Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
by Laksiri Fernando
( April 3, 2015, Sydney, Sri Lanka Guardian) Reforming of the electoral system is a hot
topic these days. Even abolishing or reforming the executive presidential system might
(or threatened to) depend on finding a feasible reform for the electoral system. There
are some who want to get back to the old first past the post (FPP) system. There are
others who prefer or want to stick to the proportional representation (PR). The general
thinking for a long time has been to employ a mixed system which is again
controversial due to a lack of feasible method or controversy over employable different
formulas. The Dinesh Gunawardena Report is one example for this imbroglio.
The present article is sequent to the earlier one on A Simple Solution for Electoral
Reforms (Sri Lanka Guardian, 17 March 2015), but gives a proof for the feasibility of
the proposed method. As it was argued, the effort so far has been to employ the two
systems separately, some MPs under the FPP and some MPs under the PR. As it was
stated, This to me is an unnecessary effort to combine the two, and instead an FPP or
constituency system could be accommodated quite easily within the PR system to
achieve the same or better objectives.
Objectives
The objectives of the proposal to be achieved as explained previously were:
(1) To do away with the preferential voting and competition.
(2) To create constituencies where the respective MPs are closer to the voters.
(3) To ensure the viable minor parties receive adequate representation.
(4) To guarantee the overall composition of the parliament to reflect the proportional
voting of the people.
Given the consequent debates or political haggling there is no difficulty even in adding
another objective as follows.
(5) To create stability in parliament after the abolition/reform of the executive
presidential system.
The last article explained the method/s that could be employed in determining the final
election results in four main steps or ways and a brief summary of them are as follows.
Only comment on the above fifth (5) objective is that there are other or better ways of
achieving stability not only in parliament but also in the country at large.
Four Methods/Steps
First and foremost, elections are held in constituencies (i.e. 160 constituencies) using
the traditional FPP method. Nominations are called from political parties or
independent candidates for separate constituencies (i.e. Moratuwa, Mulkirigala,
Vavuniya etc.). Thus the above first two objectives are achieved by eliminating the
preferential competition and allowing the voters in a constituency to have their own MP
(Ape Manthri). A voter has to mark only one cross (X) before the preferred
party/candidate. Thus the method is also simpler. Even at present, election results are
calculated and issued for the existing constituencies and therefore the election
department can use the same arrangements. All candidates who first past the post
get elected. See Table 2 (in Annex) calculated on the basis of 2010 parliamentary
election results as example.
Second, nominations are also called simultaneously from political parties for 22
electoral districts on list basis in a preferential order. There can be different views and
compromises as to who could (or could not) constitute these lists. Necessary
amendments need to be made to the constitution (Article 99) and the election law. This
is the same for the first step or the FPP system. The number of nominated candidates
should be equal to the number of PR seats allocated for that district by the
Commissioner of Elections under Article 98 (8). The entitlement of PR seats by each
party is calculated on the basis of the present PR calculations as per Article 99 (6) (7)
and (8). The present author consider the method as a valid PR calculation also giving
bonus seats for the leading party to ensure stability which is a much concern on the
part of some political parties. See Table 3 (in Annex) for the allocated seats on the
basis of the above method at the 2010 general elections. This is the main overarching
method to achieve the objectives (3) and (4) namely to ensure the viable minor parties
to receive adequate representation and to guarantee that the overall composition of
the parliament does not distort the proportional voting of the people.
Third. It is obvious that both systems cannot go side by side and it is not necessary. Or
otherwise, there can be a jumbo parliament (160+196= 356!). Therefore, the third
step is the important method of reconciling FPP with PR at the district level. More
correctly, this method can be called accommodating the FPP within the PR system.
This is mainly a calculation in the case of FPP winning parties and allocating PR seats
to runner up and/or minor parties who qualify for PR allocation under the present
requirements. The reconciliation is applied by deducting the number of PR seats by
the number of FPP seats (PR FPP = district entitlement or district overhang). As
explained in the last article, some parties may win more FPP seats than they are
entitled under the PR system and these are called hangover seats. These can be
reconciled later. See Table 4 for the calculations of final district PR seats on the basis
of 2010 parliamentary elections.
