WATER SYSTEM SEISMIC RESILIENCE AND

SUSTAINABILITY PROGRAM
Summary Report

September 26, 2014

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the request of Los Angeles City Mayor Eric Garcetti and USGS Seismologist Dr. Lucy Jones,
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (LADWP) Water System initiated the
development of a Seismic Resilience and Sustainability Program (Program). The Program
development started in April 2014 with a target to provide a summary report with initial
recommendations in September 2014. Program development is being accomplished through a
management team effort investigating three requisites: (1) defining characteristics of a
seismically resilient Los Angeles Water System, (2) identifying the current status of Water
System seismic resilience, and (3) recognizing aspects which may improve Water System
seismic resilience. To proceed with the Program six initial recommendations are identified as
follows:

• Establish an LADWP-wide Resilience Task Force to oversee and provide resources to

lead, support and ensure accomplishment of the Program.
• Prepare a plan for implementing the Program.
• Implement Water System seismic planning, evaluation, and monitoring to identify needed
mitigations throughout the City and along the Los Angeles Aqueducts (LAA).
• Develop a seismically resilient pipe network.
• Increase water supply and storage reliability, including
o Identify mitigation alternatives for LAA crossing the San Andreas Fault.
o Enhance the Dam Safety Program using risk-based methods.
o Identify alternative water supply sources for firefighting.
o Develop local supply sources to reduce dependence on imported water and
enhance water availability in emergencies.
• Enhance emergency response capabilities.

The Program requires a $12 to $15 billion investment over 20 years or more. Some portion of
this amount is included in or incremental to existing planned and budgeted infrastructure
investments and development of local, sustainable sources of supply.

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 INTRODUCTION

Los Angeles City Mayor Eric Garcetti established a 1-year partnership in 2014 between his
administration and United States Geologic Survey (USGS) seismologist Dr. Lucy Jones to
develop earthquake resilient strategies for Los Angeles by focusing on three main components:
water, communication, and building structures. The Los Angeles Department of Water and
Power (LADWP) Water System (Water System) is supporting the water component. The main
focus for the water component is creating a seismically resilient and sustainable Water System.

The Water System Seismic Resilience and Sustainability Program (Program) purpose is to
continually improve the Water System seismic resilience in a manner that ensures its
sustainability and improves the resilience and sustainability of Los Angeles. Appendix A
summarizes the Program development process. The initial Program development effort is viewed
as kicking off a process of continuous seismic improvement over the long term. This is not
viewed as a project with a definite end date, but instead as an effort to make the implementation
of resilience activities a standard of practice.

At the request of Dr. Jones and Deputy Mayor Eileen Decker, the Program development initiated
in April, 2014 to address, at minimum, resilience as related to the following four primary topics:

1. Water supply infrastructure

2. Resilient piping network
3. Firefighting water supply
4. Local water supply sources

The interrelationship between resilience and sustainability for water supply was recognized early
in the Program development, resulting in a resilience and sustainability Program.

This summary report reviews Water System resiliency and sustainability then provides brief
descriptions supporting recommendations and potential tasks which may be implemented to
accomplish the recommendations. Appendix B outlines the summary recommendations and
potential tasks. A more extensive report is planned to be completed in the near future. Even
though the current focus is on seismic resilience, the management team foresees the Program
evolving to incorporate more than just earthquake hazards. As a result, many aspects of this
Program extend beyond seismic issues.

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 RESILIENCY AND SUSTAINABILITY

Seismic resiliency and sustainability are achievable when the Water System:

• Has the systemic ability to provide water services in a manner allowing the
community to effectively respond to earthquake events, recover quickly from them,
and adapt to changing conditions, while also taking measures to reduce future
seismic risks, and
• Is prepared to manage all threatening seismic hazards in a manner that minimizes
and contains the hazard impacts while continuing a comprehensive approach to
natural resource conservation and maintaining environmental quality.

To understand the inter-relation between resilience and sustainability following a significant

natural hazard attack such as an earthquake, Figure 1 shows different possible trajectories of
economic activity recovery. When a damaging earthquake strikes there is an immediate drop in
economic activity. Resilience is measured by the amount of economic loss and the time it takes
to recover. There are several possible trajectories the economic activity may take over time. For
a fixed initial loss, the shorter the recovery duration the more resilient is the economy. The event
is considered a disaster when recovery takes several years (upper curve in Figure 1). A more
rapid recovery is considered a disruption. In great earthquakes, economic activity may not
recover for several decades resulting in a catastrophe (Jones et al., 2008, page 14). In some cases
the economy remains functional but has a permanent long-term reduction compared to the pre-
event levels. This condition shows a limited resilience because there is not complete recovery to
pre-event conditions and the economy is understood to be partially unsustainable to the
earthquake hazard. In the greatest extreme the economic activity may never recover, continuing
to decline and disabling a safe and equitable lifestyle for city residents (lower curve in Figure 1).
In such a case, the economy is not resilient or sustainable (this trajectory is for descriptive
purposes and not anticipated for Los Angeles).

Figure 1. Economic resilience; trajectories of possible economic recovery.

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The Water System’s resilience is dependent upon the amount of service losses suffered as a
consequence of the event and the time required to reestablish the services. In a disaster situation
water services may be disrupted and their recoveries are described by five basic categories
(Davis et al., 2012):

Water Delivery: This service is achieved when the system is able to distribute water to
customers, but the water delivered may not meet quality standards (requires water purification
notice), pre-event volumes (requires water rationing), fire flow requirements (impacting
firefighting capabilities), or pre-event functionality (inhibiting system operations).

Water Quality: This service is achieved when water quality at customer connections meets pre-
event standards. Potable water meets health standards (water purification notices removed),
including minimum pressure requirements to ensure contaminants do not leach into the system.

Water Quantity: This service is achieved when water flow to customers meets pre-event volumes
(water rationing removed).

Fire Protection: This service is achieved when the system is able to provide pressure and flow of
a suitable magnitude and duration to fight fires.

Functionality: This service is achieved when the system functions are performed at pre-event
reliability, including pressure (operational constraints resulting from the earthquake are
removed/resolved).

Each of these services can have an immediate loss and a recovery trajectory similar to that shown
for the economy in Figure 1, including partial unsustainability. The goal of a resilient Water
System is to limit the total number of service losses and restore all of the categories as rapidly as
possible while protecting property, life safety, and the regional social and economic stability.

These services are best understood through example of Water System performance during and
after the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. Figure 2 shows the 1994 earthquake service losses and
restoration times. Total water system repair costs reached $41 million. The most significant
water losses were in the highly residential San Fernando Valley impacting water services to an
estimated 850,000 people, 670,000 of which lost water delivery for some period of time.

