6.18 Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

KCP-GNS-SHE-DPR-0001
Revision: 02
Project Title:
Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project
Page 1 of 8
Document Title: Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy
Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy
Table of Contents
1
SCOPE AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...................................... 2

1.1
1.2
ASSUMPTIONS ....................................................................................... 4
2.1
2.2
2.3
SCOPE OF DOCUMENT .................................................................................. 2

PIPELINE & OFFSHORE FACILITY .................................................................... 2
HYDRAULIC ACTUATED VALVES ..................................................................... 4

EMERGENCY ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT ........................................................... 4
REMOTE OPERABILITY................................................................................... 4
DESIGN REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................... 5

3.1
3.2
OBJECTIVES OF THE ESD SYSTEM................................................................. 5

SHUTDOWN HIERARCHY - OFFSHORE............................................................. 6
3.2.1
3.2.2
3.2.3
3.3
3.4
Total Platform Shutdown (TPS) ......................................................................... 6

Surface Process Shutdown (SPS) ..................................................................... 6
Process/Utility Unit Shutdown ........................................................................... 6
CLASSIFICATION OF SAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTIONS ................................ 6

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTIONS............................... 7
MANDATORY REFERENCES ................................................................. 8
PROJECT REFERENCES ....................................................................... 8
Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

The information contained in this document (the Information) is provided in good faith.
E.ON UK plc, its subcontractors, subsidiaries, affiliates, employees, advisers, and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) make no
representation or warranty as to the accuracy, reliability or completeness of the Information and neither E.ON UK plc nor any of its subcontractors,
subsidiaries, affiliates, employees, advisers or DECC shall have any liability whatsoever for any direct or indirect loss howsoever arising from the use of the
Information by any party.
Revision: 02
Project Title:
Page 2 of 8
1 SCOPE AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

1.1
Scope of Document
This document has been produced to outline the philosophy for the
emergency shutdown system which shall be installed to protect personnel,
asset and the environment from hazards associated with the operation of the
pipeline and offshore facility part of the Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage
Project. This will also involve any onshore pipeline emergency shutdown
requirements.
1.2
Pipeline & Offshore Facility
The offshore project consists of a circa 270 km dry CO2 pipeline from
Kingsnorth Power Station on the Isle of Grain to a new Offshore Normally
Unmanned Installation (NUI) to utilise the depleted Hewett gas reservoir.
Note: The offshore project boundary starts at the exit of the compressor and
includes the onshore metering and pig launcher.
Figure 1-1: Outline System Schematic

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The offshore project shall study two cases as follows:

The base case of a single platform, which is rated to handle the CO 2 that
is flowing in the pipeline when in the gaseous phase of the CO2 phase
envelope and then is to be upgradeable to cope with the dense phase
operation. This base case option has a well capacity for 4 wells (one
spare) and has a CO2 handling capacity of 6600 tonnes/day equivalent to
what is produced when generating 400 MW (gross);
An alternative case with enough capacity to handle 12 wells and is able to
cope with an additional dense phase processing module that is suitable to
handle the CO2 produced from a 1600 MW (gross) onshore power plant
(26,400 tonnes/day).

