March 23, 2015

City & County of San Francisco

Office of Citizen Complaints
25 Van Ness Ave., Suite 700
San Francisco, CA 94102
Re:

New Citizen Complaint re SFPD Joint Terrorism Task Force interaction with Mr.
Sarmad Gilani

Dear Office of Citizen Complaints (OCC),

My name is Brice Hamack and I am the Northern California Civil Rights Coordinator for the
Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). Along with my co-complainant, Ms. Nasrina
Bargzie, Senior Staff Attorney with Asian Americans Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus
(ALC), we submit this citizen complaint in regard to an incident occurring on June 4, 2014
between a San Francisco City and County resident, Mr. Sarmad Gilani; a San Francisco Police
Department (SFPD) inspector, Mr. Gavin McEachern; and a Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI) agent, identity unknown.
I.

Incident Details

On June 4, 2014, Mr. Sarmad Gilanis employer instructed him to go to his offices reception
lobby to meet with several law enforcement officers asking to see him. Upon arriving in the
lobby Mr. Gilani was greeted by an unknown FBI agent and a Mr. Gavin McEachern. The FBI
agent introduced Mr. McEachern to Mr. Gilani as an SFPD inspector working with the FBI. The
two law enforcement officials asked Mr. Gilani if they could speak to him in a more secluded
area. Mr. Gilani declined and expressed his interest in keeping the encounter in the lobbys open
public setting.
Inspector McEachern and the unidentified FBI agent engaged in small talk with Mr. Gilani, and
after a few minutes the unidentified FBI agent told Mr. Gilani that he and Inspector McEachern
were there to follow up on a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request Mr. Gilani filed
concerning recent travel issues. The unidentified FBI agent expressed sympathy over the travel
issues underlying his FOIA request, but stated that they needed to make sure Mr. Gilani was not
just someone who has delusions of being persecuted.
Inspector McEachern then began asking Mr. Gilani questions about his past travels, including his
trips to Pakistan and the United Arab Emirates. Mr. Gilani immediately responded that if the law
enforcement officials wished to speak with him about his past travels they needed to contact Mr.
Brice Hamack, his attorney of record. Despite Inspector McEachern acknowledging this
statement, stating something to the effect of yes, we know Brice Hamack is your attorney, he
ignored Mr. Gilanis request and continued asking questions.

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March 2015

In total, Mr. Gilani politely and assertively told Inspector McEachern he did not want to answer
his questions and to contact his attorney Mr. Brice Hamack four to five times. Yet each time Mr.
Gilani asked to end the interview and directed the law enforcement officers to his attorney,
Inspector McEachern would expressly acknowledge that he understood the request but continue
asking questions as follows:

After one instance of Mr. Gilani asking to end the interview and directing the law
enforcement officers to his attorney, Inspector McEachern responded by asking what Mr.
Gilanis thoughts were on the recent release of Sergeant Bowe Bergdahl in Central Asia.
In response to Mr. Gilani again asking to end the interview and directing the law
enforcement officers to his attorney, Inspector McEachern responded with something to
the effect of, yes we understand, dont worry about giving me perfect information,
anything you can give us to help us would be great.
In response to Mr. Gilani again asking to end the interview and directing the law
enforcement officers to his attorney, Inspector McEachern said something to the effect of,
we dont understand this area [Pakistan], but we understand youve visited there. We
dont know much about it and could really use some more intelligence on the ground.
In response to Mr. Gilani yet again asking to end the interview and directing the law
enforcement officers to his attorney, the FBI agent asked him questions about what
restaurants he eats at in Pakistan, where he visits, who he sees, etc.

Mr. Gilani had to ask to end the interview and direct the law enforcement officers to his attorney
about half a dozen times to finally get Inspector McEachern to stop questioning him. Inspector
McEachern then handed Mr. Gilani his business card, at which point he and the unidentified FBI
agent left.
During the interaction Mr. Gilani could see inside the unidentified FBI agents notebook as he
began to take notes on the conversation. Already written inside the notebook was the acronym
PKKH, a Pakistani news/media outlet through which several of Mr. Gilanis blog posts had
been published. Mr. Gilani also noticed inside the notebook Brice Hamack, CAIR, Mr.
Gilanis retained attorney and the legal organization for which Mr. Hamack works.
II.