Fourth is the continuation of the national list method and national PR system as at
present. The purpose of retaining this method is to allow the nationally dispersed
parties to achieve what they might not achieve under the district PR system and to
give major parties some flexibility to accommodate deserving people in their national
list allocations. The national PR also allows the final reconciliation of the overhang
number of seats within the national PR system if the political parties agree to it. This
step enhances the objective (4) above, namely to guarantee that the overall
composition of the parliament reflects the proportional voting in the country as much
as possible. See Table 5 as an example of standard national list allocations based on
2010 general elections.
However, there can still be concerns over the stability of government as per the
objective five (5) and in the next section, different methods or options are shown to
accommodate these concerns in Table 1 (A) (B) and (C). These options are calculated
on the basis of Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 (in Annex) as explained previously in this section.
Table 1 is also the proof of the feasibility of the method/s proposed.
Proof of Feasibility
Let us begin with the final results of the calculations which prove the feasibility of the
overall method. For this purpose, three optional methods are employed for the
government and/or political parties to pick and choose.
Optional Method A
Table 1 (A) shows the comparative picture of the calculations with the actual
FPP/PR Calculation
144
60
15
7
226
2010 Results
144
60
14
7
225
The following calculations are made based on Table 2 (FPP), Table 4 (Final District
PR) and Table 5 (National PR) in the Annex.
UPFA = 136 FPP + 12 PR + 17 National 21 Overhang = 144
UNP = 9 FPP + 42 PR + 9 National 0 Overhang = 60
AITK = 15 FPP + 3 PR + 1 National 5 Overhang = 15
DNA = 0 FPP + 5 PR + 2 National 0 Overhang = 7
In this method, the overhang seats are finally deducted not only from the national list
allocations but also from the district PR allocations as necessary. Yet in the case of the
AITK still there is one seat in excess as they had only 3 district PR and only 1 national
list, while having 5 overhangs from the FPP.
Optional Method B
It is possible that the major parties might disagree to totally give up district PR
allocations for various reasons. In that case, the final results can be calculated using
the Method B.
Table 1 (B)
Feasibility of the Method (B)
Party
UPFA
UNP
AITK
DNA
Total
FPP/PR Calculation
152
60
22
7
241
2010 Results
144
60
14
7
225
In this method, the overhang number of seats are deducted only from the national list
allocations and keeping any residue seats in parliament. The obviously result is the
increase of the number of parliamentary seats and this may differ (slightly) from
election to election.
UPFA = 136 FPP + 12 PR + (17 National 21 Overhang = -4) = 152
UNP = 9 FPP + 42 PR + (9 National 0 Overhang = 9) = 60
AITK = 15 FPP + 3 PR + (1 National 5 Overhang = -4) = 22
DNA = 0 FPP + 5 PR + (2 National 0 Overhang = 2) = 7
Optional Method C
Of course there can be another method without deducting the overhang number of
seats at all even from the national list number and this will increase the size of the
parliament by another 26 seats which is also not completely a bad proposition. The
following Table 1 (C) shows the resultant calculations and the method employed.
There is a possibility of the final number 251 being stable, if other necessary electoral
reforms are undertaken.
Table 1 (C)
Feasibility of the Method (C)
Party
UPFA
UNP
AITK
DNA
Total
FPP/PR Calculation
165
60
19
7
251
2010 Results
144
60
14
7
225
This proposal is also made in this fashion considering the time constraints and political
and practical realities. No need to emphasize that politics is the art of the possible.
This proposal could be the least controversial and least cumbersome. There is no
much preparation needed on the part of the election department. The proposal also
can be a win-win solution for those who support the Dinesh Gunawardena
propositions and those who oppose them. This also can be a compromise solution for
the FPP advocates and the PR advocates as this proposes a synthesis between the
two. This system also can be called 1 to 2 PR/FPP however within an overall PR
system. In one of our examples, 160 FPP and 91 PR envisaged. There is no need to
revise substantially the present enumeration or calculation methods. Mainly the
nomination systems (methods and procedures) have to be newly designed. The voting
system however will be simpler than the present and there are certain compromises
necessary between political parties regarding bot the district PR lists and national PR
nominations.
