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discretion, and a law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when
the classification is without reasonable basis. Citizenship is a legal and valid
ground for classification.
6.ID.; ID.; NATIONALIZATION OF RETAIL TRADE; CLASSIFICATION IN
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1180 ACTUAL, REAL AND REASONABLE. The
classification in the law of retail traders into nationals and aliens is actual, real
and reasonable. All persons of one class are treated alike, and it cannot be
said that the classification is patently unreasonable and unfounded. Hence, it
is the duty of this Court to declare that the legislature acted within its
legitimate prerogative and it cannot declare that the act transcends the limits
of equal protection established by the Constitution.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF REASONABLENESS. The law in question
is deemed absolutely necessary to bring about the desired legislative
objective, i.e., to free the national economy from alien control and
dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights
and privileges (II Am. Jur., pp. 1080-1081). The test of reasonableness of a
law is the appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means
adopted to carry out its purpose into effect. Judged by this test, the disputed
legislation, which is not merely reasonable but actually necessary, must be
considered not to have infringed the constitutional limitation of
reasonableness.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1180 TOLERANT AND
REASONABLE. A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately
reveals how tolerant and reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is
made prospective and recognizes the right and privilege of those already
engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest of their lives;
and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of
aliens. The right or privilege is denied only to persons upon conviction of
certain offenses.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ATTAINMENT OF LEGISLATIVE ASPIRATIONS OF A
PEOPLE NOT BEYOND THE LIMITS OF LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY. If
political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic
independence is none of less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and
positive if the people are subject to the economic control and domination of
others, especially if not of their own race or country. The removal and
eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and domination is one
of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is impossible
to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate
aspiration of a people can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
notice, action and study of the legislators or of the public. In case at bar it
cannot be claimed that the legislators have not been apprised of the nature of
the law, especially the nationalization and prohibition provisions. The
legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a great many
of the persons affected by the prohibition in the law conducted a campaign
against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for
declaring the law invalid ever existed.
15.ID.; INTERNATIONAL TREATIES AND OBLIGATIONS NOT VIOLATED
BY REPUBLIC ACT No. 1180; TREATIES SUBJECT TO QUALIFICATION OR
AMENDMENT BY SUBSEQUENT LAW. The law does not violate international
treaties and obligations. The United Nations Charter imposes no strict or legal
obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects (Jans Kelsen,
The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed., pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of
Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation, or a
common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations. The Treaty
of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of
April 18, 1947 guarantees equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals
"upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country". But the
nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all other
countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special rights
by the Constitution, are all Prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.S. vs.
Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or restrict
the scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania 58 L. ed.,
539).
DECISION
LABRADOR, J :
p
purpose; is public welfare involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the legislature's purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary
or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or reason in connection with the
matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the legislative
power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the
questions that we ask when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of
due process and equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist. The
balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society. There can be
no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So
the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is
due process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups,
provided everyone is given the equal protection of the law. The test or
standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation must be firmly
grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been
made, there must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes further and prohibits a
group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem becomes
more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as
society itself, which from time immemorial has always been open to residents,
irrespective of race, color or citizenship.
murmur; insults of ill-bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in
his face, but he heeds them not, and he forgets and forgives. The community
takes no note of him, as he appears to be harmless and extremely useful.
Filipino111,107208,658,94665.05279,583,33357.03
Chinese13,774106,156,21833.56205,701,13441.96
Others3548,761,260.494,927,1681.01
1948:
Filipino113,631213,342,26467.30467,161,66760.51
Chinese12,08793,155,45929.38294,894,22738.20
Others42210,514,6753.329,995,4021.29
1949:
Filipino113,659213,451,60260.89462,532,90153.47
Chinese16,248125,223,33635.72392,414,87545.36
Others48612,056,3653.3910,078,3641.17
1951:
Filipino119,352224,053,62061.09466,058,05253.07
Chinese17,429134,325,30336.60404,481,38446.06
Others3478,614,0252.317,645,327.87
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES PER ESTABLISHMENT
Item Gross Sales
Year and Retailer'sAssets(Pesos)
Nationality(Pesos)
1941:
Filipino1,8781,633
Chinese7,7079,691
Others24,4158,281
1947:
Filipino1,8782,516
Chinese7,70714,934
Others24,74913,919
1948: (Census)
Filipino1,8784,111
Chinese7,70724,398
Others24,91623,686
1949:
Filipino1,8784,069
Chinese7,70724,152
Others24,80720,737
1951:
Filipino1,8773,905
Chinese7,70733,207
Others24,82422,033
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the
figures on Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors,
whose capital is necessarily small.
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assets and
of gross sales, alien participation has steadily increased during the years. It is
true, of course, that Filipinos have the edge in the number of retailers, but
aliens more than make up for the numerical gap through their assets and
gross sales which average between six and seven times those of the very
many Filipino retailers Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority;
the alien invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and
gains much more. The same of official report, pointing out to the known
predominance of foreign elements in the retail trade, remarks that the Filipino
retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises. As observed by
respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer is
practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country being merely
transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting
the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as
already pointed out above, their secret manipulations of stocks of
commodities and prices, their utter disregard of the welfare of their customers
and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of which they are
mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the
exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual,
positive and fundamental differences between an alien and a national which
fully justify the legislative classification adopted in the retail trade measure.
These differences are certainly a valid reason for the State to prefer the
national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be doing violence to fact
and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate
distinction can be found between one and the other.
effect has been correctly attributed to the act of her enrollment. But it is
to confer on her American privileges, as contra distinguished from
foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial
marine, as well as frauds upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that
this whole system is projected.'"
similar statute denying aliens the right to engage in auctioneering was also
sustained in Wright vs. May, L. R. A., 1915 P. 151 (Minnesota, 1914). So also
in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court said that aliens
are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude,
psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibition of issuance of licenses to them
for the business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an
infringement of constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of
Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058 (Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of
aliens as barbers was held void, but the reason for the decision was the
court's finding that the exercise of the business by the aliens does not in any
way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the community.
In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a
California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to
persons ineligible to citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with
Federal power over immigration, and because there is no public interest in the
mere claim of ownership of the waters and the fish in them, so there was no
adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added that the law was
the outgrowth of antagonism toward persons of Japanese ancestry. However,
two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated
traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82
Fed. 257 (Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every
employer of foreign-born unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age,
was declared void because the court found that there was no reason for the
classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction from the daily wage of
an employee.
reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit
would be derived from the operation of the law and on the other hand it
would deprive Chinese of something indispensable for carrying on their
business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed. 220 (1885) an ordinance
conferring power on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries
both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the
power granted was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination
which attended the administration and implementation of the law, and that
the motive thereof was mere racial hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A.
165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to engage as hawkers and
peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no reasonable
and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was
proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As
we already have said, aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic
consideration and regard for customers with whom they come in daily
contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's economy, except
in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the
national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of aliens
have been shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of
crisis and emergency. We can do no better than borrow the language of
Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to drive home the reality and
significance of the distinction between the alien and the national, thus:
". . . It may be judicially known, however, that aliens coming into
this country are without the intimate knowledge of our laws, customs,
and usages that our own people have. So it is likewise known that
certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow
countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that
the foreign born, whose allegiance is first to their own country, and
whose ideals of governmental environment and control have been
engendered and formed under entirely different regimes and political
systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they
as well disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship,
are a part of the government itself. Further enlargement, is
unnecessary. I have said enough so that obviously it cannot be affirmed
with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without plausible
reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate
discrimination against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . .
."
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388, it was also held:
". . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf
of the public, it must appear, first, that the interests of the public
generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes
this test of constitutionality:
"In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in
the exercise of the police power to regulate the operation of a business,
is or is not constitutional, one of the first questions to be considered by
the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient foundation
in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary,
oppressive, and capricious use of that power, without substantial
relation to the health, safety, morals, comfort, and general welfare of
the public."
that the privilege should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail trade. Such provision would defeat the law itself, its
aims and purposes. Besides, the exercise of legislative discretion is not
subject to judicial review It is well settled that the Court will not inquire into
the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative
judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an
enactment or of any of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its
validity, and though the Court may hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of
the law, it may not annul the legislation if not palpably in excess of the
legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law attacked as a
violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness,
and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer
various other arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the
law does not promote general welfare; that thousands of aliens would be
thrown out of employment; that prices will increase because of the
elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation; that
adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general
breakdown; that there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of
these arguments are directed against the supposed wisdom of the law which
lies solely within the legislative prerogative; they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is
the claim that the title thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the
real purpose of the bill, which is to nationalize the retail business and prohibit
aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional provision which is claimed to
be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
"No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more then
one subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill".
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title
completely fails to apprise the legislators or the public of the nature, scope
and consequences of the law or its operation (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration of the title and the
provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that the
term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the
idea of "nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main
purposes and objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than
either prohibition or nationalization. Both of these have always been included
within the term regulation.
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it
has also been said that the title need not be an index to the entire contents of
the law (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 4803, p. 345.) The above
rule was followed when the title of the Act in question adopted the more
general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit". Furthermore,
the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade, which
may not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were
the title changed from "regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would
have been many provisions not falling within the scope of the title which
would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term "regulate", therefore, is
in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under which a
simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all
other provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill
should be embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes,
the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of
matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the
legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the
legislators have not been apprised of the nature of the law, especially the
nationalization and prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest
in the discussion of the law, and a great many of the persons affected by the
prohibition in the law conducted a campaign against its approval. It cannot be
claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law invalid ever existed.
The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the
supposed violation thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the
Declaration of Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General
Assembly. We find no merit in the above contention. The United Nations
Charter imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and
freedom of their subjects (Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951
ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of Human Rights contains nothing more
than a mere recommendation, or a common standard of achievement for all
peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the United
Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred from
the fact that members of the United Nations Organization, such as Norway
and Denmark, prohibit foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most
nations of the world laws against foreigners engaged in domestic trade are
adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the
Republic of China of April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in
question. All that the treaty guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese
nationals "upon the same terms as the nationals of any other country." But
the nationals of China are not discriminated against because nationals of all
other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted special
rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade.
But even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U.
S.vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260), and the same may never curtail or
restrict the scope of the police power of the State (Palston vs. Pennsylvania,
58 L. ed. 539.).
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law
was enacted to remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control of the retail business and free citizens
and country from such dominance and control; that the enactment clearly
falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and by
which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that
the law does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution
because sufficient grounds exist for the distinction between alien and citizen
in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor the due process of law clause,
because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives
appear to us to be plainly evident as a matter of fact it seems not only
appropriate but actually necessary and that in any case such matter falls
within the prerogative of the Legislature, with whose power and discretion the
Judicial department of the Government may not interfere; that the provisions
of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no duplicity
and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected;
and that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty
obligations because no treaty has actually been entered into on the subject
and the police power may not be curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or
any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects
of the law could have been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus
it is stated that more time should have been given in the law for the
liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes for them to close. Our
legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the scope of
legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and
equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the
harshness of the law should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond
our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree to the proposition, principle or rule that courts may not inquire
into the wisdom of an Act passed by the Congress and duly approved by the
President of the Republic. But the rule does not preclude courts from inquiring
and deter mining whether the Act offends against a provision or provisions of
the Constitution. I am satisfied that the Act assailed as violative of the due
process of law and the equal protection of the laws clauses of the Constitution
does not infringe upon them, insofar as it affects associations, partnerships or
corporations, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines, and aliens, who are not and have not been engaged in the retail
business. I am, however, unable to persuade myself that it does not violate
said clauses insofar as the Act applies to associations and partnerships
referred to in the Act and to aliens, who are and have heretofore been
engaged in said business. When they did engage in the retail business there
was no prohibition on or against them to engage in it. They assumed and
believed in good faith they were entitled to engage in the business. The Act
allows aliens to continue in business until their death or voluntary retirement
from the business or forfeiture of their license; and corporations, associations
or partnerships, the capital of which is not wholly owned by citizens of the
Philippines to continue in the business for a period of ten years from the date
of the approval of the Act (19 June 1954) or until the expiry of the term of
the existence of the association or partnership or corporation, whichever
event comes first. The prohibition on corporations, the capital of which is not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, to engage in the retail business
for a period of more than ten years from the date of the approval of the Act
or beyond the term of their corporate existence, whichever event comes first,
is valid and lawful, because the continuance of the existence of such
corporations is subject to whatever the Congress may impose reasonably
upon them by subsequent legislation. 1 But the prohibition to engage in the
retail business by associations and partnerships, the capital of which is not
wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, after ten years from the date of
the approval of the Act, even before the end of the term of their existence as
agreed upon by the associates and partners, and by alien heirs to whom the
retail business is transmitted by the death of an alien engaged in the
business, or by his executor or administrator, amounts to a deprivation of
their property without due process of law. To my mind, the ten-year period
from the date of the approval of the Act or until the expiration of the term of
the existence of the association and partnership, whichever event comes first,
and the six- month period granted to alien heirs of a deceased alien, his
executor or administrator, to liquidate the business, do not cure the defect of
the law, because the effect of the prohibition is to compel them to sell or
dispose of their business. The price obtainable at such forced sale of the
business would be inadequate to reimburse and compensate the associates or
partners of the association or partnership, and the alien heirs of a deceased
alien, engaged in the retail business for the capital invested in it. The stock of
merchandise bought and sold at retail does not alone constitute the business.
The goodwill that the association, partnership and the alien had built up
during a long period of effort, patience and perseverance forms part of such
business. The constitutional provisions that no person shall be deprived of his
property without due process of law 1 and that no person shall be denied the
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-29646. November 10, 1978.]
MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG
TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
Angel C . Cruz, Gregorio A. Ejercito, Felix C . Chaves & Jose Laureta for
petitioner.
FERNANDEZ, J :
p
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision dated September 17, 1968
of respondent Judge Francisco Arca of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch I, in Civil Case No. 72797, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and
against the respondents, declaring Ordinance No. 6537 of the City of
Manila null and void. The preliminary injunction is hereby made
permanent. No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Manila, Philippines, September 17, 1968.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO ARCA
Judge"
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of
Manila on February 22, 1968 and signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio
J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968. 2
City Ordinance No. 6537 is entitled:
"AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A
CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY PLACE OF
EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS
OR OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST
SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA;
AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES." 3
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or
to engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated
therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of
P50.00 except persons employed in the diplomatic or consular missions of
foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective
households, and members of religious orders or congregations, sect or
denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
cdrep
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and
on September 17, 1968 rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null
and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.8
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio
J. Villegas filed the present petition on March 27, 1969. Petitioner assigned the
following as errors allegedly committed by respondent Judge in the latter's
decision of September 17, 1968: 9
"I.
Petitioner Mayor Villegas argues that Ordinance No. 6537 cannot be declared null
and void on the ground that it violated the rule on uniformity of taxation because
the rule on uniformity of taxation applies only to purely tax or revenue measures
and that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a tax or revenue measure but is an exercise
of the police power of the state, it being principally a regulatory measure in
nature.
cdll
The contention that Ordinance No. 6537 is not a purely tax or revenue measure
because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true
that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment
permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the
processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits
and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the
payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure.
There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been
cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to
raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it
fails to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens
who are required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the
Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification,
should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation
to the subject of the particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being
LLpr
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 45685. November 16, 1937.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS and THE
HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING
CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. JOSE O. VERA, Judge ad
interim of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and
MARIANO CU UNJIENG, respondents.
Corporation.
Vicente J. Francisco, Feria & La O, Orense & Belmonte and Gibbs &
McDough for respondent Cu Unjieng.
No appearance for respondent Judge.
SYLLABUS
1.PROBATION; AUTHORITY OF PROBATION COURT TO LOOK INTO
CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENSE; SUPERIOR AND INFERIOR COURTS; LEGAL
RELATION AND ETHICAL STANDARD. Probation implies guilt by final
judgment. While a probation court hearing a probation case may look into the
circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not
authorize it to reverse the findings and conclusions of the Supreme Court,
either directly or indirectly, especially where from its own admission reliance
was merely had on the printed briefs, averments, and pleadings of the par
ties. As observed in Shioji vs. Harvey ( [1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and
reiterated in subsequent cases," if each and every Court of First Instance
could enjoy the privilege of overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there
would be no end to litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming
modesty of inferior courts demands conscious realization of the position that
they occupy in the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial
system of the nation.
2.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; THE PRESIDENT AND HIS VETO POWER;
PRESIDENT'S VETO NOT BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT. In vetoing a
bill, the President may express the reasons which he may deem proper, but
his reasons are not binding upon the Supreme Court in the determination of
actual controversies submitted to it for determination. Whether or not the
Executive should express or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter
encompassed within his broad constitutional power of veto but which happens
to be at the same time pending determination before the Supreme Court is a
question of propriety for him exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever
opinion is expressed by him under these circumstances, however, cannot
sway the judgment of the court one way or another and prevent it from
taking what in its opinion is the proper course of action to take in a given
case.
3.ID.; INDEPENDENCE OF THE JUDICIARY. If it is ever necessary to
make any vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political
history, it is that the judiciary is independent of the Executive no less than of
the Legislative department of our government independent in the
performance of its functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from
politics, indifferent to popularity, and unafraid of criticism in the
accomplishment of its sworn duty as it sees it and understands it.
4.ID.; WHEN CONSTITUTIONALITY MAY BE RAISED. The
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i. e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
5.ID.; ID.; RESORT TD EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES;
ADJUDICATED CASES. The question of the constitutionality of an Act of the
legislature is frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may
be made to extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in
the ordinary course of law, even if avail able, are not plain, speedy and
adequate. Thus, in Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil., 818), the
Supreme Court held that the question of the constitutionality of a statute may
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. But the general
rule admits of exceptions. Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may
determine the time when a question affecting the constitutionality of a statute
should be presented. Thus, in criminal cases, although there is a very sharp
conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be raised for the first
time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial court or on appeal.
Even in civil cases, it has been held that it is the duty of a court to pass on
the constitutional question, though raised for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that a determination of the question is .necessary to a decision of the
case. And it has been held that a constitutional question will be considered by
an appellate court at any time, where it involves the jurisdiction of the court
below.
9.ID.; ID.; PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF PARTY RIGHT
AND INTEREST OF THE PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES TO CHALLENGE
CONSTITUTIONALITY. The person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes
without saying that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution,
the People of the Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought,
has a substantial interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the
damage caused by the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound
inflicted upon the fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute.
Hence, the well-settled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own
laws.
10.ID.; ID.; RELIANCE ON PROBATION ACT, BY FISCAL DOES NOT
CONSTITUTE ESTOPPEL AGAINST THE PEOPLE. The mere fact that the
Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon in the past and all that time
has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the Fiscal of Manila but, on the
contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as constitutional, is no reason
for considering the People of the Philippines estopped from now as sailing its
validity. For courts will pass upon a constitutional question only when
presented before it in bona fide cases for determination, and the fact that the
question has not been raised before is not a valid reason for refusing to allow
it to be raised later. The fiscal and all others are justified in relying upon the
statute and treating it as valid until it is held void by the courts in proper
cases.
11.ID.; ID.; WHEN DETERMINATION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
NECESSARY; WAIVER IF CASE CAN BE DECIDED ON OTHER POINTS.
While the court will meet the question with firmness, where its decision is
indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and a just respect for the legislature,
renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be decided on
other points. (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No 11,558; 2 Brock.,
447.Vide, also Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has been held
that the determination of a constitutional question is, necessary whenever it is
essential to the decision of the case, as where the right of a party is founded
solely on a statute the validity of which is attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782.)
12.ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONS OF PUBLIC POLICY JUSTIFYING
CONSTITUTIONAL INQUIRY. The Supreme Court will take cognizance of
the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute books and its
validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that many persons
accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have applied for
probation; that some of them are already on probation; that more people will
likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and that the re
respondent M. C. U. has been at large for a period of about four years since
his first conviction. All await the decision of this court on the constitutional
question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case has
assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be now resolved.
13.ID.; THE JUDICIARY; ITS DUTY TO ENFORCE THE CONSTITUTION.
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the
judiciary to enforce the Constitution. The Supreme Court, by clear implication
from the provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII
of the Constitution, may declare an act of the National Legislature invalid
because in conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn
duty to enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to
Five effect to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith.
This is of the essence of judicial duty.
14.ID.; ID.; STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; PRESUMPTION IN FAVOR
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY; RATIONALE OF PRESUMPTION. All reason able
doubts should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act
of the legislature approved by the executive, is presumed to be within
constitutional limitations. The responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests
not on the courts alone but on the legislature as well. "The question of the
validity of every statute is first determined by the legislative department of
the government itself." ( U. S. vs.Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case is.
Board of Health and Heiser [1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Joson t1913],
26 Phil., 1.) And a statute finally comes before the courts sustained by the
sanction of the executive. The members of the Legislature and the Chief
Executive have taken an oath to support the Constitution and it must be
presumed that they have been true to this oath and that in enacting and
sanctioning a particular law they did not intend to violate the Constitution.
Then, there is that peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to
reflect the wisdom of thepeople as expressed through an elective Legislature
and an elective Chief Executive. It follows that the courts will not set aside a
law as violative of the Constitution except in clear cases.
15.ID.; THE PARDONING POWER UNDER THE JONES LAW AT THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES. Section 21 of the Jones Law, in e at
the time of the approval of Act No. 4221, vests in the Governor-General of the
Philippines "the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit
fines and forfeitures." This power is now vested in the President of the
Philippines. The provisions of the Jones Law and the Constitution of the
Philippines differ in some respects. The adjective "exclusive" found in the
Jones Law has been omitted from the Constitution. Under the Jones Law, as
at common law, pardon could be granted any time after the commission of
the offense, either before or after conviction. The Governor-General of the
Philippines was thus empowered, like the President of the United States, to
pardon a person before the facts of his case were fully brought to light. The
framers of our Constitution thought this undesirable and, following most of
the state constitutions, provided that the pardoning power can only be
exercised "after conviction". So too, under the new Constitution, the
pardoning power does not extend to "cases of impeachment". This is also the
rule generally followed in the United States.
16.ID.; ID.; ROYAL PARDON UNDER ENGLISH LAW; POWER OF THE
HOUSE OF LORDS. The rule in England is different. There, a royal pardon
can not be pleaded in bar of an impeachment; "but," says Blackstone, "after
the impeachment has been solemnly heard and determined, it is not
understood that the king's royal grace is further restrained or abridged." The
reason for the distinction is obvious. In England, judgment on impeachment is
not confined to mere "removal from office and disqualification to hold and
enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Government" but extends
to the whole punishment attached by law to the offense committed. The
House of Lords, on a conviction may, by its sentence, inflict capital
punishment, perpetual banishment, fine or imprisonment, depending upon
the gravity of the offense committed, together with removal from office and
incapacity to hold office.
