Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON and RICARDO L. PRONOVE, JR., as
Judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches, THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMISSION, HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as
Commissioner of Immigration, and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command
(AVSECOM), respondents.

FERNAN, J.:
The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a person facing a
criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an unrestricted right to travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house. Having transferred the
management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he holds no officer-position in said
business, but acts as president of the former corporation.
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from this
jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together with his costockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission for the appointment of a
management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc., but likewise for Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No.
001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc
Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw, Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a
management committee was organized and appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange Commission requested
the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to clear petitioner for departure and a
memorandum to this effect was issued by the Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the
Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was suspected to be a
fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against petitioner and one Raul Leveriza,
Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course,
corresponding criminal charges for estafa were filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court

of First Instance of Rizal, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to
respondent Judge Camilon, and Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove.
In all cases, petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU
Instance Corporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled, "motion for
permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the United States,
"relative to his business transactions and opportunities." 1 The prosecution opposed said motion and
after due hearing, both trial judges denied the same. The order of Judge Camilon dated March 9, 1982,
reads:
Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the all
embracing ground that his trip is ... relative to his business transactions and
opportunities.
The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any magnitude is
discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.
In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo Manotoc, Jr. now
or in the future until these two (2) cases are terminated . 2
On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:
6.-Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the Court would
allow the accused to leave the Philippines the surety companies that filed the bail
bonds in his behalf might claim that they could no longer be held liable in their
undertakings because it was the Court which allowed the accused to go outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippine Court, should the accused fail or decide not to
return.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED. 3
It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter requesting the recall
or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February 4, 1980, but said request was also denied
in a letter dated May 27, 1982.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of Appeals 4 seeking
to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon and Pronove, respectively, as well as
the communication-request of the Securities and Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel
abroad. He likewise prayed for the issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration
Commissioner and the Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.
On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5 dismissing the petition for lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on April 14,

1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 7 In his motion,
petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in connection "with the obtention of
foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8 He attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the chief
executive officer of the Exploration Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller 9 requesting his
presence in the United States to "meet the people and companies who would be involved in its
investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases Nos. 4933 to 4936
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545) had been dismissed as to him "on
motion of the prosecution on the ground that after verification of the records of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ... (he) was not in any way connected with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of the
date of the commission of the offenses imputed to him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, however, remained pending as Judge Camilon, when notified of the
dismissal of the other cases against petitioner, instead of dismissing the cases before him, ordered
merely the informations amended so as to delete the allegation that petitioner was president and to
substitute that he was "controlling/majority stockholder,'' 11 of Manotoc Securities, Inc. On September 20,
1984, the Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go abroad pendente lite. 12
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts which
granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a
necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given for the
release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his
appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do
what the law may require of him. 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires
his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy
Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit
said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said
orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts
from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would
have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of record, and
the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of the accused from the
public officials who have him in their charge to keepers of his own selection. Such
custody has been regarded merely as a continuation of the original imprisonment.
The sureties become invested with full authority over the person of the principal and
have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state. 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court
from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person of the principal
remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact, this inherent right of the court is
recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the
country, for he would not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it
were otherwise.

To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals' ruling in People
vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly citing the following passage:
... The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants at the
pleasure of the Court. ... The law does not limit such undertaking of the bondsmen as
demandable only when the appellants are in the territorial confines of the Philippines
and not demandable if the appellants are out of the country. Liberty, the most
important consequence of bail, albeit provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty
operates as fully within as without the boundaries of the granting state. This principle
perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly declaring
that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country.
The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is misplaced. The
rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy; for while there is, indeed,
neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the
territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the reason suggested by the appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the accused was
able to show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration thereof and the conforme of her
sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the court that she would comply with the conditions
of her bail bond. in contrast, petitioner in this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As
aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his comment:
A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that it
is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United States where he will,
allegedly attend to some business transactions and search for business
opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner's motion, no urgent or
compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur thereto.
Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for him to travel
abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that the alleged business transactions