The water delivery service dropped to about 78%, with 22% of all Los Angeles customers
receiving no water shortly after the earthquake due to water leaking from broken pipes. The
quantity and fire protection services dropped to a low of about 72% on January 17, 1994. The
quality service dropped immediately to zero because a boil water notice was issued across the
entire city within 3 hours after the earthquake. As shown in Figure 2, the water delivery service
was restored to 100% at about 7 days, quantity and fire services at about 8.5 to 9 days, and

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quality service at 12 days after the earthquake. The functionality service initially dropped to
about 34% and rapidly increased to about 60% once critical repairs were completed a few days
after the earthquake and was 95% restored within 3 years. It took 6 years to return Functionality
to 99% after completing a number of tank and reservoir repairs and replacements. Functionality
was completely restored at about 9 years after completing the Granada Trunk Line Relocation
and because of limited ability to remove the aqueduct channels from service to complete their
repairs.

Figure 2. Los Angeles Water System service restorations following the 1994 Northridge
Earthquake.

Overall, the Water System is considered to have been highly resilient to the Northridge
Earthquake because it was able to restore system operability within a relatively short period of
time. Likewise, the Los Angeles economic system was also resilient to the Northridge
Earthquake, resembling something like the upper curve in Figure 1. However, if the earthquake
were larger or located elsewhere around the City the performance would have been different.
The Water System will perform differently to different earthquakes based on shaking severity
and locations of different vulnerabilities within the network. For example, Figure 3 shows results
from simulated Water System performance subjected to a magnitude 7.8 earthquake on the
southern San Andreas Fault. This earthquake scenario was developed for the 2008 ShakeOut
event by a group of experts working with the USGS, and allows for independent assessment on
how the Water System may perform in a great San Andreas Earthquake event.

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 Delivery Fire
100 Normal Service Level
H I
Quality

ShakeOut Scenario Event

Los Angeles Water Service (%)

80
A Quantity
30% Rationing (11 months)
G

60

F
50% Rationing (3 months)
C
40
B
A. Immediately after event
B. 1-day after event, decline from pipe leaks
E Functionality C. 2-days after event, open emergency storage reservoirs
20 D D. Flow declines for 1-week due to pipe leaks and fire fighting demand
E. 1 to 4-weeks: improved from pipe repairs and ground water pumping
F. 1-month: Regional supplies are delivered
G. 4-months: California Aqueduct West Branch returned to service
H. 15-months: Colorado RiverAqueduct returned to service
I. 18-months: Los Angeles Aqueducts returned to service
0
-1 t0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17

Time (months)

Figure 3. Service restoration for the Los Angeles Water System following the ShakeOut Scenario
earthquake, based on analyses presented by Davis and O’Rourke (2011).

Figure 4 maps the ShakeOut Scenario and shows the major water supply aqueducts crossing the
San Andreas Fault. In the ShakeOut Scenario the San Andreas Fault damages the Los Angeles
Aqueducts (LAA), Colorado River Aqueduct (CRA), and California Aqueduct in a single
rupture. As a result, in a matter of minutes all imported water is lost to Los Angeles and it may
take over one year to return these aqueduct systems to operation (Davis, 2010). In addition, the
transmission and distribution systems suffer significant damage.

The Shakeout Scenario has greater impact on all services as compared to the 1994 Northridge
Earthquake, mostly because the San Andreas fault rupture has a regional impact while the
Northridge Earthquake had a local impact to a portion of the Water System. Water delivery,
quantity, and fire protection services drop to about 20% soon after the earthquake and water
quality services are temporarily lost to all customers. Water delivery service is completely
restored in about 3 weeks, fire protection service is restored in about 4 weeks, and water quality
restored in about 7 weeks. Of great significance is the long quantity service restoration due to the
need for long-term water rationing resulting from the water supply aqueduct damages. Water
quantity services may not be restored for at least 15 months in this scenario. Functionality
service initially drops to 16% and may take decades to restore, leaving the system more
vulnerable during this timeframe.

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Figure 4. ShakeOut Scenario showing ground shaking intensity and fault rupture crossing the
major water supply aqueducts.

The Water System is obviously less resilient to the San Andreas Earthquake scenario than it was
to the 1994 Northridge Earthquake. Water service losses from a San Andreas event result in
significant community impacts. Economic impacts include about $53 billion in direct and
indirect economic losses throughout Southern California as a result of water loss alone, which is
about 25% of the total $213.3 billion estimated losses to this event (Jones, et al., 2008). Business
interruption from water loss is greater than 50% of the total business interruption losses for the
entire event. This gross loss in output from water alone is sufficient to drive the region into a
recession. Fire following earthquake results in significant social impacts having an estimated
economic loss of about $87 billion, a large portion of this is within the City of Los Angeles.
Considering the relation between fire and water service losses, the earthquake effects on the
Water System has the greatest impact of all aspects considered in the ShakeOut Scenario. If
unmitigated, the initial recession fostered by Water System losses could build toward a regional
economic catastrophe (Jones, et al., 2008) as defined in Figure 1. Further, it is unclear if some
sectors in the City highly dependent upon water would be partially unsustainable. To achieve the
Program goal, the water service losses and restoration times for the ShakeOut Scenario need to
shift up and toward the left in Figure 3. The target acceptable losses and restoration time, as well
as strategies to shift these curves, needs to be determined as part of the Program.

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Figure 5. Earthquake faults around the City and along the Los Angeles Aqueducts.

The Water System can reduce the social impacts and economic downturn following earthquakes
through targeted cost-effective risk reduction measures. The Program should aim to remove the
potential for Water System related economic catastrophe or partially unsustainable conditions.
This is a critical and significant undertaking based on the number of potential earthquakes and
the possible consequences. Figure 5 shows the many earthquake faults around the City and along
the LAA threating the Water System’s ability to provide safe and reliable service. The Program
will evaluate expected performance in future plausible earthquake scenarios on these faults.

A seismically resilient and sustainable Water System is achievable through:

• An organization capable of managing the planning and implementation of seismic

resilience activities,
• Creating a seismically resilient pipe network,
• Increasing water supply reliability, and
• Ability to effectively respond after earthquakes followed by recovering and rebuilding to
meet intended performance.
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The Water System must put these resilience characteristics into action to secure a safe and
reliable water supply against the threatening earthquake hazards and help protect the social and
economic vitality of Los Angeles.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Establish an LADWP-wide Resilience Task Force to oversee and provide resources to lead,
support and ensure accomplishment of the Seismic Resilience and Sustainability Program.

Encouraged. The Water System strongly supports developing the Program and making
implementation of resilience activities a standard of practice. In fact, the Water System
continually strives to improve seismic resilience, as evidenced by recent activities in pursuing
innovative seismic solutions including the earthquake-resistant ductile-iron pipe pilot project,
Terminal Hill Tunnel, and high density polyethylene pipe installation at Elizabeth Tunnel.
Recent trends in facility designs have incorporated important resilience aspects, exemplified for
the Headworks Reservoirs as described in the following paragraph. This “Resilience by Design”
should be incorporated into all aspects of the Program. The Program development is an extension
of ongoing resilience activities allowing the Water System to improve the management and
coordination of all seismically related activities, including system planning, design, construction,
operations, and maintenance. The Resilience by Design concept is applicable to all parts of
Water System business from redesigning the entire system for resilient performance to ensuring
the system operation and maintenance incorporates resilience activities. This not only allows a
continued increase in ability to provide water following an earthquake but also provides
improved focus ensuring customers also increase their resilience and reducing overall economic
impacts.

