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RESEARCH ARTICLE
LIU Dachun,
LIU Yongmou
Abstract
been
Richard Rorty, and Michel Foucault, summarizing the similarities and differences
between alternative philosophies of science and traditional philosophy of science
so as
to unveil
breakthroughs in terms of its field of vision, scope, and methodology, and its
relationship with science has become more humanistic and pluralistic. Attention
should be given to alternative perspectives in the contemporary philosophy of
science, and research should be expanded into the fields of the epistemology of
science and cognitive science, the sociology of scientific knowledge
and
scientific anthropology, the scientific cultural philosophy, and scientific ethics.
alternative philosophy of science, traditional philosophy of science,
Keywords
Paul Feyerabend, Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault
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Introduction
than 30 years ago, Feyerabend said that the philosophy of science was a
subject with a great past, but no future (Feyerabend 1999, pp. 127-137). From the
More
philosophers of science and some later, but all have stirred up discussion and led
new trends in the field. In addition, there are a group of contemporary scholars
active in the philosophy of science, including Agassi, Haack, and Hess, who do
not belong to the alternative category but who are deeply influenced by the
Feyerabend:
of "farewell to reason"
so-called
alternative thinking is
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578
establishment
mechanisms
mercilessly
rejecting the principle of falsification and holding that "a strict
of
falsification, or a 'naive falsificationism' as Lakatos called it,would
principle
as we know it and would never have permitted it to start"
out
science
wipe
(Feyerabend 1975, p. 176). Feyerabend also strongly opposed political rule by
1
In 1987, Feyerabend
impact on traditional
was
philosophy
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579
"experts", demanding that intellectuals be cleared out from the centre stage of
social life; he claimed that non-professionals should intervene in the activity of
science, believing that this could lead to a liberal society. Feyerabend also argued
that science should be separated from the government in case science might
intervene in and encroach upon freedom. In fact, the later Feyerabend turned
to pondering human freedom and
criticizing science and philosophy
from
happiness.
Feyerabend is famous for his "against method", and for asserting "anything
goes". Based on careful and rigorous analysis and criticism of the history of
an alternative anarchic epistemology
and
established
science, Feyerabend
an anarchic
pluralistic methodology. He considered science to be essentially
their
have
felt
that
all
and
limitations; we must
methodologies
enterprise
a
therefore abandon methodological monism, adopting
pluralistic methodology
is a free practice and
characterized by divergence and openness. Science
scientific discovery has no absolute laws to follow; science is always utilizing the
and results of non-science to enrich itself.He wrote that "Looking at the
actual historical situation we see that science was advanced inmany different
In
ways and that scientific problems were attacked by many differentmethods.
to seems to be: 'anything
practice the only principle that is constantly adhered
that
statement
His
"anything goes" first
1999, p. 122).
(Feyerabend
goes'"
and a democratic
environment
academic
a
free
and
kind
of
easy
represents
scientific spirit which opposes academic arbitrariness. Feyerabend discovered
that the traditional philosophy of science had changed science into a kind of
of natural science to its special
myth and had attributed the superiority
was
not
good for the development of science. He
system, which
methodological
said that although existing scientific methods have their value, ifwe insist that
science must be done only according to them,we could only obtain the opposite
methods
effect. Of course, the existing theories and methods which have already been
affirmed by the philosophy of science should not be negated altogether; rather,
no methods should be treated as dogmatic and programmable even if they are
effective in scientific practice. For a scientist, the most important thing is to
even negating it.
choose; this includes daring to refute the existing method, and
more the particularity of science, comparing it to the
Feyerabend emphasized
on generality and instrumental
which
tradition
greater emphasis
placed
to the particularity of her or his
attention
characteristics. A scientist should pay
scientific practice; toomuch attention to the instrumental, to abstract features and
science. Therefore, Feyerabend's "against
generality, will harm the progress of
not
the
is
his
discarding of method but rather a demand
contrariness,
method",
Anarchism is not doing whatever
choices.
and
for plural methods
independent
aware
of methodological monism: "I do not say that
you want, but rather being
or the philosophy of science should
epistemology should become anarchic,
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580
LIU
become
Dachun,
LIU
Yongmou
anarchic.
medicine.
