Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 5161

April 14, 2004

ISIDRA TING-DUMALI, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ROLANDO S. TORRES, respondent.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
In a Complaint-Affidavit1 filed on 22 October 1999 with this Court, complainant Isidra TingDumali charges respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres with presentation of false testimony;
participation in, consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainants signature
in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the
purpose of profiting from such forgery, thereby violating his oath as a lawyer and the canons of
legal and judicial ethics.
The complainant is one of the six children of the late spouses Julita Reynante and Vicente Ting.
Her siblings are Marcelina T. Rivera; Miriam T. Saria; Felicisima T. Torres, who is married to
herein respondent; Vicente Ting, Jr.; and Eliseo Ting. Their parents died intestate and left
several parcels of land, to wit:
a) One half of Lot 1586 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of
43,908 square meters more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6203) RT19151 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
b) Lot 1603 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 16,073
square meters, more or less, and covered at that time by TCT No. (T-6425) RT-7688 of
the Registry of Deeds of Cavite;
c) Lot 1605 of the San Francisco de Malabon Estate, containing an area of 22,131
square meters, more or less and covered at that time by TCT No. T- 1869 of the Registry
of Deeds of Cavite.
According to the complainant, the respondent took advantage of his relationship with her and
her brothers and used his profession to deprive them of what was lawfully due them even if it

involved the commission of an illegal, unlawful, or immoral act. She attributes to the respondent
the following acts or omissions:
1. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the perjury
committed by his wife Felicisima and his sister-in-law Miriam when they executed a
Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate dated 11 November 1986, wherein the two
made it appear that they were the sole heirs of the late spouses Julita Reynante and
Vicente Ting, knowing fully well that the same was false. He presented that document to
the Register of Deeds of Cavite for the transfer of the title over Lot No. 1586 in the
names of his wife and Miriam. The lot was later sold to Antel Holdings Inc. for
P1,195,400. Payment was already made to, and received by, Felicisima and Miriam.
2. The respondent participated in, consented to, and failed to advise against, the forgery
of complainants signature in a purported Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17
March 1995 involving Lot 1603 when he knew that she was in Italy at that time working
as an overseas contract worker. He even presented the falsified document to the
Register of Deeds of Cavite to transfer the title over the property in favor of his wife
Felicisima and sister-in-law Marcelina. The forgery or falsification was made to enable
them to sell Lot 1603 to Antel Holdings, Inc. Payment was received and misappropriated
by Felicisima and Marcelina.
3. In LRC Rec. No. 5964 entitled In Re:Petition for Judicial Reconstitution of the Original
Copy and Owners Duplicate Copy of TCT No. T-1869 Covering Lot No. 1605 of the
Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite, filed by complainants sisters Marcelina
and Felicisima on 24 October 1995, the respondent made gross misrepresentation and
offered false testimony to the effect that Marcelina and Felicisima are the only children
and legal heirs of the late spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante for the purpose of
obtaining a new title in their names. With the reconstituted title, and with the express
conformity of the respondent, Felicisima and Marcelina were able to sell Lot 1605 to
Antel Holdings, Inc., for P2,213,100 and profited from the sale to the exclusion of their
other siblings. Partial payment was even received pending the reconstitution
proceedings.
4. On 20 November 1996, the respondent made gross and false misrepresentations for
the purpose of profiting therefrom when he requested the buyer through a certain Mrs.
Ong to release the full payment for Lot 1605 under the pretense that the order of
reconstitution would be released within a month when he knew that it would be
impossible because he presented evidence in the reconstitution case only on 12 August
1997. To facilitate the release of the money, he even used the stationery of the Philippine
National Bank, of which he was an employee.
In his Comment,2 the respondent denies the allegations of the complaint and asserts that he did
not take advantage of his profession to deprive any of the co-heirs of his wife of the estate left
by his parents-in-law.
Insofar as Lot 1586 is concerned, the respondent affirms that Felicisima and Miriam were not
motivated by any desire to solely profit from the sale. Neither can he be faulted by the execution
of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot 1603 because he had
no part in the execution of the document. All the while he believed in good faith that the Ting

sisters had already agreed on how to dispose of the said lot. If ever complainants signature was
affixed on that document, it was done in good faith.
The respondent admits that he was the counsel of Marcelina Ting Rivera, et. al., in LRC Case
No. 5964 for the reconstitution of TCT No. T-1869. The false testimony of Marcelina in that case
that she and Felicisima were the only children of spouses Vicente Ting and Julita Reynante
could not be faulted on him because such was a clear oversight. Moreover, the sale of Lot 1605
to Antel Holdings, Inc., was the decision of Marcelina and his wife. His conformity through his
signature was pro-forma because the property was a paraphernal property of Marcelina and his
wife. Anent his alleged gross and false misrepresentation that the order of reconstitution would
be released by the end of November 1996, suffice it to say that the assurance was made by the
Clerk of Court, Mr. Rosauro Morabe. Besides, petitions for reconstitution are usually
uncontested and granted by courts.
Finally, the respondent believes that complainant intended to harass him in bombarding him
with numerous lawsuits, i.e., this administrative case; Civil Case No. TM-855 for "Annulment of
Documents, Titles, and Reconveyance plus Damages"; and a criminal case for Estafa and
Falsification of Public Documents.
In her reply, the complainant denies the presence of toka or verbal will allegedly made by her
mother and allegedly implemented by their eldest brother Eliseo in view of the following
circumstances: (1) her mother met a sudden death in 1967; and partition of the properties in
total disregard of their father was morally reprehensible, since the latter was still alive; (2) when
their mother died, four of the siblings were still minors including respondents wife herself; (3) on
5 February 2000, Eliseo wrote his siblings, in response to the previous letter of Felicisima,
Marcelina, and Miriam, denying the existence of a toka. She further states that the respondent
was not merely a passive onlooker but, as he admitted, the administrator of the properties of the
Ting spouses.
On 14 June 2000, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation or decision.3
On 9 January 2003, after due hearing and consideration of the issues presented by both parties,
Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
IBP found the actuations of the respondent to be violative of Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of
Canon
1 and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Thus she
recommended that the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.4
In its Resolution No. XV-2003-3335 of 21 June 2003, the Board of Governors of the IBP
approved and adopted Commissioner San Juans report, but reduced the penalty to suspension
from the practice of law for six years.
We fully agree with the Investigating Commissioner in her findings of facts and conclusion of
culpability. The respondent has sufficiently demonstrated that he is morally and legally unfit to
remain in the exclusive and honorable fraternity of the legal profession. In his long years as a
lawyer, he must have forgotten his sworn pledge as a lawyer. It is time once again that the Court
inculcate in the hearts of all lawyers that pledge; thus:

LAWYER'S OATH
I, , do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of
the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor consent to its
commission; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no man for money or
malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon
myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
SO HELP ME GOD.
This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to
the pursuit of justice is not a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten
afterwards; nor is it mere words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold
and keep inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyers oath, they become guardians of truth
and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial dispensation of justice.6 This
oath is firmly echoed and reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
...
CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.

Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
...
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.

All of these underscore the role of a lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. When the
respondent took the oath as a member of the legal profession, he made a solemn promise to so
stand by his pledge. In this covenant, respondent miserably failed.
The records show that Felicisima and Miriam stated in the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate
dated 11 November 1986 that they are the children of Julita Reynante and thus adjudicated only
between them Lot No. 1586 to the exclusion of their other siblings.7 There was concealment of
the fact that there were other compulsory heirs to the estate of the deceased. Significantly, the
respondent is the brother-in-law of complainant. Being married to complainants sister, he knew
of his wifes siblings. In fact, he declared that the complainant stayed with them while she was in
the Philippines.8 Yet, the respondent presented that document to the Register of Deeds of
General Trias, Cavite, to effect the transfer of the title of the lot in question in the name of his
wife and his sister-in-law Miriam.
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted9 regarding the falsification of
complainants signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement10 dated 17 March 1995 involving Lot
1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the property.
Marcelina admitted that she signed complainants name in that document.11 Such act of
counterfeiting the complainants signature to make it appear that the complainant had
participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a public
document.12
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against
committing falsification, he presented13 such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a new
title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife.14 He himself, therefore, may also be held liable
for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant and her other coheirs.15 Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that he prepared the legal
documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.16
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are contrary to
law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer, which is to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the Constitution, and obey the laws of the
land. The Code of Professional Responsibility underscores the primacy of such duty by
providing as its canon that a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and
promote respect for law and legal processes.17 For a lawyer is the servant of the law and
belongs to a profession to which society has entrusted the administration of law and the
dispensation of justice.18As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to
emulate.19 He should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful
conduct.20 He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such
unbecoming act or conduct.21
Respondents argument that the non-declaration by his wife and his sister- in-law Marcelina of
the other siblings in LRC Rec. No. 5964 for the reconstitution of title involving Lot 1605 was a
mere oversight does not deserve credence in view of the following circumstances: First, the
petition clearly names only Felicisima and Marcelina as the petitioners when there were six
siblings who were heirs of the unpartitioned lot.22 Second, during the hearing of said case when
the respondent asked Marcelina whether she has brothers and sisters other than Felicisima, the
latter said none. The transcript of that hearing reads:
ATTY. TORRES:

Q Madame Witness, are you the only child or daughter of the deceased Sps. Vicente
Ting, Jr. and Julita Reynante?
WITNESS:
A No, sir. We are two, Felicisima Torres and I.
Q Do you have other brothers and sisters?
A None, sir.23
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony24 in court, and he
never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and circumstances of the
case.25 Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false testimony, he himself may be
punished as guilty of false testimony.26
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes candor,
fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall "not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice."27 This Rule was
clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that
she had no siblings aside from Felicisima and when he offered such testimony in the petition for
reconstitution of the title involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called upon
to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to advance its
cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the administration of
justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against him.28
It may not be amiss to mention that to further support the reconstitution, he offered in evidence
an Affidavit of Loss, which was executed by Marcelina and notarized by him. During the hearing
of this administrative case, Marcelina admitted that her statement in that affidavit that the title
was in her possession was false, as she was never in possession of the title29 and would not,
therefore, know that the same was lost.
Moreover, in a letter dated 20 November 1996 addressed to a certain Mrs. Ong, the respondent
requested the release of 50% of the remaining balance for the sale of Lot 1605, relaying to Antel
Holdings, Inc., through Mrs. Ong that he was assured by the Clerk of Court that the order
directing the reconstitution of title for Lot 1605 would be released within the
month.30 Respondents information was misleading because he presented evidence only on 12
August 1997, or almost a year after he sent the letter.31 Such act, therefore, shows lack of
candor and honesty on the part of the respondent.
Respondents acts or omissions reveal his moral flaws and doubtless bring intolerable dishonor
to the legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct for which he may be disbarred or
suspended pursuant to Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. -A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral

turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court,
or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority
to do so. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally
or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
In the determination of the imposable disciplinary sanction against an erring lawyer, we take into
account the primary purpose of disciplinary proceedings, which is to protect the administration
of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent,
honorable, and reliable men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.32 While the
assessment of what sanction may be imposed is primarily addressed to our sound discretion,
the sanction should neither be arbitrary or despotic, nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice. Rather, it should ever be controlled by the imperative need to scrupulously guard the
purity and independence of the bar.33
Thus, the supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member
of the bar. We will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers where the evidence calls for it.34 Verily, given the peculiar factual circumstances
prevailing in this case, we find that respondents gross misconduct calls for the severance of his
privilege to practice law for life, and we therefore adopt the penalty recommended by the
Investigating Commissioner.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent Atty. Rolando S. Torres guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of the lawyers oath, as well as Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, thereby rendering him unworthy of continuing membership in the
legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from the practice of law, and his name is
ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, which shall forthwith
record it in the personal files of the respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all
administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22320

July 29, 1968

MERCEDES RUTH COBBPEREZ

and DAMASO P. PEREZ, petitioners,
vs.
HON. GREGORIO LANTIN, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
RICARDO P. HERMOSO and the CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
Crispin D. Baizas and Associates for petitioners.
Isidro T. Almeda for respondents.
CASTRO, J.:
This is a motion for partial reconsideration of this Court's decision of May 22, 1968, specifically
directed against the following observation therein made:
We feel compelled to observe that during the protracted litigation below, the petitioners
resorted to a series of actions and petitions, at some stages alternatingly, abetted by
their counsel, for the sole purpose of thwarting the execution of a simple money
judgment which has long become final and executory. Some of the actions were filed,
only to be abandoned or withdrawn. The petitioners and their counsel, far from viewing
courts as sanctuaries for those who seek justice, have tried to use them to subvert the
very ends of justice.
Corollarily, this Court assessed treble costs against the petitioners, to "be paid by their
counsel.".
The herein movants, Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A. N. Bolinas, counsels for the petitioners,
while submitting to the judgment on the merits, seek reconsideration of the decision in so far as
it reflects adversely upon their "professional conduct" and condemns them to pay the treble
costs adjudged against their clients.
At first blush, the motion for reconsideration presents a semblance of merit. After mature
deliberation and patient reprobing into the records of the case, however, we are of the firmer
conviction that the protracted litigation, alluded to in the above-quoted portion of our decision,
was designed to cause delay, and the active participation of the petitioners' counsels in this
adventure is patent.
After November 15, 1962 when the Court of Appeals rendered judgment sustaining Damaso
Perez' position with respect to the extent of the levy, the subsequent proceedings interposed

alternatingly by the petitioner spouses were obviously quixotic maneuvers expected to be

overthrown by the courts but calculated to delay an execution long overdue.
Had the petitioners and their counsels seriously believed that the levied shares of stock were
conjugal property, why did they not adopt this position from the very start, or, at the latest, in CAG.R. 29962-R, wherein Damaso Perez challenged the legality of the levy's coverage, in order to
end the litigation with reasonable dispatch? They chose, however, to attack the execution in a
piecemeal fashion, causing the postponement of the projected execution sale six times. More
than eight years after the finality of the judgment have passed, and the same has yet to be
satisfied.
In a determined effort to prolong the litigation, the Perez spouses, as represented by their
counsels, sought the issuance of preliminary injunctions to restrain the execution of the final
judgment in civil case 39407 from courts which did not have jurisdiction and which would, as
expected, initially or ultimately deny their prayer. For instance, after Damaso Perez bowed out
temporarily from the scene following the rendition of the aforementioned Court of Appeals
decision, his wife, Mercedez, Ruth Cobb-Perez, intruded into the controversy and asked for an
ex parte writ of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal in connection with
civil case 7532 which she filed with the said court, knowing fully well that the basic civil case
39407 was decided by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII presided by the
respondent Judge Lantin), which latter court was the proper forum for any action relative to the
execution. Judge Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, looking to Acosta vs.
Alvendia (L-14598, October 31, 1960), which held that courts of first instance have no power to
restrain acts outside their territorial jurisdictions, lifted on October 4, 1963 the ex parte writ
which he previously issued enjoining the respondent sheriff from carrying out the execution sale.
It is clear, however, that Mrs. Perez and her counsels, the movants, knew or ought to have
known beforehand that the Court of First Instance of Rizal did not have jurisdiction to issue the
writ which Mrs. Perez herself sought, and, anticipating the recall of the writ improvidently issued,
on September 3, 1963, a month before the said writ was actually lifted, filed in the basic civil
case 39407 an urgent motion to lift the writ of execution issued on August 15, 1961, alleging as
justification the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stock and the personal nature of Damaso
Perez' judgment debt, the very same reasons advanced in civil case 7532 which was then still
pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Incidentally, Mrs. Perez failed to adduce any
evidence in support of her aforesaid urgent motion, as in fact neither she nor her counsels
appeared during the scheduled hearing, prompting the respondent judge to issue the following
order:
When the urgent motion to recall or lift writ of execution was called this morning for
hearing, counsel for the movant did not appear despite the fact that he had been duly
notified of the motion for hearing. In view thereof the court assumes that he is waiving
his right to present evidence in support of his urgent motion to recall or lift writ of
execution. Said urgent motion is therefore deemed submitted for resolution.
Despite the recall of the aforementioned writ of injunction by Judge Mencias on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction (since the execution sought to be enjoined was ordered by another tribunal), Mrs.
Perez, now assisted by her husband who had staged a comeback, prayed for the issuance of
another injunction, this time from Branch XXII of the Court of First Instance of Manila (not the
same Branch which issued the controverted writ of execution), in connection with civil case
7532, then still pending in the Court of First Instance of Rizal. As most probably anticipated
anew by the Perez spouses and their counsels, Judge Alikpala, presiding judge of Branch XXII,

on November 8, 1963 denied the preliminary injunction sought, on the ground, among others,
that he had no power to interfere by injunction with the judgment or decree of a court of
concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. On the very day the injunction was denied, Damaso Perez,
as if expecting the reversal from Judge Alikpala, was already prepared with another "remedy,"
as in fact on that day, November 8, 1963, he filed in the basic civil case 39407 an "Urgent
Motion for Reconsideration" of the order of October 19, 1963, which denied his wife's abovementioned motion to recall the controverted writ of execution.
The foregoing motion, far from seriously seeking the reconsideration of the order of October 19,
1963, which in the first place Damaso Perez could not legally do for he was not even a party to
the denied "Urgent Motion to Recall Writ of Execution" (filed by his wife alone), was merely an
offer to replace the levied stocks with supposed cash dividends due to the Perez spouses as
stockholders in the Republic Bank.1 As a matter of fact, when the motion was set for hearing on
December 21, 1963, the counsels for Damaso Perez promised to produce the said cash
dividends within five days, but the promise was never fulfilled.2 Consequently, the respondent
Judge on January 4, 1964, denied the said motion for reconsideration.
The above exposition of the circumstances relative to the protracted litigation clearly negates
the avowal of the movants that "in none of the various incidents in the case at bar has any
particular counsel of petitioners acted with deliberate aforethought to delay the enforcement of
the judgment in Civil Case No. 39407." From the chronology of antecedent events, the fact
becomes inescapable that the Perez spouses, coached by their counsels, had sallied forth on a
strategem of "remedies" projected to foil the lawful execution of a simple money judgment. It is
equally obvious that they foreshadowed their own reversals in the "remedies" they ventured to
adopt, such that even before, one remedy had been exhausted, they interposed another until
the case reached this Court for the second time. 3 Meanwhile, justice was delayed, and more
than one member of this Court are persuaded that justice was practically waylaid.
The movants also contend that even this Court sanctions the aforesaid civil cases 7532 and
55292 as the "proper remedy" when we said that.
In reality, what they attacked is not the writ of execution, the validity and regularity of
which are unchallenged, but the levy made by the respondent Sheriff. In this regard, the
remedy is not the recall of the writ, but an independent action to enjoin the Sheriff from
proceeding with the projected sale, in which action the conjugal nature of the levied
stocks should be established as a basis for the subsequent issuance of a permanent
injunction, in the event of a successful claim. Incidentally, in the course of the protracted
litigation, the petitioners had already availed of this remedy in civil cases 7532 and
55292, only to abandon it as they incessantly sought other, and often simultaneous,
devices of thwarting satisfaction of the judgment debt. (Emphasis supplied) .
And because of this statement, they now counter that the said cases could not be branded as
having been instituted for delay.
The reference we made to civil cases 7532 and 55292 in the above-quoted statement must not
be considered out of context. We said that the petitioners incidentally had already availed of the
suggested remedy only in the sense that said civil cases 7532 and 55292
were apparently instituted to prove the conjugal nature of the levied shares of stocks in
question. We used the word incidentally advisedly to show that in their incessant search for
devices to thwart the controverted execution, they accidentally stumbled on the suggested

remedy. But the said civil cases were definitely not the "proper remedy" in so far as they sought
the issuance of writs of preliminary injunction from the Court of First Instance of Rizal and the
Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XXII) where civil cases 7532 and 55292 were filed
respectively, for the said courts did not have jurisdiction to restrain the enforcement of the writ of
execution issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VII) under the settled
doctrines that Courts are without power to restrain acts outside of their territorial jurisdiction 4 or
interfere with the judgment or decree of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. 5
However, the recall and the denial of the writs of preliminary injunction in civil cases 7532 and
55292 did not amount to the termination or dismissal of the principal action in each case. Had
the Perez spouses desired in earnest to continue with the said cases they could have done so.
But the fact is that Mrs. Perez practically abandoned civil case 7532 when she instituted the
above mentioned urgent motion to recall writ of execution in the basic civil case 39407,
anchored on the same grounds which she advanced in the former case, until the said civil case
7532 was dismissed on November 9, 1963, upon her own motion. Anent civil case 55292, the
Perez spouses virtually deserted the same when they instituted the herein petition
for certiorari with urgent writ of preliminary injunction based on the same grounds proffered in
the said civil case until the latter was also dismissed on March 20, 1964, with the consent of
the parties because of the pendency then of the aforesaid petition for certiorari.
The movants further contend that "If there was delay, it was because petitioners' counsel
happened to be more assertive ... a quality of the lawyers (which) is not to be condemned."
A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with candour and honesty his client's cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's
insistence despite the patent futility of his client's position, as in the case at bar.
It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and vagaries
of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
defenseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior
to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable.
The movants finally state that the "Petitioners have several counsel in this case but the
participation of each counsel was rather limited implying that the decision of this Court ordering
that "treble costs are assessed against the petitioners, which shall be paid by their counsel" is
not clear. The word "counsel" may be either singular or plural in construction, so that when we
said "counsel" we meant the counsels on record of the petitioners who were responsible for the
inordinate delay in the execution of the final judgment in the basic civil case 39407, after the
Court of Appeals had rendered its aforementioned decision of November 15, 1962. And it is on
record that the movants are such counsels. Atty. Bolinas, upon his own admission, "entered his
appearance in the case at bar about the time the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissed the
petitioners' Petition for Relief in Civil Case No. 39407," or about August 3, 1961 and even prior
to the Court of Appeals decision above-mentioned. Atty. Baizas claims that he "became
petitioners' counsel only in October, 1963 when he filed, with Atty. A.N. Bolinao, Jr. Civil Case
No. 55292 before the Court of First Instance of Manila presided by the Hon. Judge Alikpala
although it appears on record that the urgent motion to recall writ of execution filed by Mrs.
Perez in the basic civil case 39407 on September 3, 1963, was over the signature of one Ruby
Zaida of the law firm of "Crispin Baizas & Associates" as counsel for Mrs. Perez. It is to be
recalled that the said urgent motion is the same motion discussed above, which, curiously

enough, antedated by at least one month the lifting of the writ of preliminary injunction issued in
civil case 7532.
ACCORDINGLY, the motion for partial reconsideration is denied. Our decision of May 22, 1968
is hereby modified in the sense that Attys. Crispin D. Baizas and A.N. Bolinao, Jr. shall pay
jointly and severally the treble costs assessed against the petitioners.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, and Angeles, JJ., concur.
Concepcion C.J., voted for denial of the motion for reconsideration.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.C. No. 5379

May 9, 2003

WALTER T. YOUNG, complainant,

vs.
CEASAR G. BATUEGAS, MIGUELITO NAZARENO V. LLANTINO and FRANKLIN Q.
SUSA, respondents.
RESOLUTION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On December 29, 2000, Atty. Walter T. Young filed a Verified Affidavit-Complaint for disbarment
against Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino and Franklin Q. Susa for
allegedly committing deliberate falsehood in court and violating the lawyer's oath.1
Complainant is the private prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 00-187627 for Murder, entitled
"People of the Philippines versus Crisanto Arana, Jr.", pending before the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 27. On December 13, 2000, respondents Batuegas and Llantino, as counsel
for accused, filed a Manifestation with Motion for Bail, alleging that the "accused has voluntarily
surrendered to a person in authority. As such, he is now under detention."2 Upon personal
verification with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) where accused Arana allegedly
surrendered, complainant learned that he surrendered only on December 14, 2000, as shown
by the Certificate of Detention executed by Atty. Rogelio M. Mamauag, Chief of the Security
Management Division of the NBI.
Respondent Susa, the Branch Clerk of Court of RTC of Manila, Branch 27, calendared the
motion on December 15, 2000 despite the foregoing irregularity and other formal defects,
namely, the lack of notice of hearing to the private complainant, violation of the three-day notice
rule, and the failure to attach the Certificate of Detention which was referred to in the Motion as
Annex "1".
Respondents filed their respective comments, declaring that on December 13, 2000, upon
learning that a warrant of arrest was issued against their client, they filed the Manifestation with
Motion for Bail with the trial court. Then they immediately fetched the accused in Cavite and
brought him to the NBI to voluntarily surrender. However, due to heavy traffic, they arrived at the
NBI at 2:00 a.m. the next day; hence, the certificate of detention indicated that the accused
surrendered on December 14, 2000. They argued that there was neither unethical conduct nor
falsehood in the subject pleading as their client has voluntarily surrendered and was detained at
the NBI. As regards the lack of notice of hearing, they contend that complainant, as private

prosecutor, was not entitled to any notice. Nevertheless, they furnished the State and City
prosecutors copies of the motion with notice of hearing thereof. Moreover, the hearing of a
motion on shorter notice is allowed under Rule 15, Sec. 4(2) of the Rules of Court.3
For his part, respondent Susa argues in his comment that he was no longer in court when his
co-respondents filed the Manifestation with Motion for Bail. Ms. Teofila A. Pea, Clerk III,
received the said Motion and noticed that it was set for hearing on December 15, 2000 and the
Certificate of Detention was not attached. However, the presiding judge instructed her to receive
the Motion subject to the presentation of the Certificate of Detention before the hearing. Thus,
the inclusion of the Motion in the court's calendar on December 15, 2000 was authorized by the
presiding judge and, thus, was done by respondent Susa in faithful performance of his
ministerial duty.
In a Resolution dated August 13, 2001,4 the instant case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation or decision.
On December 7, 2001, the Investigating Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, submitted
her report and recommendation as follows:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that
Atty. Ceasar G. Batuegas and Atty. Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino be suspended from
the practice of their profession as a lawyer/member of the Bar for a period of six (6)
months from receipt hereof. The complaint against Atty. Franklin Q. Susa, upon the other
hand, is hereby recommended dismissed for lack of merit.5
The foregoing Report and Recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBPCommission on Bar Discipline in Resolution No. XV-2002-400, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, and in view of respondents' commission of deliberate falsehood, Atty. Batuegas
and Atty. Llantino are hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
The complaint against Atty. Susa is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.6
We agree with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner.
Respondents Batuegas and Llantino are guilty of deliberate falsehood.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth.7 He swore upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer
according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to his clients."8 He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high vocation is to
correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and
arriving at correct conclusion.9 The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only

complete honesty from lawyers appearing and pleading before them.10 While a lawyer has the
solemn duty to defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of
his client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth.11
The Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.12
Evidently, respondent lawyers fell short of the duties and responsibilities expected from them as
members of the bar. Anticipating that their Motion for Bail will be denied by the court if it found
that it had no jurisdiction over the person of the accused, they craftily concealed the truth by
alleging that accused had voluntarily surrendered to a person in authority and was under
detention. Obviously, such artifice was a deliberate ruse to mislead the court and thereby
contribute to injustice. To knowingly allege an untrue statement of fact in the pleading is a
contemptuous conduct that we strongly condemn. They violated their oath when they resorted
to deception.
Respondents contend that their allegation of the accused's detention was merely a statement of
an ultimate fact which still had to be proved by evidence at the hearing of the Motion. That they
were able to show that their client was already under the custody of the NBI at the hearing held
on December 15, 2000 does not exonerate them. The fact remains that the allegation that the
accused was in the custody of the NBI on December 13, 2000 was false.
In Comia vs. Antona, we held:
It is of no moment that the accused eventually surrendered to the police authorities on
the same date "tentatively" scheduled for the hearing of the application for bail. To our
mind, such supervening event is of no bearing and immaterial; it does not absolve
respondent judge from administrative liability considering that he should not have
accorded recognition to the application for bail filed on behalf of persons who, at that
point, were devoid of personality to ask such specific affirmative relief from the court.13
In this jurisdiction, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, reasonable notice of hearing is
required to be given to the prosecutor or fiscal, or at least, he must be asked for his
recommendation.14
In the case at bar, the prosecution was served with notice of hearing of the motion for bail two
days prior to the scheduled date. Although a motion may be heard on short notice, respondents
failed to show any good cause to justify the non-observance of the three-day notice rule. Verily,
as lawyers, they are obliged to observe the rules of procedure and not to misuse them to defeat
the ends of justice.15
Finally, we are in accord with the Investigating Commissioner that respondent clerk of court
should not be made administratively liable for including the Motion in the calendar of the trial
court, considering that it was authorized by the presiding judge. However, he is reminded that

his administrative functions, although not involving the discretion or judgment of a judge, are
vital to the prompt and sound administration of justice.16 Thus, he should not hesitate to inform
the judge if he should find any act or conduct on the part of lawyers which are contrary to the
established rules of procedure.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas, Miguelito
Nazareno V. Llantino are found guilty of committing deliberate falsehood. Accordingly, they
are SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal records of Attys. Ceasar G. Batuegas
and Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies thereof be
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

Administrative Case No. 1571 September 23, 1999

PARALUMAN B. AFURONG, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. ANGEL G. AQUINO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:
The case before the Court is a verified letter-complaint for disbarment, filed on December 22,
1975, by Paraluman B. Afurong against Atty. Angel G. Aquino, for filing frivolous harassment
cases to delay the execution of a final decision, committing falsehood in an Urgent Motion for
Postponement, and misrepresenting himself as an attorney for the Citizens Legal Assistance
Office.1wphi1.nt
The antecedent facts show that on April 2, 1974, Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint for
ejectment with the City Court of Manila for non-payment of rentals against Victorino
Flores. 1 The court rendered judgment on May 27, 1974 in favor of petitioner Paraluman
Afurong. The court then issued a writ of execution on February 17, 1975, which was served on
Victorino Flores in March 1975.
Facing eviction from the land he was occupying, Victorino Flores sought the assistance of the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office. His case was assigned to Atty. Angel G. Aquino, an employee
of said office at the time.
On April 3, 1975, Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed with the City Court of Manila a Petition for Relief
from Judgment with prayer for the issuance of a restraining order. 2 On May 9, 1975, the
petition, after due hearing, was dismissed for having been filed out of time.
Atty. Aquino subsequently filed on May 29, 1975, with the Court of First Instance of Manila a
Petition for Certiorariand Prohibition. 3 The court set the pre-trial conference on December 12,
1975.

Notwithstanding the fact that he was separated from the Citizens Legal Assistance Office on
October 1, 1975, Atty. Angel G. Aquino filed on December 11, 1975, an Urgent Motion for
Postponement, signing his name as counsel for Victorino Flores and indicating the address of
the Citizens Legal Assistance Office at 715 Gastambide, Sampaloc, Manila as his office
address.
In the aforesaid Urgent Motion for Postponement, Atty. Aquino stated that he would be unable to
attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on December 12, 1975, at 9:00 a.m., of Civil Case No.
97976 because he needed to attend the hearing of a Habeas Corpus Case 4 before the Juvenile
and Domestic Relations Court that same day and hour.
However, a certification from the Clerk of Court of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
stated that a decision had been rendered on the aforementioned special proceedings case, and
that there was no hearing in connection with the case on December 12, 1975, for there was
nothing more to be done in the proceedings and the same was declared closed and
terminated. 5
Thus, on December 22, 1975, Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint 6 with this Court for
disbarment against Atty. Angel G. Aquino.
According to complainant, appropriate punitive sanction should be meted to Atty. Angel G.
Aquino for filing frivolous harassment cases in the form of Civil Case Nos. 97265 and 97976,
and for giving false allegations in his Urgent Motion for Postponement.
Complainant emphasized that when Civil Case No. 97976 was set for pre-trial on December 12,
1975, at 9:00 a.m., respondent falsely represented that on the same date and hour, he would
attend the hearing also on said date and time of Special Proceedings No. D-00326, entitled "In
the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ ofHabeas Corpus of Lordeliza V. Sohnrey".
Complainant further contended that Atty. Angel G. Aquino misrepresented himself as an attorney
of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, using the name and address of said Office to postpone
the pre-trial hearing of Civil Case No. 97976, on December 12, 1975, despite the fact that he
had been separated from office at the time.
On February 13, 1976, respondent filed with this Court his Answer 7 to the complaint denying
the charges against him, contending that such acts had been done without malice.
He admitted, however, that at the time of the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 97976 set on December
12, 1975, he was no longer connected with the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, for he was
"included as one of the employees purged by the President in a list published in the newspapers
last October 1, 1975." 8 Yet, he reasoned, "Not wanting to remove the case from the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office by appearing as private counsel for the petitioner and still unable to wait
for my reinstatement which I was informed was forthcoming, I decided to file a motion to
postpone the pre-trial conference of the case."