Applicable SFPD Policies and Standards

The SFPDs participation in the FBIs JTTF is pursuant to a Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) between the two agencies. In 2011, Police Chief Greg Suhr issued SFPD Bureau Order
No. 2011-07 clarifying that under the MOU SFPD personnel assigned to the JTTF must comply
with Department policies at all times. Additionally, in 2012, San Francisco Administrative
Code Section 2A.74, known as the Safe San Francisco Civil Rights Ordinance (the Ordinance),
was enacted to further clarify the SFPDs boundaries in JTTF participation. The Ordinance
allows SFPD JTTF participation:
[O]nly in a manner that is fully consistent with the laws of the State of
California, including but not limited to the inalienable right to privacy
guaranteed by Article 1, Section 1 of the California Constitution, as well
as the laws and policies of the City and County of San Francisco and, as

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March 2015

applicable to the Police Department, that Departments policies,

procedures, and orders.1

For over thirty years local law has required all SFPD conduct be subjected to independent
civilian oversight. Voter enacted Charter Section 4.127, and SFPD General Order (DGO) 2.04
and 2.01, require all civilian misconduct complaints be independently investigated by the OCC,
and that SFPD members provide the OCC prompt and full cooperation and assistance in those
investigations. These provisions apply to all SFPD personnel, including those assigned to the
JTTF.
SFPD policy has for decades included strong and specific protections against gathering
intelligence on First Amendment activities absent reasonable suspicion of serious criminal
activity; and even when permitted, only under a system requiring multiple layers of written
authorizations from command personnel and independent civilian oversight. These guidelines
are currently codified in DGO 8.10, Guidelines for First Amendment Activities. DGO 8.10
was crafted in a lengthy, collaborative effort involving the SFPD, civil rights organizations, and
the Human Rights Commission, and was designed to prevent any repeat of prior episodes of over
broad and inappropriate intelligence gathering by the SFPDsometimes by the SFPD alone and
other times in collaboration with the FBI. DGO 8.10 applies to all SFPD personnel, including
those assigned to the JTTF.
DGO 8.10 states it is SFPD policy to ensure that the United States Constitutions First
Amendment rights are protected for all individuals, and to permit police involvement in the
exercise of those rights only to the extent necessary to provide for the legitimate needs of law
enforcement in investigating criminal activity.2 This passage provides that there is a general
prohibition of SFPD involvement in First Amendment activities, which can only be overcome if
necessary to further a criminal investigation.
In addition to overcoming the necessary requirement, DGO 8.10 further provides that SFPD
officers may only take part in a criminal investigation involving First Amendment activities
when additional certain enumerated criteria are satisfied. For such an investigation to take place,
the suspect must first be planning or engaged in criminal activity which could reasonably be
expected to result in bodily injury and/or property damage in excess of $2500 or which
constitutes a felony or misdemeanor hate crime. . . .3 In addition, the First Amendment
activities being investigated must be relevant to the criminal investigation.4
To further protect information on First Amendment activities that may be gathered by SFPD
personnel, DGO 8.10 prohibits the SFPD from collect[ing] or maintain[ing] information of a
personal nature that does not relate to a criminal investigation. In the absence of a specific
investigation authorized under these guidelines [DGO 8.10], the Department [SFPD] shall not
collect or maintain information on First Amendment activities.5

San Francisco, California, Administrative Code 2A.74(b) (2012) (emphasis added).

