EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIALOGUE OF VALIDITY:

BUILDING VALIDITY IN
EDUCATIONAL AND SOCIAL RESEARCH
MUSTAFA AKIR

Marmara University, Istanbul, Turkey

The notioti of validity iti the social sciences is evolving and is
influenced by philosophy of science, critiques of objectivity, and
epistemological debates. Methodology for validation of the
knowledge claims is diverse across different philosophies of science. In other words, definition and the way to establish of
validity have evolved as epistemology of science changed. In
this paper, I attempt to explain the nature of knowledge, outline
the central premises of several philosophies of science (e.g.,
logical positivism, post positivism, scientific realism, postmodernism, and hermeneutics) and their positions on the issue of
validity, provide a history of test validation from the beginning
of educational and psychological testing until the present, with
emphasize on changes in epistemology of knowledge. The concepts, methods, and processes of validation are central to
educational and other social research, it is important to examine
each epistemology that lie at the heart of both natural and social
science.
Keywords: Validity, Epistemology of Knowledge, Educational
Research

Introduction

Understanding and views of the nature

of knowledge has evolved during 20th century, each philosophy introduced new
perspectives on notion of "truth". Correspondingly, discourse of what constitute a
valid knowledge has also evolved along
with understandings and beliefs about the
nature of truth. Epistemology is the theory of scientific knowledge. It has to do with
nature, validity, and limitations of inquiry.
In some contexts it also includes ontological dimensions such as the nature of
reality. Methodology for validation of the
knowledge claims is diverse across different philosophies of science. In other
words, definition and the way to establish
of validity has evolved and changed as
epistemology of science changed. In this

paper, I will attempt to explain the nature

of knowledge, outline the central premises of several philosophies of science and
their positions on the issue of validity, provide a history of test validation from the
beginning of educational and psychological testing until the present, with
emphasize on changes in epistemology of
knowledge.
I will focus on the philosophy of science
issues and attempt to relate them to the
interpretation of concept of validity. Each
epistemology raises new questions and
brings back long-standing debates that lie
at the heart of both natural and social science. The concept, method, and process
of validation are central to educational and
other social research.

664

Epistemological Dialogue... /665

Science, Objectivism, and Relativism

Objectivity is defined, as a method of

acquiring knowledge by reasoning solely
based on the facts of reality and in accordance with the laws of logic (Phillips,
2000). Modem social science seeks to produce objective theory that can be
challenged on the basis of data. Data and
evidence are the basis for choosing
between two competing theories (Messick,
1989). There have been severe attacks on
the premises on objectivism from various
points of view (Rorty, 1980), is it possible
to obtain an objective knowledge when all
observation is potentially contaminated,
whether by our theories or our worldview
or our past experiences? The process of
forming concepts and making conceptual
integrations is fallible. We might be unable
to obtain certain relevant data and we also
know that every fact is itself theory laden,
a constmction without meaning independent of language and context (Kuhn, 1996).
The thesis of incommensurability of rival
theories implies that since the advocates
of different paradigms often subscribe to
different methodological standards and
have different sets of cognitive values, full
translation between rival paradigms is
impossible (Kuhn, 1996).
Objectivist (Protagonist) position advocates that reason can reveal tme knowledge
and relativist (Antagonist) position advocates that all knowledge claims are relative
to individual and cultural bias and therefore true knowledge is not possible. During
the historical course both epistemology
has been influenced by events in the philosophy of science. Some events, such as
Kuhn's (1996) study of history of science

and the formation of the sociology of

knowledge have strengthened the relativist
position while logical positivism provided support for objectivist position. Logical
positivism in the 1920s and 1930s reaffirmed and refined the commitment to
observations as foundation for tmth. By
the late 1950s and 1960s, the idea that
observations were mirror reflections of
extemal reality became increasingly under
attack (Rorty, 1980). Finally conclusion
was that observations do not produce
"facts", because of the fact that observations are dependent in the various
theoretical and cultural schemes that the
observer brings into the situation. Knowledge is a matter of communication between
individuals who share decisions and actions
(Rorty, 1980).
Evolution of Scientific
Thought - Positivism to Hermeneutics

