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Ambiguities of Forest Management

Decentralization in Ghana
Joseph K. Teye

Department of Geography and Resource Development, University

of Ghana, Legon-Accra, Ghana
Available online: 03 Oct 2011

To cite this article: Joseph K. Teye (2011): Ambiguities of Forest Management Decentralization in
Ghana, Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 3:4, 355-369
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Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research

Vol. 3, No. 4, 355369, October 2011

Ambiguities of Forest Management

Decentralization in Ghana
JOSEPH K. TEYE

Downloaded by [Joseph Teye] at 12:26 03 October 2011

Department

of Geography and Resource Development, University of Ghana, Legon-Accra, Ghana

A BSTRACT This article examines the outcomes of forest management decentralization in Ghana. It
has been demonstrated that despite claims that Ghana has adopted forest management decentralization policy, actual forest management powers and rights over forest resources are still retained by the
central government. The government is only interested in using the decentralization policy to reduce
expenditure and extend its control over forest resources. Nevertheless, it has employed policy ambiguities to hide its true intentions from international donors. In order to contain international donor
demands for equity in the distribution of natural resource revenue, a small stream of forest revenue is
paid to a few unelected traditional rulers and district assembly officials, who are actually within the
executives patronage networks. In the absence of any meaningful reward system and secure rights
over forest resources, community forestry committees are not functioning properly.

Introduction
Since the late 1980s, decentralization has become an important policy objective in many
developing countries (Manor, 2004; Ribot & Oyono, 2006). Proposals for natural resource
management decentralization, the focus of this article, are based on the belief that it will
reduce management cost and ensure equitable distribution of natural resource revenue
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Balooni et al., 2010). It has also been argued that decentralization will give local people a greater sense of ownership over natural resources, thereby
increasing their willingness to observe rules on sustainable natural resource management
(Larson, 2002). These arguments have prompted intense international pressures on governments of developing countries to decentralize forest management. Such pressures, in
recent years, have often taken the form of financial aid conditionalities, whereby developing countries are required to adopt forest decentralization policies in return for bilateral
and multilateral donor grants (Kaimowitz et al., 1998). In Africa, for instance, many of
the recent donor-funded forestry projects emphasize forest management decentralization
(Amanor & Brown, 2003).
In response to these donor demands, many developing countries claim that they have
adopted decentralized forest policies (Carney & Farrington, 1998). Yet, rates of deforestation are still quite high (FAO, 2005; Agrawal, 2007). Against this background, it has been
suggested that forest policies of individual countries should be critically examined so as

Correspondence Address: Joseph K. Teye, Department of Geography and Resource Development, University of
Ghana, P.O. Box LG 59, Legon-Accra, Ghana. Email: jteye@ug.edu.gh

ISSN 1939-0459 Print/1939-0467 Online 2011 Taylor & Francis

http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/19390459.2011.620776

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J. K. Teye

to understand the extent to which stated forest management decentralization policies are
actually implemented on the ground (Blaikie, 2006; Ribot, 2008). Despite these calls, only
few researchers have analysed the nature and actual outcomes of forest decentralization
reforms in Africa (Bazaara, 2003; Ribot & Oyono, 2006; Ribot, 2008). Although it has
been acknowledged that both the extent of decentralization and its outcomes vary from one
context to another (Bazaara, 2003), there has not been any serious attempt to analyse the
spatio-temporal dynamics of the character and outcomes of forest decentralization efforts
within individual countries.
In order to help fill some of these gaps, this paper examines the nature and outcomes of
forest management decentralization programme in Ghana. It also interrogates the actual
intentions of policy makers towards forest management decentralization, and discusses
the strategies they employ to contest international pressures for democratic reforms. In
so doing, the article throws more light on the paradoxes and ambiguities of forest management decentralization reforms in Ghana. The paper also aims at highlighting the spatial
variations in the character and outcomes of decentralization reforms across the national
space.
The choice of Ghana for this study is very significant, given the fact that the country is
often cited as a model democracy in West Africa (Amanor & Brown, 2003). This good
image has helped Ghana to receive huge amounts of grants for its forest decentralization
programme (Forestry Commission, 2005). The country will, therefore, be a good place
to analyse the extent to which stated goals of forest decentralization policy are actually
implemented in Africa.
Conceptual Framework for Analysing Decentralization
Although the term decentralization is contested (Smoke & Lewis, 1996; Turner & Hulme,
1997), it broadly refers to the transfer of power from central governments to local actors
(Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) identified four major types
of decentralizations. These are deconcentration, delegation, devolution and privatization.
Deconcentration involves the transfer of functions from the central government to its own
field staff. Delegation entails the transfer of certain functions from the central government to a semi-independent agency. Devolution is a system through which the central
government transfers certain functions to independent local units. Privatization involves
the transfer of some functions from central government to private organizations. In practice, several types of decentralization are combined. Most of the so called decentralization
programmes in the developing world are just some form of deconcentration (Olowu, 2001).
Given that not all democratic reforms lead to actual devolution of powers to local actors,
a robust theoretical framework is required for analysing the extent and outcomes of forest decentralization programmes. A number of theoretical frameworks have been proposed
for such analyses (Cheema & Rondinelli, 1983; Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Olowu, 2001). In
their framework, Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) proposed that any study on decentralization reforms must focus on the examination of four factors, namely: the socioeconomic and
political setting of a nation; inter-organizational relationships; resources availability; and
characteristics of implementing agencies in terms of staff numbers and skills. This framework ignores the importance of representativeness and accountability of local actors to the
effectiveness of any decentralized programme.
Another useful framework was proposed by Olowu (2001), who argued that researchers
must analyse the following seven mechanisms of decentralization: types of responsibilities