Gen. Order No. 8.10, San Francisco Police Dept. I.A (2008) (emphasis added).
3
Gen. Order No. 8.10, San Francisco Police Dept. I.B.1 (2008).
4
Gen. Order No. 8.10, San Francisco Police Dept. I.B.2 (2008).
5
Gen. Order No. 8.10, San Francisco Police Dept. IX.A.2 (2008).
2

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In stark contrast, the FBI operates under guidelines permitting them to collect and retain in their
intelligence databases information about First Amendment activities when conducting
assessments involving no particular factual predication (i.e., suspicion of criminal activity),
or when pursuing preliminary investigations involving a factual predicate but no reasonable
suspicion. Yet while working under the command and direct day-to-day supervision of FBI
personnel, SFPD members assigned to the JTTF must avoid all participation in these common
FBI information and intelligence gathering assessments and investigations, and instead adhere
strictly to DGO 8.10s standards and procedures.
Ensuring all SFPD personnel strictly adhere to these restrictions, DGO 8.10 requires that
information gathering involving First Amendment activity take place only after the member
involved submits a written request seeking authorization that documents his or her reasonable
suspicion, and obtains written authorizations from three levels of the SFPDs chain of
command.6 If the information gathering involves First Amendment activities, these
authorizations must be obtained before interviews are sought with the subject, publicly-available
information is sought and reviewed, and/or the records of other government or law enforcement
agencies are examined.7
Recognizing the sensitivity of any law enforcement involvement in First Amendment activities,
DGO 8.10 requires regular, independent civilian oversight of these provisions with monthly
review of all DGO 8.10 requests and authorizations by a Police Commissioner, as well as annual
audits by the OCC.8 The OCCs 2014 annual audit states that no requests or authorizations had
been located.9
SFPD DGO 5.17, Policy Prohibiting Biased Policing, prohibits the use, to any extent or
degree, of actual or perceived race, color, ethnicity, national origin, [or] religion . . . in
determining whether to initiate any law enforcement action in the absence of a specific suspect
description.10 The policy emphasizes that it is crucial for members to eliminate any
perception of bias, and is intended to clarify the very limited, suspect-specific circumstances
when factors like national origin or religion may be considered when making law enforcement
decisions.11 In sharp contrast, the analogous federal policy covering FBI activities carves out a
major exception for intelligence gathering of the sort conducted by the JTTF.12 Again, SFPD
officers assigned to the JTTF must follow the much stricter San Francisco anti-bias policy.
In 2011 and 2012and as documented in a number of hearings and voluminous correspondence
with various public bodiesthe local FBI repeatedly informed our organizations and the ACLU
that under its MOU with the SFPD covering JTTF activity it had authority to prevent direct, local
6

Gen. Order No. 8.10, San Francisco Police Dept. I.C.2, III (2008).
Gen. Order No. 8.10, San Francisco Police Dept. IV.B (2008).
8
Gen. Order No. 8.10, San Francisco Police Dept. VI (2008).
9
2014 SAN FRANCISCO POLICE COMMISSION OCC ANN. DGO 8.10 AUDIT 2.
10
Gen. Order No. 5.17, San Francisco Police Dept. (2011) (emphasis added).
11
Gen. Order No. 5.17, San Francisco Police Dept. (2011).
12
See GUIDANCE FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES REGARDING THE USE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, GENDER,
NATIONAL ORIGIN, RELIGION, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, OR GENDER IDENTITY, U.S. Department of Justice (December
2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/pages/attachments/2014/12/08/use-of-racepolicy.pdf
7

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civilian oversight of SFPD activities within the JTTF. We were told the FBI would try to
prohibit SFPD personnel assigned to the JTTF from cooperating with any OCC investigations
involving the SFPDs JTTF work, and would prohibit the DGO 8.10 provisions requiring written
SFPD authorizations being sought, retained at SFPD, and subject to local civilian review, from
being applied to SFPD JTTF activities. While this would violate Bureau Order No. 2011-07 and
the Ordinance requiring all local laws and policies apply to SFPD JTTF activities, the FBI and
SFPD have consistently claimed that no SFPD officer would ever be involved in JTTF matters
that come close to implicating DGO 8.10s standards and procedures. Those prior assurances
notwithstanding, it is clear that local law and policy require the SFPD to cooperate fully with the
OCCs investigation into the allegations listed below.
III.

