Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Table of Contents
United States vs. Barrias
G.R. No. 4349
September 24, 1908
December 2, 1940
Given the complexity of the nature of the function of rate-fixing and its far-reaching effects on millions
of commuters, government must not relinquish this important function in favor of those who would
benefit and profit from the industry. Neither should the requisite notice and hearing be done away with.
The people, represented by reputable oppositors, deserve to be given full opportunity to be heard in
their opposition to any fare increase.
administrative procedure, the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis
of which the officer makes his decisions. It is sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally
exercised are those of the officer authorized by law. Neither does due process of law nor the
requirements of fair hearing require that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who
will make the decision in the case. As long as a party is not deprived of his right to present his own case
and submit evidence in support thereof, and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record,
there is no question that the requirements of due process and fair trial are fully met. In short, there is
no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with
and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to give the substance of a hearing, which is
for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations
must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.
to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no impediment to the Board's exercise of
jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public Service Act to issue certificates of public
convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101
Issue: Whether or not the Charter of the City of Manila should be followed
Held: It is understandable why the choice for the lower court was not difficult to make. What has been
so clearly ordained in the Charter is controlling. It survives in the face of the assertion that the
additional power granted local officials to appoint employees paid out of local funds would suffice to
transfer such authority to petitioner Mayor. A perusal of the words of the statute, even if far from
searching would not justify such an interpretation. This is all more evident, considering the fidelity
manifested by this Court to the doctrine that looks with less than favor on implied appeals. The
decision now on appeal, to repeat, must be affirmed.
The contract for services did not have the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor
General or the Corporate Counsel and concurrence of the Commission on Audit as required
under COA Circular No. 86-255 dated April 2, 1986.
The contract was not supported with Certificate of Availability of Funds as required under Sec.
86 of P.D. 1445.
The contract was not submitted to the Civil Service Commission for final review and was not
forwarded to the Compensation and Position Confirmation and Classification Bureau, DBM for
appropriate action as required in CSC MC # 5 Series of 1985.3
Issue: Whether or not that the circular requiring the approval of the SOLICITOR GENERAL was
UNCONSTITUTIONAL because it restricted to practice LAW.
Ruling: The circular was merely a safeguard to prevent irregular, unnecessary, excessive, and
extravagant or unconscionable expenditures.We cannot grant the prayer of the petitioner that Atty.
Satorre should be compensated based on the principle of quantum meruit, on the ground that the
government will be unjustly enriched at the expense of another. We do not deny that Atty. Satorre has
indeed rendered legal services to the government. However to allow the disbursement of public funds
to pay for his services, despite the absence of requisite consent to his hiring from the OSG or OGCC
would precisely allow circumvention of COA Circular No. 86-255.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of showing that the respondents committed a
reversible error.
government agencies from granting incentive benefits without approval from him and directing the
refund of the excess over the prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over
executive departments.
The President issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive benefits and to prevent
discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization among government personnel by committing limited
resources of government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was only exercising
his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of the government agencies who granted
incentive benefits to their employees without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres.,
thereby resulting in the uneven distribution of government resources.
The Presidents duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is his control of executive
departments.
closure be held in abeyance for fifteen (15) days, 7 which the Regional Director denied on the same
day.
On even date, i.e. on 25 June 1990, the Regional Director received a letter from AMA asking that the
parties await the decision of the Secretary of DECS on its application for permit to operate before the
closure order is effected. On 27 June, 1990, the Secretary of DECS denied AMA's
application.
Hence, AMA filed this petition for mandamus to enjoin the DECS to compel the release of their license
to operate.
Issue: Whether or not the petition for mandamus would prosper
Ruling: As a rule, mandamus will lie only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty but not a
discretionary function. A ministerial duty is one which is so clear and specific as to leave no room for
the exercise of discretion in its performance. On the other hand, a discretionary duty is that which by
nature requires the exercise of judgment. As explained in the case of Symaco vs. Aquino,
A purely ministerial act or duty to a discretional act, is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of
legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment, upon the propriety
of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer, and gives him the right
to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is ministerial only when
the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.
In the present case, the issuance of the permit in question is not a ministerial duty of the petitioners. It
is a discretionary duty or function on the part of the petitioners because it had to be exercised in
accordance with and not in violation of the law and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
Thus, as aptly observed by the Solicitor General in his Motion to Dismiss the
petition
Establishment or recognition of private schools through government grant of permits is
governed by law, specifically Batas Pambansa Blg. 232. The authority to grant permit is
vested upon the judgment of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, which
prescribes the rules and regulations governing the recognition on private schools
(Section 27, Batas Pambansa Blg. 232).
Whether to grant or not a permit is not a ministerial duty of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports. Rather it is a discretionary duty to be exercised in accordance with the rules and regulations
prescribed.
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 92008 July 30, 1990
RAMON P. BINAMIRA, petitioner,
vs.
PETER D. GARRUCHO, JR., respondent.
Facts: The petitioner bases his claim on the following communication addressed to him by the Minister
of Tourism on April 7, 1986:
MEMORANDUM TO: MR. RAMON P. BINAMIRA
You are hereby designated General Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority,
effective immediately.
By virtue hereof, you may qualify and enter upon the performance of the duties of the
office.
(Sgd.) JOSE ANTONIO GONZALES Minister of Tourism and Chairman, P.T.A. Board
Pursuant thereto, the petitioner assumed office on the same date.
On April 10, 1986, Minister Gonzales sought approval from President Aquino of the composition of the
Board of Directors of the PTA, which included Binamira as Vice-Chairman in his capacity as General
Manager. This approval was given by the President on the same date. 1
Binamira claims that since assuming office, he had discharged the duties of PTA General Manager and
Vice-Chairman of its Board of Directors and had been acknowledged as such by various government
offices, including the Office of the President.
He complains, though, that on January 2, 1990, his resignation was demanded by respondent Garrucho
as the new Secretary of Tourism. What does is that on January 4, 1990, President Aquino sent
respondent Garrucho the following memorandum, 2 copy furnished Binamira:
4 January 1990
MEMORANDUM TO: Hon. Peter D. Garrucho, Jr.. Secretary of Tourism
It appearing from the records you have submitted to this Office that the present General
Manager of the Philippine Tourism Authority was designated not by the President, as
required by P.D. No. 564, as amended, but only by the Secretary of Tourism, such
designation is invalid. Accordingly, you are hereby designated concurrently as General
Manager, effective immediately, until I can appoint a person to serve in the said office in
a permanent capacity.
Please be guided accordingly.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue
taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.
opportunity to meet the charges made against him and the evidence presented against him during the
hearings of the investigating committees. There is no doubt that he has been accorded his rights.
AO No. 218 made certain findings of fact on the basis of which petitioner was removed from office.
Those findings included the facts that (a) petitioner terminated the CLSU's Executive Vice-President,
offered new academic courses, undertook unprogrammed projects resulting in wastage of university
property, all without the necessary approval of the Board of Regents; (b) he directed the purchase at
uncanvassed prices of chemicals unsuitable for the required school purposes from a firm owned by
him; (c) he executed, on behalf of CLSU, a crop harvest sales agreement in favor of a company where
he was holding a directorship; and (d) he collected financial contributions from the faculty and students
in disregard of the provisions of R.A. No. 5546. These acts constitute dishonesty and grave
misconduct, and furnish legal basis for dismissal from the public service.