17.ID.; ID.; COMMUTATION AND AMNESTY UNDER THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION. Our Constitution makes specific mention of
"commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the par dons
he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem
proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution but
only with the concurrence of the National Assembly.
18.ID.; ID.; EXCLUSIVE CHARACTER OF THE PARDONING POWER.
The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the Executive cannot be taken
away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions, nor can like power be given
by the legislature to any other officer or authority. The coordinate
departments of government have nothing to do with the pardoning power,
since no person properly belonging to one of the departments can exercise
any powers appertaining to either of the others except in cases expressly
provided for by the constitution. (20 R. C. L., pp. 540, 541.) Where the
pardoning power is conferred on the executive without express or implied
limitations, the grant is exclusive, and the legislature can neither exercise
such power itself nor delegate it elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the
proper exercise thereof (12 C. J., pp. 838, 839).
19.ID.; PROBATION, POWER OF THE PHILIPPINE LEGISLATURE TO
ENACT A PROBATION LAW. The Philippine Legislature, like the Congress of
the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to
fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. The legislative power to set
punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the
legislature may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest discretion as to
the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of the punishment,
and whether it should be certain, or indeterminate, or conditional. Indeed, the
Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the penalties for their
violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the desire to vest in the
courts particularly the trial courts large discretion in imposing the
penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is believed that
justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts, they being in a
position to best determine the penalties which an individual convict, peculiarly
circumstance, should suffer.
20.ID.; ID.; PROBATION AND PARDON NOT COTERMINOUS;
PROBATION DISTINGUISHED FROM REPRIEVE AND COMMISSION.
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same. They are
actually distinct and different from each other, both in origin and in nature. In
probation, the probationer is in no true sense, as in pardon, a freeman He is
not finally and completely exonerated. He is not exempt from the entire
punishment which the law inflicts. Under the Probation Act, the probationer's
case is not terminated by the mere fact that he is placed on probation. The
probationer, during the period of probation, remains in legal custody
subject to the control of the probation officer and of the court, he may be
rearrested upon the non-fulfillment of the conditions of probation and, when
may select. Courts have also sustained the delegation of legislative power to
the people at large, though some authorities maintain that this may not be
done. Doubt less, also, legislative power may be delegated by the
Constitution itself. Section 14, paragraph 2, of Article VI of the Constitution of
the Philippines provides that "The National Assembly may by law authorize
the President, subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose,
to fix within specified limits, tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage
and wharfage dues." And section 16 of the same article of the Constitution
provides that "In times of war or other national emergency, the National
Assembly may by law authorize the President, for a limited period and subject
to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to
carry out a declared national policy."
25.ID.; ID.; ID.; TEST OF UNDUE DELEGATION; DETAILS OF
EXECUTION. In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation
of legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee or
delegate of the legislature. In United States vs. Ang Tang Ho ( [1922], 43
Phil., 1), the Supreme Court adhered to the foregoing rule. The general rule,
however, is limited by another rule that to a certain extent matters of detail
may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be adopted or
promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards. As a rule, an act
of the legislature is incomplete and hence invalid if it does not lay down any
rule or definite standard by which the administrative board may be guided in
the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to it.
26.ID.; ID.; ID.; PROBATION ACT MAKES VIRTUAL SURRENDER OF
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO PROVINCIAL BOARDS. The Probation Act does
not, by the force of any of its provisions, fix and impose upon the provincial
boards any standard or guide in the exercise of their discretionary power.
What is granted is a "roving commission" which enables the provincial boards
to exercise arbitrary discretion. By section 11 of the Act, the legislature does
seemingly on its own authority extend the benefits of the Probation Act to the
provinces but in reality leaves the entire matter for the various provincial
boards to determine. If a provincial board does not wish to have the Act
applied in its province, all that it has to do is to decline to appropriate the
needed amount for the salary of a probation officer. This is a virtual surrender
of legislative power to the provincial boards.
27.ID.; ID.; ID.; TRUE DISTINCTION BETWEEN POWER TO MAKE LAW
AND DISCRETION AS TO ITS EXECUTION; ADJUDICATED CASES. The true
distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
30.ID.; ID.; ID.; LOCAL OPTION LAWS RIGHT OF LOCAL SELFGOVERNMENT; SUSPENSION OF OPERATION OF A GENERAL LAW
COUNTENANCED. The legislature may enact laws for a particular locality
different from those applicable to other localities and, while recognizing the
force of the principle hereinabove expressed, courts in many jurisdictions
have sustained the constitutionality of the submission of option laws to the
vote of the people. (6 R. C. L., p. 171.) But option laws thus sustained treat
of subjects purely local in character which should receive different treatment
in different localities placed under different circumstances. Without denying
the right of local self-government and the propriety of leaving matters of
purely local concern in the hands of local authorities or for the people of small
communities to pass upon in matters of general legislation like that which
treats of criminals in general, and as regards the general subject of probation,
discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified and absolute as
provided in Act No. 4221.
31.ID.; ID.; ID.; PROVINCIAL BOARDS EMPOWERED TO SUSPEND
OPERATION OF PROBATION ACT. The statute does not expressly state
that the provincial boards may suspend the operation of the Probation Act in
particular provinces but, considering that, in being vested with the authority
to appropriate or not the necessary funds for the salaries of probation officers
they thereby are given absolute discretion to determine whether or not the
law should take effect or operate in their respective provinces, the provincial
boards are in reality empowered by the legislature to suspend the operation
of the Probation Act in particular provinces, the Act to be held in abeyance
until the provincial boards should decide otherwise by appropriating the
necessary funds. The validity of a law is not tested by what has been done,
but by what may be done under its provisions. (Walter E. Olsen &
Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad [1922], 43 Phil., 259; 12 C. ,T., p. 786.)
32.ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATIVE POLICY; EXECUTION THEREOF
CONSTITUTION BOTH A GRANT AND LIMITATION OF POWER. A great
deal of latitude should be granted to the legislature not only in the expression
of what may be termed legislative policy but in the elaboration and execution
thereof. "Without this power, legislation would become oppressive and yet
imbecile." (People vs. Reynolds, 5 Gilman, 1.) It has been said that popular
government lives because of the inexhaustible reservoir of power behind it. It
is unquestionable that the mass of powers of government is vested in the
representatives of the people and that these representatives are no further
restrained under our system than by the express language of the instrument
imposing the restraint, or by particular provisions which by clear intendment,
have that effect. But it should be borne in mind that a constitution is both a
the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or several
provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province may
appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year and have
probation during that year and thereafter decline to make further
appropriation, and have no probation in subsequent years. While this
situation, goes rather to the abuse of discretion which delegation implies, it is
here indicated to show that the Probation Act sanctions a situation which is
intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove how easy it is, under the
Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a rope of sand."
36.ID.; PARTIAL UNCONSTITUTIONALITY; PRESUMPTION AGAINST
MUTILATION OF STATUTE. In seeking the legislative intent, the
presumption is against any mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort
to elimination only where an unconstitutional pro vision is interjected into a
statute otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal
will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act substantially
unaffected by the process.
37.ID.; SECTION 11 OF PROBATION ACT INSEPARABLE FROM REST OF
ACT; PROBATION AND PROBATION OFFICERS. Section 11 of the Probation
Act (No. 4221) is inseparably linked with the other portions of the Act that
with the elimination of the section what would be left is the bare idealism of
the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people who
may be deserving of the intended beneficial results of that system. The clear
policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the whole
context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the
affirmative action of the different provincial boards. If not one of the
provinces and this is the actual situation now appropriates the necessary
fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221 would
be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can
there be a probation officer with out a probation system.
38.ID.; ID.; PROBATION ACT ANALYZED; SECTIONS 10 AND 11 ACT;
RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. The probation officer the
administrative personnel referred to in section 10 are clearly not those
probation officers required to be appointed for the provinces under section
11. It may be said, reddendo singula singulis, that the probation officers
referred to in section 10 are to act as such, not in the various provinces, but
in the central office known as the Probation Office established in the
Department of Justice, under the supervision of a Chief Probation Officer.
When the law provides that "the probation officer" shall investigate and make
reports to the court; that "the probation officer" shall supervise and visit the
probationer; that the probationer shall report to the "probation officer", shall
al low "the probation officer" to visit him, shall truthfully answer any
reasonable inquiries on the part of "the probation officer" concerning his
conduct or condition; that the court shall notify "the probation officer" in
writing of the period and terms of probation, it means the probation officer
who is in charge of a particular probationer in a particular province. It never
could have been the intention of the legislature, for instance, to re quire a
probationer in Batanes, to report to a probation officer in the City of Manila,
or to require a probation officer in Manila to visit the probationer in the said
province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to
instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such
other functions as are assigned to him by law.
39.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WISDOM AND PROPRIETY OF LEGISLATION;
PROGRESSIVE INTERPRETATION AND JUDICIAL LEGISLATION. That under
section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many probation officers as
there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course, possible. But this
would be arguing on what the law may beor should beand not on what the
law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom and propriety of
legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law better otherwise
than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive interpretation and
judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not permitted to read
into the law matters and provisions which are not there. Not for any purpose
not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
40.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS; APPOINTMENT OF
PROBATION OFFICERS BY SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JUDICIAL NOTICE.
The clear intention and policy of the law is not to make the Insular
Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the provinces but to
make the provinces defray them should they desire to have the Probation Act
apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry out the purposes
of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the salaries of probation
officers in the central office at Manila. These probation officers are to receive
such compensation as the Secretary of Justice may fix "until such positions
shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was not the intention of
the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix the salaries of
probation officers in the provinces or later on to include said salaries in an
appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000, appropriated
in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the
administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the
amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to
probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that
there are 48 provinces in the Philippines, and we do not think it is seriously
contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central
office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a
salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this is correct, the
contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an
impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that
there can be a system of probation in the provinces without probation
officers.
41.ID.; PROBATION AS DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PENOLOGY;
PROBATION ACT AS REPUGNANT TO FUNDAMENTAL LAW. Probation as a
development of modern penology is a commendable system. Probation laws
have been enacted, here and in other countries, to permit what modern
criminologists call the "individualization of punishment", the adjustment of the
penalty to the character of the criminal and the circumstances of his particular
case. It provides a period of grace in order to aid in the rehabilitation of a
penitent offender. It is believed that, in many cases, convicts may be
reformed and their development into hardened criminals aborted. It,
therefore, takes advantage of an opportunity for reformation and avoids
imprisonment so long as the convict gives promise of reform. The welfare of
society is its chief end and aim. The benefit to the individual convict is merely
incidental. But while probation is commendable as a system and its
implantation into the Philippines should be welcomed, the law is set aside
because of repugnancy to the fundamental law.
42.ID.; CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS; RULES OF STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION; DECISIONS OF UNITED STATES COURTS; LOCAL
CONDITIONS AND ENVIRONMENT. The constitutional relations between
the Federal and the State governments of the United States and the dual
character of the American Government is a situation which does not obtain in
the Philippines. The situation of a state of the American Union or of the
District of Columbia with reference to the Federal Government of the United
States is not the situation of a province with respect to the Insular
Government; the distinct federal and state judicial organizations of the United
States do not embrace the integrated judicial system of the Philippines;
"General propositions do not decide concrete cases" and "to keep pace with .
. . new developments of times and circumstances", fundamental principles
should be interpreted having in view existing local conditions and
environments.
DECISION
LAUREL, J :
p
This is an original action instituted in this court on August 19, 1937, for
the issuance of the writs of certiorari and of prohibition to the Court of First
Instance of Manila so that this court may review the actuations of the
aforesaid Court of First Instance in criminal case No. 42649 entitled
"The People of the Philippine Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", more
particularly the application of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng therein for
probation under the provisions of Act No. 4221, and thereafter prohibit the
said Court of First Instance from taking any further action or entertaining
further the aforementioned application for probation, to the end that the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng may be forthwith committed to prison in
accordance with the final judgment of conviction rendered by this court in
said case (G. R. No. 41200). 1
Petitioners herein, the People of the Philippine Islands and the
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, are respectively the plaintiff
and the offended party, and the respondent herein Mariano Cu Unjieng is one
of the defendants, in the criminal case entitled "The People of the Philippine
Islands vs. Mariano Cu Unjieng, et al.", criminal case No. 42649 of the Court
of First Instance of Manila and G. R. No. 41200 of this court. Respondent
herein, Hon. Jose O. Vera, is the Judge ad interim of the seventh branch of
the Court of First Instance of Manila, who heard the application of the
defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for probation in the aforesaid criminal case.
The information in the aforesaid criminal case was filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila on October 15, 1931, petitioner herein Hongkong
and Shanghai Banking Corporation intervening in the case as private
prosecutor. After a protracted trial unparalleled in the annals of Philippine
jurisprudence both in the length of time spent by the court as well as in the
volume of the testimony and the bulk of exhibits presented, the Court of First
Instance of Manila, on January 8, 1934, rendered a judgment of conviction
sentencing the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from four years and two months of prision correccional to eight years
of prison mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation of civil action to the
offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation. Upon
appeal, the court, on March 26, 1935, modified the sentence to an
indeterminate penalty of from five years and six months of prision
correccional to seven years, six months and twenty-seven days of prison
mayor, but affirmed the judgment in all other respects. Mariano Cu Unjieng
filed a motion for reconsideration and four successive motions for new trial
which were denied on December 17, 1935, and final judgment was
accordingly entered on December 18, 1935. The defendant thereupon sought
to have the case elevated on certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States but the latter denied the petition for certiorari in November, 1936. This
court, on November 24, 1936, denied the petition subsequently filed by the
defendant for leave to file a second alternative motion for reconsideration or
new trial and thereafter remanded the case to the court of origin for
execution of the judgment.
The instant proceedings have to do with the application for probation
filed by the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng on November 27, 1936,
before the trial court, under the provisions of Act No. 4221 of the defunct
Philippine Legislature. Herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng states in his
petition, inter alia, that he is innocent of the crime of which he was convicted,
that he has no criminal record and that he would observe good conduct in the
future. The Court of First Instance of Manila, Judge Pedro Tuason presiding,
referred the application for probation to the Insular Probation Office which
recommended denial of the same on June 18, 1937. Thereafter, the Court of
First Instance of Manila, seventh branch, Judge Jose O. Vera presiding, set
the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
On April 2, 1937, the Fiscal of the City of Manila filed an opposition to
the granting of probation to the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng. The
private prosecution also filed an opposition on April 5, 1937, alleging, among
other things, that Act No. 4221, assuming that it has not been repealed by
section 2 of Article XV of the Constitution, is nevertheless violative of section
1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection
of the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the
Islands and because section 11 of said Act No. 4221 endows the provincial
boards with the power to make said law effective or otherwise in their
respective provinces. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary
opposition on April 19, 1937, elaborating on the alleged unconstitutionality of
Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the provincial
boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution). The City Fiscal
concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect to
the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
On June 28, 1937, herein respondent Judge Jose O. Vera promulgated
a resolution with a finding that "las pruebas no han establecido de una
manera concluyente la culpabilidad del peticionario y que todos los hechos
probados no son inconsistentes o incongruentes con su inocencia" and
concludes that the herein respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng "es inocente por
duda racional" of the crime for which he stands convicted by this court in G.
R. No. 41200, but denying the latter's petition for probation for the reason
that:
". . . Si este Juzgado concediera la probacion solicitada por las
circunstancias y la historia social que se han expuesto en el cuerpo de
esta resolucion, que hacen al peticionario acreedor de la misma, una
parte de la opinion publica, atizada por los recelos y las suspicacias,
podria levantarse indignada contra un sistema de probacion que permite
atisbar en los procedimientos ordinarios de una causa criminal
perturbando la quietud y la eficacia de las decisiones ya recaidas al traer
a la superficie conclusiones enteramente diferentes, en menoscabo del
interes publico que demanda el respeto de las leyes y del veredicto
judicial."
Fiscal of the City of Manila moved for the hearing of his motion for execution
of judgment in preference to the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae but, upon objection of counsel for Mariano Cu Unjieng, he moved for
the postponement of the hearing of both motions. The respondent judge
thereupon set the hearing of the motion for execution on August 21, 1937,
but proceeded to consider the motion for leave to intervene as amici curiae as
in order. Evidence as to the circumstances under which said motion for leave
to intervene as amici curiae was signed and submitted to court was to have
been heard on August 19, 1937. But at this juncture, herein petitioners came
to this court on extraordinary legal process to put an end to what they alleged
was an interminable proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Manila which
fostered "the campaign of the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng for delay in the
execution of the sentence imposed by this Honorable Court on him, exposing
the courts to criticism and ridicule because of the apparent inability of the
judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment of this court imposed on
the defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng."
The scheduled hearing before the trial court was accordingly suspended
upon the issuance of a temporary restraining order by this court on August
21, 1937.
To support their petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of
certiorari and prohibition, herein petitioners allege that the respondent judge
has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of his jurisdiction:
I.Because said respondent judge lacks the power to place respondent
Mariano Cu Unjieng under probation for the following reasons:
(1)Under section 11 of Act No. 4221, the said Act of the Philippine
Legislature is made to apply only to the provinces of the Philippines; it
nowhere states that it is to be made applicable to chartered cities like the City
of Manila.
(2)While section 37 of the Administrative Code contains a proviso to the
effect that in the absence of a special provision, the term "province" may be
construed to include the City of Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws
of general application, it is also true that Act No. 4221 is not a law of general
application because it is made to apply only to those provinces in which the
respective provincial boards shall have provided for the salary of a probation
officer.
(3)Even if the City of Manila were considered to be a province, still, Act
No. 4221 would not be applicable to it because it has not provided for the
salary of a probation officer as required by section 11 thereof; it being
immaterial that there is an Insular Probation Office willing to act for the City
of Manila, said Probation Office provided for in section 10 of Act No. 4221
being different and distinct from the Probation Officer provided for in section
11 of the same Act.
II.Because even if the respondent judge originally had jurisdiction to
entertain the application for probation of the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng,
he nevertheless acted without jurisdiction or in excess thereof in continuing to
entertain the motion for reconsideration and by failing to commit Mariano Cu
Unjieng to prison after he had promulgated his resolution of June 28, 1937,
denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's application for probation, for the reason that:
(1)His jurisdiction and power in probation proceedings is limited by Act
No. 4221 to the granting or denying of applications for probation.
(2)After he had issued the order denying Mariano Cu Unjieng's petition
for probation on June 28, 1937, it became final and executory at the moment
of its rendition.
(3)No right of appeal exists in such cases.
(4)The respondent judge lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said
order or to modify or change the same.
III.Because the respondent judge made a finding that Mariano Cu
Unjieng is innocent of the crime for which he was convicted by final judgment
of this court, which finding is not only presumptuous but without foundation
in fact and in law, and is furthermore in contempt of this court and a violation
of the respondent's oath of office as ad interim judge of first instance.
IV.Because the respondent judge has violated and continues to violate
his duty, which became imperative when he issued his order of June 28,
1937, denying the application for probation, to commit his co-respondent to
jail.
Petitioners also aver that they have no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
In a supplementary petition filed on September 9, 1937, the petitioner
Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation further contends that Act No.
4221 of the Philippine Legislature providing for a system of probation for
persons eighteen years of age or over who are convicted of crime, is
unconstitutional because it is violative of section 1, subsection (1), Article III,
of the Constitution of the Philippines guaranteeing equal protection of the
laws because it confers upon the provincial board of each province the
absolute discretion to make said law operative or other wise in their
respective provinces, because it constitutes an unlawful and improper
court and was still pending resolution before the trial court when the present
petition was filed with this court.
(3)That the petitioners having themselves raised the question as to the
execution of judgment before the trial court, said trial court has acquired
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the same under the theory that its resolution
denying probation is unappealable.
(4)That upon the hypothesis that this court has concurrent jurisdiction
with the Court of First Instance to decide the question as to whether or not
execution will lie, this court nevertheless cannot exercise said jurisdiction
while the Court of First Instance has assumed jurisdiction over the same upon
motion of herein petitioners themselves.
(5)That the procedure followed by the herein petitioners in seeking to
deprive the trial court of its jurisdiction over the case and elevate the
proceedings to this court, should not be tolerated because it impairs the
authority and dignity of the trial court which court while sitting in probation
cases is "a court of limited jurisdiction but of great dignity."
(6)That, under the supposition that this court has jurisdiction to resolve
the question submitted to and pending resolution by the trial court, the
present action would not lie because the resolution of the trial court denying
probation is appealable; for although the Probation Law does not specifically
provide that an applicant for probation may appeal from a resolution of the
Court of First Instance denying probation, still it is a general rule in this
jurisdiction that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior court is
appealable to the superior court.
(7)That the resolution of the trial court denying probation of herein
respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng being appealable, the same had not yet
become final and executory for the reason that the said respondent had filed
an alternative motion for reconsideration and new trial within the requisite
period of fifteen days, which motion the trial court was not able to resolve in
view of the restraining order improvidently and erroneously issued by this
court.
(8)That the Fiscal of the City of Manila had by implication admitted that
the resolution of the trial court denying probation is not final and
unappealable when he presented his answer to the motion for reconsideration
and agreed to the postponement of the hearing of the said motion.
(9)That under the supposition that the order of the trial court denying
probation is not appealable, it is incumbent upon the accused to file an action
for the issuance of the writ of certiorari with mandamus, it appearing that the
trial court, although it believed that the accused was entitled to probation,
denying the said application assumed the task not only of considering the
merits of the application, but of passing upon the culpability of the applicant,
notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by this court. (G. R. No.
41200.) Probation implies guilt by final judgment. While a probation court
hearing a probation case may look into the circumstances attending the
commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to reverse the findings
and conclusions of this court, either directly or indirectly, especially where
from its own admission reliance was merely had on the printed briefs,
averments, and pleadings of the parties. As already observed by this court in
Shioji vs.Harvey ([1922], 43 Phil., 333, 337), and reiterated in subsequent
cases, "if each and every Court of First Instance could enjoy the privilege of
overruling decisions of the Supreme Court, there would be no end to
litigation, and judicial chaos would result." A becoming modesty of inferior
courts demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in the
interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of the nation.
After threshing carefully the multifarious issues raised by both counsel
for the petitioners and the respondents, this court prefers to cut the Gordian
knot and take up at once the two fundamental questions presented, namely,
(1) whether or not the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly
raised in these proceedings; and (2) in the affirmative, whether or not said
Act is constitutional. Consideration of these issues will involve a discussion of
certain incidental questions raised by the parties.
To arrive at a correct conclusion on the first question, resort to certain
guiding principles is necessary. It is a well-settled rule that the
constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question its properly raised and presented in appropriate
cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i. e., the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented. (McGirr vs. Hamilton
and Abreu [1915], 30 Phil., 563, 568; 6 R. C. L., pp. 76, 77; 12 C. J., pp. 780782, 783.)