He also conceded that, "In order to give more "force" to my motion for postponement, I indicated
therein that I had to attend the hearing of another case before the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court." 9
He further admitted that the filing of the motion with the facts so stated "might have caused
some delay", but justifies such act by stating that "such filing was prompted by some
circumstances which we can consider as inevitable and unavoidable at the moment." He adds,
"If I shall be given another chance to continue handling the case, I promise that this mistake
shall never be
repeated." 10
In a Reply filed on April 6, 1976, 11 complainant asserted that Atty. Angel G. Aquino was declared
guilty of contempt of court and correspondingly fined by this Court in a Decision 12 dated
February 26, 1976, for making false allegations in his Urgent Motion for Postponement.
On May 3, 1976, this Court referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report
and recommendation. The parties agreed, however, to hold the case in abeyance until the
termination of Civil Case No. 97976. 13
Effective June 1, 1988, all cases pending investigation by the Office of the Solicitor General
were transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors for investigation
and disposition as provided in the Revised Rules of Court. 14
On May 22, 1997, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline submitted a Report, 15 finding that
respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino failed to perform his duties expected of an attorney as
provided under the existing Canons of Professional Ethics and Section 20 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court in force at the time of the commission of the acts in question. Investigating
Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose recommended that respondent be penalized with six (6) months
suspension.
On July 26, 1997, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt and approve the report
and recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. 16
We agree.
The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain
such actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law. 17 The decision in Civil Case No. 231552 had
reached finality and execution of such decision was being effected. Respondent Atty. Aquino
should not have filed a petition for certiorari considering that there was no apparent purpose for
it than to delay the execution of a valid judgment.
Furthermore, respondent committed falsehood when he stated in his Urgent Motion for
Postponement that he had to attend the hearing of a special proceedings case the same day as

the pre-trial of Civil Case No. 97976. Respondent himself admitted that he only included such
statement "in order to give more 'force'" to the Urgent Motion for Postponement. Such act
violates the Canons of Professional Ethics which obliges an attorney to avoid the concealment
of the truth from the court. A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.
In this case, Atty. Aquino stated false allegations in his motion for postponement which delayed
the execution of a valid decision. It is worthy to note that the lower court correctly declared
respondent in contempt of court for conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice, in violation of Section 3 (d), Rule 71 of the Revised Rules
of Court. 18
Moreover, Atty. Aquino purposely allowed the court to believe that he was still employed with the
Citizens Legal Assistance Office when in fact he had been purged from said office. That he was
awaiting reinstatement to the same position at the time does not remove the fact that he was
misrepresenting himself to the court. By doing so, he has violated his duty to employ, for the
purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such means only as are consistent with truth
and honor, and never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false
statement of fact or law. 19 He could have delegated the case to another lawyer in the same
office.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds respondent Atty. Angel G. Aquino guilty of malpractice
and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for six (6) months commencing upon receipt of
notice hereof.
Let this decision be spread in the personal record of respondent in this Court and copies thereof
furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which shall provide all its chapters with copies
thereof, and the Office of the Court Administrator which shall forthwith provide with copies
thereof all other courts through the respective presiding Justices and Executive
Judges.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concu

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-35113 March 25, 1975
EUGENIO CUARESMA, petitioner,
vs.
MARCELO DAQUIS, PHHC, CESAR NAVARRO, NICANOR GUEVARRA, Sheriff of Quezon
City or his Deputy and JUDGE PACIFICO P. DE CASTRO, respondents. ATTORNEY
MACARIO O. DIRECTO, respondent.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:+.wph!1
The predicament in which respondent Macario O. Directo, a member of the Philippine bar, now
finds himself is one of his own making. In a petition for certiorari filed with this Court on behalf of
one Eugenio Cuaresma, he included the following categorical allegations: "4. That your
petitioner has no knowledge of the existence of said case (Civil Case No. 12176, CFI of Rizal,
Quezon City Branch) aforecited between the respondents Marcelo Daquis, PHHC, and Cesar
Navarro, and wherein the respondent Judge, [gave] due course to the complaint, and the
subject matter in litigation; 5. That on May 26, 1972, the respondent Judge issued an order of
demolition, ordering the respondent Sheriff of Quezon City or his deputy to demolish the house
of your petitioner etc., and on the same day May 26, 1972, the Sheriff of Quezon City through
his deputy [gave] three (3) days to your petitioner to remove his house or face demolition, ... ;
6 ... 7. That your petitioner was not given a day in court to present his side of the case, in
violation of law, and of the dictum of due process of the constitution, ... " 1 Thereafter, after
receipt of the comments of respondents, it turned out, as set forth in a resolution of this Court of
August 4, 1972, "that petitioner was fully aware of the existence of said civil case because on
December 14, 1971 Atty. Macario Directo, as counsel of petitioner, addressed to respondent
Marcelo Daquis a letter which indicates that both counsel and petitioner were aware of the
existence of the case. It also appears that, before respondents Marcelo Daquis and Cesar
Navarro filed a motion for a writ of Possession in Civil Case No. Q-12176, petitioner Eugenio
Cuaresma, along with the other occupants of the lot in question, was given thirty (30) days
notice to vacate the premises which period was even extended for another thirty (30) days, but
that, despite that notice, petitioner Eugenio Cuaresma refused to vacate the lot involved in the
case. It further appears that on May 3, 1972, Atty. Macario Directo, as counsel for petitioner,
filed a motion for intervention in the aforementioned Civil Case No. Q-12176; and on May 13,
1972, same counsel filed a motion to quash or recall the writ of execution, and an opposition to
the issuance of a writ of demolition. On May 22, 1972, respondent Judge Pacifico de Castro

issued an order denying the motion to intervene as well as the motion to quash or recall the writ
of execution." 2 It was then set forth in such resolution that there was no truth to the allegation
that on May 27, 1972, the date of the filing of the petition for certiorari in the present case,
petitioner had no knowledge of the existence of Civil Case No. 12176.
Respondent Macario O. Directo was then given ten days to show cause why no disciplinary
action should be taken against him for deliberately making false allegations in such petition.
Thereafter, on August 16, 1972, came a pleading which he entitled Compliance. This is his
explanation: "What your petitioner honestly meant when he alleged that he [has] no knowledge
of the existence of said Civil Case No. 12176, CFI of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, was from the
time the plaintiff Marcelo Daquis instituted the said case in June 1968 up to and after the time
the Court issued the decision in the year 1970. The plaintiff Marcelo Daquis entered into a
conditional contract of sale of the lot involved in said Civil Case No. 12176 with the PHHC.
There were four (4) purchasers, the plaintiff, two others, and your petitioner. Because of the
requirement of the PHHC that only one of them should enter into the contract, Marcelo Daquis
was chosen by the others to enter into the same. Since this was a sale on installment basis, by
agreement of all the purchasers, duly acknowledged by the PHHC, the monthly dues of the
petitioner and the two others, were remitted to Marcelo Daquis, who in turn remits the same to
the PHHC. In June 1968 plaintiff Marcelo Daquis instituted Civil Case No. 12176 in the CFI of
Quezon City. From June 1968 up to the time and after the decision was issued by the court,
plaintiff Marcelo Daquis never informed your petitioner of the said case." 3 He reiterated in a later
paragraph that all he wanted to convey was that his knowledge of the aforesaid civil case came
only after the decision was issued. He closed his Compliance with the plea that if there were
any mistake committed, "it had been an honest one, and would say in all sincerity that there was
no deliberate attempt and intent on his part of misleading this Honorable Court, honestly and
totally unaware of any false allegation in the petition." 4
The above explanation lends itself to the suspicion that it was a mere afterthought. It could very
well be that after his attention was called to the misstatements in his petition, he decided on
such a version as a way out. That is more than a bare possibility. There is the assumption
though of good faith. That is in his favor. Moreover, judging from the awkwardly worded petition
and even his compliance quite indicative of either carelessness or lack of proficiency in the
handling of the English language, it is not unreasonable to assume that his deficiency in the
mode of expression contributed to the inaccuracy of his statements. While a mere disclaimer of
intent certainly cannot exculpate him, still, in the spirit of charity and forbearance, a penalty of
reprimand would suffice. At least, it would serve to impress on respondent that in the future he
should be much more careful in the preparation of his pleadings so that the least doubt as to his
intellectual honesty cannot be entertained. Every member of the bar should realize that candor
in the dealings with the Court is of the very essence of honorable membership in the profession.
WHEREFORE, Attorney Macario O. Directo is reprimanded. Let a copy of this resolution be
spread on his record.
Barredo, Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.1wph1.t

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-25291 March 10, 1977
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD. EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, FGU
INSURANCE GROUP WORKER & EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATU, and INSULAR LIFE
BUILDING EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,petitioners,
vs.
THE INSULAR LIFE ASSURANCE CO., LTD., FGU INSURANCE GROUP, JOSE M. OLBES
AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, C.J:
The Insular Life Assurance Company, Ltd., FGU Insurance Group, and Jose M. Olbes, through
a motion for reconsideration filed on April 21, 1971, ask this Court to re-examine its decision
dated January 30, 1971.
In the main, the respondents question the review made by this Court of the determination of
facts reached by the Court of Industrial Relations and the consequent revision of the said
findings of fact. The respondents allege that this Court "swept into unmerited oblivion the
voluminous documentary and testimonial evidence" they proffered which evidence consisted of
Exhibits "1" to "38", and the testimony of Messrs. Felipe Enage, Enrique
Clemente, Vicente Abella, Rodolfo R. Encarnacion, Nestor Cipriano, Mauro
Blardoni, Sr., Ramon Garcia, Ramon M. Zosa, Vicente R. Ayllon, Antonio L.
Castillo, Carlos Valencia, Juan S. Raymundo, Jose Olbes, Calixto S. Fernandez,
Detective Lieutenant Felino Singh of the Manila Police Department Sergeant
Crisanto Lorenzo of the Manila Police Department, and Feliciano Morada. 1
Concededly, the findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations, if supported by substantial
evidence, bind this Court. 2 This, for the reason that the rule of substantial evidence, rather than
the rule of preponderance of evidence applicable in ordinary civil cases, governs the Court of
Industrial Relations in its findings of fact. 3 And substantial evidence refers to "such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." 4 There too,

the substantiality, of the evidence depends on its quantitative as well as its qualitative aspects.
For, to be considered as substantial, Evidence should primarily be credible. 5
However, findings of fact of the Court of Industrial Relations unsupported by substantial and
credible evidence do not bind this Court. 6 And, certainly, the failure of substantial and credible
proof to sustain the findings of fact of the Court of industrial Relations justifies the review by this
Court of the said factual determination. Conmitantly, the need to revise, reverse or modify the
factual findings of the Court of Industrial Relations arises to enable this court to draw the
appropriate and correct conclusions for the proper resolution of the questions on the rights and
obligations of the parties involved.
Thus, before coming to the numerous errors which respondents claim have been committed by
this Court in reviewing and reversing the factual determination reached by the Court of Industrial
Relations, we reiterate what we stated in the decision of January 10, 1971: we deemed it
necessary to review the entire factual milieu of the case in controversy and to reverse the
factual findings arrived at by the Court of Industrial Relations because we found the sa same
unsupported by Substantial evidence and much more, by credible proof.
The errors allegedly committed by this Court in its factual findings and its conclusions derived
therefrom, properly summed up and grouped, fall into three categories (1) those pertaining to
findings and conclusions without basis on record or contrary to the evidence on records (2)
those referring to findings and conclusions contrary to the factual determination made by and
conclusions arrived at by the Court of Industrial Relations, and (3) those relating to issues not
raises or errors not assigned by the parties.
To the respondents' first cauldron of steaming objections belong the following factual findings
and conclusions of this Court purportedly unsupported by the records or contrary to what
appears in the same: (1) that the respondents instructed Ramon Garcia and Vicente Abella to
create the disturbance which occurred on May 21, 1958; (2) that Garcia issued a circular to
dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the NATU; (3)
that the respondents did not make counter-proposals to the Unions' demands and that the said
respondents insisted on the Unions' dropping their demands for union security, "promising
money benefits if this was done;" (4) that the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the
restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of the various criminal cases against striking
members of the Unions;" (5) that "more than 120 criminal charges" were filed against the
members of the Unions; (6) that the respondents hired Felipe Enage and Garcia, "former legal
counsels of the petitioner, as personnel manager and assistant corporate secretary respectively,
with attractive compensations," and (7) that Jose M. Olbes "brought three truckloads of nonstrikers and others, escorted by armed men, who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the
three buildings occupied by the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters
wide and in the process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the
Insular Life Building."

1. Anent the first point raised by the respondents, this Court, in the decision of January 30,
1971, stated:
There is therefore a reasonable suggestion that they were sent to work at the
latter building to create such an incident and have a basis for filing criminal
charges against the petitioners in the fiscal's office and applying for injunction
from the court of first instance. 7
Earlier in the decision (Page 4) and in the preceding statements, this Court briefly recounted the
circumstances attending the occurrence. To claim that this Court, in the above-quoted portion of
the decision, found and categorically stated that Garcia and Abella participated in some sort of a
pre- planned scheme to "create the disturbance" constitutes but a mistaken impression of the
statement of this Court. The statement simply express that in the circumstances already
mentioned which circumstances the records unraveled lurked the distinct likelihood that
Garcia and Abella purposely provided the provocation for the incident.
2. We find the second objection of the respondents well-taken, for the records offer little to
provide sufficient clarity on whether or not Garcia, as acting president of the Insular Life/FGU
unions and the Insular Life Building Employees Association, "in a circular issued in his name
and signed by him, tried to dissuade the members of the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW
and joining the National Association of Trade Unions (NATU)." The transcript of the proceedings
before the Court of Industrial Relations reveals only Garcia's apparent adeptness at evasion
and inability to recall, among other things, whether or not he issued the circular aforementioned.
Nonetheless, the foregoing questioned statement of this Court in the narration of facts in the
decision bears no materiality to the conclusions finally arrived at.
3. The respondents claim the statement of this Court that "the Companies did not make any
counter-proposals but, instead, insisted that the Unions first drop their demand for union
security, promising money benefits if this was done" as "truly false" and "an unwarranted
deviation from the truth." Far from being so, we find that the records precisely support the
finding. The thrust of the testimony of Enage (Pages 13 to 65, tsn, March 30, 1960; pages 7 to
13, tsn, April 29, 1960) the chairman of the negotiating committee for the respondents
verily points out that the said respondents omitted, without sufficient reasons, to present
counter-proposals to the Unions' demands. This, in addition to the testimonial evidence offered
by Ignacio Lacsina (Pages 56 to 62, tsn, September 8, 1958) chairman of the negotiating
panel for the Unions, supports the finding that, indeed, the respondents offered no counterproposals to the demands of the said Unions. At most, the records reveal, the respondents, to
placate the Unions, indulged in the superficial discussion of the demands, requiring the said
Unions to explain and clarify the import of their demands. Then, too, the totality of the
testimonial evidence of Lacsina (pages 35 to 38, tsn, October 14, 1958) and the Unions' panel
members Villaruel (Pages 60 to 61, tsn, November 21, 1958) and Du Timbol (Pages 25 to 26
and 30, tsn, November 18, 1959) clearly indicates that the respondents more than persuaded
the Unions to drop their union security demands with the promise of monetary benefits.

4. We consider the objection of the respondents to the statement of this Court that the Court of
First Instance of Manila issued the restraining order "on the basis of the pendency of the various
criminal cases against striking members of the Unions" as well-founded. The records show that
the respondents predicated their petition for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
(Exhibit "32-B") upon certain acts which the said respondents claimed the picketing members of
the striking Unions committed through "force, threats, intimidation, coercion and violence." The
restraining order (Exhibit "33-C") issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila on May 31,
1958 makes no express mention of the pendency of the various criminal charges already filed
against the picketing members of the striking Unions. Nevertheless, the fact remains that on the
day the Court of First Instance of Manila issued the restraining order, several criminal charges
(Exhibits "19," "20", "23" to "29," inclusive and "31") had been filed already with the Office of the
City Fiscal of Manila against many of the picketing members of the Unions.
5. The respondents also question the statement of this Court giving the impression of the filing
of "more than 120 criminal charges" against the members of the striking Unions. The evidence
at hand (Exhibits "19", "20," "23", to "31," inclusive) show, as of June 2, 1958, four complaints
for coercion and seven for grave coercion already filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila. Each of the preliminary investigation memoranda, however, except three (Exhibits "26,"
"29" and "30") names several members of the striking Unions collectively as accused. Counting
the charges individually prescinding from the fact that a number of the members of the
striking Unions then faced two or more charges, having been named as accused in more than
one memorandum the charges add up to eighty-four. On this point, we sustain the objection of
the respondents.
6. The respondents also allege as objectionable the following statement of this Court:
It must be recalled that previous to the petitioners' submission of proposals for an
amended renewal of their respective collective bargaining agreements to the
respondents, the latter hired Felipe Enage and Ramon Garcia, former legal
counsels of the petitioners, as personnel manager and assistant corporate
secretary, respectively, with attractive compensations. 8
The respondents claim the "falsity of the finding" that Enage and Garcia worked as "legal
counsels of the petitioners" and alleged this Court as "unduly unkind" in giving the impression
that they enticed Enage and Garcia "from their positions as 'legal counsels of the petitioners'
with high salaries." The records, however, evince that Garcia served as Secretary-Treasurer of
the Federation of Free Workers (Pages 59 to 61, tsn, August 4, 1961) and that Garcia handled
cases for the Federation of Free Workers (Page 58, tsn, August 4, 1961) with which the Unions
then formed an affiliation (Pages 59 to 62, tsn, August 4, 1961; page 62, tsn, January 16, 1962).
With respect to Enage, the records show that he worked with the Federation of Free Workers
(Page 25, tsn, April 29, 1960). Even the respondents, in their brief (Page 46), stated that Garcia
and Enage worked as counsels for the Federation of Free Workers. Nevertheless, assuming the
truth of the respondents' assertion that neither Garcia nor Enage served as counsel, directly or
indirectly through the Federation of Free Workers, for the Unions, this passing mention of the

disputed former connection of Garcia and Enage to the said Unions bears no relevance to the
principal merits of the case at bar. As to the other observations of the respondents, we deem it
unnecessary to discuss the same for only a misreading of the aforequoted portion of the
decision gives, in the words of the respondents themselves, "the unkind impression that
respondents enticed them (Enage and Garcia) from their position as 'legal counsels of the
petitioners' with high salaries."
7. The respondents' allegation that no evidence supports the statement of this Court that they,
through their president and manager Jose Olbes,
brought three truckloads of non-strikers and others, escorted by armed men,
who, despite the presence of eight entrances to the three buildings occupied by
the Companies, entered thru only one gate less than two meters wide and in the
process, crashed thru the picket line posted in front of the premises of the Insular
Life Building.9
rounds up the objections of the said respondents properly falling under the first group, The
respondents claim the absence of Evidence showing that: (1) Olbes held the position of
manager; (2) Olbes brought three truckloads of "non-strikers and others;" (3) armed men
escorted the non-strikers and others;" (4) eight entrances provided access to the three
buildings; and (5) that the gate through which the non-strikers and others entered measured
"less than two meters wide."
Object number one deals with an inconsequential detail whether or not Olbes held, in any
capacity, the position of manager which bears no materiality to the main issues raised by the
case at hand.
As to number two, the evidence of the respondents' own witnesses Ramon Zosa (Page 38,
tsn, December 5, 1960), Nestor Cipriano (Pages 18, 19 and 26, tsn, February 1, 1961) and
Olbes (Pages 7 to 13, 33, 34 and 45 to 50, tsn, October 2, 1962) more than sufficiently
indicate the truth that Olbes led three busloads of non-strikers and others to the picketed
buildings. To this effect too, testified some witnesses of the Unions, particularly Ponciano
Abesamis (Pages 57 to 66, tsn, January 20, 1959) and Jose Victorio (Pages 19 to 25, tsn, June
11, 1959).
Regarding number three, the records miss to evince clearly whether or not armed men escorted
the three JD buses filled with non-strikers and others to the respondents' picketed premises.
On number four, a collation of all the evidence bearing on this objection ion reveal the following
means of access of the office premises of the respondents comprised of almost one block
bounded by Plaza Cervantes, Plaza Moraga, Muelle de la Industria and Juan Luna: (1) the
Plaza Cervantes entrance to the Insular Life Building (Page 8, tsn, February 8, 1961); (2) the
two Plaza Moraga entrances to the Insular Life Building (Page 8, tsn, September 13, 1960); (3)
the basement entrance to the Insular Life Building (Page 29, tsn, October 2, 1962); (4) the Juan
Luna entrance to the Ayala Building (Page 11, tsn, August 4, 1961); (5) the Muelle de la

Industria entrance to the Ayala Building (Page 27, tsn, August 4, 1961); (6) the Plaza Moraga
entrance to the Filipinas Building (Page 21, tsn, August 18, 1959); and (7) the entrance to the
National City Bank of New York the premises of which have a connecting door to the lobby of
the Ayala Building (Page 30, tsn, October 2, 1962).
As to objection number five, not one of the parties offers any specific evidence showing the
exact measurement of the gate through which the non-strikers and others entered. The
evidence on record relevant to this point disclose that the gate measures about two to three
meters wide.
The respondents further unleash their vigorous exception to the following findings arrived at by
this Court; (1) that the respondents discriminated against the strikers in the re-admission; (2)
that the respondents dismissed thirty-four strikers without lawful cause; (3) that the respondents
omitted to give the dismissed strikers the opportunity to defend themselves against the
supposed charges against them; and (4) that the respondents' letter of May 21, 1959 (Exhibit
"A") contained "promises of benefits to the employees in order to entice them to return to work"
and that the said respondents' letter of May 31, 1958 (Exhibit "B") contained threats to obtain
replacements for the striking employees' in the event of their failure to report for work on June 2,
1958. The respondents strongly protest against the alteration and reversal made by this Court of
the factual determination reached by the Court of Industrial Relations on these salient points.
Setting aside the incisive dissection performed by the respondents on the statements of this
Court relevant and related to the aforementioned findings, the arguments of the said
respondents all but lead to their primary objection that this Court erred in finding that they
committed unfair labor practice. For, admittedly, the foregoing findings provided this Court with
the unshakeable bases in arriving at the inescapable conclusion that the respondents
committed unfair labor practice.
In the decision of January 30, 1971, this Court, fully cognizant that the findings now questioned
by the respondents constituted the considerations of importance to the issues involved in the
case at bar, sufficiently and clearly, albeit lengthily, discussed all of them. And a consultation
with and a combing of the voluminous records disclose the evidence, substantial and credible,
in support of the said findings.
The respondents labor under the impression that, in the controversy at hand, the findings of fact
of the Court of Industrial Relations deserve much weight and consideration. The said findings of
fact, the respondents argue, should remain conclusive. However, the want of substantial
evidence, nay, credible proof, to uphold the findings of the Court of Industrial Relations on the
matters now disputed by the respondents, brought about by the mistaken appreciation of the
facts, prompted this Court to review the facts on record and to alter and reverse the
determination reached by the said Court of Industrial Relations. These, consequently, resulted in
a view rather different from that of the Court of Industrial Relations.
Not infrequently, the Court of Industrial Relations misapprehends the facts and, eventually,
arrives at erroneous conclusions. For in the Court of Industrial Relations, only one judge hears

the case and usually, not even a judge hears the same. Instead, a hearing examiner an
employee of the Court of Industrial Relations takes charge of the proceedings and receives
the evidence. After hearing, the hearing examiner submits his report on the case to the judge.
The judge then studies the case and, relying on the ability and integrity of the hearing examiner
who saw and heard the witnesses and submitted the report, renders the decision. More often
than not, the proceedings before the Court of Industrial Relations drag through years before the
case finally becomes subject to study and decision by the judge.
And even in the reconsideration of the decision asked for by the aggrieved party, no rehearing
takes place before the Court of Industrial Relations en banc. The individual judges, if they have
the disposition and the time to do so, review the evidence on record or merely read and rely
upon the memoranda submitted by the respective parties and the decision subject of
reconsideration, giving due consideration to the capability, competency and probity of the judge
who penned the said decision. And almost invariably, the Court of Industrial Relations en
banc upholds the decision for reconsideration. 10
The case at bar, this Court notes, passed from the hands of one hearing examiner Arsenio
Adriano to another Guillermo Medina. This case also took more than seven years before
its determination by the Court of Industrial Relations. These factors, we opine, contributed to the
misapprehension of facts committed by the Court of Industrial Relations warranting a review of
the factual determination in its totality.
Thus, this Court finds it neither important nor imperative to pursue any further discussion and
resolution of the matters claimed by the respondents as contrary to the findings of the Court of
Industrial Relations. And for the satisfaction of the respondents, an examination of the entire
evidence on record makes it more apparent that evidence of quantity and quality sustain, the
findings of this Court on the aforementioned matters now disputed by them.
To the third group of the respondents' objections appertain those findings of this Court on issues
not raised or errors not assigned by the parties. The respondents question the action taken by
this Court in discussing and resolving the following: (1) the question as to the nature of the strike
staged by the Unions; (2) the issue as to whether or not the respondents refused to bargain
collectively in good faith; and (3) the question as to the reclassification of eighty-seven
employees as supervisors.
Concededly, the Rules of Court, in proceedings before the appellate courts, namely, the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, require the party seeking the review of a judgment to set out in
his brief the errors upon which he relies for reversal. Otherwise, the appellate courts would not
consider those errors not properly assigned or specified. 11 However, the Supreme Court has
ample authority to review and resolve matters not assigned and specified as errors by either of
the parties in the appeal if it finds the consideration and determination of the same essential and
indispensable in order to arrive at a just decision in the case. 12 This Court, thus, has the
authority to waive the lack of proper assignment of errors if the unassigned errors closely relate

to errors properly pinpointed out or if the unassigned errors refer to matters upon which the
determination of the questions raised by the errors properly assigned depend. 13
The same also applies to issues not specifically raised by the parties. The Supreme Court,
likewise, has broad discretionary powers, in the resolution of a controversy, to take into
consideration matters on record which the parties fail to submit to the Court as specific
questions for determination. 14 Where the issues already raised also rest on other issues not
specifically presented, as long as the latter issues bear relevance and close relation to the
former and as long as they arise from matters on record, the Court has the authority to include
them in its discussion of the controversy as well as to pass upon them. In brief, in those cases
wherein questions not particularly raised by the parties surface as necessary for the complete
adjudication of the rights and obligations of the parties and such questions fall within the issues
already framed by the parties, the interests of justice dictate that the Court consider and resolve
them.
In the case at hand, the questions as to the nature of the strike staged by the Unions, the
refusal of the respondents to bargain collectively in good faith, and the reclassification of eightyseven employees as supervisors relate closely to the determination of whether or not the
respondents committed unfair labor practice. Thus, this Court found it necessary to resolve
these issues, without confining itself to those tendered by the parties.
In the same vein, we are also constrained to reassess the ruling in our decision of January 30,
1971 to the effect that the strikes must receive backwages from the date of the act of
discrimination, that is, from the date of their discharge or their offer to return to work up to the
date of their actual reinstatement, deducting therefrom whatever they have earned pending
readmission.
Significant changes have since supervened as to the method of awarding backwages. In a line
of cases, the court has established a policy of fixing the amount of backwages to a just and
reasonable level without qualification or deduction.
Blazing the trail is Mercury Drug Co. vs. CIR, 15 L-23357, April 30, 1974, which enunciated the
policy. The doctrine is not without justification, for, in the same case, it was stated that the
evident aim is "to avoid protracted delay in the execution of the award of backwages due to
extended hearings and unavoidable delays and difficulties encountered in determining the
earnings of the laid-off employees ordered to be reinstated with backwages during the
pendency of the case for purposes of deducting the same from the gross backwages awarded."
Feati University Club vs. Feati University, L-35103, August 25, 1974, adopted a consensus
policy of pegging the amount of backwages to their total equivalent for three years (depending
on the circumstances) without deduction or qualification. The rationale for the policy was stated
in the following words:
As has been noted, this formula of awarding reasonable net backwages without
deduction or qualification relieves the employees from proving or disproving their

earnings during their lay-off and the employers from submitting counterproofs,
and obviates the twin evils of Idleness on the part of the employee who would
"with folded arms, remain inactive in the expectation that a windfall would come
to him" (Itogon Suyoc Mines, Inc. vs. Sangilo-Itogon Workers Union, 24 SCRA
873 (1968), cited in Diwa ng Pagkakaisa vs. Filtex International Corp., 43 SCRA
217 (1972)) and attrition and protracted delay in satisfying such award on the
part of unscrupulous employers who have seized upon the further proceedings to
determine the actual earnings of the wrongfully dismissed or laid-off employees
to hold unduly extended hearings for each and every employee awarded
backwages and thereby render practically nugatory such award and compel the
employees to agree to unconscionable settlements of their backwages award in
order to satisfy their dire need. (See La Campana Food Products, Inc. vs. CIR,
28 SCRA 314 (1969) and Kaisahan ng Mga Manggagawa vs. La Campana Food
Products, Inc., 36 SCRA 142 (1970)).
The above judicial policy became entrenched in our jurisprudence when the Court, in Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation and B.H. Tenefrancia vs. CIR, et al., L-34300, November 22, 1974,
reiterated the same way of computation, decreeing the grant of backwages not exceeding three
years without requiring the parties to submit proof of compensation received from other sources
from the time of the illegal dismissal until actual reinstatement.16
We must now respond to the pronouncements in the above and related cases if we are to give
our law on the matter order, direction and light.
Here, a total of eighteen (18) years has elapsed from June 2, 1958, date of the commencement
of the backwages. Considering all the commencement of the backwages. Considering all the
circumstances at bar, viz., the lengthy procedural and technical manipulations of the parties, the
delay in the resolution of the case by the court below, the complexity of the issues raised by the
parties which were resolved only on January 30, 1971, etc., the Court considers the fixing and
limitation of the backwages award to their total equivalent of three years without qualification
and deduction as applicable to and fully justified in the case at bar.
The Court finds no sufficient or compelling reason to further depart from its judgment as
embodied in the decision of January 30, 1971.
ACCORDINGLY, subject to the above modification as to backwages, the motion for
reconsideration is hereby denied, and the judgment of the Court as embodied in its decision of
January 30, 1971 is affirmed in all other respects. This denial is immediately executor.
Barredo., Makasiar, Antonio, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Martin, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

With the observation that for him the opinion likewise signifies that Attorney Felipe Enage had
been acting all the while on accordance with the strict requirements of legal ethics.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
With the observation that for him the opinion likewise signifies that Attorney Felipe Enage had
been acting all the while on accordance with the strict requirements of legal ethics.
Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-90-483 September 25, 1998

ATTY. ANTONIO T. GUERRERO, complainant,
vs.
HON. ADRIANO VILLAMOR, respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-90-617 September 25, 1998
GEORGE CARLOS, complainant,
vs.
HON. ADRIANO VILLAMOR, respondent.

QUISUMBING, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint 1 addressed to this Court through the Court Administrator, dated
March 8, 1990, Atty. Antonio Guerrero charges Judge Adriano Villamor of the Regional Trial
Court at Naval, Sub-Province of Biliran, Leyte, Branch 16, with serious misconduct, ignorance of
the law, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, misfeasance, malfeasance and neglect of duty
for issuing an Order 2 dated December 11, 1987 declaring the complainant and one George
Carlos guilty of direct contempt.
In a separate verified complaint, involving exactly the same incident, George Carlos also
charges Judge Adriano Villamor with substantially the same offenses. 3
By resolution dated February 5, 1991, this Court referred to Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia
of the Court of Appeals the complaint of Atty. Guerrero, docketed as Administrative Matter (A.M.)
RTJ 90-483, for investigation, report and recommendation. This was followed by another
resolution, 4 pursuant to which the records of the case relating to Carlos' complaint, docketed, as
A.M. RTJ-90-617, were forwarded to said investigator for consolidation with A.M. RTJ 90-483.
The said administrative matters have now to be resolved in view of respondent's pending
claims, for gratuity granted by this Court per its Resolution dated April 12, 1994, which reads as
follows:

A.M. No. RTJ-90-474 (Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. vs. Judge Adriano Villamor,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte) and A.M. No. RTJ-90-606
(Clemencio C. Sabitsana, JR. vs. Judge Adriano Villamor, Regional Trial Court,
Branch 16, Naval, Leyte). Acting on the plea for mercy and compassion, dated
February 2, 1994, filed by counsel for respondent judge, and it appearing that the
Court in its per curiam resolution, dated February 7, 1992, amended the
dispositive portion of its decision, dated October 4, 1991, by allowing Judge
Villamor to enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he has earned during
the period of his government service and in the resolution of May 11, 1993,
denied the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondent for having been
filed late, and although the Court will not condone the wrongdoings of any
member of the bench, neither will it negate any move to recognize and
remunerate their lengthy Service in the government, more so, if this will greatly
benefit the last days of their remaining life, the Court Resolved to GRANT former
Judge Adriano Villamor a gratuity equivalent to 25% of his retirement benefits.
The payment of this benefit, however, shall be subject to the availability of funds
and the usual clearance requirements. This ruling is pro hac vice and is not a
precedent for other cases.
As gleamed from the report by the Investigating Justice, the antecedent facts of the present
consolidated cases are as follows:
Sometime in November 1968, one Gloria Pascubillo filed a complaint against George Carlos for
quieting of title. Docketed as Civil Case No. B-0168 in the Regional Trial Court at Naval, Leyte,
the case ended in a compromise agreement approved by the court whereby Carlos agreed to
deliver possession of the property in question to Pascubillo who, in turn, undertook to pay the
former the sum of P5,000.00 as purchase price. For some reason or another, the judgment by
compromise remained dormant for five (5) years.
On November 23, 1977, Gloria Naval, nee Pascubillo, filed before the Regional Trial Court at
Naval, Leyte, Civil Case No. B-0398 against Carlos for revival and enforcement of the judgment
in Civil Case No. B-0168. In turn, Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991, N-992
and N-993 for qualified theft against Naval and her helpers. These criminal cases, like Civil
Case No. B-0398, were raffled to the sala of Judge Villamor.
Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-0398, Judge Villamor had the criminal cases archived,
noting in his Orders 5 of January 4, 1984 that both sets of cases have for their subject the same
parcel of land.
Eventually, Judge Villamor rendered judgment in Civil Case No. B-0398, declaring Naval to be
the lawful owner/possessor of the land being disputed, and ordering Carlos to vacate the same.
Forthwith, Carlos moved to reactivate the archived aforecited criminal cases. Acting on the
motion of the accused, Judge Villamor dismissed the cases. As he observed in his dismissal

order dated December 5, 1986, Naval and her helpers cannot be held liable for qualified theft for
gathering coconuts on a piece of land of which Naval is the owner. 6
Meanwhile, Carlos appealed the decision in Civil Case No. B-0398. During the pendency of the
appeal, Judge Villamor issued an order granting execution which Carlos, in due time,
challenged through a petition for certiorari before this Court. The case was certified to the Court
of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 12011. In its Decision dated October 7, 1987,
amending its earlier decision of July 24, 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification
the order of immediate execution issued by Judge Villamor. Later, this Court, in G.R. No. 81826,
resolved to deny the petition for review filed by Carlos for failure to show that the Appellate
Court committed reversible error in sustaining the trial court's order granting execution pending
appeal. 7
On July 28, 1987, Carlos filed with this Court an administrative case against Judge Villamor,
docketed as A.M. RTJ 87-105 charging the latter with having issued an illegal order and unjust
decision principally in the aforementioned criminal cases and in Civil Case No. B-0398. In its En
Banc Resolution dated November 21, 1988, as reiterated in another resolution of January 26,
1989, this Court dismissed the said administrative case for being premature but "without
prejudice to refiling should the Supreme Court decision later in G.R. 81826 warrants its
refiling." 8
Dissatisfied with the outcome of his administrative case, Carlos, through Atty. Antonio Guerrero,
filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu a civil action for damages against Judge Villamor. In
his complaint, docketed as CEB-6478, and raffled to Branch 21 presided by then Judge Juanito
Bernad, Carlos alleged that Judge Villamor knowingly rendered an unjust judgment when he
dismissed the five criminal cases against Naval and her co-accused.
The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served on Judge Villamor on December 10,
1987. The following day, instead of answering the complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal
Cases Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order declaring Carlos and his lawyer, Antonio Guerrero guilty of
direct contempt for "degrading the respect and dignity of the court through the use of derogatory
and contemptuous language before the court," 9 In full, the contempt order reads:
ORDER OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
It is indeed unfortunate and regrettable that George Carlos and his counsel, Atty.
Antonio T. Guerrero have brushed aside the warning of this Court not to mistake
its maximum tolerance as weakness. Once again, they have defiled this Court
with abusive, offensive and disrespectful language in their complaint for
Damages, Civil Case CEB 6478, RTC, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City against the
herein presiding judge for dismissing the aforementioned cases on December 5,
1986.
Neither George Carlos, the private prosecutor or public prosecutor questioned
the said dismissal in the proper forum. It was only on December 3, 1987 that

George Carlos and his counsel Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero when they filed civil
case CEB 6478 peremptorily labelled the dismissal as "unjust decision."
And in their complaint they alleged:
Par. 12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990,
0991, 0992 and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly
without circumspection without any moral or legal basis a
case of knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal
was tantamount to acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is
now beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability all because
the defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with
his eyes and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances
which demanded the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion
from bias, . . .
Par. 14. By the standard of a public official and a private person
the conduct of defendant Honorable Judge not only shocking,
but appalling in giving the plaintiff before his court the runaround is at the very least distasteful, distressing and mortifying
and moral damages therefor would warrant on this kind of
reprehensible behavior . . . .
Par. 15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations,
defendant judge should also visit upon him . . . for reducing
plaintiff his agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the
former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated
and spitefully scorned.
The foregoing specially chosen language by George Carlos and Atty. Guerrero is
what Dean Pound aptly termed as "Epithetical Jurisprudence". And to paraphrase
then Chief Justice Bengzon inLagumbay v. Comelec (16 SCRA 175) the
employment of intemperate language serves no purpose but to detract the force
of the argument. That is to put as its mildest a well-deserved reproach to such
propensity. A member of the bar who has given vent to such expressions of ill
will, not to say malevolence, betrays gross disrespect not only to the adverse
party, but also to this Tribunal (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31
SCRA 1).
These epithets undermines (sic) the dignity of the court. It (sic) affronts its
majesty and puts (sic) it in disrepute and disrespect. Not only are they unfounded
and unsubstantiated. They constitute direct contempt or contempt in facie curiae
summarily punishable without hearing.