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357

devolved to local actors; level of financial autonomy given to local actors; extent to which
decision making powers have been transferred; management of decentralized personnel;
enforcement of local government accountability; linkages between decentralized agencies
and other organizations outside the state. This framework also failed to consider how local
power relations affect decentralization programmes.
More recently, the network approach has been suggested as an alternative framework
for analysing decentralized/participatory forestry programmes. It explains the outcomes
of decentralization programmes by examining the exchanges and networks between state
and societal actors (Carlsson & Sandstrm, 2008; Balooni et al., 2010). Whilst insights
from this approach will be useful for assessing the informal networks that characterize
the implementation of the forest decentralization reforms, the approach is not suitable for
assessing the extent to which powers have actually been devolved to local actors.
In view of the weaknesses of these alternative models, the Actor, Powers and
Accountability framework of Agrawal and Ribot (1999) is the main model chosen for
the analysis in this paper. This framework, which has been proposed for analysing forest
management decentralization reforms in the developing world, posits that decentralization only works when powers are transferred to local representatives who are downwardly
accountable to their constituents. It is argued that any analysis of forest decentralization
programmes must begin with an examination of whether the local actors receiving powers are the true representatives of the local people. Second, the researcher must examine
the types of power transferred to the local actors. Here, the researcher must establish if
local people have power to: create rules; make decisions; ensure compliance and adjudicate disputes. Finally, the researcher must establish if local representatives are downwardly
accountable to the citizens.
Although this framework does not pay much attention to the influence of local power
structures and incentive packages on decentralization programmes (Larson 2002), it is
adopted for this study, in view of its robustness for the examination of character and
outcomes of decentralization reforms (Bazaara, 2003). Following this framework, it is
assumed that democratic decentralization, which entails the transfer of power to downwardly accountable local representatives, is the best form of power transfer for effective
natural resource management. In addition to analysing the factors proposed by this framework (i.e., actors, powers and accountability), this author will also examine the influence
of incentive packages and land tenure systems on the outcomes of forest decentralization
reforms in Ghana.
Research Methods
The techniques used to collect data for this study include questionnaire survey, in-depth
interviews, and focus group discussions (Teye, 2008). Such a triangulation of methods
was deemed appropriate in view of the strengths and weaknesses of individual methods
(Bryman, 1992). Semi-structured questionnaire was used to obtain data from 102 employees of the Forest Services Division at the national, regional and local levels. Specifically,
information was sought from forest officers on such issues as: collaboration with local communities; distribution of forest revenue; and problems faced by forest policy implementers.
A proportionate stratified sampling technique was used to select these respondents. Forest
officers at each unit and level within the Forest Services Division were grouped into appropriate strata. Separate samples were then randomly selected from each stratum. The actual
number of respondents from each stratum depended on the percentage of entire employee