As an introduction to the multiple discourses of validation, the following

discussion examines the evolution of scientific thought from logical positivism to
post positivism, scientific realism, postmodemism and hermeneutics positions as
defined by Bemstein and Gadamer. During the early part of 20th century "logical
positivism" has dominated discussions of
scientific epistemology. Developed by the
Vienna Circle logical positivism accepted
as its central doctrine Wittgenstein's verification theory of meaning. Positivism has
two fundamental doctrines. They are namely (a) propositions of existential import
have an exclusively empirical reference,
and (b) this empirical reference can be conclusively shown by logical analysis

666 / Education Vol. 132 No. 3

(Weinberg, 1960). For positivist something

is meaningful if and only if it is logically
true or else is empirically verifiable.
Unlike positivists, Karl Popper accepted the fact that "observation always
presupposes the existence of some system
of expectations". When a theory's predictions are falsified, it is to be ruthlessly
rejected. Theories that survive falsification are said to be corroborated and
tentatively accepted (Popper, 1999). His
theory was developed directly opposed to
all attempts to operate the idea that inductive logic. As opposed to logical positivist
Popper admits that metaphysics has value
for empirical science by stating:
"Scientific discovery is impossible
without faith in ideas which are of
a purely speculative kind; a faith
which is completely unwanted from
the point of view science, and which,
to extent, is metaphysical" (Popper,
1999).
Popper accepts a system as scientific only
if it is capable of being tested by experience. Therefore, he suggests, not the
verifiability but the falsifiability of a
system is to be taken as a criterion of
demarcation. Popper's criterion of demarcation is based upon an asymmetry
between verifiability and falsifiability.
Although natural laws or theories for logical reasons are not verifiable, they are in
an asymmetrical way falsifiable. How do
we decide that scientific statements do not
call for any further test, it is simply matter of convention. Both the verifiability
and falsifiability views of meaning are
based on the distinction between theoretical and observational terms. Both views

assume that observations can be sufficiently independent of presumptions in the

theory to be useful in tesfing its validity.
However, theories are not value - neutral,
neither observations nor meanings are theory - independent, being infiuenced by the
world view of the theory; methodology
itself is not theory - neutral and hence is
incapable of generating a neutral set of
facts for appraising competing theories.
Fundamental to the Thomas Kuhn's
argument is the concept of a "paradigm."
A paradigm constitutes the worldview of
a scientific community. In his influential
book Kuhn (1996) describes normal
(everyday) scientific research as occurring
within a paradigm or worldview that comprises a strong network of conceptual,
theoretical, instrumental, and metaphysical commitments. Paradigm is what the
members of a scientific community share.
These paradigms determine the nature of
the problems addressed, how phenomena
are viewed, what counts as solution, and
the criteria of acceptability for theories
(Kuhn, 1996). Philosophers of science have
repeatedly showed that more than one theoretical construction can always be placed
upon a given collection of data. Once it
has achieved the status of paradigm, a theory is declared invalid only if an altemate
candidate is available to take its place
(Kuhn, 1996). To reject one paradigm without simultaneously accepting another is to
reject science itself.
Kuhn claimed that rival paradigms are
always incommensurable. That is, there is
no completely neutral standpoint from
which one can judge the relative worth of
the two paradigms. Successive paradigms