The Court finds George Carlos and Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Direct Contempt of Court and sentences both to an
imprisonment of five (5) days and to pay a fine of Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos.
xxx xxx xxx
Carlos and Atty. Guerrero afterwards went to this Court on a petition for certiorari with a prayer
for preliminary injunction against Judge Villamor. On November 13, 1989, this Court, in G.R. No.
82238-42, promulgated a decision annulling the contempt order 10.
On March 8, 1990, Atty. Guerrero filed this instant case. Eight months later, Carlos followed with
his complaint.
Complainant Atty. Guerrero, joined for the most part by complainant Carlos, alleged that the
respondent judge issued the contempt order (a) as an incident of Criminal Case Nos. N-989 to
N-993 which have long been terminated, (b) without informing them of the charge, (c) without a
hearing, or at least a show cause order to determine whether their alleged contemptuous
utterances constitute direct or indirect contempt, and (d) without following the prescription of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on contempt. Complainant Atty. Guerrero adds that the supporting
cases cited by the respondent in his order referring to Lagumbay vs.
COMELEC 11 and Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel 12 are contextually not at all in
point. Thus, it is contended that respondent is ignorant of the law and/or has knowingly
rendered an unjust judgment. It is also contended that respondent stands liable for serious
misconduct for adjudging complainants guilty of direct contempt despite their non-presence in
court. 13
In his comment, respondent submits that the various reverses encountered by the complainants
before his court and the appellate courts impelled them to institute their complaint as a measure
of harassment. 14 He, however, anchors his defense on the following terse line: What happened
was an error in judgment. 15 In connection with this main posture, respondent submitted a
Manifestation of Supervening Supreme Court Decision 16, attaching therewith a copy of the
decision promulgated on November 13, 1991 by this Court in the consolidated cases of Hon.
Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Hon. Judge Bernardo LI. Salas & George Carlos and Hon. Judge
Adriano Villamor vs. Antonio Guerrero & Hon. Peary G. Aleonar 17. In the decision, this Court
said:
Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order of direct
contempt (G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989) can there be found a
declaration that the erroneous order was rendered maliciously or with conscious
and deliberate intent to commit an injustice. In fact, a previous order of direct
contempt issued by Judge Villamor against Carlos' former counsel was sustained
by this Court (Jaynes C. Abbarientos, et al. vs. Judge Villamor, G.R. No. 82237,
June 1, 1988).

At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered
an error of judgment for which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or civilly
liable to the respondents.
A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of malice or
wrongful conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA 161).
Investigating Justice Garcia recommends the dismissal of the complaints against respondent
judge. This Court agrees with this recommendation.
With regard to the charge of malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect of duty, or misconduct,
complainants have not established a prima-facie case against respondent judge. After a careful
examination of the records of this case, the Court concurs with the findings of the investigating
Justice that the acts or omission allegedly constituting any of these offenses have either not
been spelled out with definite specificity, or the causal connection between the given
act/omission and the resulting offense/s not logically demonstrated.
The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing an unjust judgment, deserve
consideration, since the direct contempt order of the respondent judge, under the attending
circumstances it was issued, appears to be clearly erroneous. The supposedly contemptuous
language used in a pleading was not submitted to respondent, but filed in another court
presided by another judge stationed in Cebu literally miles away from where respondent holds
court in Leyte. As this Court ruled in Ang vs. Castro: 18
Use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a particular judge in
pleadings presented in another court or proceeding is indirect, not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence of or so near a
court or judge as to interrupt the administration of justice.
However, administrative liability for ignorance of the law and/or knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment does not immediately arise from the bare fact of a judge issuing a
decision/resolution/order later adjudged to be erroneous.19 Otherwise, perhaps no judge,
however competent, honest or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire from the judiciary
with an unblemished record. 20
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order, decision or actuation of the
judge in the performance of official duties must not only be found erroneous but, most
importantly, it must also be established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or
some other like
motive. 21 Similarly, a judge will be held administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment
one which is contrary to law or jurisprudence or is not supported by evidence when he
acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar motive. In fine, bad faith is the ground
for liability in either or both offenses. 22

Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering an unjust judgment will not
prosper against a judge acting in good faith. Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous
judgment cannot be the basis of a charge for any said offenses, mere error of judgment not
being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.
From the record before us we agree with the finding of the investigating Justice that respondent,
in issuing his erroneous contempt order, was not moved by ill-will or by an impulse to do an
injustice. To be sure, complainants have not presented evidence or offered logical arguments
tending to show that bad faith accompanied the issuance of the contempt order. It ought to be
remembered that bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus of
proving it. In this regard, complainants have not discharged that burden of proof sufficiently.
Should a circumstance tend to becloud the bona fides of respondent's actuation, it could only
refer to the strained relationship existing between him and complainants brought about by the
cumulative effect of the reverses Carlos encountered in respondent's sala, on one hand, and the
filing by complainant Carlos, through Atty. Guerrero, of the damage suit against respondent, on
the other. 23 The text of the contempt order, however, yields no indication that respondent, in
mistakenly citing complainants for direct contempt, was prevailed upon by personal animosity or
by a desire to exact revenge. On the contrary, respondent stressed in his order that he observed
"maximum tolerance" in dealing with complainants, previous legal skirmishes notwithstanding.
The fact that respondent did not accord complainants a hearing nor informed them beforehand
of the charges relative to the contempt incident cannot, without more, be indicative of bad faith
or malice. For, respondent labored under the impression, mistaken as it turned out to be, that
complainants committed an act constituting direct contempt summarily punishable. 24 Assuming,
as respondent did assume, that complainants did indeed commit an act punishable by direct
contempt, then a formal hearing would hardly be necessary.
Needless to underscore, the utilization by respondent of the long-terminated criminal cases as
the vehicle for his contempt order formed a part of his error. Bad faith, however, cannot be
inferred from this particular error, per se.
Incidentally, the invocation in the contempt order of the cases Lagumbay and Cloribel is not at
all misplaced as complainants now urge. To be sure, respondent cited these cases not so much
to support the propriety of the contempt order as to accentuate the pernicious effect of the use
of intemperate language in pleadings on the orderly administration of justice.
In all, the assailed act of the respondent judge appears to be a case of error of judgment not
subject to disciplinary action. The decision of this Court in the consolidated cases of Hon. Judge
Adriano Villamor vs. Hon. Judge Bernardo Ll. Salas & George Carlos and Hon. Judge Adriano
Villamor vs. Antonio Guerrero & Hon. Peary G. Aleonar 25 concedes as much. In the decision,
this Court held:

At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only be considered
as error of judgment for, which Judge Villamor may not be held criminally or
civilly liable to the respondents [herein complainants].
While the quoted portion of the foregoing ruling speaks only of exemption from criminal or civil
liability, there is no reason not to include from its reach administrative liability as well. After all,
this Court had occasion to rule that:
[A] judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of judgment in the
absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose. 26
Moreover, it is settled that judges cannot be held to account criminally, civilly, or
administratively for an erroneous decision rendered by them in good faith. 27
In sum, there is no legal basis nor convincing evidence, to support the proposition that the
respondent judge, in issuing his controversial contempt order, acted in bad faith or with ill-will or
malice as to justify holding him liable for an error in judgment.
WHEREFORE, herein administrative complaints against Judge Adriano Villamor are hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Martinez and Purisima, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989
JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C. GASTON
and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES, and BEL-AIR
VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC.,intervenors-petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 74376 August 30, 1989
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ROSARIO DE JESUS TENORIO, and CECILIA
GONZALEZ,respondents.
G.R. No. 76394 August 30, 1989
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEAL and EDUARDO and BUENA ROMUALDEZ respondents.
G.R. No. 78182 August 30, 1989
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, DOLORES FILLEY and J. ROMERO & ASSOCIATES, respondents.
G.R. No. 82281 August 30, 1989
BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VIOLETA MONCAL, and MAJAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.
RESOLUTION

SARMIENTO, J.:
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco,
counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. (G.R. No. 71169.)

On February 2, 1989, the Court issued a Resolution, requiring, among other things, Atty.
Sangco to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt "for using intemperate and
accusatory language." 1 On March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an explanation.
The Court finds Atty. Sangco's remarks in his motion for reconsideration, reproduced as follows:
...
This Decision of this Court in the above-entitled case reads more like a Brief for
Ayala ... 2
... [t]he Court not only put to serious question its own integrity and competence
but also jeopardized its own campaign against graft and corruption undeniably
pervading the judiciary ... 3
...
The blatant disregard of controlling, documented and admitted facts not put in
issue, such as those summarily ignored in this case; the extraordinary efforts
exerted to justify such arbitrariness and the very strained and unwarranted
conclusions drawn therefrom, are unparalleled in the history of this Court ... 4
...
... [T]o ignore the fact that Jupiter Street was originally constructed for the
exclusive benefit of the residents of Bel- Air Village, or rule that respondent
Court's admission of said fact is "inaccurate," as Ayala's Counsel himself would
like to do but did not even contend, is a manifestation of this Court's unusual
partiality to Ayala and puts to serious question its integrity on that account. 5
...
[i]t is submitted that this ruling is the most serious reflection on the Court's
competence and integrity and exemplifies its manifest partiality towards Ayala. It
is a blatant disregard of documented and incontrovertible and uncontroverted
factual findings of the trial court fully supported by the records and the true
significance of those facts which both the respondent court and this Court did not
bother to read and consequently did not consider and discuss, least of all in the
manner it did with respect to those in which it arrived at conclusions favorable to
Ayala. 6
To totally disregard Ayala's written letter of application for special membership in
BAVA which clearly state that such membership is necessary because it is a new
development in their relationship with respect to its intention to give its
commercial lot buyers an equal right to the use of Jupiter Street without giving
any reason therefor, smacks of judicial arrogance ... 7
...

... [A]re all these unusual exercise of such arbitrariness above suspicion? Will the
current campaign of this Court against graft and corruption in the judiciary be
enhanced by such broad discretionary power of courts? 8
disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled for. His suggestions that the Court might have been
guilty of graft and corruption in acting on these cases are not only unbecoming, but comes, as
well, as an open assault upon the Court's honor and integrity. In rendering its judgment, the
Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences,
much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior
court, should know better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify
indictments of bribery by the other party. He should be aware that because of his accusations,
he has done an enormous disservice to the integrity of the highest tribunal and to the stability of
the administration of justice in general.
As a former judge, Atty. Sangco also has to be aware that we are not bound by the findings of
the trial court (in which his clients prevailed).lwph1.t But if we did not agree with the findings
of the court a quo, it does not follow that we had acted arbitrarily because, precisely, it is the
office of an appeal to review the findings of the inferior court.
To be sure, Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with
derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court's
duty "to act to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the
legal profession." 9
We are not satisfied with his explanation that he was merely defending the interests of his
clients. As we held inLaureta, a lawyer's "first duty is not to his client but to the administration of
justice; to that end, his client's success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and
must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics." 10And while a lawyer must advocate
his client's cause in utmost earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at
liberty to resort to arrogance, intimidation, and innuendo.
That "[t]he questions propounded were not meant or intended to accuse but to ... challenge the
thinking in the Decision, 11 comes as an eleventh-hour effort to cleanse what is in fact and
plainly, an unfounded accusation. Certainly, it is the prerogative of an unsuccessful party to ask
for reconsideration, but as we held in Laureta, litigants should not "'think that they will win a
hearing by the sheer multiplication of words' ". 12 As we indicated (see Decision denying the
motions for reconsideration in G.R. Nos. 71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281, and deciding
G.R. No. 60727, dated August 25, 1989), the movants have raised no new arguments to warrant
reconsideration and they can not veil that fact with inflammatory language.
Atty. Sangco himself admits that "[a]s a judge I have learned to live with and accept with grace
criticisms of my decisions". 13 Apparently, he does not practice what he preaches. Of course, the
Court is not unreceptive to comment and critique of its decisions, but provided they are fair and
dignified. Atty. Sangco has transcended the limits of fair comment for which he deserves this
Court's rebuke.
In our "show-cause" Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt, specifically, for
resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the meaning of
Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also constitutes
malpractice as the term is defined by

Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as follows:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS.
Rule 11.01...
Rule 11.02...
Rule 11.03-A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04-A lawyer should not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05...
Thus, aside from contempt, Atty. Sangco faces punishment for professional misconduct or
malpractice.
WHEREFORE Atty. J. Cezar Sangco is (1) SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3)
months effective from receipt hereof, and (2) ORDERED to pay a fine of P 500.00 payable from
receipt hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in his record.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Cortes,
Gri;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27654 February 18, 1970

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY.
VICENTE RAUL ALMACEN In L-27654, ANTONIO H. CALERO,
vs.
VIRGINIA Y. YAPTINCHAY.
RESOLUTION

CASTRO, J.:
Before us is Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen's "Petition to Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title,"
filed on September 25, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is "a great injustice
committed against his client by this Supreme Court." He indicts this Court, in his own phrase, as
a tribunal "peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without
reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity." His client's he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment,"
has become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy." In the same breath that
he alludes to the classic symbol of justice, he ridicules the members of this Court, saying "that
justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only blind, but also
deaf and dumb." He then vows to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum," so that
"the people may know of the silent injustice's committed by this Court," and that "whatever
mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated." He ends his
petition with a prayer that
... a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the
undersigned attorney and counsellor-at-law IN TRUST with reservation that at
any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we
may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.
He reiterated and disclosed to the press the contents of the aforementioned petition. Thus, on
September 26, 1967, the Manila Times published statements attributed to him, as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did it to expose the
tribunal's"unconstitutional and obnoxious" practice of arbitrarily denying petitions
or appeals without any reason.

Because of the tribunal's "short-cut justice," Almacen deplored, his client was
condemned to pay P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, "where
our Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas for
justice, who ignore without reason their own applicable decisions and commit
culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his
living, the present members of the Supreme Court "will become responsive to all
cases brought to its attention without discrimination, and will purge itself of those
unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit" or "denied resolutions. (Emphasis
supplied)
Atty. Almacen's statement that
... our own Supreme Court is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of
[sic] justice, who ignore their own applicable decisions and commit culpable
violations of the Constitution with impunity
was quoted by columnist Vicente Albano Pacis in the issue of the Manila Chronicle of
September 28, 1967. In connection therewith, Pacis commented that Atty. Almacen had
"accused the high tribunal of offenses so serious that the Court must clear itself," and that "his
charge is one of the constitutional bases for impeachment."
The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Virginia Y. Yaptinchay vs.
Antonio H. Calero,1 in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court, after
due hearing, rendered judgment against his client. On June 15, 1966 Atty. Almacen received a
copy of the decision. Twenty days later, or on July 5, 1966, he moved for its reconsideration. He
served on the adverse counsel a copy of the motion, but did not notify the latter of the time and
place of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, on July 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution
of the judgment. For "lack of proof of service," the trial court denied both motions. To prove that
he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, Atty. Almacen
filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration to which he attached the required
registry return card. This second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn
by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who, earlier,
that is, on August 22, 1966, had already perfected the appeal. Because the plaintiff interposed
no objection to the record on appeal and appeal bond, the trial court elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals.
But the Court of Appeals, on the authority of this Court's decision in Manila Surety & Fidelity
Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., L-16636, June 24, 1965, dismissed the appeal, in the
following words:
Upon consideration of the motion dated March 27, 1967, filed by plaintiff-appellee
praying that the appeal be dismissed, and of the opposition thereto filed by

defendant-appellant; the Court RESOLVED TO DISMISS, as it hereby dismisses,

the appeal, for the reason that the motion for reconsideration dated July 5, 1966
(pp. 90-113, printed record on appeal) does not contain a notice of time and
place of hearing thereof and is, therefore, a useless piece of paper (Manila
Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R. No. L-16636, June
24, 1965), which did not interrupt the running of the period to appeal, and,
consequently, the appeal was perfected out of time.
Atty. Almacen moved to reconsider this resolution, urging that Manila Surety & Fidelity Co. is not
decisive. At the same time he filed a pleading entitled "Latest decision of the Supreme Court in
Support of Motion for Reconsideration," citing Republic of the Philippines vs. Gregorio A.
Venturanza, L-20417, decided by this Court on May 30, 1966, as the applicable case. Again, the
Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration, thus:
Before this Court for resolution are the motion dated May 9, 1967 and the
supplement thereto of the same date filed by defendant- appellant, praying for
reconsideration of the resolution of May 8, 1967, dismissing the appeal.
Appellant contends that there are some important distinctions between this case
and that of Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Batu Construction & Co., G.R.
No. L- 16636, June 24, 1965, relied upon by this Court in its resolution of May 8,
1967. Appellant further states that in the latest case,Republic vs. Venturanza, L20417, May 30, 1966, decided by the Supreme Court concerning the question
raised by appellant's motion, the ruling is contrary to the doctrine laid down in the
Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. case.
There is no substantial distinction between this case and that of Manila Surety &
Fidelity Co.
In the case of Republic vs. Venturanza, the resolution denying the motion to
dismiss the appeal, based on grounds similar to those raised herein was issued
on November 26, 1962, which was much earlier than the date of promulgation of
the decision in the Manila Surety Case, which was June 24, 1965. Further, the
resolution in the Venturanza case was interlocutory and the Supreme Court
issued it "without prejudice to appellee's restoring the point in the brief." In the
main decision in said case (Rep. vs. Venturanza the Supreme Court passed
upon the issue sub silencio presumably because of its prior decisions contrary to
the resolution of November 26, 1962, one of which is that in the Manila Surety
and Fidelity case. Therefore Republic vs. Venturanza is no authority on the
matter in issue.
Atty. Almacen then appealed to this Court by certiorari. We refused to take the case, and by
minute resolution denied the appeal. Denied shortly thereafter was his motion for
reconsideration as well as his petition for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and
for extension of time. Entry of judgment was made on September 8, 1967. Hence, the second
motion for reconsideration filed by him after the Said date was ordered expunged from the
records.
It was at this juncture that Atty. Almacen gave vent to his disappointment by filing his "Petition to
Surrender Lawyer's Certificate of Title," already adverted to a pleading that is interspersed

from beginning to end with the insolent contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and derogatory
remarks hereinbefore reproduced, against this Court as well as its individual members, a
behavior that is as unprecedented as it is unprofessional.
Nonetheless we decided by resolution dated September 28, 1967 to withhold action on his
petition until he shall have actually surrendered his certificate. Patiently, we waited for him to
make good his proffer. No word came from him. So he was reminded to turn over his certificate,
which he had earlier vociferously offered to surrender, so that this Court could act on his
petition. To said reminder he manifested "that he has no pending petition in connection with
Case G.R. No. L-27654, Calero vs. Yaptinchay, said case is now final and executory;" that this
Court's September 28, 1967 resolution did not require him to do either a positive or negative
act; and that since his offer was not accepted, he "chose to pursue the negative act."
In the exercise of its inherent power to discipline a member of the bar for contumely and gross
misconduct, this Court on November 17, 1967 resolved to require Atty. Almacen to show cause
"why no disciplinary action should be taken against him." Denying the charges contained in the
November 17 resolution, he asked for permission "to give reasons and cause why no
disciplinary action should be taken against him ... in an open and public hearing." This Court
resolved (on December 7) "to require Atty. Almacen to state, within five days from notice hereof,
his reasons for such request, otherwise, oral argument shall be deemed waived and incident
submitted for decision." To this resolution he manifested that since this Court is "the
complainant, prosecutor and Judge," he preferred to be heard and to answer questions "in
person and in an open and public hearing" so that this Court could observe his sincerity and
candor. He also asked for leave to file a written explanation "in the event this Court has no time
to hear him in person." To give him the ampliest latitude for his defense, he was allowed to file a
written explanation and thereafter was heard in oral argument.
His written answer, as undignified and cynical as it is unchastened, offers -no apology. Far from
being contrite Atty. Almacen unremittingly repeats his jeremiad of lamentations, this time
embellishing it with abundant sarcasm and innuendo. Thus:
At the start, let me quote passages from the Holy Bible, Chapter 7, St. Matthew:

"Do not judge, that you may not be judged. For with what
judgment you judge, you shall be judged, and with what measure
you measure, it shall be measured to you. But why dost thou see
the speck in thy brother's eye, and yet dost not consider the beam
in thy own eye? Or how can thou say to thy brother, "Let me cast
out the speck from thy eye"; and behold, there is a beam in thy
own eye? Thou hypocrite, first cast out the beam from thy own
eye, and then thou wilt see clearly to cast out the speck from thy
brother's eyes."
"Therefore all that you wish men to do to you, even to do you also
to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets."
xxx xxx xxx

Your respondent has no intention of disavowing the statements mentioned in his

petition. On the contrary, he refirms the truth of what he stated, compatible with
his lawyer's oath that he will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
court. But he vigorously DENY under oath that the underscored statements
contained in the CHARGE are insolent, contemptuous, grossly disrespectful and
derogatory to the individual members of the Court; that they tend to bring the
entire Court, without justification, into disrepute; and constitute conduct
unbecoming of a member of the noble profession of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent stands four-square that his statement is borne by TRUTH and has
been asserted with NO MALICE BEFORE AND AFTER THOUGHT but mainly
motivated with the highest interest of justice that in the particular case of our
client, the members have shown callousness to our various pleas for JUSTICE,
our pleadings will bear us on this matter, ...
xxx xxx xxx
To all these beggings, supplications, words of humility, appeals for charity,
generosity, fairness, understanding, sympathy and above all in the highest
interest of JUSTICE, what did we get from this COURT? One word, DENIED,
with all its hardiness and insensibility. That was the unfeeling of the Court
towards our pleas and prayers, in simple word, it is plain callousness towards our
particular case.
xxx xxx xxx
Now that your respondent has the guts to tell the members of the Court that
notwithstanding the violation of the Constitution, you remained unpunished, this
Court in the reverse order of natural things, is now in the attempt to inflict
punishment on your respondent for acts he said in good faith.
Did His Honors care to listen to our pleadings and supplications for JUSTICE,
CHARITY, GENEROSITY and FAIRNESS? Did His Honors attempt to justify their
stubborn denial with any semblance of reason, NEVER. Now that your
respondent is given the opportunity to face you, he reiterates the same statement
with emphasis, DID YOU? Sir. Is this. the way of life in the Philippines today, that
even our own President, said: "the story is current, though nebulous ,is to its
truth, it is still being circulated that justice in the Philippines today is not what it is
used to be before the war. There are those who have told me frankly and brutally
that justice is a commodity, a marketable commodity in the Philippines."
xxx xxx xxx
We condemn the SIN, not the SINNER. We detest the ACTS, not the ACTOR.
We attack the decision of this Court, not the members. ... We were provoked. We
were compelled by force of necessity. We were angry but we waited for the
finality of the decision. We waited until this Court has performed its duties. We
never interfered nor obstruct in the performance of their duties. But in the end,

after seeing that the Constitution has placed finality on your judgment against our
client and sensing that you have not performed your duties with "circumspection,
carefulness, confidence and wisdom", your Respondent rise to claim his God
given right to speak the truth and his Constitutional right of free speech.
xxx xxx xxx
The INJUSTICES which we have attributed to this Court and the further
violations we sought to be prevented is impliedly shared by our President. ... .
xxx xxx xxx
What has been abhored and condemned, are the very things that were applied to us. Recalling
Madam Roland's famous apostrophe during the French revolution, "O Liberty, what crimes are
committed in thy name", we may dare say, "O JUSTICE, what technicalities are committed in
thy name' or more appropriately, 'O JUSTICE, what injustices are committed in thy name."
xxx xxx xxx
We must admit that this Court is not free from commission of any abuses, but
who would correct such abuses considering that yours is a court of last resort. A
strong public opinion must be generated so as to curtail these abuses.
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolize in paintings that can be found in all
courts and government offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is
also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that no members of this Court has ever
heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding sympathy and for
justice; dumb in the sense, that inspite of our beggings, supplications, and
pleadings to give us reasons why our appeal has been DENIED, not one word
was spoken or given ... We refer to no human defect or ailment in the above
statement. We only describe the. impersonal state of things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this
Court and for which reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN
TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost today may be regained tomorrow. As
the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we alone may decide
as to when we must end our self-sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard
our Constitution and to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the
members of this Court, there is no choice, we must uphold the latter.
But overlooking, for the nonce, the vituperative chaff which he claims is not intended as a
studied disrespect to this Court, let us examine the grain of his grievances.

He chafes at the minute resolution denial of his petition for review. We are quite aware of the
criticisms2 expressed against this Court's practice of rejecting petitions by minute resolutions.
We have been asked to do away with it, to state the facts and the law, and to spell out the
reasons for denial. We have given this suggestion very careful thought. For we know the abject
frustration of a lawyer who tediously collates the facts and for many weary hours meticulously
marshalls his arguments, only to have his efforts rebuffed with a terse unadorned denial. Truth
to tell, however, most petitions rejected by this Court are utterly frivolous and ought never to
have been lodged at all.3 The rest do exhibit a first-impression cogency, but fail to, withstand
critical scrutiny. By and large, this Court has been generous in giving due course to petitions
for certiorari.
Be this as it may, were we to accept every case or write a full opinion for every petition we
reject, we would be unable to carry out effectively the burden placed upon us by the
Constitution. The proper role of the Supreme Court, as Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the U.S.
Supreme Court has defined it, is to decide "only those cases which present questions whose
resolutions will have immediate importance beyond the particular facts and parties involved."
Pertinent here is the observation of Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Maryland vs. Baltimore Radio
Show, 94 L. ed 562, 566:
A variety of considerations underlie denials of the writ, and as to the same
petition different reasons may read different justices to the same result ... .
Since there are these conflicting, and, to the uninformed, even confusing reasons
for denying petitions for certiorari, it has been suggested from time to time that
the Court indicate its reasons for denial. Practical considerations preclude. In
order that the Court may be enabled to discharge its indispensable duties,
Congress has placed the control of the Court's business, in effect, within the
Court's discretion. During the last three terms the Court disposed of 260, 217,
224 cases, respectively, on their merits. For the same three terms the Court
denied, respectively, 1,260, 1,105,1,189 petitions calling for discretionary review.
If the Court is to do its work it would not be feasible to give reasons, however
brief, for refusing to take these cases. The tune that would be required is
prohibitive. Apart from the fact that as already indicated different reasons not
infrequently move different members of the Court in concluding that a particular
case at a particular time makes review undesirable.
Six years ago, in Novino, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 1,21098, May 31, 1963 (60 O.G.
8099), this Court, through the then Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, articulated its considered view
on this matter. There, the petitioners counsel urged that a "lack of merit" resolution violates
Section 12 of Article VIII of the Constitution. Said Chief Justice Bengzon:
In connection with identical short resolutions, the same question has been raised
before; and we held that these "resolutions" are not "decisions" within the above
constitutional requirement. They merely hold that the petition for review should
not be entertained in view of the provisions of Rule 46 of the Rules of Court; and
even ordinary lawyers have all this time so understood it. It should be
remembered that a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right, but of sound judicial discretion; and so there is no need to fully
explain the court's denial. For one thing, the facts and the law are already
mentioned in the Court of Appeals' opinion.

By the way, this mode of disposal has as intended helped the Court in
alleviating its heavy docket; it was patterned after the practice of the U.S.
Supreme Court, wherein petitions for review are often merely ordered
"dismissed".
We underscore the fact that cases taken to this Court on petitions for certiorari from the Court of
Appeals have had the benefit of appellate review. Hence, the need for compelling reasons to
buttress such petitions if this Court is to be moved into accepting them. For it is axiomatic that
the supervisory jurisdiction vested upon this Court over the Court of Appeals is not intended to
give every losing party another hearing. This axiom is implied in sec. 4 of Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court which recites:
Review of Court of Appeals' decision discretionary.A review is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only when there are
special and important reasons therefor. The following, while neither controlling
nor fully measuring the court's discretion, indicate the character of reasons which
will be considered:
(a) When the Court of Appeals has decided a question of substance, not
theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, nor has decided it in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions of the Supreme
Court;
(b) When the Court of Appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such departure by the lower
court, as to call for the exercise of the power of supervision.
Recalling Atty. Almacen's petition for review, we found, upon a thoroughgoing examination of the
pleadings. and records, that the Court of Appeals had fully and correctly considered the
dismissal of his appeal in the light of the law and applicable decisions of this Court. Far from
straying away from the "accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings," it traced the
procedural lines etched by this Court in a number of decisions. There was, therefore, no need
for this Court to exercise its supervisory power.
As a law practitioner who was admitted to the Bar as far back as 1941, Atty. Almacen knew or
ought to have known that for a motion for reconsideration to stay the running of the period of
appeal, the movant must not only serve a copy of the motion upon the adverse party (which he
did), but also notify the adverse party of the time and place of hearing (which admittedly he did
not). This rule was unequivocally articulated in Manila Surety & Fidelity vs. Batu Construction &
Co., supra:
The written notice referred to evidently is prescribed for motions in general by
Rule 15, Sections 4 and 5 (formerly Rule 26), which provides that such notice
shall state the time, and place of hearing and shall be served upon all the Parties
concerned at least three days in advance. And according to Section 6 of the
same Rule no motion shall be acted upon by the court without proof of such
notice. Indeed it has been held that in such a case the motion is nothing but a
useless piece of paper (Philippine National Bank v. Damasco, I,18638, Feb. 28,
1963; citing Manakil v. Revilla, 42 Phil. 81; Roman Catholic Bishop of Lipa v.
Municipality of Unisan, 41 Phil. 866; and Director of Lands vs. Sanz, 45 Phil.