The question of the constitutionality of an act of the legislature is
frequently raised in ordinary actions. Nevertheless, resort may be made to
extraordinary legal remedies, particularly where the remedies in the ordinary
course of law even if available, are not plain, speedy and adequate. Thus, in
Cu Unjieng vs. Patstone ([1922], 42 Phil., 818), this court held that the
question of the constitutionality of a statute may be raised by the petitioner in
-mandamus proceedings (see, also, 12 C. J., p. 783); and in Government of
the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259 [affirmed in
Springer vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (1928), 277 U. S., 189; 72
Law. ed., 845]), this court declared an act of the legislature unconstitutional
283; and Wilson vs. New, 243 U. S., 332; 61 Law. ed., 755; L. R. A.
1917E, 938; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 298; Ann. Cas., 1918A, 1024). Although
objection to the jurisdiction was raised by demurrer to the petition, this
is now disclaimed on behalf of the respondents, and both parties ask a
decision on the merits. In view of broad powers in prohibition granted to
that court under the Island Code, we acquiesce in the desire of the
parties."
on Constitutional Limitations (Vol. I, p. 339; 12 C. J., sec. 177, pp. 760 and
762), and McGlue vs.Essex County ([1916], 225 Mass., 59; 113 N. E., 742,
743), as authority for the proposition that a court will not consider any attack
made on the constitutionality of a statute by one who has no interest in
defeating it because his rights are not affected by its operation. The
respondent judge further stated that it may not motu proprio take up the
constitutional question and, agreeing with Cooley that "the power to declare a
legislative enactment void is one which the judge, conscious of the fallibility of
the human judgment, will shrink from exercising in any case where he can
conscientiously and with due regard to duty and official oath decline the
responsibility" (Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 332), proceeded
on the assumption that Act No. 4221 is constitutional. While, therefore, the
court a quoadmits that the constitutional question was raised before it, it
refused to consider the question solely because it was not raised by a proper
party. Respondents herein reiterate this view. The argument is advanced that
the private prosecution has no personality to appear in the hearing of the
application for probation of defendant Mariano Cu Unjieng in criminal case
No. 42648 of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and hence the issue of
constitutionality was not properly raised in the lower court. Although, as a
general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the
constitutionality of a statute involved in a judicial decision, it has been held
that since the decree pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void,
where the jurisdiction of the court depends on the validity of the statute in
question, the issue of constitutionality will be considered on its being brought
to the attention of the court by persons interested in the effect to be given
the statute. (12 C. J., sec. 184, p. 766.) And, even if we were to concede that
the issue was not properly raised in the court below by the proper party, it
does not follow that the issue may not be here raised in an original action of
certiorari and prohibition. It is true that, as a general rule, the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not
raised by the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. (12 C. J., p.
786. See, also, Cadwallader-Gibson Lumber Co. vs. Del Rosario, 26 Phil., 192,
193-195.) But we must state that the general rule admits of exceptions.
Courts, in the exercise of sound discretion, may determine the time when a
question affecting the constitutionality of a statute should be presented. ( In
re Woolsey [1884], 95 N. Y., 135, 144.) Thus, in criminal cases, although
there is a very sharp conflict of authorities, it is said that the question may be
raised for the first time at any stage of the proceedings, either in the trial
court or on appeal. (12 C. J., p. 786.) Even in civil cases, it has been held that
it is the duty of a court to pass on the constitutional question, though raised
for the first time on appeal, if it appears that a determination of the question
is necessary to a decision of the case. (McCabe's Adm'x. vs. Maysville & B. S.
R. Co. [1910], 136 Ky., 674; 124 S. W., 892; Lohmeyer vs. St. Louis Cordage
Co. [1908], 214 Mo., 685; 113 S. W., 1108; Carmody vs. St. Louis Transit Co.
[1905], 188 Mo., 572; 87 S. W., 913.) And it has been held that a
constitutional question will be considered by an appellate court at any time,
where it involves the jurisdiction of the court below (State vs. Burke [1911],
175 Ala., 561; 57 S., 870.) As to the power of this court to consider the
constitutional question raised for the first time before this court in these
proceedings, we turn again and point with emphasis to the case of Yu Cong
Eng vs. Trinidad, supra. And on the hypothesis that the Hongkong & Shanghai
Banking Corporation, represented by the private prosecution, is not the
proper party to raise the constitutional question here a point we do not
now have to decide we are of the opinion that the People of the
Philippines, represented by the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of
Manila, is such a proper party in the present proceedings. The unchallenged
rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a
personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. It goes without saying
that if Act No. 4221 really violates the Constitution, the People of the
Philippines, in whose name the present action is brought, has a substantial
interest in having it set aside. Of greater import than the damage caused by
the illegal expenditure of public funds is the mortal wound inflicted upon the
fundamental law by the enforcement of an invalid statute. Hence, the wellsettled rule that the state can challenge the validity of its own laws. In
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Springer ([1927], 50 Phil., 259
(affirmed in Springer vs.Government of the Philippine Islands [1928], 277 U.
S., 189; 72 Law. ed., 845), this court declared an act of the legislature
unconstitutional in an action instituted in behalf of the Government of the
Philippines. In Attorney Generalvs. Perkins ([1889], 73 Mich., 303, 311, 312;
41 N. W. 426, 428, 429), the State of Michigan, through its Attorney General,
instituted quo warranto proceedings to test the right of the respondents to
renew a mining corporation, alleging that the statute under which the
respondents base their right was unconstitutional because it impaired the
obligation of contracts. The capacity of the chief law officer of the state to
question the constitutionality of the statute was itself questioned. Said the
Supreme Court of Michigan, through Champlin, J.:
". . . The idea seems to be that the people are estopped from
questioning the validity of a law enacted by their representatives; that to
an accusation by the people of Michigan of usurpation upon their
government, a statute enacted by the people of Michigan is an adequate
In State vs. Doane ([1916], 98 Kan., 435; 158 Pac., 38, 40), an original
action (mandamus) was brought by the Attorney-General of Kansas to test
the constitutionality of a statute of the state. In disposing of the question
whether or not the state may bring the action, the Supreme Court of Kansas
said:
". . . The state is a proper party indeed, the proper party to
bring this action. The state is always interested where the integrity of its
Constitution or statutes is involved.
"'It has an interest in seeing that the will of the Legislature is not
disregarded, and need not, as an individual plaintiff must, show grounds
of fearing more specific injury. (State vs. Kansas City, 60 Kan., 518 [57
Pac., 118]'). (State vs. Lawrence, 80 Kan., 707; 103 Pac., 839.)
"Where the constitutionality of a statute is in doubt the state's
law officer, its Attorney-General, or county attorney, may exercise his
best judgment as to what sort of action he will bring to have the matter
determined, either by quo warranto to challenge its validity
(State vs. Johnson, 61 Kan., 803; 60 Pac., 1068; 49 L. R. A., 662), by
mandamus to compel obedience to its terms (State vs. Dolley, 82 Kan.,
533; 108 Pac., 846), or by injunction to restrain proceedings under its
questionable provisions (State ex rel. vs. City of Neodesha, 3 Kan. App.,
319; 45 Pac., 122)."
Other courts have reached the same conclusion (See State vs. St. Louis
S. W. Ry. Co. [1917], 197 S. W., 1006; State vs. S. H. Kress & Co. [1934],
155 S., 823; State vs. Walmsley [1935], 181 La., 597; 160 S., 91;
State vs. Board of County Comr's [1934], 39 Pac. [2d], 286; First Const. Co.
of Brooklyn vs. State [1917], 221 N. Y., 295; 116 N. E., 1020; Bush vs. State
[1918], 187 Ind., 339; 119 N. E., 417; State vs. Watkins [1933], 176 La.,
837; 147 S., 8, 10, 11). In the case last cited, the Supreme Court of Louisiana
said:
City Fiscal is estopped from attacking the validity of the Act and, not being
authorized to enforce laws outside of the City of Manila, cannot challenge the
validity of the Act in its application outside said city. (Additional memorandum
of respondents, October 23, 1937, pp. 8, 10, 17 and 23.)
The mere fact that the Probation Act has been repeatedly relied upon in
the past and all that time has not been attacked as unconstitutional by the
Fiscal of Manila but, on the contrary, has been impliedly regarded by him as
constitutional, is no reason for considering the People of the Philippines
estopped from now assailing its validity. For courts will pass upon a
constitutional question only when presented before it in bona fide cases for
determination, and the fact that the question has not been raised before is
not a valid reason for refusing to allow it to be raised later. The fiscal and all
others are justified in relying upon the statute and treating it as valid until it is
held void by the courts in proper cases.
It remains to consider whether the determination of the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 is necessary to the resolution of the instant
case. For, ". . . while the court will meet the question with firmness, where its
decision is indispensable, it is the part of wisdom, and a just respect for the
legislature, renders it proper, to waive it, if the case in which it arises, can be
decided on other points." (Ex parte Randolph [1833], 20 F. Cas. No. 11,558; 2
Brock., 447.Vide, also, Hoover vs. Wood [1857], 9 Ind., 286, 287.) It has
been held that the determination of a constitutional question is necessary
whenever it is essential to the decision of the case (12 C. J., p. 782, citing
Long Sault Dev. Co.vs. Kennedy [1913], 158 App. Div., 398; 143 N. Y. Supp.,
454 [aff. 212 N. Y., 1; 105 N. E., 849; Ann. Cas. 1915D, 56; and app dism
242 U. S., 272]; Hesse vs. Ledesma, 7 Porto Rico Fed., 520;
Cowan vs. Doddridge, 22 Gratt [63 Va.], 458; Union Line Co .vs. Wisconsin R.
Comm., 146 Wis., 523; 129 N. W., 605), as where the right of a party is
founded solely on a statute, the validity of which is attacked. (12 C. J., p. 782,
citing Central Glass Co. vs. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 131 La., 513; 59 S., 972;
Cheney vs. Beverly, 188 Mass., 81; 74 N. E., 306). There is no doubt that the
respondent Cu Unjieng draws his privilege to probation solely from Act No.
4221 now being assailed.
Apart from the foregoing considerations, this court will also take
cognizance of the fact that the Probation Act is a new addition to our statute
books and its validity has never before been passed upon by the courts; that
many persons accused and convicted of crime in the City of Manila have
applied for probation; that some of them are already on probation; that
more people will likely take advantage of the Probation Act in the future; and
that the respondent Mariano Cu Unjieng has been at large for a period of
about four years since his first conviction. All await the decision of this court
on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which
the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong
reasons of public policy demand that the constitutionality of Act No. 4221 be
now resolved. (Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad [1925], 47 Phil., 385; [1926], 271 U.
S., 500; 70 Law. ed., 1059. See 6 R. C. L., pp. 77, 78; People vs. Kennedy
[1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442, 444; Ann. Cas. 1914C, 616;
Borginis vs. Falk Co. [1911], 147 Wis., 327; 133 N. W., 209, 211; 37 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 489; Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1922], 43 Phil., 304.) In
Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, supra, an analogous situation confronted us. We
said: "Inasmuch as the property and personal rights of nearly twelve
thousand merchants are affected by these proceedings, and inasmuch as Act
No. 2972 is a new law not yet interpreted by the courts, in the interest of the
public welfare and for the advancement of public policy, we have determined
to overrule the defense of want of jurisdiction in order that we may decide
the main issue. We have here an extraordinary situation which calls for a
relaxation of the general rule." Our ruling on this point was sustained by the
Supreme Court of the United States. A more binding authority in support of
the view we have taken can not be found.
We have reached the conclusion that the question of the
constitutionality of Act No. 4221 has been properly raised. Now for the main
inquiry: Is the Act unconstitutional?
Under a doctrine peculiarly American, it is the office and duty of the
judiciary to enforce the Constitution. This court, by clear implication from the
provisions of section 2, subsection 1, and section 10, of Article VIII of the
Constitution, may declare an act of the national legislature invalid because in
conflict with the fundamental law. It will not shirk from its sworn duty to
enforce the Constitution. And, in clear cases, it will not hesitate to give effect
to the supreme law by setting aside a statute in conflict therewith. This is of
the essence of judicial duty.
This court is not unmindful of the fundamental criteria in cases of this
nature that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of the
constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature approved by the
executive, is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. The
responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but
on the legislature as well. "The question of the validity of every statute is first
determined by the legislative department of the government itself." (U.
S. vs. Ten Yu [1912], 24 Phil., 1, 10; Case vs. Board of Health and Heiser
[1913], 24 Phil., 250, 276; U. S. vs. Joson [1913], 26 Phil., 1.) And a statute
finally comes before the courts sustained by the sanction of the executive.
The members of the Legislature and the Chief Executive have taken an oath
to support the Constitution and it must be presumed that they have been true
to this oath and that in enacting and sanctioning a particular law they did not
intend to violate the Constitution. The courts cannot but cautiously exercise
its power to overturn the solemn declarations of two of the three grand
departments of the government. (6 R. C. L., p. 101.) Then, there is that
peculiar political philosophy which bids the judiciary to reflect the wisdom of
the people as expressed through an elective Legislature and an elective Chief
Executive. It follows, therefore, that the courts will not set aside a law as
violative of the Constitution except in a clear case. This is a proposition too
plain to require a citation of authorities.
One of the counsel for respondents, in the course of his impassioned
argument, called attention to the fact that the President of the Philippines had
already expressed his opinion against the constitutionality of the Probation
Act, adverting that as to the Executive the resolution of this question was a
foregone conclusion. Counsel, however, reiterated his confidence in the
integrity and independence of this court. We take notice of the fact that the
President in his message dated September 1, 1937, recommended to the
National Assembly the immediate repeal of the Probation Act (No. 4221); that
this message resulted in the approval of Bill No. 2417 of the National
Assembly repealing the Probation Act, subject to certain conditions therein
mentioned; but that said bill was vetoed by the President on September 13,
1937, much against his wish, "to have stricken out from the statute books of
the Commonwealth a law . . . unfair and very likely unconstitutional." It is
sufficient to observe in this connection that, in vetoing the bill referred to, the
President exercised his constitutional prerogative. He may express the
reasons which he may deem proper for taking such a step, but his reasons
are not binding upon us in the determination of actual controversies
submitted for our determination. Whether or not the Executive should express
or in any manner insinuate his opinion on a matter encompassed within his
broad constitutional power of veto but which happens to be at the same time
pending determination in this court is a question of propriety for him
exclusively to decide or determine. Whatever opinion is expressed by him
under these circumstances, however, cannot sway our judgment one way or
another and prevent us from taking what in our opinion is the proper course
of action to take in a given case. If it is ever necessary for us to make any
vehement affirmance during this formative period of our political history, it is
that we are independent of the Executive no less than of the Legislative
department of our government independent in the performance of our
functions, undeterred by any consideration, free from politics, indifferent to
(Com. vs. Lockwood, supra.) Our Constitution also makes specific mention of
"commutation" and of the power of the executive to impose, in the pardons
he may grant, such conditions, restrictions and limitations as he may deem
proper. Amnesty may be granted by the President under the Constitution but
only with the concurrence of the National Assembly. We need not dwell at
length on the significance of these fundamental changes. It is sufficient for
our purposes to state that the pardoning power has remained essentially the
same. The question is: Has the pardoning power of the Chief Executive under
the Jones Law been impaired by the Probation Act?
As already stated, the Jones Law vests the pardoning power exclusively
in the Chief Executive. The exercise of the power may not, therefore, be
vested in anyone else. ". . . The benign prerogative of mercy reposed in the
executive cannot be taken away nor fettered by any legislative restrictions,
nor can like power be given by the legislature to any other officer or
authority. The coordinate departments of government have nothing to do
with the pardoning power, since no person properly belonging to one of the
departments can exercise any powers appertaining to either of the others
except in cases expressly provided for by the constitution." (20 R. C. L., pp.
540, 541, and cases cited.) ". . . where the pardoning power is conferred on
the executive without express or implied limitations, the grant is exclusive,
and the legislature can neither exercise such power itself nor delegate it
elsewhere, nor interfere with or control the proper exercise thereof, . . .." (12
C. J., pp. 838, 839, and cases cited.) If Act No. 4221, then, confers any
pardoning power upon the courts it is for that reason unconstitutional and
void. But does it?
In the famous Killitts decision involving an embezzlement case, the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled in 1916 that an order indefinitely
suspending sentence was void. (Ex parte United States [1916], 242 U. S., 27;
61 Law. ed., 129; L. R. A. 1917E, 1178; 37 Sup. Ct. Rep., 72; Ann. Cas.
1917B, 355.) Chief Justice White, after an exhaustive review of the
authorities, expressed the opinion of the court that under the common law
the power of the court was limited to temporary suspension and that the right
to suspend sentence absolutely and permanently was vested in the executive
branch of the government and not in the judiciary. But, the right of Congress
to establish probation by statute was conceded. Said the court through its
Chief Justice: ". . . and so far as the future is concerned, that is, the causing
of the imposition of penalties as fixed to be subject, by probation legislation
or such other means as the legislative mind may devise, to such judicial
discretion as may be adequate to enable courts to meet by the exercise of an
enlarged but wise discretion the infinite variations which may be presented to
We have seen that in 1916 the Supreme Court of the United States; in
plain and unequivocal language, pointed to Congress as possessing the
requisite power to enact probation laws, that a federal probation law was
actually enacted in 1925, and that the constitutionality of the Act has been
assumed by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1928 and consistently
sustained by the inferior federal courts in a number of earlier cases.
We are fully convinced that the Philippine Legislature, like the Congress
of the United States, may legally enact a probation law under its broad power
to fix the punishment of any and all penal offenses. This conclusion is
supported by other authorities. In Ex parte Bates ([1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R.
A. 1916A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698, the court said: "It is clearly within the
province of the Legislature to denominate and define all classes of crime, and
to prescribe for each a minimum and maximum punishment." And in
State vs. Abbott ([1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33 L. R. A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6;
Ann. Cas. 1912B, 1189), the court said: "The legislative power to set
punishment for crime is very broad, and in the exercise of this power the
general assembly may confer on trial judges, if it sees fit, the largest
discretion as to the sentence to be imposed, as to the beginning and end of
the punishment and whether it should be certain or indeterminate or
conditional." (Quoted in State vs. Teal [1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69.)
Indeed, the Philippine Legislature has defined all crimes and fixed the
penalties for their violation. Invariably, the legislature has demonstrated the
desire to vest in the courts particularly the trial courts large discretion in
imposing the penalties which the law prescribes in particular cases. It is
believed that justice can best be served by vesting this power in the courts,
they being in a position to best determine the penalties which an individual
convict, peculiarly circumstanced, should suffer. Thus, while courts are not
thereof are not unanimous in their voting as to the propriety of the imposition
of the death penalty (art. 47, see also, sec. 133, Revised Administrative Code,
as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 3); the death sentence is not to be
inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following the date of the
sentence or while she is pregnant, or upon any person over seventy years of
age (art. 83); and when a convict shall become insane or an imbecile after
final sentence has been pronounced, or while he is serving his sentence, the
execution of said sentence shall be suspended with regard to the personal
penalty during the period of such insanity or imbecility (art. 79).
But the desire of the legislature to relax what might result in the undue
harshness of the penal laws is more clearly demonstrated in various other
enactments, including the probation Act. There is the Indeterminate Sentence
Law enacted in 1933 as Act No. 4103 and subsequently amended by Act No.
4225, establishing a system of parole (secs. 5 to 10) and granting the courts
large discretion in imposing the penalties of the law. Section 1 of the law as
amended provides: "Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense
punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of
which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which
shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the
Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum
term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same."
Certain classes of convicts are, by section 2 of the law, excluded from the
operation thereof. The Legislature has also enacted the Juvenile Delinquency
Law (Act No. 3203) which was subsequently amended by Act No. 3559.
Section 7 of the original Act and section 1 of the amendatory Act have
become article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, amended by Act No. 4117 of
the Philippine Legislature and recently reamended by Commonwealth Act No.
99 of the National Assembly. Finally came the (Adult) Probation Act now in
question. In this Act is again manifested the intention of the legislature to
"humanize" the penal laws. It allows, in effect, the modification in particular
cases of the penalties prescribed by law by permitting the suspension of the
execution of the judgment in the discretion of the trial court, after due
hearing and after Investigation of the particular circumstances of the offense,
the criminal record, if any, of the convict, and his social history. The
Legislature has in reality decreed that in certain cases no punishment at all
shall be suffered by the convict as long as the conditions of probation are
faithfully observed. If this be so, then, it cannot be said that the Probation Act
comes in conflict with the power of the Chief Executive to grant pardons and
reprieves, because, to use the language of the Supreme Court of New Mexico,
"the element of punishment or the penalty for the commission of a wrong,
while to be declared by the courts as a judicial function under and within the
limits of law as announced by legislative acts, concerns solely the procedure
and conduct of criminal causes, with which the executive can have nothing to
do." (Ex parte Bates, supra.) In Williams vs. State ([1926], 162 Ga., 327; 133
S. E., 843), the court upheld the constitutionality of the Georgia probation
statute against the contention that it attempted to delegate to the courts the
pardoning power lodged by the constitution in the governor of the state and
observed that "while the governor alone is vested with the power to pardon
after final sentence has been imposed by the courts, the power of the courts
to impose any penalty which may be from time to time prescribed by law and
in such manner as may be defined cannot be questioned."
We realize, of course, the conflict which the American cases disclose.
Some cases hold it unlawful for the legislature to vest in the courts the power
to suspend the operation of a sentence, by probation or otherwise, as to do
so would encroach upon the pardoning power of the executive. (In re Webb
[1895], 89 Wis., 354; 27 L. R. A., 356; 46 Am. St. Rep., 846; 62 N. W., 177; 9
Am. Crim. Rep., 702; State ex rel. Summer field vs. Moran [1919], 43 Nev.,
150; 182 Pac., 927; Ex parte Clendenning [1908], 22 Okla., 108; 1 Okla.
Crim. Rep., 227; 19 L. R. A. [N. S.], 1041; 132 Am. St. Rep., 628; 97 Pac.,
650; People vs. Barrett [1903], 202 Ill., 287; 67 N. E., 23; 63 L. R. A., 82; 95
Am. St. Rep., 230; Snodgrass vs. State [1912], 67 Tex. Crim. Rep., 615; 41 L.
R. A. [N. S.], 1144; 150 S. W., 162; Ex parteShelor [1910], 33 Nev., 361; 111
Pac., 291; Neal vs. State [1898], 104 Ga., 509; 42 L. R. A., 190; 69 Am. St.
Rep., 175; 30 S. E., 858; State ex rel. Payne vs. Anderson [1921], 43 S. D.,
630; 181 N. W., 839; People vs. Brown, 54 Mich., 15; 19 N. W., 571;
State vs. Dalton [1903], 109 Tenn., 544; 72 S. W., 456.)
