Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Issue
The sole issue for the resolution of this Court is the
propriety of Antoninos use of the remedy of a petition for
annulment of judgment as against the final and executory
orders of the RTC.
Our Ruling
In Ramos v. Judge Combong, Jr.,[22] this Court
expounded that the remedy of annulment of judgment is
only available under certain exceptional circumstances as
this is adverse to the concept of immutability of final
judgments:
Annulment of judgment is a
recourse equitable in character, allowed
only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate
remedy. Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, governs
actions for annulment of judgments or
final orders and resolutions, and Section
2 thereof explicitly provides only two
grounds for annulment of
judgment, i.e., extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction. The underlying reason is
traceable to the notion that annulling
final judgments goes against the grain
of finality of judgment. Litigation must
end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective administration of justice that
once a judgment has become final, the
issue or cause involved therein should
be laid to rest. The basic rule of finality
of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy
and sound practice that at the risk of
occasional error, the judgment of courts
and the award of quasi-judicial agencies
must become final at some definite
date fixed by law.[23] (Citations omitted)
In Barco v. Court of Appeals,[24] this Court
emphasized that only void judgments, by reason of
extrinsic fraud or the courts lack of jurisdiction, are
susceptible to being annulled.
The law sanctions the
annulment of certain judgments which,
though final, are ultimately
void. Annulment of judgment is an
equitable principle not because it allows
a party-litigant another opportunity to
reopen a judgment that has long lapsed
into finality but because it enables him
to be discharged from the burden of
being bound to a judgment that is an
absolute nullity to begin with.[25]
Apart from the requirement that the existence of
extrinsic fraud or lack of jurisdiction should be amply
demonstrated, one who desires to avail this remedy must
convince that the ordinary and other appropriate
remedies, such as an appeal, are no longer available for
causes not attributable to him. This is clearly provided
under Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court.
Antoninos recourse to annulment of judgment is
seriously flawed and the reasons are patent. There is
therefore no reason to disturb the questioned issuances
of the RTC that are already final and executory.
xxxx
XIV
Defendant also refused to accept the
$50,000.00 US Dollars and was about to
tear up the document they previously
signed the day before when plaintiff
prevented him from doing so.
XV
Consequently, plaintiff
discovered that defendant was already
negotiating to sell the said property to
another Chinese national who
incidentally is also one of plaintiffs
buyers.
xxxx
Premises considered, in the
interest of substantial justice, it is most
respectfully prayed that after due
hearing that judgment be rendered:
1.
Ordering defendant to
sell his property located at
1623 Cypress, Dasmarias Village, Mak
ati City covered by TCT No. 426900 to
plaintiff in accordance with the terms
and conditions stipulated in their
agreement dated July 7, 2004.
x x x x[35]
Antoninos cause of action is premised on her claim
that there has already been a perfected contract of sale
by virtue of their execution of the Undertaking Agreement
and Su had refused to comply with his obligations as
seller. However, by claiming the existence of a perfected
contract of sale, it does not mean that Antonino acquired
title to the subject property. She does not allege
otherwise and tacitly acknowledges Sus title to the
subject property by asking for the consummation of the
sale.
That there is a private document supposedly
evidencing the alleged sale does not confer to Antonino
title to the subject property. Ownership is transferred
when there is actual or constructive delivery and the
thing is considered delivered when it is placed in the
control or possession of the buyer or when the sale is
made through a public instrument and the contrary does
not appear or cannot be clearly inferred.[36] In other
words, Antoninos complaint is not in the nature of a real
action as ownership of the subject property is not at
issue.
Moreover, that the object of the alleged sale is a
real property does not make Antoninos complaint real in
nature in the absence of a contrary claim of title. After a
contract of sale is perfected, the right of the parties to
reciprocally demand performance, thus consummation,
arises the vendee may require the vendor to compel the
transfer the title to the object of the sale[37] and the
vendor may require the payment of the purchase price.
[38]
The action to cause the consummation of a sale does
not involve an adverse claim of ownership as the
vendors title is recognized and the vendor is simply
being asked to perform an act, specifically, the transfer of
such title by any of the recognized modes of delivery.
Considering that the filing of the complaint in a
wrong venue sufficed for the dismissal thereof, it would
be superfluous to discuss if Antoninos non-payment of
the correct docket fees likewise warranted it.
