Metempsychosis in Pindar

Author(s): Donal McGibbon

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1964), pp. 5-11
Published by: BRILL
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Metempychosis
in Pindar
DONAL

In

McGIBBON

this note I wish to discuss several points of dispute with regard to

the presentation of the theory of metempsychosis by Pindar in

Olympian II and fragment 137 (Turyn).
In Olympian II 56f Pindar presents a form of the theory of metempsychosis. After mentioning the reward or punishment which the good
and guilty meet in Hades after a life upon earth, he passes (68f) to
ot. 3'ETr6?Vxaav E'arptqsxa-pw0O
those no longer subject to rebirth. 6oa
?LVXVT-rO&7t
1pjnXva8LxWv EZjsV 4uzx&v, XTAL?OvAt'g o rovp& Kp6vou
upOLV &'vOa
pLC7rVSOLaV. Two questions
paxapov v5aov 0xCxavi8s
ovp3 '=
arise. (1) How many lives are necessary to gain release? (2) What is
the nature of these lives?
(1)

may
Sa(TpLq Cxr-r?po0L

refer to eitherthree lives in each world, giving

a total of six, or two lives in one world and one in an other, giving a
total of three. Most scholars are agreed that the first is the more natural
meaning. H. S. Long however following Mommsen chose the second
on the ground that if the first was adopted, it would follow that the
soul passed to the Island of the Blessed from Hades thus infringing the
principle that "wherever the belief in immortality occurs in Greek
religion, it is from this world that the soul passes to its final dwelling
place".' It has been rightly pointed out, however, by R. S. Bluck that
in the Phaedrus the philosophic soul which departs at the end of the
third periodos to join the company of the gods, makes its departure not
from earth but from the place of recompense.2 In connection with this
I would like to make two remarks. First, the fact that the place of
recompense for Pindar is beneath the earth while for Plato it is in
heaven need not be regarded as a matter of any difficulty. Throughout
the theory of metempsychosis topographical details fluctuate freely.3
Further Pindar's determination to adhere as closely as possible to
traditional beliefs and to regard man's ultimate existence as only that
of a hero naturally precludes the idea of heaven as a place of recompense. The sufficient answer to Long is that in both cases it is from the
I A Study of the Doctrine of Metempsychosis in Greece. Princeton
2 American Journal of Philology Vol. 79 (1958) p. 409f.
2

1948 p. 35.

The variations in Plato himself are sufficient evidence of this.

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same kind of existence that the soul finally departs. Secondly, an even
closer parallel may be present in Aeneid vi. The Elysium in Hades
where we find the soul of Anchises does not seem to be its final restingplace. The natural interpretation of 743f is that after a period has
elapsed, it will go to some other place which is presumably heaven.4
It is improbable that Virgil is responsible himself for this idea any more
than he is for the other ideas which he presents and the likelihood is
that he is reproducing a genuine tradition of Orphic-Pythagorean
eschatology. In view of these two parallels, therefore, there would seem
no difficulty in accepting the natural view that the scheme which
Pindar had in mind was one of six existences.
(2) The question of the nature of these existences requires discussion.
K. von Fritz objecting to Long's interpretation of eaTGpLq
eXoTepoot
can
be won in Hades
has argued recently that since the idea that merit
is found nowhere else, Pindar cannot have meant a stay in Hades to
be one of the times that a soul must stay away from all evil. What
Pindar had in mind he suggests was a scheme of three lives upon earth
in which alone merit could be won together with three passive retributory periods in Hades.s Now although we may believe that at least
three earthly lives were required before release, to suppose that the
stay in Hades was passive seems to place an undue strain upon Pindar's
words. Why should he mention the other world at all, if the need to
remain free from guilt did not apply to it as well? It is more reasonable
to believe that he held one might respond well or badly to the rewarding
or punishing as the case might be in Hades. Such an idea would be a
natural extension of the process upon earth. The latter was itself a
purgatory in which as in Hades souls were placed in favourable or
unfavourable circumstances and it was simply as they allowed these
circumstances to have a purificatory effect that they earned merit for
final release. Further the conception is not necessarily without parallel.
In Republic x we learn that when all souls come together to choose
new lives, many of the worst choices are made by souls who have come
from heaven. On the other hand most, though not all those who have
come from beneath the earth, made wiser by their experiences, make a
suitable choice. We seem to have here, as has been observed,6 the idea
that life in the place of retribution is a time of trial and test. It needs
little effort to conceive the idea that the guilty may to some extent
4
5
6

So W. K. C. Guthrie Orpheus and GreekReligion London 1935 p. 186.