117). The reason is obvious: Unless the movant sets the time and place of
hearing the Court would have no way to determine whether that party agrees to
or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the
Rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply or
opposition.
If Atty. Almacen failed to move the appellate court to review the lower court's judgment, he has
only himself to blame. His own negligence caused the forfeiture of the remedy of appeal, which,
incidentally, is not a matter of right. To shift away from himself the consequences of his
carelessness, he looked for a "whipping boy." But he made sure that he assumed the posture of
a martyr, and, in offering to surrender his professional certificate, he took the liberty of vilifying
this Court and inflicting his exacerbating rancor on the members thereof. It would thus appear
that there is no justification for his scurrilous and scandalous outbursts.
Nonetheless we gave this unprecedented act of Atty. Almacen the most circumspect
consideration. We know that it is natural for a lawyer to express his dissatisfaction each time he
loses what he sanguinely believes to be a meritorious case. That is why lawyers are given 'wide
latitude to differ with, and voice their disapproval of, not only the courts' rulings but, also the
manner in which they are handed down.
Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and criticize the actuations of public
officers. This right is not diminished by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial
authority,4 or that it is articulated by a lawyer.5 Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation,6 because then the court's actuations are thrown open
to public consumption.7 "Our decisions and all our official actions," said the Supreme Court of
Nebraska,8 "are public property, and the press and the people have the undoubted right to
comment on them, criticize and censure them as they see fit. Judicial officers, like other public
servants, must answer for their official actions before the chancery of public opinion."
The likely danger of confusing the fury of human reaction to an attack on one's integrity,
competence and honesty, with "imminent danger to the administration of justice," is the reason
why courts have been loath to inflict punishment on those who assail their actuations.9 This
danger lurks especially in such a case as this where those who Sit as members of an entire
Court are themselves collectively the aggrieved parties.
Courts thus treat with forbearance and restraint a lawyer who vigorously assails their
actuations. 10 For courageous and fearless advocates are the strands that weave durability into
the tapestry of justice. Hence, as citizen and officer of the court, every lawyer is expected not
only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to expose the shortcomings and
indiscretions of courts and judges. 11
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. 12 They should and expect critical evaluation of their
performance. 13 For like the executive and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the
soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizens whom it is
expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and
judges. The reason is that

An attorney does not surrender, in assuming the important place accorded to him
in the administration of justice, his right as a citizen to criticize the decisions of
the courts in a fair and respectful manner, and the independence of the bar, as
well as of the judiciary, has always been encouraged by the courts. (In re Ades, 6
F Supp. 487) .
Criticism of the courts has, indeed, been an important part of the traditional work of the bar. In
the prosecution of appeals, he points out the errors of lower courts. In written for law journals he
dissects with detachment the doctrinal pronouncements of courts and fearlessly lays bare for
-all to see that flaws and inconsistence" of the doctrines (Hill v. Lyman, 126 NYS 2d 286). As
aptly stated by Chief Justice Sharswood in Ex Parte Steinman, 40 Am. Rep. 641:
No class of the community ought to be allowed freer scope in the expansion or
publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. They have the best opportunities for observing and forming
a correct judgment. They are in constant attendance on the courts. ... To say that
an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood, by the judge or
judges whom he may consider it his duty to attack and expose, is a position too
monstrous to be
entertained. ... .
Hence, as a citizen and as Officer of the court a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the
right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is
he "professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would
not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen." (Case of Austin, 28 Am. Dee. 657, 665).
Above all others, the members of the bar have the beat Opportunity to become
conversant with the character and efficiency of our judges. No class is less likely
to abuse the privilege, as no other class has as great an interest in the
preservation of an able and upright bench. (State Board of Examiners in Law v.
Hart, 116 N.W. 212, 216)
To curtail the right of a lawyer to be critical of the foibles of courts and judges is to seal the lips
of those in the best position to give advice and who might consider it their duty to speak
disparagingly. "Under such a rule," so far as the bar is concerned, "the merits of a sitting judge
may be rehearsed, but as to his demerits there must be profound silence." (State v. Circuit
Court, 72 N.W. 196)
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill
over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the One
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is Such a misconduct that
subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action.
For, membership in the Bar imposes upon a person obligations and duties which are not mere
flux and ferment. His investiture into the legal profession places upon his shoulders no burden
more basic, more exacting and more imperative than that of respectful behavior toward the
courts. He vows solemnly to conduct himself "with all good fidelity ... to the courts; 14 and the

Rules of Court constantly remind him "to observe and maintain the respect due to courts of
justice and judicial officers." 15 The first
canon
of legal ethics enjoins him "to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake
of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme
importance."
As Mr. Justice Field puts it:
... the obligation which attorneys impliedly assume, if they do not by express
declaration take upon themselves, when they are admitted to the Bar, is not
merely to be obedient to the Constitution and laws, but to maintain at all times
the respect due to courts of justice and judicial officers. This obligation is not
discharged by merely observing the rules of courteous demeanor in open court,
but includes abstaining out of court from all insulting language and offensive
conduct toward judges personally for their judicial acts. (Bradley, v. Fisher, 20
Law. 4d. 647, 652)
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those
gifted with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
The counsel in any case may or may not be an abler or more learned lawyer than
the judge, and it may tax his patience and temper to submit to rulings which he
regards as incorrect, but discipline and self-respect are as necessary to the
orderly administration of justice as they are to the effectiveness of an army. The
decisions of the judge must be obeyed, because he is the tribunal appointed to
decide, and the bar should at all times be the foremost in rendering respectful
submission. (In Re Scouten, 40 Atl. 481)
We concede that a lawyer may think highly of his intellectual endowment That is
his privilege. And he may suffer frustration at what he feels is others' lack of it.
That is his misfortune. Some such frame of mind, however, should not be allowed
to harden into a belief that he may attack a court's decision in words calculated to
jettison the time-honored aphorism that courts are the temples of right. (Per
Justice Sanchez in Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer, L-22979. June 26, 1967)
In his relations with the courts, a lawyer may not divide his personality so as to be an attorney at
one time and a mere citizen at another. Thus, statements made by an attorney in private
conversations or communications 16 or in the course of a political, campaign, 17 if couched in
insulting language as to bring into scorn and disrepute the administration of justice, may subject
the attorney to disciplinary action.
Of fundamental pertinence at this juncture is an examination of relevant parallel precedents.
1. Admitting that a "judge as a public official is neither sacrosanct nor immune to public criticism
of his conduct in office," the Supreme Court of Florida in State v. Calhoon, 102 So. 2d 604, 608,
nevertheless declared that "any conduct of a lawyer which brings into scorn and disrepute the

administration of justice demands condemnation and the application of appropriate penalties,"

adding that:
It would be contrary to, every democratic theory to hold that a judge or a court is
beyond bona fide comments and criticisms which do not exceed the bounds of
decency and truth or which are not aimed at. the destruction of public confidence
in the judicial system as such. However, when the likely impairment of the
administration of justice the direct product of false and scandalous accusations
then the rule is otherwise.
2. In In Re Glenn, 130 N.W. 2d 672, an attorney was suspended for putting out and circulating a
leaflet entitled "JUSTICE??? IN OTUMWA," which accused a municipal judge of having
committed judicial error, of being so prejudiced as to deny his clients a fair trial on appeal and of
being subject to the control of a group of city officials. As a prefatory statement he wrote: "They
say that Justice is BLIND, but it took Municipal Judge Willard to prove that it is also DEAF and
DUMB!" The court did not hesitate to find that the leaflet went much further than the accused, as
a lawyer, had a right to do.
The entire publication evidences a desire on the part Of the accused to belittle
and besmirch the court and to bring it into disrepute with the general public.
3. In In Re Humphrey, 163 Pac. 60, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the two-year
suspension of an attorney who published a circular assailing a judge who at that time was a
candidate for re-election to a judicial office. The circular which referred to two decisions of the
judge concluded with a statement that the judge "used his judicial office to enable -said bank to
keep that money." Said the court:
We are aware that there is a line of authorities which place no limit to the criticism
members of the bar may make regarding the capacity, impartiality, or integrity of
the courts, even though it extends to the deliberate publication by the attorney
capable of correct reasoning of baseless insinuations against the intelligence and
integrity of the highest courts. See State Board, etc. v. Hart. 116 N.W. 212, 17
LRA (N.S.) 585, 15 Ann Cas 197 and note: Ex parte Steinman 95 Pac. 220, 40
Am. Rep. 637. In the first case mentioned it was observed, for instance:
"It may be (although we do not so decide) that a libelous
publication by an attorney, directed against a judicial officer, could
be so vile and of such a nature as to justify the disbarment of its
author."
Yet the false charges made by an attorney in that case were of graver character
than those made by the respondent here. But, in our view, the better rule is that
which requires of those who are permitted to enjoy the privilege of practicing law
the strictest observance at all times of the principles of truth, honesty and
fairness, especially in their criticism of the courts, to the end that the public
confidence in the due administration of justice be upheld, and the dignity and
usefulness of the courts be maintained. In re Collins, 81 Pac. 220.
4. In People ex rel Chicago Bar Asso. v. Metzen, 123 N.E. 734, an attorney, representing a
woman who had been granted a divorce, attacked the judge who set aside the decree on bill of

review. He wrote the judge a threatening letter and gave the press the story of a proposed libel
suit against the judge and others. The letter began:
Unless the record in In re Petersen v. Petersen is cleared up so that my name is
protected from the libel, lies, and perjury committed in the cases involved, I shall
be compelled to resort to such drastic action as the law allows and the case
warrants.
Further, he said: "However let me assure you I do not intend to allow such dastardly work to go
unchallenged," and said that he was engaged in dealing with men and not irresponsible political
manikins or appearances of men. Ordering the attorney's disbarment, the Supreme Court of
Illinois declared:
... Judges are not exempt from just criticism, and whenever there is proper
ground for serious complaint against a judge, it is the right and duty of a lawyer to
submit his grievances to the proper authorities, but the public interest and the
administration of the law demand that the courts should have the confidence and
respect of the people. Unjust criticism, insulting language, and offensive conduct
toward the judges personally by attorneys, who are officers of the court, which
tend to bring the courts and the law into disrepute and to destroy public
confidence in their integrity, cannot be permitted. The letter written to the judge
was plainly an attempt to intimidate and influence him in the discharge of judicial
functions, and the bringing of the unauthorized suit, together with the write-up in
the Sunday papers, was intended and calculated to bring the court into disrepute
with the public.
5. In a public speech, a Rhode Island lawyer accused the courts of the state of being influenced
by corruption and greed, saying that the seats of the Supreme Court were bartered. It does not
appear that the attorney had criticized any of the opinions or decisions of the Court. The lawyer
was charged with unprofessional conduct, and was ordered suspended for a period of two
years. The Court said:
A calumny of that character, if believed, would tend to weaken the authority of the
court against whose members it was made, bring its judgments into contempt,
undermine its influence as an unbiased arbiter of the people's right, and interfere
with the administration of justice. ...
Because a man is a member of the bar the court will not, under the guise of
disciplinary proceedings, deprive him of any part of that freedom of speech which
he possesses as a citizen. The acts and decisions of the courts of this state, in
cases that have reached final determination, are not exempt from fair and honest
comment and criticism. It is only when an attorney transcends the limits of
legitimate criticism that he will be held responsible for an abuse of his liberty of
speech. We well understand that an independent bar, as well as independent
court, is always a vigilant defender of civil rights. In Re Troy, 111 Atl. 723. 725.
6. In In Re Rockmore, 111 NYS 879, an attorney was suspended for six months for submitting to
an appellate court an affidavit reflecting upon the judicial integrity of the court from which the
appeal was taken. Such action, the Court said, constitutes unprofessional conduct justifying
suspension from practice, notwithstanding that he fully retracted and withdrew the statements,

and asserted that the affidavit was the result of an impulse caused by what he considered grave
injustice. The Court said:
We cannot shut our eyes to the fact that there is a growing habit in the profession
of criticising the motives and integrity of judicial officers in the discharge of their
duties, and thereby reflecting on the administration of justice and creating the
impression that judicial action is influenced by corrupt or improper motives. Every
attorney of this court, as well as every other citizen, has the right and it is his
duty, to submit charges to the authorities in whom is vested the power to remove
judicial officers for any conduct or act of a judicial officer that tends to show a
violation of his duties, or would justify an inference that he is false to his trust, or
has improperly administered the duties devolved upon him; and such charges to
the tribunal, if based upon reasonable inferences, will be encouraged, and the
person making them
protected. ... While we recognize the inherent right of an attorney in a case
decided against him, or the right of the Public generally, to criticise the decisions
of the courts, or the reasons announced for them, the habit of criticising the
motives of judicial officers in the performance of their official duties, when the
proceeding is not against the officers whose acts or motives are criticised, tends
to subvert the confidence of the community in the courts of justice and in the
administration of justice; and when such charges are made by officers of the
courts, who are bound by their duty to protect the administration of justice, the
attorney making such charges is guilty of professional misconduct.
7. In In Re Mitchell, 71 So. 467, a lawyer published this statement:
I accepted the decision in this case, however, with patience, barring possible
temporary observations more or less vituperative and finally concluded, that, as
my clients were foreigners, it might have been expecting too much to look for a
decision in their favor against a widow residing here.
The Supreme Court of Alabama declared that:
... the expressions above set out, not only transcend the bounds of propriety and
privileged criticism, but are an unwarranted attack, direct, or by insinuation and
innuendo, upon the motives and integrity of this court, and make out a prima
facie case of improper conduct upon the part of a lawyer who holds a license
from this court and who is under oath to demean himself with all good fidelity to
the court as well as to his client.
The charges, however, were dismissed after the attorney apologized to the Court.
8. In State ex rel. Dabney v. Breckenridge, 258 Pac. 747, an attorney published in a newspaper
an article in which he impugned the motives of the court and its members to try a case, charging
the court of having arbitrarily and for a sinister purpose undertaken to suspend the writ
of habeas corpus. The Court suspended the respondent for 30 days, saying that:
The privileges which the law gives to members of the bar is one most subversive
of the public good, if the conduct of such members does not measure up to the
requirements of the law itself, as well as to the ethics of the profession. ...

The right of free speech and free discussion as to judicial determination is of

prime importance under our system and ideals of government. No right thinking
man would concede for a moment that the best interest to private citizens, as
well as to public officials, whether he labors in a judicial capacity or otherwise,
would be served by denying this right of free speech to any individual. But such
right does not have as its corollary that members of the bar who are sworn to act
honestly and honorably both with their client and with the courts where justice is
administered, if administered at all, could ever properly serve their client or the
public good by designedly misstating facts or carelessly asserting the law. Truth
and honesty of purpose by members of the bar in such discussion is necessary.
The health of a municipality is none the less impaired by a polluted water supply
than is the health of the thought of a community toward the judiciary by the filthy
wanton, and malignant misuse of members of the bar of the confidence the
public, through its duly established courts, has reposed in them to deal with the
affairs of the private individual, the protection of whose rights he lends his
strength and money to maintain the judiciary. For such conduct on the part of the
members of the bar the law itself demands retribution not the court.
9. In Bar Ass'n of San Francisco v. Philbrook, 170 Pac. 440, the filing of an affidavit by an
attorney in a pending action using in respect to the several judges the terms criminal corrupt,
and wicked conspiracies,," "criminal confederates," "colossal and confident insolence," "criminal
prosecution," "calculated brutality," "a corrupt deadfall," and similar phrases, was considered
conduct unbecoming of a member of the bar, and the name of the erring lawyer was ordered
stricken from the roll of attorneys.
10. In State Board of Examiners v. Hart, 116 N.W. 215, the erring attorney claimed that greater
latitude should be allowed in case of criticism of cases finally adjudicated than in those pending.
This lawyer wrote a personal letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Minnesota
impugning both the intelligence and the integrity of the said Chief Justice and his associates in
the decisions of certain appeals in which he had been attorney for the defeated litigants. The
letters were published in a newspaper. One of the letters contained this paragraph:
You assigned it (the property involved) to one who has no better right to it than
the burglar to his plunder. It seems like robbing a widow to reward a fraud, with
the court acting as a fence, or umpire, watchful and vigilant that the widow got no
undue
advantage. ... The point is this: Is a proper motive for the decisions discoverable,
short of assigning to the court emasculated intelligence, or a constipation of
morals and faithlessness to duty? If the state bar association, or a committee
chosen from its rank, or the faculty of the University Law School, aided by the
researches of its hundreds of bright, active students, or if any member of the
court, or any other person, can formulate a statement of a correct motive for the
decision, which shall not require fumigation before it is stated, and quarantine
after it is made, it will gratify every right-minded citizen of the state to read it.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota, in ordering the suspension of the attorney for six months,
delivered its opinion as follows:
The question remains whether the accused was guilty of professional misconduct
in sending to the Chief Justice the letter addressed to him. This was done, as we

have found, for the very purpose of insulting him and the other justices of this
court; and the insult was so directed to the Chief Justice personally because of
acts done by him and his associates in their official capacity. Such a
communication, so made, could never subserve any good purpose. Its only effect
in any case would be to gratify the spite of an angry attorney and humiliate the
officers so assailed. It would not and could not ever enlighten the public in regard
to their judicial capacity or integrity. Nor was it an exercise by the accused of any
constitutional right, or of any privilege which any reputable attorney, uninfluenced
by passion, could ever have any occasion or desire to assert. No judicial officer,
with due regard to his position, can resent such an insult otherwise than by
methods sanctioned by law; and for any words, oral or written, however abusive,
vile, or indecent, addressed secretly to the judge alone, he can have no redress
in any action triable by a jury. "The sending of a libelous communication or
libelous matter to the person defamed does not constitute an actionable
publication." 18 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law (2d Ed.) p. 1017. In these respects the
sending by the accused of this letter to the Chief Justice was wholly different
from his other acts charged in the accusation, and, as we have said, wholly
different principles are applicable thereto.
The conduct of the accused was in every way discreditable; but so far as he
exercised the rights of a citizen, guaranteed by the Constitution and sanctioned
by considerations of public policy, to which reference has been made, he was
immune, as we hold, from the penalty here sought to be enforced. To that extent
his rights as a citizen were paramount to the obligation which he had assumed as
an officer of this court. When, however he proceeded and thus assailed the Chief
Justice personally, he exercised no right which the court can recognize, but, on
the contrary, willfully violated his obligation to maintain the respect due to courts
and judicial officers. "This obligation is not discharged by merely observing the
rules of courteous demeanor in open court, but it includes abstaining out of court
from all insulting language and offensive conduct toward the judges personally
for their official acts."Bradley v. Fisher, 13 Wall. (U.S.) 355, 20 L. Ed. 646. And
there appears to be no distinction, as regards the principle involved, between the
indignity of an assault by an attorney upon a judge, induced by his official act,
and a personal insult for like cause by written or spoken words addressed to the
judge in his chambers or at his home or elsewhere. Either act constitutes
misconduct wholly different from criticism of judicial acts addressed or spoken to
others. The distinction made is, we think entirely logical and well sustained by
authority. It was recognized in Ex parte McLeod supra. While the court in that
case, as has been shown, fully sustained the right of a citizen to criticise rulings
of the court in actions which are ended, it held that one might be summarily
punished for assaulting a judicial officer, in that case a commissioner of the court,
for his rulings in a cause wholly concluded. "Is it in the power of any person," said
the court, "by insulting or assaulting the judge because of official acts, if only the
assailant restrains his passion until the judge leaves the building, to compel the
judge to forfeit either his own self-respect to the regard of the people by tame
submission to the indignity, or else set in his own person the evil example of
punishing the insult by taking the law in his own hands? ... No high-minded,
manly man would hold judicial office under such conditions."
That a communication such as this, addressed to the Judge personally,
constitutes professional delinquency for which a professional punishment may be

imposed, has been directly decided. "An attorney who, after being defeated in a
case, wrote a personal letter to the trial justice, complaining of his conduct and
reflecting upon his integrity as a justice, is guilty of misconduct and will be
disciplined by the court." Matter of Manheim 133 App. Div. 136, 99 N.Y. Supp. 87
The same is held in Re Griffin (City Ct.) 1 N.Y. 7 and in Re Wilkes (City Ct.) 3
N.Y. In the latter case it appeared that the accused attorney had addressed a
sealed letter to a justice of the City Court of New York, in which it was stated, in
reference to his decision: "It is not law; neither is it common sense. The result is I
have been robbed of 80." And it was decided that, while such conduct was not a
contempt under the state, the matter should be "called to the attention of the
Supreme Court, which has power to discipline the attorney." "If," says the court,
"counsel learned in the law are permitted by writings leveled at the heads of
judges, to charge them with ignorance, with unjust rulings, and with robbery,
either as principals or accessories, it will not be long before the general public
may feel that they may redress their fancied grievances in like manner, and thus
the lot of a judge will be anything but a happy one, and the administration of
justice will fall into bad repute."
The recent case of Johnson v. State (Ala.) 44 South. 671, was in this respect
much the same as the case at bar. The accused, an attorney at law, wrote and
mailed a letter to the circuit judge, which the latter received by due course of
mail, at his home, while not holding court, and which referred in insulting terms to
the conduct of the judge in a cause wherein the accused had been one of the
attorneys. For this it was held that the attorney was rightly disbarred in having
"willfully failed to maintain respect due to him [the judge] as a judicial officer, and
thereby breached his oath as an attorney." As recognizing the same principle,
and in support of its application to the facts of this case, we cite the following: Ex
parte Bradley, 7 Wall (U.S.) 364, 19 L. Ed. 214; Beene v. State, 22 Ark.
149;Commonwealth v. Dandridge, 2 Va. Cas. 408; People v. Green, 7 Colo 237,
244, 3 Pac. 65, 374, 49 Am. Rep. 351; Smith's Appeal, 179 Pa. 14, 36 Atl. 134;
Scouten's Appeal, 186 Pa. 270, Atl. 481.
Our conclusion is that the charges against the accused have been so far
sustained as to make it our duty to impose such a penalty as may be sufficient
lesson to him and a suitable warning to others. ...
11. In Cobb v. United States, 172 F. 641, the court affirmed a lawyer's suspension for 18 months
for publishing a letter in a newspaper in which he accused a judge of being under the sinister
influence of a gang that had paralyzed him for two years.
12. In In Re Graves, 221 Pac. 411, the court held that an attorney's unjustifiable attack against
the official acts and decisions of a judge constitutes "moral turpitude." There, the attorney was
disbarred for criticising not only the judge, but his decisions in general claiming that the judge
was dishonest in reaching his decisions and unfair in his general conduct of a case.
13. In In Re Doss, 12 N.E. 2d 659, an attorney published newspaper articles after the trial of
cases, criticising the court in intemperate language. The invariable effect of this sort of
propaganda, said the court, is to breed disrespect for courts and bring the legal profession into
disrepute with the public, for which reason the lawyer was disbarred.

14. In State v. Grimes, 354 Pac. 2d 108, an attorney, dissatisfied with the loss of a case,
prepared over a period of years vicious attacks on jurists. The Oklahoma Supreme Court
declared that his acts involved such gross moral turpitude as to make him unfit as a member of
the bar. His disbarment was ordered, even though he expressed an intention to resign from the
bar.
The teaching derived from the above disquisition and impressive affluence of judicial
pronouncements is indubitable: Post-litigation utterances or publications, made by lawyers,
critical of the courts and their judicial actuations, whether amounting to a crime or not, which
transcend the permissible bounds of fair comment and legitimate criticism and thereby tend to
bring them into disrepute or to subvert public confidence in their integrity and in the orderly
administration of justice, constitute grave professional misconduct which may be visited with
disbarment or other lesser appropriate disciplinary sanctions by the Supreme Court in the
exercise of the prerogatives inherent in it as the duly constituted guardian of the morals and
ethics of the legal fraternity.
Of course, rarely have we wielded our disciplinary powers in the face of unwarranted outbursts
of counsel such as those catalogued in the above-cited jurisprudence. Cases of comparable
nature have generally been disposed of under the power of courts to punish for contempt which,
although resting on different bases and calculated to attain a different end, nevertheless
illustrates that universal abhorrence of such condemnable practices.
A perusal of the more representative of these instances may afford enlightenment.
1. In Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61 Phil. 724, where counsel branded the denial of his motion for
reconsideration as "absolutely erroneous and constituting an outrage to the rigths of the
petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls," this Court,
although conceding that
It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his
client, should do so with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is
not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting to intimidation
or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts
requires. The reason for this is that respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution would be resting on a
very shaky foundation,
found counsel guilty of contempt inasmuch as, in its opinion, the statements made disclosed
... an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional
contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights to the parties, and 'of
the untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and
flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's client ... .
2. In In re Sotto, 82 Phil. 595, counsel, a senator and the author of the Press Freedom Law,
reaching to, the imprisonment for contempt of one Angel Parazo, who, invoking said law,
refused to divulge the source of a news item carried in his paper, caused to be published in i
local newspaper a statement expressing his regret "that our High Tribunal has not only
erroneously interpreted said law, but it is once more putting in evidence the incompetency or

narrow mindedness of the majority of its members," and his belief that "In the wake of so many
blunders and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, ... the only remedy to put
an end to go much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court," which tribunal he
denounced as "a constant peril to liberty and democracy" and "a far cry from the impregnable
bulwark of justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel
Araullo and other learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary." He
there also announced that one of the first measures he would introduce in then forthcoming
session of Congress would have for its object the complete reorganization of the Supreme
Court. Finding him in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
guarantee of free speech, this Court declared:
But in the above-quoted written statement which he caused to be published in
the press, the respondent does not merely criticize or comment on the decision
of the Parazo case, which was then and still is pending consideration by this
Court upon petition of Angel Parazo. He not only intends to intimidate the
members of this Court with the presentation of a bill in the next Congress, of
which he is one of the members, reorganizing the Supreme Court and reducing
the number of Justices from eleven, so as to change the members of this Court
which decided the Parazo case, who according to his statement, are incompetent
and narrow minded, in order to influence the final decision of said case by this
Court, and thus embarrass or obstruct the administration of justice. But the
respondent also attacks the honesty and integrity of this Court for the apparent
purpose of bringing the Justices of this Court into disrepute and degrading the
administration. of justice ... .
To hurl the false charge that this Court has been for the last years committing
deliberately so many blunders and injustices, that is to say, that it has been
deciding in favor of Que party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of
the adverse party and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered,
in many cases decided during the last years, would tend necessarily to
undermine the confidence of the people in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court, and consequently to lower ,or degrade the administration
of justice by this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the
Constitution, the last bulwark to which the Filipino people may repair to obtain
relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when these are trampled
upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they
might be driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps
chaos might be the result. As a member of the bar and an officer of the courts,
Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has
taken as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice. Respect to the courts guarantees the stability of other institutions, which
without such guaranty would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
Significantly, too, the Court therein hastened to emphasize that
... an attorney as an officer of the court is under special obligation to be
respectful in his conduct and communication to the courts; he may be removed

from office or stricken from the roll of attorneys as being guilty of flagrant
misconduct (17 L.R.A. [N.S.], 586, 594.)
3. In Rheem of the Philippines vs. Ferrer: In re Proceedings against Alfonso Ponce Enrile, et al.,
supra, where counsel charged this Court with having "repeatedly fallen" into ,the pitfall of blindly
adhering to its previous "erroneous" pronouncements, "in disregard of the law on jurisdiction" of
the Court of Industrial Relations, our condemnation of counsel's misconduct was unequivocal.
Articulating the sentiments of the Court, Mr. Justice Sanchez stressed:
As we look back at the language (heretofore quoted) employed in the motion for
reconsideration, implications there are which inescapably arrest attention. It
speaks of one pitfall into which this Court has repeatedly fallen whenever the
jurisdiction of the Court of Industrial Relations comes into question. That pitfall is
the tendency of this Court to rely on its own pronouncements in disregard of the
law on jurisdiction. It makes a sweeping charge that the decisions of this
Court, blindly adhere to earlier rulings without as much as making any reference
to and analysis of the pertinent statute governing the jurisdiction of the industrial
court. The plain import of all these is that this Court is so patently inept that in
determining the jurisdiction of the industrial court, it has committed error and
continuously repeated that error to the point of perpetuation. It pictures this Court
as one which refuses to hew to the line drawn by the law on jurisdictional
boundaries. Implicit in the quoted statements is that the pronouncements of this
Court on the jurisdiction of the industrial court are not entitled to respect. Those
statements detract much from the dignity of and respect due this Court. They
bring into question the capability of the members and some former members
of this Court to render justice. The second paragraph quoted yields a tone of
sarcasm which counsel labelled as "so called" the "rule against splitting of
jurisdiction."
Similar thoughts and sentiments have been expressed in other cases 18 which, in the interest of
brevity, need not now be reviewed in detail.
Of course, a common denominator underlies the aforecited cases all of them involved
contumacious statements made in pleadings filed pending litigation. So that, in line with the
doctrinal rule that the protective mantle of contempt may ordinarily be invoked only against
scurrilous remarks or malicious innuendoes while a court mulls over a pending case and not
after the conclusion thereof, 19 Atty. Almacen would now seek to sidestep the thrust of a
contempt charge by his studied emphasis that the remarks for which he is now called upon to
account were made only after this Court had written finis to his appeal. This is of no moment.
The rule that bars contempt after a judicial proceeding has terminated, has lost much of its
vitality. For sometime, this was the prevailing view in this jurisdiction. The first stir for a
modification thereof, however, came when, inPeople vs. Alarcon, 20 the then Chief Justice
Manuel V. Moran dissented with the holding of the majority, speaking thru Justice Jose P.
Laurel, which upheld the rule above-adverted to. A complete disengagement from the settled
rule was later to be made in In re Brillantes, 21 a contempt proceeding, where the editor of the
Manila Guardian was adjudged in contempt for publishing an editorial which asserted that the
1944 Bar Examinations were conducted in a farcical manner after the question of the validity of
the said examinations had been resolved and the case closed. Virtually, this was an adoption of
the view expressed by Chief Justice Moran in his dissent in Alarcon to the effect that them may

still be contempt by publication even after a case has been terminated. Said Chief Justice
Moran in Alarcon:
A publication which tends to impede, obstruct, embarrass or influence the courts
in administering justice in a pending suit or proceeding, constitutes criminal
contempt which is 'summarily punishable by courts. A publication which tends to
degrade the courts and to destroy public confidence in them or that which tends
to bring them in any way into disrepute, constitutes likewise criminal contempt,
and is equally punishable by courts. What is sought, in the first kind of contempt,
to be shielded against the influence of newspaper comments, is the all-important
duty of the courts to administer justice in the decision of a pending case. In the
second kind of contempt, the punitive hand of justice is extended to vindicate the
courts from any act or conduct calculated to bring them into disfavor or to destroy
public confidence in them. In the first there is no contempt where there is no
action pending, as there is no decision which might in any way be influenced by
the newspaper publication. In the second, the contempt exists, with or without a
pending case, as what is sought to be protected is the court itself and its dignity.
Courts would lose their utility if public confidence in them is destroyed.
Accordingly, no comfort is afforded Atty. Almacen by the circumstance that his statements and
actuations now under consideration were made only after the judgment in his client's appeal
had attained finality. He could as much be liable for contempt therefor as if it had been
perpetrated during the pendency of the said appeal.
More than this, however, consideration of whether or not he could be held liable for contempt for
such post litigation utterances and actuations, is here immaterial. By the tenor of our Resolution
of November 17, 1967, we have confronted the situation here presented solely in so far as it
concerns Atty. Almacen's professional identity, his sworn duty as a lawyer and his fitness as an
officer of this Court, in the exercise of the disciplinary power the morals inherent in our authority
and duty to safeguard and ethics of the legal profession and to preserve its ranks from the
intrusions of unprincipled and unworthy disciples of the noblest of callings. In this inquiry, the
pendency or non-pendency of a case in court is altogether of no consequence. The sole
objective of this proceeding is to preserve the purity of the legal profession, by removing or
suspending a member whose misconduct has proved himself unfit to continue to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney.
Undoubtedly, this is well within our authority to do. By constitutional mandate, 22 our is the
solemn duty, amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the practice of law.
Inherent in this prerogative is the corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy of continued membership in the
Bar. Thus
The power to discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an inherent
and incidental power in courts of record, and one which is essential to an orderly
discharge of judicial functions. To deny its existence is equivalent to a declaration
that the conduct of attorneys towards courts and clients is not subject to restraint.
Such a view is without support in any respectable authority, and cannot be
tolerated. Any court having the right to admit attorneys to practice and in this
state that power is vested in this court-has the inherent right, in the exercise of a
sound judicial discretion to exclude them from practice. 23

This, because the admission of a lawyer to the practice of law is a representation to all that he is
worthy of their confidence and respect. So much so that
... whenever it is made to appear to the court that an attorney is no longer worthy
of the trust and confidence of the public and of the courts, it becomes, not only
the right, but the duty, of the court which made him one of its officers, and gave
him the privilege of ministering within its bar, to withdraw the privilege. Therefore
it is almost universally held that both the admission and disbarment of attorneys
are judicial acts, and that one is admitted to the bar and exercises his functions
as an attorney, not as a matter of right, but as a privilege conditioned on his own
behavior and the exercise of a just and sound judicial discretion. 24
Indeed, in this jurisdiction, that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a mere
inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to an express mandate by the Rules of
Court. 25
Our authority and duty in the premises being unmistakable, we now proceed to make an
assessment of whether or not the utterances and actuations of Atty. Almacen here in question
are properly the object of disciplinary sanctions.
The proffered surrender of his lawyer's certificate is, of course, purely potestative on Atty.
Almacen's part. Unorthodox though it may seem, no statute, no law stands in its way. Beyond
making the mere offer, however, he went farther. In haughty and coarse language, he actually
availed of the said move as a vehicle for his vicious tirade against this Court. The integrated
entirety of his petition bristles with vile insults all calculated to drive home his contempt for and
disrespect to the Court and its members. Picturing his client as "a sacrificial victim at the altar of
hypocrisy," he categorically denounces the justice administered by this Court to be not only blind
"but also deaf and dumb." With unmitigated acerbity, he virtually makes this Court and its
members with verbal talons, imputing to the Court the perpetration of "silent injustices" and
"short-cut justice" while at the same time branding its members as "calloused to pleas of
justice." And, true to his announced threat to argue the cause of his client "in the people's
forum," he caused the publication in the papers of an account of his actuations, in a calculated
effort ;to startle the public, stir up public indignation and disrespect toward the Court. Called
upon to make an explanation, he expressed no regret, offered no apology. Instead, with
characteristic arrogance, he rehashed and reiterated his vituperative attacks and, alluding to the
Scriptures, virtually tarred and feathered the Court and its members as inveterate hypocrites
incapable of administering justice and unworthy to impose disciplinary sanctions upon him.
The virulence so blatantly evident in Atty. Almacen's petition, answer and oral argumentation
speaks for itself. The vicious language used and the scurrilous innuendoes they carried far
transcend the permissible bounds of legitimate criticism. They could never serve any purpose
but to gratify the spite of an irate attorney, attract public attention to himself and, more important
of all, bring ;this Court and its members into disrepute and destroy public confidence in them to
the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Odium of this character and texture
presents no redeeming feature, and completely negates any pretense of passionate
commitment to the truth. It is not a whit less than a classic example of gross misconduct, gross
violation of the lawyer's oath and gross transgression of the Canons of Legal Ethics. As such, it
cannot be allowed to go unrebuked. The way for the exertion of our disciplinary powers is thus
laid clear, and the need therefor is unavoidable.