CIVIL CASE NO. Q01At any rate, even if the RTC erred in ordering the
dismissal of her complaint, such had already become final
and executory and will not be disturbed as it had
jurisdiction and it was not alleged, much less, proved that
there was extrinsic fraud. Moreover, annulment of the
assailed orders of the RTC will not issue if ordinary
remedies, such as an appeal, were lost and were not
availed of because of Antoninos fault. Litigation should
end and terminate sometime and somewhere. It is
essential to an effective and efficient administration of
justice that, once a judgment has become final, the
winning party should not be deprived of the fruits of the
verdict.[39]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition
is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated May
26, 2008 and Resolution dated December 5, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89145 are
hereby AFFIRMED
1.
Ordering the
respondent Atty. Erlando
Abrenica to render full
accounting of the amounts he
received as profits from the
sale and resale of the Lemery
property in the amount of
4,524,000.00;
2.
Ordering the
respondent Atty. Erlando
Abrenica to remit to the law
firm the said amount of
4,524,000.00 plus interest of
12% per annum from the time
he received the same and
converted the same to his own
personal use or from
September 1997 until fully
paid; and
3.
costs of suit.
42959
To pay the
1.
Ordering Atty.
Erlando Abrenica to render a
full accounting of the amounts
he received under the retainer
agreement between the law
firm and Atlanta Industries Inc.
and Atlanta Land Corporation
in the amount of 320,000.00.
2.
Ordering Atty.
Erlando Abrenica to remit to
the law firm the amount
received by him under the
Retainer Agreement with
Atlanta Industries, Inc. and
Atlanta Land Corporation in
the amount of 320,000.00
plus interests of 12% per
annum from June 1998 until
fully paid;
4.
costs of suit.
WHEREFORE, in view
of all the foregoing, judgment
is hereby rendered as follows:
42948
3.
Ordering Atty.
Erlando Abrenica to pay the
law firm his balance on his
cash advance in the amount of
25,000.00 with interest of
12% per annum from the date
this decision becomes final;
and
To pay the
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner received a copy of
the decision on December 17, 2004. On
December 21, 2004, he filed a notice of
appeal under Rule 41 and paid the
required appeal fees.
Two days later, respondents
filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Execution pursuant to A.M. 01-2-04-SC,
which provides that decisions in intracorporate disputes are immediately
I.
II.
III.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.
x
x
xx
xx
xxx
xxx
xxx
xx
VIII.
respective claims, as it
relied purely on the gist
of what its personnel did
as regards the transcript
of stenographic notes the
latter [sic] in collusion
with the respondents.
II.
V.
x x x. Readily noticeable
is that CA-G.R. SP No. 90076
practically contained the prayer for
the annulment of the subject
consolidated Decision premised on
the very same allegations, grounds
or issues as the present annulment
of judgment case.
xxx
x
xx
xx
xxx
xx
xxx
Annulment of judgment is a
recourse equitable in character, allowed
only in exceptional cases as where
there is no available or other adequate
remedy (Espinosa vs. Court of Appeals,
430 SCRA 96[2004]). Under Section 2 of
Rule 47 of the Revised Rules of Court,
the only grounds for an annulment of
judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, 426
SCRA 167 [2004]). Extrinsic fraud shall
not be a valid ground if it was availed
of, or could have been availed of, in a
motion for new trial or petition for relief.
x
x
Our Ruling
Forum-shopping consists of
filing multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively,
for the purpose of obtaining a favorable
judgment. Thus, it has been held that
there is forum-shopping
(1) whenever as a result of an
adverse decision in one forum, a party
seeks a favorable decision (other than
by appeal or certiorari) in another, or
10
[4]
[5]
3)
To pay, as reasonable
compensation for their
continued withholding of
possession of the subject
lots, the sum of Three
Thousand Two Hundred
and Twenty One Pesos
(P3,221.00) every month,
commencing July 2, 1992
up to such time that they
finally yield possession
thereof to the plaintiffs,
subject to an increase of
ten percent (10%) after
every two (2) years from
said date; and
4)
To pay plaintiffs
attorneys fees in the sum
of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00)
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
Petitioners appealed to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63 (Civil Case No. 93-3733)
which reversed the MeTC. The RTC found that petitioners
have in fact exercised their option to buy the leased
property but the respondents refused to honor the
same. It noted that respondents even informed the
petitioners about foreclosure proceedings on their
property, whereupon the petitioners tried to intervene by
tendering rental payments but the respondents advised
them to withhold such payments until the appeal of
respondents in the case they filed against the Rural Bank
of Bombon (Camarines Sur), Inc. (Civil Case No. 6062) is
resolved. It further noted that respondents intention to
sell the lot to petitioners is confirmed by the fact that the
former allowed the latter to construct a building of strong
materials on the premises. The RTC thus decreed:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE
FOREGOING, judgment is hereby
rendered reversing the decision of the
lower court dated July 14, 1993 and
ordering as follows:
11
1)
2)
SO ORDERED.[7]
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration on
December 23, 1994. In its Order dated March 24, 1995,
the RTC denied the motion for having been filed beyond
the fifteen (15)-day period considering that respondents
received a copy of the decision on December 7, 1994.
