LONDONS GLOBAL UNIVERSITY

University College London

Department of Civil, Environmental & Geomatic Engineering
Disaster Risk Reduction
(CEGEG023 / CEGEM023)

Coursework 2
Guadalajaras explosions of 1992

Luis Fernando Gutierrez Urzua

14060635

Lecturer: Dr John Twigg

Academic Year
2014-15

Guadalajaras explosions of 1992

LUIS F. GUTIERREZ URZUA (14060635)
DISASTER RISK REDUCTION
MSC IN EARTHQUAKE ENGINEERING WITH DISASTER MANAGEMENT
UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
After more than 48 hours of continuous reports of the smell of gasoline coming from the street
sewers and house toilets, a series of explosions disrupted the apparent calm of the traditional
barrio1 of Analco, in the city of Guadalajara. The morning of the 22nd April 1992, is
remembered as one of the biggest disasters in the history of the city, but also as the disaster
that could have been avoided. Poor urban planning of the city during the preceding 30 years,
many omissions made by the authorities and a lack of technical judgment by PEMEX workers,
led to the fatal events of that Wednesday. However, thanks to the lifestyle, immediate response
and organisation of the local residents of Analco, many of the potential fatalities were avoided.
Furthermore, the particular characteristic of this event was that the reconstruction process
was led by Non-governmental organisations and local residents due to the lack of trust in the
government and Mexicos main party of that time, PRI (Partido Revolucionario Institucional).

Barrio of Analco before the explosions: vulnerabilities and pre-existing

conditions of the neighbourhood
The Barrio of Analco

The working-class Barrio of Analco is located in the southern-central part of the city of
Guadalajara. In 1992, this neighbourhood was mainly populated by small local families who
had been living there for generations. These families had a strong social connection amongst
themselves and were usually very familiar with the customs and lifestyles of their neighbours
(SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993).
The majority of the people living in the zone had fixed regular working schedules (usually 9am
to 6pm in Mexico). Small family-led businesses were easy to find on Analcos streets, as well
as a considerable amount of small industrial workshops and street based food carts.
Men tended to be the economic support of the families while women were usually housewives.
For most of the day, children were at school (usually 8am to 1pm) and once free, could often
be found playing football with neighbours on the streets. It was also common to find university
students, either as members of a family or renting a spare room in family home.
The buildings of Analco were usually constructed by non-professionals and therefore many of
them had a lack of foundations and concrete confinement on the masonry walls, needed to
properly resist blast impacts like the ones caused by the explosions (IBAEZ ET AL. 2003).

Barrio is Spanish for low-income neighbourhood. These places are usually characterised by having
old low-engineered buildings and heavily populated living complexes called vecindades.
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Political situation of the country and relationship with the victims

The electoral process of Mexico in 1988 was far from being perceived as a clean process.
After 60 years of having elected presidents from the same party, PRI, polls tended to declare
the PRD (Partido de la Revolucin Democrtica) party as the winner. However, on the night
of the election when the PRD was leading the provisional results, the system for counting the
votes stopped working for several hours. The next morning, when it finally worked again,
Carlos Salinas de Gortari, the PRI candidate, was declared the winner (which is now stated as
an electoral fraud). This led the country to a social discontent, which, in the case of Guadalajara,
was against the three levels of government (all of them headed by PRI). This social discontent
is accompanied by a complete lack of trust in authorities and governments (SHEFNER AND
WALTON 1993; RAMIREZ SAIZ AND REGALADO SANTILLAN 1993; SHEFNER 1999).
PEMEX facilities and the induced hazard risk to Guadalajara

Guadalajaras explosions were

not the first event of its kind in
Mexico. There were many other events
of different magnitudes throughout the
country. However, the event in
Guadalajara was caused by a series of
irrational decisions, typical of a
developing country: a dangerous plant
is located near a heavily populated
zone in order to take advantage of the
cheap costs of salaries and services,
not enough money is invested in safety
measures and there are no regulations
or planning for an eventual disaster, or
they are simply not enforced
(ANDERSSON AND MORALES 1992).
PEMEX (which stands for Mexican
Petroleum) is the state-owned
company in charge of all the oilrelated processes, from the exploration
to the final customer sales. One of the
responsibilities of this company is the
distribution within the national
territory. In the early 60s, Guadalajara
was experiencing a shortage of oil- Figure 1. Central Guadalajara, Analco Neighbourhood, affected sewer
derived products due to the increase of system and "La Nogalera" PEMEX plant. (Shefner and Walton 1993)
industrial activity in the city, and the
usage of automobiles. Therefore, in March 1963 the new pipeline from Salamanca to
Guadalajara was confirmed by the states governor and its construction started three years later
(PARTIDA 1993).
In 1970, the industrial park El Alamo was created in the southern part of the city, under a
suspicious permission given by the government to the owners of the land where the park was
being created (apparently, there were family links between them). The new industries settling
2