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2 ASSUMPTIONS
The offshore Emergency Shutdown (ESD) system architecture will be
consistent with its Integrity Level classification. There is an opportunity to
have an offshore integrated control and safety system. Integrated in terms of
peripheral devices and supplied by one vendor with segregated safety and
control hardware.
The ESD system manufacturer should be the same as for the onshore carbon
capture part of the Project. This will offer continuity between onshore and
offshore plant.
2.1 Hydraulic Actuated Valves
It is recommended offshore actuated spring return valves are supplied by
hydraulic motive power. This will keep the actuator weight and size to a
minimum. Valve closure times shall account for potential of water hammer in
dense phase operation.
2.2 Emergency Electrical Equipment
Typical offshore emergency electrical equipment to remain operational during
an emergency are as listed below:
Emergency/Escape/Helideck Lighting;
Emergency Communications;
Platform Control System including Pipeline Integrity System;
ESD System;
Fire and Gas System;
Public Address and General Alarm System;
Navaids and markings;
Temporary Safe Refuge (TSR)/Equipment Room Ventilation (HVAC)
Systems fed from the emergency switchboard.
Emergency electrical equipment will normally be supplied from the emergency
generator. Selected items will have an Uninterruptible Power Supply.
2.3
Remote Operability
The NUI will require a remote trip from Kingsnorth Power Station and a local
offshore trip used while the facility is manned.
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3 DESIGN REQUIREMENTS
3.1
Objectives of the ESD System
The objectives of the ESD system are to shutdown the pipeline and injection
facilities to:
Protect the facility personnel;
Protect the environment;
Protect the plant and equipment on the facility.
The ESD system objectives shall be met by:
Provision of self acting mechanical devices or systems where appropriate;
Automatically sensing an abnormal facility operational or equipment
condition. Note Safeguarding interfaces for - heater failure; power failure;
inadvertent valve opening; blocked outlet and intertrips between onshore and
offshore needs to be confirmed by a separate study;
Automatically reacting to these conditions by shutting down ESD valves,

wellhead valves and/or isolating where appropriate. Note - automatic CO2
sectionalised depressurising onshore and offshore needs to be confirmed by a
separate study;
Providing additional manual facilities for shutdown and/or isolation of the

facility;
Intertrip from Fire & Gas system detecting potential sources of hazard
such as toxic or flammable gas and eliminating potential sources of
ignition. Note Mitigation systems for toxic CO2 gas release; fuel gas release
(alternative heating source);
Providing audible and visual shutdown status information to the operators

both onshore and offshore and raise General Platform Alarm at all
potentially manned offshore locations.
The system as a minimum will meet the objectives described above. The ESD
system functionality shall be typically determined from the following
preliminary reviews:
Hazardous Identification/Operability Studies;
Cause and Effects diagrams;
Desktop Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Review.
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3.2
Shutdown Hierarchy - Offshore
The Shutdown Hierarchy shall be based on the following three generic levels
of Shutdown; presented in descending order of priority:
3.2.1
Total Platform Shutdown (TPS)
TPS is defined as the total isolation of the platform from external sources of
process gas and deactivation of all process and non-essential utility systems.
It is only initiated manually from dedicated push-buttons locally or from
onshore Kingsnorth Power Station.
3.2.2
Surface Process Shutdown (SPS)
SPS is defined as the shutdown of all process systems and initiation of

emergency depressurising (EDP), but leaving utility systems, including power
generation operational.
3.2.3
Process/Utility Unit Shutdown
Unit Shutdown is defined as the tripping of individual process or utility

systems or subsystems, initiated automatically and through operator action.
3.3
Classification of Safety Instrumented Functions
To enable optimisation of loop design and testing strategy, each shutdown

function should be classified using a risk-based approach. This is achieved by
subjecting all required Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) to an integrity
level classification, to analyse the consequences of failure of that particular
function upon demand, in terms of risk to personnel safety, potential asset
loss, and effect on the environment. From this classification, Safety Integrity
Level (SIL), Environmental Integrity Level (EIL) and Commercial Integrity
Level (CIL) should be assigned to each function. Design of the function should
optimise the combination of hardware, software and test interval to achieve
the Probability of Failure on Demand prescribed by the highest of the SIL, EIL
or CIL.
For example, the integrity levels in BS EN 61508-1 Functional safety of
electrical/electronic/programmable electronic safety related systems are
classified as SIL 1, 2, 3 & 4. Following this standard will generally identify that
a SIF does not need to be assigned a SIL rating or where it does it will fall into
the category of SIL 1, 2, 3 or 4.

