Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours?

55

Israels Fence: Can Separation

Make Better Neighbours?

Jonathan Rynhold

Bitter controversy surrounds Israels construction of a security barrier

between itself and the Palestinians in the West Bank. Palestinians, and
most of the international community, condemn the project as a land grab
that will destroy any prospect of resurrecting the peace process. The
Israeli public, meanwhile, overwhelmingly favours the barrier as a
security measure to prevent the infiltration of terrorists. The concept was
proposed, originally, by the Israeli left as part of a strategy of unilateral
disengagement following the collapse of the peace process in September
2000. The Israeli right initially opposed the plan because it considered
unilateral disengagement to be a form of retreat. But the right-wing
government of Ariel Sharon is now constructing the barrier with some
dispatch, while many on the left are increasingly critical of the way the
scheme is being implemented; they claim it will bring added suffering to
the Palestinians, deepen hatreds and worsen the conflict.
The barrier is under construction and it is likely to be finished, so
arguments about whether it should be built at all are pretty much
academic. Far more important now is the nature and route of the barrier.
Routes that go too deep into West Bank territory, that cut off and isolate
Palestinian villages and encompass remote Israeli settlements are indeed
likely to heighten the Palestinians humiliation, harm them economically
and provoke worsened violence and terrorism. But other routes, closer
to the Green Line, could exert more positive influence, not least because
they would logically entail the abandonment of unviable settlements. A
sensibly routed barrier has the potential not only to help protect Israelis
from terrorists, but also to make a broader strategic contribution as a
mechanism for managing the conflict and as a back-up plan as the
prospects for a formal agreement fade. Such a back-up plan is needed

Jonathan Rynhold is a lecturer in the department of Political Studies, Bar Ilan University,
Israel and a research associate at the BESA Centre for Strategic Studies. His research focuses
on Israeli policy towards the peace process. He recently published an article on the Barak
government and the peace process and is co-editor of a forthcoming book on the 2003
Israeli elections.
Survival, vol. 46, no. 1, Spring 2004, pp. 5576

The International Institute for Strategic Studies

56 Jonathan Rynhold

because the ongoing diplomacy now focused on the Road Map

endorsed by Washington, the EU, Moscow and United Nations does
not look promising.

A road map to nowhere

One lesson drawn by participants in the failed Permanent Status
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) was the
importance of having a back-up plan if agreement on core issues proves
impossible.1 Unfortunately, this lesson has not been widely absorbed. In
July 2003, the US Under-Secretary of State, David Satterfield, declared
with regard to the Road Map sponsored by the Quartet (the US, Russia,
the EU and the UN), We dont have a Plan B.2
The Road Map aims to resolve the conflict in three stages by 2005. In
the first stage, the PA is to implement comprehensive security reforms
while Israel is to dismantle illegal settler outposts set up since March
2001. The second stage involves the creation of a Palestinian state within
provisional borders, while the third stage envisages negotiations on the
core Permanent Status issues such as borders, Jerusalem and the right of
return for Palestinian refugees. Thus far, the Road Map has not been a
success, nor is the outlook promising. Security reforms have not taken
place and Yasser Arafats continued presence at the heart of the PA
continues to hamper any prospect of this occurring. Two major terrorist
attacks in Jerusalem in August 2003 signalled the end of the internal
Palestinian cease-fire, but even before these attacks the Israel Defence
Forces (IDF) thwarted 57 attempted terrorist attacks during the two
months when the cease-fire was in place.3 Meanwhile, Israeli Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon has dismantled only a few illegal settler outposts.
The problem of ripeness

The Road Map is unlikely to succeed anytime soon for the basic reason
that it has inherited the fundamental limitations of Oslo. The Oslo
process led to many worthwhile achievements in the period 19932000.
Moreover, the detailed negotiations conducted in 2000 will no doubt
contribute significantly to the shape of any future permanent status
agreement, once conditions are ripe. The problem is that conditions are
not ripe and are not likely to be any time soon.4 This is demonstrated
most notably by the heretofore unbridgeable disagreements over the
emotive issues of identity: sovereignty over Temple Mount/Haram alSharif and the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Polls consistently
demonstrate widespread Palestinian opposition to giving up on what
they term a right of return for refugees and their families to Israel.5 On
the other hand, 68% of Israelis are opposed to allowing any refugees