The Headworks East and West Reservoirs (currently in construction and design,
respectively) provide good examples on how to incorporate Resilience by Design. A
number of resilience activities are incorporated for these reservoirs. Computer
simulations of seismic motions and effects on the buried reservoir structures were made
to ensure they will be operable following expected earthquakes. Physical modeling was
undertaken to improve knowledge on the buried reservoirs expected seismic
performance. The project team developed a new methodology to evaluate liquefaction
potential for on-site soils containing gravels and cobbles (now being used at other critical
dam sites). Foundation improvements are implemented to prevent liquefaction and
differential settlement problems. Special seismic designs for inlet and outlet pipes are
incorporated to accommodate seismic induced differential ground settlements across the
reservoir and connections to the reservoirs. Seismic instrumentation to measure ground
motions, water sloshing, and dynamic soil pressures are being installed to monitor actual
earthquake performance. These resilience measures and other design aspects are being
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 overseen by a Technical Review and Advisory Panel made up of professional structural,
geotechnical, and lifeline engineering experts. These and other resilience aspects of the
design and construction are undertaken to ensure limited damage during an earthquake,
and to allow rapid restoration if damage does occur.

Resilience Management. The Water System holds high value in seismic performance and
emergency response capabilities; seismic risk reduction is ingrained into the working culture.
LADWP has several models for safety, expert board of consultants, and value engineering
wherein direction and oversight of systems and projects is provided. Water System resilience can
be improved by designating and appointing similar resilience oversight in the form of a
Resilience Task Force. After the Program is established to implement the previously explained
Resilience by Design concepts, the Resilience Task Force will meet periodically to review
specific projects for seismic integrity and conformance with the Program and review the success
of the Program implementation. The Program planning, development, and implementation must
have resilience management authority and resources to ensure accomplishment of all seismically
related activities in a coordinated manner. A manager needs to be assigned to coordinate and
represent the Resilience Task Force to senior management, as well as with other City
departments, external agencies, and communities within Los Angeles. Resilience management
covers topics related to pre-event planning, mitigation alternatives, emergency response, post-
earthquake recovery, and reconstruction as described in this report.

Synergy and Focus. Many times the activities and actions undertaken to improve system
capabilities are leveraged to improve seismic performance, and seismic related activities are
generally enacted to improve performance against other hazards. This Program provides an
opportunity to evaluate the Water System to ensure the seismic resilience, water quality, water
supply, and infrastructure improvement programs can all be achieved in a cost-effective and
coordinated manner. In this way, system changes for any program can help enhance
improvements for other programs. Placing a high level focus on seismic resilience sends a clear
message to the entire organization on the importance to make resilience thinking and activities a
standard of practice at the LADWP. Furthermore, it will help generate a work environment
where groups throughout the organization can begin to understand how the Water System may
perform in numerous possible earthquake scenarios which may impact the system and the core
technical capabilities necessary to accomplish a successful Program.

Prepare a plan for implementing a Water System Seismic Resilience and Sustainability
Program.

Stakeholder Involvement. To implement an effective Program, all stakeholders need to be aware

of the Program and implementation plans. Water System resilience can be improved by creating
a plan for implementing the proposed Program. The plan should include expected costs and
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potential funding sources, benefits for implementing, needed resources, risks, priority projects
and timeframe for implementing, and how the activities improve Water System resilience to
earthquakes and other hazards. The plan should also identify how to focus on the next highest
risk items as aspects within the Program are accomplished and how to continually maintain a
focus on resilience as a cost effective means for supporting the community well-being. The
Program plan development process is encouraged to proceed in a cooperative and engaging
manner with stakeholders to keep them informed and obtain their input for creating the plan.
Stakeholders include, but are not limited to, City leaders, Neighborhood Councils, other
community stakeholder groups, essential service providers (e.g., hospitals and other medical
facilities), Fire Department, Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, and Los Angeles
City residents and businesses.

Continued Learning and Advancement. The Water System endeavors to continually learn from
earthquakes and other disastrous events across the country and around the world. Staff engages
with the international community in post-earthquake investigations for the purpose of learning
how the Water System can improve operations. Other information is passed through educational
seminars, professional organizations, or workshops. The Water System participates in, and at
times holds, specialized earthquake workshops with other water utilities around the world. As a
member of the Caltech Earthquake Research Affiliates the Water System has access to some of
the world’s experts and takes advantage of learning opportunities by attending semi-annual
seminars and face-to-face meetings. The Water System also actively engages in cost-effective
seismic related research and development activities with major universities. Investigations are
commonly undertaken to identify the usefulness of different materials, products, and
technologies for seismic improvements. These types of activities are extremely beneficial to staff
development and ensuring the Program will be successful, and should be maintained and
expanded whenever possible.

Implement Water System seismic planning, evaluation, and monitoring to identify needed
mitigations throughout the City and along the Los Angeles Aqueducts (LAA).

Comprehensive Approach. As shown in Figure 5, the Water System has many seismic threats
which can disrupt operations. State-of-the-practice procedures are utilized to assess the seismic
related hazards, and when necessary, more advanced procedures are utilized and at times
developed by the LADWP to ensure proper hazard evaluation to meet Water System needs. The
types of seismic related hazards which can damage the system are generally known, and are
addressed on a case by case basis for different components within the system. Water System
resilience can be improved with comprehensive seismic system planning, evaluation, and
monitoring to identify mitigations to implement throughout the City and along the LAA to meet
defined performance objectives.

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Performance Objectives. The Water System meets performance objectives for normal operations
in accordance with requirements of the California Department of Water Resources Division of
Safety of Dams (DSOD), the State Water Resources Control Board Division of Drinking Water,
as well as applicable codes and standards to provide safe and reliable water to all customers.
Water System resilience can be improved by developing seismic performance objectives
protecting public health to the greatest extent possible, with stakeholder input, targeting how the
system should perform during defined earthquakes, levels of acceptable service losses, and
service restoration times. This would entail defining target limits on curves like those shown in
Figures 2 and 3 along both axes. Additionally, resilience can be further improved by establishing
design criteria consistent with meeting the established performance criteria and ensuring all
standards, guidelines and goals are consistent with the performance objectives. Preliminary
performance criteria have recently been proposed for an LAA seismic evaluation, which can be
used as a starting point for developing more comprehensive system-wide objectives.

