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This
SOLMSEN
through which in the last thirty years several scholars have advanced our understandingof the evidence for Zeno of Elea and
in particular of the verbatim preserved fragments. In fact my intention is not to replace theories by other theories but to create
doubt about matters that for some time have been taken for granted
and to change confident assumptions into hypotheses that would
tolerate others besides them.
Accounts of Zeno's philosophy generally take as their starting
point some well known statements at the beginning of Plato's Parmenides.1Given the paucity of reports bearing on his work as a whole,
the information here vouchsafed about its content and purpose
must seem priceless.It also seems authoritative, the idea of examining
it critically almost sacrilegious. Zeno, we here read, wrote against
those who ridiculed the thesis of his master Parmenides that "all is
one"s;2 the opponents tried to discredit this thesis by pointing out
contradictions and "ridiculous" consequences resulting from the
Parmenidean "One." In return Zeno took the adversaries' position
that "there are many" as basis for his reasoning, deducing from
it in each of his arguments contradictions and other results even more
"ridiculous" than what the opponents had found in Parmenides'
theory.
It is easy to see why this testimony is so irresistible. Plato himself
* On earlier versions of this study, including one submitted to a meeting,
I have received valuable comments from more scholars than I can name. I
must however mention my obligations to Harold Cherniss, Alexander Mourelatos, and most of all to Gregory Vlastos, who twice sent me extensive critical
comments and suggestions, with the result that little has remained unchanged.
Acknowledgement in every particular point was impossible and in spite of my
large debt the responsibility for the opinions expressed is entirely mine. - I
greatly regret that on many topics important in themselves, but peripheral
to my subject, I had to be briefer and more dogmatic than I like to be.
IParm. 127 d6 -128 e4, esp. 127e8- 128b6.
2 I CtlVL Tr n&V (128 a 8); b la'LV (d 1; cf. d 6).
116
117
humorwould guarantee the correctunderstandingof a philosophicalendeavor. But it is perhapsmoreprofitableto develop Frankel'sdoubts "as
to how much (Plato), or his readersfor that matter, would be interested
in problems of mere historicity."7For these doubts apply even farther
than Frankel may be inclined to think. Would Plato really wish
to make sure that his readers had a correct knowledge of what Zeno's
treatise intended and achieved? Had he carefully and with something
approaching philological accuracy worked his way through all u'Ioin the treatise and found out to his satisfaction what purpose
@Nmtq
they served? Does he now, to communicate this discovery to the
readers, use the dramatic device of making Socrates ask whether
his interpretation is correct and Zeno confirm that in substance
it is? Why anyhow must this be more, or much more, than a dramatic
device - especially if the device has a bearing on the later developments
in the dialogue?
Actually we see how Socrates arrives at his view about Zeno's
treatise. After making Zeno repeat something that he said in his
treatise, he quite tentatively goes first one step and then another
beyond the actual words, and while thus advancing pedelemptim
asks at each stage: "is this what you mean?" (ok ou'h XkycL4;127 e 4;
ou&rco
?kyeLg128 a 1)8 or "is this the purpose of your arguments"
(&pxSroT6 &aTv8 Poiov'owcaou ot X6yol; 127 e 8 f.)? Could it be made
passage )iYELq by "say," in the latter by "mean." For reasons connected with
the subject of the next note I should prefer "mean" in both instances.
9While Parm. 127 e 1 ff.: el nro)Ac&OaLv
T& 6VTO, &p6 z 8Ct OC&m6o.otLtdC ttVai xod
&v61.OLawas obviously one of Zeno's paradoxical conclusions, what follows in
has no parallel in the fragPlato beginning with the words 'ro53ro&i 80 &Kvacrov
ments and should not be included in a collection of these, pace H. D. P. Lee
(Zeno of Elea, Cambridge, 1936, repr. Amsterdam 1967, 20; 32; see however
the reservations 29), who incidentally omits the tell-tale 8&. I agree with the
judgment of Guido Calogero (Studi sull' Eleatismo, Rome, 1932, 108 n. 1; see
ibid. for earlier discussions). Cornford (see note 8) seems to side with Lee.