in this park required a higher demand of natural gas, therefore, PEMEX announced the
construction of a satellite distribution plant called La Nogalera, in 1973. Many changes to
the paths of the pipelines were made to allow the construction of the park (PARTIDA 1993;
OLIVER SANCHEZ 1993). One of these new pipelines was the one which had the leak that caused
the explosion.
Unfortunate chain of negligent actions

A drop in the pressure in the pipelines between Salamanca and Guadalajara was
registered eight days before the event, however, PEMEX officials decided to ignore it instead
of reporting the imminent leak (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993; AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995; SHEFNER
1999; PROCESO 2002). Macias and Calderon Aragon (1994) believed that the pipes were
actually leaking for at least 17 years prior to the incident, but the leak just became bigger days
before the explosions.
There were several reports from
the neighbours about the smell
of gasoline coming from street
sewers and the presence of
gasoline in toilets and sinks
(BLAS AND ROMERO 2012).
SIAPA, the state-managed
organisation responsible for
water and sewage in the
metropolitan
area
of
Guadalajara,
attended
the
reports and sent a work crew to
check for explosive levels in the
Figure 2. Firemen opening manholes. (Blas and Romero 2012)
sewers. They reported alarming
levels in the sewers and SIAPA ordered the opening of manholes for ventilation. This was done
by firemen and SIAPA workers. However, even when the mayor and governor were informed,
no one gave the order to evacuate the zone (ANDERSSON AND MORALES 1992).
The smell of gasoline was widely spread at least three days before the explosions. Some of the
local radio broadcasters had journalists on site to report any news related to that strong smell
and many of the neighbours decided to evacuate themselves, even without an order from the
authorities (AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995). That was a very good decision.

Barrio of Analco during the explosions: scale of the disaster, impacts

and community behaviour
Why the sewers exploded

There are many theories as to how the leak was produced, however, none of them have
been proved yet. The most widely known theory says that the steel-made gasoline pipe had
friction (or made a chemical reaction) with a recently installed zinc-made water pipe, damaging
the gasoline pipe and leaking the gasoline to the soil. From the soil it was matter of time for it
to reach the sewer system to continue flowing (PROCESO 2002). The leaks were calculated as 5
litres per second (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993).

After the gasoline infiltrated into the sewer pipes, it travelled under the Barrio of Analco to the
San Juan de Dios tubed river. Due to the recent development of an underground train line
crossing, the river was deviated with a U-shaped pump system (siphon). This system provides
a perfect solution for liquids because they push and flow by gravity. However, the gas expelled
by the gasoline got trapped in the sewer system before the siphon, right under Analco
neighbourhood, because it could not be pumped as it was lighter than liquid gasoline (MACIAS
AND CALDERON ARAGON 1994).
No one knows how the gas was ignited, it could have been a cigarette, a lighter or a car, but
between 10:00am and 10:10am on the 22nd April 1992, the first two explosions were produced.
During the following hour and a half around 15 explosions were registered in diverse points of
the sewer path (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993) and damaged 8.022 kilometres of street (other
sources say up to 13 kilometres were affected) and 98 blocks (PADILLA AND REGUILLO 1993).
Scale of the disaster

The
official
government sources say that
the explosions left 210 dead,
600 injured, 3020 damaged
buildings
(570
totally
collapsed), 135 damaged
commercial establishments,
525 damaged vehicles and
around 3,500 families in a
temporary homeless situation
(PADILLA AND REGUILLO
1993). However, dead count
was based on the number of
bodies found and did not take Figure 3. Some of the vehicles ended on the roofs of buildings. (Blas and Romero 2012)
into account the disappeared
ones. In addition, incomplete body parts were not even counted. Unofficial reports account up
to 1200 dead people (ANDERSSON AND MORALES 1992) and 2000 injured (ESPARZA 1997) but
this unofficial information cannot be confirmed.
The victims were mainly residents of Analco and usual clients of the businesses. Since the
explosions took place during schools Easter break, many of the victims were children who
were playing on the streets or sleeping in their bedrooms (in this neighbourhood, most of the
bedrooms are street-facing rooms). On the contrary, many of the women of Analco survived
the explosions thanks to specific cleaning customs. Usually, they cleaned common rooms such
as the kitchen and living room during the morning (after breakfast) to account for the
unexpected visitors they might have in the afternoon. These rooms were usually located in the
rear rooms of the houses, which in many cases were not heavily affected (AGUIRRE ET AL.
1995). The different timing distribution of the explosions allowed the partial evacuation of
certain blocks, reducing the casualties. A few cases of cholera followed the destruction,
however, it was controlled on time by the Green Cross (government emergency organisation)
(MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993; OLIVER SANCHEZ 1993).