Phronesis Vol. 2 (1957) p. 86.
Guthrie op. cit. p. 184.

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resist purification, yet even the good, it seems, may deteriorate in

Elysium. Again, why does the thrice philosophic soul in the Phaedrus
depart after its last earthly life to the place of recompense? It cannot
be as a reward. The only reward which the soul can seek is to join the
company of the gods as soon as possible. Is it not a necessary inference
that Plato regarded the whole periodos including the life in the place
of recompense as a test and that it was because the soul had to prove
its worth for 3,000 not 2,100 years that it did not finally depart directly
after its last earthly life? These two plausible parallels make it not
unreasonable to adopt the natural interpretation of Olympian II 68-72
and hold that Pindar believed all six existences to be periods of
trial.
Another statement of the theory of metempsychosis is to be found in
fragment 137 which runs as follows.
olar. 8? (Iepaecp6vcx7tOLVxV
7v?aWx=O
ItovOo4?
'? Ov U{ntpOev &`X?OVxeLvoV ev&TW &Tr
ae?0PvTmt,
aV&c3oL 4UX'CJ MX?LV, ?X T'-cV aPL?e4
xod aOVer.
&Mpe

XpCXLT7VOL

'
&U",OVT' * 84

CaoyLx

'r

QV
TOJLTt7V

&yauoL

pyCo
ZpOVOV "pOeq

OyVcL 7tp'O

&VOpC07r(.V

XCXr5V-rt

otalryap iv. Plato, emend.Boeckh. oarL XERose.

The fragment has been rightly compared with Empedocles B146.7
In Empedocles as in Pindar the incarnation prior to elevation to a
higher existence is in the form of a superior human. In Pindar only
one earthly life is mentioned before release but any number may have
preceded the stay in Hades.8 The meaning of the fragment depends
upon the interpretation which is given to the "acceptance of atonement" which is made by Persephone.9
Long refers poina to punishment of the type mentioned at Olympian
II 58-60 as undergone by guilty souls for sins of a previous earthly
7 "And at the last they become seers, and bards, and physicians and princes
among earth-dwelling men from which they blossom forth as gods highest in
honour".
8 That many lives have preceded is suggested by the fragment's similarity to
Empedocles B146 and, by its citation by Plato to support the view that the
soul has lived many times.
9 The 'ancient woe' is identified by H. J. Rose with grief felt by Persephone for
the murder of Dionysus. Mankind as descendants of the Titans share in their
guilt and have to do atonement. GreekPoetry and Life Oxford 1936 p. 79f. I. M.
Linforth as another alternative suggests 'atonement consisting in acient woe'
where the reference is simply to the suffering of the soul. The Arts of Orpheus,
Berkley and Los Angeles 1941 p. 347.

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life.10 He does not, however, give any reason which might explain
why such souls would merit the extraordinary treatment which the
fragment mentions. Further, it may be objected against this and indeed
any interpretation which refers poina exlusively to atonement undergone in Hades that Plato's citation of the passage as a reason for living
well on earth, suggests that he regarded the acceptance of atonement
as related to the manner in which earthly life was spent.'1 E. Rohde
adopts the view that poina refers to a special period of atonement
undergone by the soul at the end of the cycle of lives. It is modelled,
he believes, on the enneateris, a period of banishment laid down in
ancient procedure for murder and extended to cover other serious
offences.12 His interpretation has been accepted by Bluck who modifies
it, however, to make poina include a reference to the cycle of lives.13
Now although Bluck speaks of this view as almost certainly correct,
it is not in fact without difficulty. The notion of a banishment following
the cycle which is itself a long banishment requires if it is to be accepted
as wholly convincing that the two periods be meaningfully distinguished. What point are we to suppose is covered by the second period
which has not been covered adequately by the first? In an attempt to
answer this question Bluck makes two suggestions.'4 (1) The cycle may
correspond to the 'great' year of unconsciousness which Hesiod
mentions as a punishment additional to the nine years banishment
which is undergone by a god who forswears himself. He refers to
10