could not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any hint
that petitioner's absence from the United States would absolutely preclude him from
taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor is there any showing that
petitioner's non-presence in the United States would cause him irreparable damage
or prejudice. 15
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it.
Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities. The
court cannot allow the accused to leave the country without the assent of the surety because in accepting
a bail bond or recognizance, the government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with
the principal that will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against him. Under this
rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation inconsistent with the
conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result has been reached as to a stipulation or
agreement to postpone the trial until after the final disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to
leave the state or country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has
been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal cases pending before
said judge, We see the rationale behind said order.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel,
the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel, We find no abuse of
judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the country, in
much the same way, albeit with contrary results, that We found no reversible error to have been
committed by the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself
that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health.
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as
contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and jurisprudence, the Court
finds that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz and
Paras, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Annex "D", Petition, p. 44, Rollo.
2 Ibid, p. 44, Rollo.
3 Ibid, p. 44, Rollo.
4 Annex "A Petition, p. 17, Rollo
5 Annex "D", Petition, p. 42, Rollo.
6 p. 87, Rollo.
7 p. 117, Rollo.
8 p. 120, Rollo.
9 Annex "BB", Motion for Leave p. 124, Rollo.
10 p. 117, Rollo.
11 p. 121, Rollo.
12 p. 129, Rollo.
13 6 Am. Jur. [Rev. Ed.], Bailment, S6
14 6 Am. Jur. [Rev. Ed.], Bailments, $100,
15 Comment, pp. 69-70, Rollo.
16 6 Am. Jur. 125.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 94284 April 8, 1991

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. BENIGNO G. GAVIOLA, as Judge of the Regional Trial Court
of Cebu City, Branch IX, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Quisumbing, Torres & Evangelista for petitioner.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:p
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court praying that the
Decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 15827, entitled "Ricardo C. Silverio vs.
Hon. Benigno C. Gaviola, etc., et al.," dated 31 January 1990, as well as the Resolution of 29 June
1990 denying reconsideration, be set aside.
On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised
Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he
posted bail for his provisional liberty.
On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent
People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a
hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several
times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and
scheduled hearings.
Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the
Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and
the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based
primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the
accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates
scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.
has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court"
(Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.
Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990.
Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.
After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and
to decide the case.
Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4
April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the
scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the

Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court,
even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."
We perceive no reversible error.
1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent
that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments
had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion
to Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and
conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:
1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this
date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled
arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio
to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to appear had invariably been
because he is abroad in the United States of America;
2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never
appeared in person before the Court;
3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of
arrest had been issued against him all for the same reason failure to appear at
scheduled arraignments.
In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio
more than enough consideration. The limit had long been reached (Order, 28 July
1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).
Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not
based on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the
pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been
scheduled and cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.
2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that
the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the
"interest of national security, public safety or public health."
To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been
cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his
failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for
violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given
for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon
his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).

The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever
the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs.
Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges
may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return
(Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released
on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the
Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd
par. ]).
Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the
Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable
impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.
Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision.
Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:
The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be impaired.
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of
the court or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or
public health (Article IV, Section 5).
The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them
differently, to wit:
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by
law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right
to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only
on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of
travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative
authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only
on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a
limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol.
I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to

the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel
Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested
party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso & Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA
121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the
inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all
auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such
Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).
Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect
that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times
whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no
longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond
has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides,
the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in People
v. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by
failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those
orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to
remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a
criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be
considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with
law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best
interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue
delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo
C. Silverio.
SO ORDERED.
Paras, Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 99289-90 January 27, 1993

MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
CONRADO M. VASQUEZ, Ombudsman; GUALBERTO J. DE LA LLANA, Special Prosecutor;
SANDIGANBAYAN and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, respondents.
Marciano P. Defensor for petitioner.
Nestor P. Ifurong for Maria S. Tatoy.
Danilo C. Cunanan for respondents.
RESOLUTION