Allegations

To ensure we receive findings on each of the following, we respectfully request the OCC fully
investigate the following separate allegations.
A. UNWARRANTED ACTION: Inspector McEacherns participation in interviewing
Mr. Gilani violated DGO 8.10.
Inspector McEachern violated DGO 8.10 by participating in the questioning of Mr. Gilani, by
collecting and/or reviewing information involving or touching upon Mr. Gilanis First
Amendment activities, and/or by contributing to the creation of records regained by the JTTF,
FBI, and/or other federal agencies involving Mr. Gilanis First Amendment activities in the
absence of reasonable suspicion of significant criminal activity involving Mr. Gilani and any
relevance of his First Amendment activities to that suspicion.
The First Amendment activities covered by DGO 8.10 are defined broadly by the policy to
include everything covered by the scope of the federal First Amendment and similar California
constitution provisions.13 The information sought and/or already gathered by SFPD Inspector
McEachern and his FBI JTTF colleague involved these sorts of First Amendment activities.
First, filing a FOIA request is petitioning the government for redress of grievances, protected
under the First Amendment. Second, working with and associating oneself with a civil rights
organization like CAIR to pursue a FOIA request is protected under the First Amendment.
Third, the First Amendment right to association covers the right to travel. Fourth, writing blog
posts published or republished by PKKH, or any other outlet, is speech protected by the First
Amendment. Fifth, Mr. Gilanis personal viewpoint, if any, about events in the news like the
release of Sergeant Bergdahlwhich Inspector McEachern specifically asked him aboutis
protected by the First Amendment.
The principle is simple and the standards are clear. SFPD personnel cannot engage in JTTF
activities that they could not engage in on their own independent of FBI involvement.
Regardless if the FBI considers the JTTFs interview of Mr. Gilani to be proper under their
guidelines, and/or if the records created from the JTTFs questioning and review of Mr. Gilani
are now maintained only in FBI and federal files and databases, SFPD personnel should not be
13

Gen. Order No. 8.10, San Francisco Police Dept. II.A (2008).

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involved at all in such activity in the absence of articulable reasonable suspicion of significant
criminal activity defined by DGO 8.10.
B. NEGLECT OF DUTY: Inspector McEacherns failure to submit required written
authorization requests violated DGO 8.10.
Even if Inspector McEachern reasonably or unreasonably believed he could properly participate
in the JTTF interview of Mr. Gilani, given its clear involvement with First Amendment
activities he violated DGO 8.10 by failing to submit the required written request for
authorization, and for proceeding by examining records involving Mr. Gilanis First Amendment
activities (e.g., his FOIA request, blog posts, travel history, contacts with CAIR, etc.) and asking
Mr. Gilani for his opinion about Sergeant Berghdahls release before receiving such
authorization from his commanders.
Even if there was somehow reasonable suspicionundetectable to us or Mr. Gilanior even if
Inspector McEachern mistakenly believed he did not need reasonable suspicion or a criminal
nexus to proceed, it was unambiguous that this JTTF inquiry involved Mr. Gilanis First
Amendment activities, and that participation in the inquiry required prior written authorization
from his commanding officers.
Note: This allegation is based on the assumption that no written request for authorization was
submitted because none was reported in the SFPDs 2014 DGO 8.10 audit. If the OCCs
investigation reveals that a written request was submitted, but not retained by SFPD for review
by the designated Police Commissioner and subject to the annual audit, please consider this an
allegation against the unnamed member who failed to retain it properly.
C. UNWARRANTED ACTION: Inspector McEacherns involvement in the JTTFs
contact and review of Mr. Gilani violated DGO 5.17s prohibition against biased
policing.
When making law enforcement decisions or initiating actions, DGO 5.17 strictly limits a SFPD
members use or consideration, at all, of an individuals actual or perceived race, ethnicity,
national origin, or religion to circumstances involving a specific suspect description. Mr. Gilani
was not a suspect. Furthermore, it is quite apparent from the context, questions, and mission of
the JTTF that his travels to Pakistan and perceived Pakistani national origin and/or Muslim faith
factored into the decision to contact and review information related to him. The FBI has an
intelligence interest in religious-related terrorism activity in Pakistan, so the JTTF targeted a man
they perceive to be of Pakistan origin and Muslim faith. FBI policy may permit this sort of over
broad, biased, general intelligence gathering aimed squarely at Muslims and people of certain
national origins, but SFPD policy strictly prohibits it.
Our organizations are curious to know if as part of their JTTF duties Inspector McEachern and/or
his SFPD JTTF colleague contact international travelers to predominantly non-Muslim countries,
simply because they file a FOIA request. Does Inspector McEachern and/or his JTTF colleague
ever contact a non-AMEMSA14 community member who filed a FOIA request to relieve travel
14