Other cases, however, hold contra. (Nix vs. James 1925; C. C. A., 9th],
7 F. [2d], 590; Archer vs. Snook [1926; D. C.], 10 F. [2d], 567;
Riggs. vs. United States [1926; C. C. A. 4th], 14]) [2d], 5; Murphy vs. State
[1926], 171 Ark., 620; 286 S. W., 871; 48 A. L. R., 1189; Re Giannini [1912],
18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831; Re Nachnaber [1928], 89 Cal. App., 530;
265 Pac., 392; Ex parte De Voe [1931], 114 Cal. App., 730; 300 Pac.,
874; People vs. Patrick [1897], 118 Cal., 332; 50 Pac., 425;
Martin vs. People [1917], 69 Colo., 60; 168 Pac., 1171; Belden vs. Hugo
[1914], 88 Conn., 50; 91 A., 369, 370, 371; Williams vs. State [1926], 162
Ga., 327; 133 S. E., 843; People vs. Heise [1913], 257 Ill., 443; 100 N. E.,
1000; Parker vs. State [1893], 135 Ind., 534; 35 N. E., 179; 23 L. R. A., 859;
St. Hilarie, Petitioner [1906], 101 Me., 522; 64 Atl., 882; People vs. Stickle
[1909], 156 Mich., 557; 121 N. W., 497; State vs.Fjolander [1914], 125 Minn.,
529; State ex rel. Bottomnly vs. District Court [1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237
Pac., 525; State vs. Everitt [1913], 164 N. C., 399; 79 S. E., 274; 47 L. R. A.
[N. S.], 848; State ex rel. Buckley vs. Drew [1909], 75 N. H., 402; 74 Atl.,
875; State vs. Osborne [1911], 79 N. J. Eq., 430; 82 Atl. 424; Ex parte Bates
[1915], 20 N. M., 542; L. R. A., 1916 A, 1285; 151 Pac., 698; People ex
rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions [1894], 141 N. Y., 288; 23 L. R. A., 856; 36
N. E., 386; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675; People ex rel. Sullivan vs. Flynn [1907],
55 Misc., 639; 106 N. Y. Supp., 928; People vs. Goodrich [1914], 149 N. Y.
Supp., 406; Moore vs. Thorn [1935], 245 App. Div., 180; 281 N. Y. Supp., 49;
Re Hart [1914], 29 N. D., 38; L. R. A., 1915C, 1169; 149 N. W., 568; Ex
parte Eaton [1925], 29 Okla., Crim. Rep., 275; 233 P., 781; State vs. Teal
[1918], 108 S. C., 455; 95 S. E., 69; State vs. Abbot [1910], 87 S. C., 466; 33
L. R. A. [N. S.], 112; 70 S. E., 6; Ann. Cas., 1912B, 1189; Fults vs. State
[1854], 34 Tenn., 232; Woods vs.State [1814], 130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W.,
558; Baker vs. State [1913], 70 Tex., Crim. Rep., 618; 158 S. W., 998;
Cookvs. State [1914], 73 Tex. Crim. Rep., 548; 165 S. W., 573; King vs. State
[1914], 72 Tex. Crim. Rep., 394; 162 S. W., 890; Clare vs. State [1932], 122
Tex. Crim. Rep., 211; 54 S. W. [2d], 127; Re Hall [1927], 100 Vt., 197; 136
A., 24; Richardson vs. Com. [1921], 131 Va., 802; 109 S. E., 460;
State vs. Mallahan [1911], 65 Wash., 287; 118 Pac., 42; State ex
rel. Tingstad vs. Starwich [1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R.,
393; 396.) We elect to follow this long catena of authorities holding that the
courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by
the establishment of a system of probation however characterized. State ex
rel. Tingstad vs. Starwich ([1922], 119 Wash., 561; 206 Pac., 29; 26 A. L. R.,
393), deserved particular mention. In that case, a statute enacted in 1921
which provided for the suspension of the execution of a sentence until
otherwise ordered by the court, and required that the convicted person be
placed under the charge of a parole or peace officer during the term of such
suspension, on such terms as the court may determine, was held
constitutional and as not giving the court a power in violation of the
constitutional provision vesting the pardoning power in the chief executive of
the state. (Vide, also, Re Giannini [1912], 18 Cal. App., 166; 122 Pac., 831.)
Probation and pardon are not coterminous; nor are they the same.
They are actually distinct and different from each other, both in origin and in
nature. In People ex rel. Forsyth vs. Court of Sessions ([1894], 141 N. Y.,
288, 294; 36 N. E., 386, 388; 23 L. R. A., 856; 15 Am. Crim. Rep., 675), the
Court of Appeals of New York said:
". . . The power to suspend sentence and the power to grant
reprieves and pardons, as understood when the constitution was
adopted, are totally distinct and different in their origin and nature. The
former was always a part of the judicial power; the latter was always a
part of the executive power. The suspension of the sentence simply
postpones the judgment of the court temporarily or indefinitely, but the
conviction and liability following it, and all civil disabilities, remain and
become operative when judgment is rendered. A pardon reaches both
the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the offender.
It releases the punishment, and blots out of existence the guilt, so that
in the eye of the law, the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense. It removes the penalties and disabilities, and
restores him to all his civil rights. It makes him, as it were, a new man,
and gives him a new credit and capacity. (Ex parte Garland, 71 U. S., 4
Wall., 333; 18 Law. ed., 366; U. S. vs. Klein, 80 U. S., 13 Wall., 128; 20
Law. ed., 519; Knote vs. U. S. 95 U. S., 149; 24 Law. ed., 442.)
"The framers of the federal and state constitutions were perfectly
familiar with the principles governing the power to grant pardons, and it
was conferred by these instruments upon the executive with full
knowledge of the law upon the subject, and the words of the
constitution were used to express the authority formerly exercised by
the English crown, or by its representatives in the colonies. (Ex
parte Wells, 59 U. S., 18 How., 307; 15 Law. ed., 421.) As this power
was understood, it did not comprehend any part of the judicial functions
to suspend sentence, and it was never intended that the authority to
grant reprieves and pardons should abrogate, or in any degree restrict,
the exercise of that power in regard to its own judgments, that criminal
courts had so long maintained. The two powers, so distinct and different
in their nature and character, were still left separate and distinct, the
one to be exercised by the executive, and the other by the judicial
department. We therefore conclude that a statute which, in terms,
authorizes courts of criminal jurisdiction to suspend sentence in certain
cases after conviction, a power inherent in such courts at common
law, which was understood when the constitution was adopted to be an
ordinary judicial function, and which, ever since its adoption, has been
exercised by the courts, is a valid exercise of legislative power under the
constitution. It does not encroach, in any just sense, upon the powers of
the executive, as they have been understood and practiced from the
earliest times." (Quoted with approval in Director of Prisons vs. Judge of
"That the power to suspend the sentence does not conflict with
the power of the Governor to grant reprieves is settled by the decisions
of the various courts; it being held that the distinction between a
'reprieve' and a suspension of sentence is that a reprieve postpones the
execution of the sentence to a day certain, whereas a suspension is for
an indefinite time. (Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R., 262; In
re Buchanan, 146 N. Y., 264; 40 N. E., 883), and cases cited in 7 Words
& Phrases, pp. 6115, 6116. This law cannot be held in conflict with the
power confiding in the Governor to grant commutations of punishment,
for commutation is but to change the punishment assessed to a less
punishment."
In State ex rel. Bottomly vs. District Court ([1925], 73 Mont., 541; 237
Pac., 525), the Supreme Court of Montana had under consideration the
validity of the adult probation law of the state enacted in 1913, now found in
sections 1207812086, Revised Codes of 1921. The court held the law valid
as not impinging upon the pardoning power of the executive. In a unanimous
decision penned by justice Holloway, the court said:
". . . the terms 'pardon,' 'commutation,' and 'respite' each had a
well understood meaning at the time our Constitution was adopted, and
no one of them was intended to comprehend the suspension of the
execution of a judgment as that phrase is employed in sections 1207812086. A 'pardon' is an act of grace, proceeding from the power
intrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts the individual on
whom it is bestowed from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he
has committed (United States vs. Wilson, 7 Pet., 150; 8 Law. ed., 640);
It is a remission of guilt (State vs. Lewis, 111 La., 693; 35 So., 816), a
forgiveness of the offense (Cook vs. Middlesex County, 26 N. J. Law,
326; Ex parte Powell, 73 Ala., 517; 49 Am. Rep., 71). 'Commutation' is a
remission of a part of the punishment; a substitution of a less penalty
for the one originally imposed (Lee vs. Murphy, 22 Grat. [Va.], 789; 12
Am. Rep., 563; Rich vs. Chamberlain, 107 Mich., 381; 65 N. W., 235). A
'reprieve' or 'respite' is the withholding of a sentence for an interval of
time (4 Blackstone's Commentaries, 394), a postponement of execution
(Carnal vs. People, 1 Parker, Cr. R. [N. Y.], 272), a temporary
suspension of execution (Butler vs. State, 97 Ind., 373).
"Few adjudicated cases are to be found in which the validity of a
statute similar to our section 12078 has been determined; but the same
objections have been urged against parole statutes which vest the
power to parole in persons other than those to whom the power of
pardon is granted, and these statutes have been upheld quite uniformly,
as a reference to the numerous cases cited in the notes to
Woods vs. State (130 Tenn., 100; 169 S. W., 558, reported in L. R. A.,
1915F, 531), will disclose. (See, also, 20 R. C. L., 524.)"
We conclude that the Probation Act does not conflict with the
pardoning power of the Executive. The pardoning power, in respect to those
serving their probationary sentences, remains as full and complete as if the
Probation Law had never been enacted. The President may yet pardon the
probationer and thus place it beyond the power of the court to order his
rearrest and imprisonment. (Riggs vs. United States [1926], 14 F. [2d], 5, 7.)
2.But while the Probation Law does not encroach upon the pardoning
power of the executive and is not for that reason void, does section 11
thereof constitute, as contended, an undue delegation of legislature power?
Under our constitutional system, the powers of government are
distributed among three coordinate and substantially independent organs: the
legislative, the executive and the judicial. Each of these departments of the
government derives its authority from the Constitution which, in turn, is the
highest expression of popular will. Each has exclusive cognizance of the
matters within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere.
The power to make laws the legislative power is vested in a
bicameral Legislature by the Jones Law (sec. 12) and in a unicameral National
Assembly by the Constitution (Art. VI, sec. 1, Constitution of the Philippines).
The Philippine Legislature or the National Assembly may not escape its duties
and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority.
Any attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the
principle that potestas delegata non delegare potest. This principle is said to
have originated with the glossators, was introduced into English law through
a misreading of Bracton, there developed as a principle of agency, was
established by Lord Coke in the English public law in decisions forbidding the
delegation of judicial power, and found its way into America as an
enlightened principle of free government. It has since become an accepted
corollary of the principle of separation of powers. (5 Encyc. of the Social
Sciences, p. 66.) The classic statement of the rule is that of Locke, namely:
"The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power of making laws to
anybody else, or place it anywhere but where the people have." (Locke on
Civil Government, sec 142.) Judge Cooley enunciates the doctrine in the
following oft-quoted language: "One of the settled maxims in constitutional
law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws cannot be
delegated by that department to any other body or authority. Where the
sovereign power of the state has located the authority, there it must remain;
and by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the
Constitution itself is changed. The power to whose judgment, wisdom, and
patriotism this high prerogative has been intrusted cannot relieve itself of the
responsibility by choosing other agencies upon which the power shall be
devolved, nor can it substitute the judgment, wisdom, and patriotism of any
other body for those to which alone the people have seen fit to confide this
sovereign trust." (Cooley on Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 224.
Quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327.) This court
posits the doctrine "on the ethical principle that such a delegated power
constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the
instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of
legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. (U.
S. vs. Barrias, supra, at p. 330.)
The rule, however, which forbids the delegation of legislative power is
not absolute and inflexible. It admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned
by immemorial practice permits the central legislative body to delegate
legislative powers to local authorities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro
[1919], 39 Phil., 660; U. S. vs.Salaveria [1918], 39 Phil., 102;
Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick [1889], 129 U. S., 141; 32 Law. ed., 637; 9 Sup.
Ct. Rep., 256; Statevs. Noyes [1855], 30 N. H., 279.) "It is a cardinal principle
of our system of government, that local affairs shall be managed by local
authorities, and general affairs by the central authority; and hence while the
rule is also fundamental that the power to make laws cannot be delegated,
the creation of municipalities exercising local self government has never been
held to trench upon that rule. Such legislation is not regarded as a transfer of
general legislative power, but rather as the grant of the authority to prescribe
local regulations, according to immemorial practice, subject of course to the
interposition of the superior in cases of necessity."
(Stoutenburgh vs. Hennick, supra.) On quite the same principle, Congress is
empowered to delegate legislative power to such agencies in the territories of
the United States as it may select. A territory stands in the same relation to
Congress as a municipality or city to the state government. (United
States vs. Heinszen [1907], 206 U. S., 370; 27 Sup. Ct. Rep., 742.; 51 L. ed.,
1098; 11 Ann. Cas., 688; Dorr vs. United States [1904], 195 U. S., 138; 24
Sup. Ct. Rep., 808; 49 Law. ed., 128; 1 Ann. Cas., 697.) Courts have also
sustained the delegation of legislative power to the people at large. Some
authorities maintain that this may not be done (12 C. J., pp. 841, 842; 6 R. C.
L., p. 164, citing People vs. Kennedy [1913], 207 N. Y., 533; 101 N. E., 442;
Ann. Cas., 1914C, 616). However, the question of whether or not a state has
ceased to be republican in form because of its adoption of the initiative and
referendum has been held not to be a judicial but a political question (Pacific
States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon [1912], 223 U. S., 118; 56 Law. ed., 377; 32
Sup. Ct. Rep., 224), and as the constitutionality of such laws has been looked
upon with favor by certain progressive courts, the sting of the decisions of the
more conservative courts has been pretty well drawn. (Opinions of the
Justices [1894], 160 Mass., 586; 36 N. E., 488; 23 L. R. A., 113;
Kiernan vs. Portland [1910], 57 Ore., 454; 111 Pac., 379; 112 Pac., 602; 37 L.
R. A. [N. S.], 332; Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. vs. Oregon, supra.) Doubtless,
also, legislative power may be delegated by the Constitution itself. Section 14,
paragraph 2, of article VI of the Constitution of the Philippines provides that
"The National Assembly may by law authorize the President, subject to such
limitations and restrictions as it may impose, to fix within specified limits,
tariff rates, import or export quotas, and tonnage and wharfage dues." And
section 16 of the same article of the Constitution provides that "In times of
war or other national emergency, the National Assembly may by law authorize
the President, for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may
prescribe, to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy." It is beyond the scope of this decision to determine whether or not, in
the absence of the foregoing constitutional provisions, the President could be
authorized to exercise the powers thereby vested in him. Upon the other
hand, whatever doubt may have existed has been removed by the
Constitution itself.
The case before us does not fall under any of the exceptions
hereinabove mentioned.
The challenged section of Act No. 4221 is section 11 which reads as
follows:
"This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the
It should be observed that in the case at bar we are not concerned with
the simple transference of details of execution or the promulgation by
executive or administrative officials of rules and regulations to carry into
effect the provisions of a law. If we were, recurrence to our own decisions
would be sufficient. (U. S. vs. Barrias [1908], 11 Phil., 327; U. S. vs. Molina
[1914], 29 Phil., 119; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs [1929], 53 Phil., 394;
Cebu Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus [1931], 56 Phil., 446; U. S. vs. Gomez [1915],
31 Phil., 218; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro [1919], 39 Phil., 660.)
It is contended, however, that a legislative act may be made to the
effect as law after it leaves the hands of the legislature. It is true that laws
may be made effective on certain contingencies, as by proclamation of the
executive or the adoption by the people of a particular community (6 R. C. L.,
116. 170-172; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. I, p. 227). In
Wayman vs. Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat. 1; 6 Law. ed., 253), the Supreme
Court of the United States ruled that the legislature may delegate a power not
legislative which it may itself rightfully exercise. (Vide,
also, Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co. [1896], 92 Wis., 63; 65 N. W., 738; 31
L. R. A., 112.) The power to ascertain facts is such a power which may be
delegated. There is nothing essentially legislative in ascertaining the existence
of facts or conditions as the basis of the taking into effect of a law. That is a
mental process common to all branches of the government.
(Dowling vs. Lancashire Ins. Co., supra; In re Village of North Milwaukee
[1896], 93 Wis., 616; 97 N. W., 1033; 33 L. R. A., 938; Nash vs. Fries [1906],
129 Wis., 120; 108 N. W., 210; Field vs. Clark [1892], 143 U. S., 649; 12 Sup.
Ct., 495; 36 Law. ed., 294.) Notwithstanding the apparent tendency,
however, to relax the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority on
account of the complexity arising from social and economic forces at work in
this modern industrial age (Pfiffner, Public Administration [1936] ch. XX;
Laski, "The Mother of Parliaments", Foreign Affairs, July, 1931, Vol. IX, No. 4,
pp. 569-579; Beard, "Squirt-Gun Politics", in Harper's Monthly Magazine, July,
1930, Vol. CLXI, pp. 147, 152), the orthodox pronouncement of Judge Cooley
in his work on Constitutional Limitations finds restatement in Prof.
Willoughby's treatise on the Constitution of the United States in the following
language speaking of declaration of legislative power to administrative
agencies: "The principle which permits the legislature to provide that the
administrative agent may determine when the circumstances are such as
require the application of a law is defended upon the ground that at the time
this authority is granted, the rule of public policy, which is the essence of the
legislative act, is determined by the legislature. In other words, the
legislature, as it is its duty to do, determines that, under given circumstances,
certain executive or administrative action is to be taken, and that, under other
circumstances, different or no action at all is to be taken. What is thus left to
the administrative official is not the legislative determination of what public
policy demands, but simply the ascertainment of what the facts of the case
require to be done according to the terms of the law by which he is
governed." (Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States, 2nd ed., Vol.
III, p. 1637.) In Miller vs. Mayer, etc., of New York ([1883], 109 U. S., 385; 3
Sup. Ct. Rep., 228; 27 Law. ed., 971, 974), it was said: "The efficiency of an
Act as a declaration of legislative will must, of course, come from Congress,
but the ascertainment of the contingency upon which the Act shall take effect
may be left to such agencies as it may designate." (See, also, 12 C. J., p.
864; State vs. Parker [1854], 26 Vt., 357; Blanding vs. Burr [1859], 13 Cal.,
343, 358.) The legislature, then, may provide that a law shall take effect upon
the happening of future specified contingencies leaving to some other person
or body the power to determine when the specified contingency has arisen.
But, in the case at bar, the legislature has not made the operation of the
Probation Act contingent upon specified facts or conditions to be ascertained
extirpate the protestant religion, and the laws and liberties of the
kingdom; and the first of them is the assuming and exercising a power
of dispensing with and suspending the laws, and the execution of the
laws without consent of parliament. The first article in the claim or
declaration of rights contained in the statute is, that the exercise of such
power, by regal authority without consent of parliament, is illegal. In the
tenth section of the same statute it is further declared and enacted, that
'No dispensation by non obstante of or to any statute, or any part
thereof, should be allowed; but the same should be held void and of no
effect, except a dispensation be allowed of in such statute.' There is an
implied reservation of authority in the parliament to exercise the power
here mentioned; because, according to the theory of the English
Constitution, 'that absolute despotic power, which must in all
governments reside somewhere,' is intrusted to the parliament: 1 Bl.
Com., 160.
"The principles of our government are widely different in this
particular. Here the sovereign and absolute power resides in the people;
and the legislature can only exercise what is delegated to them
according to the constitution. It is obvious that the exercise of the power
in question would be equally oppressive to the subject, and subversive
of his right to protection, 'according to standing laws,' whether exercised
by one man or by a number of men. It cannot be supposed that
the people when adopting this general principle from the English bill of
rights and inserting it in our constitution, intended to bestow by
implication on the general court one of the most odious and oppressive
prerogatives of the ancient kings of England. it is manifestly contrary to
the first principles of civil liberty and natural justice, and to the spirit of
our constitution and laws, that any one citizen should enjoy privileges
and advantages which are denied to all others under like circumstances;
or that any one should be subject to losses, damages, suits, or actions
from which all others under like circumstances are exempted."
our Bill of Rights which prohibits the denial to any person of the equal
appeals to the Supreme Court of the state from final judgments of any circuit
court, except those in certain counties for which counties the constitution
establishes a separate court of appeals called the St. Louis Court of Appeals.
The provision complained of, then, is found in the constitution itself and it is
the constitution that makes the apportionment of territorial jurisdiction.
We are of the opinion that section 11 of the Probation Act is
unconstitutional and void because it is also repugnant to the equal- protection
clause of our Constitution.
Section 11 of the Probation Act being unconstitutional and void for the
reasons already stated, the next inquiry is whether or not the entire Act
should be avoided.
"In seeking the legislative intent, the presumption is against any
mutilation of a statute, and the courts will resort to elimination only
where an unconstitutional provision is interjected into a statute
otherwise valid, and is so independent and separable that its removal
will leave the constitutional features and purposes of the act
substantially unaffected by the process." (Riccio vs. Hoboken, 69 N. J.
Law., 649, 662; 63 L.. R. A., 485; 55 Atl., 1109, quoted in
Williams vs. Standard Oil Co. [1929], 278 U. S., 235, 240; 73 Law. ed.,
287, 309; 49 Sup. Ct. Rep., 115; 60 A. L. R., 596.) In
Barrameda vs. Moir ([1913], 25 Phil., 44, 47), this court stated the wellestablished rule concerning partial invalidity of statutes in the following
language:
". . . where part of a statute is void, as repugnant to the Organic
Law, while another part is valid, the valid portion, if separable from the
invalid, may stand and be enforced. But in order to do this, the valid
portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the Legislature would have enacted it by itself if they had
supposed that they could not constitutionally enact the other. (Mutual
Loan Co. vs. Martell, 200 Mass., 482; 86 N. E., 916; 128 A. S. R., 446;
Supervisors of Holmes Co. vs. Black Creek Drainage District, 99 Miss.,
739; 55 Sou., 963.) Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent.
(Pearson vs. Bass, 132 Ga., 117; 63 S. E., 798.) The void provisions
must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of
the Act, in a manner contrary to the intention of the Legislature.
(State vs. A. C. L. R., Co., 56 Fla., 617, 642; 47 Sou., 969;
Harpervs. Galloway, 58 Fla., 255; 51 Sou., 226; 26 L. R. A., N. S., 794;
Connolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540,
565; People vs. Strassheim, 240 Ill., 279, 300; 88 N. E., 821; 22 L. R. A.,
N. S., 1135; State vs.Cognevich, 124 La., 414; 50 Sou., 439.) The
language used in the invalid part of a statute can have no legal force or
efficacy for any purpose whatever, and what remains must express the
legislative will, independently of the void part, since the court has no
power to legislate. (State vs. Junkin, 85 Neb., 1; 122 N. W., 473; 23 L.