REGALADO, J.:
Filed directly with the Court, ostensibly as an incident in the present special civil action, is petitioner's
so-called "Motion to Restrain the Sandiganbayan from Enforcing its Hold Departure Order with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction, with Motion
to Set Pending Incident for Hearing." Despite the impropriety of the mode adopted in elevating the
issue to us, as will hereinafter be discussed, we will disregard the procedural gaffe in the interest of
an early resolution hereof.
The chronology of events preceding the instant motion is best summarized to readily provide a clear
understanding and perspective of our disposition of this matter, thus:
1. On May 13, 1991, an information dated May 9, 1991 and docketed as Criminal Case No. 16698
was filed against petitioner with the Sandiganbayan for alleged violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
2. On May 14, 1991, an order of arrest was issued in said case against herein petitioner by Presiding
Justice Francis E. Garchitorena of the Sandiganbayan, with bail for the release of the accused fixed
at P15,000.00. 1
3. On even date, petitioner filed an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond for
and in Behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago," 2 which pertinently states in part:
xxx xxx xxx
3. As a result of the vehicular collision, she suffered extensive physical injuries which
required surgical intervention. As of this time, her injuries, specifically in the jaw or
gum area of the mouth, prevents her to speak (sic) because of extreme pain. Further,
she cannot for an extended period be on her feet because she is still in physical pain.
....

4. On the other hand, the accused Miriam Defensor Santiago seeks leave of this
Honorable Court that she be considered as having placed herself under the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, for purposes of the required trial and other
proceedings and further seeks leave of this Honorable Court that the recommended
bail bond of P15,000.00 that she is posting in cash be accepted.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that the bail bond she
is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted, and that by this motion, she
be considered as having placed herself under the custody of this Honorable Court
and dispensing of her personal appearance for now until such time she will (sic) have
recovered sufficiently from her recent near fatal accident.
Further, on the above basis, it is also respectfully prayed that the warrant for her
arrest be immediately recalled.
xxx xxx xxx
4. Also on the same day, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution 3 authorizing petitioner to post a cash
bond for her provisional liberty without need for her physical appearance until June 5, 1991 at the latest,
unless by that time her condition does not yet permit her physical appearance before said court. On May
15, 1991, petitioner filed a cash bond in the amount of P15,000.00, aside from the other legal fees. 4
5. On May 21, 1991, respondent Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez filed with the Sandiganbayan a
manifestation "that accused Miriam Defensor-Santiago appeared in his office in the second floor of
the Old NAWASA Building located in Arroceros Street, Ermita, Manila at around 3:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of May 20, 1991. She was accompanied by a brother who represented himself to be Atty.
Arthur Defensor and a lady who is said to be a physician. She came and left unaided, after staying
for about fifteen minutes. 5
6. Acting on said manifestation, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution also on May 21, 1991,
setting the arraignment of the accused for May 27, 1991, and setting aside the court's resolution of
May 14, 1991 which ordered her appearance before the deputy clerk of the First Division of said
court on or before June 5, 1991. 6
7. In a motion dated May 22, 1991, petitioner asked that her cash bond be cancelled and that she be
allowed provisional liberty upon a recognizance. She contended that for her to continue remaining
under bail bond may imply to other people that she has intentions of fleeing, an intention she would
like to prove as baseless. 7
8. Likewise on May 24, 1991, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, and a subsequent addendum thereto, seeking to enjoin the
Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial Court of Manila from proceeding with Criminal Cases Nos.
12298 (for violation of Section 3[e] of Republic Act No. 3019), 91-94555 (violation of Presidential
Decree No. 46), and 91-94897 (for libel), respectively. Consequently, a temporary restraining order