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J. K. Teye

population in that stratum. Respondents, therefore, represented all categories of workers

within the Forest Services Division.
In-depth interviews were held with a total of 27 key informants, mainly selected from
the Ministry of Lands and Forestry, the Forest Services Division, traditional authority,
two District Assemblies, and community forestry committees. These respondents provided
information on the goals of the decentralized forest policy as well as collaboration among
key stakeholders. Apart from the key informants, interviews were held with 105 household
heads, randomly selected from the two forest fringe communities, namely Ahinkwa and
Saponso No.3. The household heads, who were mainly peasant farmers, answered questions on behalf of the household. They answered a number of questions that relate to their
participation in the formulation and implementation of forest policy.
Two focus group discussions were also held with local people in each of the two communities. Discussions were recorded, but notes were also occasionally taken on group
dynamics, mood and gesture. One of the focus groups was made up of 10 participants,
while the other three were made up of 9 participants each.
As hinted already, while a number of forest communities were visited to interview forest
guards, the household interviews and the focus group discussions were held in two farming
communities, namely Ahinkwa in the Eastern Region and Saponso No.3 in the Western
Region. These two farming communities were selected strategically to ensure geographical
representation of the forest communities in Ghana. The high forest zone of Ghana is made
up of two sub-zonesthe evergreen forest and the semi-deciduous forest. One community
was chosen from each of these zones. It was also the researchers aim to ensure that one
community was selected within a degraded forest reserve, while another was selected from
a reserve that is in a relatively good condition.
In order to represent the two important agro-ecological zones, Ahinkwa was selected
from the semi-deciduous forest zone and Saponso No.3 was selected from the evergreen
forest zone. The two communities also differ in terms of land tenure systems. The dominant
land tenure system at Ahinkwa is the decentralized customary system, in which land is
owned and controlled by families and individuals. In contrast, the centralized customary
tenure system is the main system of landownership at Saponso No.3. In this system the
title of the land is entirely held and controlled by a traditional authority. The choice of two
contrasting communities was to find out if there are spatial variations in the character and
outcomes of decentralized management within the country.
The data was analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively. The qualitative data were
subjected to intensive content analysis. In the presentation, quotations were used to emphasize certain statements and assessments. The quantitative analysis involved the use of
descriptive statistics to describe patterns. In addition to the primary data, official documents from relevant local organizations were also used for this study. The 1994 Forest and
Wildlife Policy document was comprehensively analysed.

Results and Discussion

History of Forest Management Decentralization in Ghana
Decentralized government (local government) in Ghana began in 1878 when the British
colonial administration introduced indirect rule. The objective of this decentralization was
to provide a legal basis for traditional authorities to carry out some limited functions,

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including judicial and natural resource management (Ayee, 1994). Most state forest
reserves in the Ghana were constituted during this era. Local communities, under the supervision of their chiefs, played significant role in the establishment and management of forest
reserves. Chiefs collected revenue from timber firms and local farmers provided free labour
to support the activities of the Forestry Department (now Forest Services Division). Whilst
this institutional arrangement may be seen as an early form of forest management decentralization in Ghana, it does not actually conform to the tenets of democratic decentralization
in which local power holders are supposed to be downwardly accountable to their subjects.
The native authorities were rather upwardly accountable to the colonial executive, constituting a decentralized despotism (Mamdani, 1996). As Boone (2003) noted elsewhere, such
a decentralized despotism does not expand grass roots participation in local governance;
it rather increases the power of local elites. The revenue obtained from the exploitation
of timber and other natural resources exclusively benefited the colonial administration and
traditional rulers, but not local farmers (DeGrassi, 2003).
In his attempt to consolidate his power through the use of a strict centralized administration, the first post-colonial president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, weakened the local
government system (Ayee, 1994; Rathbone, 2000). The early 1960s witnessed increased
re-centralization of forest management, as Nkrumah attempted to extend the central governments control over off-reserve forests. After the overthrow of Nkrumah, in 1966,
successive governments did not make any attempt to undertake democratic reforms. The
Ghanaian scenario is therefore consistent with Olowus (2001) assertion that instead of
strengthening the local government structures put in place by the colonial masters, the new
crop of indigenous African leaders rather destroyed this legacy, mainly due to their desire
to consolidate the nation-state.
In response to pressure from international donors, the Provisional National Defence
Council (PNDC) government introduced a new local government system in 1988. As in
many developing countries, this was financially supported by international donor organizations, such as the World Bank and the Department for International Development (DFID).
Eighty six functions were devolved to the District Assemblies (DAs), which are made up
of 70% elected representatives and 30% government appointees (Ayee, 1994). The Forest
Services Division was among the state organizations which were decentralized. The legal
basis for this forest decentralization programme was provided by the 1994 Forest and
Wildlife Policy, which is still the main policy document guiding forest management in
Ghana. Apart from donor pressures, the formulation of this forest policy was influenced
by the proposal of the International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) that by the year
2000, its member countries should source timber from only sustainably managed forests
(ITTO, 1992). The Agenda 21 document of the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, which declares
the need to ensure community participation in natural resource management, also put pressure on the government of Ghana to make forest policy revisions. The importance of both
the ITTO proposal and the Rio declaration was stated clearly in the background statement
of the 1994 Forest and Wildlife Policy document:
The past decade has witnessed increased attention of the world community to the
issue of conservation and wise use of natural resources culminating in the 1992
Earth Summit organized by the United Nations Conference on Environment and
Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. In an effort to halt the deleterious effects
of deforestation, global warming and climatic change, certain European countries