op. cit. p. 39f. Long refers the 'woe' to the suffering of the soul in Hades. His
treatment here however, seems confused. He regards Olympian II and the
of
Yet how can they be on this interpretation
fragment 137 as consistent.
poina? In order to acquire the requisite number of wholly virtuous lives upon

which, according to Olympian II, release depends, the souls in fragment 137
who are due shortly for release cannot have been guilty of any sins in the earthly
life previous to the stay in Hades. The implication of Olympian II, which he
nowhere denies, is that the pattern of virtuous lives constitutes the only means
of release.
11 So Bluck op. cit. p. 161. He argues (op. cit. p. 405f) against the view of Von
Fritz (op. cit. p. 86) that poina refers to atonement undergone in Hades before
While not agreeing with all of Bluck's arguments I
the cycle commences.
believe that he has sufficiently answered Von Fritz.
12 Psyche Eng. trans. London 1925, p. 444 where examples
are listed.
13 op. Cit. p. 161. See also Plato's Meno Cambridge
1961 p. 278f. A similar view
is held by Rose (op. cit. p. 89f.) wlho likewise fails to explain why the many lives
and purgatories of the cycle are not sufficient atonement for the 'grief' of Persephone.
14
op. cit. p. 281 f.

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Pindar fragment 136 (Turyn) where the soul is said to be quiescent

during the time that man is awake. (2) The cycle may correspond to
the 'wanderings' which Plutarch'5 implies Apollo had to undergo in
addition to a period of servitude as atonement for slaying the Python.
With regard to (1) when Pindar goes on to say that the soul is often
active in dreams, he surely implies that for a large part of life and
therefore of the cycle it may not be quiescent/unconscious. (2) is
perhaps more helpful but the fact remains that much, if not most of
the cycle, has been spent in systematic servitude in Persephone's realm.
A second difficulty associated with the view of Rohde and Bluck is
that although Pindar must have adhered closely to well-established
ideas, the notion of a second atonement is not to be found elsewhere
in the history of metempsychosis. It is true that Bluck has suggested
that there may be another allusion to the special enneateris in two of
the plates discovered at Thurii.'6 In the first'7 however the poina which
the soul is said to have paid is most naturally taken to refer simply to
the cycle. A closely related passage'8 actually mentions the cycle and
it alone as that from which the soul has escaped. The second plate19
opens as follows.

6n6
o1oTMV 4uxY

7rpOXL7U'

(paoq X?XLOLo

8geLOV C<L>a<L>OL 'C &Z TLVOC

7rSyOYtVov
YOCZpe7m%V

'O

7rX'OJO

10 8'OU7o

?U~taM

7tpaOi<>

7CwT&vT(X.

?7E7r6VOeLq

OeQ0eygvou ?e XVQp07rGUBluck following a suggestion of Guthrie20 translates the third line

"Hail thou who hast suffered something which thou hadst never
suffered before", and argues that this most naturally refers to a special
enneateris. Two objections, however, may be made. First, the clear
implication contained in this plate is that the greeting to the soul takes
place immediately after its departure from earth. Second even if we
suppose that a special enneateris followed the cycle, it is not necessary
to believe that it would always be accepted. Although, as Bluck
observes,2' Persephone could control atonement done in her realm,
1I

de def. orac 15.

A.J.P. Vol. 79 (1958) p. 410f.
17 DK 1 B19. The fact that the soul comes 'suppliant to Persephone' need only
be connected, as by Guthrie, with its application for release from the cycle.
18 D.K. 1 B18.