was issued by this Court on May 24, 1991, enjoining the Sandiganbayan and the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 3, from proceeding with the criminal cases pending before them. This Court,
in issuing said order, took into consideration the fact that according to petitioner, her arraignment,
originally set for June 5, 1991, was inexplicably advanced to May 27, 1991, hence the advisability of
conserving and affording her the opportunity to avail herself of any remedial right to meet said
contingency.
9. On May 27, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued an order deferring: (a) the arraignment of petitioner
until further advice from the Supreme Court; and (b) the consideration of herein petitioner's motion to
cancel her cash bond until further initiative from her through counsel. 8
10. On January 18, 1992, this Court rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and
lifting and setting aside the temporary restraining order previously issued. 9 The motion for
reconsideration filed by petitioner was eventually denied with finality in this Court's resolution dated
September 10, 1992.
11. Meanwhile, in a resolution adopted on July 6, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued a hold departure
order against petitioner which reads as follows:
Considering the information in media to the effect that accused Santiago intends to
leave the country soon for an extended stay abroad for study purposes, considering
the recent decision of the Supreme Court dismissing her petition promulgated on
January 13, 1992, although the same is still subject of a Motion for Reconsideration
from the accused, considering that the accused has not yet been arraigned, nor that
she has not (sic) even posted bail the same having been by reason of her earlier
claim of being seriously indisposed, all of which were overtaken by a restraining
order issued by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 99289 and No. 99290 dated May 24,
1991, the accused is ordered not to leave the country and the Commission on
Immigration and Deportation is ordered not to allow the departure of the accused
unless authorized from (sic) this Court. 10
The hold departure order was issued by reason of the announcement made by petitioner, which was
widely publicized in both print and broadcast media, that she would be leaving for the United States
to accept a fellowship supposedly offered by the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University. Petitioner likewise disclosed that she would be addressing Filipino communities in the
United States in line with her crusade against election fraud and other aspects of graft and
corruption.
In the instant motion submitted for our resolution, petitioner argues that:
1. The Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion in issuing the hold departure order considering that it had not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
2. The Sandiganbayan blatantly disregarded basic principles of judicial comity and
due deference owing to a superior tribunal when it issued the hold departure order

despite the pendency of petitioner's motion for reconsideration with this Honorable
Court.
3. The right to due process of law, the right to travel and the right to freedom of
speech are preferred, pre-eminent rights enshrined not only in the Constitution but
also in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights which can be validly impaired only
under stringent criteria which do not obtain in the instant case.
4. The hold departure order in the instant case was issued under disturbing
circumstances which suggest political harassment and persecution.
5. On the basis of petitioner's creditable career in the bench and bar and her
characteristic transparency and candor, there is no reasonable ground to fear that
petitioner will surreptitiously flee the country to evade judicial processes. 11
I. Petitioner initially postulates that respondent court never acquired jurisdiction over her person
considering that she has neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily surrendered, aside from the
fact that she has not validly posted bail since she never personally appeared before said court. We
reject her thesis for being factually and legally untenable.
It has been held that where after the filing of the complaint or information a warrant for the arrest of
the accused is issued by the trial court and the accused either voluntarily submitted himself to the
court or was duly arrested, the court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
accused. 12 The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his
person, is accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the court's jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment, entering
trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the provisional liberty of
the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by
the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender. 13
In the case at bar, it becomes essential, therefore, to determine whether respondent court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of herein petitioner and, correlatively, whether there was a valid posting
of bail bond.
We find and so hold that petitioner is deemed to have voluntarily submitted herself to the jurisdiction
of respondent court upon the filing of her aforequoted "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of
Cash Bail Bond for and in behalf of Dr. Miriam Defensor-Santiago" wherein she expressly sought
leave "that she be considered as having placed herself under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan)
for purposes of the required trial and other proceedings," and categorically prayed "that the bail bond
she is posting in the amount of P15,000.00 be duly accepted" and that by said motion "she be
considered as having placed herself under the custody" of said court. Petitioner cannot now be
heard to claim otherwise for, by her own representations, she is effectively estopped from asserting
the contrary after she had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of the court and caused it to exercise
that jurisdiction over the aforestated pleadings she filed therein.