We must once more stress our explicit disclaimer of immunity from criticism. Like any other
Government entity in a viable democracy, the Court is not, and should not be, above criticism.
But a critique of the Court must be intelligent and discriminating, fitting to its high function as the
court of last resort. And more than this, valid and healthy criticism is by no means synonymous
to obloquy, and requires detachment and disinterestedness, real qualities approached only
through constant striving to attain them. Any criticism of the Court must, possess the quality of
judiciousness and must be informed -by perspective and infused by philosophy. 26
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in ;the premises,
that, as Atty. Almacen would have appear, the members of the Court are the "complainants,
prosecutors and judges" all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension,
if not a total distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role
therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not and does not involve a trial of
an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its
officers. 27 Not being intended to. inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein It may be initiated by the
Court motu proprio. 28 Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for
determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as
such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of
the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving
the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging
the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy
to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. 29 In
such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade
against the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual
members thereof. But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity
separate and distinct from the individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the
intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the individual members act not as such individuals but. only
as a duly constituted court. Their distinct individualities are lost in the majesty of their office.30 So
that, in a very real sense, if there be any complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court
itself, not the individual members thereof as well as the people themselves whose rights,
fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed at grave hazard should the
administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men unfit to discharge the
solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested
exclusively in this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally
renounce jurisdiction legally invested upon it. 31 So that even if it be conceded that the members
collectively are in a sense the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify
them from the exercise of that power because public policy demands that they., acting as a
Court, exercise the power in all cases which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a
case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the merger in one entity of the personalities of
complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.

Last to engage our attention is the nature and extent of the sanctions that may be visited upon
Atty. Almacen for his transgressions. As marked out by the Rules of Court, these may range
from mere suspension to total removal or disbarment. 32 The discretion to assess under the
circumstances the imposable sanction is, of course, primarily addressed to the sound discretion
of the Court which, being neither arbitrary and despotic nor motivated by personal animosity or
prejudice, should ever be controlled by the imperative need that the purity and independence of
the Bar be scrupulously guarded and the dignity of and respect due to the Court be zealously
maintained.
That the misconduct committed by Atty. Almacen is of considerable gravity cannot be
overemphasized. However, heeding the stern injunction that disbarment should never be
decreed where a lesser sanction would accomplish the end desired, and believing that it may
not perhaps be futile to hope that in the sober light of some future day, Atty. Almacen will realize
that abrasive language never fails to do disservice to an advocate and that in every
effervescence of candor there is ample room for the added glow of respect, it is our view that
suspension will suffice under the circumstances. His demonstrated persistence in his
misconduct by neither manifesting repentance nor offering apology therefor leave us no way of
determining how long that suspension should last and, accordingly, we are impelled to decree
that the same should be indefinite. This, we are empowered to do not alone because
jurisprudence grants us discretion on the matter 33 but also because, even without the
comforting support of precedent, it is obvious that if we have authority to completely exclude a
person from the practice of law, there is no reason why indefinite suspension, which is lesser in
degree and effect, can be regarded as falling outside of the compass of that authority. The merit
of this choice is best shown by the fact that it will then be left to Atty. Almacen to determine for
himself how long or how short that suspension shall last. For, at any time after the suspension
becomes effective he may prove to this Court that he is once again fit to resume the practice of
law.
ACCORDINGLY, IT IS THE SENSE of the Court that Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen be, as he is
hereby, suspended from the practice of law until further orders, the suspension to take effect
immediately.
Let copies of this resolution. be furnished the Secretary of Justice, the Solicitor General and the
Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
Concepcion,. C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Teehankee, Barredo
and Villamor JJ., concur.
Fernando, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 102781. April 22, 1993.

BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court, Antique,
petitioner,
vs.
HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY. NAPOLEON A. ABIERA,
respondents.
Bonifacio Sanz Maceda for and in his own behalf.
Public Attorney's Office for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; JURISDICTION; OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS JURISDICTION TO
INVESTIGATE OFFENSE COMMITTED BY JUDGE WHETHER OR NOT OFFENSE RELATES
TO OFFICIAL DUTIES; REASON. Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over said cases despite this Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, since the
offense charged arose from the judge's performance of his official duties, which is under the
control and supervision of the Supreme Court . . . The Court disagrees with the first part of
petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the decision in Orap that would restrict it only to
offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate
of service is administratively liable to the Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency
under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the
Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; JURISDICTION TO INVESTIGATE OFFENSE RELATED TO OFFICIAL DUTIES
SUBJECT TO PRIOR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION TAKEN AGAINST JUDGE BY SUPREME
COURT; REASON. However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any
administrative action taken against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service,
the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEDURE TO BE OBSERVED BY OMBUDSMAN REGARDING
COMPLAINT AGAINST JUDGE OR OTHER COURT EMPLOYEE; PURPOSE. Thus, the
Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this Court for
determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case load, as
the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination . . . In fine, where a criminal

complaint against a judge or other court employee arises from their administrative duties, the
Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same to this Court for
determination whether said judge or court employee had acted within the scope of their
administrative duties.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; OMBUDSMAN CANNOT SUBPOENA SUPREME COURT AND ITS
PERSONNEL; REASON. The Ombudsman cannot compel this Court, as one of the three
branches of government, to submit its records, or to allow its personnel to testify on this matter,
as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his affidavit-complaint. The rationale for the
foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively, the question before Us is this:
should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of time to decide cases before
him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question had not yet been raised
with, much less resolved by, this Court, how could the Ombudsman resolve the present criminal
complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
DECISION
NOCON, J p:
The issue in this petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction and/or
restraining order is whether the Office of the Ombudsman could entertain a criminal complaint
for the alleged falsification of a judge's certification submitted to the Supreme Court, and
assuming that it can, whether a referral should be made first to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, Presiding Judge of Branch 12 of the Regional Trial Court of
Antique, seeks the review of the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman: (1) the Order
dated September 18, 1991 denying the ex-parte motion to refer to the Supreme Court filed by
petitioner; and (2) the Order dated November 22, 1951 denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration and directing petitioner to file his counter-affidavit and other controverting
evidences.
In his affidavit-complaint dated April 18, 1991 filed before the Office of the Ombudsman,
respondent Napoleon A. Abiera of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had
falsified his Certificate of Service 1 dated February 6, 1989, by certifying "that all civil and
criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or determination for a period of 90 days
have been determined and decided on or before January 31, 1998," when in truth and in fact,
petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5) civil and ten (10) criminal cases
that have been submitted for decision. Respondent Abiera further alleged that petitioner
similarly falsified his certificates of service for the months of February, April, May, June, July and
August, all in 1989; and the months beginning January up to September 1990, or for a total of
seventeen (17) months.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that he had been granted by this Court an extension of
ninety (90) days to decide the aforementioned cases.
Petitioner also contends that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case despite this
Court's ruling in Orap vs. Sandiganbayan, 2 since the offense charged arose from the judge's
performance of his official duties, which is under the control and supervision of the Supreme
Court. Furthermore, the investigation of the Ombudsman constitutes an encroachment into the
Supreme Court's constitutional duty of supervision over all inferior courts.

The Court disagrees with the first Part of petitioner's basic argument. There is nothing in the
decision in Orap that would restrict it only to offenses committed by a judge unrelated to his
official duties. A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the
Supreme Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules
of Court, and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.
However, We agree with petitioner that in the absence of any administrative action taken
against him by this Court with regard to his certificates of service, the investigation being
conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Court's power of administrative supervision
over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the
Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power, it is only
the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges' and court personnel's compliance with all laws,
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation thereof. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
The Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers granted to it by the
Constitution, 3 for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific mandate of the
Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all courts and their
personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
Thus, the Ombudsman should first refer the matter of petitioner's certificates of service to this
Court for determination of whether said certificates reflected the true status of his pending case
load, as the Court has the necessary records to make such a determination. The Ombudsman
cannot compel this Court, as one of the three branches of government, to submit its records, or
to allow its personnel to testify on this matter, as suggested by public respondent Abiera in his
affidavit-complaint. 4
The rationale for the foregoing pronouncement is evident in this case. Administratively. the
question before Us is this: should a judge, having been granted by this Court an extension of
time to decide cases before him, report these cases in his certificate of service? As this question
had not yet been raised with, much less resolved by, this Court. how could the Ombudsman
resolve the present criminal complaint that requires the resolution of said question?
In fine, where a criminal complaint against a Judge or other court employee arises from their
administrative duties, the Ombudsman must defer action on said complaint and refer the same
to this Court for determination whether said Judge or court employee had acted within the scope
of their administrative duties.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Ombudsman is hereby directed to
dismiss the complaint filed by public respondent Atty. Napoleon A. Abiera and to refer the same
to this Court for appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C .J ., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.C. No. 6289

December 16, 2004

JULIAN MALONSO, complainant,

vs.
ATTY. PETE PRINCIPE, respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:
The duty of courts is not alone to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner; it is also
their duty to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees. Certainly, no one, not even the
Court can deny them that right; there is no law that authorizes them to do so.1
In a Complaint2 for disbarment dated 6 June 2001 filed before the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP), Julian Malonso claimed that Atty. Pete Principe, without any authority entered
his appearance as Malonsos counsel in the expropriation proceedings initiated by the National
Power Corporation (NAPOCOR). In addition, he complained that Atty. Principe, after illegally
representing him in the said case, claimed forty (40%) of the selling price of his land to the
NAPOCOR by way of attorneys fees and, further, in a Motion to Intervene, claimed to be a coowner of Malonsos property.3
In his Answer,4 respondent replied that the services of his law office, Principe Villano Villacorta
and Clemente Law Offices, was engaged by Samahan ng mga Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng
NAPOCOR, Inc. (SANDAMA), through its President, Danilo Elfa, as embodied in the Contract of
Legal Services executed on 01 April 1997.5 The Contract states in part:
The parties mutually agree one with the other as follows:
I. SECOND PARTY engages the services of the FIRST PARTY as their lawyer of the
collection, claim, and/ or payment of just compensation of its members with the
NAPOCOR;
II. FIRST PARTY accepts the engagement; both parties further agree on the following
conditions:

A. Scope of Work - negotiation, legal documentation, attendance to court

proceedings and other related activities;
B. Payment of Fees is on contingent basis. No acceptance fees, appearance and
liaison fees;
C. The legal fees or payment to FIRST PARTY:
1. Forty (40%) Percent of the selling price between NAPOCOR and the
SANDAMA members; this forty (40%) [percent] is the maximum rate and
may be negotiated depending on the volume of work involved;
2. Legal Fees as stated above shall cover:
i.) Attorneys Fees of FIRST PARTY;
ii.) His representation expenses and commitment expenses;
iii.) Miscellaneous Expenses, etc.
D. Both parties agree to exert their best efforts to increase or secure the best
price from NAPOCOR.
Respondent claimed that complainant Malonso is a member of SANDAMA and that said
member executed a special power of attorney6 in favor of Elfa, which served as the latters
authority to act in behalf of Malonso. In the document, Malonso authorized Elfa in the following
manner:
Ako, si JULIAN M. MALONSO, nasa hustong gulang, may asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan
sa 92 New York St. Cubao, Q.C., sa pamamagitan nito ay ITINATALAGA at
BINIBIGYANG KAPANGYARIHAN si G. DANILO V. ELFA, nasa hustong gulang, may
asawa, Pilipino at naninirahan sa 038 Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
upang gumanap at umakda para sa akin/amin upang gumawa tulad ng mga sumusunod:
1. PANGASIWAAN, ISAAYOS at MAKIPAGKASUNDO (negotiate) para sa
pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa, sa National Power Corp. (NAPOCOR), na may
Titulo Bilang T-229122, na nasasakupan ng Dulong Bayan, San Jose del Monte,
Bulacan;
2. TUMAYONG KINATAWAN O REPRESENTANTE ko/naming saan man at ano
man maging sa hukuman o alin man sa mga opisinang may kinalaman hinggil sa
aming nabanggit na pagbebenta ng akin/aming lupa;
3. TUMANGGAP AT MAGSUMITE ng mga papeles na nauukol sa lupang
nabanggit sa Bilang 1;
4. GUMANAP ng ano man sa inaakala ni G. DANILO V. ELFA na nararapat,
matuwid at makabubuti para sa nabanggit sa Bilang 1;

5. NA sa pamamagitan ng kasunduan at kapasyahang ito ay binibigyan ng

karapatan at kapangyarihang lumagda sa lahat ng papeles/dokumento si G.
Danilo V. Elfa, ngunit sa isang pasubali na HINDI KAILAN MAN SIYA DAPAT AT
WALA SIYANG KARAPATANG LUMAGDA S GANAP NA BENTAHAN
(ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE).
DITOY AKING IGINAGAWAD sa naturan naming kinatawan ang lahat ng karapatang
kumilos at magsagawa upang isakatuparan ang kapangyarihang magbili sa bisa ng
karapatang dito ay iginagawad sa kanya nang kahalintulad nang kung kami, sa ganang
aming sarili ang mismong nagsasagawa, at ditoy AMING PINAGTITIBAY ang lahat ng
kanyang gawin na nasa aming naman ang lubos na karapatang siya ay palitan o bawiin
ang Gawad na Karapatang ito.
In his Reply,7 Malonso reiterated that he did not authorize Elfa to act in his behalf, considering
that while theContract of Legal Services entered into by Atty. Principe and Elfa was dated 01
April 1997, the special power of attorney he executed bore a much later date, 27 November
1997. Moreover, he could not have authorized Elfa to hire a lawyer in his behalf since he
already had his own lawyer in the person of Atty. Benjamin Mendoza.
To counter this argument, Atty. Principe commented that the agreement entered into by
SANDAMA and his law firm is a continuing one and hence, Malonso was within the coverage of
the contract even if he executed the special power of attorney on a later date. Likewise, as a
member of SANDAMA, Malonso is bound to honor the organizations commitments.8
The Court adopts the chronological order of events as found by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner, Julio C. Elamparo:
In the early part of 1997, National Power Corp. (NPC for brevity) instituted expropriation
proceedings against several lot owners in Bulacan including the complainant in this
case.
On April 1, 1997, a "Contract of Legal Services" was entered into between the law firm
"Principe Villano and Clemente Law Offices" and SANDAMA, Inc. (Samahan ng mga
Dadaanan at Maapektuhan ng National Power Corporation) represented by its President
Danilo V. Elfa. SANDAMA is the organization of lot owners affected by the expropriation
proceedings. Complainant is a member of this organization.
On November 27, 1997, complainant executed a "Kasulatan ng Pagbibigay
Kapangyarihan" in favor of Danilo Elfa appointing the latter as the attorney-in-fact of the
complainant on the matter of negotiation with the NPC.
On December 21, 1999, NPCs Board of Directors approved the amicable settlement of
the expropriation cases by paying all the lot owners the total of One Hundred Three
Million Four Hundred Thirteen Thousand Two Hundred Pesos (P103,413,200.00).
More that two (2) years after the expropriation cases were instituted and while
complainant was represented therein by Atty. Benjamin Mendoza, or on January 18,
2000, respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Separate Legal Fees From Selling Price
Between Plaintiffs and Defendants."

About ten days after respondent filed his motion to separate legal fees, respondent filed
his "Notice of Entry of Appearance" (dated January 28, 2000) claiming that respondent is
the legal counsel of the complainant, a defendant in said case.
On February 12, 2000, Sixty Nine (69) lot owners including the complainant wrote a
letter to NPC informing the latter that they have never authorized Mr. Danilo Elfa to hire
the services of the respondents law firm to represent them in the expropriation cases.
On February 17, 2000, complainant filed an "Opposition" to respondents entry of
appearance and motion to separate legal fees.
On March 7, 2000, respondent filed a "Notice of Attorneys Lien" claiming 40% of the
selling price of the properties being expropriated by NPC.
On April 10, 2000, respondent filed a "Notice of Adverse Claim" before the Register of
Deeds of Bulacan claiming 40% of the rights, title and interest of the lot owners over
their lots being expropriated including that of complainant.
On November 20, 2000, respondent herein filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene in the
expropriation case claiming to be a co-owner of the property being expropriated.
On February 26, 2001, respondent filed an Opposition to the Compromise Agreement
submitted by the lot owners and NPC for court approval.
Because of the actions taken by the respondent, the execution of the decision approving
the compromise agreement between the lot owners and the NPC was delayed.9
The Report found that the Contract of Legal Services is between SANDAMA, a corporate being,
and respondents law firm. SANDAMA is not a party in all of the expropriation proceedings
instituted by NAPOCOR, neither does it claim co-ownership of the properties being
expropriated. Furthermore, the power of attorney was executed by Malonso in favor of Elfa and
not SANDAMA, and that said power of attorney was executed after SANDAMA entered into
the Contract of Legal Services. Thus, the Report concluded that the right of co-ownership could
not be derived from the said documents.10
Likewise, the Report noted that the right of legal representation could not be derived from the
above-mentioned documents. A contract for legal services between a lawyer and his client is
personal in nature and cannot be performed through intermediaries. Even Elfa, the attorney-infact of Malonso, was never authorized to engage legal counsels to represent the former in the
expropriation proceedings. Moreover, SANDAMA is not a party litigant in the expropriation
proceedings and thus Atty. Principe has no basis to interfere in the court proceeding involving its
members.
The Investigating Commissioner concluded that from the evidence presented by both parties,
Atty. Principe was guilty of misrepresentation. Atty. Principe was found to have violated
Canon
3, Rule 3.01, Canon 10, Rule 10.01 and Rule 12.04.11 In representing himself as Malonsos and
the other lot owners legal counsel in the face of the latters opposition, Atty. Principe was found
to be guilty of gross or serious misconduct. Likewise, his act of falsely claiming to be the co-

owner of properties being expropriated and his filing of several actions to frustrate the
implementation of the decision approving the compromise agreement make his conduct
constitutive of malpractice. The Report recommended the penalty of two (2) years suspension
from the practice of law. 12
In its Resolution13 dated 25 October 2003, the IBP Board of Governors ordained:
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2003-241
CBD Case No. 01-848
Julian Malonso v. Atty. Pete Principe
RESOLVED to ADOPT AND APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled
case, herein made part of this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and
rules, with modification, and considering respondents violation of Rule 3.01 of Canon
3, Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 and Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, Atty. Pedro Principe is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for
one (1) year.
In his Appeal Memorandum,14 respondent claims that the Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 has no
factual and legal basis, the complaint having been motivated by pure selfishness and greed,
and the Resolution itself invalid for having failed to comply with Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court.15 According to the respondent, the Investigating Commissioner continued to investigate
the instant case despite the lapse of three months provided under Section 8 of Rule 139-B,
without any extension granted by the Supreme Court.16 Moreover, in the subsequent review
made by the IBP Board of Governors, no actual voting took place but a mere consensus, and
the required number of votes provided by the Rules was not secured considering that there
were only five (5) governors present.17Respondent opines that the actions of the IBP Board
were aimed at preventing him from pursuing his known intention to run for IBP National
President.18
We find for the respondent.
It is the duty of the Supreme Court to see to it that a lawyer accounts for his behavior towards
the court, his client, his peers in the profession and the public. However, the duty of the Court is
not limited to disciplining those guilty of misconduct, but also to protecting the reputation of
those wrongfully charged, much more, those wrongfully found guilty.
On the other hand, the IBP is aimed towards the elevation of the standards of the law
profession, the improvement of the administration of justice, and the enabling of the Bar to
discharge its public responsibility more effectively.19Despite its duty to police the ranks, the IBP
is not exempt from the duty to "promote respect for the law and legal processes" and "to abstain
from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system."20 Respect for law is gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be
minions of the law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules
formulated for their observance.21 For the very same reasons, the Court cannot accept the
explanation22 of Atty. Carlos L. Valdez, Jr. on the non-holding of a formal voting for respondents
case that:

Eventually, the Board reached a consensus to reduce the recommended penalty from
two years to one year suspension. Since there was already a consensus, the Board did
not hold a formal voting. A formal voting became unnecessary inasmuch as it was
obvious that the decision of the Board became unanimous.
I assure the Honorable Justices of the Supreme Court that due process was observed
and the Rules governing the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully
observed and complied with by the IBP Board of Governors.
The procedures outlined by the Rules are meant to ensure that the innocents are spared from
the wrongful condemnation and that only the guilty are meted out their just due. These rules
cannot be taken lightly.23
This Court underscores the procedural transgression incurred by the IBP Board when it issued
Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 which was reached through a mere consensus, and not through a
formal voting, with the required number of votes not secured. As to the issue of the protracted
investigation without the requisite permission from the Supreme Court to extend the
investigation period, we agree with respondent that no such request was made to this Court.
The pertinent provisions of Rule 139-B read:
Sec. 8. Investigation. Upon joinder of issues or upon failure of the respondent to
answer, the Investigator shall, with deliberate speed, proceed with the investigation of
the case. He shall have the power to issue subpoenas and administer oaths. The
respondent shall be given full opportunity to defend himself, to present witnesses on his
behalf, and be heard by himself and counsel. However, if upon reasonable notice, the
respondent fails to appear, the investigation shall proceed ex parte.
The Investigator shall terminate the investigation within three (3) months from the date of
its commencement, unless extended for good cause by the Board of Governors upon
prior application.
...
Sec. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. (a)
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a
resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole
record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.
Relevantly, Sec. 6, Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court provides in part:
Sec. 6. Board of Governors. the Integrated Bar shall be governed by a Board of
Governors. Nine Governors shall be elected by the House of Delegates from the nine
Regions on the representation basis of one Governor from each Region.

The Board shall meet regularly once every three months, on such date and at such time
and place as it shall designate. A majority of all the members of the Board shall
constitute a quorum to do business.
From these provisions, it is clear that before a lawyer may be suspended from the practice of
law by the IBP, there should be (1) a review of the investigators report; (2) a formal voting; and
(3) a vote of at least five (5) members of the Board. The rationale for this rule is simple: a
decision reached by the Board in compliance with the procedure is the official decision of the
Board as a body and not merely as the collective view of the individual members thereof. This is
in keeping with the very nature of a collegial body which arrives at its decisions only after
deliberation, the exchange of views and ideas, and the concurrence of the required majority
vote.24 Thus, the vote of the majority would be necessary for the validity of the Boards
resolution. Without a vote having been taken, Resolution No. XVI-2003-241 (CBD Case No. 01848) is void and has no effect.
The Court views with disapproval the fashion by which the IBP Board of Governors, with a
fellow lawyer and fellow governors reputation and good name at stake, cavalierly brushed aside
the procedural rules outlined no less by this Court for the discipline and protection of its
members. The IBP, more than anyone, knows that the success of a lawyer in his profession
depends almost entirely on his reputation. Anything, which will harm his good name, is to be
deplored.25 And yet the IBP Board of Governors, despite clear evidence to the contrary, and
without any remorse, even asserted that "due process was observed and the Rules governing
the Disbarment and Discipline of Attorneys were faithfully observed and complied."
Normally, non-compliance with the procedural rules would result in the remand of the
case.26 However, on many occasions, the Court, in the public interest and the expeditious
administration of justice, has resolved actions on the merits instead of remanding them for
further proceedings, such as where the ends of justice would not be subserved by the remand
of the case, or when public interest demands an early disposition of the case, or where the trial
court had already received all the evidence of the parties.27 In view of the delay in resolving the
instant complaint against the respondent, and in the interest of justice and speedy disposition of
cases, the Court opts to resolve the same based on the records before it.28
Before delving at length on the merits of the other aspect of the present proceedings, there is
need to dwell first on a dimension of expropriation proceedings which is uniquely its own.
There are two stages in every action for expropriation. The first is concerned with the
determination by the courts of the authority of the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent
domain and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts involved in the suit. The
second phase is concerned with the determination by the court, with the assistance of
commissioners, of the just compensation for the property sought to be taken which relates to the
valuation thereof. The order fixing the just compensation on the basis of the evidence before,
and findings of, the commissioners would be final and would dispose of the second stage of the
suit, leaving nothing more to be done by the Court regarding the issue.29 During this stage, the
main bone of contention is the valuation of the property concerned.
The second stage which involves the issue of just compensation is as important, if not more,
than the first stage which refers to the issue of "public purpose." But as it frequently happens, as
in this case, the public purpose dimension is not as fiercely contested. Moreover, in their quest
to secure what they believe to be the fair compensation of their property, the owners seek

inroads to the leverages of executive power where compensation compromises are commenced
and given imprimatur. In this dimension, the services of lawyers different from the ordinary
litigator may prove to be handy or even necessary. Negotiations are mostly out of court and
relies, for most part, on the sagacity, persuasion, patience, persistence and resourcefulness of
the negotiator.
In the instant case, the trial court had already ruled on the valuation of the properties subject of
the expropriation, the same order which is subject of the appeal filed by the NAPOCOR. Aware
that it might take a long time before the said appeal is finally resolved, and in view of the delay
in the adjudication of the case, the landowners and NAPOCOR negotiated for a compromise
agreement. To assist them, the landowners, through SANDAMA and its president, Danilo Elfa,
engaged the services of a lawyer in the person of respondent. It is clear that respondent was
hired precisely for the negotiation phase of the case.
Now, on to the merits.
As a legal entity, a corporation has a personality distinct and separate from its individual
stockholders or members and from that of its officers who manage and run its affairs.30 The rule
is that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting through its directors, officers and
employees, are its sole liabilities.31 Thus, property belonging to a corporation cannot be
attached to satisfy the debt of a stockholder and vice versa, the latter having only an indirect
interest in the assets and business of the former.32 Thus, as summed by the IBP investigator,
respondent is the lawyer of SANDAMA, but SANDAMA is not a party litigant in all of the
expropriation cases; thus respondent had no basis to interfere in the court proceedings involving
the members. But things are not as simple as that.
A review of the records reveals that respondent had grounds to believe that he can intervene
and claim from the individual landowners. For one, the incorporation of the landowners into
SANDAMA was made and initiated by respondents firm so as to make negotiations with
NAPOCOR easier and more organized. SANDAMA was a non-stock, non-profit corporation
aimed towards the promotion of the landowners common interest. It presented a unified front
which was far easier to manage and represent than the individual owners. In effect, respondent
still dealt with the members, albeit in a collective manner.
Second, respondent relied on the representation of Danilo Elfa, former SANDAMA president
and attorney-in-fact of the members, with whom he entered into a contract for legal services.
Respondent could not have doubted the authority of Elfa to contract his firms services. After all,
Elfa was armed with a Board Resolution from SANDAMA, and more importantly, individual
grants of authority from the SANDAMA members, including Malonso.
Third, the contract for legal services clearly indicated a contingent fee of forty percent (40%) of
the selling price of the lands to be expropriated, the same amount which was reflected in the
deed of assignment made by the individual members of SANDAMA. Respondent could have
easily and naturally assumed that the same figure assigned to SANDAMA was the same
amount earmarked for its legal services as indicated in their service contract. Being a non-stock,
non-profit corporation, where else would SANDAMA get the funds to pay for the legal fees due
to respondent and his firm but from the contribution of its members.
Lastly, respondents legal services were disengaged by SANDAMAs new President Yolanda
Bautista around the same time when the SANDAMA members abandoned and disauthorized

former SANDAMA president Elfa, just when the negotiations bore fruit. With all these
circumstances, respondent, rightly or wrongly, perceived that he was also about to be deprived
of his lawful compensation for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its
members. With the prevailing attitude of the SANDAMA officers and members, respondent saw
the immediate need to protect his interests in the individual properties of the landowners. The
hairline distinction between SANDAMA and its individual members interests and properties,
flowing as it does from a legal fiction which has evolved as a mechanism to promote business
intercourse but not as an instrument of injustice, is simply too tenuous, impractical and even
unfair in view of the circumstances.
Thus, the Court cannot hold respondent guilty of censurable conduct or practice justifying the
penalty recommended. While filing the claim for attorneys fees against the individual members
may not be the proper remedy for respondent, the Court believes that he instituted the same out
of his honest belief that it was the best way to protect his interests. After all, SANDAMA
procured his firms services and was led to believe that he would be paid for the same. There is
evidence which tend to show that respondent and his firm rendered legal and even extra-legal
services in order to assist the landowners get a favorable valuation of their properties. They
facilitated the incorporation of the landowners to expedite the negotiations between the owners,
the appraisers, and NAPOCOR. They sought the assistance of several political personalities to
get some leverage in their bargaining with NAPOCOR. Suddenly, just after concluding the
compromise price with NAPOCOR and before the presentation of the compromise agreement
for the courts approval, SANDAMA disengaged the services of respondents law firm.
With the validity of its contract for services and its authority disputed, and having rendered legal
service for years without having received anything in return, and with the prospect of not getting
any compensation for all the services it has rendered to SANDAMA and its members,
respondent and his law firm auspiciously moved to protect their interests. They may have been
mistaken in the remedy they sought, but the mistake was made in good faith. Indeed, while the
practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer nevertheless is entitled to be duly
compensated for professional services rendered.33 It is but natural that he protect his interest,
most especially when his fee is on a contingent basis.34
Respondent was disengaged by SANDAMA after a compromise agreement was entered into by
the lot owners and NAPOCOR.35 Its motions for separate legal fees as well as for intervention
were dismissed by the trial court. Prescinding from the ultimate outcome of an independent
action to recover attorneys fees, the Court does not see any obstacle to respondent filing such
action against SANDAMA or any of its members. Any counsel, worthy of his hire, is entitled to
be fully recompensed for his services.36 Such independent action may be the proper venue to
show entitlement to the attorneys fees he is claiming, and for his client to refute the same. 37 If
respondent could resort to such separate action which obviously is more cumbersome and
portends to be more protracted, there is similarly no rhyme or reason to preclude him from filing
mere motions such as the ones he resorted to for the purpose of providing what he perceives to
be his legitimate claim. The bottom line is that respondent is not proscribed from seeking
recovery of attorneys fees for the services he and his firm rendered to SANDAMA and its
members. As to whether he would succeed in the quest, that is another story which obviously
does not have to be resolved in this case.
The fact that the contract stipulates a maximum of forty percent (40%) contingent fees does not
make the contract illegal or unacceptable. Contingent fees are not per se prohibited by law. Its
validity depends, in large measure, upon the reasonableness of the amount fixed as contingent

fee under the circumstances of the case.38Nevertheless, when it is shown that a contract for a
contingent fee was obtained by undue influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by
any fraud or imposition, or that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must, and will
protect the aggrieved party.39
WHEREFORE, this case is DISMISSED and considered CLOSED. The Integrated Bar of the
Philippines is enjoined to comply with the procedure outlined in Rule 139-B in all cases involving
the disbarment and discipline of attorneys.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Callejo, Sr., J., on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27662

October 29, 1968

MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO, as Chief Hearing
Officer of Regional Officer of the Department of Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA and
MARIO ABITRIA, respondents.
Manuel A. Corpuz for petitioner.
Pagano C. Villavieja and Cecilia E. Curso for public respondent Atanacio A. Mardo.
Hector C. Regino for private respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1967, was persuaded, regrettably as it turned out, to give
due course to acertiorari and prohibition proceeding with a plea for preliminary injunction, a
restraining order being issued, in view of the rather vehement and earnest protestations of
petitioner Manila Pest ControI, Inc. that it was denied procedural due process. As will be more
fully explained, such is not the case at all.
More specifically, it was alleged that on February 24, 1967, respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission, through its referee, considered a complaint filed against it by the
other respondent, Mario Abitria, for compensation submitted for decision after he and a
physician had testified, petitioner's counsel having failed to appear at the hearing of February
24, 1967.1 Then came, according to the petition, a motion for reconsideration dated March 7,
1967, petitioner praying that he be allowed to present evidence on his behalf.2 It was denied in
an order of April 4, 1967, as a decision had already been rendered against petitioner, as
employer, awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his disability compensation benefit. It was
also pointed out in such order that there was no plea in such motion for reconsideration for such
decision being set aside, as it was limited to seeking an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses. It could not be granted as the matter was looked upon as "moot and academic."3 It
was then alleged in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner was not aware of any decision
rendered in the case as no copy of the same had theretofore been furnished to its
counsel.4 After a denial of such motion for reconsideration on April 24, 1967, and a plea for
execution on behalf of respondent Abitria, which was granted on June 14, 1967, the City Sheriff
of Manila, likewise made a respondent, levied on petitioner's properties on June 14, 1967, by
virtue of the above writ of execution.5

It is petitioner's contention that in the light of the above alleged infringement of procedural due
process, the actuation of respondent Commission was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. That was the basis for the relief sought, seeking a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining City Sheriff of Manila, from proceeding with the sale at public auction of
petitioner's properties and after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ of execution and likewise all
the proceedings in RO4-WC Case No. 5503, thereafter making the injunction permanent, and
ordering respondent Abitria to pay petitioner the sum of P500.00 as attorney'sfees. Thus was
imparted more than just a semblance of plausibility to the petition, deceptive in character, as
subsequent pleadings proved, but nonetheless insufficient to call for its summary dismissal.
On June 21, 1967, this Court issued a resolution to this effect: "The respondents in L-27662
(Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.) are required to file,
within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition for
prohibition; let temporary restraining order issue, effective immediately and until further orders
from this Court."
The answer of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission of July 21, 1967 and the later
pleadings, revealed quite a different story. It is now quite clear that instead of being the offended
party suffering from a legitimate grievance, its right to due process having been summarily
disregarded, petitioner was not above resorting to every technicality the law affords to evade the
performance of an obligation, which under the law it must fulfill, namely, to compensate for the
serious and debilitating ailment of tuberculosis acquired in the course of employment by
respondent Abitria. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition should be, as it is
hereby, denied.
The facts as found by respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission, which must be
deemed conclusive, can yield no other conclusion but the undeniable liability for compensation
to respondent Abitria on the part of petitioner. Thus: "From the recorded evidence, it appears
that claimant was employed with the respondent since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a
week and receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as laborer for the respondent. He was
assigned in the Research Division which conducted research on rat traps and other matters
regarding extermination of pests, animals and insects. It was testified to by the claimant and his
witnesses that in the place of his employment he was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the
atmosphere was polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. The working condition of his place of
work was also warm and humid in view of the products being manufactured by the respondent.
He was not extended any protective device and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the
painting and soldering. In his soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste [were] used.
Sometime in July, 1966 while the claimant was soldering [he] began to experience symptoms of
pulmonary tuberculosis. Because of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went to consult Dr.
Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis, chronic,
active moderately advanced, right: minimal, left. He was confined at the Quezon Institute under
the care of Dr. Felix Tuazon. According to the attending physician, he was admitted in the
hospital ward as a hemoptic patient or one who is bleeding from the lungs. When he was
admitted he was prescribed Vita K. ampules, bronocal, ablocid, duestrep injections and other

anti-TB drugs. His clinical history showed that the claimant was diagnosed with severe coughing
followed by expectoration of fresh blood amounting to two glassful [when] he was brought to the
Philippine General Hospital and given injection and was X-rayed. From that hospital he was
transferred to the Quezon Institute where he was subsequently admitted. The attending
physician testified further that the right lung had bronchogenous lesions in the upper lobe with
honeycomb at 2nd and 3rd intercostal space, while the left lung had fibrotic lesion behind the
anterior rib II. ... He was discharged from the Quezon Institute on September 3, 1966, but the
illness was not yet arrested although there was stopping of the hemoptysis. The doctor testified
on cross examination that the nature of work of the claimant involving strenuous physical
exertion and other factors of work such as the lowering of his resistance in view of the
enormous inhalation of chemical fumes also brought about the aggravation of the claimant's
present condition. According to the claimant the respondent was duly notified of his illness
through the general manager and in view of the respondent's refusal to pay him disability
compensation despite repeated demands, claimant filed this instant claim."6
The sole issue then, as accurately set forth in the above decision, was "to determine in this case
... whether ... there is sufficient or substantial evidence in support of the claim for disability
compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The evidence on record is
crystal clear that the claimant had already substantially proven his case and all indications point
that the illness of moderately advanced, pulmonary tuberculosis was service connected in view
of his work as laborer involving strenuous physical exertion which brought about the lowering of
his resistance due to the massive inhalation of injurious chemical fumes to the extent that he
was made an easy prey to the contraction of TB bacilli. The fact that there was no evidence on
record that claimant was sick upon entrance to his employment, it is presumed that he was
normal in every respect during the first period of his employment and the disease of pulmonary
tuberculosis showed only during the later part of his employment when he was assigned in the
research division of the respondent. The attending physician himself stated that claimant's
exposure to his work aggravated the illness and we believe that the respondent had failed to
dispute the work connection as there is no showing that claimant's ailment was due to the
lowering of his resistance by causes other than the nature of his work as laborer of the
respondent."7
It must be a realization that no valid defenses could be interposed that prompted petitioner to
rely on the alleged deprivation of due process, a contention, which as will now be shown, is
without basis.
The petition was so worded that the employer's right to be heard appeared to have been
disregarded. No further attention should be accorded such an alleged grievance. If it did not
introduce any evidence, it had itself solely to blame. No fault could be attributed to respondent
Workmen's Compensation Commission. There must be such a realization on the part of
petitioner for its four-page memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument did not bother to
discuss such a matter at all. Accordingly, such a contention need not detain us further as it
ought never to have been raised in the first place.

