Epicurus on "Up" and "Down" ("Letter to Herodotus" 60)

Author(s): David Konstan

Reviewed work(s):
Source: Phronesis, Vol. 17, No. 3 (1972), pp. 269-278
Published by: BRILL
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Epicurus
on"Up"and"Down"
(Letterto Ilerodotus4 60)1
DAVID

KONSTAN

In

this paper, I shall defend an interpretation of section 60 of Epicurus' Letterto Herodotuswhich is faithful to the best manuscript
tradition of the text, credits Epicurus with a clear and plausible
(though lamentably fallacious) argument, does least violence to the
syntax and natural meaning of the passage, and rendersthe paragraph
appropriate to its context. An account similar to mine was first put
forward in a learned and imaginative article by Jiirgen Mau published
in 1954.2 My own arguments are independent of Mau's, and my conclusions differ in certain important respects. There is, moreover,
reason enough for a re-examination of this difficult paragraphin the
fact that Mau's work seems to have been altogether neglected in the
more recent literature on Epicurus' cosmology.3 I shall, in this study,
present the text and translation, an analysis of the argument as I
understand it, and a commentary on particular phrases and problems;
then an account of the relevance of the paragraphto its context, and
finally a critique of Bailey's interpretation of the section, which
represents most clearly and fully the traditional view.4

I wish to thank David J. Furley, David Hahm and Gregory Vlastos for helpful
criticisms and remarks at various stages of the composition of this paper.
' Jurgen Mau, "Raum und Bewegung: Zu Epikurs Brief an Herodot ? 60,"
Hermes 82 (1954) 13-24.
3 Thus, Graziano Arrighetti, Epicuro Opere (Torino, 1960), follows the interpretation of Hicks (see below, p. 277). Russel Geer, Epicurus (Indianapolis, 1964)
and G. K. Strodach, The Philosophy of Epicurus (Evanston, Ill., 1963) appear to
follow Bailey, as do Jean Bollack, Mayotte Bollack and Heinz Wismann, La
Lettre d'Atpicure (Paris, 1971). In none of these is there mention of Mau's contribution.
4 I shall note in the course of this article the places where Mau has anticipated
my arguments or results, as well as where our conclusions diverge. Mau approached the problem from a point of view somewhat different from my own,
and the reader is urged to consult his paper for many interesting suggestions
which I have not taken the space to reproduce.

269

1. THE TEXT's
xal X
5
v civurk'ca xoc
scirc ouCBet xmqyopctv
Kct [L?v xatl 'ro &nEdpou &q
&v a:c7tcv,
TO6&VC % X&k6). etE 0iVrOL tO &nvp xccpm5),i, 8cv b
tE &trCLpov &yCLv
6v, q8bio'rc (pmveaba= 'rouo iFLV, ^ 'z UnOX&rc 'IOU VwnVkOr CL &7tcpOv
roi3To yxp &86vmcrov8Lavo-n*&vact.
etvct xxl x&Tm 7tp6q rit6
&9X &r9
?
v
&v& voou~Liv &7tv
5 6=c
xmL 'rm Tivx xcic,
topo 'rvv
laL 1.tv?apclv
pOKetpov
&T&vo 6 wp' t[Wv cpcp6Lvov <Lt> roV
&v xal I?ukPL&L
np6; rouCqtk68kq -tc7Cv
unip xpcXi);,tiv

*F& x&r

Tr6rouq &c xVAL

cpcp6pcvov

yxp tn

X &7dl 'rrv xegp)y

i'nfox&m
u
'ir&v

6 7 oLp'

vop& ou'*v :tsrov ixotripm IxxripqC ivcttXvr-

&n' &1Lpov vocttrt.

2. TRANSLATION

Furthermore, of the infinite it is necessary that one not use the

expressions "up" or "down" in the sense of "highest" and "lowest."
For certainly, while it is possible to produce [a line] to infinity in the
direction overhead from whereverwe may be standing, [it is necessary]
that this [view] never seem right to us, or that the lower part of the
[line], imagined to infinity, be at the same time up and down with
respect to the same thing. For this is impossible to conceive. Therefore
one may assume one upward course imagined to infinity and one
downward, even if something moving from us toward the feet of
those above us should arrive ten thousand times at the places over our
heads, or something moving downward from us at the heads of those
below. For the whole course is nonetheless imagined to infinity as one
[direction]opposed to the other.