Arab, Middle Eastern, Muslim and South Asian (AMEMSA).

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March 2015

difficulties? If not, then perceptions about Mr. Gilanis faith and/or national origin were likely
factored into the decision to contact him. If an Irish Catholic can travel freely to Ireland and
submit a FOIA request to the federal government without any risk of SFPDs JTTF personnel
showing up unannounced at his or her work place for questioning, then San Francisco Muslims
of Pakistani descent are entitled to the same treatment by the SFPD. Anything short of that
violates DGO 5.17 and undermines the community trust and confidence in the SFPD that this
important policy is designed to protect.
D. NEGLECT OF DUTY: If the OCC fails to receive prompt and full cooperation from
SFPD members in investigating this complaint, such failure to cooperate would
violate DGO 2.04 and 2.01.
As a matter of long-established routine and procedure, the duty to fully cooperate includes
named member(s) fully and honestly responding to all OCC investigator questions about the
incident under investigation, and a review of any relevant documents or records created by the
member or involving his or her activities. Both the Ordinance and Bureau Order No. 2011-07
make clear that there is no exception to the duty to fully cooperate with OCC investigations for
SFPDs JTTF personnel or any immunity from local civilian review of their JTTF activities.
This duty applies both to named members and to commanding officers who must ensure that the
officers they supervise are not put in positions where they are unable to fulfill this legal
obligation.
If the FBI attempts to prevent Inspector McEachern from cooperating fully with the OCC
investigation, possibly under threat of expulsion from the JTTF or revocation of his security
clearancenotwithstanding the fact that there was nothing covert or secret about the JTTFs
contact with Mr. Gilaniwe leave it to the OCC to determine the appropriate named member(s)
or supervisor(s) who should be held accountable for the SFPDs failure to cooperate with the
OCC as required by policy and law. The OCC should have the same access to Inspector
McEachern as it has to other officers in other situations and to records he participated in creating
regarding this incident, regardless of whether or not they are in FBI possession.
Anything short of such cooperation would violate DGO 2.04 and the promise inherent in Bureau
Order No. 2011-07 and the Ordinance that all local legal obligations would be fully enforced
against SFPDs JTTF personnel.
E. NEGLECT OF DUTY/CONDUCT REFLECTING DISCREDIT ON THE
DEPARTMENT: Unnamed members of command staff failed to adequately
supervise the activities of SFPDs JTTF personnel.
The SFPD has repeatedly emphasized in its public reports about its JTTF activities that it
believes the FBI, notwithstanding their very different policies and priorities, has been careful to
ensure that it does not assign SFPD officers to JTTF activities possibly implicating DGOs 8.10
and 5.17. The incident involving Mr. Gilani strongly suggests that such confidence in the FBI
was severely misplaced, and that SFPD supervisors failed to adequately review the activities and
records of its JTTF personnel to ensure they did not at all involve First Amendment activities
triggering DGO 8.10s standards and procedures, and did not involve officers violating DGO
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5.17s ban on biased policing by going along with the FBIs common use of religion and