16

19 D.K.
20
21

1 B20.

op. cit. p. 175.

op. cit. p. 161, 407. Plato's Meno p. 281.

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it may be believed that she refrained from doing so. It is natural to

suppose that the point of a special enneateris would be to prove the
soul's power to perform its tasks well or badly.22 We may compare
the idea which Pindar puts forward in Olympian II that even in
purgatorial periods between earthly lives which are likewise spent in
Persephone's realm the soul is free to exercise its will. Yet if there is a
possibility that the enneateris will not be accepted, then the third line
cannot be understood as referring to it. Should Guthrie's translation be
adopted then his own interpretation which refers the line to the
apotheosis mentioned in the next line is likely.23
In conclusion it may be said that although the difficulty of relating
the special enneateris to the cycle and that of finding a parallel for it
may not constitute a decisive objection to the view of Rohde and
Bluck, they do at least indicate that it should be viewed with some
caution.
The theory of the special enneateris, however, raises a more fundamental point. It is normally assumed that if poina refers to the cycle,
the superior life which Pindars mentions prior to elevation must be
regarded as a reward life granted after purification has been attained.
Not only however is this conception unparalleled but it seems to run
counter to the two central beliefs of metempsychosis as we learn of
this theory from other sources. These two beliefs are that the purpose
of incarnation is to punish and purify the soul and secondly that any
time spent by the soul away from the higher existence to which it
naturally aspires is a severe deprivation. Empedocles who has been
cited as a parallel for the conception of a reward life,24 seems on the
contrary a decisive witness to the importance of these truths. B115,
119, 139 indicate that he regarded banishment from the company of
the gods as of its nature a dire tribulation. B118, 121, 124 vividly
portray earth as a scene of sorrow. It is possible to suppose that he
believed that earthly existence could be palliated by life in a superior
human form. That he should have regarded it as desirable, not to say
more desirable, than deification seems unlikely in the extreme. The
only reward which his fragments lead us to believe that the soul sought
was to pass to its divine existence without more ado.
22

c.f. Rose op. cit. p. 90f.

Bluck (A.J.P. Vol. 79 (1958) p. 411) objects that such a reference is "unnecessary". Economy of language however need not be a feature of solemn
ritual.
24 Bluck op. cit. p. 162. Plato's Meno p. 284.
23

10

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It may be that Pindar does carry this extraordinarily difficult and

unparalleled idea. Is it not however more satisfactory to believe that
although poina refers to the cycle, as it seems it must, 8e'-mxt is future
relative to &vataoZso that the acceptance of poina strictly follows the
superior life?25On this interpretation the latter is not to be regarded as
a reward but as a simple acknowledgement of the fact that a soul about
to gain release from the cycle is at a high level of moral development
and accordingly will live a superior moral life. Although this view
is based on the less natural view of the temporal relationship between
the two verbs, it involves a considerable advantage. It brings Pindar
into line with Empedocles and Plato, both of whom regarded the
incarnation immediately prior to release as a superior one. Further it
removes the need for supposing that as a reiresentative statement of
the theory of metempsychosis, Plato cited a passage which with its
view of incarnation as a reward for virtue contravenes all that we
learn elsewhere and carries an idea which was certainly repugnant to
Plato himself26. It is true that the reference to the 'ninth year' is left
unexplained. It is not however impossible that although it is not used
elsewhere in this sense,27 "r'e denotes a 'great' year and the reference
is to the end of the ninth milennium.
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand.

25

The verbs are of course timeless in themselves.

The determinism involved in this interpretation may be either temporal or
moral. There may be a time limit to the cycle or it may be considered a moral
impossibility for the soul not to gain release after the superior life. The latter is a
natural idea though the only explicit reference to it which I know of is at
Phaedrus 256 d, where it is said that a soul which once starts to grow its wings
cannot relapse.
27 As Bluck notes. Plato's Meno p. 281.
26

11

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