Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

The Loss of HMS Hood

A Re-Examination
by William J. Jurens
Part 3
Underwater Trajectories:
Perforation of the belt would have become much more probable as Hood passed further and further
into the turn. Had the final 20 turn been completed, the target angle would have been about 73,
and the consequent resolved obliquity only about 29. A close inspection of the armor penetration
diagrams and the application of modern armor penetration theory shows that even Hood's 305mm
belt could have penetrated if she had completed more than half of her planned final turn of 20
degrees to port. Unless the turn had been virtually completed however, it is not considered likely
that a projectile which penetrated the main belt would have maintained sufficient velocity and
integrity to make a magazine penetration probable. A comprehensive table of probable penetration
conditions at both the beginning and the end of the turn is reproduced below in Table III. 58

Table III
Table of Armor Penetration of HMS Hood
Total Obliquity = 44 (Beginning of Final Turn)

5" Armor

7" Armor

12" Armor

Projectile exit velocity

1,052 fps
321 mps

608 fps
185 mps

none
none

Projectile condition

intact

intact

broken (?)

Plug Weight

269 lbs
122 kg

405 lbs
184 kg

none
none

Plug Velocity

986 fps
301 mps

818 fps
249 mps

none
none

Fragment Weight

48 lbs
22 kg

65 lbs
29 kg

none
none

Exit angle

32

16

none

Horiz. exit component

64

77

none

Vert. exit component

-2

none

Total Obliquity = 28 (End of Final Turn)

Projectile exit velocity

1,295 fps
395 mps

1,092 fps
333 mps

457 fps
139 mps

Projectile condition

intact

intact

intact

Plug weight

269 lbs
122 kg

389 lbs
176 kg

723 lbs
328 kg

Fragment weight

35 lbs
16 kg

48 lbs
22 kg

27 lbs
12 kg

Fragment velocity

1,295 fps
395 mps

1,092 fps
333 mps

457 fps
139 mps

Exit angle

28

27

15

Horiz. exit component

74

74

81

Vert. exit component

13

13

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]

Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

It is clear from this information that Hood may indeed have been destroyed due to the action of a
projectile which penetrated her belt. But a shell need not necessarily have penetrated the belt to
destroy her. It might have gone over her armor belts. Or it might have gone under.
Both British Boards of Inquiry considered the possibility that Hood was destroyed by a projectile
which fell slightly short of the target, and, after travelling some distance underwater, penetrated the
hull and then detonated well below the waterline. This hypothesis is often associated with a similar
underwater hit suffered by Prince of Wales in the same action. This damage was not discovered
until the ship was drydocked some time after the action, and therefore the exact time and range at
which the hit was scored is uncertain, although because the projectile apparently entered the hull
from about 45 relative, it seems most probable that the hit occurred shortly after Hood was
destroyed. Prior to that time, Prince of Wales was not under 380mm fire, and shortly after that time
she turned away and presented her stern to the enemy. The hit, caused by a 380mm projectile from
Bismarck, first contacted Prince of Wales about 8.5 meters below the waterline. After piercing the
skin, it penetrated four additional internal light bulkheads before ending up nose forward just
outboard of the ship's main torpedo bulkhead alongside the main engineering spaces. This hit
certainly had the potential to destroy the ship had it exploded, and had it struck adjacent to the
magazines.
Especially because it appears that the Germans made no specific effort to enhance the underwater
capabilities of their projectiles, this represents a truly remarkable performance. Although the
detailed underwater trajectory of any individual projectile remains difficult to predict with any
precision, the general principles governing the underwater trajectories of most standard projectile
types are relatively well understood. The usual tendency of an ogival headed projectile impacting
the water at an angle of fall of about fourteen degrees would be to travel about eighty calibers
submerged in an upwardly curving path, and to re-emerge once again with its velocity greatly
diminished. The projectile would normally penetrate to a depth of about six calibers during its
underwater run, corresponding to a depth of about 2.28 meters for Bismarck's 38cm shells.
Provided the windscreen remained attached, which would be atypical, a mathematical treatment59
yields a trajectory radius of about 110 meters for Bismarck's shells, with a maximum depth of the
trajectory of approximately 2.3 meters (c. 6.1 calibers) and a corresponding run to emergence of
approximately 44 meters (c. 115 calibers). For a projectile of this type, therefore, penetration to a
depth of 8.5 meters, or more than 22 calibers, is remarkable. Only the Japanese "suichu dan"
projectiles, which were designed specifically to maximize their underwater performance, would be
expected to approach this capability - in technical terms their practical lift coefficient seems to have
been only about 0.11, corresponding to a trajectory radius of about 325 calibers. Such a projectile
striking at an angle of fall of 12 would typically be expected to penetrate to a depth of about 18-20
calibers (6.85-7.6 meters) after an underwater travel of about 110 calibers (41.8 meters). At that
point it would be expected to have retained about half of its original striking velocity.
In order to achieve this performance, the suichu dan projectile was designed with a specially
weakened windshield and armor-piercing cap which broke away upon impact with the water and
which presented the flat nose which is typical of projectiles designed for effective underwater
penetration. Although the German projectiles used by Bismarck did not have the special breakaway
windscreen and cap characteristic of the Japanese diving projectiles, they were equipped with a
rather brittle aluminum windscreen and a fairly flat faced 'knob and ring" armor-piercing cap design.
It is therefore quite possible that if the windscreen were removed by water impact, the comparatively
flat armor-piercing cap may have accidentally approximated the effects of the suichu dan design.60
In fact a broken windscreen surrounding a knob and ring cap might by chance have formed what a
hydrodynamicist commonly calls a "stagnation cup" at the nose, a shape well known for its
underwater stability.61
Even had this taken place however, there remains some doubt concerning the action of the
projectile fuze. The fuze delay of the standard German projectiles of the time was approximately
0.035 seconds, which at the range at which Hood was struck corresponds to a distance of only
about 19 meters even if the projectile were traveling in air. Because of the additional retarding
force, the equivalent distance under water would be much less - certainly less than 17 meters, and
probably closer to 13 or 14. At the angles of fall which concern us here, this corresponds to a depth
at detonation of something less than 3.5 meters. Assuming a fuze delay of 0.070 seconds, or twice
the nominal, 62 results in an underwater travel of from about 19.5 to 31.1 meters depending upon
one's (rather arbitrary) assumptions about the shell's underwater behavior. If the trajectory were
relatively straight, this corresponds to a depth of from about 4 to 7 meters. Insofar as Hood's belt
projected only about 960mm below the water line, even a projectile with a "normal" underwater

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]

Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

trajectory could have easily struck beneath it, and penetrated well into the ship before exploding.
The second board of inquiry obviously considered a penetrating underwater hit a distinct and
dangerous possibility, and prepared a special drawing of Hood showing the wave profile along the
side at a speed of 28 knots. At least in the stern of the vessel, this drawing shows that the effective
"draft" of the ship at any point along the side might range between 10.5 meters just forward of the
mainmast to only 9.5 meters just forward of 'X' turret. The drawing also shows that the main armor
belt, with its lower edge located about 7.75 meters above the keel, would normally be covered by
only from 1.75 to 2.75 meters of water. This was obviously a point of great vulnerability.
The investigators who examined the fuze of the dud projectile which had struck Prince of Wales
found that it had been actuated, probably upon water impact, but that shortly thereafter the powder
train ". . . went out." This is not surprising when one considers that shells not specially designed for
stable water entry quite commonly experience transient yaws exceeding 90 within the first twenty or
so calibers of underwater travel. It is in fact possible (though improbable) that the projectile which
struck Prince of Wales penetrated the water normally, rotated nearly 180 shortly after impact, and
stabilized base first for the remainder of its journey. Such violent rotation would almost certainly
have rendered the fuze inoperative, though after it was completed the flat base might have acted
like a suichi dan nose. The fact that the projectile was recovered nose forward in the bilges tends to
support this somewhat unusual hypothesis.
Provided the fuze operated correctly, however, an underwater hit represents one of the most
plausible explanations for the loss of the ship. Projected upon the ship's cross sections, a projectile
with an angle of fall of 10.6-13.9 striking about 6 meters short could have penetrated the hull just
below the 308mm belt and penetrated almost unimpeded directly to the area of the after
magazines. On the not unreasonable assumption that unarmored ship's structure along the path
would have approximately the same retarding characteristics as water, the nominal fuze delay range
of from 0.035 to 0.07 seconds places the likely point of detonation squarely in the after magazines.
The views below show the areas of vulnerability on Hood at the beginning and end of the turn.