118
O'UX '=LV;
10
"As if any philosopher could ever understand his predecessors in this sense,"
scil. as Aristotle had been expected to understand Plato (Jaeger, Aristotle,
translated by Richard Robinson, Oxford 2, 1948.3). I am not aware of any
instance to the contrary. Historical reconstruction of earlier systems has become
so natural to us that we forget how exceptional it is. Having like other historical
studies developed in the early 19th century (from roots in the Romantic and
in Germany also in the Classical movement), it has been practised by a few
generations of scholars and may yet remain an "episode." Cf. nn. 6, 14, 18.
11 For what follows cf. Cherniss, Philos. Rev. 59 (1950), 376; Leonardo Taran,
Parmenides, A Text with Translation etc. (Princeton, 1965) 188 ff., 269 ff.,
who inter alia points out that Plato's misrepresentation was known to ancient
commentators. See further Alexander Mourelatos, The Route of Parmenides
(New Haven and London, 1970) 130 ff. and Calogero, Storia della logica antica
1 (Bari, 1967) 172 ff. Cornford, op. cit. 35 postulated "that which is is one"
as a "premiss for which Parmenides gives no proof." His opinion has not
enjoyed much favor and was refuted by G. E. L. Owen, Cl.Q., n.s. 10 (1960),
92, who finds in B 8.22-25 the proof for fv, ouvcxk of B 8. 6. Owen in turn is
criticized by Taran, op. cit. 107. In my opinion his theory carries more (or more
immediate) conviction for uve9X.
119
is the crucial choice for him, and in the light of it we are bound to read
the most informative fragment B 8 as setting up Being, not by any
means One, in new and unheard of glory (just as conversely the
exalted status given to the k6vin B 8 throws light back on the meaning
of 1=1 favoring some of the currently advocated interpretations
rather than others). Moreover there is nothing in Parmenides to
support an identity of &6vand 6v or to suggest for the "oneness"
of the &6v a preferential status among its numerous predicates or
a,uLavoc.In truth the first and fundamental predicates are 'ykvov
and &vc&?elpov(B 8.3); of the others some aresubsidiaryto these, some
additional. In whichever of these two groups tLouvoyev4
(B 8.4) is,'"
its status is certainly no more exalted than that of oUov, 'clrpetg,
(v. 26), oux m8?eu&k(v. 33) and some others auvexk6(v. 6), aMXIv7Zov
gv in v. 6 should probably be connected with the immediately following uveX, i.e. as referring to intrinsic unity (compactness,homogeneity) rather than uniqueness. If we have to distinguish between
more and less important predicates, the former would presumably be
those supported by special arguments, i.e. in addition to the pair
already mentioned o3 tcacper6v(= auveXik,vv. 22-25) and tao7racXi
(vv. 44-49). Plato himself refers in a different context to the repudiation of the tLN&6vas Parmenides' characteristic doctrine, and again
elsewhere the Eleatics as a group uphold the Iv which "stands in itself."'3 We cannot here follow up these variations but may now say
that by identifying Parmenides' thesis as tv 9=tv Plato has got his
12For my reading of v. 4 see "The 'Eleatic One' in Melissus," Mededelingen
Nederlandse Akad., n.r. 32 (1969) 221 n. 1; for v. 6 Olof Gigon, Der Ursprung
d. griech. Philosophie von Hesiod bis Parmenides (Basel, 1945) 261. The strongest
argument for a prominent place of "the One" may be found in B 8.53 where
the positing of two Foppat is the first and cardinal error of human 86kL. Here
Parmenides does turn - not actually against pluralism but against dualism, a
significant difference, as has been pointed out to me (see now Mourelatos,
op. cit. 132). Moreover the motivation need not be a particularly strong attachment of Parmenides himself to monism but that the two "forms" and the
struck him as the pervasive error of
allied doctrine of "opposites" ('r&v'rLx)
earlier doctrines, and I think we understand why, although U. Holscher would
not agree (see his A nfdngliches Fragen, Gottingen, 1968, 9 ff., 111, 168 and pass.).