Epistemological Dialogue... 7 667

tell us different things about the population impossible, but rather that there is no metaof the universe and about that population's linguistic formula for problem solving that
behavior. What a man sees depends both might be employed to compare standards
upon what he looks at and also upon what and values in all possible contexts (Bernhis previous conceptual experience. Incom- stein, 1991).
mensurability comes in three basic
"We must avoid the fallacy of thinkvarieties:
ing that since there are no fixed,
Incommensurability of Standards or
determinate rules for distinguishing
Cognitive Values
better from worse interpretations,
Incommensurability of Language
there is consequently no rational way
Incommensurability of Experience
of making and warranting such pracMeaning and understanding are
tical comparative judgments"
fundamental concepts in Gadamer's philo(Bernstein, 1991).
sophical hermeneutics. All understanding
Gadamer's hermeneutics will reveal that
involves interpretation and all interpreta- what is called the "incommensurability of
tion involves understanding. We are always paradigms" has nothing to do with relaunderstanding and interpreting in the light tivism. Instead of saying that individuals
of our anticipatory prejudgments and prej- are "locked" within socially constructed
udices, which are themselves changing in points of view, incommensurability charthe course of history (Bernstein, 1991). acterizes the "openness" of one's
Meaning comes to realization only in and perspective. It renders dialogue with the
through the "happening" of understand- "other" not only possible, but never ending.
ing. A horizon is limited but it is open. We
"Understanding must be conceived
are not trapped in our horizon, which is
as a part of process of the coming
changing and fluid, instead it functions as
into being of meaning, in which the
a window.
significance of all statements is
formed and made complete" (BernTheories of IVuth and Validity Concerns
stein, 1991).
As a word "validity" has been used in
This also can be misinterpreted as a so many difl'erent meanings in social scitype of relativism. Gadamer's reflections ences. One reason could be we invent new
on language, horizons, and historicity con- words for new kinds of validity concerns
tribute to undermining relativism. and redefine or use old words in new ways.
Understanding is limited but not closed; it Validity is not clearly dened in logic
is open to appropriating what is alien. No either. Usually it is defined by an example,
theoretical algorithm can provide "a point such as; a valid deductive conclusion is
by point comparison between theories or always true when the premises are true
cultures". In essence, what is meant by (Enerstvedt, 1989). From this example it
"incommensurability," then, is not that is very important to be aware of that a valid
rational comparison between paradigms is conclusion does not need to be true rather

668 / Education Vol. 132 No. 3

it has to be in accordance with the mies.

The mies of validity are constmcted in the
scientific community. What is valid knowledge? Answer involves the philosophical
quesfion of what is tmth. Validity and tmth
are not the same rather validity is the logical as well as the pragmatic criteria of
tmth.
Tmth requires a distinct object and subject so that someone can stand outside and
discover what is tme (Patton, 1990). Since
this is not possible, what can be done is
that a community of knowledge may establish a consensus of language and values
making it possible to communicate certain
truths that hold for that community at a
specific place and time. We can as well
name this consensus as a paradigm.
Within philosophy, three classical
theory of truth are determined: "correspondence theory", the "coherence theory",
and the "pragmatic theory of tmth" (Kvale,
1992). Textbook presentations of validity
in social science have been based on a correspondence theory of truth within the
context of positivist epistemological
assumptions. The correspondence theory
of truth concerns whether a knowledge
statement corresponds to the objective
world and interprets validity as if we
observe what we want to observe. The
coherence theory refers to the consistency and intemal logic of a statement. The
coherence theory of tmth requires some
logical associations for a statement to be
considered as tme. Statement has to be in
coherence in a system with other statements. Logical validity is said to be high
if the correlation between two tests is high.
The pragmafic theory relates the tmth of

a knowledge statement to its practical consequences. It asserts that what is tme can
be verified in practice and can be shown
to be useful for certain purposes. To pragmatists, tmth is whatever assists us to take
actions that produce the desired results
(Kvale, 1992).
The correspondence theory of tmth is
a realisfic theory as it makes the distinction between a theory and the facts, which
the theory describes; and it makes it possible to say that a theory is tme, or false.
It allows us to speak of a reality different
from the theory (Messick, 1989). Although
we have no criterion of tmth, and no means
of being even quite sure of the falsity of a
theory, it is easier to find out that a theory
is false than to find out that it is tme. We
have even good reasons to think that most
of our theories-even our best theories are,
strictly speaking, false, for they oversimplify or idealize the facts (Popper, 1999).
Popper accepts the correspondence theory of tmth; believe in absolute objective
truth. The aim of science, for him, is to
find theories, which get nearer to the tmth.
On the other hand, Kuhn rejects the notion
that tmth, in the sense of correspondence
to nature, is central to the debate between
competing paradigms. Kuhn's objection
was not just that no theory might be closer to tmth than another. It was that there is
no basis on which to judge that theories
are closer to the tmth (Kuhn, 1996).
As a consequence of giving up a correspondence theory of truth, validation
becomes investigation, providing arguments, questioning and theoretically
interpreting research findings.
In an introduction of his book. Against