3. ANALYSIS

OF THE ARGUMENT

The argument, as I understand it, intends to expose a logical impossibility in the Aristotelian view (cf. De caelo 1.8, 3.2) that "up" is
defined by the periphery of the (spherical) cosmos, and "down" by
the center. (I shall support the claim that Aristotle is the target of
Epicurus' criticism in the commentary and discussion of the context
below.) The structure of the argument is a disjunctive syllogism:

' The text is that of H. S. Long, Diogenis Laeriii Vitae Philosophorum (Oxford,
1964). Mau employed P. Von der Muehll, Epicuri Epistulae Tres et Ratae Sententiae (Stuttgart, 1922).

270

Either

(A) the Aristotelian

view is wrong (t-8brore

pveZalX

To3o5o t"v).

Or (B) the lower part of the line is at the same time up and down with
respect to the same thing.6
Not (B) (ro5'ro y&p &86vavov 8&avoj&vxL).

Therefore (A) (la-r&... XmPe3v

xr)X).

While the argument is expressed as a disjunctive syllogism, it rests in

fact upon the implication: Aristotle's view implies (B). Basically,
then, the argument is a reductioad absurdum((B) is inconceivable).7
The argument is invalid because the implicationidoes not hold. It is
rendered plausible by an elementary confusion: "up" and "down" as
descriptions of a direction of motion with respect to a point or points
of natural attraction are identified with "up"and "down"in the sense
of "above" and "below" with respect to any given observer. On the
Aristotelian view, an object moving below an observer in a straight
line toward the center of the cosmos and then beyond the center would
be moving, first "down," and then "up" with respect to the natural
directions "down" and "up". From this, Epicurus concluded that the
region (or line) below the observer would be both "down" and "up"
with respect to the place where the observer was standing. On Epicurus' own view, anything moving down with respect to an observer
would always be moving down with respect to the natural orientation
of the universe. (An alternative interpretation is possible: &vcoand
xaVmrefer consistently in the section to directions of motion, and the
lower part of the "line imagined to infinity" is conceived of as moving
(i.e. being produced or extended, cf. &yetv)in a straight line, without
change of direction, but must nevertheless be described, when taken
as a whole (cf. i 6kX(popain line 10), as moving both downward and
upward with respect to a single point of reference. The motion, of
course, is not down and up, but first down, then up. The reader may
decide which confusion is more likely to have been Epicurus'.)
In a second argument, Epicurus meets an objection concerning
observers on different levels, for whom the space between would be
6 The clause cEt jvrOL. . . yEYLV 6v is taken as concessive; cf. the translation above
and the commentary below.
7 Cf. Mau's comment (p. 16) on lines 2-4 in the text reproduced above: "Die
erste Hialfte illustriert das in 1 [i.e. lines 1-4] Ausgesagte; in der zweiten Halfte
kann nichts anderes als die platonisch-aristotelisch-stoische Kugelwelt abgelehnt werden... Eine nach unten in Unendliche verlangerte Linie wird, auf ein
und denselben Punkt bezogen (den Erdmittelpunkt), zugleich nach oben und
nach unten sein, was nicht vorstellbar ist."

271

(respectively) "up" and "down". Epicurus replies that motion up or

down will be the same for all observers. The final sentence reaffirms
the general conclusion: there is a single direction "up" and a single
"down," and not, as in Aristotle's account, two "ups" and two
"downs.""

4. COMMENTARY

the formulation appears

tendentious, for "the infinite" obviously cannot have a "top" and
"bottom". However, -rO17tepoV is Epicurus' regular phrase for "the
universe." &vTCTrW and xovrwrm' are not Aristotle's words: he speaks
of &VWxa' xcm-,&,as does Epicurus, but adds that these are limited
(WpLaCL, De caelo I.6 [273 a 16.]) Epicurus calls Aristotle's "limited"
up and down "top" and "bottom" or "highest" and "lowest" to
avoid confusion with his own sense of 4vo and xcrw. Bailey, against all
but I
the MSS., accepts Usener's emendation iv&Tvu&tand xocatx,
the
dative in
should like to see another illustration of xxTryopev with
this sense.
1. '0o3

&'tspOU

@ 0?V

&vC-z-r& xa' XCr:XT

2. e' pev'oL Tz6 repxcx),iq: the neutral expression "overhead" is used

to avoid begging the question. For Aristotle, Epicurus will argue, "up"
is also beneath our feet. {iev'rot here is "progressive" (Denniston,
Greek Particles2, p. 406).
2-3. eK lireLpOV &yetv6v: I am not sure whether this refers to a line or a
course of motion along a line (cf. the alternative interpretation above).
In either case, a line overhead is introduced because "up," in Aristotle's
view, is always defined along a radius of the cosmos. es 17retpovis here
used loosely for "indefinitely," since, strictly speaking, Aristotle does
not allow infinite lines or motions. For 1yev 6v in this sense, cf. R. D.
Hicks, CR 37 (1923) p. 109.