13 See Soph. 237 a 4 ff. yet also 242 d 5 f.; Theaet. 180 d 8 ff. In the Sophistes
we see how in an examination of Parmenides' Being its relation to the One
and other concepts becomes a problem (I cannot digress into this subject
but refer to F. M. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, London, 1935, 218;
Taran, op. cit., 273).
120
A few more examples may illustrate Plato's lack of concern with "historicity."
If we had to rely for Heraclitus on Plato we would be satisfied with 6-r 7t&vMx
XCapet xccl ov8iv ILivEL(Crat. 402 a) and cLg-r6 8v 7ro)X&ire xxl (v ka'L (Soph. 242 e)
as his doctrines. And Legg. 10.887 a ff. would lead us to think of the Presocratics in general as thoroughgoing materialists for whom everything happens
'6xn and mechanically, intelligence or gods contributing nothing.
15 For details see my recent study cited above (n. 12) 221 ff., yet with the
modifications now made necessary by Mourelatos, op. cit., 132 f.
14
121
122
965 b - 966 a.
21
123
2"Of the Platonic triad &ya#6v, 6v and hv the first is wholly his own - unless
we prefer to regard it as a legacy of the Socratic search - the second significantly
indebted to the Eleatics, and the third, it would seem to me, only in its later
stages related to aspects of Eleatic thought. Plato's original pre-occupation
with the &yam6vand moral values in general has left its imprint on his theory of
the Xv,perhaps also of the 6v, or rather of the true 6rac, the Forms whose quality
of perfection has an axiological nuance different from Parmenides' 'r-rexscI?ivov (B 8.42). See Plato himself Resp. 6.509 b. Even
as
&nXCeLvO
'6j o6ot(ct (ibid.) the different provenience of the two concepts should be borne
in mind, although it does not suffice to explain the meaning of this thought.
See also H. J. Krwmer, Arete bei Plato und Aristoteles (Heidelberg, 1959) 143,
507 ff., 523 ff.
" For the "second generation" Eleatics see above p. 121. We should perhaps
make more effort than has been customary to compare and contrast the changing
relation of 6v and Evin Eleatic thought and a similar development in the Platonic
Academy. To what extent Plato himself - especially the "esoteric" Plato participated in this development is vigorously debated today. We do not go
into the problem but have noted Plato's probing of the conceptual relation
between 6v and *vin the Sophistes (n. 13).
124
What, then, was the actual relation between Zeno's thought and
Parmenides? Several answers may be given but before we formulate
them, some additional evidence must be analyzed.
For, it may be asked, is the testimony of the Parmenidesnot confirmed by other phases of the tradition about Zeno? There are reasons
for taking this view, and we must examine whether they are as good
as they look. Aristotle's treatises offer nothing pertinent,27nor does
any other extant author prior to the fifth century A. D. provide a
verbatim quotation. Proclus in his commentary on the Parmenides
knows the number of Zeno's arguments to have been forty, whereas
Elias puts the total figure at forty-five, asserting that all of them were
designed to support the doctrine of Parmenides, forty by proving
26
27
125
6v, the other five 6s& &axtvov 'r 6v.28These testimonies hardly
deserve more attention than they have received. We may immediately
pass on to Simplicius whose commentary on Aristotle's Physics is
by all odds our most important source of information for Zeno.
