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Dear barristers,

Please note of the following corrections on the pre-week:


18. Rolando filed a petition for declaration of the nullity of his marriage to Carmela because of
the alleged psychological incapacity of the latter. After trial, the court rendered judgment
dismissing the petition on the ground that Rolando failed to prove the psychological
incapacity of his wife. The judgment having become final, Rolando filed another petition,
this time on the ground that his marriage to Carmela had been celebrated without a
license. Is the second action barred by the judgment in the first? Why?
Yes, the second action is barred by the judgment in the first because Rolando is deemed to have
expressly and impliedly conceded the validity of their marriage celebration. In both petitions,
petitioner has the same cause - the declaration of nullity of his marriage to respondent. What
differs is the ground upon which the cause of action is predicated. The second case is premised
on the claim that the marriage is null and void because no valid celebration of the same took
place due to the alleged lack of a marriage license. In the first civil case, however, petitioner
impliedly conceded that the marriage had been solemnized and celebrated in accordance with
law. Petitioner is now bound by this admission. The alleged absence of a marriage license which
petitioner raises now could have been presented and heard in the earlier case (Mallion v.
Alcantara, G.R. No. 141528, October 31, 2006).
22. A bought a Volvo Sedan from ABC Cars for P 5.0M. ABC Cars, before delivering to A, had
the car rust proofed and tinted by XYZ Detailing. When delivered to A, the car's upholstery
was found to be damaged. ABC Cars and XYZ Detailing both deny any liability. Who can A
sue and on what cause(s) of action? Explain. (2012 Bar Exam)
A can sue ABC Cars but not XYZ Detailing. ABC Cars, by virtue of the contract of sale with A, is a
real party in interest or one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit (Rule
3, Sec. 2). It is an indispensable party, without whom no final determination of the action can be
had (Rule 3, Sec. 7). ABC Cars, as the seller, is responsible to A, the vendee, for any hidden
faults or defects in the thing sold, even though he was not aware thereof (Art. 1566, New Civil
Code). On the other hand, XYZ Detailing is neither an indispensable party nor a necessary party
since there is no privity of contract between A and XYZ Detailing.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: A can sue ABC Cars or XYZ Detailing, on the alternative. Where the
plaintiff is uncertain against who of several persons he is entitled to relief, he may join any or all of
them as defendants in the alternative, although a right to relief against one may be inconsistent
with a right of relief against the other (Section 13, Rule 3).
23. U7X, a co-owner of a certain parcel of land occupied by A and B, filed an ejectment case
against the latter. A and B moved to dismiss the case on the ground that Y, a co-owner of
the property in question, was not impleaded. Rule on the contention.
The contention of A and B is not correct. Y, as co-owner of the property in question, is not an
indispensable party (Art. 487, NCC). Pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant
jurisprudence, any one of them may bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of coowned properties. Therefore, only one of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit
for the recovery of the co-owned property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners
are not indispensable parties. They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be
afforded in the suit even without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed
for the benefit of all co-owners (Catedrilla vs. Lauron, G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013, J.
Peralta).
P. 53 Table:
NON-APPEARING PARTY
Plaintiff

Defendant

Both Parties

EFFECT
Dismissal of the claim without prejudice. Defendant who
appears shall be entitled to judgment on a permissive
counterclaim
Same effect as failure to file a response under Section 12 of
the Rule. Section 12 provides that the court by itself shall
render judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in
the Statement of claim limited to what is prayed for. The court
however, may, in its discretion, reduce the amount of
damages for being excessive or unconscionable.
Note: This shall not apply where one of two or more
defendants who are sued under a common cause of action
and have pleaded a common defense appears at the hearing.
Dismissal WITH prejudice of both the claim and counterclaim

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94. e. No. In this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator
when he has adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the
estate (Lim v. Diaz-Millarez, G.R. No. L-17633, October 19, 1966). When the fact of
indebtedness, however, was only subsequently discovered after the administrator has been duly
appointed, he should not be removed absent any other lawful ground (Dalisay, etc. v.
Consolacion, etc., G.R. No. L-44702, July 30, 1979).
96. Unggoy was validly appointed as executor of the estate of Bogie. Since Unggoy is not
acquainted with the obligations of an executor and is threatened by the many claims of
Bogies many heirs and creditors, Unggoy engaged the services of Atty. Napolie. Should
the attorneys fees of Atty. Napolie be charged against the estate? How will Atty. Napolie
enforce her claim? If Bogie realized Unggoys ignorance and appointed Atty. Napolie
instead as executor, can Atty. Napolie claim her attorneys fees against the estate?
No. A lawyer of an administrator or executor may not charge the estate for his fees, but rather, he
must charge his client. When a lawyer has rendered legal services to the executor or
administrator to assist him in the execution of his trust, his attorneys fees may be allowed as
expenses of administration. The estate is, however, not directly liable for his fees, the liability for
the payment resting primarily on the executor or administrator. If the administrator had paid the
fees, he would be entitled to reimbursement from the estate (Occena v. Marquez, GR No. L27396, September 30, 1974). Thus, Atty. Napolie can validly claim against Unggoy but not
against Bogies estate.
If Atty. Napolie was instead appointed as executor of the estate of Bogie, he is still unable to
charge the estate for attorneys fees. Under Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court, when the
executor or administrator is an attorney, he shall not charge against the estate any professional
fees for legal services rendered by him.

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