A computer-generated plot of the internal arrangements of Hood corresponding to an angle of fall

of 12 and a target angle of 53. This shows a "shell's-eye" view of Hood as she probably
appeared at the beginning of her final turn. The 12 angle of fall corresponds to an average value
that would occur over the range of probable conditions.
Click on this image for a larger view.

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]

Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

A computer-generated plot of the internal arrangements of Hood corresponding to an angle of fall

of 12 and a target angle of 73. This shows a "shell's-eye" view of Hood as she probably
appeared at the end of her final turn, if it was completed. The 12 angle of fall corresponds to an
average value that would occur over the range of probable conditions.
Click on this image for a larger view.
The boards of inquiry located, and most accounts since then have also mentioned, a band of
potential weakness about 450mm wide located slightly above the probable waterline, and stretching
from frame 259 to frame 280, i.e., abreast the after engine room. In this area, they considered it
possible that a projectile could reach the area of the magazines by passing just over the top of the
305mm belt, penetrating the 178mm belt, and sneaking in just under the flat protective main deck
by striking the portion of the deck that sloped down to meet the side. Assuming that the angle of fall
of Bismarck's shells was somewhere between 10.6 and 13.9 and that the target angle was 53,
when superimposed on a cross section of the Hood, this corresponds to a resolved angle of
between 13.2 and 17.2. Searching the cross sections from the ship's plans at this angle of fall
(instead of the 20 resolved angle of fall assumed in the Board's investigations) indicates that such
an event, though not impossible, would have been rather improbable.
As noted above, it is also possible that the fatal projectile may have reached the magazines by
passing over the belt, rather than under it. An attractive byproduct of this hypothesis is that it also
lends itself to an easy explanation of the observation of witnesses that the fatal explosion seemed to
originate in the vicinity of the mainmast rather than amongst the after magazines. As the
orthographic diagrams above show, one plausible route for a projectile heading toward the after
magazines and passing over the belt takes it in the immediate vicinity of the starboard torpedo tube
nest. Because of the mantlet armor, a projectile traveling this path would not have been capable of
detonating a torpedo, but it still might have done collateral damage along the way. There was an
obvious fire on the boat deck, and perhaps one under the boat deck as well, in the vicinity of the
torpedo tubes. If the shell or collateral fragments from the hull had perforated a charged torpedo air
flask, for example, the result - especially in an area where an extensive fire was in progress - could
have been a spectacular burst of flame around the mainmast, followed a split second later by the
detonation of the after magazines. This is, in fact, exactly what many witnesses observed. 63
Unfortunately it does not appear likely that a projectile from Bismarck could have penetrated to the
magazines under these conditions. The angle of fall of the incoming shells was only from 10.6 to
13.9, which is a very high obliquity for deck penetration indeed. Graphs of German armor
penetration for the 380mm shell (see previous page) stop at an obliquity of 20 and must be
extrapolated to obtain any figure at all for an obliquity greater than this. Further, the best estimates
obtained by such extrapolation seem to yield a total penetration capability of only about 65mm. The
total thickness of deck armor protecting the magazines in this area, admittedly distributed amongst
several layers, amount to approximately 120mm. On average, penetration via this route, especially
by a damaged projectile, is therefore considered unlikely.
It has however been suggested that a projectile striking over the engineering spaces could reach the
forward bulkhead of the magazine group by penetrating both the 50.8mm forecastle and the 19mm
main decks and then detonating between the main and lower decks just forward of station 280. The
orthographic diagrams above reveal this to be an attractive alternative hypothesis.