Whether Simplicius had the entire treatise of Zeno at his disposal
is a question on which I have nothing new to say.29 Still besides
presenting passages from it in the original wording, he also professes
to know the content of the treatise and the intention in which it was
written. This knowledge enables him more than once to pronounce on
controversial issues. His comments on Phys. A 3, 187 a 1 include his
fullest statement on the general tenor of Zeno's work; therefore Diels
many years after he had edited that part of Simplicius' commentary
incorporated this statement among the "testimonia"in his Fragmente
der Vorsokratiker.30
What Simplicius here says agrees with the Parseem
It
menides. might
to confirm Plato's testimony and clinch the
case - if the agreement were not so complete that it is bound to engender suspicion. We place this passage of Simplicius as presented
by Diels in the Vorsokratikerand Parm. 128 c 6 - d 6 side by side:
&nttlv!
-aL4Lraka.
'r&
ypa'.qi.-
lI
HptLvt8ou )6yq) np6p 'ro'
k=XeEpoU-v'rqa&r6v xtup8?cZv
26
Cf. 29 A 15 Diels-Kranz.
29There is probably still more than a grain of truth in Wilamowitz's memorable
words about Simplicius as the "brave Mann" who "in zwolfter Stunde... diese
Bucher (scil. of Parmenides, Empedocles, Eudemus, etc.) aufschlug" which
"seit Jahrhunderten ungelesen, immer noch in der Schulbibliothek lagen" and
who saved the priceless fragments (Die griechische Literatur des Altertums in
Die Kultur der Gegenwart, ed. P. Hinneberg, I 8, 3rd ed., 1911 and 1924, 283.).
Yet we can no longer consider 529 as the year in which the Academy was
closed (see Alan Cameron's brilliant paper in Proc. CambridgePhilol. Soc., n.s.
15, 1969, 7 ff.).
3029 A 23 = Simpl. in Phys., 134. 2-8.
31 The meaning and context in Aristotle are barely relevant for us. Briefly,
some thinkers posit a ILh5v to save plurality and at the same time counter
Zeno's demonstration of infinite divisibility by setting up "indivisibles."
Simplicius believes Aristotle to have Xenocrates in mind; the modem interpreters recognize the position described as that of the atomists; see e.g. Cherniss,
Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (Baltimore, 1935) 75 n. 203;
W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford, 1936) 480 f.; Furley, op. cit. (n. 3),
1967, 81 f.
126
Et IV
cL,
Ot&.
CVXT CL
Oi V
7Wp6k 'Lov
'c ito)a)4c
ypOa-uLO
'O
?yov-
X4XI &V'CX7VO8(8C.)aLTOU"a
7VXc(C),
xaol
q
'OUTO
XOCL
ro pouX6O'?vov 8Xoi3v
rt y6XoL6fpo
7rXa)OL
V XToU'V
,rr
llcxp[ev(8oo
),6ycp
7rp6q
rou'g
?seXLpoi5vTag
~aurv xcqup&etv W'
?L IV I=L't, 7MOXX&xacl yexota
ar.&-
- Xyc6yxal &cKv'r((x
a3o(vet ,yer.v32
caUTii, aetxv1J o Z6
vcv
av ociV,vw
7r&6eaLq... (DK 29 A 23)
7&aXfOL ye),OL6'?px
'~ 67r6&5ccrLc...
(A few more clauses show the same relation between the texts).
The agreement is so close that there can be only one opinion about
the relationship of the two passages, and we would form this opinion
even if Simplicius' own words did not guide us to it. For after the
passage which Diels included in the VorsokratikerSimplicius continues:
sz&at Yap oi^4 o Znvwv ' rc HXMt,avoG
(OVEat
[hppEvE8n caprupc&dv
'rj- X6ycp.3'The Zeno of the Platonic Parmenides and the historical
32
127
8)O(L
xocl
?uOou
?(
taOIJv
7tO?T
0
(?LV,
L*xaov
=Lyvq JV 08
&ElOtoUx 4icto
?()v
LteCPLau, rAv
0p?xpot)bLevov
8d
few words of explanation, especially since LSJ does not provide the
What Eudemus has in mind is
appropriate meaning of x njyopLx6;.38
Simplicius' next point is that the passage in the Physics on which he is commenting would lose its meaning if Zeno wrote to prove the existence of "the
many" and to disprove "the One." His reasoning would not permit conclusions
about Zeno's treatise, even if his understanding of the Physics were still valid
(see however above n. 31).
