at the time of retrenchment the grant of
back wages by Labour Court was quashed because workmen could have resumed work and then
raised an industrial dispute regarding wages.
Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd. v. Labour Court, Andhra Pradesh, & Ors., 1963-64 (24) FJR 333 : 1963 I LLJ
770 (AP.DB)
The question whether.not joining service. (Page: 340, Para: 3)
.The Labour Court did.respect to the wage structure. (Page: 341, Para: 1)
It is not stated.not resuming their work.without deciding that question.remarks
made by us. (Page: 341, Para: 2)
Sec. 25H
2697
b) High Court can direct reference of the dispute if conciliation report fails to
mention violation of the section (Pat.DB)
5A.1124 In view of failure report by Conciliation Officer mentioning violation of Sec. 25H by
the Bank while terminating services of temporary workmen and also violating Rules 77 and 78 and
resorting to unfair labour practice of dispensing with the services of workmen appointed for short
time and making fresh appointments on same job, High Court directed Government to refer the
dispute for adjudication.
Giridhar Gopal Tiwary & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1992 (81) FJR 197 : 1992 (65) FLR 519 : 1992 I
LLN 654 :1992 LIC 1616 : 1992 I CLR 992 : 1992 LLR 767 (Pat.DB)
.The main question.as the Act. (Page: 198, Para: 1)
.In the present.recruited by them. (Page: 203, Para: 2)
According to rules.appointing
proceedings. (Page: 203, Para: 3)
fresh
hands.After
the.of
conciliation
2698
Sec. 25H
d) Writ will not lie when employees did not respond to employers advertisement
and delayed in applying for writ (Pat.DB)
5A.1126 As the employees did not file applications pursuant to the advertisement regarding
recruitment and also as there was a delay in filing writ application by which time selection process
was completed; no writ of mandamus, as sought by temporary employees with 240 days continuous
service, could be issued for seeking preferential appointment as per Sec. 25H.
Achyutanand Singh & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., 1996 III LLJ 1208 : 1996 (88) FJR 63 : 1996 (73)
FLR 1415 : 1996 I LLN 213 (Pat.DB)
The petitioners in.of 12 months. (Page: 1208, Para: 1)
There cannot.of mandamus. (Page: 1210, Para: 18)
The petitioners.Act. (Page: 1210, Para: 19)
Sec. 25J
2699
M. Recovery of Moneys due from employers under this Chapter Sec. 25-I
b) Central Act overrides Sec. 2(s) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1131 Placing reliance on Sec. 2(s) of U.P. Industrial Disputes Act instead of Sec. 2(oo) which
clearly includes termination due to ill-health was held improper since by virtue of Sec. 25J of the
Central Act providing for the overriding effect of Central Act on the State Act.
Hindalco Industries Ltd. v. Labour Court, Varanasi & Anr., 2002 SCC (L&S) 187 : 2002 IV LLJ 837 :
2001 (9) SCC 178 (S.C.2J)
Learned counsel of the respondent workman submitted at the outset that the workman has crossed the
age of superannuation long back and therefore, no interference under Article 136 of the Constitution is
called for with the High Courts order granting relief to this workman. Learned counsel for the
respondent in all fairness did not dispute the fact that the provision of Section 25-J in the Industrial
Dispute Act, 1947 was overlooked by the High Court which makes it clear that the definition of
2700
Sec. 25J
retrenchment contained in the Central Act, i.e., Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 is to
be the basis for deciding the controversy in the present case. The definition of retrenchment contained
in Section 2(oo) clearly says that retrenchment does not include termination of the service of a workman
on the ground of continued ill health. It cannot be disputed that the unfitness of the respondent on
medical ground to function as a driver of a motor vehicle on account of failing eyesight could not
therefore, be treated as retrenchment to permit grant of the relief which the High Court has given to him. It
is necessary to say so for the purpose of correcting the conclusion reached by the High Court on this
question of law. (Page: 187, Para: 2)
.The High Court accepted the above finding of fact about the medical unfitness of the respondent
to function as driver of a motor vehicle, but placing reliance on the definition of retrenchment
contained in Section 2(s) of the U.P. Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 instead of the definition contained in
Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947, it has held that such a termination amounts to
retrenchment. Accordingly, the High Court has granted the relief of reinstatement with full back wages to
the respondent. This appeal by special leave is against that judgment (Page: 187, Para: 1)
Having said as above, we are inclined to accept the submission of learned counsel for the respondent that
the relief granted by way of payment already received by the respondent may not be set aside since he has
already crossed the age of superannuation on account of which the question of his continuance in service
does not arise. (Page: 188, Para: 3)
d) Sec. 25J does not grant compensation in addition to gratuity in the nature of
retrenchment compensation payable under a scheme (S.C.3J)
F 5A.1133 Construing proviso to Sec. 25J(1) it was held that provisions of the section was only
intended to ensure that compensation under any award is not reduced to the level provided u/s.