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have unilaterally moved to restrict importation of tropical timbers. In response, the

International Tropical Timber Organization, of which Ghana is an active member,
has launched its Target 2000 aimed at ensuring that trade in tropical timber will
be sourced from sustainably managed forests by the year 2000 . . . Ghana has also
endorsed certain international principles including those contained in the Guidelines
for Tropical Forest Management published by the International Tropical Timber
Organization, the Rio Declaration and Forest Principles, the African Convention on
Wildlife Conservation, the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
and others (Ghana Forest and Wildlife Policy 1994, section 2.5).
Formulated primarily to satisfy international donors, the 1994 Forest and Wildlife policy clearly emphasizes the rights of local communities to have access to forest resources
(see Teye, 2010). In view of these policy statements, the government of Ghana is often
being praised by international organizations for its commitment to decentralization reforms.
These claims have enabled the Forestry Commission of Ghana to receive huge financial
and technical support from international donor organizations for its participatory forestry
programmes (see Forest Commission, 2005).
It is clear from the preceding presentation that historical trends in forest management
decentralization efforts in Ghana are not consistent with paradigm established by Dubois
(1997), who suggested that local community participation in forest management in the
developing world is a recent phenomenon. His model posits that forest management in the
developing world has passed through two stages and it is now entering a third stage. The
stages are: (a) the technocratic era; (b) the participatory era; and (c) the political negotiation period. During the technocratic era, the colonial administration constructed forestry
as a scientific/technical activity that could only be undertaken by trained foresters. The
participatory era, which stretches from the late 1980s to the early 1990s, was characterized
by attempts to involve local people in forest management. In the political negotiation era,
local people actively take part in both forest policy formulation and implementation. While
these broad paradigm shifts have been reportedly observed in Tanzania (Woodcock, 2002)
and parts of South East Asia (see Poffenberger, 2000), they are not consistent with trends
in Ghana. In Ghana, a limited participatory period predates the technocratic era. The nature
of land ownership in Ghana seems to be a major contributory factor to this trend. Lands
were and are still controlled by traditional rulers. Earlier attempts by the colonial administration to directly constitute forest reserves were strongly opposed by the local people.
Consequently, the colonial administration was left with no option than to rely on traditional
authorities to constitute and manage state forest reserves (see Teye, 2010).

Nature and Extent of Forest Management Decentralization in Contemporary Ghana

The nature of the forest decentralization reforms in Ghana was critically examined within
the framework of the Actors, Powers and Accountability Framework. Based on this framework, it was assumed that decentralization can only be successful when it ensures that
discretionary powers are transferred to downwardly accountable local actors (Agrawal &
Ribot, 1999). Larson (2002), however, noted that financial incentives and secured rights
are also important for the success of decentralized natural resource management systems. In Ghana, the main actors responsible for forest management in the communities