It cannot be denied that petitioner has posted a cash bail bond of P15,000.00 for her provisional
release as evidenced by Official Receipt No. 4292925 dated May 15, 1991 and which is even
attached as Annex C-2 to her own motion now under consideration. This is further buttressed by the
fact that petitioner thereafter also filed a motion for the cancellation of said cash bond and for the
court to allow her provisional liberty upon the security of a recognizance. With the filing of the
foregoing motions, petitioner should accordingly and necessarily admit her acquiescence to and
acknowledgment of the propriety of the cash bond she posted, instead of adopting a stance which
ignores the injunction for candor and sincerity in dealing with the courts of justice.
Petitioner would also like to make capital of the fact that she did not personally appear before
respondent court to file her cash bond, thereby rendering the same ineffectual. Suffice it to say that
in this case, it was petitioner herself, in her motion for the acceptance of the cash bond, who
requested respondent court to dispense with her personal appearance until she shall have
recovered sufficiently from her vehicular accident. It is distressing that petitioner should now turn
around and fault respondent court for taking a compassionate stand on the matter and
accommodating her own request for acceptance of the cash bond posted in her absence.
II. Petitioner argues that the Sandiganbayan disregarded the rule of judicial comity when it issued
the hold departure order despite the pendency of her motion for reconsideration of the decision of
this Court which dismissed her petition. She claims that if the principle of judicial comity applies to
prevent a court from interfering with the proceedings undertaken by a coordinate court, with more
reason should it operate to prevent an inferior court, such as the Sandiganbayan, from interfering
with the instant case where a motion for reconsideration was still pending before this Court. She
contends further that the hold departure order contravenes the temporary restraining order
previously issued by this court enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding with the criminal case
pending before it.
It will be remembered that the Court rendered a decision in the present case on January 18, 1992
dismissing the petition for certiorari filed in this case and lifting and setting aside the temporary
restraining order it previously issued. It is petitioner's submission that the filing of her motion for
reconsideration stayed the lifting of the temporary restraining order, hence respondent court
continued to be enjoined from acting on and proceeding with the case during the pendency of the
motion for reconsideration. We likewise reject this contention which is bereft of merit.
Section 4, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that, unless otherwise ordered by the court, a
judgment in an action for injunction shall not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is
taken or during the pendency of an appeal. And, the rule is that the execution of a judgment
decreeing the dissolution of a writ of preliminary injunction shall not be stayed before an appeal is
taken or during the pendency of an appeal, 14 and we see no reason why the foregoing considerations
should not apply to a temporary restraining order. The rationale therefor is that even in cases where an
appeal is taken from a judgment dismissing an action on the merits, the appeal does not suspend the
judgment, hence the general rule applies that a temporary injunction terminates automatically on the
dismissal of the action.15
It has similarly been held that an order of dissolution of an injunction may be immediately effective,
even though it is not final. 16 A dismissal, discontinuance, or non-suit of an action in which a restraining

order or temporary injunction has been granted operates as a dissolution of the restraining order or
temporary injunction 17 and no formal order of dissolution is necessary to effect such
dissolution. 18 Consequently, a special order of the court is necessary for the reinstatement of an
injunction. 19 There must be a new exercise of .judicial power. 20

The reason advanced in support of the general rule has long since been duly explained, to wit:
. . . The court of this State, relying upon the last of the two clauses quoted, held that
an appeal from an order dissolving an injunction continued the injunction in force.
The evils which would result from such a holding are forcibly pointed out by Judge
Mitchell in a dissenting opinion. He said: "Although a plaintiff's papers are so
insufficient on their face or so false in their allegations that if he should apply on
notice for an injunction, any court would, on a hearing, promptly refuse to grant one,
yet, if he can find anywhere in the State a judge or court commissioner who will
improvidently grant one ex parte, which the court on the first and only hearing ever
had dissolves, he can, by appealing and filing a bond, make the ex parte injunction
impervious to all judicial interference until the appeal is determined in this court." . . .
Such a result is so unjust and so utterly inconsistent with all known rules of equity
practice that no court should adopt such a construction unless absolutely shut up to it
by the clear and unequivocal language of the statute. . . . . 21
This ruling has remained undisturbed over the decades and was reiterated in a case squarely in
point and of more recent vintage:
The SEC's orders dated June 27, 1989 and July 21, 1989 (directing the secretary of
UDMC to call a stockholders' meeting, etc.) are not premature, despite the
petitioners then pending motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court of
Appeals. The lifting by the Court of Appeals of its writ of preliminary injunction in
C.A.-G.R. SP No. 17435 cleared the way for the implementation by the SEC's en
banc resolution in SEC EB Case No. 191. The SEC need not wait for the Court of
Appeals to resolve the petitioner's motion for reconsideration for a judgment
decreeing the dissolution of a preliminary injunction is immediately executory. It shall
not be stayed after its rendition and before an appeal is taken or during the pendency
of an appeal. . . . . 22
On the bases of the foregoing pronouncements, there is no question that with the dismissal of the
petition forcertiorari and the lifting of the restraining order, nothing stood to hinder the
Sandiganbayan from acting on and proceeding with the criminal cases filed against herein petitioner.
At any rate, as we have earlier mentioned, the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner was
denied with finality in our resolution dated September 10, 1992.
Petitioner further posits, however, that the filing of the instant special civil action
for certiorari divested the Sandiganbayan of its jurisdiction over the case therein. Whether generated
by misconception or design, we shall address this proposition which, in the first place, had no reason
for being and should not hereafter be advanced under like or similar procedural scenarios.