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 57

whatsoever into Israel, while a further 16% are only prepared to let in a
few thousand. Israelis perceive the right of return as a serious threat to
their most stable consensus political value the existence of Israel as a
demographically Jewish state.6
In an effort to resolve these issues, there have been
several unofficial permanent status framework
agreements negotiated by left-wing Israeli leaders and
moderate Palestinians, most notably, the BeilinAbu
Mazen plan of 1995 and the BeilinAbed Rabbo Geneva
plan of 2003.7 But the fact that some respected public
figures have been able to reach agreement does not
mean that the conflict is ripe for resolution. None of
these people are currently in positions of significant
power. More fundamentally, it is unlikely that they will
be able to garner the necessary degree of public support
to implement the compromises that they propose.8 Precedents are not
promising: during the permanent status negotiations in 200001, Palestinian
negotiators were constrained by public opinion from adopting compromises
on the refugee question put forward in previous informal meetings.9
Previous attempts by elites to negotiate compromises on these core
issues of identity and symbolism ahead of public readiness allowed
rejectionists to mobilise the public to violence. The most notable example
is Sharons visit to Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif in September 2000,
which provided the opportunity for the incitement to violence, known by
Palestinians as the the Al Aqsa intifada.10
The same dilemma seems likely to thwart current initiatives.
Specifically, the model for dealing with the refugee question embodied in
the Geneva plan does not appear workable. The idea is to allow refugees
to choose from a number of options, including that of immigration into
Israel, with Israel having the final say on the number. In reality, however,
no Israeli government will agree to absorb all the refugees who wish to
immigrate. According to a recent survey, 10% of all refugees 400,000
people want to immigrate to Israel. Methodological problems with the
survey almost certainly mean this figure is a substantial underestimation.11
But even this figure is several times larger than Israel could be expected to
absorb, as it would significantly change of the countrys demographic
balance. Consequently, if implemented, this aspect of the Geneva plan
would have destabilising consequences, especially given that more than
75% of refugees were unwilling to accept coexistence with Israeli Jews
under any circumstances.12 On the other hand, if hundreds of thousands of
refugees are refused permission to immigrate to Israel, it would be almost
impossible for even a genuinely moderate Palestinian leadership to stand

Israelis
perceive the
right of return
as a serious
threat

58 Jonathan Rynhold

against the refugees. This would probably lead to both internecine

Palestinian violence and an escalation of violence between Israelis and
Palestinians.
Economic integration and trust

The Oslo framework sought to overcome such problems of ripeness in

two ways: economic integration, embedded in the 1994 Paris Protocols;
and the cultivation of mutual trust. Integration was supposed to generate
economic benefits for both sides, creating a reservoir of support for the
peace process that would allow creative compromises on the most
difficult issues when the time came. Confidence-building measures were
supposed to generate mutual trust between the elites necessary to
formulate the creative compromises on tough issues like Jerusalem and
refugees. Many commentators, including Oslo architect Ron Pundak
writing in these pages, have argued these mechanisms failed primarily
because their implementation was botched from 1993 to 2000 by both
Israeli and Palestinian leaders.13 But while it may indeed have been
botched in various ways, there are also structural factors that continue to
make success unlikely.
First, Oslo was based on the EU model, which entailed the integration
of the labour market, infrastructure and elements of tax collection. This
model is fundamentally unsuitable for the Middle East. EU countries
were at similar levels of socio-economic development when they joined.
By contrast, in 19992000, prior to the outbreak of violence, Israels gross
domestic product (GDP) was about 20 times higher than that of the
Palestinian Authority (PA) and its gross national product (GNP) per
capita was roughly equal to that of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan and the
PA combined.14 On this basis, a common IsraeliPalestinian economic
space cannot be based on equal, horizontal cooperation, but only on a
hierarchical relationship of dependency.15 This relationship is likely to
inspire resentment rather than reconciliation. It also provides a strong
economic incentive for illegal Palestinian immigration into Israel, a reality
that both widens and intensifies the conflict. Indeed, the World Bank has
concluded that a reduction in Palestinian employment in Israel under the
rubric of a non-discriminatory open trade regime (which allows free
movement of goods, but not labour) and not the Oslo model of
integration, is the best economic model for Palestinian development. 16
Second, the structure of the Oslo process mandated an interim
agreement before the sides knew the shape of the final status agreement.
This generated mistrust as each side sought to manoeuvre itself into a
better position for either permanent status talks or the collapse of the
process. In addition, the lack of a clear resolution to permanent status