Earthquake Scenario Simulations. Numerous faults shown in Figure 5 and potential earthquake
scenario events may impact the City or the LAA. The Water System has actively engaged in
developing scenario events of importance. Of the scenarios developed for Los Angeles, the
ShakeOut Scenario in Figure 4, has proven to be of great value for studying the potential impacts
the Water System needs to prepare for, particularly in relation to water supply (Davis, 2010;
Davis and O’Rourke, 2011). Over the past decade the Water System worked with Cornell
University to develop a computer program for damaged network flow modeling called
Geographical Iterative Response Analysis for Flow Following Earthquakes (GIRAFFE).
GIRAFFE was used by Cornell University to perform a preliminary assessment on City-wide
impacts from the ShakeOut Scenario as shown in Figure 6 (Davis and O’Rourke, 2011). This
scenario assessment has been useful for identifying system vulnerabilities, potential service
outages, and illustrating disaster-related issues the Water System may have to deal with when a
regional San Andreas Earthquake strikes. Some lessons learned by scenario evaluation include
potential extended loss of imported water from all aqueducts, potential loss of water (shown in
Figure 6) to large numbers of customers and in areas vulnerable to fire following earthquake
Scawthorn (2008), need to address material stockpiles to enable system repairs, and the
widespread impact water loss has on the regional economy. Working through this scenario shows
how the Water System resilience is not independent from the rest of Southern California’s
resilience. Water System resilience can be improved by continuing to implement lessons learned
from scenario evaluations. It is less impactful to the community and easier to identify how to
manage Water System seismic performance using computer simulations than it is to wait for
problems to be revealed from actual earthquakes.

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Figure 6. Plot of the major transmission pipelines in Los Angeles indicating system flow state
and unsatisfied demands (areas without water delivery or quantity services) for: (a) 0 and (b) 24
hours after the ShakeOut Scenario earthquake (Davis and O’Rourke, 2011).

System Seismic Evaluations. Many other earthquake scenarios can be prepared to better
understand the impacts on the Water System. Water System resilience can be improved by
preparing and analyzing specific plausible earthquake scenarios similar to that shown in Figure 6
and preparing plans useful for improving performance and responding to such scenarios. In
doing so a set of procedures should be developed and utilized to consistently quantify the
hazards across the Water System. With a better understanding of earthquake impacts, the system
post-earthquake hydraulic performance can be better estimated, allowing for forecasting of
service outage and restoration times similar to those shown in Figure 3. Areas of potential
pressure and water flow loss should further be evaluated relative to the fire following earthquake
hazards, including the urban-wild land interface. These forecasts can be used to estimate the
social and economic impacts from Water System earthquake damages to help determine cost-
effective mitigation options. A better understanding of the fire following earthquake hazard is
needed in Los Angeles for this threat to be properly addressed. Additionally, continued
improvements to the GIRAFFE computer program will increase capabilities for performing
system seismic evaluations and decision making for mitigations and emergency response.

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Prioritizing Mitigations. Numerous priority seismic mitigation projects have been undertaken by
the Water System in the past and several seismic improvement projects are currently part of the
Capital Improvement Program (CIP). The Water System consistently pursues priority seismic
improvements to mitigate known vulnerabilities. The highest priority seismic mitigations have
been accomplished over the past 40 years for vulnerable buildings, pump stations, chlorination
stations, tanks, dams, and other facilities. As the top priority tasks are accomplished and new
vulnerabilities are identified, additional seismic improvements are incorporated into the CIP.
This ongoing process for implementing seismic mitigations is consistent with the proposed
Program. In the past, priorities and design criteria focused on performance of individual
facilities, whereas moving forward with the Program prioritization will also include system
operability and functionality improvements including dependency relationships with other
lifelines, and how mitigation investments benefit the community as a whole. Prioritization can be
improved by developing methodologies to quantify system resilience and its relation with
community resilience. The priorities are to be guided by the performance objectives and service
restoration goals considering seismic risks, consistent with regional social and economic needs,
within funding capabilities and resource availability.

Performance Based Design. New Water System facilities are designed and constructed to meet
applicable seismic design codes and standards of practice. Since the current building codes and
state of the practice focuses on life safety, in most cases Water System structures have been
designed and assessed for life safety concerns. As a result, some critical facilities may not be
usable following an actual earthquake event, even though they perform as designed.
Incorporating performance based design is an important, and logical, change in system
development when implementing the Program. Current engineering practice does not consider
overall system performance objectives in the design of individual facilities, but the Program will
result in systemic performance capabilities being incorporated. This process does not inherently
result in increasing the design criteria for all facilities; system redundancies may reveal cost
savings in certain facility designs. The Water System has been migrating in this direction over
the past few years when re-evaluating some critical facilities such as dams to ensure they are not
only safe, but also help ensure reliable services can be provided following a design earthquake.
Water System resilience can be improved by incorporating system performance based design
concepts and re-evaluating existing facilities to ensure they meet the performance criteria.

Seismic Inspections. The Water System periodically inspects some critical facilities to ensure no
observable seismic vulnerabilities exist. These facilities include dams and chemical storage
facilities. Special seismic inspections for other facilities are undertaken on an as-needed basis. In
the past, mostly after the 1971 San Fernando Earthquake, seismic inspection programs have been
undertaken system wide to identify vulnerabilities and prioritize their mitigation. Water System
resilience can be improved by developing and implementing a system wide seismic inspection
program to identify vulnerabilities and prioritize their mitigation.

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Asset Management. The Water System has an active Asset Management Program consistent with
industry practice and capable of assessing the quality of infrastructure. Facility replacements or
improvements are recommended based on quality, risks of failure, expected asset life,
maintenance costs, and other metrics. The Water System recently undertook a pilot study to
investigate methodologies for incorporating seismic risks into the Asset Management Program.
These seismic risk methods should be further investigated for use in prioritizing facility
replacement within the Asset Management Program.

Seismic Instrumentation. Strong motion and GPS instruments are installed at select locations
around the City and along the LAA, mostly at reservoir sites. These instruments are monitored
and maintained by the Water System, USGS, California Geologic Survey (CGS), and
universities for use in rapid post-event reporting. Seismic records give the Water System
intelligence on seismic shaking intensity and ground movement; some of the information from
USGS and CGS is nearly real-time. This level of intelligence is useful for making decisions on
how to respond to earthquake events, repair and restore the system, and collaborate with other
responders. The Water System is currently working with the USGS to deploy strong motion and
GPS instruments along the Elizabeth Tunnel where it crosses the San Andreas Fault so real time
information can be obtained by the USGS for earthquake early warning and by the Water System
for understanding potential impacts to the LAA after a San Andreas Fault rupture. Additionally,
the John Ferraro Building was recently equipped with 34 new seismic instruments in
collaboration with the California Institute of Technology (Caltech). These instruments will allow
structural health monitoring, with the aid of Caltech experts, which can assistance in rapid
assessment of the building after an earthquake. Water System resilience can be improved by
placing modern seismic instruments at critical facilities and key locations around the system.
Resilience can be further improved by implementing structural health monitoring of the John
Ferraro Building.

