1)REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS.

VILLASOR
Facts:
A writ of execution
(a writ to put in force the sentence that the law has given)
was issued by the court against thefunds of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to satisfy
a judgment rendered against the Philippine Government.
Issue:
Whether or not the writ of execution, issued by respondent judge, is valid.
Held:
It was ruled that public funds cannot be the object of garnishment proceedings even if
the consent to be sued hadbeen previously granted and even if the State liability had
been adjudged. The universal rule that where the State givesits consent to be sued by
private parties either by general or special law, it may limit claimant's action 'only up to
thecompletion of proceedings anterior to the stage of execution' and that the power of
the Courts ends when the judgmentis rendered, since government funds and
properties may not be seized under writs of execution or garnishment
tosatisfy such judgments, is based on obvious considerations of public policy.
Disbursements of public funds must becovered by the corresponding appropriation
as required by law. The functions and public services rendered by the Statecannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of public funds from their
legitimate and specifi cobjects, as appropriated by law.
Begosa vs. PVA
Gaudencio A. Begosa,
plantiff-appellee,
vs. Chairman, Philippine Veterans Administration;and Members of the Board of
Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration,
defendants
appellants
.
Nature:
Appeal from a decision of the CFI of Manila
Date:
April 30, 1970
Ponente:
Fernando,
J.
Facts:

Plaintiff sought the aid of the judiciary to obtain the benefits to which he believed hewas
entitled under the Veterans Bill of Rights.

H e fi l e d h i s c l a i m f o r d i s a b i l i t y p e n s i o n o n M a rc h
4 , 1 9 5 5 b u t w a s e r ro n e o u s l y disapproved on June 21, 1955 due to his dishonorable
discharge from the army.

The Board of Administrators of PVA finally approved his claim on September 2,

1964,entitling him with a pension of P30 a month, to take effect on October 5 of that
year.

Believing that his pension should have taken effect back in 1955 when his claim
wasdisapproved, and that he is entitled to a higher pension of P50 (RA No. 1362
amendingSection 9 of RA No. 65) as a permanently incapacitated person, which was
increased toP100 a month when RP 1362 was amended by RA No. 1920 on June
22, 1957, Begosafiled a case against PVA in the Court of First Instance.

CFI ruled in favor plaintiff.

Defendants claim that the plaintiff has not exhausted all administrative
remediesbefore resorting to court action and that the plaintiffs claim is in reality a suit
againstt h e G o v e rn m e n t w h i c h c a n n o t b e e n t e r t a i n e d b y t h i s C o u r t f o r l a c
k o f j u r i s d i c t i o n because the Government has not given its consent.
Issue:
WON the SC can entertain the suit against PVA.
Held:
Yes.
Ratio:

Where a litigation may have adverse consequences on the public treasury, whetherin the
disbursements of funds or loss of property, the public official proceeded againstnot
being liable in his personal capacity, then the
doctrine of non-suitability
mayappropriately be invoked.

However, it has
no application where the suit against such a functionary hadt o b e i n s t i t u t e d
b e c a u s e o f h i s f a i l u re t o c o m p l y w i t h t h e d u t y i m p o s e d b y statue
appropriating public funds for the benefit of plaintiff.

Also, where there is a stipulation of facts, the question before the lower court
beings o l e l y o n e o f l a w a n d o n t h e f a c e o f t h e d e c i s i o n , t h e a c t u a t i o n o f
a p p e l l a n t s b e i n g patently illegal, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies certainly does notcome into play.
G.R. No. L-46930 June 10, 1988DALE SANDERS, AND A.S. MOREAU, JR
vs.
HON. REGINO T. VERIDIANO IIFACTS:
Petitioner Sanders was the special services director of the U.S.
Naval Station. Petitioner Moreau was thecommanding officer of the Subic
Naval Base. Private respondent Rossi is an American citizen with permanent residence
inthe Philippines.
Private respondent Rossi and Wyer were both employed as game room attendants in the
special servicesdepartment of the NAVSTA.On October 3, 1975, the private respondents
were advised that their employment had been converted from permanentfulltime to permanent part-time. They instituted grievance proceedings to the