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are employees of the Forest Services Division. Forest policy is still formulated at the
national level and local people do not have any power to make rules on forest management. Interviews revealed that in most cases, farmers are not even consulted when forest
management plans for their communities are being designed by District Forest Managers.
State forest guards, who are supervised by Technical Officers, are responsible for policing
forest reserves in the communities. Given that forestry officials are employees of the Forest
Services Division, they are not downwardly accountable to local people. Outside state forest reserves, forests are under the management of individual farmers, but utilization rights
over lucrative trees are still held by the Forest Services Division. Farmers have recently
been encouraged to form Community Forestry Committees to provide free labour to support the activities of the forest guards. As will be discussed, however, these committees
have not been functioning properly, since members are not given any powers.
The study also shows that although the Forest and Wildlife Policy of 1994 emphasizes
the rights of people to have access to natural resources for maintaining a basic standard of living (Forest and Wildlife Policy, 1994, section 3.2, emphasis added), people
in forest fringe communities in Ghana still do not have any meaningful user rights over
forests. Studies elsewhere have shown that governments in developing countries usually
retain user and management rights over lucrative forest resources whilst transferring rights
over non valuable forest resources to local people (Bazaara, 2003). However, in Ghana
the Forest Services Division still retains rights over both lucrative timber and non valuable forest resources. Rural people are required to travel to the District Forest Offices
for written permissions before they could extract even non-timber forest resources (e.g.,
fruits, seeds, mushrooms, spices, sponges, medicines etc.) needed for their livelihoods.
Local people see these restrictions as a violation of their rights. Some of the rural people
complained about the long distance that they would have to cover to the District Forest
Offices for such permits. It also came out that rural people who are unable to go to the
District Office for permits would have to pay bribes to the forest guard, who then allows
them to harvest the resources illegally. Again, rural people do not have any meaningful
utilization rights over valuable trees on their own farms outside reserves. The 1998 Timber
Utilization Bill requires farmers to produce a permit before they can harvest trees on their
own farms outside reserves for personal use. In reality, however, rural farmers can only
get such permits when they are able to make unofficial payments to the relevant forestry
officials:
When I needed wood to construct my house, I and the forest guard went to the District
[forest] Office on four occasions before they gave me the permit to cut down one tree
on my farm . . . On each day that we went there, I paid the lorry fare for the forest
guard and gave him some money. I also carried foodstuffs to some officers. After
getting the permit, I presented a goat to the forest manager (Personal interview with
a farmer, 12 June 2006).
This scenario resonates with the assertion of Ribot and Oyono (2006, p. 6) that in most
cases of natural resource decentralization, rural people are granted favours not rights
and more troubles than benefits. The findings also support the argument of Cline-Cole
(1997, p. 528) that some participatory initiatives do not necessarily result in transfer of
access controls to local communities.

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The study also revealed that forest fringe communities actually do not get any share
of timber revenue. The Forest Services Division pays a small stream of timber revenue
(usually less than 10%) to top traditional rulers and the District Assemblies. As Agrawal
and Ribot (1999) noted, such revenues are only fairly distributed when such local representatives are downwardly accountable to the citizens. In Ghana and elsewhere in Africa,
however, traditional rulers are not downwardly accountable to local people, since their
positions are inherited. District Chief Executives and other top officials of the District
Assemblies in Ghana are also not representing the interests of local people, as they are
appointed by the President. District Assemblies often use funds provided to them by government to run political activities for the ruling government (Ayee, 1994). In this case,
the forest decentralization programme in Ghana is being used to enhance and masquerade
the central governments neo-patrimonial networks with local elite, rather than serving the
interests of local people. Studies in some parts of the developing world have revealed similar situations, whereby the little forest revenue intended for local communities is captured
by local elites, who are within the governments neo-patrimonial networks (Lund & Treue,
2008; Dhakal & Masuda, 2009; Balooni et al., 2010, p. 709); such a scenario of elite
capture has been termed the curse of elites (Balooni et al., 2010, p. 709).
As mentioned already, although forest communities in Ghana do not have any rights over
forest resources, they have been asked to form Community Forestry Committees (CFCs)
that would liaise with forest guards to protect forests. The study shows, however, that CFCs
have not been established in many forest fringe communities. Even in the few communities
where they are operating, their roles have been limited to helping the guard to clear boundaries of the forest reserve. Members of the CFC have no power to make laws to govern
resource use:
We are not allowed to make any rules on the use of the forest. We only take orders
from the guard . . . If we see any chainsaw operator cutting down a tree we can only
arrest him and hand him over to the guard. It is the guard who decides whether we
should take him to the police or not (Oral Communication with the Chairman of a
Community Forest Committee, 2 March 2006).
It is clear that the CFCs are not well organized because the government just wants to use
them to promote its own interests, not the interests of local people. In fact, there is enough
evidence to suggest that the formation of the CFCs in Ghana was mainly driven by the
desire to use them to provide free labour to the Forest Services Division, which was facing a serious shortage of personnel, as a result of the Structural Adjustment Programmes,
which led to a reduction of the labour force of the Department from over 3600 employees
in the mid-1980s to 2237 in June 2006 (Forestry Commission, 2005). It was also thought
that CFC members would help the Forest Services Division to chase illegal chainsaw
operators:
If we want to control the activities of illegal chainsaw operators without local community cooperation then we have to post many guards to such communities but this
will be costly. That is why we formed community forestry committees in those communities where there are a lot of valuable trees (Oral communication with a Forest
Manager, 4 April 2006).