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The ESD system shall be designed to implement its Integrity Level

classification. It is also equally important for it to be operated, maintained and
modified in such a way as to continue to meet the safety intent whilst in
service.
3.4
Implementation of Safety Instrumented Functions
The adoption of a failsafe principle de-energise to trip shall apply to all final
actuating devices and the ESD system. Shutdowns shall de-energise solenoid
valves, trip motors, heaters etc, resulting in closure of spring return ESD
valves or de-energising of motor, thyristor circuits.
Dependent upon the choice of manufacturer, it may be possible to purchase
an integrated control, ESD, and Fire & Gas system compatible with the
onshore carbon capture systems.
The control, ESD, and Fire & Gas functionality will be segregated for reasons
of independence and differing integrity requirements. An integrated system
i.e. from one system vendor would give common peripheral components in
the communications, reporting, logging, operator interface areas and one
maintenance contract.
The ESD shall be provided with a reliable Uninterruptible Power Supply which
will be available for the period required to manage the emergency.

Revision: 02
Project Title:
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4 MANDATORY REFERENCES
UK Statutory Instruments, Codes and Standards
SI 2005/3117
SI 1995/743
SI 1996/913
BS EN 61508
BS EN 61511
API RP-14C
Offshore Installations (Safety Case)

Regulations.
The Prevention of Fire and Explosion and
Emergency Response Regulations
(PFEER)
Offshore Installations and Wells (Design
and Construction, etc) Regulations (DCR)
Functional Safety of
Electrical/Electronic/Programmable
Electronic Safety-Related Systems
Functional Safety Safety Instrumented
Systems for the Process Industry Sector
Safety Systems for Offshore Production
Platforms
5 PROJECT REFERENCES
1. Genesis Report No. KCP-GNS-PCD-STU-0001 Rev 03 Kingsnorth
Carbon Capture & Storage Project Basis Of Design For Studies
Phase 1A
2. Genesis Drawing No. KCP-GNS-PCD-PFD-0003 Rev 01 - Kingsnorth
Carbon Capture & Storage Project PFD Offshore & Transport System
CO2 Process System Demo Phase (Base Case)
3. Genesis Drawing No. KCP-GNS-PCD-PFD-0004 Rev A1 - Kingsnorth
Carbon Capture & Storage Project PFD Offshore & Transport System
CO2 Process System Full Flow Scenario


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KCP-GNS-SHE-DPR-0001

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Document Title: Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

SCOPE AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS ...................................... 2

SCOPE OF DOCUMENT .................................................................................. 2

HYDRAULIC ACTUATED VALVES ..................................................................... 4

DESIGN REQUIREMENTS ...................................................................... 5

OBJECTIVES OF THE ESD SYSTEM................................................................. 5

Total Platform Shutdown (TPS) ......................................................................... 6

CLASSIFICATION OF SAFETY INSTRUMENTED FUNCTIONS ................................ 6

MANDATORY REFERENCES ................................................................. 8

PROJECT REFERENCES ....................................................................... 8

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Document Title: Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

1 SCOPE AND FUNCTIONAL REQUIREMENTS

Pipeline & Offshore Facility

Figure 1-1: Outline System Schematic

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Document Title: Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

The offshore project shall study two cases as follows:

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Document Title: Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Document Title: Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

Objectives of the ESD System

Automatically reacting to these conditions by shutting down ESD valves,

Providing additional manual facilities for shutdown and/or isolation of the

Providing audible and visual shutdown status information to the operators

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Document Title: Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

Shutdown Hierarchy - Offshore

Total Platform Shutdown (TPS)

Surface Process Shutdown (SPS)

SPS is defined as the shutdown of all process systems and initiation of

Process/Utility Unit Shutdown

Unit Shutdown is defined as the tripping of individual process or utility

Classification of Safety Instrumented Functions

To enable optimisation of loop design and testing strategy, each shutdown

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Document Title: Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

The ESD system shall be designed to implement its Integrity Level

Implementation of Safety Instrumented Functions

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

Kingsnorth Carbon Capture & Storage Project

Document Title: Offshore Emergency Shutdown System Design Philosophy

Offshore Installations (Safety Case)

Kingsnorth CCS Demonstration Project

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