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]

Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

Magazine Detonation:
Assuming that a penetration to Hood's magazines did in fact occur, it is worthwhile investigating
exactly what the probable effects of a 380mm projectile hit on a 4-in or 15-in magazine might be.
The Admiralty conducted a number of tests to resolve this issue, though it appears that none were
specifically associated with the loss of Hood. The second board of inquiry, for example, took as
evidence the results of trials conducted in 1936. 64 This series of experiments concluded that the
ignition of cordite of Q.F. cartridges by shell splinters would not blow up a Q.F. magazine, and that
one 4.7-in shell detonated in contact with others would not result in a catastrophic explosion. When
a 6-in C.P.C. shell loaded with shellite 65 was fired directly into the magazine however, things were
different. On the first trial, a shell fired into 98 rounds rack stowed resulted in ". . . a short pause
followed by the complete disintegration of the magazine," and on the second trial, a shell fired into
94 rounds "box stowed" started a cordite fire that over a period of 48 minutes completely destroyed
the magazine. In a confined space, a catastrophic explosion would have been probable. Heavy
projectiles by themselves were much less vulnerable. Earlier trials had shown that ". . . The thick
walled A.P.C. type of shell is practically immune from sympathetic detonation or explosion. A shell,
bursting in contact with a pile of shells of this type filled 70/30 shellite and fuzed, may scatter the
pile or even break up some of the shells in the pile without any of them exploding."66
A comprehensive British survey undertaken by the boards of inquiry covering twenty-two cases of
war damage involving magazines, found only one case [4.5%] where the magazines had been
known to explode, i.e., in Hood herself, six others [27.3%] where magazines were suspected to have
exploded and fifteen cases [68.2%] where magazines had not exploded in spite of severe
damage. 67 Coupled with American experience, which seems to have indicated that catastrophic
propellant explosions were rather rare even in cases where shells or bombs had detonated directly
inside magazine spaces, this would seem to indicate that catastrophic explosions were rather rare.
It must be noted however, that British double-based propellants, which contained a substantial
amount of nitroglycerine in their makeup, were significantly more susceptible to ignition than their
single-base American counterparts. In 1945 the U.S. Navy Bureau of Ordnance conducted
systematic tests to determine the susceptibility of various propellant formulations to accidental
ignition.68 Using a nozzle mechanism capable of generating a reproducible flash, they found that
while British Cordite type propellants would ignite while still some 530mm from the vent, standard
American single base propellants would not ignite until the distance was reduced to 120mm, and the
relatively new U.S. "SPCG" flashless powder, incorporating nitroguanadine, would have to be within
25mm of the nozzle before ignition took place. These are very substantial differences. Assuming
the flame of the explosion to expand in a spherical front, the same explosion which would ignite one
cubic unit of standard American powder, would be capable of igniting almost seventy-five times as
much cordite. In the confined space of a magazine, the relative amounts of gas evolved, and the
ensuing internal pressures could easily spell the difference between disturbance and disaster. Had
Hood carried single base propellant instead of cordite, there is in fact a good possibility that the fatal
explosion might never have occurred. 69