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Given the fact that the government is not really committed to ensuring that local people
benefit from participation in forest management, CFC members have not been receiving
any meaningful rewards. This is odd given the fact that huge sums of money have been provided by international donors to support the Community Forestry Programme (see World
Bank, 2003; Forestry Commission, 2005). In the absence of any meaningful reward from
the government, majority of CFC members have reportedly stopped collaborating with the
forest guards. A few farmers, however, reported that they were still working with the forest
guards. Further analysis revealed that this group of farmers were still assisting the forest
guard only because such collaborations enable them to maintain good patronage networks
with the guards. Through these networks, those farmers are able to get illegal permission
from the guard to harvest forest resources.
The forest people do not give us any money for working with the guard. So some
of our friends have stopped doing this work, but I am still a member of the Forest
Committee because the guard is my friend. He always gives me the permission to cut
trees for charcoal production. He also gives my wife permission to harvest sponges
for sale (Oral communication with a CFC member, 4 April 2006).
The above statement shows that some members of the Community Forest Committees
have used the programme to enhance their own mutual networks with the guards. Although
their roles have been formally defined by policy makers, guards and CFC members have
been able to analyse, recreate and make appropriate choices about these institutional roles.
Indeed, roles are clearly articulated bundles of rights, duties, obligations and expectations
(Knoke, 1990, p. 7), yet while institutional roles are defined, individuals are also able to
make choices about institutional roles (Giddens, 1984; Smith, 1993).
Spatial Variations in Outcomes of Decentralization Reforms
The study shows that whilst the forest decentralization programme has generally been
poorly implemented in Ghana, its actual outcomes vary across the national space. For
instance, of the two study communities, Saponso No.3 has a Community Forestry
Committee, whilst there has never been any such committee at Ahinkwa. Further interviews show that since the main aim of forming the Community Forestry Committees was
to use them to fight illegal chainsaw operations they were only formed in communities
where lucrative trees still exist. Thus, the Forest Services Division is not too much interested in forming Community Forestry Committees at Ahinkwa because the forest reserve
there is already highly degraded.
It also came out that whilst farmers at Ahinkwa are sometimes consulted by the Forest
Services Division and timber contractors during negotiations on permits for logging in offreserve forests, their counterparts at Saponso No.3 are rarely consulted on such issues. This
difference is related to variation in land tenure systems. In view of the predominance of the
decentralized customary land tenure system at Ahinkwa, most farmers there are recognized
by both the loggers and the Forest Services Division as the actual owners of the lands
outside the reserves. In contrast, both timber contractors and the Forest Services Division
only recognize the Paramount Chief as the actual owner of the lands at Saponso No.3.
This is because, under the centralized customary system which is dominant in this area, the

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titles of lands are held by the chiefs, even though most of the farmers reportedly bought
their farming lands several years ago. In fact, some farmers even inherited the lands from
their fathers, but they are still not recognized as the actual owners since the titles are held
by the chiefs. Consequently, farmers at Saponso No.3 are rarely consulted before logging
activities take place on their farms. These farmers also hardly get compensations when their
crops are destroyed by loggers. Thus, although local people in both communities do not get
any share of timber revenue which is usually paid to their respective paramount chiefs
and District Assemblies, the two communities vary in terms of ability of farmers to get
compensations for crops destroyed by loggers. About 58% of household heads interviewed
at Ahinkwa reported that they have ever been compensated by timber contractors when
their crops outside forest reserves were destroyed by timber contractors. In contrast, only
11% of household heads at Saponso No.3 reported receiving such compensations.