Develop a seismically resilient pipe network.

Resilient Network. Developing a seismically resilient pipe network is a mitigation effort to

improve the existing network knowing earthquake damage cannot cost-effectively be completely
prevented in the near-term, but may be better controlled with a focus of providing improved
customer service. The Water System Mainline Replacement Program has a current goal to
replace mainline pipe (20 inch diameter and less) at a rate of 150,000 feet in 2014-2015, with
plans to increase this rate by 22,000 feet per year for the next 5 years to reach a goal of
approximately 260,000 feet per year. Trunk lines (pipes larger than 20 inch diameter) are being
replaced at an average rate of about 9,000 feet per year. The aforementioned pipe identified for
replacement is determined through the Asset Management Program using risk-based
methodologies primarily to target a reduction in the annual leak rate and manage the total pipe

15
replacement cycle. Water System resilience can be improved by incorporating earthquake risks
into the Asset Management Program and developing a seismically resilient pipe network.

Earthquake Resistant Pipe. The resilient network will include the use of earthquake resistant
pipes placed at key locations within the system to help increase the probability of continuous
water delivery and reduce the time to restore areas suffering a total loss of water after an
earthquake. Earthquake resistant pipes are designed to accommodate seismic forces meeting
defined performance criteria. Two types of earthquake resistant pipes are shown in Figure 7.
Damaged portions of the system preventing flow capabilities can be isolated from the earthquake
resistant pipes to increase service restoration rates. Earthquake resistant pipes can also be
strategically placed to improve water delivery, quality, quantity, fire protection, and functionality
service capabilities to critical customers following an earthquake. A resilient network may also
incorporate an earthquake resistant pipe grid dimensioned consistent with capabilities of
firefighting equipment to relay water.

Figure 7. High density polyethylene pipe (left) and earthquake resistant ductile iron pipe (right)
are two types of pipe proven to provide earthquake resistance.

Development Rate. The current mainline replacement cycle is about 300 years and trunk line
replacement cycle is about 200 years. The average pipe lifespan for existing pipe is estimated to
be up to 100 to 120 years. The Water System plans to reduce these replacement cycles in the
coming years. The development of a seismically resilient pipe network must be implemented
consistently with the ongoing mainline and trunk line replacements and the Asset Management
Program, and account for leak rate, damage potential, operational criticality, pressure, corrosion
environment, age, impacts to streets and surrounding neighborhoods, and replacement costs.
Thus, a resilient pipe network will take decades to achieve and a long-term vision must be taken
to target priority locations to incrementally reduce both seismic and daily operational risks
simultaneously.

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Increase water supply and storage reliability.

Reliance on Imported Water Supplies. Los Angeles imports more than 85% of its water supply
from the Eastern Sierra Nevada Mountains, Colorado River, and Sacramento-San Joaquin River
Delta (Bay Delta). Water from the Eastern Sierra Nevada is transported through the Los Angeles
Aqueducts (LAA). Waters from the Colorado River and Bay Delta are purchased from the
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California (MWD), each respectively transported to
Southern California through the Colorado River Aqueduct (CRA) and the California Aqueduct.
The CRA is owned and operated by the MWD. The California Aqueduct is owned and operated
by the California Department of Water Resources (DWR) and was constructed as part of the
California State Water Project (SWP). The Water System also maintains many large dams and
reservoirs in the LAA system and within the city. Water System resilience can be improved by
increasing local water supply storage and reliability. As shown in Figure 4, the LAA, CRA, and
SWP aqueduct systems all cross the San Andreas Fault and may be simultaneously damaged in a
single earthquake event resulting in the inability to import water to Los Angeles for many
months. Additionally, in recent years water supplies have become scarcer due to multi-year dry
weather, environmental reallocations, and regulatory restrictions. Creating an aqueduct supply
agency coordination team consisting of LADWP, MWD, and DWR to coordinate aqueduct post-
earthquake response and recovery and pre-earthquake mitigation efforts can also improve Water
System resilience.

Initiatives to Improve Local Water Supplies. To address the vulnerability and uncertainty of
imported water supplies, LADWP is focusing on a combination of two important initiatives: the
Local Water Supply Program and the San Fernando Groundwater Basin (SFB) clean up and
remediation program. In the 2010 Urban Water Management Plan (UWMP) LADWP set goals
for developing local water supplies through storm-water capture, water conservation, and water
recycling. The 2010 UWMP also addresses the need to clean up and remediate SFB
contamination and ensure extracted water meets safe drinking water regulations. A healthy SFB
also sets a foundation for implementing conjunctive use, recycled water and storm water capture
projects. Local supply development will enable LADWP to reduce reliance on imported water
and cut purchases from MWD in half by 2035 or sooner. This enhances resiliency by improving
the water quantity services (see Figure 3). Additionally, local supply development will enhance
water availability in emergencies and help shift the post-earthquake service restoration curves in
Figure 3 up and to the left. Water System resilience will be improved with continued
implementation of the local water supply program and SFB clean up and remediation program.
Additionally, Water System resilience can be improved by incorporating important resilience
design aspects into these two programs during development, which may include, but not be
limited to: emergency power, emergency production capacity, treatment plant bypass
capabilities, and well placement.

17
Initiatives to Improve the LAA. The Water System has been investigating vulnerabilities to the
imported water supplies, and especially the LAA for the past decade. Reports have been prepared
identifying vulnerabilities and steps are being taken to address them. In January 2014, an
initiative was established to perform an LAA seismic performance evaluation, and preliminary
performance criteria were established. An inventory of stockpiled materials is maintained to aid
in any needed rapid repairs following an earthquake. The LAA crosses the San Andreas Fault in
the 5-mile long, 9-foot wide Elizabeth Tunnel. Investigations are underway to determine the
feasibility of placing a high density polyethylene (HDPE) pipe inside the tunnel to increase the
probability of providing LAA water to the City after a damaging event, as shown in Figure 8.
Other alternatives are also being investigated. Additionally, the Water System is working with
the USGS to place instrumentation along the Elizabeth Tunnel alignment allowing near real-time
intelligence to be obtained after fault movement in the San Andreas zone. Water System
resilience can be improved by proceeding with these risk-reduction alternatives and pursuing
alternatives to mitigate LAA loss where it crosses the San Andreas Fault.

HDPE Pipe
Elizabeth Tunnel

San Andreas Fault

Elizabeth Tunnel

Figure 8. Proposed project alternative to place HDPE pipe within the Elizabeth Tunnel to
increase the probability of providing LAA water following a San Andreas earthquake.