3.

-8eO7-e

CXvezau

TroVTrofZLV: the

construction

depends

on W.

For c9cLve'rameaning "to seem so" or "to seem the case," cf. Plato
ou,r px'verot, where Adam
cv6tvo
Resp. 517 b 14 t& 9'oiSv ?0ol
s Cf. Mau (p. 17): "Schon seit Platon unterschied man zwischen dem 9t)cEL
&vo und dem 7rp6;AL&q&vc bzw. xok-xc."My account differs from Mau's insofar
as it stresses the idea of direction of motion.

272

compares 334 b 14 ro'rUo jieT'rot 9poLye 8oxet. Cf. LSJ s.v. def. B II 4.
For a survey of various views on the meaning of this sentence and
emendations in the text, cf. Mau (pp. 17-18). Mau reads ta0?e rot
instead of etL [J.kV'OL, and substitutes xx for ov. The word 'rO3-rois
usually taken to refer to "the absolute highest point" (Bailey). I take
it to mean the proposition dependent on ou 8eLin 1-2 - i.e. the use of
the expressions "up" or "down"in the sense of "highest"or "lowest."
3. 'T6 6ox&'(

0ou VO-V'?r0o et;

.7Cepov: "the lower part of the hne

imagined (in turn) as extended indefinitely;" or possibly, "what is

below the line."
4- &{o &vw X? elvat xmoxkico tp6q '0 MUTO: cf. the similar language
in Aristotle De caelo I.3 (269 b 27-8): &vayxn ' -ra-vT6 9epO'evov T
&
X&'rC
{V
XOUC6'nqr' lXCtV I' PMpoq &[L
yW , 1! np6s TO a'4 8.
4. &atvoraov8taojvx:
conceivability is the Epicurean test for possibility, cf. Letterto Pythocles 97.
5. ,av ... pop&v rqv &v&x'r: as opposed to Aristotle's view, where two

opposed directions of motion on a single line are equally "up".

6. &v xodLpuuptMxxwr: we have here a parenthetical argument, as I

understand it, in which Epicurus shows that the fact that the standpoint of an observer is relative does not render Epicurus' theory liable
to the kind of "inconsistency"he found in Aristotle's view. The "ten
thousand times" has no particular function in the argument, so far as
I can see. If it needs to be explained, I would very tentatively suggest
it is an ironic quotation from Aristotle Nic. Ethics I.1 (1103 a 20 ff.)
where, however, it is essential to the argument: otov o4 Aoqyt'ae
o6x av e'awetin &vcr ypeaocl,
xs&
scp6Xevos
o?v8' av ,LUpLMXL
au-r6v 94C-n rq &vco '=,tCv (emphasized words are apparently picked

up by Epicurus).
6-7. 7rp6qro'u n6Qx4 '4v

XVrMA... Urnep XVPMXc)

~iZLv: i.e., under those

above us, but over us. (I see no reason to suppose that there is a
reference here to other worlds, as Bailey supposes; cf. note 11 below).
8..
U-1 cpop&:a course of motion along a single line taken as a
whole.
273

8. ixcxopcx&x xcxpqf

that
&v'nLxetXL?rVn:

is, there

are two

absolutely

opposed directions, "up" and "down," whereas in Aristotle's system

"up" and "down" are not unqualifiedly opposed as directions, since
"up" on one part of a line is the same direction as "down"at another
perhaps deliberately recalls Aristotle's often repeated
part. aXV XeL;L&vprinciple that motions must be etq &V'txetLzva (cf. De caelo I.8 [277 a 22,