Response of authorities and emergency services

A poor emergency services reaction was seen in Guadalajaras explosions. According

to witnesses, the first emergency vehicles were firemen and in some zones they arrived up to
three hours after the first explosion (IBAEZ ET AL. 2003). This could be due to both the
impossibility of access for vehicles and the fact that emergency services were occupied
avoiding further explosions in other areas (in fact, 2 firemen lost their lives while they were
opening manholes). On the other hand, private aid associations such as the Red Cross, arrived
almost immediately to start helping the victims (SHEFNER 1999). The army and police also
supported by creating perimeter controls and helping the victims. These rescue efforts were
very much appreciated by the citizenry (AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995).
The reactions by the three levels of government were changing as the information about the
explosion was released. In the afternoon of that day, PEMEX made its first attempt to evade
responsibilities by blaming a local cooking-oil manufacturer La Central of throwing hexane
gas into the sewers. The company representatives quickly proved this accusation could not be
sustained because they had a registry of the sales of this waste chemical. In addition, the
company was closed due to Easter break. Actually, PEMEX did not accept their responsibility
until several days later. However, they never accepted their knowledge about the leak days
before the explosions (even when it is proved and documented nowadays) (ANDERSSON AND
MORALES 1992; MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993).
The following days, the mayor of Guadalajara, Enrique Dau Flores, resigned in order to allow
better investigations (according to him) but pointing out that he could not give the order to
evacuate since SIAPA is managed by the state. The governor, Guillermo Cosio Vidaurri,
evaded this accusation by saying that the security of the population is responsibility of the
mayor and the explosions were caused by PEMEX, a federal government-owned company.
Actually, Cosio Vidaurri never accepted his responsibility in the disaster and days later was
obligated to resign. One day after the explosions he declared that the surviving victims were
behaving like kids (MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993) and that was making the reconstruction
more difficult. However, the neighbours argued that they were only blocking the entrance of
heavy machinery to the zone of explosions, until they rescued all the buried victims, recovered
all the bodies and made the investigations to determine who was responsible for this fatal event
(SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993; SHEFNER 1999). It was evident that the people did not trust the
government and were afraid that it wanted to minimise the tragedy by burying the evidence
(IBAEZ ET AL. 2003).
At the end, the three levels of government, PEMEX and SIAPA all avoided responsibility by
blaming each other and the responsibility was diluted (LOMELI MEILLON 1993). One of the few
voices that dared to make direct accusations was the recently fired chief fireman of the city, J.
Trinidad Lpez Rivas (current States Civil Protection Secretary) who said that the explosions
could have been avoided. He was fired the day after the explosions along with the SIAPA
director (MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993).

Response of the community

After the poor

response of the emergency
services, the neighbours
started
to
organise
themselves to create human
chains to remove the debris
and try to save buried
victims. Due to the high
demand of emergency
vehicles, the neighbours of
Analco and other places
started
to
organise
transport for the injured
people in private cars
(AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995;
IBAEZ ET AL. 2003).

Figure 4. Human chains in the affected zones to remove rubble and provide goods.
(Blas and Romero 2012)

Since waiting for the emergency services to start search and rescue (SAR) of buried people was
not an option for the families, they started with their own SAR process and the authorities
became part of it when arrived. This was a good decision because most of the victims were
rescued during the first two hours after the explosion, which happens in most disasters. Some
neighbours from close streets and university students became part of the rescue team by helping
the victims to locate their missing relatives (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993; AGUIRRE ET AL.
1995).
Right after the explosions, the victims were usually concerned about where their family
members and friends were. The explosions modified the entire landscape of the streets and that
made it more difficult to find buried people. Several rescue cases were successful thanks to the
extensive knowledge of the daily routine of the community members. For example, one man
who lived two blocks away from the affected area could find his wife by knowing where she
was supposed to be at the time of the explosions. Eventually he helped other people to find
their relatives by guessing their most likely location under the rubble with information provided
by the families (RAMIREZ SAIZ AND REGALADO SANTILLAN 1993; AGUIRRE ET AL. 1995).
It can be said that the success in the rescue duties was due to the participation of the victims,
who offered a fast response because were already there and became participants of their own
emergency management. This was because of their abundant and specific knowledge about
their communities and their personal commitment to the cause. Most of the survivors who were
rescued from the rubble had strong social connections with the community and for that reason
they facilitated the SAR operation. The strong community spirit in Analco helped to rescue
more people: when a person was rescued from the debris, the family usually joined in the SAR
of other community members.
In order to support the SAR, two local private radio broadcasters (owning 5 frequencies) altered
their normal functioning to serve as a massive communication tool. Personal messages,
information about missing people and massive distribution of information was their main role.
In addition, seven radio field stations were donated by a local manufacturing firm (AGUIRRE
6