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 59

issues provided continued legitimacy for rejectionists on both sides. This

made it politically difficult for either side to take actions that would have
built trust and support for the process, such as a major settlement freeze
by Israel and an effective crackdown against the terrorist infrastructure
by the Palestinian Authority. Given that the Road Map is structured like
the Oslo agreement, with an interim and a permanent stage, it is likely to
encounter the same problems.
A common argument is that these problems can be overcome through
greater outside pressure and engagement. What is usually meant is more
pressure on Israel from the United States and more pressure on the
Palestinians from the European Union and Arab states. Yet whatever the
stated willingness of these outside parties to apply such pressure, it is
likely to be outweighed when it comes to the toughest, most emotive
issues such as refugee return and Jerusalem by the intransigence of the
protagonists. It is just not very likely, for example, that the US
administration will confront the American pro-Israel lobby if the Israeli
public remains strongly opposed to an agreement. (It is particularly
unlikely in this election year.)
Some other proposals for outside intervention seem even less
plausible such as the suggestion that a US-led international force in the
Occupied Territories could somehow dampen Palestinian terrorism and
Israeli retaliation.17 Would such a force be prepared to root out terrorist
infrastructure, even if US and other soldiers became targets of attack? If
terrorists killed a large number of international troops, would not public
opinion in Western countries demand a retreat? In any case, US resources
and the Bush administrations political capital are currently stretched to
the limit in dealing with post-Saddam Iraq.

Unilateral disengagement
The disengagement approach to peace guided the policies of former
Labor Prime Ministers Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak. In political terms,
disengagement means the creation of a Palestinian state. In security terms,
it means the construction of a security barrier along the border, with no
Israeli settlements on the Palestinian side. In economic terms, it means
lessening reliance on Palestinian labour and separating infrastructure,
including the possible construction of an elevated road and communications
link between the West Bank and Gaza under full Palestinian control.18 For
Barak, disengagement is essential with or without an agreement.19
In the wake of the first intifada in December 1987, public support for
security disengagement became increasingly strong, a fact which Rabin
and Barak successfully exploited in their respective election victories in
1992 and 1999. Following the increase in terror attacks that accompanied

60 Jonathan Rynhold

the Oslo Accords, the Rabin government built a fence around the Gaza
Strip and plans were made for a similar fence around the West Bank.
With the collapse of the peace process in September 2000, the Barak
government began to develop a comprehensive plan for unilateral
disengagement. Since Baraks defeat in the 2001 election, former members
of his team have proposed variants of this plan, one of which was included
in Labors 2003 election manifesto.20 The plans call for a staged unilateral
withdrawal from Gaza and 65-85% of the West Bank including withdrawal
from around 40-70 settlements. Some plans included disengagement from
Arab areas in East Jerusalem, excluding the holy basin.21
Politically, the plan aimed to protect Israels character as a democratic
state with a large Jewish majority. Proponents feared that in the absence
of partition, there would be a Palestinian majority in Israel and the
Territories by 2010. In strategic terms, the plan aimed at conflict
management. The hope was to reduce friction between Israelis and
Palestinians through withdrawal from many settlements and the creation
of a border that would facilitate the removal of Israeli checkpoints and
thus greater freedom of movement within Palestinian areas. The plan
allowed for the creation of a contiguous area under Palestinian control
that could form the basis for a state with temporary borders.
At first, the Sharon government categorically rejected unilateral
disengagement.22 But the government is now constructing the barrier. The
main impetus for its construction has been twofold: pressure from public
opinion; and defence against the massively increased level of terrorism.
Since the collapse of the Oslo process, 80% of Israelis have consistently
supported the construction of a security barrier in the West Bank; by the
end of 2003 a majority of the public also supported a wide-ranging
unilateral withdrawal from most of the occupied territories.23 As public
pressure grew and the death toll continued to rise, the government began,
in spring 2002, construction of the barrier. Nonetheless, Sharon remained
equivocal, and told President Bush that if the PA destroyed terrorist
infrastructure and carried out security reforms, he would re-evaluate the
whole project.24 Meanwhile, there was a growing realisation that the
governments preferred means of fighting terrorism was failing. Operation
Defensive Shield, in which the IDF re-occupied large tracts of Palestinian
territory, led to a major reduction in Israeli casualties in the Territories, but
it has been less effective in Israel proper. 25 Many who initially opposed the
barrier have come to accept the argument of Avi Dichter, the head of the
General Security Service (GSS), that the barrier is the key to Israel
extricating itself from the terrorist quagmire.26 In October 2003 the
Cabinet finally endorsed a complete route for the barrier; since then, the
pace of construction has increased significantly.