Water Supply for Firefighting. Firefighting water supplies are provided through the pipe
distribution network. The Water System works closely with the Los Angeles Fire Department to
ensure there is adequate water pressure and volume at all locations throughout the City to fight
fires under normal conditions. An earthquake can cause significant disruption to water
distribution capabilities resulting in large areas losing water. This water disruption primarily
occurs from pipes being damaged by earthquake forces. The leaks drain portions of the system,
but in a few instances water loss may result from damaged tanks, pump stations, or other
components. In the areas where there is little or no water in the distribution system, firefighters
must utilize alternate sources of supply, if available. As shown in Figure 9, a relatively large area
18
lost water in the San Fernando Valley due to damage inflicted by the 1994 Northridge
Earthquake.

Figure 9. 1994 Northridge earthquake water service interruptions and restoration dates (San
Fernando Valley and Santa Monica Mountains). Left: Areas without water delivery. Right: Areas
without sufficient volume or pressure to fight fires (Davis et al., 2012).

In 1994 firefighters were able to utilize private swimming pools as alternate water sources to
extinguish fires. Additionally, firefighters helped restore flow in portions of the distribution
network using inter-system pumping connections whereby fire pump trucks were used to pump
water from lower pressure zone into a higher pressure zone at predesigned locations. Similar to
experiences in 1994, Figure 6 shows areas losing water services from the ShakeOut Scenario
(Davis and O’Rourke, 2011) in the same locations where fires are expected to ignite (Scawthorn,
2008), but firefighters may have less flexibility for obtaining alternate water supplies as
compared to the San Fernando Valley in 1994. Community resilience can be improved by
identifying alternative water supply sources useful for firefighting throughout the City. This can
be accomplished through continued collaboration between the Water System and Fire
Department to identify these alternative water supply sources around the City and how they can
be utilized. Meetings have initiated between the LADWP and the Fire Department to focus on
fire following earthquake and water supply. In addition to swimming pools, alternative water
sources may include local ponds, lakes, adding special connections at existing reservoirs, Los
Angeles River, creeks, storm drains, ocean water, groundwater, cisterns, or recycled water.
Alternatives may consider new infrastructure (e.g., fill stations at covered reservoirs and tanks)
and new fire department equipment.

19
Figure 10. Metro Service Area Recycled Water System map. The proposed Downtown Water
Recycling Project is capable of providing emergency firefighting water supply to areas shown in
Figure 6 having lost water supply and potential for fire outbreak (Scawthorn, 2008) in the
ShakeOut Scenario, provided it is constructed to deliver this service.

Resilient Recycled Water Network. Appropriately treated recycled water can be used for fire
suppression in the event of an earthquake or other natural disaster which may render potable
water temporarily unavailable. Currently all fire flow is provided by the potable water network.
A recycled water network is currently being developed around Los Angeles. For the most part
the recycled water network is not designed to provide fire flow because there is significantly less
water available as compared to the potable supply and to accommodate the need for maintaining
water quality, which increases in difficulty with increasing reclaimed water storage. However the
recycled water network in Griffith Park is currently used for firefighting purposes. Recycled
water networks can be considered for use to help suppress fires as a back-up system to the
normal distribution network which may be damaged and unusable in an earthquake. Figure 10
identifies an example for the Downtown Water Recycling Project, which could aid fire
suppression to areas in need as identified by the ShakeOut Scenario. This will be especially
important in areas of high fire vulnerability and also to areas of high consequence (e.g., financial,
medical, and evacuation centers) if damaged by fire. In order to implement a cost-effective
resilient recycled water pipe network for firefighting purposes, special considerations such as
adding fire hydrants, using earthquake resistant pipe, adding tanks, and potable backup will need
to be balanced, if possible, with the day-to-day need to maintain water quality.
20
Figure 11. LADWP Reservoirs. Top left: Los Angeles Reservoir. Top tight: Bouquet Canyon
Reservoir. Bottom left: Hollywood Reservoirs. Bottom right: Elysian Reservoir.

Enhanced Dam Safety. Dams are used by LADWP to retain large water storage volumes. It is
essential to ensure the LADWP dams are maintained in a safe and reliable manner not only to
ensure a reliable water supply, but also to ensure the public safety. Figure 11 shows four
LADWP reservoirs highlighting the importance of water storage and downstream public safety.
The Power System also maintains several dam and reservoir facilities which can impact water
supply if they become inoperable. The Water System invests in an extensive Dam Safety
Program to ensure the dams are operated in a safe and reliable manner. Dams are inspected and
reviewed by highly trained personnel, including annual State inspections of all dams by the
DSOD. Engineers and geologists keep up with the latest knowledge in seismic hazards and
evaluate the dams and reservoirs using state-of-the-practice deterministic methodologies and
21
when necessary develop new state-of-the-art practices to ensure technical aspects related to
critical safety matters are fully understood. Figure 12 shows an example of on-going
developments to improve liquefaction assessments. An expert Board of Consultants is
maintained to review the Water System efforts in dam and reservoir safety. Additionally,
inundation maps are currently being updated and emergency action plans prepared for each
reservoir. Water System resilience can be improved by implementing risk-based methodologies
incorporating the probabilities of events and consequences.

Figure 12. The instrumented Becker Hammer Penetration Test (iBPT) implementation with the
University of California at Davis at Stone Canyon Dam (left) and North Haiwee Dam (right).
The iBPT is being developed in collaboration with UC Davis and the DSOD to improve the
LADWP capabilities to identify earthquake-induced liquefaction hazards at critical sites. iBPT is
also being implemented at Headwork’s West Reservoir and Bouquet Canyon Reservoir.

Emergency Water Supplies. Emergency water supplies are stored for use following an
earthquake. The Water System maintains the Encino, Stone Canyon, and Hollywood Reservoirs
(shown in Figure 11), where large water volumes are stored primarily for emergency purposes.
Back-up water sources are established, including intersystem connections with other water
distribution agencies and MWD connections. Additionally, MWD developed the large Diamond
Valley Reservoir and some local groundwater banks for emergency water storage, a portion of
which offset other demands and thereby make existing local supplies available to the LADWP.
Resilience improvements can be made by obtaining a better understanding of how much
emergency water Los Angeles may need for different earthquake scenarios, especially a San
Andreas earthquake, comparing to what is currently available and preparing strategies for
handling shortfalls.

22
Emergency Water Distribution. The Water System is aware of the potential for losing ability to
supply water to customers following an earthquake. This was experienced in 1971 and 1994.
Figure 9 shows the areas without water supply after the 1994 Northridge earthquake and Figure 6
estimates the areas loosing water services from the ShakeOut Scenario. As a result of expected
water delivery and quality service losses, the Water System has plans, post-earthquake staffing
assignments, materials, and equipment prepared to mobilize to locations determined after an
event to provide customers access to emergency water. Figure 13 shows a mobile emergency
water distribution station. The planning includes coordinating with emergency management
agencies. Plans are in place to establish distribution centers where customers without water can
obtain potable water in containers for their use. Water trucks are planned to be used to replenish
these stations on a regular basis. Water System resilience can be improved by investigating the
use of permanent emergency potable water storage tanks with reliable piping in designated areas,
such as parks, schools, emergency evacuation centers, etc. Japanese water agencies commonly
implement these types of emergency water tanks and can be a source of information for this
proposed investigation.