say, 'He was a rationalist, but his view caused great damage to
was
a realist, but his theory brought great threats on realism; at
he
rationalism;
the same time, he was a relativist, but he never advocated relativism in any form"
theories. Some
(Feyerabend 1990, translator's preface). He was against method and also argued
for pluralistic methods; he was against reason and not in favor of irrationalism;
his style was like the sophist's, but also had elements of postmodernism. In a
word, people have differing views about Feyerabend. His contribution to the
philosophy
of
science was
contradictory characteristics
that he led the philosophy of science to turn away from logicism and incomplete
historicism toward relativism, irrationalism, and even anti-scientism. This
Rorty also gained his academic maturity in the tradition of analytic philosophy,
?
which is said to be the reason for his
and also turned back to attack it
departure from Princeton's philosophy department. Rorty's rebellion began with
his thinking about the linguistic turn that occurred afterWittgenstein, and ended
with his claim for the end of philosophy and his promotion of a kind of
was not only
"post-philosophical culture". As compared with Feyerabend, Rorty
rebelling against analytic philosophy but also the whole Western philosophical
tradition. This tradition started with Plato, constantly seeking a real sort of
knowledge that transcended the "seeming" and finding absolute reality beyond a
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reflection
on the alternative
philosophy
581
of science
epistemology is the study of how one may keep this mirror clean and thus
maintain
the accuracy of the representation. Yet for Rorty, the so-called
"mind-body" problem is fundamentally a false one: There is no entity called
"mind" which
beliefs and desires are constructed, the third,mediating, element between self
and world"
the
(Rorty 1989, p. 10). They had not completely abandoned
delusive
Platonic
dream
of
absolute
therefore
and
could
non-historical,
reality,
neither solve the fundamental difficulties faced by traditional epistemology nor
research from
was
to
ethics
and
the
result
of
his
which
epistemology
promotion of
politics,
culture. Rorty believed that contemporary philosophy was
post-philosophical
some philosophers
such as
very different from traditional philosophy;
and
essentialism,
destroy
finally
representationalism,
fundamentalism, break themonopoly held by philosophical truth,and finally take
philosophy off its throne, allowing it to find its own place again (Rorty 2004,
culture
would
we
cannot
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582
LIU
Dachun,
LIU
Yongmou
get to know theworld itself nor its essence through philosophical research, and
we also cannot use it tomaster the essence of the activity of cognition and the
culture is
people who engage in it. Therefore, philosophy in post-philosophical
no longer a foundation which can reveal epistemological
views offered by
science, morality, art, or religion. In this culture, neither priest, physicist, poet,
nor party would be considered more rational, more scientific, or more profound
than the others (Rorty 2004,
14-15). No
can
of
science
into his
construction
of
philosophy
was
He
his
of
culture"
and
scienticism.
"post-philosophical
critique
against
scienticism which blindly worshipped
science, and was also against treating
of culture ?
science as the foundation for the whole
especially against
Rorty
integrated
in
attributing the success of science to its unique methods. He believed,
accordance with Quine, Sellas, and Davison, that analytic philosophy had already
the failure of the
transcended and negated
itself, and finally announced
sector of human knowledge could reach. Science thus turned out to be the
foundation of all the human knowledge; however, all of these assertions were
misunderstandings. Rorty considered themythicizing effect of natural science as
one of the ideas which
who
influence of science. On
a kind of "dialogue
scienticism and opposed both fundamentalism and the pursuit of certainty in the
philosophy of science; he tried to eliminate the opposition between science and
the humanities, and to integrate them. Thus, as one critic put it, "the features of
science were
of natural
completely
sociological,
Rorty's
explanation
psychological, and pragmatic, refusing all 'deep' explanation. He never wanted
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583
to explore why natural science was so successful" (Jiang 1998, p. 146). All in all,
Rorty's philosophy of science was a counter-revolution against the "strong
reason" of science which
Among these three alternative philosophers, Foucault is the most famous. His
behavior was often eccentric and unreasonable; his subjects of study were often
"out of theway"; and his thoughtswere often shocking to the public. He fully fit
its
the label "alternative"2. The main thrust of Foucault's
philosophy was
deconstruction of the subject. The reason why Foucault chose this stance was that
mess
believed
and methodological
of the subject an epistemologica!
of
method
the
foundation, especially
micro-analyzing power. Foucault used this
archeology and genealogy to deconstruct the subject and subjective philosophy
from both their historical and social aspects. The historical critique of the subject
ismainly embodied in Foucault's theory of the "knowledge prototype". Foucault
the deconstruction
gave
applied
2
We
need
showed
not
suicidal
see
it as
taboo
to note
and
in promiscuous
used drugs, engaged
sex,
clinic. The themes of Foucault's
in a psychiatric
and crime.