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Assessing the Actual Intentions of the Government towards Forest Decentralization:

Contradictions and Ambiguities
It is clear from the preceding discussions that, even though the Forest and Wildlife Policy
of 1994 emphasized the devolution of forest management powers to local people, the actual
forest decentralization programme in Ghana does not conform to the tenets of the democratic decentralization, which is what international donors believe they are promoting. The
marked contradictions between stated decentralization policy and actual outcomes of the
policy are due to the fact that successive governments have not been really committed to
forest decentralization reforms. A governments special report that emerged in 1995, for
instance, indicated that complete transfer of authority over forest management to local people was not in the interest of the state. One major reason cited in the report to support the
governments reluctance to adopt complete decentralization of forest management was that
it would lead to overexploitation of the resource:
These forests provide intangible benefits to a wide section of the population . . . we
are committed to the spirit of decentralization . . . [but] it would be reckless to transfer the authority over forest management and protection to the District Assemblies or
the DCE [District Chief Executives] (indeed they have a vested interest in exploitation as they derive a large portion of their income from royalties) (Ministry of Lands
and Forestry 1995, p. 5, as cited by DeGrassi 2003, p. 16).
The same report argued that, due to potential boundary disputes, decentralization of
forest management would bring about conflicts among various District Assemblies. Such
conflicts have been reported elsewhere. For instance, Shah and Shah (1995) reported that
a decentralized forest management project in parts of India resulted in a situation where
farmers in some communities raided the forest reserves of nearby weaker communities in
order to allow for the regeneration of their own forest. However, there is no evidence to
suggest that boundary conflicts will inevitably occur, once forest management powers are
transferred to local people (Larson, 2002).
Some officials of the Forest Services Division also believe that local communities do not
have the capacity to manage forest resources. This is how a Director of the Forest Services
Division puts it: How can they [local people] manage the forests on their own? They dont

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go to school [so] the technology is not there (Personal interview with a Director of the
Forest Services Division, 15 March 2006). Here, the unwillingness of the government to
decentralize forest management has been justified by the arguments that local people do
not have the technical expertise to make appropriate decisions on resource management.
This scenario resonates with the assertion of Amanor (2003) that whilst centralization of
natural resource management is often driven by national governments interests in controlling resource revenue, such actions are often justified through crises narratives on the
inability of local communities to manage the resources. The observation is also consistent with the argument of Ribot and Oyono (2006, p. 5) that: government environmental
agencies conflate technical with political decisions to their own benefit. They use specious
technical arguments about resource management to hold onto allocative decisions. Thus,
government officials in Ghana tend to have strong arguments against complete decentralization of forest management. However, official statements by Ghanaian officials at
international conferences continue to give good reports of decentralization in their attempt
to get more funds. An example of such statement is captured below in a report presented by
a top state government official, E. K. Smith, during an international conference organized
by donors:
Ghana is a resurgent African nation with a market oriented, people-centred, democratic agenda. This is reflected in our new Forest Policy. To implement all our policy
reforms we require some financial and specialist technical assistance from the donor
community (Smith, 1996, p. 22).
There are, therefore, contradictions between what state officials say in Ghana and what
they say when they meet international donors. By employing such politics of deception,
the government has managed to hide its true intentions from international donors. As Rees
(1990, p. 417) noted, one strategy that governments usually employ to maintain autonomy in the field of resource management, is to intentionally formulate ambiguous policies.
The government may then openly argue that lack of resources negatively affect policy
implementation. In such cases the formal resource policy statements have little more than
symbolic value. This is exactly the situation in Ghana. After 20 years of adopting the decentralization programme, there is no area where local people have been empowered (see also
Crook & Manor, 1998). Yet, the government continues to project Ghana as a country that
has adopted democratic reforms.
Whilst the decentralized forest management policy has been poorly implemented, it
has been employed to enhance and masquerade the executives neo-patrimonial networks
with traditional rulers and District Assembly officials. Although traditional rulers were
marginalized during the early post-colonial era, they emerged again as important partners of the executive after 1992, when multi-party democracy was re-introduced. This
is because securing the support of paramount chiefs is necessary for winning elections
in Ghana. In the year 2006, a Ministry of Chieftaincy Affairs was formed apparently to
strengthen the executives patronage with traditional authorities. The District Assemblies
have also become avenues for enhancing neo-patrimonial networks. As explained, the
District Chief Executive and other top members of the Assemblies are appointed by the
President (Crook & Manor, 1998). Yet, patronage networks with these actors are often
depicted as decentralization.