R. A., N. S., 839; Vide, also, U. S. vs. Rodriguez [1918], 38 Phil., 759;
Pollock vs. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. [1895], 158 U. S., 601, 635; 39
Law. ed., 1108, 1125; 15 Sup. Ct. Rep., 912; 6 R. C. L., 121.)"
It is contended that even if section 11, which makes the Probation Act
applicable only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards
have provided for the salaries of probation officers were inoperative on
constitutional grounds, the remainder of the Act would still be valid and may
be enforced. We should be inclined to accept the suggestion but for the fact
that said section is, in our opinion, so inseparably linked with the other
portions of the Act that with the elimination of the section what would be left
is the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large
number of people who may be deserving of the intended beneficial results of
that system. The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful
examination of the whole context, is to make the application of the system
dependent entirely upon the affirmative action of the different provincial
boards through appropriation of the salaries for probation officers at rates not
lower than those provided for provincial fiscals. Without such action on the
part of the various boards, no probation officers would be appointed by the
Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The Philippines is divided or
subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show that if not one of
the provinces and this is the actual situation how appropriates the
necessary fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No.
4221 would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer.
Neither can there be a probation officer without a probation system.
Section 2 of the Act provides that the probation officer shall supervise
and visit the probationer. Every probation officer is given, as to the persons
placed in probation under his care, the powers of a police officer. It is the
duty of probation officers to see that the conditions which are imposed by the
court upon the probationer under his care are complied with. Among those
conditions, the following are enumerated in section 3 of the Act:
habits;
province of Batanes, to place him under his care, to supervise his conduct, to
instruct him concerning the conditions of his probation or to perform such
other functions as are assigned to him by law.
That under section 10 the Secretary of Justice may appoint as many
probation officers as there are provinces or groups of provinces is, of course,
possible. But this would be arguing on what the law may be or should be and
not on what the law is. Between is and ought there is a far cry. The wisdom
and propriety of legislation is not for us to pass upon. We may think a law
better otherwise than it is. But much as has been said regarding progressive
interpretation and judicial legislation we decline to amend the law. We are not
permitted to read into the law matters and provisions which are not there.
Not for any purpose not even to save a statute from the doom of invalidity.
Upon the other hand, the clear intention and policy of the law is not to
make the Insular Government defray the salaries of probation officers in the
provinces but to make the provinces defray them should they desire to have
the Probation Act apply thereto. The sum of P50,000, appropriated "to carry
out the purposes of this Act", is to be applied, among other things, for the
salaries of probation officers in the central office at Manila. These probation
officers are to receive such compensations as the Secretary of Justice may fix
"until such positions shall have been included in the Appropriation Act". It was
not the intention of the legislature to empower the Secretary of Justice to fix
the salaries of probation officers in the provinces or later on to include said
salaries in an appropriation act. Considering, further, that the sum of P50,000
appropriated in section 10 is to cover, among other things, the salaries of the
administrative personnel of the Probation Office, what would be left of the
amount can hardly be said to be sufficient to pay even nominal salaries to
probation officers in the provinces. We take judicial notice of the fact that
there are 48 provinces in the Philippines and we do not think it is seriously
contended that, with the fifty thousand pesos appropriated for the central
office, there can be in each province, as intended, a probation officer with a
salary not lower than that of a provincial fiscal. If this is correct, the
contention that without section 11 of Act No. 4221 said act is complete is an
impracticable thing under the remainder of the Act, unless it is conceded that
in our case there can be a system of probation in the provinces without
probation officers.
Probation as a development of modern penology is a commendable
system. Probation laws have been enacted, here and in other countries, to
permit what modern criminologists call the "individualization of punishment",
the adjustment of the penalty to the character of the criminal and the
circumstances of his particular case. It provides a period of grace in order to
(Chief Justice Waite in Pensacola Tel. Co. vs. Western Union Tel. Co. [1899],
96 U. S., 1, 9; 24 Law. ed., 708; Yale Law Journal, Vol. XXIX, No. 2, Dec.
1919, 141, 142), fundamental principles should be interpreted having in view
existing local conditions and environments.
Act No. 4221 is hereby declared unconstitutional and void and the writ
of prohibition is, accordingly, granted. Without any pronouncement regarding
costs. So ordered.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-52304. January 28, 1980.]
RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J.
ROSAL and ALEJANDRO R.
ALINSUG,petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and NATIONAL
TREASURER, respondents.
DECISION
CONCEPCION, JR., J :
p
Petition for prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
cdasia
On December 22, 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg 51
providing for local elections on January 30,1980. Section 3 of the statute
provides:
"SEC. 3.Cities. There shall be in each city such elective local officials
as provided in their respective charters, including the city mayor, the city
vice-mayor, and the elective members of the sangguniang panglungsod,
all of whom shall be elected by the qualified voters in the city. In
addition thereto, there shall be appointive sangguniang panglungsod
members consisting of the president of the city association of barangay
councils, the president of the city federation of the kabataang barangay,
and one representative each from the agricultural and industrial labor
The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not less than P40
million, is classified as a component city. But the registered voters of the city
cannot vote for the provincial elective officials because its Charter 2 expressly
provides that the registered voters of the city cannot participate in the election of
the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu, except to be a candidate therefor.
The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered voters in the
Cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They are members of a civic and non-partisan
group known as D-O-E-R-S (an acronym for "DEMOCRACY OR EXTINCTION:
RESOLVED TO SUCCEED), which counts lawyers among its members, and
extends free legal assistance to citizens regardless of economic and social status
in meritorious cases involving violation of civil liberties and basic human rights.
They vigorously assail Section 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, which uses the
annual income of a given city as the basis for classification of whether or not a
particular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may not participate in the
election of provincial officials of the province where the city is geographically
located; and Republic Act No. 5519, otherwise known as the Charter of Mandaue
City, which went into effect without the benefit of ratification by the residents of
Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum. They pray that upon filing of the instant
petition, a restraining order be issued "temporarily prohibiting the holding of
election for Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials in the
province where the 18 cities listed by the respondent COMELEC are located,
particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, and temporarily prohibiting the National
Treasurer to release public funds and the COA to pass in audit said funds in
connection with and for the purpose of holding local elections in said provinces;
and after hearing, to make the injunction permanent declaring unconstitutional
and therefore void Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 as well as Section 96, Art. XVIII of
the Charter of Mandaue, otherwise known as RA 5519," and should the stopping
of the provincial elections in the provinces concerned be not possible, the
respondent COMELEC be directed "to allow the qualified registered voters in the
cities listed by said respondent, particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, to
participate in the election of, and vote for, the Provincial Governor and other
elective provincial officials and preparing the corresponding official ballots for this
purpose which shall provide spaces therein for Provincial Governor and other
elective provincial officials of the provinces concerned, particularly the Province
of Cebu."
The petitioners contend that "Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 3 insofar as it classifies
cities including Cebu City as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing
its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is inherently and palpably
unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions
germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification
amounts to a denial of equal protection."
cda
We find no merit in the petition. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards
the fullest autonomy of local government units. In the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies, it is stated that "The State shall guarantee and promote the
autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their fullest
development as self-reliant communities." 4 To this end, the Constitution directs
the National Assembly to "enact a local government code which may not
thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its members, defining a
more responsive and accountable local government structure with an effective
system of recall, allocating among the different local governments their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and
removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all
other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units," 5 and
empowered local government units "to create its own sources of revenue and to
levy taxes, subject to limitations as may be provided by law." 6 Art. XI, Section
4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the
supervisory power of the province where they are geographically located. This is
as it should be because of the complex and varied problems in a highly
urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic activity which
require greater autonomy.
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to
participate in provincial affairs, more particularly the selection of elective
provincial officials since these provincial officials have ceased to exercise any
governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city. Thus, in the case of Teves
vs. Commission on Election 7 this Court, in holding that the registered voters of
the City of Dumaguete cannot vote for the provincial officials of Negros Oriental
because the charter of the city does not expressly allow the voters in the city to
do so, ruled:
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on
the basis of their regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction.
The revenue of a city would show whether or not it is capable of existence and
development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit. It
would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as
to warrant its independence from the province where it is geographically
situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the provincial
government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the
election of provincial officials in some instances.
cdasia
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal
protection of the law since the voters in other component cities are allowed to
vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The practice of
allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying
the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative
discretion which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage.
In the case of Teves vs. Commission on Election 8 the Court said:
"Petitioners' contention is that, as the Charter of Dumaguete City is
silent as to the right of its qualified voters to participate in the election
of provincial officials of Negros Oriental, and as said voters are residents
of the province, they are clearly entitled to vote for said provincial
officials.
The charters of other recently formed cities are articulate on the matter.
Thus, in the cases of Bacolod, Cabanatuan, Legaspi, Naga, and Ormoc,
their charters expressly prohibit the residents therein from voting for
provincial officials of the province to which said cities formerly belonged.
Upon the other hand, the charters of Cagayan de Oro, Butuan, Cavite,
Iloilo, Calbayog, Lipa, San Pablo, and Dagupan contain provisions
extending to their residents the privilege to take part in the election of
the provincial officials of the provinces in which said cities were
previously included.
The question that presents itself has reference to the effect of the
omission in the charter of Dumaguete City of an express provision on
the right of its residents to vote for provincial officials of Negros
Oriental, in the light of the legislative practice that, when desired, the
right is either recognized or withdrawn expressly. We are inclined to
overrule petitioners' position."
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar
rights and privileges granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a
denial of the equal protection of the law if the statute prohibited an individual or
group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while granting it to
another individual or group of voters in the same city.
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of
suffrage since the Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the
provincial officials of the province where the city is located. Their right is limited
to the right to vote for elective city officials in local elections which the
questioned statutes neither withdraw nor restrict.
The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for
elective provincial officials would impose a substantial requirement on the
exercise of suffrage and would violate the sanctity of the ballot, contrary to the
provisions of Art. VI, Section 1 of the Constitution. The prohibition contemplated
in the Constitution, however, has reference to such requirements, as the Virginia
poll tax, invalidated in Harper vs. Virginia Board of Elections, 9 or the New York
requirement that to be eligible to vote in a school district. one must be a parent
of a child enrolled in a local public school, nullified in Kramer vs. Union Free
School District, 395 U.S. 621, which impose burdens on the right of suffrage
without achieving permissible estate objectives. In this particular case, no such
burdens are imposed upon the voters of the cities of Cebu and Mandaue. They
are free to exercise their rights without any other requirement, gave that of
being registered voters in the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their
ballot is maintained.
It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle of
republicanism as it would deprive a citizen his right to participate in the conduct
of the affairs of the government unit through the exercise of his right of suffrage.
It has been pointed out, however, that the provincial government has no
governmental supervision over highly urbanized cities. These cities are
independent of the province in the administration of their affairs. Such being the
case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection and election of the provincial
officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally affected and
exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.
prLL
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not
having been ratified by the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is
untenable. The Constitutional requirement that the creation, division, merger,
abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or barrio
should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite
in the governmental unit or units affected 10 is a new requirement that came into
being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective 11 in character and
therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of Mandaue which came into
existence on June 21, 1969.
Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were
behind the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue
City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known
as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in the
province, 234,582 are from Cebu City and 44,358 come from Mandaue City, so
that 278,940 electors, or close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu
would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of Cebu.
Such charge has no factual and legal basis. "Gerrymandering" is a "term
employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived
as to give an unfair advantage to the party in power." 12 The questioned
statutes in this particular case do not apportion representative districts. The said
representative districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that there is an
unfair advantage in favor of the candidates of the party in power. As the Solicitor
General pointed out, it may even be that the majority of the city voters are
supporters of the administration candidates, so that the enactment of the
questioned statutes will work to their disadvantage.
cdasia
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
petitioner.
SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; P.D. 1486, as amended by P.D. 1606;
CREATION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN, A VALID EXERCISE OF THE PRESIDENT'S
LAW-MAKING AUTHORITY DURING MARTIAL LAW. While the 1973
Constitution would contemplate that an act creating a special court such as
the Sandiganbayan should come from the National Assembly, the 1976
Amendments made clear that the incumbent President "shall continue to exercise
legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted.'' As affirmed in Aquino,
Jr. v. COMELEC, L-40004, Jan. 31, 1975 "it is not a grant of authority to legislate
but a recognition of such power as already existing in favor of the incumbent
President during the period of Martial law.
2.ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; GUARANTEE OF EQUAL PROTECTION; A REGULATORY
MEASURE MAY CUT INTO THE RIGHTS TO LIBERTY AND PROPERTY TO ASSURE
THE GENERAL WELFARE. The constitutional guarantee is not to be given a
meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the
general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may
cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected may under
such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that
the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the
common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least,
discrimination that finds no support in reason. Classification is thus not ruled out,
it being sufficient from the Tuason decision "that the laws operate equally and
uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be
treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference
cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be
given to every person under circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous.
If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a
class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some
in the group equally binding on the rest."
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SANDIGANBAYAN PROCEEDINGS PRESCRIBING A
DIFFERENT MODE ON APPEAL BASED ON SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS AND
NOT NECESSARILY OFFENSIVE TO THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. The
contention that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to
equal protection because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a
mere matter of discretion;-appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to
questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and-there is
only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead
of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to
appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate
courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court is
hardly convincing, considering that the classification satisfies the test announced
by this Court in People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937) requiring that it "must be
based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be
germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and must apply equally to each member of the class." The Constitution
specifically makes mention of the creation of a special court, the Sandiganbayan,
precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which cannot be denied,
namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that those who may
thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as Jan.
17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different
procedure for the accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a
public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
4.ID.; ID.; RIGHT AGAINST EX POST FACTO LEGISLATION; EX POST FACTO
LAW, DEFINED. In re: Kay Villegas Kami Inc., L-32485, Oct. 22, 1970, it was
held that an ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done
before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes
such an act; (2) aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than
the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of
evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate
civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful; and (6) deprives a person accused
of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as
the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; VESTED RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED IN MODES OF PROCEDURE
VITAL FOR THE PROTECTION OF LIFE AND
LIBERTY; SANDIGANBAYAN PROVISION OMITTING THE COURT OF APPEALS AS
A REVIEWING AUTHORITY, NOT A DISREGARD OF THE EX POST
FACTO CLAUSE. It cannot be successfully argued that there is a dilution of the
right to appeal. Admittedly under Presidential Decree No. 1486, there is no
recourse to the Court of Appeals, the review coming from the Supreme Court.
The test as to whether the ex post facto clause is disregarded, in the language of
Justice Marlan in Thompson v. Utah, 170 US 343 (1898) taking "from an accused
any right that was regarded, at the time of the adoption of the constitution as
vital for the protection of life and liberty, and which he enjoyed at the time of the
commission of the offense charged against him. The omission of the Court of
Appeals as an intermediate tribunal does not deprive the accused of a right vital
to the protection of his liberty. In the first place, his innocence or guilt is passed
upon by the three-judge court of a division of respondent Court. Moreover, a
unanimous vote is required, failing which "the Presiding Justice shall a designate
two other justices from among the members of the Court to sit temporarily with
them, forming a division of five justices, and the concurrence of a majority of
such division shall be necessary for rendering judgment. Then if convicted, this
Court has the duty if he seeks a review to see whether any error of law was
committed to justify a reversal of the judgment. Petitioner makes much, perhaps
excessively so as is the wont of advocates, of the fact that there is no review of
the facts. What cannot be too sufficiently stressed is that this Court in
determining whether or not to give due course to the petition for review must be
convinced that the constitutional presumption of innocence has been overcome.
In that sense, it cannot be said that on the appellate level there is no way of
scrutinizing whether the quantum of evidence required for a finding of guilt has
been satisfied. It does seem far- fetched and highly unrealistic to conclude that
the omission of the Court of Appeals as a reviewing authority results in the loss
"vital protection" of liberty.
6.ID.; ID.; PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; PEOPLE v. DRAMAYO; REVIEW OF A
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION RENDERED BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN CALLS FOR
STRICT OBSERVANCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF
INNOCENCE. In People v. Dramayo, L-21325, Oct. 29, 1971, the Supreme
Court held: "Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, as synonymous
with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies.
Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf.
Their freedom is forfeit only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for
conviction be in existence. Their guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt.
To such standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need,
therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral
and documentary, independently of whatever defense, is offered by the accused.
Only if the judge below and thereafter the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial
under such an exacting test should the sentence be one of conviction. It is thus
required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest
suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be
satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense
charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime.
What is required is moral certainty."
signifying that any rule it may promulgate cannot have force and effect unless
approved by the Supreme Court, as if they have originated therefrom. Section
5(5) of the Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the Sandiganbayan is one of those courts, "special" as it may be.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; SANDIGANBAYAN'S SPECIAL COMPOSITION AND PROCEDURE
OF APPEAL DOES NOT INFRINGE THE CONSTITUTIONAL INJUNCTION AGAINST
EX POST FACTO LAWS. The special composition of the Sandiganbayanand the
special procedure of appeal provided for it in P.D. 1606 does not infringe the
constitutional injunction against ex-post facto laws. The creation of a special
court to take cognizance of, try and decide crimes already committed is not a
constitutional abnormality. Otherwise, there would be chaos in the prosecution of
offenses which in the public interest must be dealt with more expeditiously in
order to curtail any fast surging tide of evil-doing against the social order. Since
the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court, it is obviously improper to make
appeals therefrom appealable to another collegiate court with the same number
of judges composing it. We must bear in mind that the Sandiganbayan's primary
and primordial reason for being is to insure the people's faith and confidence in
our public officers more than it used to be. We have only to recall that the
activism and restlessness in the later '60's and the early '70's particularly of the
youth who are always concerned with the future of the country were caused by
their conviction that graft and corruption was already intolerably pervasive in the
government and naturally they demanded and expected effective and faster and
more expeditious remedies. Thus, the Tanodbayan or Ombudsman was
conceived and as its necessary counterpart, theSandiganbayan.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SANDIGANBAYAN'S CONVICTION OF AN ACCUSED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT OF PROOF BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. True, in criminal eases, the Constitution mandates that
the guilt of the accused must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. But once
theSandiganbayan makes such a pronouncement, the constitutional requirement
is complied with. That the Supreme Court may review the decisions of
the Sandiganbayan only on questions of law does not, in my opinion, alter the
fact that the conviction of the accused from the factual point of view was beyond
reasonable doubt, as long as the evidence relied upon by the Sandiganbayan in
arriving at such conclusion is substantial.
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; SUPREME COURT REVIEW OF DECISIONS OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN A BETTER GUARANTEE FOR THE ACCUSED. The
accused has a better guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence
and the determination of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing
and observing the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is the Court's
constant jurisprudence that the appellate courts should rely on the evaluation of
the evidence by the trial judges, except in cases where pivotal points are shown
to have been overlooked by them. With more reason should this rule apply to the
review of the decision of a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of
Appeals passes on an appeal in a criminal case, it has only the records to rely on,
and yet the Supreme Court has no power to reverse its findings of fact, with only
the usual exceptions already known to all lawyers and judges. The review of the
decisions of the Sandiganbayan, whose three justices have actually seen and
observed the witnesses as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad
guarantee that no person accused before such special court will ever be finally
convicted without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by
the Constitution.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring and dissenting:
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; STATUTES; P.D. 1606; PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7
THEREOF VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW. Persons who are charged with estafa or
malversation of funds not belonging to the government or any of its
instrumentalities, or agencies are guaranteed the right to appeal to two appellate
courts first, to the Court of Appeals, and thereafter to the Supreme Court.
Estafa and malversation of private funds are on the same category as graft and
corruption committed by public officers, who, under the decree creating
the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to the Supreme Court (par.
3, Sec. 7, P.D. 1606). The fact that the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court
does not generate any substantial distinction to validate this invidious
discrimination. Three judges sitting on the same case does not ensure a quality
of justice better than that meted out by a trial court presided by one judge. The
ultimate decisive factors are the intellectual competence, industry and integrity
of the trial judge. But a review by two appellate tribunals of the same case
certainly ensures better justice to the accused and to the people.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; LAW-MAKING AUTHORITY RESPONSIBLE FOR CREATING
THE SANDIGANBAYAN NOT AUTHORIZED TO LIMIT THE ACCUSED'S RIGHT OF
APPEAL. The Constitution merely authorizes the law-making authority to
create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only over graft and
corruption committed by officers and employees of the government, government
instrumentalities and government-owned and controlled corporations. The
Constitution does not authorize the lawmaker to limit the right of appeal of the
accused convicted by the Sandiganbayan to only the Supreme Court. The Bill of
Rights remains as restrictions on the law-maker in creating
theSandiganbayan pursuant to the constitutional directive.
3.ID.; ID.; ID.; PAR. 3, SEC. 7 THEREOF VIOLATES PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS. Par. 3, Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 trenches upon the due process
clause of the Constitution, because the right to appeal to the Court of Appeals
and thereafter to the Supreme Court was already secured under Sections 17 and
29 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, otherwise known as R.A. No. 296, as amended,
and therefore also already part of procedural due process to which the petitioner
was entitled at the time of the alleged commission of the crime charged against
him. (Marcos vs. Cruz, 68 Phil. 96; 104 (1939); People vs. Moreno, 77 Phil. 548,
555; People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478 (1961); People vs. Sierra, 46 SCRA 717;
Fernando, Phil. Constitution, 1974 ed., pp. 674-675).
4.ID.; ID.; ID.; REVIEWING POWER OF THE SUPREME COURT OVER
CONVICTIONS BY THE SANDIGANBAYANLIMITED ONLY TO QUESTIONS OF
JURISDICTION OR GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. Paragraph 3 of Section 7
of P.D. No. 1606, by providing that the decisions of the Sandiganbayan can only
be reviewed by the Supreme Court through certiorari, likewise limits the
reviewing power of the Supreme Court only to question of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion, and not questions of fact nor findings or conclusions of the
trial court. In other criminal cases involving offenses not as serious as graft and
corruption, all questions of fact and of law are reviewed, first by the Court of
Appeals, and then by the Supreme Court. To repeat, there is greater guarantee
of justice in criminal cases when the trial court's judgment is subject to review by
two appellate tribunals, which can appraise the evidence and the law with
greater objectivity, detachment and impartially unaffected as they are by views
and prejudices that may be engendered during the trial.
court; its jurisdiction is purely limited to criminal and civil cases involving graft
and corruption as well as violation of the government, its instrumentalities and
government owned or controlled corporations. The Court of Appeals is an
appellate tribunal exercising appellate jurisdiction over all cases criminal cases,
civil cases, special civil actions, special proceedings, and administrative cases
appealable from the trial courts or quasi-judicial bodies. The disparity between
the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan is too patent to require extended
demonstration.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 14 THEREOF EFFECTIVELY MAKES
THE SANDIGANBAYAN SUPERIOR TO THE SUPREME COURT INSOFAR AS
AUTOMATIC RELEASES OF APPROPRIATIONS ARE CONCERNED. Even the
Supreme Court is not spared from such odious discrimination as it is downgraded
by Section 14 of P.D. No. 1606, which effectively makes
the Sandiganbayan superior to the Supreme Court; because said Section 14
expressly provides that "the appropriation for the Sandiganbayan shall be
automatically released in accordance with the schedule submitted by
theSandiganbayan." There is no such provision in any law or in the annual
appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the 1982 Appropriations
Act, the funds for the Supreme Court and the entire Judiciary can only be
released by the Budget Ministry upon request therefor by the Supreme Court.