ET AL.

1995). This fulfilled the necessity of information among the people on the emergency

site.
Local universities sent teams of professionals to support the victims. Architects, engineers,
psychologists, doctors and nurses were sent in to be in direct support of the victims. Since
college students were on Easter break, the universities organised volunteer teams to participate
in the emergency phase by helping with the transportation of goods and services (AGUIRRE ET
AL. 1995).

Barrio of Analco after the explosions

Management of the post-emergency situation

After the explosion risk was reduced and the first SAR phase ended, the main concern
of the government was to provide shelter for the surviving victims. Therefore, they enabled
many public buildings as shelters. The universities also allowed the establishment of refugees
in their facilities. However, the majority of the victims decided to seek for shelter in houses of
relatives in other zones of the city. The reconstruction of the affected streets took approximately
one year, however the government only reconstructed the public zones and not the private
properties.
The federal government released resources for relocation (or reconstruction) of the houses of
the victims. In addition, it started a tax-free programme for the business and people affected by
the tragedy in order to preserve jobs and companies. However, victims complained about the
amounts they received from the government because they only covered a small portion of the
real cost. The government invested 11 billion Mexican pesos, however, some sources calculate
the real cost as 280 billion Mexican pesos (In April of 1992, 3.068 Mexican pesos were
equivalent to 1 American Dollar). However, these funds were complemented by fines imposed
on PEMEX. There is no clarity about how much of the resources reached the victims since
Mexico did not have a transparency law in those days (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993; CEFP
2014).
Community post-disaster organisation

The first sights of organisation of the victims were seen when they organised the SAR.
They became a consolidated group when they did not allow the heavy machinery to enter, one
day after the disaster. Therefore they created an organisation called Damnificados del 22 de
Abril to back up the claims to the government. This organisation made political pressure that
led to higher payments and support for the victims. This organisation still exists and they are
still fighting for justice (SHEFNER AND WALTON 1993).
In the reconstruction and relocation phase some civil organisations supported the victims.
Among these organisations are Rotary International, Lions Club, Scouts Clubs and Red Cross.
In the political context, Universidad de Guadalajara and the Catholic Church supported the
victims by asking the government to put the responsible in jail, in their opinion, the governor
(MORA AND DE LA TORRE 1993).
Analco nowadays

The reality is that most of the victims had to move to cheaper parts of the city and most
of the businesses broke down. There are testimonials of victims who worked in the government
saying that they received more money than other victims, actually more than they needed for
7

recovery (IBAEZ ET AL. 2003). The Barrio of Analco is now fully reconstructed but only a few
of the original inhabitants returned.
Even though the mayor, the director of SIAPA and 7 officials of PEMEX went to jail, no one
remained there for more than 9 months (DE PALMA 1993). Recently, the states governor for
2006-2012 blamed PEMEX and Cosio Vidaurri as responsibles of the tragedy (SANTOS 2010).

Conclusions
Guadalajaras explosions show the importance of the community based disaster
management and how allowing the victims to become participants of the emergency plans, a
lot of losses can be avoided. A tailored emergency plan for each community can take advantage
of the knowledge of the people to increase their resilience.
The Analco explosions ask us to better understand better how the responsibility is distributed
among different levels of government. The responsibility and authority must be clearly stated.
If the mayor or governor had ordered the evacuation of the neighbourhood when the explosive
gases were detected, many lives could have been saved. If everyone is responsible for the same
task, the responsibility will be evaded.
In Analco, the biggest vulnerability was not the low-engineered buildings or the lack of
foundations, it was having a severe corruption problem within government and a very poor
enforcement of the law. This hazard was caused by a natural chemical chain reaction, but
powered by the impunity, corruption and indifference of governments and institutions.

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