25F, and it was not the intention of the legislature that workmen on retrenchment should get
compensation twice, once under the Act and again also under the scheme in force providing for
compensation in the name of gratuity for retrenchment and Appellate Tribunals award granting
compensation twice was set aside and Tribunals order restored.
M/s. The Brahmachari Research Institute, Calcutta v. Their workmen, 1959 II LLJ 840 : 1959-60 (17)
FJR 282 : 1960 AIR (SC) 257 (S.C.3J)
.a proviso to sub-s. (1), which says that nothing contained in the Act shall have effect to derogate
from any right which a workman has under any award for the time being in operation or any contract with
the employer. This clearly means that if by any award or contract a workman is entitled to something
more as retrenchment compensation than is provided by S. 25F, the workman will be entitled to get that
and the provisions of S. 25F will not derogate from that right of the workman, i.e., will not reduce the
compensation provided under the award or contract to the level provided under S. 25F. It is obvious that it
was not the intention of the legislature that a workman on retrenchment should get compensation twice,
i.e., once under the Act and once under the scheme in force providing for retrenchment compensation, by
whatever name the payment might have been called. We cannot agree with the Appellate Tribunal that the
payment of gratuity in the event of retrenchment has nothing to do with the compensation payable to a
workman under S. 25F of the Act. The Appellate Tribunal seems to have been carried away by the word
gratuity used in the Award and it seems to think that gratuity on retrenchment is something different
from compensation on retrenchment. We are of opinion that this is not correct. Whether it is called
Sec. 25J
Applicability
2701
II. Applicability
a) Chapter VA applies to cases of retrenchment under A.P. Shops and
Establishment Act (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1135 By virtue of Sec. 25J(2) of Industrial Disputes Act 1947 u/s. 41(1) and (3) of Andhra
Pradesh Shop and Establishment Act 1966, Chapter V-A of Central Act will be applicable to decide
rights and liabilities arising out of retrenchment.
The Krishna Dist. Co-operative Marketing Society Ltd., Vijayawada, Petitioner v. N.V. Purnachandra
Rao & Anr., 1987 II LLJ 365 : 1987 (71) FJR 482 : 1987 (55) FLR 498 : 1987 II LLN 671 : 1987 LIC 1651
: 1987 AIR (SC) 1960 : 1987 (4) SCC 99 (S.C.2J)
We respectfully agree with the rule of construction expounded in the above passage. By enacting
Section 25J (2) Parliament, perhaps, intended that the rights and liabilities arising out of lay-off and
retrenchment should be uniform throughout India where the Central Act was in force and did not wish
that the States should have their own laws inconsistent with the Central law. If really the State Legislature
intended that it should have a law of its own regarding the rights and liabilities arising out of retrenchment
it would have expressly provided for it and submitted the Bill for the assent of the President. The State
Legislature has not done so in this case. Section 40 of the State Act deals with terminations of service
generally. In the above situation we cannot agree with the contention based on Article 254 (2) of the
Constitution since it is not made out that there is any implied repugnancy between the Central law and the
State law. (Page: 372, Para: 9)
.It is thus seen that Section 41 (1) and Section 41(3) of the State Act prescribed alternative
authorities to settle a dispute arising out of a retrenchment. Those authorities may exercise their
jurisdiction under the State Act but they have to decide such dispute in accordance with the provisions of
Chapter V-A. Sub-section (2) of Section 25J of the Central Act which makes the procedure for
securing relief under Section 41(1) and (3) of the State Act available to a workman emphasises that the
rights and liabilities arising out of retrenchment shall be decided in accordance with Chapter V-A of the
2702
Sec. 25J
Central Act. The said rights can be enforced by a workman personally by himself filing an appeal under
Section 41 (1) of the State Act. It is not necessary that a reference should be sought under the Central Act
by collective action of workers. The effect of Section 25J(2) of the Central Act.
(Page: 371, Para: 6)
d) Does not apply if termination is due to retirement as per Standing Orders (S.C.2J)
F 5A.1138 While employing canteen employees, letter of appointment and Standing Orders
inter-alia provided that service could be terminated by payment of one month wages to the
employee and all employees in statutory canteen are temporary employees, subsequently Clause
3A was introduced in standing orders fixing age of retirement at 60 years and maximum
permissible service at 15 years, the services of concerned workmen were relinquished on
completion of 15 years and it was held that termination is valid and not in violation of Sec. 25J since
chapter VA does not provide for the period of service of employees, hence Sec. 25J has no
application.