37 For Eudemus cf. Fritz Wehrli, Die Schule des Aristoteks, Heft 8, frg. 37a with
commentary.
38 Lee's (cf. n. 9) rendering: "called many categorically" makes no sense;
yet his own frg. 8 (19.3 ff.) and the fuller version of Eudemus' comments in
Simplicius 97.11-29 (see Wehrli loc. cit.) puts the connection of the adjective
with Aristotle's categories beyond doubt. That Zeno did not think in terms
36
128
yu1VoMLxGc
17rLXeLPouv-ra...
Soon
however he turns to the attack and remembering the Parmenides,
continues: &v FV'&ToL TP aUYyyp0pLVL0VL
aUTOU7tOO)c (oXVt7rLXeLpvuC
xa.'
&xc'ov
8?eLxVual41 60st
'&
&7aopouiwv'(139.3-5).
xiyrv (ibid. 5-7). Next he refers (without actually quoting the text)
to one such CLtyetp-0p
which proves "the many" to be large as to be
infinite in size and small as to be of no size.42It is in the course of
this proof, he informs us, that the argument reported by Eudemus
of Aristotle's categories is obvious; cf. Tannery (see below n. 50) 261. Lee,
instead of making this simple point, speculates about "fifth century eristics"
(p. 28).
39 Metaph. B 4, 1001 b 7-13 (part of Vorsokratiker 29 A 21; Lee 4). Cf. U.
Schoebe, Quaestiones Eudemeae (Diss., Halle, 1931) 56. For Aristotle's own
conception of FT'ytLn which influences his interpretation of Zeno see Metaph.
A6,1016 b 23 ff. (cf. Furley, op. cit. in. n. 3, 47 f.).
40 "Confusion," Frankel 17 ("verworren"... "Unklarheit" 214 n. 1); "clumsiness," Vlastos, loc. cit. (n. 5) 198 n. 1.
41 Cf. P1., Parm. 127 e 11 (Simplicius uses &7tXe[pcLcx
instead of Plato's -rexu.pLwV,
which would no longer be the right word). The yupvatim motif too goes back to
the Parmenides (135 d - 136 a).
42 Ibid., 139.7-9; cf. Vorsokrat. 29 B 1 (to be discussed below pp. 131 ff.).
129
and used for such unwelcome purpose occurs. He next presents this
argument as a whole, beginning with the conclusion, but first in his
own words: o? ',m ,uey6&oq 'TE7xxo ,u 6Yxoq o'8EE &ColV, Oa'
aV ?t6 'oiVro (139.10). Now Zeno himself is allowed to speak: et yXP
&?p
6v't
(Lal)
Ou.)V
npoayiVOL'rO,
(LCLOV
=rL*LCV
lyk&oU
Li0UVVXL
coiq
y&p 0gev6O 6vro0, tpoayev%Ofvou 8i o68v ol6v -re ?et
oui8v ?tn.- et 8 &7COYLvopvo)'r6
iv
'z 7rpOnoayw6ILvov
xax ou',
4OCi7rpOOyLVOjLe'Vot
8)9)OV 6L Tr6
ITEpov [T86v Itr'OV 9a'rXL
OU'C?XL,
(ib. 11-15 = Vorsokr.