Figure 13. Left: LADWP emergency water distribution station with multiple taps. Right:
example water tanker used to refill the stations. 10 mobile stations are stored for deployment
when needed around the city.

Enhance emergency response capabilities.

Emergency Response Plans. The LADWP maintains emergency response plans (ERP) and
updates them annually. The corporate consolidated ERP is maintained by the LADWP Office of
Emergency Management and coordinated with the Los Angeles City ERP. The ERP meets the
National Incident Command System (NIMS) structure, consistent with Federal requirements.
The Water System ERP is consistent with the LADWP corporate consolidated ERP. Each Water
23
System division has an ERP updated annually, which mirrors the Water System ERP but is more
specific to each Division’s duties. Employees are trained on how to use the ERP and respond to
emergency situations.

Scenario Earthquakes and Continuity of Operations. The ERP is prepared to cover any type of
emergency situation and elements of the Water System’s continuity of operations. Water System
resilience can be improved by preparing a Continuity of Operations Plan for earthquakes and
other hazard strikes. Resilience can be further improved by specifically addressing particular
issues expected from certain earthquake scenarios and incorporating known system
vulnerabilities into the response planning (e.g., loss of the LAA and other imported supply
sources during a San Andreas Fault rupture).

Mutual Aid and Assistance. The Water System has mutual aid and mutual assistance agreements
in place with multiple organizations. These include:

 California Water/Wastewater Agency Response Network (Cal WARN)

 California Mutual Aid Laboratory Network (CAMAL Net)

 Member Agency Response System with the MWD

 Mutual Assistance Agreements with East Bay Municipal Utility District (EBMUD) and
Las Vegas Valley Water District (LVVWD)

The EBMUD and LVVWD were identified as best organizations for having mutual assistance
agreements due to their size and similar capabilities as the Water System and their locations
being sufficiently distant not to suffer from the same disasters as may strike Los Angeles.

Records. Very good records of the system are maintained. This is essential for planning
emergency response capabilities. During an earthquake emergency the operations groups need to
identify damage and re-route water. In the past decade significant changes have been made to the
Water System requiring record updating. Keeping updated records is essential to ensuring a
resilient Water System.

Incident Command. The Water Emergency Command Center (WECC) serves as the central point
for coordinating Water System emergency response activities. The WECC is the coordinating
link to the Los Angeles City Emergency Operations Center. All events will be coordinated using
the NIMS and action planning. The primary WECC command and control reporting location is at
Room 1471 in the John Ferraro Building. The second and third reporting locations are the Los
Angeles Aqueduct Filtration Plant and Central District Headquarters, respectively. In the Owens
Valley, the main command and control reporting location is the Bishop Office Building. The
Water System holds a WECC meeting every other Friday to review emergency preparedness. In
addition, the LADWP maintains a mobile emergency command post, shown in Figure 14, which

24
is shared between the water and power systems, providing mobility to respond to emergencies
while keeping responders out of adverse elements outdoors. A mobile water quality laboratory,
shown in Figure 14, is maintained to provide capability of performing on-site water quality tests
and provide more rapid results on potential contamination.

Figure 14. LADWP mobile emergency command post (left) and mobile water quality laboratory
(right).

Assessment Teams. Water operating, distribution, and aqueduct personnel are assigned and
trained to perform post-earthquake system damage assessments and report information to the
WECC. In addition, Disaster Assessment Teams and Reservoir Inspection Teams consist of
engineers and technicians who mobilize and perform more detailed facilities inspections, usually
after the field personnel have more rapidly assessed the system. Water System resilience can be
improved by maintaining a well-developed and coordinated emergency response training
program.

Rapid Earthquake Intelligence. Tools such as the California Integrated Seismic Network (CISN)
Display, ShakeMap, and ShakeCast are utilized to help obtain rapid intelligence following an
earthquake. ShakeAlert is currently being implemented in the Water System for beta testing the
earthquake early warning system. ShakeAlert can enhance early intelligence and response
capabilities once it becomes fully operational. It is important for the LADWP to imitate
conceptual application of ShakeAlert and identify additional tools to be utilized when an early
warning alert is broadcast. Water System resilience can be improved through enhanced
application of CISN Display, ShakeMap, and ShakeCast, beta testing for ShakeAlert, and
identification of how to effectively utilize alerts when broadcast after earthquake early warning
becomes fully operational.

Communications. Numerous communication capabilities are available to the Water System in

emergency situations. The LADWP continuously works to improve emergency communication
capabilities through addition/enhancement of microwave towers, cell towers, satellite phones,
and other means, including access to federal priority lines. Redundant capabilities are
25
maintained, and critical operations personnel are equipped with multiple radios in their work
vehicles. Water System resilience can be improved by enhancing communication capabilities at
critical sites known to have difficulties, enhancing cellular capabilities at critical sites, increasing
cellular backup power (this would be provider responsibility), and identifying microwave
vulnerabilities to fault rupture displacement. Additionally, community resilience can be
improved with increased capability and protocol for communicating directly to other responding
departments during a disaster situation. Resilience can be further improved by establishing
peace-time organizational meetings to communicate between agencies in advance of a disaster,
so all organizations know who to contact and have a good understanding of how the other
organizations operate in emergency situations. This could be achieved by establishing a lifelines
council.

Emergency Exercises. The Water System participates in emergency response exercises and trains
personnel in response capabilities. The incident command system is practiced during response to
water leak repairs, which not only helps with the incident response, but also allows the incident
command system to be routinely practiced. The annual Los Angeles City EOC Functional
Exercise as well as the State’s Golden Guardian exercises are used for training. The LADWP
also participates in community response drills. Emergency training classes are given to key
personnel. Training exercises are periodically undertaken through the mutual aid contracts with
the EBMUD and LVVWD. Water System resilience can be improved through better organized
system-wide and community-wide emergency exercises involving personnel who will be
responding to an emergency, as well as other agencies the Water System will likely be
coordinating with in a disaster situation. Resilience can be further improved with increased
training, including refresher courses, where the knowledge gained is later utilized in response
exercises.

Compressed Natural Gas. The Water System maintains fuel stations and tank trucks capable of
refueling vehicles at work sites. Recently the South Coast Air Quality Management District
regulations have required changing to compressed natural gas (CNG) as the primary fuel source.
Currently there are only three CNG fuel stations in the city that LADWP owns, operates, and
maintains. LADWP does not allow public vehicles to be refueled with CNG on these LADWP
sites. Two additional CNG fuel stations are planned around the City to help with the mobility of
the CNG vehicles. The CNG requirements create vulnerabilities in the emergency response
capabilities in four primary ways:

1. It will be extremely difficult for vehicles to move across the city to the few CNG stations
in a major disaster.
2. EBMUD and LVVWD do not utilize CNG for their vehicles creating a fueling capability
discrepancy.
3. The current CNG fueling stations do not have sufficient emergency storage.