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 61

Sharon has also reversed his opposition to unilateral withdrawal. In

December 2003 he declared his support for unilateral disengagement,
including withdrawal from some settlements, in the event that the Abu
Ala government fails to meet its Road Map obligations by summer 2004.
Sharon has also stated that a few settlements might be dismantled prior
to then, within the framework of the Road Map.27 In February 2004,
Sharon said,
As part of the disengagement plan I have ordered an evacuation sorry, a relocation
of 17 [out of 21] settlements with their 7,500 residents, from the Gaza Strip to Israeli
territory not only settlements in Gaza, but also three problematic settlements in
Samaria [northern half of the West Bank]. In any case, there wont be any Jews left in
Gaza after an agreement, while in Samaria there will be a few settlements.28

Controversy over the route

In announcing its decision to construct the barrier, the Sharon government
stated categorically that it is a security measure, not an expression of a
political or any other kind of border.29 Nevertheless, all parties recognise
the barriers political implications. The possibility that it could become a de
facto border has provoked much debate over its route. For this reason,
Sharon rejected the route initially proposed by the defence establishment,
which ran too close to the Green Line for his taste. In spring 2003, the
government favoured a route that included a large settlement bloc around
Ariel, other parts of the West Bank and Arab East Jerusalem.30 The
government also raised the possibility of placing another barrier on the
eastern side of the West Bank, inside the Jordan Valley, that would have
put half of the West Bank and half a million
Palestinians on the Israeli side of the fence. This route
suggested that Sharon wanted to use the barrier to
implement his old plan for a Palestinian entity based on
cantons.31 However, the idea of a Jordan Valley barrier
has been effectively dropped.
Once the settlers reversed their initial opposition
to the barrier, they succeeded in altering its route to
include more settlements.32 The Palestinians,
adamantly opposed to the whole idea, could not do
anything to influence the route, but their campaign
against it pushed Washington to weigh in. 33 The US recognises Israels
right to build the fence, but the Bush administration was also receptive to
the Palestinian argument that the barrier constituted an Israeli land
grab, exacting a high economic, social and humanitarian price from the
Palestinians. The US has strongly opposed the penetration of the barrier

All parties
recognise the
barriers
political
implications

62 Jonathan Rynhold

deep into the West Bank, and has focused its opposition to the inclusion
of the Ariel bloc inside the barriers perimeter. Washington has argued
that this undermines Palestinian moderates ability to implement their
Road Map obligations and contradicts the Road Maps vision of a viable
and territorially contiguous Palestinian state.34 As a result of US pressure,
Israel decided not to connect the Ariel bloc to the main barrier for the
time being, constructing non-contiguous barriers instead; but the issue is
up for review in spring 2004.