Petitioner would make much however of the allegation that, as shown in the answer of
respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission,8 the decision was sent to a certain Attorney
Manuel Camacho but care of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz. Petitioner would
emphasize that the one "officially furnished" with a copy of such decision was not its counsel,
who was without any connection with the aforesaid Attorney Camacho. It would conclude,
therefore, that it had not received a copy of a decision which could not thereafter reach the
stage of finality calling for a writ of execution.
This contention was squarely met in the reply-memorandum of November 6, 1967 of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. Why it happened thus was explained in an affidavit of
one of its employees, a certain Gerardo Guzman, included therein.9 As set forth in such reply
memorandum: "As stated in the affidavit of Mr. Guzman, he went to the office of Atty. Corpuz, on
March 10, 1967 to deliver a copy of the decision ..., but Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the said
decision alleging that he was no longer handling the case. Atty. Corpuz, instead instructed Mr.
Guzman to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho since it was already Atty, Camacho who
was handling the case, and Atty. Camacho, according to Atty. Corpuz, even had the records of
the case."10 In view of such instruction, it was further noted, Guzman "went the office of Atty.
Camacho, but since Atty. Camacho was not around he handed the copy of the decision to the
receiving clerk therein, who received it as evidenced by the stamp pad bearing the name of the
Law Office of Camacho, Zapa, Andaya & Associates on the attached true copy of the Notice of
Decision, ..."11
From which it could make the apt observation. "It is indeed sad to note that after the Counsel for
Petitioner refused to receive the copy of said decision, he is now impugning the delivery of said
decision to Atty. Camacho and is denying knowledge of it when in fact and truth the delivery of
said decision to Atty. Camacho was made per his instruction to Mr. Guzman, as evidenced by
the attached affidavit of Mr. Guzman."12
In view of the rather persuasive character of such an affidavit and the understandable reflection
on the actuation of counsel for petitioner, there was, as could be expected submitted by
petitioner's counsel a rejoinder, dated November 26, 1967. He would have this Court believe
that the reply-memorandum is contradicted by what appeared in respondents' answer, where it
was stated that a copy of the decision was received, not by him but by the law office of a certain
Attorney Camacho. He would then ask why Guzman did not serve a copy of the decision to him.
He would even assume, for argument sake, that there was a refusal on his part to accept a copy
of this decision, but he would argue why did not Guzman, who could be expected to know the
duties of a service officer, fail "to state said refusal in his official return."
Which of the above conflicting versions is entitled to credence? That of respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission would appear to be more in accordance with the realities of the
situation. It is entitled to belief.
This would not be the first time, in the first place, where out of excess of zeal and out of a desire
to rely on every conceivable defense that could delay if not defeat the satisfaction of an

obligation incumbent on one's client, counsel would attempt to put the most favorable light on a
course of conduct which certainly cannot be given the stamp of approval. Not that it would clear
counsel of any further responsibility. His conduct leaves much to be desired. His responsibility
aside, it made evident why, to repeat the effort to evade liability by petitioner by invoking the due
process guaranty must not be rewarded with success.
Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied such
a constitutional requirement. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision;
that such effort failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel. True, there was a
denial; it is far from persuasive, as already noted. It does not have the ring of truth. There is no
reason why the decision would have been served on some other counsel if there where no such
misinformation, if there where no such attempt to mislead.
No benefit would have accrued to respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. It was
merely performing its official function. Certainly, it could be expected to see to it that the law's
beneficiaries were not inconvenienced, much less frustrated, by its failure to follow the regular
procedure prescribed. It was unlikely that the employee entrusted with serving a copy of the
decision, in this particular case, and in this particular case alone, would depart so radically from
what the law requires, if there were no such intervening cause that resulted in his going astray.
How could petitioner escape responsibility?
Petitioner, and petitioner alone, could be expected to furnish such a cause. Who would benefit
thereby? The answer cannot be in doubt. Through such circumstance, wether intended or
otherwise, a basis was laid for at least a delay of the fulfillment of a just claim. For it is to be
noted that there is no, as there could not be any, valid ground for denying compensation to
respondent Abitria on the facts as found. Considering how great and pressing the laborer's need
for the compensation due him was and the consequent temptation to settle for less if in the
meanwhile, the money he had the right to expect, was not forthcoming, petitioner, as the
employer liable, had everything to gain and nothing to lose by such a turn of events. Even if it
were an honest mistake, the consequences were still deplorable.
It is quite revealing that in not one of the pleadings filed by petitioner did it ever indicate how it
could validly avoid its liability under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which disclosed
that the ailment suffered by respondent Abitria while in its employment was indeed
compensable. Neither in its memorandum submitted on October 19, 1967 nor rejoinder of
November 21, 1967, did it ever occur to petitioner to allege that if given the opportunity for
hearing it could interpose a plausible, not to say a valid defense. It did not do so because it
could not do so. Our decisions as to the undeniable liability of an employer similarly situated are
impressive for their number and unanimity.13
It would thus be grimly ironic if the due process concept, in itself an assurance and a guaranty
of justice and fairness, would be the very vehicle to visit on a hapless and impoverished litigant
injustice and unfairness. The law itself would stand in disrepute, if such a gross perversion of its
dictates were allowed. Any other view is unthinkable. Otherwise, there would be a stultification

of all our efforts to promote social justice14 and a mockery of the constitutional ideal of protection
to labor.15
Considering the above, it is not enough that petitioner be required to pay forthwith the sum due
respondent Abitria. The unseemly conduct, under the above circumstances disclosed, of
petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz calls for words of reproof.
It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of one's client. It is quite
another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of
events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and
demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and povertystricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many of our
countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far beyond the means of our
poverty stricken masses.
The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be
kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member in
good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with the serious responsibility of seeing to it
that no deviation from such a norm should be countenanced. If what occurred here would not be
characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be said that the law is less than fair and
far from honorable. What happens then to the ideal that only he is fit to belong to such a
profession who remains a faithful votary at the altar of justice? Such an ideal may be difficult to
approximate. That is true, but let it not be said that when such a notorious breach of its lofty
standard took place, as unfortunately it did in this case, this Court exhibited magnificent
unconcern.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied.
With treble costs against petitioner to be paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-27662

October 29, 1968

MANILA PEST CONTROL, INC., petitioner,

vs.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION COMMISSION, ATANACIO A. MARDO, as Chief Hearing
Officer of Regional Officer of the Department of Labor, CITY SHERIFF OF MANILA and
MARIO ABITRIA, respondents.
Manuel A. Corpuz for petitioner.
Pagano C. Villavieja and Cecilia E. Curso for public respondent Atanacio A. Mardo.
Hector C. Regino for private respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
This Court, in a resolution of June 21, 1967, was persuaded, regrettably as it turned out, to give
due course to acertiorari and prohibition proceeding with a plea for preliminary injunction, a
restraining order being issued, in view of the rather vehement and earnest protestations of
petitioner Manila Pest ControI, Inc. that it was denied procedural due process. As will be more
fully explained, such is not the case at all.
More specifically, it was alleged that on February 24, 1967, respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission, through its referee, considered a complaint filed against it by the
other respondent, Mario Abitria, for compensation submitted for decision after he and a
physician had testified, petitioner's counsel having failed to appear at the hearing of February
24, 1967.1 Then came, according to the petition, a motion for reconsideration dated March 7,
1967, petitioner praying that he be allowed to present evidence on his behalf.2 It was denied in
an order of April 4, 1967, as a decision had already been rendered against petitioner, as
employer, awarding respondent Abitria P6,000.00 as his disability compensation benefit. It was
also pointed out in such order that there was no plea in such motion for reconsideration for such
decision being set aside, as it was limited to seeking an opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses. It could not be granted as the matter was looked upon as "moot and academic."3 It
was then alleged in the petition that on April 11, 1967, a motion for reconsideration of the
aforesaid order was filed with the averment that petitioner was not aware of any decision
rendered in the case as no copy of the same had theretofore been furnished to its
counsel.4 After a denial of such motion for reconsideration on April 24, 1967, and a plea for
execution on behalf of respondent Abitria, which was granted on June 14, 1967, the City Sheriff
of Manila, likewise made a respondent, levied on petitioner's properties on June 14, 1967, by
virtue of the above writ of execution.5

It is petitioner's contention that in the light of the above alleged infringement of procedural due
process, the actuation of respondent Commission was either in excess of its jurisdiction or with
grave abuse of discretion. That was the basis for the relief sought, seeking a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining City Sheriff of Manila, from proceeding with the sale at public auction of
petitioner's properties and after hearing, annulling the aforesaid writ of execution and likewise all
the proceedings in RO4-WC Case No. 5503, thereafter making the injunction permanent, and
ordering respondent Abitria to pay petitioner the sum of P500.00 as attorney'sfees. Thus was
imparted more than just a semblance of plausibility to the petition, deceptive in character, as
subsequent pleadings proved, but nonetheless insufficient to call for its summary dismissal.
On June 21, 1967, this Court issued a resolution to this effect: "The respondents in L-27662
(Manila Pest Control, Inc. vs. Workmen's Compensation Commission, et al.) are required to file,
within 10 days from notice hereof, an answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition for
prohibition; let temporary restraining order issue, effective immediately and until further orders
from this Court."
The answer of respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission of July 21, 1967 and the later
pleadings, revealed quite a different story. It is now quite clear that instead of being the offended
party suffering from a legitimate grievance, its right to due process having been summarily
disregarded, petitioner was not above resorting to every technicality the law affords to evade the
performance of an obligation, which under the law it must fulfill, namely, to compensate for the
serious and debilitating ailment of tuberculosis acquired in the course of employment by
respondent Abitria. Accordingly, the petition for certiorari and prohibition should be, as it is
hereby, denied.
The facts as found by respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission, which must be
deemed conclusive, can yield no other conclusion but the undeniable liability for compensation
to respondent Abitria on the part of petitioner. Thus: "From the recorded evidence, it appears
that claimant was employed with the respondent since February 4, 1956, working six (6) days a
week and receiving an average monthly wage of P180.00 as laborer for the respondent. He was
assigned in the Research Division which conducted research on rat traps and other matters
regarding extermination of pests, animals and insects. It was testified to by the claimant and his
witnesses that in the place of his employment he was made to inhale dangerous fumes as the
atmosphere was polluted with poisonous chemical dusts. The working condition of his place of
work was also warm and humid in view of the products being manufactured by the respondent.
He was not extended any protective device and he was also made to lift heavy objects in the
painting and soldering. In his soldering work muriatic acid and soldering paste [were] used.
Sometime in July, 1966 while the claimant was soldering [he] began to experience symptoms of
pulmonary tuberculosis. Because of his spitting of blood or hemoptysis, he went to consult Dr.
Felix Tuazon of the Quezon Institute whose diagnosis was pulmonary tuberculosis, chronic,
active moderately advanced, right: minimal, left. He was confined at the Quezon Institute under
the care of Dr. Felix Tuazon. According to the attending physician, he was admitted in the
hospital ward as a hemoptic patient or one who is bleeding from the lungs. When he was
admitted he was prescribed Vita K. ampules, bronocal, ablocid, duestrep injections and other

anti-TB drugs. His clinical history showed that the claimant was diagnosed with severe coughing
followed by expectoration of fresh blood amounting to two glassful [when] he was brought to the
Philippine General Hospital and given injection and was X-rayed. From that hospital he was
transferred to the Quezon Institute where he was subsequently admitted. The attending
physician testified further that the right lung had bronchogenous lesions in the upper lobe with
honeycomb at 2nd and 3rd intercostal space, while the left lung had fibrotic lesion behind the
anterior rib II. ... He was discharged from the Quezon Institute on September 3, 1966, but the
illness was not yet arrested although there was stopping of the hemoptysis. The doctor testified
on cross examination that the nature of work of the claimant involving strenuous physical
exertion and other factors of work such as the lowering of his resistance in view of the
enormous inhalation of chemical fumes also brought about the aggravation of the claimant's
present condition. According to the claimant the respondent was duly notified of his illness
through the general manager and in view of the respondent's refusal to pay him disability
compensation despite repeated demands, claimant filed this instant claim."6
The sole issue then, as accurately set forth in the above decision, was "to determine in this case
... whether ... there is sufficient or substantial evidence in support of the claim for disability
compensation benefits under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The evidence on record is
crystal clear that the claimant had already substantially proven his case and all indications point
that the illness of moderately advanced, pulmonary tuberculosis was service connected in view
of his work as laborer involving strenuous physical exertion which brought about the lowering of
his resistance due to the massive inhalation of injurious chemical fumes to the extent that he
was made an easy prey to the contraction of TB bacilli. The fact that there was no evidence on
record that claimant was sick upon entrance to his employment, it is presumed that he was
normal in every respect during the first period of his employment and the disease of pulmonary
tuberculosis showed only during the later part of his employment when he was assigned in the
research division of the respondent. The attending physician himself stated that claimant's
exposure to his work aggravated the illness and we believe that the respondent had failed to
dispute the work connection as there is no showing that claimant's ailment was due to the
lowering of his resistance by causes other than the nature of his work as laborer of the
respondent."7
It must be a realization that no valid defenses could be interposed that prompted petitioner to
rely on the alleged deprivation of due process, a contention, which as will now be shown, is
without basis.
The petition was so worded that the employer's right to be heard appeared to have been
disregarded. No further attention should be accorded such an alleged grievance. If it did not
introduce any evidence, it had itself solely to blame. No fault could be attributed to respondent
Workmen's Compensation Commission. There must be such a realization on the part of
petitioner for its four-page memorandum submitted in lieu of oral argument did not bother to
discuss such a matter at all. Accordingly, such a contention need not detain us further as it
ought never to have been raised in the first place.

Petitioner would make much however of the allegation that, as shown in the answer of
respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission,8 the decision was sent to a certain Attorney
Manuel Camacho but care of petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel Corpuz. Petitioner would
emphasize that the one "officially furnished" with a copy of such decision was not its counsel,
who was without any connection with the aforesaid Attorney Camacho. It would conclude,
therefore, that it had not received a copy of a decision which could not thereafter reach the
stage of finality calling for a writ of execution.
This contention was squarely met in the reply-memorandum of November 6, 1967 of the
Workmen's Compensation Commission. Why it happened thus was explained in an affidavit of
one of its employees, a certain Gerardo Guzman, included therein.9 As set forth in such reply
memorandum: "As stated in the affidavit of Mr. Guzman, he went to the office of Atty. Corpuz, on
March 10, 1967 to deliver a copy of the decision ..., but Atty. Corpuz refused to receive the said
decision alleging that he was no longer handling the case. Atty. Corpuz, instead instructed Mr.
Guzman to deliver the said decision to Atty. Camacho since it was already Atty, Camacho who
was handling the case, and Atty. Camacho, according to Atty. Corpuz, even had the records of
the case."10 In view of such instruction, it was further noted, Guzman "went the office of Atty.
Camacho, but since Atty. Camacho was not around he handed the copy of the decision to the
receiving clerk therein, who received it as evidenced by the stamp pad bearing the name of the
Law Office of Camacho, Zapa, Andaya & Associates on the attached true copy of the Notice of
Decision, ..."11
From which it could make the apt observation. "It is indeed sad to note that after the Counsel for
Petitioner refused to receive the copy of said decision, he is now impugning the delivery of said
decision to Atty. Camacho and is denying knowledge of it when in fact and truth the delivery of
said decision to Atty. Camacho was made per his instruction to Mr. Guzman, as evidenced by
the attached affidavit of Mr. Guzman."12
In view of the rather persuasive character of such an affidavit and the understandable reflection
on the actuation of counsel for petitioner, there was, as could be expected submitted by
petitioner's counsel a rejoinder, dated November 26, 1967. He would have this Court believe
that the reply-memorandum is contradicted by what appeared in respondents' answer, where it
was stated that a copy of the decision was received, not by him but by the law office of a certain
Attorney Camacho. He would then ask why Guzman did not serve a copy of the decision to him.
He would even assume, for argument sake, that there was a refusal on his part to accept a copy
of this decision, but he would argue why did not Guzman, who could be expected to know the
duties of a service officer, fail "to state said refusal in his official return."
Which of the above conflicting versions is entitled to credence? That of respondent Workmen's
Compensation Commission would appear to be more in accordance with the realities of the
situation. It is entitled to belief.
This would not be the first time, in the first place, where out of excess of zeal and out of a desire
to rely on every conceivable defense that could delay if not defeat the satisfaction of an

obligation incumbent on one's client, counsel would attempt to put the most favorable light on a
course of conduct which certainly cannot be given the stamp of approval. Not that it would clear
counsel of any further responsibility. His conduct leaves much to be desired. His responsibility
aside, it made evident why, to repeat the effort to evade liability by petitioner by invoking the due
process guaranty must not be rewarded with success.
Under the above circumstances, no due process question arose. What was done satisfied such
a constitutional requirement. An effort was made to serve petitioner with a copy of the decision;
that such effort failed was attributable to the conduct of its own counsel. True, there was a
denial; it is far from persuasive, as already noted. It does not have the ring of truth. There is no
reason why the decision would have been served on some other counsel if there where no such
misinformation, if there where no such attempt to mislead.
No benefit would have accrued to respondent Workmen's Compensation Commission. It was
merely performing its official function. Certainly, it could be expected to see to it that the law's
beneficiaries were not inconvenienced, much less frustrated, by its failure to follow the regular
procedure prescribed. It was unlikely that the employee entrusted with serving a copy of the
decision, in this particular case, and in this particular case alone, would depart so radically from
what the law requires, if there were no such intervening cause that resulted in his going astray.
How could petitioner escape responsibility?
Petitioner, and petitioner alone, could be expected to furnish such a cause. Who would benefit
thereby? The answer cannot be in doubt. Through such circumstance, wether intended or
otherwise, a basis was laid for at least a delay of the fulfillment of a just claim. For it is to be
noted that there is no, as there could not be any, valid ground for denying compensation to
respondent Abitria on the facts as found. Considering how great and pressing the laborer's need
for the compensation due him was and the consequent temptation to settle for less if in the
meanwhile, the money he had the right to expect, was not forthcoming, petitioner, as the
employer liable, had everything to gain and nothing to lose by such a turn of events. Even if it
were an honest mistake, the consequences were still deplorable.
It is quite revealing that in not one of the pleadings filed by petitioner did it ever indicate how it
could validly avoid its liability under the Workmen's Compensation Commission which disclosed
that the ailment suffered by respondent Abitria while in its employment was indeed
compensable. Neither in its memorandum submitted on October 19, 1967 nor rejoinder of
November 21, 1967, did it ever occur to petitioner to allege that if given the opportunity for
hearing it could interpose a plausible, not to say a valid defense. It did not do so because it
could not do so. Our decisions as to the undeniable liability of an employer similarly situated are
impressive for their number and unanimity.13
It would thus be grimly ironic if the due process concept, in itself an assurance and a guaranty
of justice and fairness, would be the very vehicle to visit on a hapless and impoverished litigant
injustice and unfairness. The law itself would stand in disrepute, if such a gross perversion of its
dictates were allowed. Any other view is unthinkable. Otherwise, there would be a stultification

of all our efforts to promote social justice14 and a mockery of the constitutional ideal of protection
to labor.15
Considering the above, it is not enough that petitioner be required to pay forthwith the sum due
respondent Abitria. The unseemly conduct, under the above circumstances disclosed, of
petitioner's counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz calls for words of reproof.
It is one thing to exert to the utmost one's ability to protect the interest of one's client. It is quite
another thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take advantage of any unforeseen turn of
events, if not to create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of what is justly due and
demandable, especially so, when as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and povertystricken man suffering from a dreaded disease, that unfortunately afflicts so many of our
countrymen and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far beyond the means of our
poverty stricken masses.
The ancient and learned profession of the law stresses fairness and honor; that must ever be
kept in mind by everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects to remain a member in
good standing. This Tribunal is rightfully entrusted with the serious responsibility of seeing to it
that no deviation from such a norm should be countenanced. If what occurred here would not be
characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it could be said that the law is less than fair and
far from honorable. What happens then to the ideal that only he is fit to belong to such a
profession who remains a faithful votary at the altar of justice? Such an ideal may be difficult to
approximate. That is true, but let it not be said that when such a notorious breach of its lofty
standard took place, as unfortunately it did in this case, this Court exhibited magnificent
unconcern.
WHEREFORE, this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction is denied.
With treble costs against petitioner to be paid by his counsel, Attorney Manuel A. Corpuz.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Capistrano,
JJ., concur.
Zaldivar, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-35252

October 21, 1932

THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
UY TENG PIAO, defendant-appellee.
Nat. M. Balboa and Dominador J. Endriga for appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal by the plaintiff a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila absolving the
defendant from the complaint, without a special finding as to costs.
The appellant makes the following assignments of error:
The trial court erred:
1. In finding that one Mr. Pecson gave a promise to appellee Uy Teng Piao to condone
the balance of the judgment rendered against the said Uy Teng Piao and in favor of the
Philippine National Bank in civil case No. 26328 of the Court o First Instance of Manila.
2. In finding that merely in selling the property described in certificate of title No. 11274
situated at Ronquillo Street, Manila, to Mariano Santos for P8,600 (Exhibit 2), the
appellant had undoubtedly given the alleged promise of condonation to appellee Uy
Teng Piao.
3. In finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1 is the condonation of the
balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328.
4. In finding that said Mr. Pecson, granting that the latter has actually given such promise
to condone, could bind the appellant corporation.
5. In holding that the absence of demand for payment upon appellee Uy Teng Piao for
the balance of the said judgment from February 11, 1925 up to the year 1930 is "una
senal inequivoca una prueba evidente" of the condonation of the balance of the said
judgment.
6. In finding that by the sale of the said property to Mariano Santos for the sum of
P8,600, the said judgment in civil case No. 26328 has been more than fully paid even

discounting the sum of P1,300 which appellant paid as the highest bidder for the said
property.
7. In declaring that the offer of appellee Uy Teng Piao as shown by Exhibits D and D-1,
reflects only the desire of the said appellee Uy Teng Piao to avoid having a case with the
appellant bank.
8. In finally absolving appellee Uy Teng Piao and in not sentencing him to pay the
amount claimed in the complaint with costs.
On September 9, 1924, the Court of First Instance of Manila rendered a judgment in favor of the
Philippine National Bank and against Uy Teng Piao in civil case No. 26328 for the sum of
P17,232.42 with interest at 7 per cent per annum from June 1, 1924, plus 10 per cent of the
sum amount for attorney's fees and costs. The court ordered the defendant to deposit said
amount with the clerk of the court within three months from the date of the judgment, and in
case of his failure to do so that the mortgaged properties described in transfer certificates of title
Nos. 7264 and 8274 should be sold at public auction in accordance with the law and the
proceeds applied to the payment of the judgment.
Uy Teng Piao failed to comply with the order of the court, and the sheriff of the City of Manila
sold the two parcels of land at public auction to the Philippine National Bank on October 14,
1924 for P300 and P1,000 respectively.
On February 11, 1925, the Philippine National Bank secured from Uy Teng Piao a waiver of his
right to redeem the property described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. 8274, and on the same
date the bank sold said property to Mariano Santos for P8,600.1awphil.net
Evidently the other parcel, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7264, was subsequently resold by the
bank for P2,700, because the account of the defendant was credited with the sum of P11,300.
In other words, the bank credited the defendant with the full amount realized by it when it resold
the two parcels of land.
The bank brought the present action to revive the judgment for the balance of P11,574.33, with
interest at 7 per cent per annum from August 1, 1930.
In his amended answer the defendant alleged as a special defense that he waived his right to
redeem the land described in transfer certificate of title No. 8274 in consideration of an
understanding between him and the bank that the bank would not collect from him the balance
of the judgment. It was on this ground that the trial court absolved the defendant from the
complaint.
In our opinion the defendant has failed to prove any valid agreement on the part of the bank not
to collect from him the remainder of the judgment. The alleged agreement rests upon the
uncorroborated testimony of the defendant, the pertinent part of whose testimony on direct
examination was as follows:
P. En este documento aparece que usted, por consideracion de valor recibido del Banco
Nacional demandante en la presente causa, renuncia a su derecho de recompra de la
propiedad vendida por el Sheriff en publica subasta el catorce de octubre de mil
novecientos veintecuatro a favor del Banco Nacional; quiere usted explicar al

Honorable Juzgado, cual es esta consideracion de valor? R. Si, seor. Esto desde mil
novecientos veintitres o mil novecientos veintecuatro, no recuerdo bien, me haba dicho
el seor Pecson, porque algunas veces yo no podia pagar esos intereses mensuales.
Entonces me dijo Pecson, "como puede usted recibir alquileres y no paga usted
intereses?"
P. Quien es ese seor Pecson? R. Era encargado de este asunto.
P. Que era el del Banco Nacional, usted sabe? R. Era encargado de estas
transacciones. Cuando tenia necesidad siempre llamaba yo al seor Pecson. Entonces
hable al seor Pecson que somos comerciantes, algunas veces los alquileres no
pueden cobrarse por anticipado.
Sr. ENDRIGA. No es responsiva la contestacion a la pregunta.
Sr. GONZALEZ. Si esta explicando y no ha terminado el testigo su contestacion.
JUZGADO. Que la termine.
TESTIGO. Me dijo el seor Pecson que es cosa mala para mi "por que usted cobra
alquileres y no paga los intereses? Mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes para cubrir sus
deudas.
P. El seor Pecson le dijo a usted "mejor deje usted ya todos sus bienes," a que bienes
se referia el ? R. Al terreno de Ronquillo y al terreno de Paco.
P. Cual de esos terrenos, el de Ronquillo o el de Paco, el que se refiere aqui en el
Exhibit 1? R. Paco, primeramente, los dos ambos.
P. Pero este Exhibit 1, a que se refiere; al de Paco o al de Ronquillo? R. Parece que
Paco.
P. No recuerda usted muy bien? R. No recuerdo.
P. Y cuando le dijo a usted el seor Pecson mejor que dejara todos sus bienes, le dijo
a usted a favor de quien iba usted a dejar sus bienes? R. Al Banco Nacional.
P. Y que le dijo a usted, si le dijo a usted algo el seor Pecson con respecto al saldo
deudor que usted todavia era en deber a favor del Banco Nacional? R. No recuerdo
mas; pero mas o menos de catorce mil pesos.
P. Que le dijo el con respeto al saldo, si el cobraria todavia o se le condonaria?
Sr. ENDRIGA. Es alternativa la pregunta. Me opongo.
JUZGADO. Cambiese la pregunta.
P. Que le dijo a usted con respeto al saldo, una vez otorgado este Exhibit 1?

SR. ENDRIGA. La pregunta no tiene ninguna base. Nos openemos.

Sr. GONZALES. Si dice el que se havian vendido todos los terrenos.
JUZGADO. Puede contestar.
Sr. ENDRIGA. Excepcion.
R. Me dijo que para que usted no cobre alquileres y no pague intereses deje usted esos
terrenos de Ronquillo y terreno de Paco para cubrir ya todas mis deudas. Entonces dije
ya, si, como yo tengo buena fe con este Banco. Hasta que al fin yo dije que queria yo
comprar.
P. Cuando usted firmo el once de febrero de mil novecientos veintecinco este
documento Exhibit 1, recibio usted algun centimo de dinero del Banco? R. Nada,
absolutamente.
When asked on cross-examination if Pecson was not in Iloilo at the time of the execution of
defendant's waiver of his right to redeem, the defendant answered that he did not know; asked
when Pecson had spoken to him about the matter, the defendant replied that he did not
remember.
One of the attorneys for the plaintiff testified that the defendant renounced his right to redeem
the parcel of land in Calle Ronquillo, Exhibit 1, because a friend of the defendant was interested
in buying it.
The bank ought to have presented Pecson as a witness, or his deposition, if he was not residing
in Manila at the time of the trial.
With respect to the testimony of the bank's attorney, we should like to observe that although the
law does not forbid an attorney to be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a cause, the
courts prefer that counsel should not testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that they
should withdraw from the active management of the case. (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, p. 148.)
Canon
19 of the Code of Legal Ethics reads as follows:
When a lawyer is a witness for his client, except as to merely formal matters, such as the
attestation or custody of an instrument and the like, he should leave the trial of the case
to other counsel. Except when essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should avoid
testifying in court in behalf of his client.
Defendant's testimony as to the alleged agreement is very uncertain. There is no mention in
Exhibit 1 as to such an agreement on the part of the bank. Exhibit 1 relates only to the land in
Calle Ronquillo. If Pecson had made any such agreement as the defendant claims, it is
reasonable to suppose that he would have required the defendant to waive his right to redeem
both parcels of land, and that the defendant, a Chines business man, would have insisted upon
some evidence of the agreement in writing. It appears to us that the defendant waived his right
to redeem the land in Calle Ronquillo, because a friend of his wished to purchase it and was

willing to pay therefor P8,600, and the bank agreed to credit the defendant with the full amount
of the sale.
Furthermore, if it be conceded that there was such an understanding between Pecson and the
defendant as the latter claims, it is not shown that Pecson was authorized to make any such
agreement for the bank. Only the board of directors or the persons empowered by the board of
directors could bind the bank by such an agreement. There is no merit in the contention that
since the bank accepted the benefit of the waiver it cannot now repudiate the alleged
agreement. The fact that the bank after having bought the land for P1,000 resold it at the
instance of the defendant for P8,600 and credited the defendant with the full amount of the
resale was a sufficient consideration for the execution of defendant's waiver of his right to
redeem.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the defendant is
condemned to pay the plaintiff the sum of P11,574.38 with interest thereon at the rate of 7 per
cent per annum from August 1, 1930, and the costs of both instances.
Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
A.M. No. 2003-5-SC

November 20, 2003

VALENTINO V. RUGA, MISO (Casual), complainant,

vs.
EDWIN S. LIGOT, SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Management Information Systems Office
(MISO), MISO-SDAAD, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The peoples faith in the Judiciary is certainly eroded when they stand witness to the dismaying
spectacle of a supervisory court employee shouting at and hitting at subordinate in front of
others. It becomes even more appalling when the people involved are no less than employees
of this Court.
Complainant and respondent are both employees of the Courts Management Information
Systems Office (MISO). Complainant Valentino V. Ruga is a casual employee of the
Management Information Systems Office, Systems Planning and Project Evaluation Division
(MISO-SPPED) while respondent Edwin S. Ligot, is an SC Chief Judicial Staff Officer, Systems
Development for Administrative Application Division (MISO-SDAAD).
In a Memorandum dated May 20, 2003 addressed to Atty. Eden T. Candelaria, Chief of the
Courts Office of Administrative Services (OAS), complainant Ruga charged respondent Ligot
with misconduct for the maltreatment he allegedly received from the latter on May 14, 2003 at
around 10:20 a.m., when respondent approached him at the Satellite 1 Office of the MISO to
follow up on the liquidation of certain purchases, and angrily said in a loud voice, "Gawin mo
na!" Suddenly, the latter hit him on the chest with an open palm.
Complainant ignored what respondent did and tried to explain the details of the liquidations.
Respondent, however, ignored what he said and walked out of the room, thereby embarrassing
complainant.
Melissa Limlengco and Noel Beltran, Clerk and Utility Personnel, respectively, of the MISO,
witnessed the incident and heard a loud sound caused by respondents blow to complainants
chest.
Later that afternoon, complainant went to the medical clinic for examination of the pain he felt in
his chest because of the blow he sustained.