Epistemological Diaiogue... 7 669

Method, Feyerabend (1994) tells us that

the whole book tries to establish the thesis that
"The events, procedures, and results
that constitute the sciences have no
common structure; there are no elements that occur in every scientific
investigation but are missing elsewhere".
Against Method's attack on methodological unity suggests that there is no
single scientific method. In other words
there can be many different kinds of science. Science, according to Feyerabend,
exhibits neither methodological nor theoretical unity. Feyerabend (1994) admitted
to having been a relativist, although insisting that even in his most extravagantly
relativistic moods, he never endorsed the
idea that any standpoint is as good as any
other.
A Brief History of Concept of Validity:
from Early Conceptions of Validity to
Messick's Multi-Facet Model of Validity
a) Early Conceptions of Validity in
Psychometrics Theory

From the earliest days of educational

and psychological testing, validation procedures tried to show the usefulness of a
test by correlating test scores with an external criterion. These correlational studies
reported "validity coefficients", which provided an index of the degree to which a
test measured what it purported to measure. In 1946, Guilford definition of
validity was "in a very general sense, a test
is valid for anything with which it correlates". In his recommendations Rulon

(1946) stated some instruments are "obviously valid" and need no further study,
some researchers used the term "face validity" for this quality. Mosier (1947)
identified three distinct implication typically attributed to the term "face validity":
1) validity by assumption, 2) validity by
definition, and 3) appearance of validity.
He dismissed this "type" of validity as a
"pernicious fallacy." In 1950, Cruton
defined validity as the correlation of
observed scores on the test with true scores
in criterion. One major problem with validity coefficients was demonstrating the
relevance of the chosen criterion to the purpose of the testing (Suen, 2003). Another,
even more serious problem was demonstrating the validity of the criterion itself.
In 1951, American Psychological Association (APA) commissioned a panel to
offer test standards to be used in the construction, use, and interpretation of
psychological tests. The first product from
the Committee was the Technical Recommendations for Psychological Tests and
Diagnostic Techniques: A Preliminary
Proposal (APA, 1952). This publication
suggested four categories of validity: predictive validity, status validity, content
validity, and congruent validity. In 1954,
a joint committee of the APA, American
Educational Research Association
(AERA), and the National Council on
Measurements Used in Education (NCME)
was formed, and published the Technical
Recommendations for Psychological Tests
and Diagnostic Techniques (APA, 1954).
There were several modifications to the
1952 proposed recommendations. For
example, "Congruent validity" was

670 / Education Vol. 132 No. 3

renamed "constmct validity", and "status

validity" was renamed "concurrent validity." Concurrent validity defined as the
correlation among predictor scores and the
criterion scores that observed at the same
time. Concurrent validity used for predictive purposes.
In 1966, APA, AERA, and NCME
revised the 1954 Technical Recommendations and published the Standards for
Educational and Psychological Tests and
Manuals (Moss, 1992). They reduced the
four "types" of validity to three "aspects"
of validity, subsuming concurrent and predictive validities under the rubric of
"criterion-related validity" (as suggested
by Cronbach and Meehl, 1955). Another
modification incorporated into the 1966
Standards was the notion that test users
were also responsible for maintaining
validity. For the first time responsibility
was given to the test users and burden of
establishing validity placed on both test
publishers' and test users' shoulders.
Criterion-related validity is the degree
to which scores obtained on one test or
measure correlates with an existing external criterion measure of the same traits,
attributes, or behavior (Suen, 2003). Constmct-related validity is the extent to which
an instrument measures a theoretical,
abstract construct. Construct validation
implies constmction of what Cronbach and
Meehl (1955) call a nomological networkan interlocking system of laws. It involves
correlations with other measures of the
constmct and logical analysis of their relationships.
Concept of constmct validity is open
to arguments for postmodem emphasis on