7rpoayev6jLevovou86v 0v ou' '6 &3toyev6jLevov
29 B 2). The full text of this painful argument having been presented,
Simplicius once more feels the need of dispelling misunderstandings
about Zeno's purpose. Zeno, he affirms, is not here doing away
with the One
(xoaL rai3t
oXl
r6Tv
OaVaLcPV o
what we read "because (6tL) each of the many and infinite has size'"
as a result of the infinite divisibility. This is a surprise, because in
the light of his previous remark - and in view of his commitment to
the testimony in the Parmenides - we should not expect Simplicius
to accept any proposition about "the many" as Zeno's true opinion
but to treat it as one of two Evav'act attaching to "the many." However there follows in Simplicius a sentence which, though again somewhat puzzling, may be intended to set things right: "He proves this
("this" presumably = the size of the many and infinite), having
previously proved that nothing has size because each of the many
is identical with itself and one" (7poM?Otq6TLOU'8 9YEL
JA &oq&X'roi
ExaaTov rCav 7ro0Aov ow'rap) -rcu'6v ClvaL xax gv, 139.18 f.). "No size"
tAyco;
LXCL1xmcr-ovrCov7roX)7v xxl
130
131
x? 7pOayOLVOu
avira,
jv ou& 'O
6v, o'8'
TO
nv, &v&yx-q
IxOCov tye06g tXLv?
xog xcxLa7Xetv
OCUrou
toi 'repou,xal =pt Tov 7rpo6xovro0 oau&r6 yos
TO 9'r?pov &on6
xoclyap exetvo 9,cL jyelog xal npoze,etoWuroiu
rL 6ootov &0 rouko&7rtcE
=
?L7rEL
a l AxyiLV,
OLOOV
yTxpm to5
gaXovrowv
goToL o6re 9&cpov
7rp6q9,pov ou'x9=oca (ibid., 141.1-6).411
d) ou'rca; eL 7ro?dX
grtLv, ov'yxq oc&rdFLtxp&-r elvto xoct ty&,
LLxp&
6)'
7reteLpaetvat (ibid., 6-8).
iLiV &a'c tL 9X;LV y6&0;, t1ey0aM
Zeller I (5th ed.) 591, n. 2. How symmetrically the parallel arguments were
worked out is of course not possible to say. Alternatively the argument for
&7r0y(y(vMoL may have come first, in which case Simplicius would only quote
the second part of two parallel thoughts. Once more his report seems incomplete,
and with all due respect for his integrity I do not exclude the possibility that
what he omits would have created difficulties for his thesis. See below pp. 134 ff.
49 I do not discuss the content of this difficult piece whose understanding
hinges largely on the meaning of r 7pokXov.Our choice lies between the brilliant
interpretation of Frankel, loc. cit. 193 ff. (233) who assumes progressively
thinner outer layers of an object, and the simpler explanation given by Vlastos,
loc. cit. 196 and illustrated by the diagram in his contribution on Zeno in W.
Kaufmann's Philosophic Classics (New York, 1961) 31. An infinite progress of
the division materializes on either view, and on either d(:Lpa.remains a problem.
132
Booth, and Furley,50a formidable array of authorities, in whose consensus it might be wise to acquiesce. Still, since the testimony of the
Parmenidesdoes not have the same authority for us as it has for them
- and has for Simplicius -, a new examination may have some excuse.
The champions of the theory now favored adduce, as far as I can see,
one principal reason against considering ,uxp&c[ziv xcrae ,uj&v 9XCLv
in d) as based on c) and one reason for consideringthese words
WLkye&og
as based on a). The "negative" reason stresses what Vlastos calls the
"logical gaffe" committed by Zeno if he went from c) to d). For if
the parts emerging successively in the process of the division become
smaller and smaller but no gaxovrov
is ever reached, it clearly is illicit
to make the step from the constantly decreasing magnitudes to a nil
magnitude. This gaffe cannot be gainsaid; if Zeno proceeded from c)
to both conclusions of d), he is guilty of a serious logical error and
cannot by exonerated.
The reason supporting the connection of ptxp&,Lv a'0re ,qv 9XeLv
V?eyeoq with a) has far less force; for it rests on a dubious premise
and is open to vanrousobjections.Offhandoiv gXet V ye&oq,the last
words of a), would indeed seem to furnish the ,-8?v XeLviye6oc of d).