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Concluding Remarks
The preceding presentation shows that, although Ghana is often portrayed as a country
that has adopted forest decentralization policy, there is nothing on the ground to suggest
that forest management powers have been transferred to local communities. Claims of
enhanced local communities rights over forest resources were found to be untrue. The
article, thus, supports the assertion of Agrawal and Ribot (1999) that most decentralization
efforts end up without increasing much the powers of local people. Similar to scenarios reported in Uganda (Bazaara, 2003), the Forest Services Division was interested in
transferring only those powers that increased its control over forest, while reducing expenditures. The Community Forestry Committees were formed mainly to reduce management
expenditure.
Although the forest decentralization programme was poorly implemented in the whole
country, its outcomes were found to vary over the national space. These variations were
explained in terms of differences in land tenure systems and local power structures. These
findings support the assertion that processes of local community participation in forest
management represent a power struggle that unfolds in many ways between state actors
and local community fractions (Balooni et al., 2010).
Lack of commitment on the part of the government was identified as the main factor
responsible for the poor implementation of decentralized forest policy in Ghana. The policy makers carefully formulated the decentralized forest policy just to satisfy international
donors, but had no intention of implementing it. Good statements on forest management
decentralization were literally imported from international agreements and accords. This
resonates with what Grainger and Konteh (2007, p. 2) term policy ambiguity by manipulating the language of the discourse of governments of developed countries. Even though
the imported texts are not consistent with the governments actual intentions, the political
leaders are able to outwit their international masters because of the latters misunderstanding of political structures in African countries. As shown, for instance, paramount
chiefs who actually live in urban areas do not necessarily represent the interests of poor
farmers, yet patronage networks between them and the government are seen by international donors as a form of forest management decentralization in Ghana. Similarly,
international donor pressures for an equitable distribution of forest revenue has been contained by designing a revenue distribution formula that directs a small stream of revenue to
unrepresentative traditional rulers and district assemblies. Here, although what constitutes
a local community is an important question that needs to be addressed in any decentralization programme (Cline-Cole, 1997), this has not been adequately engaged in the forest
policy of Ghana. Based on the foregoing discussions, it is concluded that there is a similarity between Ghanas current forest decentralization programme and indirect rule or the
decentralized despotism (Mamdani, 1996), which was adopted during the early colonial
era. Both indirect rule and the current decentralization programme are characterized by
patronage politics and therefore only benefit the executive and a few traditional rulers.
Poor implementation of decentralized forest policy is not peculiar to Ghana. As the presentations on various countries (such as India, Uganda, Bolivia, Cameroon and Indonesia)
during the international Conference on Decentralization and the Environment in Italy in
2002 demonstrates, forest decentralization programmes in many parts of the developing
world are poorly implemented because the governments are not really committed to them
(Latif, 2002). African governments, in particular, have often used policy ambiguities to
contest international pressures for forest management decentralization (Bazaara, 2003). As

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Ribot and Oyono (2006) noted, in most cases, governments in the developing world intentionally create the decentralized natural resource policies with vast room for interpretation
and reinterpretation, which usually creates ambiguities which can serve as an obstacle to
the decentralization process. The use of ambiguity to contest international donor pressures
resonates with the ideas of symbolic politics (Matten, 2003), in that the formal forest
policy is just a symbolic statement (Smith, 1985, p. 135) that will never be implemented.
These observations clearly demonstrate that financial aid conditionalities alone cannot
bring about actual environmental policy changes in Africa. This is because African leaders
understand the difficulties in monitoring policy implementation (Bratton & van de Walle,
1997). It is concluded, therefore, that external pressures for participatory forestry can only
achieve desired goals when supported by strong civil society, since local people are in a
better position to monitor developments in their respective countries.
Based on the findings of this study, it is recommended that local people should be actively
involved in forest policy formulation. The government of Ghana must be made to understand that decentralized natural resource management systems are effective only when all
stakeholders have a voice in decision-making. Local people should also be given secure
rights over forest resources. As Tucker (2010, p. 694) noted rights become secure only
when they are recognized as legitimate and enduring by formal government entities. It is
obvious that the government is not ready to transfer complete management powers to local
people, yet there is the need to ensure that they are allowed to harvest non-timber resources
which they need for their survival. Finally, community forestry committee members must
directly receive some payments from the state. Issues of land tenure systems should be
reconsidered to ensure a fair distribution of timber revenue. In places where land titles are
held by traditional authorities, part of timber revenue and compensation should be paid to
farmers whenever trees are harvested from their farms.

Acknowledgements
I would like to thank the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom and the
British Petroleum Company for jointly funding this study. I am also grateful to Dr. Alan Grainger,
who supervised my doctoral research.

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