26
 4. Refueling is prohibited on City streets. This would preclude refueling at jobsites and
would require vehicles to return to CNG fueling stations or district yards for refueling.

Water System resilience can be improved by identifying and implementing measures to eliminate
the CNG fuel vulnerabilities.

COST AND SCEDULE

Conceptual estimates indicate the Program may realize costs of $12 to $15 billion over 20 years
or more. Some portion of this amount is included in or incremental to existing planned and
budgeted infrastructure investments and development of local, sustainable sources of supply.
Approximately 25% of these costs are for pipeline improvements.

REFERENCES

Davis, C.A., 2010, “Los Angeles Water Supply Impacts from a M7.8 San Andreas Fault
Earthquake Scenario,” Journal of Water Supply: Research and Technology - AQUA,
International Water Association, 59(6-7), September.

Davis, C.A. and T.D. O’Rourke, 2011, “ShakeOut Scenario: Water System Impacts from A
M7.8 San Andreas Earthquake,” EERI Spectra, Vol. 27, No. 2.

Davis, C. A., T. D. O’Rourke, M. L. Adams, M. A. Rho, 2012, “Case Study: Los Angeles
Water Services Restoration Following the 1994 Northridge Earthquake,” 15th World Conference
on Earthquake Engineering, paper No. 364, Lisbon, Portugal, September 24-28.

Jones, L.M., R. Bernknopf, D. Cox, J. Goltz, K. Hudnut, D. Mileti, S. Perry, D. Ponti, K.

Porter, M. Reichle, H. Seligson, K. Shoaf, J. Treiman, and A. Wein, 2008, “The ShakeOut
Scenario,” U.S. Geological Survey OFR 2008-1150 and California Geological Survey
Preliminary Report 25.

Scawthorn, C.R., 2008, “Fire Following Earthquake,” ShakeOut Scenario Supplement Study
prepared for United States Geologic Survey and California Geologic Survey,
<http://www.colorado.edu/hazards/shakeout/fire.pdf>

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 Appendix A

PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

The Program development was undertaken by a team of Water System managers representing all
parts of the organization working closely with the Mayor’s staff. The team held weekly
programmatic meetings to review progress and establish action items. The weekly meetings
included members of the Mayor’s staff. Every other week the programmatic meeting provided an
opportunity to brief Deputy Mayor Decker, Dr. Jones, and Water System upper management,
review progress with them, and get input. The team held intermittent technical meetings to make
more detailed and specific progress on Program development. The objective was to complete this
summary report containing initial recommendations in September 2014. Dr. Jones and the
Mayor’s office could then use these initial results to incorporate into their larger efforts for
developing City-wide resilience strategies including the Water System, communication systems,
and building structures, planned to be released in October 2014.

The Program development progressed by investigating three requisites for preparing a resilience
plan: (1) defining characteristics of a seismically resilient Los Angeles Water System, (2)
identifying the current status of Water System seismic resilience, and (3) recognizing aspects
which may improve Water System seismic resilience. This summary report does not itemize in
detail the defined characteristics, current status, or all recognized aspects which may improve
Water System resilience. Instead, this report provides brief descriptions supporting the summary
recommendations and potential tasks which may be implemented to accomplish the
recommendations. Appendix B outlines the summary recommendations and potential tasks. A
more extensive report is planned to be completed in the near future addressing the defined
characteristics of a seismically resilient Water System, current status of the Water System
seismic resilience, recognized aspects which may improve resilience, and the envisioned
Program including some near-term, intermediate-term, and long-term recommendations.

28
 Appendix B

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND POTENTIAL TASKS TO ACCOMPLISH

• Establish an LADWP-wide Resilience Task Force to oversee and provide resources

to lead, support and ensure accomplishment of the Seismic Resilience and
Sustainability Program.
• Prepare a plan for implementing Water System Seismic Resilience and
Sustainability Program.
o Outline costs, benefits, schedules, staffing, other resources, prioritization, risks,
and communications with City leaders, community leaders, and customers.
o Obtain stakeholder support for the Water System Seismic Resilience and
Sustainability Program.
• Implement Water System seismic planning, evaluation, and monitoring to identify
needed mitigations throughout the City and along the Los Angeles Aqueducts
(LAA).
o Develop Water System seismic performance objectives with stakeholder input,
consistent design criteria, consistent standards, design guidelines and goals.
o Perform system seismic evaluations (City and LAA) for different earthquake
scenarios; estimate network component damage, hydraulic performance, water
service outages, restoration times.
 Utilize consistent procedures to quantify hazards across system; prepare
ground movement maps.
 Use for mitigations, planning response, preparing for emergency water
distribution, material stockpiles, …
o Continue improving the GIRAFFE computer program and use for system
evaluations.
o Perform studies to obtain better understanding of the fire following earthquake
hazard.
o Evaluate social and economic impacts from Water System earthquake damages.
o Develop methodologies to quantify system resilience useful to help prioritize
seismic mitigations.
o Assess components to meet performance criteria; includes buildings and dams;
code design is for life safety not post-earthquake performance.
o Implement a system-wide seismic inspection program.
o Incorporate seismic risks into the Asset Management Program.
o Place modern seismic instrumentation at critical locations (e.g., dams and
important facilities).

29
 • Develop a seismically resilient pipe network.
o Develop/implement seismically resilient pipe network and criteria for prioritizing
pipe installation, including essential facilities and firefighting needs.
o Evaluate criteria for priority restorations to improve community resilience.
• Increase water supply and storage reliability.
o Create an aqueduct supply agency coordination team consisting of LADWP,
MWD, and DWR to coordinate aqueduct post-earthquake response and recovery
and pre-earthquake mitigation efforts.
o Develop local supply sources to reduce dependence on imported water and
enhance water availability in emergencies.
o Identify mitigation alternatives for LAA crossing San Andreas Fault.
o Identify alternative water supply sources for firefighting.
o Enhance the Dam Safety Program using risk-based methods.
o Make detailed estimates for total volumes of emergency storage water needed
following a San Andreas earthquake event and current volumes available.
Develop plans for shortfall.
o Investigate emergency potable water storage tanks with reliable piping in
designated areas, such as parks, schools, emergency evacuation centers, etc.
• Enhance emergency response capabilities.
o Prepare business continuity plans for earthquakes and other hazard strikes.
o Enhance applications for CISN Display, ShakeMap, and ShakeCast, ShakeAlert;
effectively use earthquake early warning alerts.
o Improve communications capabilities (difficult sites, essential personnel, with
other utilities, L.A. Fire Department, and L.A. Police Department).
o Undertake system-wide and community-wide emergency exercises with
responding personnel.
o Identify and implement measures to eliminate the CNG fuel vulnerabilities.

In addition to the above, address the numerous detailed recommendations and tasks identified for
improving Water System seismic resilience.

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