The original and special civil action filed with this Court is, for all intents and purposes, an invocation
for the exercise of its supervisory powers over the lower courts. It does not have the effect of
divesting the inferior courts of jurisdiction validly acquired over the case pending before them. It is
elementary that the mere pendency of a special civil action for certiorari, commenced in relation to a
case pending before a lower court, does not even interrupt the course of the latter when there is no
writ of injunction restraining it. 23 The inevitable conclusion is that for as long as no writ of injunction or
restraining order is issued in the special civil action for certiorari, no impediment exists and there is
nothing to prevent the lower court from exercising its jurisdiction and proceeding with the case pending
before it. And, even if such injunctive writ or order is issued, the lower court nevertheless continues to
retain its jurisdiction over the principal action.
III. It is further submitted by petitioner that the hold departure order violates her right to due process,
right to travel and freedom of speech.
First, it is averred that the hold departure order was issued without notice and hearing. Much is
made by petitioner of the fact that there was no showing that a motion to issue a hold departure
order was filed by the prosecution and, instead, the same was issued ex mero motu by the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner is in error.
Courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be implied from a general grant of
jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly conferred on them. 24 These inherent powers are such
powers as are necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; 25 or essential to the
existence, dignity and functions of the courts, 26 as well as to the due administration of justice; 27 or are
directly appropriate, convenient and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; 28 and include the
power to maintain the court's jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf of the litigants. 29
Therefore, while a court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its
jurisdiction, a grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and
usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and constitutional
provisions, every regularly constituted court has the power to do all things that are reasonably
necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction. Hence, demands,
matters, or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and coming within
the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and determined, since such
jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even though the court may thus be
called on to consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not be within its
cognizance.
Furthermore, a court has the inherent power to make interlocutory orders necessary to protect its
jurisdiction. 30Such being the case, with more reason may a party litigant be subjected to proper coercive
measures where he disobeys a proper order, or commits a fraud on the court or the opposing party, the
result of which is that the jurisdiction of the court would be ineffectual. What ought to be done depends
upon the particular circumstances. 31
Turning now to the case at bar, petitioner does not deny and, as a matter of fact, even made a public
statement that she had every intention of leaving the country allegedly to pursue higher studies
abroad. We uphold the course of action adopted by the Sandiganbayan in taking judicial notice of
such fact of petitioner's plan to go abroad and in thereafter issuing sua sponte the hold departure

order, in justified consonance with our preceding disquisition. To reiterate, the hold departure order is
but an exercise of respondent court's inherent power to preserve and to maintain the effectiveness of
its jurisdiction over the case and the person of the accused.
Second, petitioner asseverates that considering that she is leaving for abroad to pursue further
studies, there is no sufficient justification for the impairment of her constitutional right to travel; and
that under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, the right to travel may be impaired only
when so required in the interest of national security, public safety or public health, as may be
provided by law.
It will be recalled that petitioner has posted bail which we have declared legally valid and complete
despite the absence of petitioner at the time of filing thereof, by reason of the peculiar circumstances
and grounds hereinbefore enunciated and which warrant a relaxation of the aforecited doctrine
in Feliciano. Perforce, since under the obligations assumed by petitioner in her bail bond she holds
herself amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the court, she may legally be prohibited
from leaving the country during the pendency of the case. This was the ruling we handed down
in Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 32 to the effect that:
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and
given for the release of a person who is in custody of the law, that he will appear
before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail
bond or recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the burden of
keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as much
under the power of the court as if he were in custody of the proper officer, and to
secure the appearance of the accused so as to answer the call of the court and do
what the law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right
to travel. As we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935):
. . . the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold
the accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the
lower court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction
of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will
be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from
which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines
they would have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.

Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
This was reiterated in a more recent case where we held:
Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right
to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."
The submission is not well taken.
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while
the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion
to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security,
public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase
which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin, G., S.J.,
Vol. I, First Edition, 197, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution
was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime
when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to
travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga v. Hermoso & Travel
Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).
Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as
delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their
orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is
conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxiliary writs, processes and other means
necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135,
Section 6, Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by
preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid
restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law.
The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to
their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to
finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to
Court Orders and processes. 33
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity on the part of
petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses
before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from
this Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of their
original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated bylaw to be sought therein. This practice
must be stopped, not only because of the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also
because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of the case

which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We,
therefore, reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise of our primary
jurisdiction.
For the guidance of the bench and the bar, we elucidate that such policy includes the matter of
petitions or motions involving hold departure orders of the trial or lower courts. Parties with pending
cases therein should apply for permission to leave the country from the very same courts which, in
the first instance, are in the best position to pass upon such applications and to impose the
appropriate conditions therefor since they are conversant with the facts of the cases and the
ramifications or implications thereof. Where, as in the present case, a hold departure order has been
issued ex parte or motu propio by said court, the party concerned must first exhaust the appropriate
remedies therein, through a motion for reconsideration or other proper submissions, or by the filing
of the requisite application for travel abroad. Only where all the conditions and requirements for the
issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus indubitably obtain against a
disposition of the lower courts may our power of supervision over said tribunals be invoked through
the appropriate petition assailing on jurisdictional or clearly valid grounds their actuations therein.
WHEREFORE, with respect to and acting on the motion now before us for resolution, the same is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

# Footnotes
1 Annex 1, Consolidated Comment of Public Respondents.
2 Annex 2, id.
3 Rollo, Vol. II, 594.
4 Official Receipts Nos. 4292925, 5775510 and 3276456; Rollo, 595.
5 Annex 3, Consolidated Comment of Public Respondents.
6 Annex 4, id.
7 Annex 5, id.

8 Rollo, Vol. II, 599.

9 Ibid., Vol. I, 495.
10 Rollo, 644.
11 Rollo, 573.
12 Crespo vs. Mogul, et al., 151 SCRA 462 (1987).
13 Feliciano vs. Pasicolan, et al., 112 Phil. 781 (1961); Mendoza vs. Court of First
Instance of Quezon, et al., 51 SCRA 369 (1973).
14 Capistrano, et al. vs. Pea, et al., 78 Phil. 749 (1947).
15 State vs. Neveau, 295 NW 718.
16 Poole, et al., vs. Giles, et al., 248 SW 2d 464.
17 42 Am Jur 2d, Injunctions S291.
18 Rochelle vs. State, 75 So. 2d 268.
19 43A CJS, Judgments 617.
20 Chasnoff vs. Porto, et al., 99 A 2d 189.
21 A.S. Watson & Co., Ltd. vs. Enriquez, et al., 1 Phil. 480 (1902).
22 Crisostomo vs. Securities and Exchange Commission, et al., 179 SCRA 146
(1989).
23 Peza, et al. vs. Alikpala, etc., et al., 160 SCRA 31 (1988); Aparicio vs. Andal, et
al., 175 SCRA 569 (1989).
24 21 CJS, Courts 41.
25 State ex rel. Andrews, et al. vs. Superior Court of Maricopa County, et al., 5 P 2d
192.
26 In re Integration of Nebraska State Bar Association, 114 ALR 151.
27 Fuller vs. State, 57 So. 806.
28 Clark vs. Austin, 101 SW 2d 977.

29 21 CJS, Courts 134.

30 Ibid., 136-137.
31 In re Slimmer's Estate 169 NW 536.
32 142 SCRA 149 (1986).
33 Silverio vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 195 SCRA 760 (1991).