the social constmction of knowledge. Cronbach, who introduced the concept, has later
argued for an extended concept of constmct validity: it is an open process where
to validate is to investigate - "...validation
is more than corroboration; it is a process
for developing sounder interpretations of
observations". In an article where he argues
that value free standards for validity is a
contradiction in terms, Cronbach concludes
with a discursive concept of validity resting upon public discussion:
In 1974, AERA, APA, and NCME
revised the 1966 Standards, and published
the Standards for Educational and Psychological Tests. This revision retained the
notion of three unique "aspects" of validity. After publication of the 1974 Standards,
two schools of thought emerged regarding
validation theory: one school promoting
the idea that validity consisted of three
"separate but equal" aspects; the other
school advocating a unitary conceptualization centered on construct validity.
Standards for Educational and Psychological Testing (1985) emphasized a
unitary conceptualization of validity. In
this version, the "aspects" of validity denoted in the 1971 Standards were described
as "categories" of validation. All validity
is of one kind, namely constmct validity.
Other so-called separate types of validity
- whether labeled content validity, criterion-related validity, consequential validity,
or whatever - cannot stand alone in validity arguments. Rather, these so-called
validity types refer to complementary
forms of evidence to be integrated into an
overall judgment of constmct validity.

Epistemological Dialogue... /671

Table 1 : Messick's faeets of validity

Evidential basis

Test interpretation

Test use

Construct validity

Construct validity
+ Relevance/utility

Consequential basis

Value implications

Social consequences

Note. From "Validity" by S. Messick, 1989b, In: R.L. Linn (Ed) Educational measurement, p.2O.

b) Messick's Multi-Facet Model of Validity

One of the most influential psychometricticans of the second half of the twentieth
century, Samuel Messick, has argued that
validity is a unitary concept -all validity is
construct validity. Messick (1989) argues
that the traditional conception of validity
fails to take into account both evidence of
the value implications of score meaning
as a basis for action and the social consequences of score use (Messick, 1989).
A definition of validity is provided by
Messick (1989) states that validity is "an
integrated evaluative judgment of the
degree to which empirical evidence and
theoretical rationales support the adequacy and appropriateness of inferences and
actions based upon test scores or other
modes of assessment (Messick, 1989)."
Messick asserted that different forms
of evidence of validity do not constitute
different kinds of validity. While he maintained that different types of inferences
derived from test scores might require different forms of evidence, he rejected
labeling these forms of evidence "validity". He characterizes validity in a two
dimensional table that distinguishes
between interpretation and use on the one
hand and the evidential and consequential

bases on the other.

Messick (1989) is careful to note that
validity judgments are on going acfions
and validation an evolving process, always
open to new evidence and theories. Practically speaking then, validation is matter
of making the most reasonable case with
the available evidence while recognizing
that these judgments will evolve as new
evidence is brought to our attention. Messick's other major contribution was to stress
that validity is not a quality of a test. It is
not the test that is or is not valid. What are
or are not valid are the inferences that we
draw using the test results.
In a postmodem era the conception of
knowledge as a mirror of reality is replaced
by knowledge as a linguistic and social
construction of reality. There is a focus
upon interpretation and negotiation of the
meaning of the lived world (Rosenau,
1992). Truth is constituted through a dialogue; valid knowledge claims emerge as
conflicting interpretations and action possibilities are discussed and negotiated
among the members of a community. A
postmodem approach to validation does
not secure unambiguous knowledge. The
quest for absolute certain knowledge is
replaced by a conception of defensible

672 7 Education Vol. 132 No. 3

knowledge claims. Validation becomes the

issue of choosing among competing and
falsifiable interpretations, of examining
and providing arguments for the relative
credibility of alternative knowledge claims
(Polkinghome, 1992).
Conclusion