The similarity in the language might have the weight which scholars
attach to it if we read a) in Zeno's own words. But we read it in
Simplicius', and this faithful Platonist is most anxious to make all
arguments of Zeno prove 6TL 'r- 7ro?X&m
elvoc X&yov't
&vMVcvM
mipa(veLTa&
It
would
(139.6
suit
this
if
the
f.).
purpose
infinite
division
of c)
X&yetv
proves only the presence of "size," whereas "no size" was proved in
the earliest part of the argument, scil. in a). For if this were the case,
'r ivawv'a ?eyeLv about "the many" would not be confined to c) and d)
but would materialize in the development of the entire argument.51
Actually ou'&vgXyLv{LEelk in a) is not truly the same as -8>v
8 ywetv
50
Calogero, op. cit., 98 ff.; Frinkel, 23 (214) ff., esp. 199 (228) ff.; Vlastos,
loc. cit., 197 f.; Furley, op. cit., 65; Booth, J.H.S., 77 (1957), 200. The alternative
opinion, scil. that both parts of d) result from c) was the obvious one to take
as long as the entire argument from a) to d) had not yet been reconstructed.
See esp. P. Tannery, Pour l'histoire de la science hellene (Paris, '1930) 263;
Th. Heath, A History of Greek Mathematics (Oxford, 1921) I 275.
61 This may well be the impression with which the reader is left at 139.19
(unless he is too bewildered to have any impression at all). Vlastos, 198, interprets Simplicius correctly, i.e. as he presumably wished to be understood.
Since Simplicius never quotes the text of a) and what he tells us about it is
incomplete (see above p. 131), there is room for suspicion.
133
ye&osin the conclusion. It only looks the same. But ou8kvis the
grammatical subject of its clause, whereasin d) 07jgivis in appositionto
iydoq. "Nothing has size" can never provide an honest basis for
"so small as to haveno size."52
Similar flaws come to light if we look more closely at the alleged
parallel between a) and c). According to Simplicius' account (139.18)
a) proves the absence of size for 9xaxcTov
'rv 7o)XXv.Two lines earlier
Zeno is said to prove the presence of size for 9xwsov 'T&v o)AXsV(xO'
here Simplicius clearly refers to c), and he next alludes
&7reEpwv);
to the infinite division as c) makes use of it. But here too there is
something specious and manufactured in what looks like perfect
mutual correspondence.The words gxxa'ov r'Wiv
7ro?sv, while not falsifying the meaning of c), do not actually occur in its text but are
in d).
Simplicius' own conflation of 1xa=rovearly in c) and orcoXM
If a genitive is to be understood with xxatov in c), 'r-v 6vmv would
have a better claim than 'rcv =o?cov;for even though Simplicius has
done his best to minimize it, there is an ontological motif in Zeno's
argument.53Of a) we do not know Zeno's own text; if the words
9xwraov'r&v no)$v
all that we may assert about them with confidence is that they did
not figure as subject of oiv8dv
gXeL[Uyehg."
Moreover in the slightly later passage (141.1 ff.) where Simplicius
quotes c) and d) in Zeno's authentic words, he quite readily with them
alone as basis, and without any reference at all to a), defines Zeno's
wro- U7Tt0'L.0.....
'jo a'CvocvtLT
intention as (&vLapo-Uv'ro;)
rm&
a4pot(VeLV
X xyovro;
'6v H
L au,rao&c
Ikvo
xacxl'rwau'rrn
lpp iev ou x6yov Pe f3cLOu
V?O4IV elCvt
'r6 6v (the familiar melody; 141.10 f.). This time evidently c) alone
suffices to establish opposites about "the many."55 Does Simplicius
not know his own mind? Or why is he so inconsistent in his treatment
of Zeno's argument? The explanation is not far to seek. In the later
52 Frankel, 17 n. 46 (214 n. 5) tries to correct this incongruity by changing
a) to ou'Sv Xet jycyoqT&v iro)Xciw &x TroV?xx'Sov
not accepting Frankel's text, accepts its meaning. Simplicius would have been
pleased to find this wording in his copy of Zeno.