26, etc.]).
5. THE

CONTEXT9

The Epicurean theory of the atom, which is the subject of sections

54-62 of the Letterto Herodotus,required that atoms have a natural
tendency to move in a single direction, which was by definition
"down"and was accounted for by ascribing to the atom the property
For if atoms had "weight" or "heaviness," then
of "weight" (r3&pu).
the phenomena of heavier and lighter things could be accounted for
by the theory of W$Xt1tq or "extrusion,"which Strato and Epicurus
both adopted (cf. Simplicius on De caelo pp. 267.29 ff., 269.4 ff.
Heiberg, cited as Strato fragments 52 and 50 Wehrli; cf. also Letterto
Herodotus53, Letterto Pythocles 109, and Strato fragments 51 and 53
Wehrli). In De caelo I.8 Aristotle attacked the theory of extrusion,
but his critique involved the assumption of natural places, a crucial
notion in Aristotle's cosmology. Now, the idea of an infinite universe
necessarily involved the rejection of natural places, but Aristotle had
charged that without natural places there could be no up and down
[cf. De caelo I.7 (276 a 8-11)]: 687X re, o6 pm lan i?kaov jq' faxw'ov,
gmaL rozq saG'CCL -q o
s O?Lq
,u-8 C6
sZ v &VWr6 8i X&cM,r6noq
;.
Cf. also Physics III 5 (205 b 30 ff.)].
8i ,uA6G'rogxv-atg o6x a.
TOUbrou
Epicurus of course rejected this conclusion, but not without conceding to Aristotle certain important arguments. In any case, if my
interpretation of section 60 is nrght,Epicurus thought he had a logical argument against Aristotle's theory of natural place, in which he
did not have to treat specifically the matter of orientation in an
infinite universe.
That Epicurus should have in mind specifically Aristotle's theory of
natural place in this passage is no cause for surprise, since, as David
Furley has shown, Epicurus' treatment of minima and atomic motions
9 Cf. Mau's remark (p. 14): "Da der Zusammenhang mit dem Kontext so lose
ist, dass auch er uns bei der Erklarung nicht helfen kann..."

274

in sections 56-9 and 61-2 is heavily indebted to Aristotle's analysis of

minima in the Physics. Epicurus was compelled to conclude that the
theory of minima entailedthe constant motion of atoms at equal speed.
Epicurus, as Furley sums up the position, "accepted Aristotle's conclusion that there must be indivisible units of time, distance, and
motion if there are indivisible units of any one of these three... And
he accepted Aristotle's contention that faster and slower motion entails
the divisibility of time and distance; he developed the theory that
there are no real differences in speed, and undertook to explain away
the apparent differences in the speeds of visible moving bodies" (Two
Studies in the GreekAtomists, p. 121). I believe that Furley's analysis
of Epicurus' position is correct. There is, however, a difficulty in
employing this analysis to explain the transition from the theory of
minima in sections 56-59 to the account of atomic motions in sections
61-62 of the Letter to Herodotus.10For section 61 begins with a discussion, not of any and all atomic motions, but specifically of motion
downward through the void and with particular emphasis on the indifference of this motion to heaviness and lightness. On my interpretation of section 60, it is possible to say why this should be so.
In the De caelo, Aristotle set forth certain consequences of rejecting
the doctrine of natural places and a finite universe: (1) there would be
one direction of motion for all things (275 b 30 - 276 a 3); (2) the speed
of all bodies would be infinite (277 a 30-34); (3) bodies would neither
accelerate nor decelerate (277 b 5-8). I think it is safe to add one more
consequence, which Aristotle does not make explicit: (4) no body
would naturally be at rest. Conclusions (2) and (3) rest on the premise
that bodies accelerate as they approach their natural place, an assumption which was widely accepted, according to Simplicius' commentary on the passage. Without going into the details of Aristotle's
arguments, the important thing for our purposes is to note that
Epicurus essentially admits as valid all four conclusions: (1) the basic
motion of the atoms is in a single direction; (2) their speed is, not
infinite, but inconceivably great; (3) they neither accelerate nor
decelerate, but move at uniform speed; (4) and, of course, they are
never at rest. Thus the discussion in section 61, which begins with a
terse recapitulation of these notions, emerges naturally out of the
refutation, in section 60, of Aristotle's conception of "up"and "down."

10 Furley does not discuss section 60.

275

6. CRITIQUE

OF THE

PREVAILING

INTERPRETATION

I shall examine in detail Bailey's version, which is the fullest statement

of the view. Bailey sets out Epicurus' argument as follows (all quotations from Bailey are from his Commentary on Epicurus ad loc.,
pp. 213-215; numbers in parentheses refer, for convenience, to lines in
the text reproducedabove):
A (1-2): "We must not speak of the 'up' and the 'down' as though
(measuredby) the highest or a lowest" (reading&v arco m
A' (2-3): For, "even if we were to prolong to infinity the line passing
above our heads, we shall never reach the top" (Bailey adds, "nor the
bottom... ," but this is not warrantedon his interpretationof the text).
B (3-4): "We must not either say that that which stretches downward to infinity... can be at once up and down in reference to the
same thing," (that is, up and down "have a relative truth.")
B' (5): For this is inconceivable.
C (5): "We may then in this conventional sense say that there is
a motion upwards and a motion downwardsin respect to us."
D (6-8): "Even though there are thousands of worlds above and
below us..."
E (8-9): "A summing up: for in any case, whether you call them
up and down or not, the two motions are diametrically opposed to one
another. Of course once more, not a mathematical statement but R
conclusion based on experience."
Bailey's account raises insuperable objections. First, the paragraph
is irrelevant in its context, as Bailey acknowledges, printing his
translation in brackets. Second, much of the argument is trivial,
irrelevant or otiose: (i) A and A' are merely another argument, and a
worse one, for the infinity of the universe, which was already demonstrated in section 41; (ii) there is no point to the phrase "downward
to infinity" in B; (iii) D is irrelevant (Bailey remarks, "the clause is
not very satisfactory");"1 (iv) E is trivial, for if "up" and "down"
conventionally describe opposed motions, the sentence reduces to:
"opposedmotions are opposed to one another" (what Bailey means by
"a mathematical statement" here eludes me). Third, Bailey's is an
unnatural reading of the text: (i) the emendation in A gives awkward
Greek (Bailey calls it "a sentence of some difficulty;" Usener, who
It was Gassendi who first supposed our text to refer to other worlds above and
below us. It is a quite unnecessary supposition, as Mau (p. 20) demonstrates
clearly.
11