Detonation of Torpedoes:
A number of writers, including some members of the original boards of inquiry, have speculated that
it was an explosion of torpedo warheads which directly or indirectly caused the loss of the ship. The
Second Board of Inquiry itself concluded that though such an event was possible, it was not a likely
scenario. The board concluded:
"Evidence of eye witnesses, REPULSE, and an Officer who had recently served in
HOOD leaves little room for doubt that the mantlet doors were closed. A warhead
could still, however, have been detonated or exploded by a direct hit from
BISMARCK'S shell. There is no direct evidence that such a hit occurred, but it may
have done so on either side of the ship. If a single warhead had gone off one other,
but probably not more than one, the other warhead would also have gone off. . . .
Expert opinion suggested that the explosion of two warheads would produce an all
round almost instantaneous flash. It would not have produced the very high column of
flame of appreciable duration, which was seen by so many witnesses. Nor was the
noise, reported as being heard, compatible with that of a T.N.T. detonation or

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]

Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

explosion. The consensus of expert opinion was definitely against the characteristics
of the explosion as given in evidence by eyewitnesses being that of T.N.T."70

Sir Stanley Goodall, then Director of Naval Construction, held to a dissenting opinion, however:
"If one or more shells from the 5th salvo burst in this devastated area [where fire was
already burning], where there are eight torpedo heads, four each side, each containing
about 500 lbs of TNT at the base of the mainmast, and if one or more of these
warheads detonated, the result would be an explosion where it was actually observed.
Such an explosion could break the ship's back already weakened in this
neighbourhood by the earlier damage. With the force on the after bulkhead of the
engine room due to the ship's speed of 28 knots and the low reserve of buoyancy of
the after part of the ship, this portion would rapidly sink. The foregoing is an
alternative explanation of the occurrence which is as likely as the explanation in the
finding of the court." 71

Sir Stanley was probably wrong. Although no formal calculations were ever done, the court had
looked long and hard into the issue, and received the testimony of a number of expert witnesses.
Typical of these was Capt. John Carslake, R.N., an explosives expert who testified on Friday, 29
August. After confirming that although he was not an expert on cordite explosions per se, but that
he ". . . knew a fair amount" about high explosive detonations, the court subjected him to a detailed
examination.
"Would a 15-in or 8-in shell striking Hood's side abreast the torpedo tubes detonate a warhead with
a pistol in it?" they asked. His answer, based on trials, was "No, not unless it penetrated and
detonated inside the mantlet. If it detonated outside it would not detonate the warhead." "Would a
direct hit, either from a shell or a splinter detonate a warhead without a pistol in it?" the court
inquired. "If the shell detonated on impact with the warhead, it would detonate the warhead. If the
shell hit the warhead but did not detonate, it would not detonate the warhead . . ." When asked
what would be the probable effects if the warheads detonated, he replied:
"I would expect the mantlet, the ship's side, and the forecastle deck to be nearly
demolished, but that the major venting would have been as I suggested horizontal.
Immediately after the explosion it is anticipated that the observer would have seen a
gap in the ship's side, probably some 15 or 20 ft. radius down to the top of the 12-in
belt. . . . I would expect the boat deck above the tubes also to be blown away.72

B.A. Fraser, Controller, summarized his particular objections to the torpedo scenario in a memo
dated 7th July:73
"D.N.C. has raised the question of whether the above water torpedoes in 'HOOD' were
responsible for the destruction of the ship. I disagree with his view, and accept the
report of the Board of Inquiry for the following reasons:
a) from trials, a 15-in shell burst outside a torpedo tube protected by a mantlet will not
detonate the torpedo.
b) Although a direct hit may detonate one torpedo, it is extremely unlikely that others
will be countermined. In 'KHARTOM' a torpedo was fixed 74 into the after galley by an
air vessel bursting. The head did not detonate but it burnt to detonation in the fire
after a considerable period, about 20 minutes, and in 'HOOD' the interval between the
first hit and the destruction of the ship seems to have been under 3 minutes .