53See &M)c6vtt at the beginning of b), 6v and et- at its end. If Simplicius'
exegesis were correct, 'i& no) would be better than 6v.
54
as proved.
134
if Zeno
I.
135
136
In the course of our study we have become acquainted with "testimonies" in which Zeno's purpose was understood as &vmtpeiV
'Z6Iv.
Still it would be unwise to play off statements of Eudemus and Alexander against the Parmenides; for neither of them gives the impression
of first hand acquaintance with Zeno's text." Nor should we linger
over what Porphyry professes to know about actual proofs for the
"One" in Zeno. Even Alcidamas' report xoc'a&
ro'u a'ou; p6vou;
xocl 'E,tin8ox?im axouaoct HaptevE8ou, zt1 5aCTepov... T6v p.Lv
Z4vwvoc
(D.L. 8.56 = D.K. 31 A 1, 56) may be
Z4vVocxMIr'Walv
kporoyopaat
discounted, although he bids fair to be our earliest witness. But
even if we dismiss all that Alcidamas, Eudemus and Alexander profess
to know, including, hesitant though we may be, in this massaperditionis
V &tMo80
even Zeno's alleged remark et Tcms
ocu
i
EII TL 7NOeTE
0LVvT& v'roc
for
it
is
after
all
introduced
by
a
X6yetv
cpMa6
Xy&e'v
The refutation of the Evwould however not take the form of proving kvav'cxi
for it; yet why should all of Zeno's arguments be cast in the same mold? A
more serious point may be that in my interpretation Et no)Xci&a-Lv in d) may
come as a surprise. The "many" would not be introduced but just emerge in c).
'3 At 141.1 f. Simplicius "gives away" that Zeno's concern was with -T ,v.
See also n. 53. In A&oC6&65?oLmxal &v6oLoa(Phaedr. 261 d), r& muz&would be
A&6v-T regarded as 7roXX&
(Parm. 127 e). For the third illustration: SLkvov-m
T'oc xXt "p6[Leva, we may think of the arrow. Cf. also Isocr. 10.3: Zwvcvx 'r6v
rmaur&
&uvaar xxl 7t&?Lv&8tova'roa
71ELpC'4LCOv
&7roqaEvetv.
64 Lee's collection of testimonia especially under A (pp. 12 ff.) and B (14 ff.)
includes arguments in Themistius and Philoponus purporting to be Zeno's;
some refute the "many"; others actually argue for the "One." Since none of
them show first hand acquaintance with Zeno's text, I do not think it safe to
use them.
62
137
138
66
139
their source." How could it escape him that what recurs in Simplicius is far more
than this word and that the immediately following sentence does make certain
what to him "seem(s) almost certain"? Next he remarks: "at any rate it shows
that they knew of no other tradition of the general tenor of Zeno's work."
Again one wonders how it could escape him that all quotations from Zeno in
Simplicius are intended to combat "other tradition(s) of the general tenor of
his work." Not surprisingly he concludes: "there seems to be no reason for not
accepting theirs and Plato's opinion."
69 I have said nothing about Parm. 128 b 7 - e 4 where Zeno corrects Socrates
and tells the "true" (c 6) story about the origin, intention, and publication
of his treatise. Scholars feel uneasy about the xXo7 motif (d 7 f.). It is difficult
to imagine what Plato had in mind. Probably nothing very serious. Once more,
he was not a historian, and it is only for believers in historicity that the two
versions should be embarrassing.
140
best to rememberour earlier remarks about the puzzling and tantalizing effect of his treatise. If Plato on one occasion puts him close to
Parmenides, as a defender of the "One,"and on the other groups him
with rhetoricians like Gorgias as a man able to make contrary beliefs
plausible, we may wonder whether Socrates' questions in the Parmenides do not prejudicethe answer.To ask what Zeno "says"or "means"
(XkyeLq),what he "contends" (8LaqdicabL),
?6yoL
on every subject
141