276

proposed the emendation, suggested a lacuna); (ii) it is difficult to

make B depend on xzarjyopsev(Bailey notes the "somewhat awkward
want of parallelism"between A' and B). Fourth, C is a distortion of
the text, where (i) nothing correspondingto the phrase, "in this conventional sense," is to be found, and (ii) Epicurus speaks of one motion
up and down, not a motion (VACv...pop&v);but this conclusion will
not follow from A and B. Fifth, and most damaging of all, Bailey's
interpretation of the passage makes it inconsistent with Epicurean
theory, and this for two reasons: (i) Epicurus does not believe that
"up" and "down" are conventional, he believes they are natural. Of
course it does not matter "whetheryou call them up and down or not,"
but whatever you call them, down is different from up not merely in
being the opposite direction, but in being the direction in which all
bodies by nature tend (cf. Lucretius 2.184 ff. and 2.217-8 corpora cum
deorsum rectum per inane feruntur/ponderibus propriis). If section 60

says anything about down and up, it must be consistent with this.
(ii) The fact of natural directions "up"and "down"is not "a conclusion
based on experience" in the sense Bailey intends when he remarks:
"we know what we mean by motion upwardand downwardin reference
to ourselves, and we have only to prolong such motion to infinity, and
we then have the conception we need." By this reasoning one could
argue that because we know what we mean by right and left in reference to ourselves, there must be a right and left in the natural universe,
a conclusion the Epicureans would not countenance. That atoms tend
naturally in a single direction is a theoretical premise of the atomic
hypothesis of Epicurus, which is consistent with and can account for
the "up" and "down" which we perceive (the natural "up" happens
to coincide with our sense of "up"). The argument is not worked out
explicitly in Epicurus or Lucretius, but if we put together the premise
that all things tend naturally downward (save when forced upwards
by "extrusion") and the notion that the earth, for various reasons,
tends to be at rest relative to its own local cosmos (Lucretius5.534 ff.),
then we can see, I think, the general structure of the account.'2
(R. D. Hicks [CR 37 (1923) 108-110] proposed to read A' and B as a
single argument to the effect that "infinity will be either up or down
Mau remarks (p. 20): "Im unendlichen Raum gibt es kein absolutes Oben
und Unten, demnach auch keine Mitte." Whatever the status of this proposition
in modern physical theory (which acknowledges, incidentally, an absolute right
and left in infinite space), it is surely the case that Epicurus would reject it.
There exists, for Epicurus, an absolute up-down orientation in space.

277

it cannot possibly be both up and down - in reference to the same

point" (p. 110). Apart from the awkwardness of calling "infinity"
either up or down, Hicks' view does little, so far as I can see, to redeem
the traditional interpretation.)
-

7. THE EVIDENCE

OF LUCRETIUS

While Lucretius does not appear to employ the argument against the
doctrine of natural places which Epicurus used in section 60, it is
perhapssignificant that he does specifically attack the idea of a natural
center of the universe toward which all heavy things tend (1.1052 ff.).
The doctrine he is criticizing includes the notion that the antipodes of
the earth are inhabited by creatures who walk upside-down (suppa,
line 1061), and this is perhaps a Stoic elaboration. The details of
Lucretius' arguments need not concern us (in any case, the text is
badly mutilated here). For my purposes, it is enough to show that the
Epicureans, at least, directed special arguments against the doctrine
of natural places, apart from their arguments in defense of an infinite
universe. It is perhaps worth noting that when the discussion of
physics resumes, after the proem to Book 2, the subject is the motion
of the atoms.
Wesleyan University

278