Harmohinder Singh v. Kharga Canteen, 2001 (99) FJR 416 : 2001 (90) FLR 548 : 2001 III LLN 715 :
2001 LIC 2391 : 2001 II CLR 927 : 2001 LLR 849 : 2001 SCC (5) 540 : 2001 AIR (SC) 2681 (S.C.2J)
Sec. 25J
2703
.The appellant was appointed as a salesman by the respondent canteen on 1st June, 1974 and
subsequently as a cashier on 9th August, 1975. The letter of appointment and the Standing Orders, inter
alia, provided that the service of the appellant could be terminated by one months notice by either party.
The Standing Orders also provided that the services of all canteen employees will be on temporary basis
extendable on six monthly basis. (Page: 418, Para: 1)
In 1988 Para 3-A was introduced in the Standing Orders of the respondent. It provided
a) Maximum age limit for an employee is 60 years.
b) Maximum permissible service for an employee is 15 years.
c) The service of an employee will be automatically relinquished based on completion of age limit or
maximum permissible service whichever occurs first.
d) One month pay and allowance will be given to the individual once his services are relinquished.
As the appellant had joined service in June, 1974 notice was issued to him on 15th May, 1989 to the effect
that his service would be relinquished (sic) with effect from 30th June, 1989 as he would complete 15
years of service. (Page: 418, Para: 2)
The Labour Court rejected the claim of the appellant and held that Para 3-A of the Standing Orders of the
respondent was binding on the appellant and the termination of the appellants service after the
contractual period was valid.The High Court dismissed the writ petition.
(Page: 419, Para: 3)
As far as Section 25J is concerned. There is no substantive provision in Chapter V-A of the Act
which pertains to the period of service of an employee. Consequently, Section 25J has no application at
all to the present case. We have already held that Paragraph 3-A of the Standing Orders of the respondent
was binding on the appellant and it is nobodys case that the termination was not in terms thereof.
(Page: 422, T.L.: 13)
2704
Sec. 25J
submission of learned Counsel for the appellant is accepted, Section 25-J (1) will have to be re-written by
introducting the additional words therein in any other part of this Act or before the words any other
law as mentioned therein. On the Express language of the said provisions, therefore, such an exercise is
contra-indicated and is totally impermissible. (Page: 397, Para: 13)
b) Lay-off compensation u/s. 25C to be given but not as per Standing Orders since
the Central Act prevails over Standing Orders (All.HC)
5A.1141 The High Court held that the workmen are entitled to only compensation as per the
provisions of Sec. 25C which has already been paid because Sec. 25J provides that Sec. 25C
supersedes the standing orders of the establishment.
British India Corporation, Ltd., Kanpur v. B.P. Singh, P.O. Labour Court, Kanpur, & Ors.,1964 I LLJ
601 : 1964 (8) FLR 256 (All.HC)
Sec. 25J
2705
c) Standing Orders providing for lesser lay-off compensation will not prevail
over the Central Act (S.C.CB)
F 5A.1142 Even though the Standing Orders of the company provide for lay-off due to fire etc.
and fix the quantum of compensation, the same cannot be invoked if the compensation is lesser
than that under the provision of Ch. V-A as the latter will prevail over the former by virtue of
Sec. 25J.
R.B. Bansilal Abirchand Mills Co. Pvt. Ltd. v. The Labour Court, Nagpur & Anr., etc., 1972 I LLJ 231 :
1972 (41) FJR 249 : 1972 (24) FLR 169 : 1972 LIC 285 : 1972 AIR (SC) 451 : 1972 (1) SCC 154 (S.C.CB)
The last point urged was that in view of standing Orders 19 and 21 the quantum of compensation had to
be scaled down or measured in terms of the Standing Orders. Under Standing Order 19 the employer
could, in the event of fire, breakdown of machinery etc. stop any machine or machines or department or
departments wholly or partially or the whole or a part of the establishment for any period, without notice
and without compensation in lieu of notice. Under standing Order 21, any operative played (sic) off under
Standing Order 19 was not to be considered as dismissed from service but as temporarily unemployed and
was not to be entitled to wages during such unemployment except to the extent mentioned in Standing
Order No. 19. The High Court rightly turned down the contention in view of S. 25-J of the Act under
which the provisions of Chapter V-A are to have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any other law including Standing Orders made under the Industrial Employment (Standing
Orders) Act, 1946. (Page: 239, Para: 27)
2706
Sec. 25J
e) Sec. 25F has overriding effect over REC (Railway Establishment Code)
provisions on retrenchment of railway workman (All.DB)
5A.1144 Termination of service of workman who was in employment of Railways for more
than a year amounts to retrenchment and provisions of Sec. 25F are applicable, overriding the
provisions of the Railway Establishment Code. Order of termination in contravention of Sec. 25F is
quashed.