Sometimes compliance with such request is hampered by bureaucratic
procedures. Such discrimination against the Supreme Court-the highest tribunal
of the land and the only other Branch of our modified parliamentary-presidential
government the first Branch being constituted by the merger or union by the
Executive and the Batasang Pambansa emphasizes the peril to the
independence of the Judiciary, whose operations can be jeopardized and the
administration of Justice consequently obstructed or impeded by the delay or
refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the needed funds for the
operation of the courts.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; VIOLATION OF THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO
LAW; VITAL RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED TO A REVIEW OF THE JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION BY TWO APPELLANT TRIBUNALS TAKEN AWAY. In Kay Villegas
Kami (Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429) it was ruled that an ex post facto law is one
which alters the rules of evidence and authorizes conviction upon less testimony
than the law required at the time the crime was committed, or deprives a person
accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled.
The indictment against the petitioner accuses him of graft and corruption
committed "from July 20, 1977 up to and including January 12, 1978," long
before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No.
1606 which expressly repealed P.D, No. 1486, the original charter of
the Sandiganbayan promulgated on June 11, 1978. Before the creation of
theSandiganbayan, all persons accused of malversation of public funds or graft
and corruption and estafa were entitled to a review of a trial court's judgment of
conviction by the Court of Appeals on all questions of fact and law, and
thereafter by the Supreme Court also on both questions of fact and law. This
right to a review of the judgment of conviction by two appellate tribunals on both
factual and legal issues, was already part of the constitutional right of due
process enjoyed by the petitioner in 1977. This vital right of the accused has
been taken away on Dec. 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606, thus placing the petitioner
under a great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly committed prior to 1978.
10.ID.; ID.; ID.; REVIEW OF SANDIGANBAYAN DECISION BY CERTIORARI;
CONSTITUTIONAL PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED
IMPAIRED. Review by certiorari impairs the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, which requires proof beyond reasonable doubt
to rebut the presumption. P.D. No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the quality and
quantity of the evidence requisite for a criminal conviction. The conviction of
petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. 1606, which was not so prior
to its promulgation.
11.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 7 THEREOF CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RULE-MAKING AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT. Section 9 of P.D. No.
1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own rules of procedure
without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court, collides with the
constitutional rule-making authority of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of
court for all courts of the land (par. 5, Sec. 5, of Art. X of the New Constitution.).
12.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTIONS 10, 12 and 13 OF P.D. 1606 SUBVERTS THE
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER INFERIOR COURTS
INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN. Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing
the Sandiganbayan to "administer its own internal affairs, to adopt such rules
governing the constitution of its divisions, the allocation of cases among them
and other matters relating to its business," without requiring the approval of the
Supreme Court also contravenes the constitutional power of supervision over
the Sandiganbayan as an inferior trial court. It cannot be disputed that
the Sandiganbayan is an inferior court. Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606
vesting the Sandiganbayan with the power to select and appoint its personnel
including a clerk of court and three deputy clerks of court and to remove them
for cause without reserving to the Supreme Court the authority to approve or
disapprove such appointments and to review such removals, aggravates the
In categorical and explicit language, the Constitution provided for but did not
create a special Court, the Sandiganbayan, with "jurisdiction over criminal and
civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses
committed by public officers and employees, including those in governmentowned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined
by law." 1 It came into existence with the issuance in 1978 of a Presidential
Decree. 2 Even under the 1935 Constitution, to be precise, in 1955, an anti-graft
statute was passed, 3 to be supplemented five years later by another act, 4 the
validity of which was upheld in Morfe v. Mutuc, 5 a 1968 decision. As set forth in
the opinion of the Court: "Nothing can be clearer therefore than that the AntiGraft Act of 1960 like the earlier statute was precisely aimed at curtailing and
minimizing the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of
honesty in the public service. It is intended to further promote morality in public
administration. A public office must indeed be a public trust. Nobody can cavil at
its objective; the goal to be pursued commands the assent of all. The conditions
then prevailing called for norms of such character. The times demanded such a
remedial device." 6 It should occasion no surprise, therefore, why the 1971
Constitutional Convention, with full awareness of the continuing need to combat
the evils of graft and corruption, included the above-cited provision.
Petitioner in this certiorari and prohibition proceeding assails the validity of the
Presidential Decree creating theSandiganbayan. He was accused before such
respondent Court of estafa through falsification of public and commercial
documents committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public
officials, in several cases. 7 The informations were filed respectively on it
February 21 and March 26, 1979. Thereafter, on May 15 of that year, upon being
arraigned, he filed a motion to quash on constitutional and jurisdictional
grounds. 8 A week later, respondent Court denied such motion. 9 There was a
motion for reconsideration filed the next day; it met the same fate. 10 Hence this
petition for certiorari and prohibition. It is the claim of petitioner that Presidential
Decree No. 1486, as amended, creating the respondent Court is violative of the
due process, 11 equal protection, 12 and ex post facto 13 clauses of the
Constitution.14
The overriding concern, made manifest in the Constitution itself, to cope more
effectively with dishonesty and abuse of trust in the public service whether
committed by government officials or not, with essential cooperation of the
private citizens with whom they deal, cannot of itself justify any departure from
or disregard of constitutional rights. That is beyond question. With due
recognition, however, of the vigor and persistence of counsel of petitioner 15 in
his pleadings buttressed by scholarly and diligent research, the Court, equally
aided in the study of the issues raised by the exhaustive memorandum of the
Solicitor General, 16 is of the view that the invalidity of Presidential Decree No.
1486 as amended, creating respondent Court has not been demonstrated.
The petition then cannot be granted. The unconstitutionality of such Decree
cannot be adjudged.
1.It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister
Ferdinand E. Marcos to create theSandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this
proceeding. While such an act should come from the National Assembly, the
1976 Amendments made clear that he as incumbent President "shall continue to
exercise legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted." 17 Thus,
there is an affirmation of the ruling of this Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on
Elections 18 decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice Makasiar, it
dissipated "all doubts as to the legality of such law-making authority by the
President during the period of Martial Law, . . ." 19 As the opinion went on to
state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate, but a recognition of such power
as already existing in favor of the incumbent President during the period of
Martial Law." 20
2.Petitioner in his memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in
seeking to nullify Presidential Decree No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote
from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration: 21 "The ideal situation is
for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the
sphere of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the
affairs of men governed by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the
very essence of the idea of law." 22 There is recognition, however, in the opinion
that what in fact exists "cannot approximate the ideal. Nor is the law susceptible
to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the situation.
1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of Rights, included among
which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must "give away
to [a] specific provision," in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino citizens of
the operation of public services or utilities." 29 The scope of such a principle is
not to be constricted. It is certainly broad enough to cover the instant situation.
5.It may not be amiss to pursue the subject further. The first authoritative
exposition of what is prohibited by the ex post facto clause is found in
Mekin v. Wolfe, 34 decided in 1903. Thus: "An ex post facto law has been
defined as one (a) Which makes an action done before the passing of the law
and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or (b)
Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or
(c) Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the
law annexed to the crime when it was committed; or (d) Which alters the legal
rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law required
at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant." 35 There is relevance to the next paragraph of the opinion of Justice
Cooper: "The case clearly does not come within this definition, nor can it be seen
in what way the act in question alters the situation of petitioner to his
disadvantage. It gives him, as well as the Government, the benefit of the appeal,
and is intended as furnishing the means for the correction of errors. The
possibility that the judge of the Court of First Instance may commit error in his
favor and wrongfully discharge him appears to be the only foundation for the
claim. A person can have no vested right in such a possibility." 36
6.Mekin v. Wolfe is traceable to Calder v. Bull, 37 a 1798 decision of the United
States Supreme Court. Even the very language as to what falls within the
category of this provision is well-nigh identical. Thus: "I will state what laws I
consider ex post facto laws, within the words and the intent of the prohibition.
1st. Every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law; and
which was innocent when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2nd. Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed.
3rd. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th. Every law that alters
the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or different, testimony, than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense, in order to convict the
offender. All these, and similar laws, are manifestly unjust and
oppressive." 38 The opinion of Justice Chase who spoke for the United States
Supreme Court went on to state: "The expressions 'ex post facto laws,' are
technical, they had been in use long before the Revolution, and had acquired an
appropriate meaning, by legislators, lawyers, and authors. The celebrated and
judicious Sir William Blackstone in his commentaries, considers anex post
facto law precisely in the same light I have done. His opinion is confirmed by his
successor, Mr. Wooddeson; and by the author of the Federalist, who I esteem
superior to both, for his extensive and accurate knowledge of the true principles
of government." 39
9.The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it.
In the exhaustive forty-two page memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half
pages were devoted to its discussion. There is the allegation of lack of fairness.
Much is made of what is characterized as "the tenor and thrust" of the leading
American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts. 49 Again this
citation cuts both ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words, Justice
Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized: "The law, as we have seen, is
sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of
procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so
Aquino, Guerrero, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Ericta and Concepcion JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I concur.
I have read with great care the concurring and dissenting opinion of our learned
colleague, Mr. Justice Makasiar, and I fully agree with the view that P.D. 1606
has unduly and improperly placed the Sandiganbayan on a higher plane than the
Supreme Court insofar as the matter of automatic releases of appropriations is
concerned, which definitely should not be the case. I must say emphatically that
if such a provision was conceived to guarantee the Sandigan's independence, it
is certainly unwise to assume that the Supreme Court's independence is
unworthy of similar protection. Strong as my feeling in this respect is, I am
aware that my objection to the provision in question is not ground enough to
render the same unconstitutional. In expressing myself as I do, I am just adding
my little voice of protest in order that hopefully those concerned may hear it loud
and clear and thus give the Supreme Court its deserved superior status over
theSandiganbayan.
I regret, however, I cannot agree with the constitutional strictures expressed by
Justice Makasiar. I am more inclined to agree with our honored and distinguished
Chief Justice, whose learning in constitutional law is duly respected here and
abroad, that the arguments against the constitutionality of P.D. 1606 advanced
by its critics lack sufficient persuavity.
LLphil
It should not be surprising nor unusual that the composition of and procedure in
the Sandiganbayan should be designed and allowed to be different from the
ordinary courts. Constitutionally speaking, I view the Sandiganbayan as sui
generisin the judicial structure designed by the makers of the 1971 Constitution.
To be particularly noted must be the fact that the mandate of the Constitution
that the National Assembly "shall create," it is not under the Article on the
Judiciary (Article X) but under the article on Accountability of Public Officers.
More, the Constitution ordains it to be "a special court. To my mind, such
"special" character endowed to the Sandiganbayan carries with it certain
concomittants which compel that it should be treated differently from the
ordinary courts. Of course, as a court it exercises judicial power, and so under
It must be against this backdrop of recent historical events that I feel We must
view the Sandiganbayan. At this point, I must emphasize that P.D. 1606 is a
legislative measure, and the rule-making power of the Supreme Court is not
insulated by the Charter against legislature's attribute of alteration, amendment
or repeal. Indeed, it is the Supreme Court that cannot modify or amend, much
less repeal, a rule of court originated by the legislative power.
Accordingly, the method of appeal provided by P.D. 1606 from decisions of
the Sandiganbayan cannot be unconstitutional. If a new or special court can be
legitimately created to try offenses already committed, like the People's Court of
Collaboration times, I cannot see how the new procedure of appeal from such
courts can be faulted as violative of the Charter.
True, in criminal cases, the Constitution mandates that the guilt of the accused
must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But once the Sandiganbayan makes
such a pronouncement, the constitutional requirement is complied with. That the
Supreme Court may review the decisions of the Sandiganbayan only on
questions of law does not, in my opinion, alter the fact that the conviction of the
accused from the factual point of view was beyond reasonable doubt, as long as
the evidence relied upon by the Sandiganbayan in arriving at such conclusion is
substantial.
Since the creation of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court's power of review
over the decisions of the former even in criminal cases has been limited
statutorily or by the rules only to legal questions. We have never been supposed
to exercise the power to reweigh the evidence but only to determine its
substantiality. If that was proper and legal, and no one has yet been heard to
say the contrary, why should We wonder about the method of review of the
decisions of theSandiganbayan under P.D. 1606? With all due respect to the
observation of Justice Makasiar, I believe that the accused has a better
guarantee of a real and full consideration of the evidence and the determination
of the facts where there are three judges actually seeing and observing the
demeanor and conduct of the witnesses. It is Our constant jurisprudence that
the appellate courts should rely on the evaluation of the evidence by the trial
judges, except in cases where pivotal points are shown to have been overlooked
by them. With more reason should this rule apply to the review of the decision of
a collegiate trial court. Moreover, when the Court of Appeals passes on an appeal
in a criminal case, it has only the records to rely on, and yet the Supreme Court
has no power to reverse its findings of fact, with only the usual exceptions
already known to all lawyers and judges. I strongly believe that the review of the
decisions of theSandiganbayan, whose three justices have actually seen and
observed the witnesses as provided for in P.D. 1606 is a more iron-clad
guarantee that no person accused before such special court will ever be finally
convict without his guilt appearing beyond reasonable doubt as mandated by the
Constitution.
LexLib
enactment of ex post facto laws, but also the constitutional provisions on the
power of supervision of the Supreme Court over inferior courts as well as its rulemaking authority.
All the relevant cases on due process, equal protection of the law and ex post
facto laws, have been cited by the petitioner, the Solicitor General, and the
majority opinion; hence, there is no need to repeat them here.
It should be noted that petitioner does not challenge the constitutionality of P.D.
No. 1606 on the ground that it impairs the rule-making authority of the Supreme
Court and its power of supervision over inferior courts.
It should likewise be emphasized that in the opinion of the Writer, the provisions
of P.D. No. 1606 which he does not impugn, remain valid and complete as a
statute and therefore can be given effect minus the challenged portions, which
are separable from the valid provisions.
LLphil
The basic caveat for the embattled citizen is obsta principiis resist from the
very beginning any attempt to assault his constitutional liberties.
I
PARAGRAPH 3, SECTION 7 OF P.D. NO. 1606 DENIES PETITIONER DUE
PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW.
1.Persons who are charged with estafa or malversation of funds not belonging to
the government or any of its instrumentalities or agencies are guaranteed the
right to appeal to two appellate courts first, to the Court of Appeals, and
thereafter to the Supreme Court. Estafa and malversation of private funds are on
the same category as graft and corruption committed by public officers, who,
under the decree creating the Sandiganbayan, are only allowed one appeal to
the Supreme Court (par. 3, Sec. 7, P.D. No. 1606). The fact that
the Sandiganbayan is a collegiate trial court does not generate any substantial
distinction to validate this invidious discrimination. Three judges sitting on the
same case does not ensure a quality of justice better than that meted out by a
trial court presided by one judge. The ultimate decisive factors are the
intellectual competence, industry and integrity of the trial judge. But a review by
two appellate tribunals of the same case certainly ensures better justice to the
accused and to the people.
It should be stressed that the Constitution merely authorizes the law-making
authority to create the Sandiganbayan with a specific limited jurisdiction only
or in the annual appropriations act in favor of the Supreme Court. Under the
1982 Appropriations Act, the funds for the Supreme Court and the entire
Judiciary can only be released by the Budget Ministry upon request therefor by
the Supreme Court. Sometimes compliance with such request is hampered by
bureaucratic procedures. Such discrimination against the Supreme Court the
highest tribunal of the land and the only other Branch of our modified
parliamentary-presidential government the first Branch being constituted by
the merger or union of the Executive and the Batasang Pambansa emphasizes
the peril to the independence of the Judiciary, whose operations can be
jeopardized and the administration of justice consequently obstructed or
impeded by the delay or refusal on the part of the Budget Ministry to release the
needed funds for the operation of the courts.
II
P.D. NO. 1606 VIOLATES THE GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAWS
1.WE ruled in Kay Villegas Kami (Oct. 22, 1970, 35 SCRA 429) that an ex post
facto law is one which alters the rules of evidence and authorizes conviction
upon less testimony than the law required at the time the crime was committed,
or deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he
has become entitled. The indictment against herein petitioner accuses him of
graft and corruption committed " from July 20, 1977 up to and including January
12, 1978" (Annex A, p. 24, rec.), long before the creation of
the Sandiganbayan on December 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606 which expressly
repealed P.D. No. 1486, the original charter of the Sandiganbayan promulgated
on June 11, 1978.
As heretofore stated, before the creation of the Sandiganbayan on December 10,
1978, all persons accused of malversation of public funds or graft and corruption
and estafa were entitled to a review of a trial court's judgment of conviction by
the Court of Appeals on all questions of fact and law, and thereafter by the
Supreme Court also on both questions of fact and law. This right to a review of
the judgment of conviction by two appellate tribunals on both factual and legal
issues, was already part of the constitutional right of due process enjoyed by the
petitioner in 1977. This vital right of the accused has been taken away on
December 10, 1978 by P.D. No. 1606, thus placing herein petitioner under a
great disadvantage for crimes he allegedly committed prior to 1978.
2.As a necessary consequence, review by certiorari impairs the constitutional
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused, which requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt to rebut the presumption (Sec. 19, Art. IV, 1973 Constitution).
P.D. No. 1606 thus in effect reduces the quality and quantity of the evidence
requisite for a criminal conviction.
The conviction of petitioner is thus facilitated or made easier by P.D. No. 1606,
which was not so prior to its promulgation.
The Sandiganbayan could not be likened to the People's Court exclusively trying
cases against national security whose decisions were appealable directly only to
the Supreme Court (Sec. 13, CA 682); because at the time the People's Court Act
or C.A. No. 682 was enacted on September 25, 1945, the Court of Appeals was
no longer existing then as it was abolished on March 10, 1945 by Executive
Order No. 37 issued by President Sergio Osmea soon after the Liberation.
Consequently, the People's Court Act could not provide for appeal to the Court of
Appeals which was revived only on October 4, 1946 by R.A. No. 52. But even
under Section 13 of the People's Court Act appeal to the Supreme Court is not
limited to the review by certiorari. The Supreme Court can review all judgments
of the People's Court both on questions of fact and of law.
III
SECTION 9 OF P.D. NO. 1606 CLASHES WITH THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULEMAKING AUTHORITY OF THE SUPREME COURT
Section 9 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to promulgate its own
rules of procedure without requiring the approval thereof by the Supreme Court,
IV
P.D. NO. 1606 SUBVERTS THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF SUPERVISION
OVER INFERIOR COURTS INCLUDING THE SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 10 of P.D. No. 1606 authorizing the Sandiganbayan to "administer its
own internal affairs, to adopt such rules governing the constitution of its
divisions, the allocation of cases among them and other matters relating to its
business," without requiring the approval of the Supreme Court also contravenes
the constitutional power of supervision over the Sandiganbayan as an inferior
trial court. It cannot be disputed that the Sandiganbayan is an inferior court.
2.Likewise, Section 12 of P.D. No. 1606 vesting the Sandiganbayan with
the power to select and appoint its personnel including a clerk of court and three
deputy clerks of court and to remove them for cause without reserving to the
3.Section 13 of P.D. No. 1606 also contravenes the constitutional power of the
Supreme Court to supervise inferior courts; because said Section 13 requires
the Sandiganbayan to submit an annual report directly to the President without
coursing the same to the Supreme Court for review and approval.
That the Sandiganbayan is a specially favored court is further shown by the
General Appropriations Act of 1982 which states that "all appropriations provided
herein for the Sandiganbayan shall be administered solely by the Presiding
Justice, . . ." (par. 1, Sp. Provisions XXV on the Judiciary, p. 538, Gen.
Appropriations Act of 1982). This particular provision impairs likewise the
constitutional power of administrative supervision vested in the Supreme Court
over all inferior courts (Sec. 6, Art. X, 1972 Constitution). It should be
emphasized that the same General Appropriations Act of 1982 expressly provides
that the disposition of all the appropriations for the Court of Appeals, Court of
Tax Appeals, Circuit Criminal Courts, and the Court of Agrarian Relations is
expressly subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court (pp.
539-541, General Appropriations Act of 1982).
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 can be considered valid by just considering as not
written therein the phrase "of the same level as the Court of Appeals."
Section 5 of P.D. No. 1606 could likewise be validated by simply appointing three
more members of the Sandiganbayanto complete its membership.
Paragraph 3 of Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606 can be declared unconstitutional
without affecting the completeness and validity of the remaining provisions of
P.D. No. 1606; because in the absence of said paragraph 3, Sections 17 and 29
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, can apply.
LLpr
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 81958. June 30, 1988.]
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS,
INC., petitioner, vs. HON. FRANKLIN M.DRILON as Secretary
of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as
or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it
is exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used
to further private interests at the expense of the citizenry, there is a clear misuse
of the power. 12
In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.
As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed validity. 13 In the absence of
clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, the presumption logically stands.
The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure
should be nullified. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies
only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law"
under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect identity of rights among all
men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such
classifications rest on substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions; and (4)
they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16
The Court is satisfied that the classification made the preference for female
workers rests on substantial distinctions.
As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that
has befallen our female labor force abroad, especially domestic servants, amid
exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and
personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina
workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of
returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As
precisely the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect
victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the Court sustains the Government's
efforts.
Cdpr
The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there
is no evidence that, except perhaps for isolated instances, our men abroad have
been afflicted with an identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no
argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers.
The Court, of course, is not impressing some male chauvinistic notion that men
are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of
evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive
instances) and not upon some fanciful or arbitrary yardstick that the Government
The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female
domestic overseas workers. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is
not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious
reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced. What the Constitution
prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an
existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair
advantage to another person or group of persons. To apply the ban, say
exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would
obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a
classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A and
gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom
of contract and needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the
classification is based on such distinctions that make a real difference as infancy,
sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is
to recognize its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities
are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be an element of
unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering
to their needs is made the basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If
such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of equal
protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to
certain women workers, and not the contrary.)
It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on
overseas deployment. From scattered provisions of the Order, it is evident that
such a total ban has not been contemplated. We quote:
5.AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT The deployment of domestic helpers
and workers of similar skills defined herein to the following [sic] are
authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the
suspension
. LibLex
The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair
the right. The right to travel is subject, among other things, to the requirements
of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a
valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford
protection to labor," 26 pursuant to the respondent Department of Labor's rulemaking authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner assumes that
it is unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we
have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The disputed Order is a valid
qualification thereto.
Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes
an invalid exercise of legislative power. It is true that police power is the domain
of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be
lawfully delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the
Department of Labor and Employment with rule-making powers in the
enforcement whereof. 28
The petitioners' reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation
"in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits." 29 is
not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the
demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation.
LLjur
"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What
concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be
above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to
send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their
employment needs at home. Under these circumstances, the Government is
duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection,
personally and economically, while away from home. In this case, the
Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously dispute, of
the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely
ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made
use of its authority. It is not contested that it has in fact removed the prohibition
with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.
The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must
yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government. 31 Freedom of
contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions,
more so in this jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as
a controlling economic way of life.
This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the
business of recruitment. The concern of the Government, however, is not
necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000.]
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE
), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his
capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting
Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN
MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent
of InternationalSchool-Manila;
and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
Azcuna Yorac Sarmiento Arroyo & Chua Law Offices for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Bernas Law Office for private respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Private respondent International School, Inc. is a domestic educational institution
established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other
temporary residents. It hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty classifying them as foreign-hires and local-hires. It grants foreign-hires
certain benefits as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave
travel allowance which are not accorded to local-hires. Foreign-hires are also
paid a salary rate of twenty-five percent (25%) more than the local-hires.
The school justified the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages"
foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited
tenure. When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held
in June 1995, petitionerInternational School Alliance of Educators (ISAE) as a
legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all the
faculty members of the school contested the difference in salary rates between
foreign and local hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreignhires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a
deadlock between the parties. The Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over the dispute. It subsequently issued an Order
resolving the issues in favor of the school. The motion for reconsideration of
ISAE was also denied. Hence, this petition.
The Court ruled that the point-of-hire classification employed by
respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires
and local-hires was an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction
between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of
the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy
and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of the Court.
The Court agreed, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same
bargaining unit as the local-hires. The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's
acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best
assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. It does
not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective
bargaining history in the School also showed that these groups were always
treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working
conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their
status as foreign-hires, and justified the exclusion of the former from the latter.
To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure
either group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights. The
orders of the Secretary of Labor were reversed and set aside insofar as they
upheld the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher
salaries than local-hires.
SYLLABUS
1.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; PUBLIC POLICY ABHORS
INEQUALITY AND DISCRIMINATION. That public policy abhors inequality and
discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy
against these evils. The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures
that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code
requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of
this duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."
2.INTERNATIONAL LAW; SPRINGS FROM GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW WHICH
PROSCRIBE DISCRIMINATION. International law, which springs from general
principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law
include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,
based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very
antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has
incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
3.POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SOCIAL JUSTICE AND HUMAN
RIGHTS; LABOR; HUMANE CONDITIONS OF WORK INCLUDES THE MANNER BY
WHICH EMPLOYERS TREAT THEIR EMPLOYEES. The Constitution specifically
provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions
are not restricted to the physical workplace the factory, the office or the field
but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
4.LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; THE STATE SHALL ENSURE
EQUAL WORK OPPORTUNITIES REGARDLESS OF SEX, RACE OR CREED. The
Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be
an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of
its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities,
The Schoolcannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile
to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating the principle of equal
work for equal pay.
8.ID.; ID.; ID.; SALARY; DEFINED. "Salary" is defined in Black's Law
Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed."
Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the
"[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services."
In Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission, we said that: "salary" means
a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in
another man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more
fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the
fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered.
9.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; "DISLOCATION FACTOR" AND FOREIGN HIRES' LIMITED
TENURE CANNOT SERVE AS VALID BASES FOR DISTINCTION IN SALARY RATES.
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries
should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-hires. The localhires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the
same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the
foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in
salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not
enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and
home leave travel allowances.
10.ID.; ID.; THE STATE HAS THE RIGHT AND DUTY TO REGULATE THE
RELATIONS BETWEEN LABOR AND CAPITAL. The Constitution enjoins the
State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," "to afford
labor full protection." The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the
relations between labor and capital. These relations are not merely contractual
but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective
bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good. Should such
contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not
hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
11.ID.; ID.; CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT; POINT-OF-HIRE CLASSIFICATION
TO JUSTIFY THE DISTINCTION IN THE SALARY RATES OF FOREIGN-HIRES AND
LOCAL-HIRES IS AN INVALID CLASSIFICATION. [W]e find the point-of-hire
13.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FOREIGN-HIRES SHOULD NOT BELONG TO THE SAME
BARGAINING UNIT AS LOCAL-HIRES. We agree, however, that foreign-hires
do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires. . . . It does not
appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together
with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining
history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure.
Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working
conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their
status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To
include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either
group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J :
p
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of
private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That
the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course,
beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work
of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a
principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we
uphold today.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to
Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational institution established
primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents. 1 To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational
program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree
authorizes the School to
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it
either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such
personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations
attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be
enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its
faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires.
The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be
classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a.What is one's domicile?
b.Where is one's home economy?
c.To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in
the School and was the School responsible for bringing that
individual to the Philippines? 2
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty
member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreignhire.
llcd
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These
include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel
allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%)
more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant
economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the
"dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home
country, leave his family and friends, and take the risk of deviating from
a promising career path all for the purpose of pursuing his profession
as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is
faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's
family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of
one's children, adequate insurance against illness and death, and of
course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the
same economic reality after his term: that he will eventually and
inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the
uncertainty of obtaining suitable employment after a long period in a
foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to
remain competitive on an internationallevel in terms of attracting
competent professionals in the field of international education. 3
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June
1995, petitioner International SchoolAlliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor
union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" 4 of
the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and localhires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be
included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock
between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a compromise
prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary,
Cresenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation
issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo
A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an
Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in
salary rates:
The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the
present case. The internationalcharacter of the School requires the
hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and
different cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and
benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which system is universally
recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to
these people in order to entice them to render their services in the
Philippines and in the process remain competitive in
the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited
contract of employment unlike the local hires who enjoy security of
tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would
also require parity in other terms and conditions of employment which
include the employment contract.
cda
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our
Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution 8 in
the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The
very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, 9 likewise
proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of
equity, 10 i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of
what is reasonable. 11 The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, 12 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, 13 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped
together with local-hires for purposes of collective bargaining. The collective
bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always
treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of
tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working
conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not
granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their
status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To
include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either
group the exercise of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby
GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated
June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreignhires higher salaries than local hires.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 124360. November 5, 1997.]
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioner, vs. THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY AND THE SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 127867. November 5, 1997.]
EDCEL C. LAGMAN, JOKER P. ARROYO, ENRIQUE GARCIA,
WIGBERTO TAADA, FLAG HUMAN RIGHTS FOUNDATION,
Brillantes, Navarro, Jumamil, Arcilla, Escolin and Martinez Law Office for
petitioner in G.R. No. 124360.
Sanidad, Abaya, Cortez, Te Madrid, Viterbo & Tan Law Firm for petitioners in
G.R. No. 127867.
Alfonso M. Cruz Law Offices for Enrique Garcia.
SYNOPSIS
Republic Act No. 8180, or the Downstream Oil Industry Regulation Act of 1996,
was enacted by Congress for the purpose of deregulating the downstream oil
industry. Its validity was challenged on the following constitutional grounds: a)
that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported
refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause; b) the
imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the downstream oil
industry but instead controls the oil industry; c) the inclusion of the tariff
provision in Section 5(b) of RA 8180 violates the one title-one subject
requirement of the Constitution; d) that Section 15 thereof constitutes undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of Energy and
violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies; and e) that Executive
Order No. 392 implementing R.A. 8180 is arbitrary and unreasonable because it
was enacted due to the alleged depletion of OPSF fund a condition not found
in the law.
This Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one title-one subject rule. A
law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number
of provisions, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for
the method and means of carrying out the general subject. Section 5(b)
providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which
is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Section 15 can hurdle both completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
Full deregulation at the end of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has
no discretion to postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete
on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
Section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 did not mention the depletion of the OPSF fund as
basis of deregulation, thus said extraneous factor constitutes a misapplication of
R.A. No. 8180.
The 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement are significant barriers
which discourage new players to enter the market. As the dominant players,
Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various capacities and
easily comply with the inventory requirement as against prospective new players.
The offending provisions of R.A. No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the
entire law has to be struck down. R.A. No. 8180 with its anti-competition
provisions cannot be allowed by this Court to stand even while Congress is
working to remedy its defects.
TIAEac
SYLLABUS
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; JUDICIARY; JUDICIAL POWER, CONSTRUED.
Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but
also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government. The courts, as guardians of the Constitution,
have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the
legislature transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute
violates the Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to
declare such act as unconstitutional and void.
EcSCHD
and then, a law may be denounced in court both as bereft of wisdom and
constitutionally infirmed. Such denunciation will not deny this Court of its
jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of the said law while prudentially
refusing to pass on its wisdom.
3.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; PARTIES; TECHNICALITIES SUCH AS
PERSONALITY, STANDING OR INTEREST, ARE BRUSHED ASIDE WHERE ISSUES
ARE OF PUBLIC IMPORTANCE. The effort of respondents to question the locus
standi of petitioners must also fall on barren ground. In language too lucid to be
misunderstood, this Court has brightlined its liberal stance on a petitioner's locus
standi where the petitioner is able to craft an issue of transcendental significance
to the people. In Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc.
v. Tan, we stressed: ". . . Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient
personality, standing or interest are, however, in the main procedural matters.
Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping with
the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the
other branches of government have kept themselves within the limits of the
Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to
them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of these petitions." There is not a dot of disagreement between the
petitioners and the respondents on the far reaching importance of the validity of
RA No. 8180 deregulating our downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no good
sense in being hypertechnical on the standing of petitioners for they pose issues
which are significant to our people and which deserve our forthright resolution.
4.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS; ONE TITLE-ONE SUBJECT RULE;
LITERALLY CONSTRUED. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal
construction of the one title-one subject rule. We have consistently ruled that the
title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a
law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any
number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are
not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.
5.ID.; ID.; ID.; SECTION 5(B) PROVIDING FOR TARIFF DIFFERENTIAL,
GERMANE TO DEREGULATION OF DOWNSTREAM OIL INDUSTRY. We hold
that Section 5(b) providing for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A.
No. 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is
supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our country and
make them rely less on imported petroleum.
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; EVEN IF THE LAW DOES NOT EXPRESSLY PINPOINT THE
STANDARD, COURTS WILL BEND BACKWARD TO LOCATE THE SAME
ELSEWHERE. The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in
our constitutional landscape. As sagely observed, delegation of legislative power
has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity of the task of
government. Thus, courts bend as far back as possible to sustain the
constitutionality of laws which are assailed as unduly delegating legislative
powers. Citing Hirabayashi v. United Statesas authority, Mr. Justice Isagani A.
Cruz states "that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the standard, the
courts will bend over backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare
the statute, if it can, from constitutional infirmity."
market and the stability of the peso to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of
E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to determine the weight given by the Executive
department to the depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal
consideration for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal
significance. Or its importance could be nil. In light of this uncertainty, we rule
that early deregulation under E.O. No. 392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A.
No. 8180.
10.ID.; NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY; MONOPOLY AND
COMBINATION IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE, DEFINED. A monopoly is a privilege
or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies, consisting in
the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade,
manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the whole supply of a
particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which one or only a few
firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a
combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two
or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool holding company, or other
form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition,
monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its
production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade
without statutory authority. Combination in restraint of trade refers to the means
while monopoly refers to the end.
11.ID.; ID.; FREE ENTERPRISE SYSTEM DID NOT PER SE PROHIBIT THE
OPERATION OF MONOPOLIES. While the Constitution embraced free
enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the operation of
monopolies which can, however, be regulated in the public interest. Thus too,
our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated
competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the letthe-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competitions are absolutely proscribed and the proscription is directed both
against the State as well as the private sector. This distinct free enterprise
system is dictated by the need to achieve the goals of our national economy as
defined by Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution which are: more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase in the
amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the
people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for
all, especially the underprivileged. It also calls for the State to protect Filipino
enterprises against unfair competition and trade practices.
be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to presume that the
legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not
constitutionally enact the other. Enough must remain to make a complete,
intelligible and valid statute, which carries out the legislative intent. . . .
The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so
mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements,
or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making
the parts of the statute dependent, conditional, or connected with one another
the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would not
have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are
unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus dependent, conditional, or
connected must fall with them."
17.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONGRESS; R.A. NO. 8180, UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for
any reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or
invalid, such parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This
separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A.
No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The
provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the
principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their
intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing
inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free
interaction of market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free
and fair competition. The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be
overstated.Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real
competitors but did not have a free run of the market because government
controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After
deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real
competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to
their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a
deregulated market where competition can be corrupted and where market
forces can be manipulated by oligopolies. R.A. No. 8180 is declared
unconstitutional and E.O. NO. 372 void.
18.ID.; SUPREME COURT; GUARDIAN NOT ONLY OF THE PEOPLE'S POLITICAL
RIGHTS BUT THEIR ECONOMIC RIGHTS AS WELL. With this Decision, some
circles will chide the Court for interfering with an economic decision of Congress.
Such criticism is charmless for the Court is annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it
1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT; HAS THE DUTY, NOT JUST THE
POWER, TO DETERMINE WHETHER A LAW OR A PART THEREOF OFFENDS THE
CONSTITUTION. Under the Constitution, this Court has in appropriate
cases the DUTY, not just the power, to determine whether a law or a part
thereof offends the Constitution and, if so, to annul and set it aside. Because a
serious challenge has been hurled against the validity of one such law, namely
RA 8180 its criticality having been preliminarily determined from the petition,
comments, reply and, most tellingly, the oral argument on September 30, 1997
this Court, in the exercise of its mandated judicial discretion, issued the status
quo order to prevent the continued enforcement and implementation of a law
that was prima facie found to be constitutionally infirm. Indeed, after careful
final deliberation, said law is now ruled to be constitutionally defective thereby
disabling respondent oil companies from exercising their erstwhile power,
granted by such defective statute, to determine prices by themselves.
2.ID.; ID.; HAS NO POWER TO PASS UPON THE WISDOM, MERITS AND
PROPRIETY OF THE ACTS OF ITS CO-EQUAL BRANCHES IN GOVERNMENT.
Concededly, this Court has no power to pass upon the wisdom, merits and
propriety of the acts of its co-equal branches in government. However, it does
have the prerogative to uphold the Constitution and to strike down and annul a
law that contravenes the Charter. From such duty and prerogative, it shall never
shirk or shy away.
3.ID.; ID.; UPHOLDS CONSTITUTIONAL ADHERENCE TO A TRULY COMPETITIVE
ECONOMY BY INVALIDATING RA. 8180. By annulling RA 8180, this Court is
not making a policy statement against deregulation. Quite the contrary, it is
simply invalidating a pseudo deregulation law which in reality restrains free trade
and perpetuates a cartel, an oligopoly. The Court is merely upholding
constitutional adherence to a truly competitive economy that releases the
creative energyof free enterprise. It leaves to Congress, as the policy-setting
agency of the government, the speedy crafting of a genuine, constitutionally
justified oil deregulation law.
MELO, J., dissenting opinion:
1.REMEDIAL LAW; ACTIONS; POLITICAL QUESTION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY; IMPOSITION OF DIFFERENT TARIFF RATES ON IMPORTED
CRUDE OIL AND IMPORTED REFINED PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, A POLITICAL
QUESTION. The instant petitions do not raise a justiciable controversy as the
issues raised therein pertain to the wisdom and reasonableness of the provisions
of the assailed law. The contentions made by petitioners, that the "imposition of
different tariff rates on imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum
products will not foster a truly competitive market, nor will it level the playing
fields" and that said imposition "does not deregulate the downstream oil
industry, instead, it controls the oil industry, contrary to the avowed policy of the
law," are clearly policy matters which are within the province of the political
departments of the government. These submissions require a review of issues
that are in the natural of political questions, hence, clearly beyond the ambit of
judicial inquiry.
cCAIDS
providing for the method and means of carrying out the general object." (Sinco,
Phil. Political Law, 11th ed., p. 225)
7.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; TARIFF PROVISION IN SEC. 5 (B) OF RA 8180,
GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF SAID LAW. The questioned tariff provision in
Section 5 (b) was provided as a means to implement the deregulation of the
downstream oil industry and hence, is germane to the purpose of the assailed
law. The general subject of Republic Act No. 8180, as expressed in its title, "An
Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry, and for Other Purposes,"
necessarily implies that the law provides for the means for such deregulation.
One such means is the imposition of the differential tariff rates which are
provided to encourage new investors as well as existing players to put up new
refineries. The aforesaid provision is thus germane to, and in furtherance of, the
object of deregulation. The trend of jurisprudence, ever since Sumulong vs.
COMELEC (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), is to give the above-stated constitutional
requirement a liberal interpretation. Hence, there is indeed substantial
compliance with said requirement.
8.ID., ID.; ID.; CONFERENCE COMMITTEE; CAN INCLUDE AN AMENDMENT TO A
HOUSE OR SENATE BILL PROVIDED IT IS GERMANE TO THE SUBJECT
THEREOF. As regards the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee to
include in its report an entirely new provision that is neither found in the House
bill or Senate bill, this Court already upheld such power in Tolentino vs. Sec. of
Finance (235 SCRA 630 [1994]), where we ruled that the conference committee
can even include an amendment in the nature of a substitute so long as such
amendment is germane to the subject of the bill before it.
9.ID.; ID.; "ENROLLED BILL THEORY"; CONSTRUED. Lastly, in view of the
"enrolled bill theory" pronounced by this Court as early as 1947 in the case
of Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito (78 Phil. 1 [1947]), the duly authenticated copy of the
bill, signed by the proper officers of each house, and approved by the President,
is conclusive upon the courts not only of its provisions but also of its due
enactment.
10.ID.; ID.; DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER; CONSTRUED. Congress
may validly provide that a statute shall take effect or its operation shall be
revived or suspended or shall terminate upon the occurrence of certain events or
contingencies the ascertainment of which may be left to some official agency. In
effect, contingent legislation may be issued by the Executive Branch pursuant to
a delegation of authority to determine some fact or state of things upon which
the enforcement of a law depends (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 96; Cruz
vs. Youngberg, 56 Phil. 234 [1931]). This is a valid delegation since what the
11.ID; ID.; ID.; SUFFICIENT STANDARDS TEST; COMPLIED WITH IN R.A. 8180.
The law satisfies the sufficient standards test. The words "practicable",
"declining", and "stable", as used in Section 15 of the assailed law are sufficient
standards that saliently "map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority by
defining the legislative policy and indicating the circumstances under which it is
to be pursued and effected." (Cruz, Phil. Political Law, 1996 ed., p. 98).
Considering the normal and ordinary definitions of these standards, the factors to
be considered by the President and/or Secretary of Energy in implementing full
deregulation are, as mentioned, determinate and determinable.
12.ID.; ID.; R.A. 8180; NOT VIOLATIVE OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST MONOPOLIES, COMBINATION OF TRADES AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION. The three provisions relied upon by petitioners (Section 5 [b]
on tariff differential, Section 6 on the 40-day minimum inventory requirement,
and Section 9 [b] on the prohibited act of predatory pricing) actually promote,
rather than restrain, free trade and competition. The 4% tariff differential aims
to ensure the stable supply of petroleum products by encouraging new entrants
to put up oil refineries in the Philippines and to discourage fly-by-night importers.
As regards the 40-day inventory requirement, it must be emphasized that the
10% minimum requirement is based on the refiners' and importers' annual sales
volume, and hence, obviously inapplicable to new entrants as they do not have
an annual sales volume yet. Contrary to petitioners' argument, this requirement
is not intended to discourage new or prospective players in the downstream oil
industry. Rather, it guarantees "security and continuity of petroleum crude and
products supply." (Section 6, Republic Act No. 8180). This legal requirement is
meant to weed out entities not sufficiently qualified to participate in the local
13.ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. The
assailed tariff differential is likewise not violative of the equal protection clause of
the Constitution. It is germane to the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8180
which is to achieve (1) fair prices; and (2) adequate and continuous supply of
environmentally-clean and high quality petroleum products. Said adequate and
continuous supply of petroleum products will be achieved if new investors or
players are enticed to engage in the business of refining crude oil in the country.
Existing refining companies, are similarly encouraged to put up additional
refining companies. All of this can be made possible in view of the lower tariff
duty on imported crude oil than that levied on imported refined petroleum
products. In effect, the lower tariff rates will enable the refiners to recoup their
investments considering that they will be investing billions of pesos in putting up
their refineries in the Philippines. That incidentally the existing refineries will be
benefited by the tariff differential does not negate the fact that the intended
effect of the law is really to encourage the construction of new refineries,
whether by existing players or by new players.
cDIHES
to or connection with the deregulation of the oil industry. The tax provision is a
mere tool and mechanism considered essential by Congress to fulfill Republic Act
No. 8180's objective of fostering a competitive market and achieving the social
policy objectives of fair prices. To curtail any adverse impact which the tariff
treatment may cause by its application, and perhaps in answer to petitioners'
apprehension Congress included under the assailed section a proviso that will
effectively eradicate the tariff difference in the treatment of refined petroleum
products and crude oil by stipulating "that beginning on January 1, 2004 the
tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be the
same."
unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the courts scarcely venture to
declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in the
discretion of the authority which exercises it.
EcDTIH
avowed policy because Congress did not carefully evaluate the long term effects
of some of its provisions is a matter clearly beyond this Court's domain .
DECISION
PUNO, J :
p
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180
entitled "An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other
Purposes". 1 R.A. No. 8180 ends twenty six (26) years of government regulation
of the downstream oil industry. Few cases carry a surpassing importance on the
life of every Filipino as these petitions for the upswing and downswing of our
economy materially depend on the oscillation of oil.
prcd
First, the facts without the fat. Prior to 1971, there was no government agency
regulating the oil industry other than those dealing with ordinary commodities.
Oil companies were free to enter and exit the market without any government
interference There were four (4) refining companies (Shell, Caltex, Bataan
Refining Company and Filoil Refining) and six (6) petroleum marketing
companies (Esso, Filoil, Caltex, Getty, Mobil and Shell), then operating in the
country. 2
In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by a crippling oil crisis. The
government, realizing that petroleum and its products are vital to national
security and that their continued supply at reasonable prices is essential to the
general welfare, enacted the Oil Industry Commission Act. 3 It created the Oil
Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the business of importing, exporting, reexporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, storing, distributing,
marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other refined
petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the
market prices of petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to
license new refineries and to regulate the operations and trade practices of the
industry. 4
In addition to the creation of the OIC, the government saw the imperious need
for a more active role of Filipinos in the oil industry. Until the early seventies, the
downstream oil industry was controlled by multinational companies. All the oil
refineries and marketing companies were owned by foreigners whose economic
interests did not always coincide with the interest of the Filipino. Crude oil was
transported to the country by foreign-controlled tankers. Crude processing was
done locally by foreign-owned refineries and petroleum products were marketed
By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were operating in the country Caltex,
Shell and the government-owned PNOC.