The notion of validity in the social sciences is evolving and is influenced by

philosophy of science, critiques of objectivity, and epistemological debates
(Geisinger, 1992). Epistemology is concerned with origin, nature, Hmits, methods,
and justification of human knowledge.
Kuhn (1996), Popper (1999), and others
have noted that observations are always
interpreted in the context of a priori knowledge. Since the social disciplines are
concerned with human beings, hermeneutical dimension is more important in the
social disciplines than in the natural sciences.
One of the primary themes that underlie Messick's validity theory is represented
in the Singerian approach to inquiry (Messick, 1989) where one method of inquiry
is evaluated in terms of another to highlight
the assumptions and values underlying
each. As Messick describes it:
"A Singerian inquiring system starts
with the set of other inquiring systems
...and applies any system recursively to
another system, including itself. The intent
is to elucidate the distinctive technical and
value assumptions underlying each system application and to integrate the
scientific and ethical implications of the
inquiry." (Messick, 1989), p. 32).
Since there is no method that is not
infected with error, any given method can-

not yield, by itself, true foundation for the

knowledge. Therefore, any method should
be crosschecked against other methods.
Campbell and Fiske (1959) introduced the
concept of convergent and discriminant
validation. Convergent validity requires
for different methods that was intended to
measure same construct to have relatively
high intercorrelations, while discriminant
validity requires for similar methods that
was intended to measure different
constructs to have relatively low intercorrelations (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
Convergent validation is an example of triangulation. The premise of triangulation
is that the bias of any method can be overcome by triangulating with very different
method, in view of the fact that it is very
unlikely for two very different methods to
have same bias.
In the evidential basis of Messick's
model, value-neutral as well as theory-neutral facts are problematic, so validity is not
really independent of values. Furthermore,
in the consequential basis of the model,
validity is not only dependent on values
but also on evidence of consequences and
of preconditions (Messick, 1989). The justification of values is not a simple matter.
The problem is that many important values are likely to remain relative to their
community of believers or stakeholders.
As Martin & Kleindorfer (1987) stated;
"Values are beyond full explication. Most
of the decision-making action is to be
found in the never-ending process of translating values into goals".
Messick's (1989) theory is so powerful because his theoretical universe
incorporates three distinct views of scientific theories: the realist, the constructivist.

Epistemological Dialogue... /673

and the critical realist (or critical rationalist). The realist view is that theories can be
tested against facts that exist independent
of theories about them. The constmctivist
view does not deny the existence of a separate reality, but simply denies that there
are independent facts against which theories can be tested. The third view, critical
realism, holds that theories can be tested
against corresponding facts, despite the
fact that they are not fully independent of
the theory. For the realist, theoretical terms
are direct conjectures about unobserved
attributes that exist independent of scienfific theory. The realist accepts that such
conjectures cannot be verified, and instead
submits them to critical tests. The constmctivist judge tmth by the standard of
consistency between statements and the
usefulness of the resulting coherent set of
beliefs. We do test conjectures against
observafions, but not in the unproblematic way that the realist envisioned. Rather,
the process of testing is itself nested in a
specific set of pre-existing practices. This
is the constmctivist's contribution to the
synthesis. The hope is that although the
procedures for testing conjectures are relative to our specific practices, they will
still lead to rational decisions about the
conjectures. The function of test validation is to collect evidence and arguments
in support of, or counter to, proposed interpretations and uses of test scores (Messick,
1989). Messick's Singerian approach to
inquiry is a powerful means of maintaining the openness of validity theory.
Evidence derived from any of the research
traditions is important for validity. It serves
both a critical and a generative function, by

simultaneously encouraging us to consider alternative methodologies and

scrutinizing our own taken for granted
practices for critique. All of these sources
of evidence have respectable foundations
and all have their limitations. The major
limitation is shortsightedness with respect
to other possibilities (Messick, 1989). This
approach allows us to maintain validity
theory as an ongoing accomplishment and
always open to other perspecfives.
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