rules and regulations of the U.S.Department of Defense. The hearing officer

recommended for reinstatement of their permanent full-time status.However, in a
letter addressed to petitioner Moreau, Sanders disagreed with the hearing
offi cer's report. The lettercontained the statements that: a ) "Mr. Rossi tends to
alienate most co-workers and supervisors;" b) "Messrs. Rossi andWyers have proven,
according to their immediate supervisors, to be diffi cult employees to
supervise;" and c) "eventhough the grievants were under oath not to discuss the case
with anyone, (they) placed the records in public placeswhere others not involved in the
case could hear."Before the start of the grievance hearings, a-letter from
petitioner Moreau was sent to the Chief of Naval Personnel explaining the change
of the private respondent's employment status. So, private respondent filed for damages
allegingthat the letters contained libelous imputations and that the prejudgment of
the grievance proceedings was an invasion of their personal and proprietary
rights.However, petitioners argued that the acts complained of were performed by them
in the discharge of their official dutiesand that, consequently, the court had no
jurisdiction over them under the doctrine of state immunity. However, the motionwas
denied on the main ground that the petitioners had not presented any evidence that
their acts were official in nature.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners were performing their official duties?
RULING:
Yes. Sanders, as director of the special services department of NAVSTA, undoubtedly had
supervision over itspersonnel, including the private respondents. Given the official
character of the letters, the petitioners were being sued asofficers of the United States
government because they have acted on behalf of that government and within the scope
of their authority. Thus, it is that government and not the petitioners personally that is
responsible for their acts.It is stressed at the outset that the mere allegation that a
government functionary is being sued in his personal capacitywill not automatically
remove him from the protection of the law of public officers and, if appropriate, the
doctrine of stateimmunity. By the same token, the mere invocation of official character
will not suffice to insulate him from suability andliability for an act imputed to him as a
personal tort committed without or in excess of his authority. These well-settledprinciples
are applicable not only to the officers of the local state but also where the person sued in
its courts pertains tothe government of a foreign state, as in the present case.Assuming
that the trial can proceed and it is proved that the claimants have a right to the payment
of damages, suchaward will have to be satisfied not by the petitioners in their personal
capacities but by the United States government astheir principal. This
will require that government to perform an affi rmative act to satisfy
the judgment,
viz,
theappropriation of the necessary amount to cover the damages awarded, thus
making the action a suit against thatgovernment without its consent.
Re p u b l i c v. P u r i s i m a
Fa c t s :
A motion to dismiss was filed on September 7, 1972 by defendant Rice and Corn
Administration in a pending civil suit inthe sala of respondent Judge for the collection of a
money claim arising from an alleged breach of contract, the plaintiff being private
respondent Yellow Ball Freight Lines, Inc. At that time, the leading case of Mobil
Philippines Exploration,Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Service, where Justice Bengzon stressed
the lack of jurisdiction of a court to pass on the meritsof a claim against any office or

entity acting as part of the machinery of the national government unless consent
beshown, had been applied in 53 other decisions. Respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima
of the Court of First Instance of Manila denied the motion to dismiss dated October 4,
1972. Hence, the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
Issue:
WON the respondents decision is valid
Ruling:
No.
Rationale:
The position of the Republic has been fortified with the explicit affirmation found in this
provision of the presentConstitution: "The State may not be sued without its
consent.""The doctrine of non-suability recognized in this jurisdiction even prior to the
effectivity of the [1935] Constitution is alogical corollary of the positivist concept of law
which, to para-phrase Holmes, negates the assertion of any legal right asagainst the
state, in itself the source of the law on which such a right may be predicated. Nor is this
all, even if such aprinciple does give rise to problems, considering the vastly expanded
role of government enabling it to engage in businesspursuits to promote the general
welfare, it is not obeisance to the analytical school of thought alone that calls for
itscontinued applicability. Nor is injustice thereby cause private parties. They could
still proceed to seek collection of theirmoney claims by pursuing the statutory remedy of
having the Auditor General pass upon them subject to appeal to judicial tribunals for final
adjudication. We could thus correctly conclude as we did in the cited Providence
WashingtonInsurance decision: "Thus the doctrine of non-suability of the government
without its consent, as it has operated inpractice, hardly lends itself to the charge that it
could be the fruitful parent of injustice, considering the vast and ever-widening scope of
state activities at present being undertaken. Whatever difficulties for private claimants
may still exist,is, from an objective appraisal of all factors, minimal. In the balancing of
interests, so unavoidable in the determination of what principles must prevail if
government is to satisfy the public weal, the verdict must be, as it has been these so
manyyears, for its continuing recognition as a fundamental postulate of constitutional
law." [
Switzerland General Insurance Co.,Ltd. v. Republic of the Philippines]
***The consent, to be effective, must come from the State acting through a duly enacted
statute as pointed out byJustice Bengzon in Mobil. Thus, whatever counsel for defendant
Rice and Corn Administration agreed to had no bindingforce on the government
Santiago vs Republic
on October 26, 2011
Constitutional Law Immunity of the State from Suit
On 20 Jan 1971, Santiago gratuitously donated a parcel of land to the Bureau of Plant
Industry. The terms of the donation are; that the Bureau should construct a building on
the said lot and that the building should be finished by December 7, 1974, that the
Bureau should install lighting facilities on the said lot. However, come 1976 there were
still no improvements on the lot. This prompted Santiago to file a case pleading for the
revocation of such contract of donation. The trial court dismissed the petition claiming
that it is a suit against the government and should not prosper without the consent of
the government.
ISSUE: Whether or not the state has not waived its immunity from suit.
HELD: The government has waived its immunity and such waiver is implied by virtue of
the terms provided in the deed of donation. The government is a beneficiary of the terms

of the donation. But the government through the Bureau has breached the terms of the
deed by not complying with such, therefore, the donor Santiago has the right to have his
day in court and be heard. Further, to not allow the donor to be heard would be unethical
and contrary to equity which the government so advances. Case should prosper.