These descriptions are consistent with the results of other experience. To take one example, on 26
December, 1943 the destroyer U.S.S. Brownson (DD-518) was struck by a Japanese bomb which
apparently detonated one or more of the 374kg torpex loaded torpedo warheads in her after
quintuple torpedo mount.75 The resulting explosion removed or completely demolished all ship
structure over a radius of approximately 10 meters. Fifteen minutes later, Brownson sank. Although

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]

Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

the detonation of a torpedo tube nest could result in the sinking of a destroyer in fifteen minutes, it
is clearly unlikely to have caused the loss of a battlecruiser in three. The chances of a torpedo
explosion near the mainmast detonating even the closest of the ship's magazines twenty-five meters
and two decks away are inconsequentially small.

The Boat Deck Fire:

There is a natural possibility that the fire on the boat deck spread, and in so doing led to an
explosion in the magazines. Particularly if diesel fuel or gasoline were involved, it is possible that
burning fuel could have penetrated to a magazine via a vent duct, part of the plumbing system, or
by pouring down an ammunition hoist. Few witnesses seemed to feel petrol was involved in the
boat deck fire, however, and the ammunition hoist hatches were almost certainly shut as the action
began. Able Seaman Tilbum testified to this, and the court appearance of Captain William Wellcose
Davis, R.N., who had been aboard Hood as recently as 20 September, 1940 confirmed it. 76 The
torpedo doors would have been definitely shut, he said, his recollection of the Ship's Torpedo
Standing Orders was that doors were always closed until the Captain indicated a torpedo target. His
answer with respect to the 4-in ammunition hoists was equally clear and unambiguous:
"The 4-in. ammunition supply doors in the ship were closed until the Captain passed
the order 'supply 4-in. ammunition.' This organization resulted from an incident when
the ship was bombed at the end of September or beginning of October 1939, as it was
then found that 4-in. ammunition was being replenished before any order had been
given. I can visually confirm that this procedure was rigidly adhered to as I was on the
boat deck during the subsequent bombings of the ship and during the action off Oran.
. . . The water-tight door organization was extremely thorough and efficient and was
practiced every day at sea. All doors were marked in plain language."

With regards to the gasoline stowage, he testified:

When the ship proceeded to sea, all petrol, except approximately 2 gals, was left in
the drifter. This was kept behind to enable the power boats to be started up on return
to harbour. There was a special organization for landing a number of 50 gallon drums
which were kept on the boat deck adjacent to the sea' lifebuoy abreast the mainmast.
The quick release drums originally supplied to the ship were released into the sea and
not recovered or replaced, on the first occasion of the ship being attacked by aircraft,
about 3 weeks after the outbreak of war. The drums were stowed on trays and the
stoker who looked after this stowage was so proud of his care that he told me he
could not fill a petrol lighter."77

It would thus appear that the fire on the boat deck, though spectacular, probably played no direct
part in the loss of the ship.

A Hit from Prinz Eugen:

There has been considerable speculation that the fatal explosion could have been caused by a
projectile fired from the main battery of Prinz Eugen. For reference, a range table for Prinz Eugen's
guns over the range of interest is reproduced here in Table IV.

Table IV
Range Table for 20.3cm SK C/34
Projectile Weight = 122kg Initial Velocity = 925 mps
Range
(Meters)

Angle of Fall
(Deg)

Time of Flight
(Sec)

Striking Velocity
(mps)

Prob. Err.
(Meters)

14,000

11.00

21.3

483

64.5

14,500

11.95

22.4

472

65.0

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]

Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

15,000

12.8

23.4

463

65.5

15,500

13.8

24.5

451

66.0

16,000

14.5

25.7

441

67.0

16,500

15.5

26.9

431

68.0

17,000

16.5

28.1

424

69.0

17,500

17.5

29.5

417

69.5

18,000

18.6

30.6

408

70.0

18,500

19.7

31.9

400

71.1

19,000

21.0

33.2

394

72.5

19,500

22.0

34.6

388

73.2

20,000

23.2

36.0

383

74.0

20,500

24.5

37.3

378

75.0

21,000

25.9

38.7

372

76.0

21,500

27.1

40.1

370

77.5

22,000

28.7

41.5

367

79.5

22,500

30.1

43.0

363

80.4

23,000

31.5

44.6

360

81.0

23,500

32.8

46.2

358

82.8

24,000

34.1

47.8

357

85.0

Speculations concerning Prinz Eugen's shells usually revolve around the idea that although her
projectiles would have had little or no chance of penetrating Hood's belt armor at the specified range
and obliquity, due to their "plunging" trajectory, they might have set off the after magazines after
penetrating Hood's relatively thinly armored decks. In support of this, one article purporting to
reproduce a diagram of the relative trajectories of Bismarck's and Prinz Eugen's guns has been
drawn so as to give an angle of fall exceeding 35 degrees.78 A quick examination of the range
tables, however, shows that such an angle is highly exaggerated, to say the least. In reality, due
largely to the higher initial velocity of Prinz Eugen's guns, at the range at which Hood was engaged
the angles of fall of both Bismarck's and Prinz Eugen's guns were remarkably similar. Over the
ranges of interest, the angle of fall of Prinz Eugen's projectiles was only about 13-19, an angle
which cannot in any meaningful sense be construed as "plunging fire." Further, the striking velocity
of Prinz Eugen's shells could not have exceeded about 460 meters per second. Even assuming that
the shells could have found a spot to hit the deck directly, at the calculated angle of fall the official
German armor penetration curves for this gun, though not reproduced here, allow them a
penetration of only about 40-60mm of homogeneous armor at best. In fact, as was the case of the
380mm gun, the curves for these conditions are effectively "off the graph," strongly implying almost
no possibility of intact penetration at all. Even at the closest possible range, belt armor penetration
at the calculated obliquity of 47 would have only been about 100mm for an intact projectile and
103mm for a broken one, both of which are well under the thickness of even Hood's uppermost and
thinnest belt.
Although a hit from Prinz Eugen could possibly have caused the fire in Hood's after superstructure,
it would have been almost impossible for such a hit to have penetrated to the after magazines. 79
Prinz Eugen may have been able to hurt the Hood, but she would almost certainly be unable to kill
her.

To Part 2 To Part 4

Footnotes for Part 3:

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]

Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

58 I am indebted to Nathan Okun for this table, who exercised considerable expertise and judgment
in computing and checking the values therein.
59 All normal underwater trajectories are found to develop an upward curvature as the projectile
slows. A rough approximation of this curvature is given by the equation:
R = 2m/p A Cl y where:
R = Radius of trajectory
m = Mass of projectile
p = Density of fluid
A = Area of projectile
Cl = Lift coefficient
y = yaw angle
It is interesting to note that neither the angle of fall nor the velocity of the projectile enters into this
formulation. Of the quantities above, only the yaw angle and the lift coefficient are typically
unknowns, it is therefore convenient to replace these with a single term, CIp, the practical lift
coefficient, which can be selected to match the results of actual observations. For most projectiles,
CIp lies in the range between 0.05 and 3.00 with most underwater trajectories corresponding to a
practical lift coefficient of about 0.33. A comprehensive if complex treatment of practical underwater
ballistics is given in May, Albert, "Water Entry and the Cavity-Running Behavior of Missiles,"
Nav/Sea Hydroballistics Advisory Committee Technical Report 75-2, Silver Springs, Maryland, 1975,
450 pp.
60 It is known for certain that German windscreens could be detached on water impact, as one
fetched up on destroyer Zulu while engaging Bismarck a few days later. This is not surprising when
one considers that the instantaneous load on a windscreen upon typical water impact could well
exceed fifty tons. In fact, during World War II, the U.S. Navy had difficulty with armor piercing
projectile caps and windscreens coming loose through normal handling. A U.S. 16-inch projectile
recovered from Casablanca Harbor in 1960 was found to be missing not only its windscreen but its
armor-piercing cap as well.
61 Other similar nose forms which serve the same purpose are known colloquially as "spades,"
"pickle barrels," and perhaps somewhat more officially as "kopfrings."
62 Evidence from U.S. sources indicates that such an increase in delay would not be unusual. For
example, U.S. Navy specifications for the Base Detonating Fuze Mark 21 considered the fuze action
satisfactory if the detonation occurred between 0.030 and 0.070 seconds after impact when set for a
nominal 0.033 second delay. British experience at the River Plate and elsewhere lead them to
estimate the effective German fuze delay as being about 0.05 seconds.
63 Captain William Weilcose Davies, who had left Hood less than a year before her loss, testified
that the torpedoes would have been stowed with pistols installed if shipped in the tubes, and that
spare torpedoes without pistols but with warheads in place would have been slung above the ready
use torpedoes, with the nose section run into the protective mantlets.
64 "Enclosure 'B' to D.N.O.'s Minute of .6.36 - Trials to obtain the effect of shell fire on 4.7" Q.F.
fixed ammunition R.U. magazines" extracted in ADM 116/4352 pp. 386.
65 "Shellite" was the British term for a mixture of picric acid and dinitrophenol, with approximately
the same explosive power as TNT. See C. B01831 "Memorandum on Armour, Shells, Fuzes and
Aerial Bombs, 1928," ADM 186/174 for more details.
66 CB 1594, "PROGRESS IN GUNNERY MATERIAL, 1921," ADM 1861251 x/L00326. See also
C.B. 01831, "MEMORANDUM ON ARMOUR, SHELLS, FUZED AND AERIAL BOMBS, 1928" ADM
186/174 ERD17626, describing complete trials with essentially the same results.
67 The full list is given and discussed in ADM 116/4351 pp. 116-119. Evidence to support the
second category was characterized as typically "scanty" in nature.
68 Bulletin of Ordnance Information, No.245, pp. 54-60.
69 I am indebted to John Howard Oxley of Halifax, Nova Scotia for bringing to mind the role that
powder characteristics might have played in the disaster.