Nand Lall v. The Union of India & Anr., 1978 LIC 1267 (All.DB)
Sec. 25J.Section. (Page: 1268, Para: 5)
From the.be quashed. (Page: 1269, Para: 6)
f) Benefits of Sec. 25F, 25G and 25H available to employees of shops and
establishments even after commencement of Punjab Shops & Commercial
Establishments Act (P&H.DB)
5A.1145 On a conjoint reading of Sec. 25J of Industrial Disputes Act and Sec. 33 of Punjab
Shops and Commercial Establishments Act 1958 it implies that benefits of Sec. 25F, 25G and 25H
will continue to be available to employees of shops and commercial establishment even after
commencement of 1958 Act.
Ram Sumer v. P.O. Industrial-cum-Labour Court-I, Faridabad & Ors., 1998 III LLJ 1151 : 1997 LIC
232 (P&H.DB)
.However1958 Act. (Page: 1157, Para: 16)
Sec. 25J
2707
Section 6-R (1) provides that the provisions from Ss. 6-J to 6-Q shall have effect notwithstanding
anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law (including Standing Orders) made under the
Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946.so, if the point raised by Mr. Setalvad had to
be decided solely by reference to the provisions of Ss. 6-K and 6-R, there would have been considerable
force in his argument. But the difficulty in accepting Mr. Setalvads argument is created by the provisions
of S. 25-J of the Central Act. (Page: 340, Para: 2)
It is thus clear that the last part of S. 25-J (2) categorically provides that the rights and liabilities of the
employers and workmen in relation to lay-off shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of
Ch. V-A of the Central Act. (Page: 340, Para: 3)
Once we reach this stage, we have to go the proviso to S. 25-J (1), and this proviso clearly and
unambiguously lays down, inter alia, that where under any Standing Orders, a workman is entitled to
benefits in respect of any matter covered by Ch. V-A which are more favourable to him than those to
which he would be entitled under this Act, he shall continue, to be entitled to the more favourable benefits
in respect of that matter, notwithstanding that he receives benefits in respect of other matters under this
Act. The position, therefore, is that S. 25-J (2) makes Chapter V-A of the Central Act applicable to
disputes in relation to compensation for lay-off, notwithstanding Ss. 6-K and 6-R of the U. P. Act; and
amongst the provisions thus made applicable by S. 25-J(2) is the proviso to S. 25-J(1) under which the
Standing Orders which give more favourable benefits to the employees in respect of compensation for
lay-off, will prevail over the provisions of the Central Act. (Page: 340/341, Para: 5)
b) Wages under Minimum Wages Act to be granted but not those fixed under an
award since the wages under the latter are lower (Cal.HC)
5A.1147 Because of Sec. 25J(1) of the Industrial Dispute Act, the rate of minimum wages fixed
under the provisions of the Minimum Wages Act will prevail over the rate of wages fixed under an
award passed by the Industrial Tribunal under the Industrial Dispute Act in the case when the
latter rates gof wages are lower than the rates fixed under the provisions of Minimum Wages Act,
even during the period during which the award is in force.
Shib Prasad Ghosh v. District Judge, 24-Parganas (Authority under the Minimum Wages Act) 1963 II
LLJ 184 (Cal.HC)
2708
Sec. 25J
VI. Rights and liabilities of employers and workmen relating to lay-off and
retrenchment compensation to be as per Chapter VA
a) Agreement between employer and employees not to be dehors the provisions of
Chapter VA (Mad.HC)
5A.1148 Sec. 25J(2) makes it clear that the provisions of Chapter VA ought to and will prevail
when the question relating to lay-off or retrenchment compensation payable by an employer arises.
The mandate is imperative and it imports an implied avoidance of any arrangement outside the
provisions of that chapter between the employer and the workmen. Therefore it cannot be
contended that an agreement de hors the provisions of the Act can be pressed into service in a claim
u/s. 33C(2) for lay- off compensation. Also held that the agreement referred only to badli workmen
but not to permanent workmen.
Sree Rajendra Mills Ltd. v. Labour Court, Coimbatore & Ors., 1970 (37) FJR 249 : 1970 (21) FLR 94
(Mad.HC)