national origin as proxies for actual suspicion.
SFPD supervisors failed to ensure that SFPD JTTF personnel are not improperly participating in
the collection of information about the First Amendment activities of San Francisco residents,
workers, and visitors, such as Mr. Gilaniinformation that is then retained in FBI and/or other
federal databases. This activity by SFPD personnelin the face of repeated public assurances
that nothing of the sort has been taking placebrings discredit upon the department and harms
community trust and confidence in the SFPD.
Given the FBIs prior lack of concern and familiarity with SFPD policy, and given their on-going
refusal to appear at any local public hearings to address these issues and hear community
concerns,15 SFPD command staff should have known that more active independent supervision
and oversight was necessary to ensure full SFPD compliance with local law and policy.
F. CONDUCT REFLECTING DISCREDIT: Inspector McEacherns conduct toward
Mr. Gilani on June 4, 2014 lacked courtesy and respect and thus violated DGO 2.01,
and potentially infringed on Mr. Gilanis Fifth Amendment rights.
By needlessly and intimidatingly showing up at Mr. Gilanis workplace unannounced, and by
continuing to question him after he had repeatedly made clear he was represented by an attorney,
that he would not answer their highly offensive questions and that they should contact his
attorney, Inspector McEachern violated his duty to treat members of the public with courtesy
and respect,16 and potentially infringed on Mr. Gilanis Fifth Amendment rights.17
Separate and apart from violations of DGOs 8.10 and 5.17, SFPDs JTTF personnel must
remember they ultimately represent the SFPD, and that adopting common FBI tactics may
improperly bring discredit on and undermine public confidence in the department. The FBIs
standards of behavior towards the public should not be mirrored by SFPD personnel. Our
organizations are very familiar with FBI JTTF tactics. It is sadly quite common for the FBI to
seek voluntary cooperation through intimidation tactics such as unnecessary and unannounced
visits to workplaces and simply ignoring repeated insistence from interviewees that the FBI
contact his or her attorney rather than continue the questioning.
The FBI has redefined itself as primarily a national security rather than a law enforcement
agency, and openly argues that their ends justify their means. They are simply less dependent on
or accountable to any particular local community in carrying out their mission. That is not true
for the SFPD or any other local police department for whom local community trust and
confidence is central to its effectiveness. Merely because the FBI wants its JTTF officers to be
discourteously persistent and needlessly intimidating, even in the absence of any exigency or any
In fact, according to Police Chief Greg Suhrs recent public remarks, the FBI did not even provide him with a
courtesy reply after inviting the current FBI Special Agent in Charge to the Police Commissions February public
hearing on the annual JTTF report.
16
Gen. Order No. 2.01, San Francisco Police Dept. 14 (2005).
17
The Supreme Court of the United States has held inherent in the Fifth Amendments right against selfincrimination is the right to remain silent and to the presence of an attorney during certain law enforcement
interactions. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
15