In May, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino signed Executive Order No. 172
creating the Energy Regulatory Board to regulate the business of importing,
exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining, marketing
and distributing energy resources "when warranted and only when public
necessity requires." The Board had the following powers and functions:
1.Fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products;
2.Fix and regulate the rate schedule or prices of piped gas to be charged
by duly franchised gas companies which distribute gas by means
of underground pipe system;
3.Fix and regulate the rates of pipeline concessionaries under the
provisions of R.A. No. 387, as amended . . .;
4.Regulate the capacities of new refineries or additional capacities of
existing refineries and license refineries that may be organized
after the issuance of (E.O. No. 172) under such terms and
conditions as are consistent with the national interest; and
5.Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any
petroleum product, or when public interest so requires, it may
take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the
temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum
products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund . . .
by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such
amounts as may be determined by the Board, which may enable
the importer to recover its cost of importation. 8
Pursuant to the policies enunciated in R.A. No. 7638, the government approved
the privatization of Petron Corporation in 1993. On December 16, 1993, PNOC
sold 40% of its equity in Petron Corporation to the Aramco Overseas
Company.
LexLib
The deregulation process has two phases: the transition phase and the full
deregulation phase. During the transition phase, controls of the non-pricing
aspects of the oil industry were to be lifted. The following were to be
In G.R. No. 124360, petitioner Francisco S. Tatad seeks the annulment of section
5 (b) of R.A. No. 8180. Section 5 (b) provides:
tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall be
the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended only
by an Act of Congress."
Second, that the imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the
downstream oil industry but instead controls the oil industry, contrary to the
avowed policy of the law. Petitioner avers that the tariff differential between
imported crude oil and imported refined petroleum products bars the entry of
other players in the oil industry because it effectively protects the interest of oil
companies with existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the
law "to foster a truly competitive market."
Third, that the inclusion of the tariff provision in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180
violates Section 26(1) Article VI of the Constitution requiring every law to have
only one subject which shall be expressed in its title. Petitioner contends that the
imposition of tariff rates in section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 is foreign to the subject
of the law which is the deregulation of the downstream oil industry.
Garcia, Wigberto Taada, Flag Human Rights Foundation, Inc., Freedom from
Debt Coalition (FDC) and Sanlakas contest the constitutionality of section 15 of
R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. Section 15 provides:
"Sec. 15.Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to Section
5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the
President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall
time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate
of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the
implementation of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition
In assailing section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392, petitioners offer the
following submissions:
First, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation of legislative
power to the President and the Secretaryof Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry. Petitioners contend that the law does not define when it is practicable
for the Secretary of Energy to recommend to the President the full deregulation
of the downstream oil industry or when the President may consider it practicable
to declare full deregulation. Also, the law does not provide any specific standard
to determine when the prices of crude oil in the world market are considered to
be declining nor when the exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.
Second, petitioners aver that E.O. No. 392 implementing the full deregulation of
the downstream oil industry is arbitrary and unreasonable because it was
enacted due to the alleged depletion of the OPSF fund a condition not found
in R.A. No. 8180.
Third, section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392 allow the formation of a de
facto cartel among the three existing oil companies Petron, Caltex and Shell
in violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competition.
Respondents, on the other hand, fervently defend the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 8180 and E.O. No. 392. In addition, respondents contend that the issues
raised by the petitions are not justiciable as they pertain to the wisdom of the
law. Respondents further aver that petitioners have no locus standi as they did
not sustain nor will they sustain direct injury as a result of the implementation of
R.A. No. 8180.
The petitions were heard by the Court on September 30, 1997. On October 7,
1997, the Court ordered the private respondents oil companies "to maintain the
status quo and to cease and desist from increasing the prices of gasoline and
other petroleum fuel products for a period of thirty (30) days . . . subject to
further orders as conditions may warrant."
We shall now resolve the petitions on the merit. The petitions raise procedural
and substantive issues bearing on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 and E.O.
No. 392. The procedural issues are: (1) whether or not the petitions raise a
justiciable controversy, and (2) whether or not the petitioners have the standing
to assail the validity of the subject law and executive order. The substantive
issues are: (1) whether or not section 5(b) violates the one title one subject
requirement of the Constitution; (2) whether or not the same section violates the
equal protection clause of the Constitution; (3) whether or not section 15
violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of power; (4) whether
or not E.O. No. 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable; and (5) whether or not R.A.
No. 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies, combinations
in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
We shall first tackle the procedural issues. Respondents claim that the avalanche
of arguments of the petitioners assail the wisdom of R.A. No. 8180. They aver
that deregulation of the downstream oil industry is a policy decision made by
Congress and it cannot be reviewed, much less be reversed by this Court. In
constitutional parlance, respondents contend that the petitions failed to raise a
justiciable controversy.
Respondents' joint stance is unnoteworthy. Judicial power includes not only the
duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, but also the duty to determine whether or not
there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government. 12 The courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends
the limit imposed by the fundamental law. Where a statute violates the
Constitution, it is not only the right but the duty of the judiciary to declare such
act as unconstitutional and void. 13 We held in the recent case of Taada
v. Angara: 14
"xxx xxx xxx
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it
contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right
but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The question
Even a sideglance at the petitions will reveal that petitioners have raised
constitutional issues which deserve the resolution of this Court in view of their
seriousness and their value as precedents. Our statement of facts and definition
of issues clearly show that petitioners are assailing R.A. No. 8180 because its
provisions infringe the Constitution and not because the law lacks wisdom. The
principle of separation of power mandates that challenges on the constitutionality
of a law should be resolved in our courts of justice while doubts on the wisdom
of a law should be debated in the halls of Congress. Every now and then, a law
may be denounced in court both as bereft of wisdom and constitutionally
infirmed. Such denunciation will not deny this Court of its jurisdiction to resolve
the constitutionality of the said law while prudentially refusing to pass on its
wisdom.
cdrep
There is not a dot of disagreement between the petitioners and the respondents
on the far reaching importance of the validity of RA No. 8180 deregulating our
downstream oil industry. Thus, there is no good sense in being hypertechnical on
the standing of petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our
people and which deserve our forthright resolution.
We shall now track down the substantive issues. In G.R. No. 124360 where
petitioner is Senator Tatad, it is contended that section 5(b) of R.A. No. 8180 on
tariff differential violates the provision 17 of the Constitution requiring every law
to have only one subject which should be expressed in its title. We do not concur
with this contention. As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of
the one title - one subject rule. We have consistently ruled 18 that the title need
not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A
law having a single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number
of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in
furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject. 19 We hold that section 5(b) providing for tariff
differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is the deregulation
of the downstream oil industry. The section is supposed to sway prospective
investors to put up refineries in our country and make them rely less on imported
petroleum. 20 We shall, however, return to the validity of this provision when we
examine its blocking effect on new entrants to the oil market.
We shall now slide to the substantive issues in G.R. No. 127867. Petitioners
assail section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 which fixes the time frame for the full
deregulation of the downstream oil industry. We restate its pertinent portion for
emphasis, viz.:
"Sec. 15.Implementation of Full Deregulation. Pursuant to section
5(e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the DOE shall, upon approval of the
President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall
time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate
of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. . ."
Petitioners urge that the phrases "as far as practicable," "decline of crude oil
prices in the world market" and "stability of the peso exchange rate to the US
dollar" are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete in meaning. They submit that they
do not provide the "determinate or determinable standards" which can guide the
President in his decision to fully deregulate the downstream oil industry. In
addition, they contend that E.O. No. 392 which advanced the date of full
deregulation is void for it illegally considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a
factor.
The power of Congress to delegate the execution of laws has long been settled
by this Court. As early as 1916 inCompaia General de Tabacos de Filipinas
vs. The Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 21 this Court thru, Mr. Justice
Moreland, held that "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to
make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and
in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection
can be made." Over the years, as the legal engineering of men's relationship
became more difficult, Congress has to rely more on the practice of delegating
the execution of laws to the executive and other administrative agencies. Two
tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to
execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We
delineated the metes and bounds of these tests in Eastern Shipping Lines,
Inc. vs. POEA, 22 thus:
"There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power, viz.: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in
all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative such that when
it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to do is to enforce it.
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's
authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both tests are
intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the
delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and
exercise a power essentially legislative."
stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. By considering another
factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive department rewrote the
standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The Executive is bereft of any right to alter
either by subtraction or addition the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no
power to make laws. To cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite
tyranny, indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The exercise
of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere
agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of agency. In the cases at bar, the
Executive co-mingled the factor of depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of
decline of the price of crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso
to the US dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to
determine the weight given by the Executive department to the depletion of the
OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration for the early deregulation.
It could have been accorded an equal significance. Or its importance could be nil.
In light of this uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No.
392 constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
We now come to grips with the contention that some provisions of R.A. No. 8180
violate section 19 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. These provisions are:
(1)Section 5 (b) which states "Any law to the contrary
notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this Act, tariff
duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the
rate of three percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum
products at the rate of seven percent (7%) except fuel oil and
LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported
crude oil. Provided, that beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff
rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products shall
be the same. Provided, further, that this provision may be
amended only by an Act of Congress."
(2)Section 6 which states "To ensure the security and continuity of
petroleum crude and products supply, the DOE shall require the
refiners and importers to maintain a minimum inventory
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of their respective annual sales
volume or forty (40) days of supply, whichever is lower," and
cdphil
(3)Section 9 (b) which states "To ensure fair competition and prevent
cartels and monopolies in the downstream oil industry, the
following acts shall be prohibited:
On the other hand, section 19 of Article XII of the Constitution allegedly violated
by the aforestated provisions of R.A. No. 8180 mandates: "The State shall
regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed."
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or
companies, consisting in the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular
business or trade, manufacture a particular article, or control the sale or the
whole supply of a particular commodity. It is a form of market structure in which
one or only a few firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. 28 On the
other hand, a combination in restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding
between two or more persons, in the form of a contract, trust, pool, holding
company, or other form of association, for the purpose of unduly restricting
competition, monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity,
controlling its production, distribution and price, or otherwise interfering with
freedom of trade without statutory authority. 29 Combination in restraint of trade
refers to the means while monopoly refers to the end. 30
Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code and Article 28 of the New Civil Code
breathe life to this constitutional policy.Article 186 of the Revised Penal Code
penalizes monopolization and creation of combinations in restraint of
trade, 31while Article 28 of the New Civil Code makes any person who shall
engage in unfair competition liable for damages. 32
Respondents aver that sections 5(b), 6 and 9(b) implement the policies and
objectives of R.A. No. 8180. They explain that the 4% tariff differential is
designed to encourage new entrants to invest in refineries. They stress that the
inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic supply of
petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also submit that the
prohibition against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants.
Respondents manifested to the Court that new players have entered the
Philippines after deregulation and have now captured 3%-5% of the oil market.
The validity of the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 8180 has to be decided in light
of the letter and spirit of our Constitution, especially section 19, Article XII.
Beyond doubt, the Constitution committed us to the free enterprise system but it
is a system impressed with its own distinctness. Thus, while the Constitution
embraced free enterprise as an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the
operation of monopolies which can, however be regulated in the public
interest. 33 Thus too, our free enterprise system is not based on a market of
pure and unadulterated competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off
policy and follows the let-the-devil devour the hindmost rule. Combinations in
restraint of trade and unfair competitions are absolutely proscribed and the
proscription is directed both against the State as well as the private
sector. 34 This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to achieve
the goals of our national economy as defined by section 1, Article XII of the
Constitution which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and
wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services produced by
the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the
key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged. It also calls
for the State to protect Filipino enterprises against unfair competition and trade
practices.
Section 19, Article XII of our Constitution is anti-trust in history and in spirit. It
espouses competition. The desirability of competition is the reason for the
prohibition against restraint of trade, the reason for the interdiction of unfair
competition, and the reason for regulation of unmitigated monopolies.
Competition is thus the underlying principle of section 19, Article XII of our
Constitution which cannot be violated by R.A. No. 8180. We subscribe to the
observation of Prof. Gellhorn that the objective of anti-trust law is "to assure a
competitive economy, based upon the belief that through competition producers
will strive to satisfy consumer wants at the lowest price with the sacrifice of the
fewest resources. Competition among producers allows consumers to bid for
goods and services, and thus matches their desires with society's opportunity
costs." 35 He adds with appropriateness that there is a reliance upon "the
operation of the 'market' system (free enterprise) to decide what shall be
produced, how resources shall be allocated in the production process, and to
whom the various products will be distributed. The market system relies on the
consumer to decide what and how much shall be produced, and on competition,
among producers to determine who will manufacture it."
Again, we underline in scarlet that the fundamental principle espoused by section
19, Article XII of the Constitution is competition for it alone can release the
creative forces of the market. But the competition that can unleash these
creative forces is competition that is fighting yet is fair. Ideally, this kind of
competition requires the presence of not one, not just a few but several players.
A market controlled by one player (monopoly) or dominated by a handful of
R.A. No. 8180 contains a separability clause. Section 23 provides that "if for any
reason, any section or provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid,
such parts not affected thereby shall remain in full force and effect." This
separability clause notwithstanding, we hold that the offending provisions of R.A.
No. 8180 so permeate its essence that the entire law has to be struck down. The
provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing are among the
principal props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry without these provisions. Unfortunately, contrary to their
intent, these provisions on tariff differential, inventory and predatory pricing
inhibit fair competition, encourage monopolistic power and interfere with the free
interaction of market forces. R.A. No. 8180 needs provisions to vouchsafe free
and fair competition. The need for these vouchsafing provisions cannot be
overstated. Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real
competitors but did not have a free run of the market because government
controls both the pricing and non-pricing aspects of the oil industry. After
deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain unthreatened by real
competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with respect to
their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a
deregulated market where competition can be corrupted and where market
forces can be manipulated by oligopolies.
The fall out effects of the defects of R.A. No. 8180 on our people have not
escaped Congress. A lot of our leading legislators have come out openly
with bills seeking the repeal of these odious and offensive provisions in R.A. No.
8180. In the Senate, Senator Freddie Webb has filed S.B. No. 2133 which is the
result of the hearings conducted by the Senate Committee on Energy. The
hearings revealed that (1) there was a need to level the playing field for the new
entrants in the downstream oil industry, and (2) there was no law punishing a
person for selling petroleum products at unreasonable prices. Senator Alberto
G. Romulo also filed S.B. No. 2209 abolishing the tariff differential beginning
January 1, 1998. He declared that the amendment ". . . would mean that instead
of just three (3) big oil companies there will be other major oil companies to
provide more competitive prices for the market and the consuming
public."Senator Heherson T . Alvarez, one of the principal proponents of R.A. No.
8180, also filed S.B. No. 2290 increasing the penalty for violation of its section 9.
It is his opinion as expressed in the explanatory note of the bill that the present
oil companies are engaged in cartelization despite R.A. No. 8180, viz.:
"xxx xxx xxx
"Since the downstream oil industry was fully deregulated in February
1997, there have been eight (8) fuel price adjustments made by the
three oil majors, namely: Caltex Philippines, Inc.; Petron Corporation;
and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation. Very noticeable in the price
adjustments made, however, is the uniformity in the pump prices of
practically all petroleum products of the three oil companies. This,
despite the fact, that their selling rates should be determined by a
combination of any of the following factors: the prevailing peso-dollar
exchange rate at the time payment is made for crude purchases,
sources of crude, and inventory levels of both crude and refined
petroleum products. The abovestated factors should have resulted in
different, rather than identical prices.
The fact that the three (3) oil companies' petroleum products are
uniformly priced suggests collusion, amounting to cartelization, among
Senator Francisco S. Tatad also filed S.B. No. 2307 providing for a uniform tariff
rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products. In the explanatory
note of the bill, he declared in no uncertain terms that ". . . the present setuphas raised serious public concern over the way the three oil companies have
uniformly adjusted the prices of oil in the country, an indication of a possible
In the House of Representatives, the moves to rehabilitate R.A. No. 8180 are
equally feverish. Representative Leopoldo E. San Buenaventura has filed H.B. No.
9826 removing the tariff differential for imported crude oil and imported refined
petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the bill, Rep. Buenaventura
explained:
"xxx xxx xxx
As we now experience, this difference in tariff rates between imported
crude oil and imported refined petroleum products, unwittingly provided
Representative Marcial C. Punzalan, Jr., filed H.B. No. 9981 to prevent collusion
among the present oil companies by strengthening the oversight function of the
government particularly its ability to subject to a review any adjustment in the
prices of gasoline and other petroleum products. In the explanatory note of the
bill, Rep. Punzalan, Jr., said:
Representative Sergio A.F. Apostol filed H.B. No. 10039 to remedy an omission in
R.A. No. 8180 where there is no agency in government that determines what is
"reasonable" increase in the prices of oil products. Representative Dante
O. Tinga, one of the principal sponsors of R.A. No. 8180, filed H.B. No. 10057 to
strengthen its anti-trust provisions. He elucidated in its explanatory note:
"xxx xxx xxx
Representative Erasmo B. Damasing filed H.B. No. 7885 and has a more
unforgiving view of R.A. No. 8180. He wants it completely repealed. He
explained:
"xxx xxx xxx
Contrary to the projections at the time the bill on the Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation was discussed and debated upon in the plenary
session prior to its approval into law, there aren't any new players or
investors in the oil industry. Thus, resulting in practically a cartel or
monopoly in the oil industry by the three (3) big oil companies, Caltex,
Shell and Petron. So much so, that with the deregulation now being
partially implemented, the said oil companies have succeeded in
increasing the prices of most of their petroleum products with little or no
interference at all from the government. In the month of August, there
was an increase of Fifty centavos (50) per liter by subsidizing the same
with the OPSF, this is only temporary as in March 1997, or a few months
from now, there will be full deregulation (Phase II) whereby the increase
in the prices of petroleum products will be fully absorbed by the
consumers since OPSF will already be abolished by then. Certainly, this
would make the lives of our people, especially the unemployed ones,
doubly difficult and unbearable.
namely, Caltex, Shell and Petron. Even if these new players will come in,
they will still have no chance to compete with the said three (3) existing
big oil companies considering that there is an imposition of oil tariff
differential of 4% between importation of crude oil by the said oil
refineries paying only 3% tariff rate for the said importation and 7%
tariff rate to be paid by businessmen who have no oil refineries in the
Philippines but will import finished petroleum/oil products which is being
taxed with 7% tariff rates.
So, if only to help the many who are poor from further suffering as a
result of unmitigated increase in oil products due to deregulation, it is a
must that the Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1996, or
R.A.8180 be repealed completely."
Various resolutions have also been filed in the Senate calling for an immediate
and comprehensive review of R.A. No. 8180 to prevent the downpour of its ill
effects on the people. Thus, S. Res. No. 574 was filed by Senator Gloria
M.Macapagal entitled Resolution "Directing the Committee on Energy to Inquire
Into The Proper Implementation of the Deregulation of the Downstream Oil
Industry and Oil Tax Restructuring As Mandated Under R.A. Nos. 8180 and 8184,
In Order to Make The Necessary Corrections In the Apparent Misinterpretation Of
The Intent And Provision Of The Laws And Curb The Rising Tide Of
Disenchantment Among The Filipino Consumers And Bring About The Real
Intentions And Benefits Of The Said Law." Senator Blas P. Ople filed S. Res. No.
664 entitled resolution "Directing the Committee onEnergy To Conduct An
Inquiry In Aid Of Legislation To Review The Government's Oil Deregulation Policy
In Light Of The Successive Increases In Transportation, Electricity And Power
Rates, As Well As Of Food And Other Prime Commodities And Recommend
Appropriate Amendments To Protect The Consuming Public." Senator Ople
observed:
"xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, since the passage of R.A. No. 8180, the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB) has imposed successive increases in oil prices which has
triggered increases in electricity and power rates, transportation fares,
as well as in prices of food and other prime commodities to the
detriment of our people, particularly the poor;
WHEREAS, the new players that were expected to compete with the oil
cartel-Shell, Caltex and Petron-have not come in;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that a review of the oil deregulation policy be
made to consider appropriate amendments to the existing law such as
an extension of the transition phase before full deregulation in order to
give the competitive market enough time to develop;
WHEREAS, the review can include the advisability of providing some
incentives in order to attract the entry of new oil companies to effect a
dynamic competitive market;
WHEREAS, it may also be necessary to defer the setting up of the
institutional framework for full deregulation of the oil industry as
mandated under Executive Order No. 377 issued by President Ramos
last October 31, 1996. . . ."
Senator Alberto G. Romulo filed S. Res. No. 769 entitled resolution "Directing the
Committees on Energy and Public Services In Aid of Legislation To Assess The
Immediate Medium And Long Term Impact of Oil Deregulation On Oil Prices And
The Economy." Among the reasons for the resolution is the finding that "the
requirement of a 40-day stock inventory effectively limits the entry of other oil
firms in the market with the consequence that instead of going down oil prices
will rise."
C . Punzalan, Jr., Dante O. Tinga and Antonio E. Bengzon III filed H.R. No. 894
The Court, however, takes note of the plea of PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX to lift
our restraining order to enable them to adjust upward the price of petroleum and
petroleum products in view of the plummeting value of the peso. Their plea,
however, will now have to be addressed to the Energy Regulatory Board as the
effect of the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 8180 is to revive the
former laws it repealed. 39 The length of our return to the regime of regulation
depends on Congress which can fasttrack the writing of a new law on oil
deregulation in accord with the Constitution.
With this Decision, some circles will chide the Court for interfering with an
economic decision of Congress. Such criticism is charmless for the Court is
annulling R.A. No. 8180 not because it disagrees with deregulation as an
economic policy but because as cobbled by Congress in its present form, the law
violates the Constitution. The right call therefor should be for Congress to write a
new oil deregulation law that conforms with the Constitution and not for this
Court to shirk its duty of striking down a law that offends the Constitution.
Striking down R.A. No. 8180 may cost losses in quantifiable terms to the oil
oligopolists. But the loss in tolerating the tampering of our Constitution is not
quantifiable in pesos and centavos. More worthy of protection than the supranormal profits of private corporations is the sanctity of the fundamental
principles of the Constitution. Indeed when confronted by a law violating the
Constitution, the Court has no option but to strike it down dead. Lest it is missed,
the Constitution is a covenant that grants and guarantees both the political
and economic rights of the people. The Constitution mandates this Court to be
the guardian not only of the people's political rights but their economic rights as
well. The protection of the economic rights of the poor and the powerless is of
greater importance to them for they are concerned more with the esoterics of
living and less with the esoterics of liberty. Hence, for as long as the Constitution
reigns supreme so long will this Court be vigilant in upholding the economic
rights of our people especially from the onslaught of the powerful. Our defense
of the people's economic rights may appear heartless because it cannot be halfhearted.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are granted. R.A. No. 8180 is declared
unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.
SO ORDERED.