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]

Loss of HMS Hood Part 3

70 ADM 116/4351, pp. 105-106.

71 Raven & Roberts pp. 350-351. A variant of this memo, reaching essentially the same conclusion
and dated 2 July 1941, appears in ADM 116/4351 p. 7.
72 ADM 116/4351 pp. 385.
73 ADM 116/4351 pp. 8.
74 This is obviously a misprint for "in KHARTOUM a torpedo was fired" and has been so corrected
by an unknown hand.
75 BuShips War Damage Report #51, "Destroyer Report - Gunfire, Bomb, and Kamikaze Damage.
17 October 1941 to 15 August 1945," pp. 80 et. seq.
76 ADM 116/4351 pp. 368.
77 ADM 116/4351 pp. 368 et. seq. Astute readers will recall that AB Tilburn had earlier testified that
he did not know whether the petrol drums on the boat deck had been dumped or not, but this
testimony suggests that even if they had been aboard, they would have likely been empty.
78 In fact, even projectiles from Bismarck have been characterized in the popular literature in similar
terms, e.g., "The fatal salvo, fired at a 19-km/12mls range [the longest range reported yet!],
screamed down almost perpendicularly and went straight through Hood's unstrengthened deck into
the magazine deep below the waterline." John Howard Oxley sent me this quote from John
Macdonald's Great Battles of World War II.
79 Paul Schmalenbach, who should have known, himself discounted the possibility of Prinz Eugen's
shells causing the fatal explosion. He saw his shells hit Hood's boatdeck and start the fire, but
stated flatly of theories that Prinz Eugen sank the Hood, "Diese Behauptung its eine reine
Erfindung." [such assertions have no basis in evidence]. Vide Kreuzer Prinz Eugen, pp. 139.

Send mail to editor@warship.org with questions or comments about the International Naval Research Organization
Send mail to webmaster@warship.orgattention: Webmaster with technical questions about this web site.
Copyright 2007 International Naval Research Organization
Last modified: December 18, 2007

http://www.warship.org/loss_of_hms_hood__part_3.htm[14/02/2015 19:30:51]