[8]
Consequently, the November 18, 1994 decision of the
RTC became final and executory.[9]
On December 22, 1998, respondents filed a
petition for annulment of the RTC decision in the CA.
Respondents assailed the RTC for ordering them to sell
their property to petitioners arguing that said courts
appellate jurisdiction in ejectment cases is limited to the
determination of who is entitled to the physical
possession of real property and the only judgment it can
render in favor of the defendant is to recover his costs,
which judgment is conclusive only on the issue of
possession and does not affect the ownership of the
land. They contended that the sale of real property by
one party to another may be ordered by the RTC only in a
case for specific performance falling under its original
exclusive jurisdiction, not in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction in an ejectment case. Respondents also
alleged that the petition for annulment is the only remedy
available to them because the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault on their
part.
By Decision dated February 27, 2004, the CA
granted the petition, annulled the November 18, 1994
RTC decision and reinstated the July 14, 1993 MeTC
decision. On the issue of lack of jurisdiction raised by the
respondents, the CA ruled as follows:
It must be stressed that the
main action before the Metropolitan
Trial Court is one for ejectment
grounded on the expiration of the
parties contract of lease. And said
court, finding that petitioners have a
valid right to ask for the ejectment of
private respondents, ordered the latter
to vacate the premises and to pay their
rentals in arrears. To Our mind, what
the respondent court should have
done in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction, was to confine itself to
the issue of whether or not petitioners
have a valid cause of action for
ejectment against the private
respondents.
Unfortunately, in the decision
herein sought to be annulled, the
respondent court went further than
what is required of it as an appellate
court when it ordered the petitioners to
sell their properties to the private
respondents. In a very real sense, the
respondent court materially
changed the nature of petitioners
cause of action by deciding the
question of ownership even as the
appealed case involves only the
issue of prior physical possession
which, in every ejectment suit, is
the only question to be
resolved. As it were, the respondent
court converted the issue to one for
specific performance which falls under
its original, not appellate
jurisdiction. Sad to say, this cannot be
done by the respondent court in an
12
13
(3)
(4)
(5)
(2)
14
participated in expedited
discovery in the United
States xxx;
either waived or
accepted service of
process and waived any
other jurisdictional
defense within 40 days
after the entry of this
Memorandum and Order
in any action commenced
by a plaintiff in these
xxxx
Notwithstanding the dismissals
that may result from this Memorandum
and Order, in the event that the highest
court of any foreign country finally
affirms the dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction of an action commenced by
a plaintiff in these actions in his home
country or the country in which he was
injured, that plaintiff may return to this
court and, upon proper motion, the
court will resume jurisdiction over the
action as if the case had never been
dismissed for [forum non conveniens].
[13]
15
16
17
2.
3.
18
19
b)
b.
c.
Assumption of jurisdiction by
the U.S. District Court over
petitioner[s] claims did not
divest Philippine [c]ourts of
jurisdiction over the same.
d.
DISCUSSION
On the issue of jurisdiction
Essentially, the crux of the controversy in the
petitions at bar is whether the RTC of General Santos City
and the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing Civil Case
Nos. 5617 and 24,251-96, respectively, for lack of
jurisdiction.
Remarkably, none of the parties to this case
claims that the courts a quo are bereft of jurisdiction to
determine and resolve the above-stated cases. All
parties contend that the RTC of General Santos City and
the RTC of Davao City have jurisdiction over the action for
damages, specifically for approximately P2.7 million for
each of the plaintiff claimants.
NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., argue that the
allegedly tortious acts and/or omissions of defendant
companies occurred within Philippine
territory. Specifically, the use of and exposure to DBCP
that was manufactured, distributed or otherwise put into
the stream of commerce by defendant companies
happened in the Philippines. Said fact allegedly
constitutes reasonable basis for our courts to assume
jurisdiction over the case. Furthermore, NAVIDA, et al.,
and ABELLA, et al., assert that the provisions of Chapter 2
of the Preliminary Title of the Civil Code, as well as Article
2176 thereof, are broad enough to cover their claim for
damages. Thus, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., pray
that the respective rulings of the RTC of General Santos
City and the RTC of Davao City in Civil Case Nos. 5617
and 24,251-96 be reversed and that the said cases be
remanded to the courts a quo for further proceedings.
DOLE similarly maintains that the acts attributed
to defendant companies constitute a quasi-delict, which
falls under Article 2176 of the Civil Code. In addition,
DOLE states that if there were no actionable wrongs
committed under Philippine law, the courts a quo should
have dismissed the civil cases on the ground that the
Amended Joint-Complaints of NAVIDA, et al., and
ABELLA, et al., stated no cause of action against the
20
TO PAY THE
b.
21
Failed to
adequately warn
Plaintiffs of the
dangerous
characteristics of
DBCP, or to cause
their subsidiaries or
affiliates to so warn
plaintiffs;
Failed to provide
plaintiffs with
information as to
what should be
reasonably safe and
sufficient clothing and
proper protective
equipment and
appliances, if any, to
protect plaintiffs from
the harmful effects of
exposure to DBCP, or
to cause their
subsidiaries or
affiliates to do so;
c.
Failed to place
adequate warnings, in
a language
understandable to the
worker, on containers
of DBCP-containing
materials to warn of
the dangers to health
of coming into
contact with DBCP, or
to cause their
subsidiaries or
affiliates to do so;
d.
Failed to take
reasonable precaution
or to exercise
reasonable care to
publish, adopt and
enforce a safety plan
and a safe method of
handling and applying
DBCP, or to cause
their subsidiaries or
affiliates to do so;
e.
Failed to test
DBCP prior to
releasing these
products for sale, or
to cause their
subsidiaries or
affiliates to do so; and
f.
Failed to reveal
the results of tests
conducted on DBCP to
each plaintiff,
governmental
agencies and the
public, or to cause
their subsidiaries or
affiliate to do so.
Failed to
adequately supervise
and instruct Plaintiffs
in the safe and proper
application of DBCPcontaining products;
b.
Failed to
implement proper
methods and
techniques of
application of said
products, or to cause
such to be
implemented;
c.
Failed to warn
Plaintiffs of the
hazards of exposure
to said products or to
cause them to be so
warned;
d.
Failed to test
said products for
adverse health
effects, or to cause
said products to be
tested;
e.
Concealed from
Plaintiffs information
concerning the
observed effects of
said products on
Plaintiffs;
f.
Failed to monitor
the health of plaintiffs
exposed to said
products;
g.
Failed to place
adequate labels on
containers of said
products to warn
them of the damages
of said products; and
h.
Failed to use
substitute
nematocides for said
products or to cause
such substitutes to
[be] used.
[62]
(Emphasis
supplied and words in
brackets ours.)
22
23
[71]
24
SO ORDERED.
February 8, 2007
DECISION
Based on the report of the Commissioner, the respondent
judge ordered as follows:
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner, Ma. Teresa Chaves Biaco, seeks a review of the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 67489
dated August 27, 2003, which denied her petition for
annulment of judgment, and the Resolution2 dated
December 15, 2003 which denied her motion for
reconsideration.
The facts as succinctly stated by the Court of Appeals are
as follows:
Ernesto Biaco is the husband of petitioner Ma. Teresa
Chaves Biaco. While employed in the Philippine
Countryside Rural Bank (PCRB) as branch manager,
Ernesto obtained several loans from the respondent bank
as evidenced by the following promissory notes:
Feb. 17, 1998
P 65,000.00
30,000.00
May 6, 1998
60,000.00
350,000.00
155,000.00
Sept. 8, 1998
40,000.00
Sept. 8, 1998
120,000.00
SO ORDERED.
25
On July 12, 2000, the sheriff personally served the abovementioned judgment to Ernesto Biaco at his office at
Export and Industry Bank. The spouses Biaco did not
appeal from the adverse decision of the trial court. On
26
27
REYES, J.:
1
28
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