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actual suspicion of criminal behavior, does not mean SFPD officers representing the department
should follow suit and ignore their own behavioral standards.
Note: Should the OCC determine there is insufficient specific policy guidance on this point to
sustain this allegation, we encourage you to consider making a policy recommendation, beyond
well-established DGO 8.10 and 5.17 standards, regarding the behavior of SFPD personnel
working with the FBI to ensure that common FBI tactics implemented by SFPD do not bring
discredit on the department.
G. CONDUCT REFLECTING DISCREDIT: The factually inaccurate statements in
SFPDs recent Annual Report on Involvement in the FBI JTTF were avoidable,
misleading, and harm public confidence in the Department.
The Ordinance requires that by January 31 of each year the Chief of Police provide the Police
Commission a public report detailing the Police Departments involvement with the JTTF,
including any issues related to compliance with this Section.18 Compliance with the Ordinance
includes conducting investigations in a manner fully consistent with DGO 8.10. Thus any
investigations raising issues with DGO 8.10 should be listed in the SFPDs annual public report.
In the SFPDs 2014 Annual Report on Involvement in the FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force (the
Report), the SFPD states that [t]here were no violations, or possible violations of the Ordinance
in 2014.19 The Report also states that its members assigned to the JTTF do not engage in
interviews regarding solely constitutionally protected activities.20 Finally, the Report states that
it would not provide the names of SFPD officers currently assigned to the JTTF as it would
compromise their security, privacy, and safety.21
In light of Inspector McEacherns participation in the interview with Mr. Gilani, the unnamed
members of the SFPD responsible for the Reports preparation and presentation should not have
falsely claimed that there were no possible violations of the Ordinance in 2014, and that SFPD
members assigned to the JTTF do not engage in interviews regarding solely constitutionally
protected activities. The report should also not have falsely claimed it would compromise the
security, privacy, and safety of the SFPD officers currently assigned to the JTTF to reveal their
identity when, as appropriate and required by Bureau Order No. 2011-07, they provide their
business cards clearly identifying themselves, as they did with Mr. Gilani, and when Inspector
McEachern publicly lists his current JTTF assignment on LinkedIn.22 These sorts of false claims
and unnecessary obfuscations foster mistrust in the SFPD.
IV.

Conclusion

SFPD Inspector McEacherns interview of Mr. Gilani on June 4, 2014 targeted solely his First
Amendment activity as defined in DGO 8.10. Because the interview did not meet DGO 8.10s
enumerated criteria for First Amendment activity related information gathering it violated the
18

San Francisco, California, Administrative Code 2A.74(d) (2012).

2014 SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPT. ANN. JTTF REP. 1.
20
2014 SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPT. ANN. JTTF REP. 6.
21
2014 SAN FRANCISCO POLICE DEPT. ANN. JTTF REP. 6.
22
https://www.linkedin.com/pub/gavin-mceachern/24/409/698
19

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Order. In doing so, and additionally because the interview was in a manner inconsistent with the
United States and California constitutions, the Ordinance was violated. Furthermore, Inspector
McEacherns refusal to comply with Mr. Gilanis requests to end the interview and contact his
attorney was disrespectful and discourteous in violation of DGO 2.01, and the nature of the
questions suggests the interview was conducted based on Mr. Gilanis Pakistani heritage and
Islamic religious beliefs in violation of DGO 5.17.
Due to the nature of SFPD Inspector McEacherns interview of Mr. Gilanis First Amendment
activity, DGO 8.10 further required him to request written authorization before engaging in the
information gathering. The OCCs Audit states that no such requests were made and granted,
nor were any made and denied. Therefore SFPD Inspector McEachern either failed to follow
protocol and request authorization for his interview, the Audit did not inspect all documents
under SFPD control, or the SFPD relinquished control of such documents before the Audit was
conducted. Any one of which is greatly concerning.
Moreover, due to the nature of SFPD Inspector McEacherns interview, the SFPDs Report
should have listed it as a violation, or possible violation of the Ordinance, and as an interview
regarding solely constitutionally protected activities. The Report fails to list the interview in
response to either of these prompts, and thus its legitimacy is called into question.
We request an immediate investigation into this incident, including a determination of violations,
and the absence of the incident in the OCCs Audit, audit process, and the SFPDs Report. All
questions and requests for information from Mr. Sarmad Gilani should be directed to Brice
Hamack.
Sincerely,
/s/ Brice Hamack

/s/ Nasrina Bargzie

Brice Hamack, Esq.

Northern California Civil Rights Coordinator
CAIR-California
3000 Scott Blvd., Ste. 101
Santa Clara, CA 95054
Bhamack@cair.com
(408) 986-9874

Nasrina Bargzie, Esq.

Senior Staff Attorney
Advancing Justice-Asian Law Caucus
55 Columbus Ave.
San Francisco, CA 94111
Nasrinab@advancingjustice-alc.org
(415) 848-7733

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