The only disadvantage of the proposed system or method would be the uncertainty of
the final number of MPs in parliament until the elections are concluded. That is
however within a reasonable range (225 and 251). There are several other countries
who are in the same category. However, there is no reason for the number to go
beyond 251 at a forthcoming election as no party at the immediate future would be in a
position to perform as the UPFA did at the last 2010 elections. Therefore, the overall
overhang number of seats would be less and not more. This proposal can be
considered an interim solution while retaining the same method and procedure for the
future. By increasing the number of district PR allocations (i.e. from present 196 to
122) and/or reducing the number of FPP seats subsequently through new delimitation,
the overhang element could completely be eliminated.
Note: The present author has been arguing for the retention of an overall PR system
for the national parliament for a long time from a Political Science and a democracy
point of view. (See Laksiri Fernando and Dietmar Kneitschel (Ed.), A New Electoral
System for Sri Lanka, FES, 1999).
The data in Tables 2, 3, 4 and 5 referred to in the text to calculate the optional
Methods A, B and C are given in the following annex. No further explanations are
given for the tables at this stage.
Annex
Table 2
2010 Election Results by (FPP) Constituency
District
Mahanuwara
Matale
Nuwaraeliya
UPFA
12
4
4
UNP
1
0
0
DNA
0
0
0
AITK
-
Other
0
0
0
Total
13
4
4
Batticaloa
Digamadulla
Trincomalee
Jaffna
Vanni
Galle
Matara
Hambantota
Colombo
Gampaha
Kalutara
Kurunegala
Puttalam
Anuradhapur
a
Polonnaruwa
Badulla
Moneragala
Ratnapura
Kegalle
Total
2
3
1
1
0
10
7
4
9
13
8
14
5
0
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
1
10
3
-
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
4
3
11
3
10
7
4
15
13
8
14
5
3
9
3
8
9
136
0
0
0
0
0
9
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
0
0
0
0
0
0
3
9
3
8
9
160
DNA
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
ITAK
3
1
1
5
3
-
Other
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Total
12
5
7
5
7
4
9
6
10
8
7
Table 3
2010 PR Results by Party
District
Mahanuwara
Matale
Nuwaraeliya
Batticaloa
Digamadulla
Trincomalee
Jaffna
Vanni
Galle
Matara
Hambantota
UPFA
8
4
5
1
4
2
3
2
7
6
5
UNP
4
1
2
1
2
1
1
1
2
2
2
Colombo
Gampaha
Kalutara
Kurunegala
Puttalam
Anuradhapur
a
Polonnaruwa
Badulla
Moneragala
Ratnapura
Kegalle
Total
10
12
7
10
6
7
5
2
5
2
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
19
18
10
15
8
4
6
4
7
7
127
1
2
1
3
2
51
0
0
0
0
0
5
13
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
8
5
10
9
196
Table 4
Calculation of FPP, PR and Overhang Seats by Party (2010 Example)
UPFA
District
FPP PR
Mahanuwara 12 0
Matale
4
0
Nuwaraeliya 4
1
Batticaloa
2
0
Digamadulla 3
1
Trincomalee 1
1
Jaffna
1
2
Vanni
0
2
Galle
10 0
Matara
7
0
Hambantota 4
1
Colombo
9
1
Gampaha
13 0
Kalutara
8
0
Kurunegala 14 0
UNP
Over FPP PR
(-4) 1
3
0
0
1
0
0
2
(-1) 0
1
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
1
(-3) 0
2
(-1) 0
2
0
0
2
0
6
1
(-1) 0
5
(-1) 0
2
(-4) 0
5
ITAK
Over FPP PR
0
0
0
0
1
2
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
10 0
0
3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
-
DNA
Over FPP PR
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
(-5) 0
0
0
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
2
0
1
0
1
0
0
Total
Over
0
16*
0
5
0
7
0
6*
0
7
0
4
0
14*
0
6
0
13*
0
9*
0
7
0
19
0
19*
0
11*
0
19*
Puttalam
Anuradhapura
Polonnaruwa
Badulla
Moneragala
Ratnapura
Kegalle
Total
5
7
3
9
3
8
9
136
1
0
1
0
1
0
0
12
0
0
0
(-3)
0
(-1)
(-2)
-21
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
9
2
2
1
2
1
3
2
42
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
15
-5
National Seats
17
9
1
2
29
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
8
9
5
11*
5
11*
11*
222* (196)