In support of his allegations, complainant submitted the Joint Affidavit of Melissa Limlengco and
Noel Beltran together with a Medical Certificate issued by Dr. Prudencio P. Banzon Jr. of the
Supreme Court Clinic.
Respondent, in his comment dated May 27, 2003, claimed that the matter should have been
brought first for settlement before the Chief of their Office, Atty. Ivan Uy, pursuant to the
provisions of Section 4, Item No. 2 of the Supreme Court Grievance Machinery.
Respondent averred that he was assigned by Mrs. Petrita Arguelles, Assistant Chief, MISO, to
monitor the disbursements and liquidation of the cash advances given to their office for the
emergency purchase of computer parts and supplies. He had been requesting complainant to
submit the liquidation of the expenses taken from the cash advance, and he properly apprised
the latter of the proper procedure, the schedule and the required documents to be submitted for
liquidation. From the time he started monitoring the liquidation, complainant has always been
late in submitting the required documents despite repeated demands to submit the same on
time.
Respondent further narrated that on May 14, 2003, he went to complainants workstation and
asked him for the liquidation report which was overdue for more than three weeks. He reiterated
that the delay would result in the interruption of the cash advance of the MISO for the
succeeding weeks. He admitted that he tapped the complainants chest with his open palm, not
to purposely inflict injury, but to call his attention. He expressed doubts as to whether he really
inflicted pain on complainant, considering that the latter went for consultation at the SC Clinic,
which is only a few steps away from their office, six hours after the incident. Moreover,
complainant could not have performed his duties if the pain he felt was persistent and
unbearable. Respondent suspects that the filing of the complaint was deliberately filed to
discredit him and that, knowing complainant to be a good man, the latter would not have thought
of filing the complaint unless he was advised by someone who had malicious intentions to
destroy his integrity and reputation.
Moreover, respondent averred that he did not have any intention to abuse his authority as a
Division Chief of the MISO as he had never been known to be a person with a short temper and
a heavy hand. He claims that he is easy to work with and this could be attested to by staff
members of the OAS, who had the opportunity to work with him.
The case was set for investigation on June 10, 2003 before the OAS. Complainant testified that
his duties include the servicing of computer units in the different offices of the Court, and to
identify the computer peripherals that need replacement and to buy the same in the market
using the cash advance issued to the MISO. He averred that it is not part of his duties to make
the liquidation of the receipts issued in connection with the purchase of computer peripherals.
Rather, it was Ms. Marie Ilagan who was assigned to do it. However, complainant admitted that
the task has since then been assigned to him when Ms. Ilagan was transferred to the 7th floor
office of the MISO and that he experienced difficulty performing the same because of his tight

schedule in his other duties. He likewise admitted that he was not able to submit on time the
necessary report for April despite repeated demands by respondent.
Respondent, who also appeared on the same date, reiterated his allegations in his comment of
May 27, 2003. He submitted in evidence copies of the previous liquidation reports submitted by
complainants Division to show that the task is not so complicated as to prevent him from
accomplishing and submitting the reports on time.
Pursuant to a Resolution of the Court dated September 9, 2003, complainant manifested his
willingness to submit this case for resolution on the basis of the pleadings filed. For his part,
respondent sent a letter addressed to the Office of the Chief Justice dated September 22, 2003
averring that he and complainant have amicably settled their differences.
Addressing preliminarily the question of whether or not the complaint should be referred to the
Grievance Machinery of the Court, we find respondents reliance on the provisions of Section 4
of the Grievance Machinery1misplaced. Section 2 of the Grievance Machinery provides:
The Grievances that shall be acted upon through the grievance machinery are those that are
work related or which may give rise to employee dissatisfaction, such as:
1. Non-implementation of policies, practices and procedures on economic and financial
issues and other terms and conditions of employment fixed by law including salaries,
incentives, working hours, leave benefits, and other related terms and conditions;
2. Non-implementation of policies, practices and procedures which affect employees
from recruitment to promotions, detail, transfer, retirement, termination, lay-offs and
other related issues that affect them;
3. Physical working conditions;
4. Protests on appointments and other personal actions;
5. Interpersonal relationships and linkages; and
6. All other matters giving rise to employee dissatisfaction and discontentment outside of
those cases enumerated above.
The following cases shall not be acted upon through the grievance machinery:
1. Disciplinary cases which shall be resolved pursuant to the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases;
2. Sexual Harassment cases as provided for in R.A. 7877; and
3. Employees Associations issues and concerns.

Clearly, the complaint filed against respondent does not fall under any of the instances
enumerated in the foregoing provisions. What the foregoing Section, in fact, states is that the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases govern the action considering that it is a complaint for
conduct unbecoming of an officer/employee of the Court and prays that disciplinary sanctions
be meted on respondent.
We note that this case stemmed from an altercation between complainant and respondent
wherein the latter hit the former during office hours in a fit of anger. It was established that
respondent hit complainant heavily on the chest, although he insists that it was merely a
"friendly tap." Belying respondents contention, however, are Melissa Limlengco and Noel
Beltran who were present at the time and witnessed the incident.
Contrary to respondents claim, Limlengco and Beltran declared that the force of the impact of
the alleged "friendly tap" produced a loud sound. This is further corroborated by the findings of
Dr. Prudencio Banzon, SC Senior Staff Officer, Supreme Court Clinic, who certified that
complainant sustained "mild contusions on the chest and that, barring complications, the period
of recovery may entail 3-5 days."
Moreover, it is highly unlikely that the blow to complainants chest was merely a "friendly tap."
The events which unfolded before, during and after the incident disprove such a claim. The facts
show that respondent was in an angry mood when he approached complainant and asked him
for the liquidation report which was three weeks overdue.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not respondent is liable for misconduct. In her evaluation
and report, Atty. Eden C. Candelaria, SC Chief Administrative Officer, found him culpable for
simple misconduct and recommended that he be reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of
the same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
The findings of Atty. Candelaria are well-taken but the recommended penalty is not
commensurate to respondents malfeasance.
In Rodriguez v. Bonifacio,2 we held that government service is people oriented. Patience is an
essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a mark of culture and good breeding.
Belligerent behavior has no place in government service where personnel are enjoined to act
with self-restraint and civility at all times even when confronted with rudeness and
insolence.3 Indeed, the maintenance of the dignity of courts and the enforcement of the duty of
the citizens to respect them are necessary adjuncts to the administration of justice.4
More to the point, we held in De Joya v. Balubar:5
Respondents high-strung and belligerent behavior cannot be countenanced. Fighting with a coemployee during office hours is a disgraceful behavior reflecting adversely on the good image of
the judiciary. Shouting in the workplace and during office hours is arrant discourtesy and
disrespect not only towards co-workers but to the Court as well. It displays a cavalier attitude
towards the seriousness and dignity with which court business should be treated.

Such deportment especially during office hours, was totally unbecoming of an employee who
forms part of the judicial service and this definitely cannot be allowed. Respondents conduct
exhibits failure on his part to discharge his duties with the required degree of professionalism, to
respect at all times the rights of others and refrain from acts contrary to good morals and good
customs as demanded by Republic Act No. 6713 which, inter alia, enunciates the State policy of
promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service.6
It must be stressed that the courts, which are tasked to administer justice, to settle justiciable
controversies or disputes involving enforceable and demandable rights, and to afford redress of
wrongs for the violation of said rights,7 must be allowed to decide cases independently, free of
outside influence or pressure.8 So, too, must the Court be not unduly hampered or importuned
by the resolution of petty internal bureaucratic squabbles such as this case as its time and
attention should be devoted to addressing more serious concerns and issues brought before it.
Furthermore, an unflattering picture of the Highest Court of the land populated by overbearing
and pugnacious bureaucrats is one image it could do without.
Respondents bellicose act of thumping the chest of a subordinate in a fit of rage does not
speak well of his character. Prudence, restraint and sobriety are traits expected of those who
occupy sensitive supervisory positions like respondent.9 Everyone in the judiciary from the
presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, bears a heavy responsibility for the proper discharge of his
duty, and it behooves each one to steer clear of any situation in which the slightest suspicion
might be cast on his conduct. Any misbehavior on his part, whether true or only perceived, is
likely to reflect adversely on the administration of justice.10 Hence, based on these
considerations, we find the penalty of fine in the amount of P2,000.00 to be commensurate to
the offense in this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Edwin S. Ligot, SC Chief Judicial Staff
Officer, MISO-SDAAD, is hereby FINED in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) for
conduct unbecoming an employee of the Court. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio and Azcuna, concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 75209 September 30, 1987
NESTLE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, MINISTER OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and THE UNION
OF FILIPRO EMPLOYEES, respondents.
No. 78791 September 30, 1987
KIMBERLY INDEPENDENT LABOR UNION FOR SOLIDARITY, ACTIVISM AND
NATIONALISM-OLALIA,petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, MANUEL AGUILAR, MA. ESTRELLA
ALDAS, CAPT. REY L. LANADA, COL. VIVENCIO MANAIG and KIMBERLY-CLARK
PHILIPPINES, INC., respondents.
RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:
During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro Employees,
and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting since June 17,
1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up pickets'
quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing access to
and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees. They
constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place with
food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved their
red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long with
the use of loud speakers.
These acts were done even after their leaders had been received by Justices Pedro L. Yap and
Marcelo B. Fernan as Chairmen of the Divisions where their cases are pending, and Atty. Jose
C. Espinas, counsel of the Union of Filipro Employees, had been called in order that the pickets
might be informed that the demonstration must cease immediately for the same constitutes
direct contempt of court and that the Court would not entertain their petitions for as long as the
pickets were maintained. Thus, on July 10, 1987, the Court en banc issued a resolution giving

the said unions the opportunity to withdraw graciously and requiring Messrs. Tony Avelino. Lito
Payabyab, Eugene San Pedro, Dante Escasura, Emil Sayao and Nelson Centeno, union
leaders of respondent Union of Filipro Employees in the Nestle case and their counsel of record,
Atty. Jose C. Espinas; and Messrs. Ernesto Facundo, Fausto Gapuz, Jr. and Antonio Gonzales,
union leaders of petitioner Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity, Activism and
Nationalism-Olalia in the Kimberly case to appear before the Court on July 14, 1987 at 10:30
A.M. and then and there to SHOW CAUSE why they should not be held in contempt of court.
Atty. Jose C. Espinas was further required to SHOW CAUSE why he should not be
administratively dealt with.
On the appointed date and time, the above-named individuals appeared before the Court,
represented by Atty. Jose C. Espinas, in the absence of Atty. Potenciano Flores, counsel of
record of petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, who was still recuperating from an operation.
Atty. Espinas, for himself and in behalf of the union leaders concerned, apologized to the Court
for the above-described acts, together with an assurance that they will not be repeated. He
likewise manifested to the Court that he had experienced to the picketers why their actions were
wrong and that the cited persons were willing to suffer such penalty as may be warranted under
the circumstances. 1 He, however, prayed for the Court's leniency considering that the picket
was actually spearheaded by the leaders of the "Pagkakaisa ng Mangagawa sa Timog
Katagalogan" (PAMANTIK), an unregistered loose alliance of about seventy-five (75) unions in
the Southern Tagalog area, and not by either the Union of Filipro Employees or the Kimberly
Independent Labor Union. 2
Atty. Espinas further stated that he had explained to the picketers that any delay in the
resolution of their cases is usually for causes beyond the control of the Court and that the
Supreme Court has always remained steadfast in its role as the guardian of the Constitution.
To confirm for the record that the person cited for contempt fully understood the reason for the
citation and that they wig abide by their promise that said incident will not be repeated, the Court
required the respondents to submit a written manifestation to this effect, which respondents
complied with on July 17, 1987.
We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition of
the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by
this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES
UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March 30,
1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the
euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will
not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt
those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending
before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts
as impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an

orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice." 3
The right of petition is conceded to be an inherent right of the citizen under all free governments.
However, such right, natural and inherent though it may be, has never been invoked to shatter
the standards of propriety entertained for the conduct of courts. For "it is a traditional conviction
of civilized society everywhere that courts and juries, in the decision of issues of fact and law
should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should be decided upon evidence
produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias,
prejudice or sympathies." 4
Moreover, "parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly in court by an
impartial tribunal, uninfluenced by publication or public clamor. Every citizen has a profound
personal interest in the enforcement of the fundamental right to have justice administered by the
courts, under the protection and forms of law free from outside coercion or interference." 5 The
aforecited acts of the respondents are therefore not only an affront to the dignity of this Court,
but equality a violation of the above-stated right of the adverse parties and the citizenry at large.
We realize that the individuals herein cited who are non-lawyers are not knowledgeable in her
intricacies of substantive and adjective laws. They are not aware that even as the rights of free
speech and of assembly are protected by the Constitution, any attempt to pressure or influence
courts of justice through the exercise of either right amounts to an abuse thereof, is no longer
within the ambit of constitutional protection, nor did they realize that any such efforts to influence
the course of justice constitutes contempt of court. 6 The duty and responsibility of advising
them, therefore, rest primarily and heavily upon the shoulders of their counsel of record. Atty.
Jose C. Espinas, when his attention was called by this Court, did his best to demonstrate to the
pickets the untenability of their acts and posture. Let this incident therefore serve as a reminder
to all members of the legal profession that it is their duty as officers of the court to properly
apprise their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice, and to
labor leaders of the importance of a continuing educational program for their members.
WHEREFORE, the contempt charges against herein respondents are DISMISSED. Henceforth,
no demonstrations or pickets intended to pressure or influence courts of justice into acting one
way or the other on pending cases shall be allowed in the vicinity and/or within the premises of
any and all courts.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Gancayco, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO
PEREZ
, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to
televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The
motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is
really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the
press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a
clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press
because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live
media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments
for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV
and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule
and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only
pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations
aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada
contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less
distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.1wphi1.nt
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due
deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6)
of its members,1 the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, 2 has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial.

What follows is the opinion of the majority.lawphil.net

Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada
and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an
audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time
broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing,
after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the
recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary
except annotations which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The
audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan
or its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording.1awphil.net First, the hearings are of
historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is
under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed
sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who
have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be
enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the
education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary
purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way
that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events.
They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings,
rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of
the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the
tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those
taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the
proper performance of their roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges -will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public
opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized.
The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice
can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it may be
assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision
of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem
posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.

Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be served by audiovisual recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the
filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of
then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This
Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of a public character."6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary
record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its
accuracy against such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes
clbres was made was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As
he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly
moving. An educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther
leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four
installments, several months after the case was concluded -- concluded incidentally, with
a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking
way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with
uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense
of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar
good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for
the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an
educational experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and
with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment
that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is
now a desperate need.7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is
perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live
TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a
case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of
the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have
subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof

as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted
therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the
Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President
shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of
the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its
Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original
thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives
Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. I am for full live coverage hence I maintain my original view; nonetheless. I concur.
Kapunan, J. I maintain my original view prohibiting live T.V. and radio coverage and concur with
the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Quisumbing, J. Although earlier I respectfully Dissented as I favor live TV coverage, I now
concur in the result.
Pardo, J. I concur with the denial of the motion for reconsideration only. The conditions are
inadequate. I join J. Vitug's opinion.
Buena, J. I concur with the Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.
Ynares-Santiago, J. I concur with the separate opinion of J. Jose Vitug.
De Leon, Jr., J. I concur with Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. I concur but only in the denial with finality of the MR.
Separate Opinion
VITUG, J.:
Due Process is timeless. It is a precious fundamental right that secures and protects, under a
rule of law, the life, and liberty of a person from the oppression of power. A cherished fixture in
our bill of rights, its encompassing guarantee will not be diminished by advances in science and
technology. I fail to perceive it to be otherwise.
Precisely, in its 29th June 2001 decision, the Court did not consider it propitous to allow live
television and radio coverage of the trial in order to help ensure a just and fair trial. The Court

felt it judicious to insulate not only the Sandiganbayan but also the trial participants, the lawyers
and witnesses, from being unduly influenced by possible adverse effects that such a coverage
could bring. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the above ruling and countered that,
if one must be pitted against the other, the right to public information of grave national interest
should be held more paramount than the right of the accused to a "fair and public trial," the
former being appurtenant to the sovereign and latter being merely a privilege bestowed to an
individual.
I am not ready to accept such a notion. I see it as being an implicit retreat, unwisely, from an
age-old struggle of the individual against the tyranny of the sovereign.1 The right of the public to
information, in any event, is not here really being sacrified. The right to know can very well be
achieved via other media coverage; the windows of information through which the public might
observe and learn are not closed.
In addressing the present motion for reconsideration, colleagues on the Court opine that there
should be an audio-visual recording of the proceedings for documentary purposes
because, first, the hearings are of historic significance, second, the Estrada cases involve
matters of vital concern to our people who have a fundamental right to know how their
government works; third, the audio-visual presentation is essential for education and civil
training of the people; and fourth, such recording can be used by appellate courts in the event
that the review of the proceedings, ruling, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or
becomes necessary.lawphil.net2
The proposition has novel features, regrettably, I still find it hard to believe that the presence of
the cameras inside the courtroom will not have an untoward impact on the court proceedings.
No empirical data has been shown to suggest otherwise. To the contrary, experience attests to
the intimidating effect of cameras and electronic devices in courtrooms on the litigants,
witnesses and jurors.3 In addition, the natural reticence of witnesses at the stand can even
easily be exacerbated by placing them on
camera
in contravention of normal experience.4 The demeanor of the witnesses can also have an
abstruse effect on the ability of the judge to accurately assess the credibility of such
witnesses.5 The presence of cameras, for whatever reason, may not adequately address the
dangers mentioned in the Court's decision of 29 June 2001. There are just too many
imponderables.
Most importantly, it does not seem right to single out and make a spectacle of the cases against
Mr. Estrada. Dignity is a precious part of personability innate in ever human being, and there
can be no cogent excuse for impinging it even to the slightest degree. It is not the problem of
privacy that can cause concern more than the erosion of reality that cameras tend to cast.
In the petition, albeit entitled an administrative matter, the only issue raised is whether the case
of a former President pending before the Sandiganbayan can be covered by live television and
radio broadcast. The matter now being sought to be addressed by my esteemed colleagues is
not even an issue. If it has to be considered at all, the rule must be of general application and
promulgated after a thorough study and deliberation, certainly far more than what have been
said and done in this case. Hearings, where expert opinion is sought and given, should prove to
be helpful and of value.1wphi1.nt

WHEREFORE, I concur but only in the denial with finality of the motion for reconsideration.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 01-4-03-SC September 13, 2001
RE: REQUEST FOR LIVE RADIO-TV COVERAGE OF THE TRIAL IN THE SANDIGANBAYAN
OF THE PLUNDER CASES AGAINST FORMER PRESIDENT JOSEPH E. ESTRADA
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE HERNANDO
PEREZ
, KAPISANAN NG MGA BRODKASTER NG PILIPINAS, CESAR SARINO, RENATO
CAYETANO, and ATTY. RICARDO ROMULO, petitioners,
vs.
JOSEPH E. ESTRADA and INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES,oppositors.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision denying petitioners' request for permission to
televise and broadcast live the trial of former President Estrada before the Sandiganbayan. The
motion was filed by the Secretary of Justice, as one of the petitioners, who argues that there is
really no conflict between the right of the people to public information and the freedom of the
press, on the one hand, and, on the other, the right of the accused to a fair trial; that if there is a
clash between these rights, it must be resolved in favor of the right of the people and the press
because the people, as the repository of sovereignty, are entitled to information; and that live
media coverage is a safeguard against attempts by any party to use the courts as instruments
for the pursuit of selfish interests.
On the other hand, former President Joseph E. Estrada reiterates his objection to the live TV
and radio coverage of his trial on the ground that its allowance will violate the sub judice rule
and that, based on his experience with the impeachment trial, live media coverage will only
pave the way for so-called "expert commentary" which can trigger massive demonstrations
aimed at pressuring the Sandiganbayan to render a decision one way or the other. Mr. Estrada
contends that the right of the people to information may be served through other means less
distracting, degrading, and prejudicial than live TV and radio coverage.1wphi1.nt
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties on this important issue and, after due
deliberation, finds no reason to alter or in any way modify its decision prohibiting live or real time
broadcast by radio or television of the trial of the former president. By a vote of nine (9) to six (6)
of its members,1 the Court denies the motion for reconsideration of the Secretary of Justice.
In lieu of live TV and radio coverage of the trial, the Court, by the vote of eight (8) Justices, 2 has
resolved to order the audio-visual recording of the trial.

What follows is the opinion of the majority.lawphil.net

Considering the significance of the trial before the Sandiganbayan of former President Estrada
and the importance of preserving the records thereof, the Court believes that there should be an
audio-visual recording of the proceedings. The recordings will not be for live or real time
broadcast but for documentary purposes. Only later will they be available for public showing,
after the Sandiganbayan shall have promulgated its decision in every case to which the
recording pertains. The master film shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records
Management and Archives Office for historical preservation and exhibition pursuant to law.4
For the purpose of recording the proceedings, cameras will be inconspicuously installed in the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews will be regulated, consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings. The trial shall be recorded in its entirety, except such portions
thereof as the Sandiganbayan may decide should not be held public pursuant to Rule 119, 21
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. No comment shall be included in the documentary
except annotations which may be necessary to explain certain scenes which are depicted. The
audio-visual recordings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan
or its Division as the case may be.
There are several reasons for such televised recording.1awphil.net First, the hearings are of
historic significance. They are an affirmation of our commitment to the rule that "the King is
under no man, but he is under God and the law." (Quod Rex non debet esse sub homine, sed
sub Deo et Lege.) Second, the Estrada cases involve matters of vital concern to our people who
have a fundamental right to know how their government is conducted. This right can be
enhanced by audio visual presentation. Third, audio-visual presentation is essential for the
education and civic training of the people.
Above all, there is the need to keep audio-visual records of the hearings for documentary
purposes. The recordings will be useful in preserving the essence of the proceedings in a way
that the cold print cannot quite do because it cannot capture the sights and sounds of events.
They will be primarily for the use of appellate courts in the event a review of the proceedings,
rulings, or decisions of the Sandiganbayan is sought or becomes necessary. The accuracy of
the transcripts of stenographic notes taken during the trial can be checked by reference to the
tapes.
On the other hand, by delaying the release of the tapes for broadcast, concerns that those
taking part in the proceedings will be playing to the cameras and will thus be distracted from the
proper performance of their roles -- whether as counsel, witnesses, court personnel, or judges -will be allayed. The possibility that parallel trials before the bar of justice and the bar of public
opinion may jeopardize, or even prevent, the just determination of the cases can be minimized.
The possibility that judgment will be rendered by the popular tribunal before the court of justice
can render its own will be avoided.
At the same time, concerns about the regularity and fairness of the trial -- which, it may be
assumed, is the concern of those opposed to, as much as of those in favor of, televised trials will be addressed since the tapes will not be released for public showing until after the decision
of the cases by the Sandiganbayan. By delaying the release of the tapes, much of the problem
posed by real time TV and radio broadcast will be avoided.

Thus, many important purposes for preserving the record of the trial can be served by audiovisual recordings without impairing the right of the accused to a fair trial.
Nor is the right of privacy of the accused a bar to the production of such documentary. In Ayer
Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong,5 this Court set aside a lower court's injunction restraining the
filming of "Four Day Revolution," a documentary film depicting, among other things, the role of
then Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile in the 1986 EDSA people power. This
Court held: "A limited intrusion into a person's privacy has long been regarded as permissible
where that person is a public figure and the information sought to be elicited from him or to be
published about him constitute matters of a public character."6
No one can prevent the making of a movie based on the trial. But, at least, if a documentary
record is made of the proceedings, any movie that may later be produced can be checked for its
accuracy against such documentary and any attempt to distort the truth can thus be averted.
Indeed, a somewhat similar proposal for documentary recording of celebrated cases or causes
clbres was made was made way back in 1971 by Paul Freund of the Harvard Law School. As
he explained:
In fairness let me refer to an American experience many of my lay friends found similarly
moving. An educational television network filmed a trial in Denver of a Black Panther
leader on charges of resisting arrest, and broadcast the document in full, in four
installments, several months after the case was concluded -- concluded incidentally, with
a verdict of acquittal.
No one could witness the trial without a feeling of profound respect for the painstaking
way in which the truth was searched for, for the ways whereby law copes with
uncertainties and ambiguities through presumptions and burden of proof, and the sense
of gravity with which judge and jury carried out their responsibilities.
I agree in general with the exclusion of television from the courtroom, for the familiar
good reasons. And yet the use of television at a trial for documentary purposes, not for
the broadcast of live news, and with the safeguards of completeness and consent, is an
educational experiment that I would be prepared to welcome. Properly safeguarded and
with suitable commentary, the depiction of an actual trial is an agency of enlightenment
that could have few equals in its impact on the public understanding.
Understanding of our legal process, so rarely provided by our educational system, is
now a desperate need.7
Professor Freund's observation is as valid today as when it was made thirty years ago. It is
perceptive for its recognition of the serious risks posed to the fair administration of justice by live
TV and radio broadcasts, especially when emotions are running high on the issues stirred by a
case, while at the same time acknowledging the necessity of keeping audio-visual recordings of
the proceedings of celebrated cases, for public information and exhibition, after passions have
subsided.
WHEREFORE, an audio-visual recording of the trial of former President Estrada before the
Sandiganbayan is hereby ordered to be made, for the account of the Sandiganbayan, under the
following conditions: (a) the trial shall be recorded in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof

as the Sandiganbayan may determine should not be held public under Rule 119, 21 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure; (b) cameras shall be installed inconspicuously inside the
courtroom and the movement of TV crews shall be regulated consistent with the dignity and
solemnity of the proceedings; (c) the audio-visual recordings shall be made for documentary
purposes only and shall be made without comment except such annotations of scenes depicted
therein as may be necessary to explain them; (d) the live broadcast of the recordings before the
Sandiganbayan shall have rendered its decision in all the cases against the former President
shall be prohibited under pain of contempt of court and other sanctions in case of violations of
the prohibition; (e) to ensure that the conditions are observed, the audio-visual recording of the
proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the Sandiganbayan or its
Division concerned and shall be made pursuant to rules promulgated by it; and (f)
simultaneously with the release of the audio-visual recordings for public broadcast, the original
thereof shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives
Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Puno, Panganiban, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J. I am for full live coverage hence I maintain my original view; nonetheless. I concur.
Kapunan, J. I maintain my original view prohibiting live T.V. and radio coverage and concur with
the separate opinion of Justice Vitug.
Quisumbing, J. Although earlier I respectfully Dissented as I favor live TV coverage, I now
concur in the result.
Pardo, J. I concur with the denial of the motion for reconsideration only. The conditions are
inadequate. I join J. Vitug's opinion.
Buena, J. I concur with the Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.
Ynares-Santiago, J. I concur with the separate opinion of J. Jose Vitug.
De Leon, Jr., J. I concur with Separate Opinion of Justice Vitug.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. I concur but only in the denial with finality of the MR.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30894 March 25, 1970

EDUARDO L. MARTELINO, CIRILO OROPESA, TEODORO FACELO, RUPERTO AMISOTO,
ALBERTO SOTECO, SOLFERINO TITONG, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
JOSE ALEJANDRO, RUBEN S. MONTOYA, SIXTO R. ALHAMBRA, AVELINO C. MENEZ,
EFRAIN S. MACLANG, ET AL., respondents.
Amelito R. Mutuc for petitioners.
Colonel Manuel V. Reyes (Judge Advocate General, GSC), Major Samuel M. Soriano (JAGS),
Major Higinio E. Dacanay, Jr. (JAGS, PC) and Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant
Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista, Solicitor Jaime M. Lantin and Guillermo Nakar, Jr. for
respondents.

CASTRO, J.:
This case presents another aspect of the court-martial proceedings against the petitioner, Major
Eduardo Martelino, alias Abdul Latif Martelino, of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and the
officers and men under him, for violation of the 94th and 97th Articles of War, as a result of the
alleged shooting on March 18, 1968 of some Muslim recruits then undergoing commando
training on the island of Corregidor. Once before the question was raised before this Court
whether the general court-martial, convened on April 6, 1968 to try the case against the
petitioners, acquired jurisdiction over the case despite the fact that earlier, on March 23, a
complaint for frustrated murder had been filed in the fiscal's office of Cavite City by Jibin Arula
(who claimed to have been wounded in the incident) against some of the herein petitioners. The
proceedings had to be suspended until the jurisdiction issue could be decided. On June 23,
1969 this Court ruled in favor of the jurisdiction of the military court.1
The jurisdiction question thus settled, attention once again shifted to the general court-martial,
but no sooner had the proceedings resumed than another hitch developed. This came about as
the petitioners, the accused in the court-martial proceedings, in turn came to this Court, seeking
relief against certain orders of the general court-martial.

It appears that at the hearing on August 12, 1969 the petitioner Martelino sought the
disqualification of the President of the general court-martial, following the latter's admission that
he read newspaper stories of the Corregidor incident. The petitioner contended that the case
had received such an amount of publicity in the press and other news media and in fact was
being exploited for political purposes in connection with the presidential election on November
11, 1969 as to imperil his right to a fair trial. After deliberating, the military court denied the
challenge.
Thereafter the petitioners raised peremptory challenges against Col. Alejandro, as president of
the court-martial, and Col. Olfindo, Lt. Col. Camagay, Lt. Col. Valones, Lt. Col. Blanco and Col.
Malig, as members. With regard to peremptory challenges it was the petitioners' position that for
each specification each accused was entitled to one such challenge. They later changed their
stand and adopted that of the trial judge advocate that "for each specification jointly tried, all of
the accused are entitled to only 1 peremptory challenge; and that with respect to the
specifications tried commonly, each one of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge."
They there contended that they were entitled to a total of eleven peremptory challenges. On the
other hand the court-martial ruled that the accused were entitled to only one peremptory
challenge as the specifications were being jointly tried.
The petitioners therefore filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition, to nullify the orders of
the court-martial denying their challenges, both peremptory and for cause. They allege that the
adverse publicity given in the mass media to the Corregidor incident, coupled with the fact that it
became an issue against the administration in the 1969 elections, was such as to unduly
influence the members of the court-martial. With respect to peremptory challenges, they
contend that they are entitled to eleven such challenges, one for each specification.
On August 29, 1969 this Court gave due course to the petition, required the respondents as
members of the general court-martial to answer and, in the meantime, restrained them from
proceeding with the case.
In their answer the respondents assert that despite the publicity which the case had received,
no proof has been presented showing that the court-martial's president's fairness and
impartiality have been impaired. On the contrary, they claim, the petitioner's own counsel
expressed confidence in the "integrity, experience and background" of the members of the
court. As a preliminary consideration, the respondents urge this Court to throw out the petition
on the ground that it has no power to review the proceedings of the court-martial, "except for the
purpose of ascertaining whether the military court had jurisdiction of the person and subject
matter, and whether, though having such jurisdiction, it had exceeded its powers in the sentence
pronounced," and that at any rate the petitioners failed to exhaust remedies available to them
within the military justice system.
I
It is true that civil courts as a rule exercise no supervision or correcting power over the
proceedings of courts-martial, and that mere errors in their proceedings are not open to

consideration. "The single inquiry, the test, is jurisdiction."2 But it is equally true that in the
exercise of their undoubted discretion, courts-martial may commit such an abuse of discretion
what in the language of Rule 65 is referred to as "grave abuse of discretion" as to give rise
to a defect in their jurisdiction.3 This is precisely the point at issue in this action suggested by its
nature as one for certiorari and prohibition, namely, whether in overruling the petitioners'
challenges, the general court-martial committed such an abuse of discretion as to call for the
exercise of the corrective powers of this Court. It is thus obvious that no other way is open to
this Court by which it may avoid passing upon the constitutional issue thrust upon it. Nor will the
fact that there may be available remedies within the system of military justice bar review
considering that the questions raised are questions of law.4
And so the threshold question is whether the publicity given to the case against the petitioners
was such as to prejudice their right to a fair trial. As already stated, the petitioner Martelino
challenged the court-martial president on the ground that newspaper accounts of what had
come to be referred to as the "Corregidor massacre" might unduly influence the trial of their
case. The petitioner's counsel referred to a news item appearing in the July 29, 1969 issue of
the Daily Mirror and cited other news reports to the effect that "coffins are being prepared for the
President (of the Philippines) in Jolo," that according to Senator Aquino "massacre victims were
given sea burial," and that Senator Magsaysay, opposition Vice President candidate, had gone
to Corregidor and "found bullet shells." In addition the petitioners cite in this Court a Manila
Times editorial of August 26, 1969 which states that "The Jabidah [code name of the training
operations] issue was bound to come up in the course of the election campaign. The opposition
could not possibly ignore an issue that is heavily loaded against the administration." The
petitioners argue that under the circumstances they could not expect a just and fair trial and
that, in overruling their challenge for cause based on this ground, the general court-martial
committed a grave abuse of discretion. In support of their contention they invoke the rulings of
the United States Supreme Court in Irvin v. Dowd,5 Rideau vs. Louisiana,6 Estes v.
Texas,7 and Shepard v. Maxwell.8
An examination of the cases cited, however, will show that they are widely disparate from this
case in a fundamental sense. In Irvin, for instance, the Supreme Court found that shortly after
the petitioner's arrest in connection with six murders committed in Vanderburgh County, Indiana,
the prosecutor and police officials issued press releases stating that the petitioner had
confessed to the six murders and that "a barrage of newspaper headlines articles, cartoons and
pictures was unleashed against him during the six or seven months preceding his trial." In
reversing his conviction, the Court said:
Here the "pattern of deep and bitter prejudice' shown to be present throughout
the community, ... was clearly reflected in the sum total of the voir
dire examination of a majority of the jurors finally placed in the jury box. Eight out
of the 12 thought petitioner was guilty. With such an opinion permeating their
minds, it would be difficult to say that each could exclude this preconception of
guilt from his deliberations. The influence that lurks in an opinion once formed is
so persistent that it unconsciously fights detachment from the processes of the

average man. ... Where one's life is at stake and accounting for the frailties of
human nature we can only say that in the light of the circumstances here the
finding of impartiality does not meet the constitutional standard.9
Irvin marks the first time a state conviction was struck down solely on the ground of prejudicial
publicity. 10 In the earlier case of Shepherd v. Florida, 11 which involved elements of publicity,
the reversal of the conviction was based solely on racial discrimination in the selection of the
jury, although to concurring Justice Jackson, who was joined by Justice Frankfurter, "It is hard to
imagine a more prejudicial influence than a press release by the officer of the court charged with
defendants' custody stating that they had confessed, and here just such a statement unsworn
to, unseen, uncross-examined and uncontradicted, was conveyed by the press to the jury. 12
In Rideau, the petitioner, suspect in the robbery of a bank in Lake Charles, Louisiana and in the
kidnapping of three of its employees, and in the killing of one of them, was similarly given "trial
by publicity." Thus, the day after his arrest, a moving picture film was taken of him in an
"interview" with the sheriff. The "interview," which lasted approximately 20 minutes, consisted of
interrogation by the sheriff and admission by Rideau that he had perpetrated the bank robbery,
kidnapping and murder. The interview was seen and heard on television by 24,000 people. Two
weeks later he was arraigned. His lawyers promptly moved for a change of venue but their
motion was denied and Rideau was convicted and sentenced to death. Rideau's counsel had
requested that jurors be excused for cause, having exhausted all of their peremptory
challenges, but these challenges for cause had been denied by the trial judge. In reversing his
conviction, the Court said:
[W]e hold that it was a denial of due process of law to refuse the request for a
change of venue, after the people of Calcasieu Parish had been exposed
repeatedly and in depth to the spectacle of Rideau personally confessing in detail
to the crimes with which he was later to be charged. For anyone who has ever
watched television the conclusion cannot be avoided that this spectacle, to the
tens of thousands of people who saw and heard it, in a very real sense was
Rideau's trial at which he pleaded guilty to murder. Any subsequent court
proceedings in a community so pervasively exposed to such a spectacle could
be but a hollow formality. 13
In the third case, Estes, the Court voided a televised criminal trial for being inherently a denial of
due process.
The state ... says that the use of television in the instant case was "without
injustice to the person immediately concerned," basing its position on the fact
that the petitioner has established no isolate prejudice and that this must be
shown in order to invalidate a conviction in these circumstances. The State paints
too broadly in this contention, for this Court itself has found instances in which a
showing of actual prejudice is not a prerequisite to reversal. This is such a case.
It is true that in most cases involving claims of due process deprivations we

require a showing of identifiable prejudice to the accused. Nevertheless, at times

a procedure employed by the State involves such a probability that prejudice will
result that it is inherently lacking in due process. 14
In Sheppard, the celebrated murder case of Sam Sheppard, who was accused of the murder of
his wife Marilyn, the Supreme Court observed a "carnival atmosphere" in which "bedlam reigned
at the courthouse ... and newsmen took over practically the entire courtroom, hounding most of
the participants in the trial, especially Sheppard." It observed that "despite the extent and nature
of the publicity to which the jury was exposed during the trial, the judge refused defense
counsel's other requests that the jury be asked whether they had read or heard specific
prejudicial comment about the case. ... In these circumstances, we assume that some of this
material reached members of the jury." The Court held:
From the cases coming here we note that unfair and prejudicial news comment
on pending trials has become increasingly prevalent. Due process requires that
the accused receive a trial by an impartial jury free from outside influences.
Given the pervasiveness of modern communications and the difficulty of effacing
prejudicial publicity from the minds of the jurors, the trial courts must take strong
measures to ensure that the balance is never weighed against the accused. And
appellate tribunals have the duty to make an independent evaluation of the
circumstances. Of course, there is nothing that proscribes the press from
reporting events that transpire in the courtroom. But where there is a reasonable
likelihood that prejudicial news prior to trial will prevent a fair trial, the judge
should continue the case until the threat abates, or transfer it to another county
not so permeated with publicity. In addition sequestration of the jury was
something the judge should have sua sponte with counsel. If publicity during the
proceeding threatens the fairness of the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But
we must remember that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those
remedial measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. The courts
must take such steps by rule and regulation that will protect their processes from
prejudicial outside interference. Neither prosecutors, counsel for defense, the
accused, witnesses, court staff nor enforcement officers coming under the
jurisdiction of the court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration
between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fairness of a
criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly censurable and worthy
of disciplinary measure. 15
In contrast the spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the
petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a
"massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the
petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to
protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of
the trial 16 either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to
another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided.

Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which
did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to
be identified with due process.
At all events, even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the
petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply
that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity, we think that the suspension of the court-martial
proceedings has accomplished the purpose sought by the petitioners' challenge for cause, by
postponing the trial of the petitioner until calmer times have returned. The atmosphere has since
been cleared and the publicity surrounding the Corregidor incident has so far abated that we
believe the trial may now be resumed in tranquility.
II
Article of War 18 provides that "Each side shall be entitled to one peremptory challenge, but the
law member of the court shall not be challenged except for cause." The general court-martial
originally interpreted this provision to mean that the entire defense was entitled to only
one peremptory challenge. Subsequently, on August 27, 1969, it changed its ruling and held that
the defense was entitled to eight peremptory challenges, but the petitioners declined to exercise
their right to challenge on the ground that this Court had earlier restrained further proceedings in
the court-martial.
It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one
peremptory challenge," and therefore because there are eleven charges they are entitled to
eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents, upon the other hand, argue that "for
each specification jointly tried, all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge
and that with respect to specifications tried commonly each of the accused is entitled to one
peremptory challenge." Although there are actually a total of eleven specifications against the
petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with two other specifications, "since
in fact they allege the same offenses committed in conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight
specifications." The general court-martial thereof takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are
entitled to a total of only eight peremptory challenges.
We thus inescapably confront, and therefore now address, the issue here posed.
We are of the view that both the petitioners and the general court-martial misapprehend the true
meaning, intent and scope of Article of War 18. As will hereinafter be demonstrated, each of the
petitioners is entitled as a matter of right to one peremptory challenge. The number of
specifications and/or charges, and whether the accused are being jointly tried or undergoing a
common trial, are of no moment.
In the early formative years of the infant Philippine Army, after the passage in 1935 of
Commonwealth Act No. 1 (otherwise known as the National Defense Act), except for a handful
of Philippine Scout officers and graduates of the United States military and naval academies
who were on duty with the Philippine Army, there was a complete dearth of officers learned in

military law, this aside from the fact that the officer corps of the developing army was
numerically inadequate for the demands of the strictly military aspects of the national defense
program. Because of these considerations it was then felt that peremptory challenges should
not in the meanwhile be permitted and that only challenges for cause, in any number, would be
allowed. Thus Article 18 of the Articles of War (Commonwealth Act No. 408), as worded on
September 14, 1938, the date of the approval of the Act, made no mention or reference to any
peremptory challenge by either the trial judge advocate of a court-martial or by the accused.
After December 17, 1958, when the Manual for Courts-Martial 17 of the Philippine Army became
effective, the Judge Advocate General's Service of the Philippine Army conducted a continuing
and intensive program of training and education in military law, encompassing the length and
breadth of the Philippines. This program was pursued until the outbreak of World War II in the
Pacific on December 7, 1941. After the formal surrender of Japan to the allies in 1945, the
officer corps of the Armed Forces of the Philippines had expanded to a very large number, and a
great many of the officers had been indoctrinated in military law. It was in these environmental
circumstances that Article of War 18 was amended on June 12, 1948 to entitle "each side" to
one peremptory challenge, with the sole proviso that "the law member of court shall not be
challenged except for cause."
By its very inherent nature a peremptory challenge does not require any reason or ground
therefor to exist or to be stated. It may be used before, during, or after challenges for cause, or
against a member of the court-martial unsuccessfully challenged for cause, or against a new
member if not previously utilized in the trial. A member challenged peremptorily is forthwith
excused from duty with the court-martial.
The right of challenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury itself, and has always
been held essential to the fairness of trial by jury. 18
As was said by Blackstone, and repeated by Mr. Justice Story: 'In criminal cases,
or at least in capital ones, there is in favorem vitae, allowed to the prisoner an
arbitrary and capricious species of challenge to a certain number of jurors,
without showing any cause at all, which is called a peremptory challenge; a
provision full of that tenderness and humanity to prisoners, for which our English
laws are justly famous. This is grounded on two reasons: 1) As every one must
be sensible, what sudden impression and unaccountable prejudices we are apt
to conceive upon the bare looks and gestures of another; and how necessary it is
that a prisoner (when put to defend his life) should have a good opinion of his
jury, the want of which might totally disconcert him; the law has conceived a
prejudice even without being able to assign a reason for his dislike. 2) Because,
upon challenges for cause shown, if the reason assigned prove insufficient to set
aside the juror, perhaps the bare questioning his indifference may sometimes
provoke a resentment, to prevent all ill consequences from which, the prisoner is
still at liberty, if he pleases, peremptorily to set him aside.' 19

The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers who
remain an impartial military court is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial
is maintained. ... 20
As we have hereinbefore stated, each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general courtmartial) is entitled to one peremptory challenge, 21 irrespective of the number of specifications
and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in common. Three overriding
reasons compel us to this conclusion.
First, a peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly,
honestly feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged by him cannot sit in
judgment over him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial. It is not enough
that objectively the members of the court may be fair and impartial. It is likewise necessary that
subjectively the accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers.
Because the petitioners may entertain grave doubts as to the fairness or impartiality of distinct,
separate and different individual members of the court-martial, it follows necessarily that each of
the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge.
Second, Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor does
it make the nature or number of specifications and/or charges a determinant. Reference is made
by the respondents here to US military law, in support of their argument that for each
specification jointly tried all of the accused are entitled to only one peremptory challenge and
with respect to all specifications tried in common each of the accused is entitled to one
peremptory challenge. We have carefully scrutinized U.S. military law, and it is unmistakable
from our reading thereof that each accused person, whether in a joint or common trial,
unquestionably enjoys the right to one peremptory challenge. 22
Third, a perceptive analysis of the companion articles 23 to Article 18 convinces us that the
word, "each side," as used in the said article in reference to the defense, should be construed to
mean each accused person. Thus, Articles of War 17 (Trial Judge Advocate to Prosecute;
Counsel to Defend), 19 (Oath), 21 (Refusal or Failure to Plead), 28 (Court to Announce Action),
29 (Closed Sessions), 30 (Method of Voting), and 36 (Irregularities Effect of), unequivocally
speak of and refer to the "accused" in the singular.
ACCORDINGLY, subject to our pronouncement that each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one
separate peremptory challenge, the present petition is denied. The temporary restraining order
issued by this Court on August 29, 1969 is hereby lifted. No pronouncement as to costs. .
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-12871

July 25, 1959

TIMOTEO V. CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO G. H. SALVA, respondent.
Baizas and Balderrama for petitioner.
City Attorney Francisco G. H. Salva in his own behalf.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction filed by Timoteo V. Cruz
against Francisco G. H. Salva, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Pasay City, to restrain him from
continuing with the preliminary investigation he was conducting in September, 1957 in
connection with the killing of Manuel Monroy which took place on June 15, 1953 in Pasay City.
To better understand the present case and its implications, the following facts gathered from the
pleadings and the memoranda filed by the parties, may be stated.
Following the killing of Manuel Monroy in 1953 a number of persons were accused as involved
and implicated in said crime. After a long trial, the Court of First Instance of Pasay City found
Oscar Castelo, Jose de Jesus, Hipolito Bonifacio, Bienvenido Mendoza, Francis Berdugo and
others guilty of the crime of murder and sentenced them to death. They all appealed the
sentence although without said appeal, in view of the imposition of the extreme penalty, the
case would have to be reviewed automatically by this Court. Oscar Castelo sought a new trial
which was granted and upon retrial, he was again found guilty and his former conviction of
sentence was affirmed and reiterated by the same trial court.
It seems that pending appeal, the late President Magsaysay ordered a reinvestigation of the
case. The purpose of said reinvestigation does not appear in the record. Anyway, intelligence
agents of the Philippine Constabulary and investigators of Malacaang conducted the
investigation for the Chief Executive, questioned a number of people and obtained what would
appear to be confession, pointing to persons, other than those convicted and sentenced by the
trial court, as the real killers of Manuel Monroy.
Counsel for Oscar Castelo and his co-defendants wrote to respondent Fiscal Salva to conduct a
reinvestigation of the case presumably on the basis of the affidavits and confessions obtained
by those who had investigated the case at the instance of Malacaang. Fiscal Salva conferred
with the Solicitor General as to what steps he should take. A conference was held with the

Secretary of Justice who decided to have the results of the investigation by the Philippine
Constabulary and Malacaang investigators made available to counsel for the appellants.
Taking advantage of this opportunity, counsel for the appellants filed a motion for new trial with
this Tribunal supporting the same with the so-called affidavits and confessions of some of those
persons investigated, such as the confessions of Sergio Eduardo y de Guzman, Oscar Caymo,
Pablo Canlas, and written statements of several others. By resolution of this Tribunal, action on
said motion for new trial was deferred until the case was studied and determined on the merits.
In the meantime, the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, head sent to the Office of Fiscal Salva
copies of the same affidavits and confessions and written statements, of which the motion for
new trial was based, and respondent Salva proceeded to conduct a reinvestigation designating
for said purposes a committee of three composed of himself as chairman and Assistant City
Attorneys Herminio A. Avendaio and Ernesto A. Bernabe.
In connection with said preliminary investigation being conducted by the committee, petitioner
Timoteo Cruz was subpoenaed by respondent to appear at his office on September 21, 1957, to
testify "upon oath before me in a certain criminal investigation to be conducted at the time and
place by this office against you and Sergio Eduardo, et al., for murder." On September 19, 1957,
petitioner Timoteo Cruz wrote to respondent Salva asking for the transfer of the preliminary
investigation from September 21, due to the fact that this counsel, Atty. Crispin Baizas, would
attend a hearing on that same day in Naga City. Acting upon said request for postponement,
Fiscal Salva set the preliminary investigation on September 24. On that day, Atty. Baizas
appeared for petitioner Cruz, questioned the jurisdiction of the committee, particularly
respondent Salva, to conduct the preliminary investigation in view of the fact that the same case
involving the killing of Manuel Monroy was pending appeal in this Court, and on the same day
filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition. This Tribunal gave due course to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition and upon the filing of a cash bond of P200.00 issued a writ
of preliminary injunction thereby stopping the preliminary investigation being conducted by
respondent Salva.
The connection, if any, that petitioner Cruz had with the preliminary investigation being
conducted by respondent Salva and his committee was that affidavits and confessions sent to
Salva by the Chief, Philippine Constabulary, and which were being investigated, implicated
petitioner Cruz, even picturing him as the instigator and mastermind in the killing of Manuel
Monroy.
The position taken by petitioner Cruz in this case is that inasmuch as the principal case
of People vs. Oscar Castelo, et al., G.R. No. L-10794, is pending appeal and consideration
before us, no court, much less a prosecuting attorney like respondent Salva, had any right or
authority to conduct a preliminary investigation or reinvestigation of the case for that would be
obstructing the administration of justice and interferring with the consideration on appeal of the
main case wherein appellants had been found guilty and convicted and sentenced; neither had
respondent authority to cite him to appear and testify at said investigation.

Respondent Salva, however, contends that if he subpoenaed petitioner Cruz at all, it was
because of the latter's oral and personal request to allow him to appear at the investigation with
his witnesses for his own protection, possibly, to controvert and rebut any evidence therein
presented against him. Salva claims that were it not for this request and if, on the contrary,
Timoteo Cruz had expressed any objection to being cited to appear in the investigation he
(Salva) would never have subpoenaed him.
Although petitioner Cruz now stoutly denies having made such request that he be allowed to
appear at the investigation, we are inclined to agree with Fiscal Salva that such a request had
been made. Inasmuch as he, Timoteo Cruz, was deeply implicated in the killing of Manuel
Monroy by the affidavits and confessions of several persons who were being investigated by
Salva and his committee, it was but natural that petitioner should have been interested, even
desirous of being present at that investigation so that he could face and cross examine said
witnesses and affiants when they testified in connection with their affidavits or confessions,
either repudiating, modifying or ratifying the same. Moreover, in the communication, addressed
to respondent Salva asking that the investigation, scheduled for September 21, 1957, be
postponed because his attorney would be unable to attend, Timoteo Cruz expressed no
opposition to the subpoena, not even a hint that he was objecting to his being cited to appear at
the investigation.
As to the right of respondent Salva to conduct the preliminary investigation which he and his
committee began ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened though nominally,
for according to respondent, two government attorneys had been designed by the Secretary of
Justice to handle the prosecution in the trial of the case in the court below, is tried and decided
and it is appealed to a higher court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said
fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the government by the Office of the
Solicitor General. Consequently, there would be no reason or occasion for said fiscal to conduct
a reinvestigation to determine criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.
However, in the present case, respondent has, in our opinion, established a justification for his
reinvestigation because according to him, in the original criminal case against Castelo, et al.,
one of the defendants named Salvador Realista y de Guzman was not included for the reason
that he was arrested and was placed within the jurisdiction of the trial court only after the trial
against the other accused had commenced, even after the prosecution had rested its case and
the defense had begun to present its evidence. Naturally, Realista remained to stand trial. The
trial court, according to respondent, at the instance of Realista, had scheduled the hearing at an
early date, that is in August, 1957. Respondent claims that before he would go to trial in the
prosecution of Realista he had to chart his course and plan of action, whether to present the
same evidence, oral and documentary, presented in the original case and trial, or, in view of the
new evidence consisting of the affidavits and confessions sent to him by the Philippine
Constabulary, he should first assess and determine the value of said evidence by conducting an
investigation and that should he be convinced that the persons criminally responsible for the
killing of Manuel Monroy were other than those already tried and convicted, like Oscar Castelo

and his co-accused and co-appellants, including Salvador Realista, then he might act
accordingly and even recommend the dismissal of the case against Realista.
In this, we are inclined to agree with respondent Salva. For, as contended by him and as
suggested by authorities, the duty and role of prosecuting attorney is not only to prosecute and
secure the conviction of the guilty but also to protect the innocent.
We cannot overemphasize the necessity of close scrutiny and investigation of the
prosecuting officers of all cases handled by them, but whilst this court is averse to any
form of vacillation by such officers in the prosecution of public offenses, it is
unquestionable that they may, in appropriate cases, in order to do justice and avoid
injustice, reinvestigate cases in which they have already filed the corresponding
informations. In the language of Justice Sutherland of the Supreme Court of the United
States, theprosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling
as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall
not escape nor innocent suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike had blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a
wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one. (69
United States law Review, June, 1935, No. 6, p. 309, cited in the case of Suarez vs.
Platon, 69 Phil., 556)
With respect to the right of respondent Salva to cite petitioner to appear and testify before him at
the scheduled preliminary investigation, under the law, petitioner had a right to be present at
that investigation since as was already stated, he was more or less deeply involved and
implicated in the killing of Monroy according to the affiants whose confessions, affidavits and
testimonies respondent Salva was considering or was to consider at said preliminary
investigation. But he need not be present at said investigation because his presence there
implies, and was more of a right rather than a duty or legal obligation. Consequently, even if, as
claimed by respondent Salva, petitioner expressed the desire to be given an opportunity to be
present at the said investigation, if he latter changed his mind and renounced his right, and even
strenuously objected to being made to appear at said investigation, he could not be compelled
to do so.
Now we come to the manner in which said investigation was conducted by the respondent. If, as
contended by him, the purpose of said investigation was only to acquaint himself with and
evaluate the evidence involved in the affidavits and confessions of Sergio Eduardo, Cosme
Camo and others by questioning them, then he, respondent, could well have conducted the
investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and without much fanfare, much less publicity.

However, according to the petitioner and not denied by the respondent, the investigation was
conducted not in respondent's office but in the session hall of the Municipal Court of Pasay City
evidently, to accommodate the big crowd that wanted to witness the proceeding, including
members of the press. A number of microphones were installed. Reporters were everywhere
and photographers were busy taking pictures. In other words, apparently with the permission of,
if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers and newsmen had a filed day.
Not only this, but in the course of the investigation, as shown by the transcript of the
stenographic notes taken during said investigation, on two occasions, the first, after Oscar
Caymo had concluded his testimony respondent Salva, addressing the newspapermen said,
"Gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask questions I am willing to let you do so and the
question asked will be reproduced as my own"; and the second, after Jose Maratella y de
Guzman had finished testifying and respondent Salva, addressing the newsmen, again said,
"Gentlemen of the press is free to ask questions as ours." Why respondent was willing to
abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and address the questions to the
witnesses under investigation, in favor of the members of the press, is difficult for us to
understand, unless he, respondent, wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his
investigation as much as possible. Fortunately, the gentlemen of the press to whom he
accorded such unusual privilege and favor appeared to have wisely and prudently declined the
offer and did not ask questions, this according to the transcript now before us.
But, the newspapers certainly played up and gave wide publicity to what took place during the
investigation, and this involved headlines and extensive recitals, narrations of and comments on
the testimonies given by the witnesses as well as vivid descriptions of the incidents that took
place during the investigation. It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for the killing of
Manuel Monroy which had already been tried and finally determined by the lower court and
which was under appeal and advisement by this Tribunal, was being retried and redetermined in
the press, and all with the apparent place and complaisance of respondent.
Frankly, the members of this Court were greatly disturbed and annoyed by such publicity and
sensationalism, all of which may properly be laid at the door of respondent Salva. In this, he
committed what was regard a grievous error and poor judgment for which we fail to find any
excuse or satisfactory explanation. His actuations in this regard went well beyond the bounds of
prudence, discretion and good taste. It is bad enough to have such undue publicity when a
criminal case is being investigated by the authorities, even when it being tried in court; but when
said publicity and sensationalism is allowed, even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and
is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent,
and this Court, in the interest of justice, is constrained and called upon to put an end to it and a
deterrent against its repetition by meting an appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty to
the one liable.
Some of the members of the Court who appeared to feel more strongly than the others favored
the imposition of a more or less severe penal sanction. After mature deliberation, we have finally
agreed that a public censure would, for the present, be sufficient.

In conclusion, we find and hold that respondent Salva was warranted in holding the preliminary
investigation involved in this case, insofar as Salvador Realista is concerned, for which reason
the writ of preliminary injunction issued stopping said preliminary investigation, is dissolved; that
in view of petitioner's objection to appear and testify at the said investigation, respondent may
not compel him to attend said investigation, for which reason, the subpoena issued by
respondent against petitioner is hereby set aside.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted in part and denied in
part. Considering the conclusion arrived at by us, respondent Francisco G. H. Salva is hereby
publicly reprehended and censured for the uncalled for and wide publicity and sensationalism
that he had given to and allowed in connection with his investigation, which we consider and
find to be contempt of court; and, furthermore, he is warned that a repetition of the same would
meet with a more severe disciplinary action and penalty. No costs.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Barrera, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 90083 October 4, 1990
KHALYXTO PEREZ MAGLASANG, accused-petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Presiding Judge ERNESTO B. TEMPLADO (San Carlos
City Court), Negros Occidental, respondents.
Marceliano L. Castellano for petitioner.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
On June 22, 1989, a petition for certiorari 1 entitled "Khalyxto Perez Maglasang vs. People of
the Philippines, Presiding Judge, Ernesto B. Templado (San Carlos City Court) Negros
Occidental," was filed by registered mail with the Court. Due to non-compliance with the
requirements of Circular No. 1-88 of the Court, specifically the non- payment of P316.50 for the
legal fees and the non-attachment of the duplicate originals or duly certified true copies of the
questioned decision and orders of the respondent judge denying the motion for reconsideration,
the Court dismissed the petition on July 26, 1989. 2
On September 9, 1989, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a
reconsideration of the resolution dismissing the petition. 3 This time, the amount of P316.50 was
remitted and the Court was furnished with a duplicate copy of the respondent judge's decision,
and also the IBP O.R. No. and the date of the payment of his membership dues. The motion for
reconsideration did not contain the duplicate original or certified true copies of the assailed
orders. Thus, in a Resolution dated October 18, 1989, the motion for reconsideration was
denied "with FINALITY." 4
Three months later, or on January 22, 1990 to be exact, the Court received from Atty. Castellano
a copy of a complaint dated December 19, 1989, filed with the Office of the President of the
Philippines whereby Khalyxto Perez Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as
complainant, accused all the five Justices of the Court's Second Division with "biases and/or
ignorance of the law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution." 5The complaint was
signed by Atty. Castellano "for the complainant" with the conformity of one Calixto B.
Maglasang, allegedly the father of accused-complainant Khalyxto. 6 By reason of the strong and
intemperate language of the complaint and its improper filing with the Office of the President,
which, as he should know as a lawyer, has no jurisdiction to discipline, much more, remove,
Justices of the Supreme Court, on February 7, 1990, Atty. Castellano was required to show
cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt with for improper
conduct. 7 On March 21, 1990, Atty. Castellano filed by registered mail his "Opposition To Cite
For Contempt Or Administratively Dealt With For An Improper Conduct (sic)." 8

In his "Opposition", Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint "was a constructive criticism
intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices
concerned, as Respondents (sic). 9 Atty. Castellano further disputed the authority and
jurisdiction of the Court in issuing the Resolution requiring him to show cause inasmuch as "they
are Respondents in this particular case and no longer as Justices and as such they have no
more jurisdiction to give such order." 10 Thus, according to him, "the most they (Justices) can do
by the mandate of the law and procedure (sic) is to answer the complaint satisfactorily so that
they will not be punished in accordance with the law just like a common tao." 11
Notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a "constructive criticism," the Court finds the
various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint he lodged with the Office of the
President of the Philippines and in his "Opposition" filed with the Court portions of which read as
follows:
VI
That with all these injustices of the 2nd Division, as assigned to that most
Honorable Supreme Court, the complainant was legally constrained to file this
Administrative Complaint to our Motherly President who is firm and determined to
phase-out all the scalawags (Marcos Appointees and Loyalists) still in your
administration without bloodshed but by honest and just investigations, which the
accused-complainant concurs to such procedure and principle, or otherwise, he
could have by now a rebel with the undersigned with a cause for
being maliciously deprived or unjustly denied of Equal Justice to be heard by our
Justices designated to the Highest and most Honorable Court of the Land
(Supreme Court); 12 (Emphasis ours.)
VII
That the Honorable Supreme Court as a Court has no fault at all for being
Constitutionally created, but the Justices assigned therein are fallables (sic),
being bias (sic), playing ignorance of the law and knowingly rendering unjust
Resolutions the reason observed by the undersigned and believed by him in
good faith, is that they are may be Marcos-appointees, whose common intention
is to sabotage the Aquino Administration and to rob from innocent Filipino people
the genuine Justice and Democracy, so that they will be left in confusion and
turmoil to their advantage and to the prejudice of our beloved President's honest,
firm and determined Decision to bring back the real Justice in all our Courts, for
the happiness, contentment and progress of your people and the only country
which God has given us. PHILIPPINES. 13 (Emphasis ours.)
VIII
That all respondents know the law and the pure and simple meaning of Justice,
yet they refused to grant to the poor and innocent accused-complainant, so to
save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B.
Templado, . . . 14
IX

. . . If such circulars were not known to the undersigned, it's the fault of the
Justices of the Honorable Supreme Court, the dismissal of the petition was
based more of money reasons. . . . This is so for said Equal Justice is our very
Breath of Life to every Filipino, who is brave to face the malicious acts of the
Justices of the Second Division, Supreme Court. By reason of fear for the truth
Respondents ignore the equal right of the poor and innocent-accused
(complainant) to be heard against the rich and high-ranking person in our
Judiciary to be heard in equal justice in our Honorable Court, for the respondents
is too expensive and can't be reached by an ordinary man for the Justices therein
areinconsiderate, extremely strict and meticulous to the common tao and hereby
grossly violate their Oath of Office and our Constitution "to give all possible help
and means to give equal Justice to any man, regardless of ranks and status in
life" 15 (Emphasis ours.)
xxx xxx xxx
5. That the undersigned had instantly without delay filed a Motion for
Reconsideration to the Resolution which carries with it a final denial of his appeal
by complying (sic) all the requirements needed for a valid appeal yet the
respondents denied just the same which legally hurt the undersigned in the name
of Justice, for the Respondents-Justices, were so strict or inhumane and
soinconsiderate that there despensation (sic) of genuine justice was too far and
beyond the reach of the Accused-Appellant, as a common tao, as proved by
records of both cases mentioned above. 16
xxx xxx xxx
D. That by nature a contempt order is a one sided weapon commonly abused by
Judges and Justices, against practicing lawyers, party-litigants and all Filipino
people in general for no Judges or Justices since the beginning of our Court
Records were cited for contempt by any presiding Judge. That this weapon if
maliciously applied is a cruel means to silence a righteous and innocent
complainant and to favor any person with close relation. 17
scurrilous and contumacious. His allegations that the Court in dismissing his petition did
so "to save their brethren in rank and office (Judiciary) Judge Ernesto B. Templado," and
that the dismissal was "based more for (sic) money reasons;" and his insinuation that the
Court maintains a double standard in dispensing justice one set for the rich and
another for the poor went beyond the bounds of "constructive criticism." They are not
relevant to the cause of his client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court's
integrity as a neutral and final arbiter of all justiciable controversies brought before it.
Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in resolving complaints yields only to the
records before it and not to any extraneous influence as he disparagingly intimates.
It bears stress that the petition was dismissed initially by the Court for the counsel's failure to
fully comply with the requirements laid down in Circular No. 1-88, a circular on expeditious
disposition of cases, adopted by the Court on November 8, 1988, but effective January 1, 1989,
after due publication. It is true that Atty. Castellano later filed on behalf of his client a motion for
reconsideration and remitted the necessary legal fees, 18 furnished the Court with a duplicate
original copy of the assailed trial court's decision, 19 and indicated his IBP O.R. No. and the date

he paid his dues. 20 But he still fell short in complying fully with the requirements of Circular No.
1-88. He failed to furnish the Court with duplicate original or duty certified true copies of the
other questioned orders issued by the respondent trial court judge. At any rate, the explanation
given by Atty. Castellano did not render his earlier negligence excusable. Thus, as indicated in
our Resolution dated October 18, 1989 which denied with finality his motion for reconsideration,
"no valid or compelling reason (having been) adduced to warrant the reconsideration sought."
Precisely, under paragraph 5 of Circular No. 1-88 it is provided that "(S)ubsequent compliance
with the above requirements will not warrant reconsideration of the order of dismissal unless it
be shown that such non-compliance was due to compelling reasons."
It is clear that the case was lost not by the alleged injustices Atty. Castellano irresponsibly
ascribed to the members of the Court's Second Division, but simply because of his inexcusable
negligence and incompetence. Atty. Castellano, however, seeks to pass on the blame for his
deficiencies to the Court, in the hope of salvaging his reputation before his client. Unfortunately,
the means by which Atty. Castellano hoped to pass the buck so to speak, are grossly improper.
As an officer of the Court, he should have known better than to smear the honor and integrity of
the Court just to keep the confidence of his client. Time and again we have emphasized that a
"lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics." 21 Thus, "while a lawyer must advocate his client's cause in utmost
earnest and with the maximum skill he can marshal, he is not at liberty to resort to arrogance,
intimidation, and innuendo." 22
To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms. After all, it is through the
criticism of its actions that the Court, composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever
mistake it may have unwittingly committed. But then again, "[i]t is the cardinal condition of all
such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander
of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross
violation of the duty of respect to courts." 23 In this regard, it is precisely provided under
Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that:
CANON 11-A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE
TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON
SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
xxx xxx xxx
RULE 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menancing
language or behavior before the courts.
RULE 11.04 A lawyer should not attribute to a judge motives not supported by
the record or have materiality to the case.
xxx xxx xxx
We further note that in filing the "complaint" against the justices of the Court's Second Division,
even the most basic tenet of our government system the separation of powers between the

judiciary, the executive, and the legislative branches has been lost on Atty. Castellano. We
therefore take this occasion to once again remind all and sundry that "the Supreme Court is
supreme the third great department of government entrusted exclusively with the judicial
power to adjudicate with finality all justiciable disputes, public and private. No other department
or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them 'unjust.'" 24 Consequently, and owing to
the foregoing, not even the President of the Philippines as Chief Executive may pass judgment
on any of the Court's acts.
Finally, Atty. Castellano's assertion that the complaint "was a constructive criticism intended to
correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices, concerned as
Respondents (sic)" is but a last minute effort to sanitize his clearly unfounded and irresponsible
accusation. The arrogance displayed by counsel in insisting that the Court has no jurisdiction to
question his act of having complained before the Office of the President, and in claiming that a
contempt order is used as a weapon by judges and justices against practicing lawyers, however,
reveals all too plainly that he was not honestly motivated in his criticism. Rather, Atty.
Castellano's complaint is a vilification of the honor and integrity of the Justices of the Second
Division of the Court and an impeachment of their capacity to render justice according to law.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Marceliano L. Castellano is found guilty of CONTEMPT OF COURT and
IMPROPER CONDUCT as a member of the Bar and an officer of the Court, and is hereby
ordered to PAY within fifteen (15) days from and after the finality of this Resolution a fine of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos, or SUFFER ten (10) days imprisonment in the municipal jail of
Calatrava, Negros Occidental in case he fails to pay the fine seasonably, and SUSPENDED
from the practice of law throughout the Philippines for six (6) months as soon as this Resolution
becomes final, with a WARNING that a repetition of any misconduct on his part will be dealt with
more severely. Let notice of this Resolution be entered in Atty. Castellano's record, and be
served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Court of Appeals, and the Executive Judges
of the Regional Trial Courts and other Courts of the country, for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes,
Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., Paras and Feliciano, JJ., is on leave.