sexual experiences,
prisons,
hospitals,
that Foucault
time
tendencies,
spent
concern madmen,
psychiatric
mainly
can we find the truth about human nature: For example,
that only in the darkness
He believed
?
individuals were more authentic and even more normal than the sane
he held that disturbed
works
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584
was
dying. Foucault pointed out that all of his research was aimed at revealing
the history of the process in our culture that turned human beings into subjects
(Foucault 1992, p. 271); this process was in fact the process through which
modern
introduced the
knowledge-power
produced modern people. Foucault
?
method of origin analysis from genealogy
that is, themicro-analysis of power
and also turned the subject of research from knowledge to power, revealing the
profound relationships between the subject, knowledge, and power. According to
Foucault, modern people are the result of the process which turns human beings
into subjects, and modern people are essentially the slaves of knowledge and
power. There are three elements in the process of "turning a human being into a
science and
subject": differentiation, discipline, and subjectification. Modern
knowledge have changed society into a sort of controlling machine, and made
modern people voluntarily accept the rule of science and knowledge. It ismodern
and power which construct non-diversified, subjectified modern
knowledge
Therefore, Foucault advocated
anti-discipline and anti-subjectification,
fight" and an "aesthetics of survival".
people.
of knowledge was just the starting point for Foucault; his philosophy ultimately
aimed at the real historical situation of the modern people behind knowledge.
research was different
Aiming at the deconstruction of the subject, Foucault's
from both scientific epistemology and also the traditional study of the history of
science. According to Foucault's expression of his views, his study of knowledge
was aligned along the discourse-axis of practice-knowledge-science,
not that of
(Foucault 2003b, p. 204). Unlike proponents
consciousness-knowledge-science
of scientific epistemology, Foucault viewed knowledge and science from a
practical angle; that is, he saw them as a kind of historical activity unfolding in
reality, paying attention to how knowledge got its name without paying attention
to its legitimacy. Unlike students of the history of science, Foucault treated
science and knowledge from a discursive perspective; that is, he treated them as
to certain
formed according
among the group of discourses which
one
regulations. He never paid attention to how science was born (from pre-science
or non-science), but rather focused on the formation of its discourse. Foucault
used the archeology of knowledge to eliminate the distinction between science
non-science,
denying scientific progress and also the corresponding
the incommensurability of science from
of
truth,
emphasizing
conception
and
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585
defined
decisions
was
3
the truth system was
In Foucault's
genealogy,
in other places.
and a deployment
also
called
a machine,
an institution, a strategy,
The repressed knowledge mentioned by Foucault mainly falls into two types: one is
about disturbed
long-neglectedmarginal knowledge, such as the historical knowledge
individuals,
prisons,
The
deprived
of its qualification
to be
in the
knowledge and is considered as inadequate and imprecise; it is naive knowledge, low
hierarchy
and beneath
knowledge
and science.
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586
course, Foucault 's philosophy of science went against the subject and used
to replace
historicism
it, raising many
important issues, but it faced
contradictions it could not resolve.
alternative
philosophers
of science
Deeply
are
has broken
science has an objective foundation and the essentialists who insist that natural
of objects via external observation of
the essence
science can master
now
are
being questioned about their beliefs. The viewpoint that
phenomenon
sees natural science as objective truth,and science as a linear accumulation with
continued progress, is being shaken. Research methods are changing from an
emphasis on construction toward one on deconstruction of fundamentalism and
ismore and more one approach among many. The general posture of science has
to moderate
turned from pan-scientism
scientism, and has led to various
reconciliations
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587
and the post-modern "deconstruction" method; at the same time, the aim of
research has turned away from a preference for action and has sought operability
to question scientific culture and make social criticisms. Since 1970, some
scholars have begun to apply themethods of phenomenology and hermeneutics
towards resolving the problems in the philosophy of science; structuralism and
science
that the systematic approach could not resolve all problems, preference for action
and pursuit of operability cannot override everything else. On the contrary, the
questioning of certain scientific cultural systems and the criticism of society has
become something of a fad.
alternative philosophers of science make contemporary philosophy of
scope of views and discussion
increasingly pluralistic; the aim of
research thus turns towards the integration of science and the humanities. In
alternative philosophy of science, science is first understood as an ontological
The
science's
without
and people are calling for science to be integrated with the humanities. How to
close the gap between them is a very important problem in contemporary
philosophy of science.
Of course, the expansion, transition, and transformation of such study should
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588
LIU
LIU
Dachun,
Yongmou
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