Dimensions of the barrier

The barrier consist of several layers. In most places, it is 5070 metres
wide and includes a ditch and obstacles; patrol roads exclusively for
military use; and dirt roads that will be dusted for footprints to track any
infiltrators. A smart fence with electronic sensors, thermal observation
posts and video cameras will run down the middle. On the outer edges
of the barrier, barbed wire hinders potential infiltrators. In places where
Jewish and Palestinian population centres are in close proximity, the
barrier takes the form of a six-metre high concrete wall (8.5km of the
existing barrier and less than 5% of planned final project35).
The barrier will be about 700km in length, more than 300km longer than
the Green Line. As a result, about 15% of the West Bank will be on the
Israeli side of the barrier. Approximately 70,000 West Bank Palestinians
and 200,000 East Jerusalem Palestinians will be separated from the rest of
the West Bank.36 The whole project is scheduled for completion by the
summer of 2005.37
Security implications
Since the outbreak of violence in September 2000, more Israeli civilians
have been killed and wounded than Israeli soldiers, which is
unprecedented. Of the total 862 Israeli casualties from 29 September 2000
to 24 September 2003, over 60% were killed within the Green Line, even
though only 4% of the nearly 19,000 attacks occurred there.38
The creation of a contiguous physical barrier between the West Bank
and Israel would limit the ability of terrorists, saboteurs and weapons to
infiltrate into Israel. It would also make it more difficult for terrorists to
recruit Israeli Arabs, who since September 2000 have started to become
involved in terrorism (albeit still in small numbers).39 According to the
GSS, from September 2000 to August 2003 there were 116 suicide
bombings. All but one suicide bombing was launched from the unfenced
West Bank.40 The erection of concrete walls close to Israeli population
centres adjacent to the border makes it more difficult for Palestinians to
shoot at Israelis from Palestinian areas, as they shot at the Jerusalem

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 63

nea

n S
ea

LEBANON

rra

SYRIA

Jenin

ed

ite

Nazareth
Nablus

Tel Aviv

Gaza

West JORDAN
Bank Jericho
Jerusalem

Hebron

Tulkarm

Dead
Sea

25km
25 miles

Nablus
Qalkilya

Ariel

ISRAEL

Ramallah
Jericho

The Security Barrier

based on an original map B'Tselem
updated by J. Rynhold, January 2004

Jerusalem

Bethlehem
Dead
Sea

'Green line' 1949 Armistice line

Hebron

main barrier completed

main barrier under construction
main barrier planned

IISSmaps

secondary fence
main Palestinian towns and villages
main Jewish settlements

64 Jonathan Rynhold

suburb of Gilo from Bethlehem in 2000. The length, topography and

human geography of the West Bank border make it more difficult to
defend than the Gaza Strip. However, the IDF has developed technical
solutions to such problems including the use of hand-held computers
with a global positioning system.41
For the barrier to be effective, it must be uninterrupted. The gap near
Ariel would have to be closed one way or the other. In addition, the IDF
needs to implement its plan for proper regulation of the passageways.
Failure to do this was responsible for the death of 19 Israelis in an
October 2003 terrorist attack in Haifa.42 The inclusion of the major
settlement blocs within the barrier eases the task of defending them, but
major deviations from the Green Line to achieve this increase the overall
length of the barrier, making it more difficult to defend. This is
particularly true of the Ariel bloc, where topography and geography add
to the strategic burden of creating easily defensible borders for Israel.
Deviation from the Green Line has also complicated the defence of those
borders by necessitating the construction of 41 extra gates to allow
Palestinians to reach farmland on the Israeli side of the barrier. The areas
slated for inclusion inside the secondary fences have generally been
chosen for strategic reasons unrelated to suicide bombings, most notably
in the Beit Ayreh area, where the purpose is to keep Israels only
international airport out of the range of shoulder-launched missiles.43
Mobile forces or a non-contiguous barrier could be used to secure these
areas instead. On balance, while major deviation of the barrier from the
Green Line will enhance the security of the settlements that are included,
it will be at the cost of complicating the defence of Israel proper.
But even a highly successful barrier will be no panacea, although it might
contribute to a de-escalation of the violence. The fewer successful terrorist
attacks in Israel, the fewer Israeli retaliatory and defensive operations. As
for the argument that Palestinian radicals will respond to the barrier by
firing Qassim missiles over it, these have been far less lethal than suicide
bombings. So far, over 1,400 mortar shells and over 160 Qassim rockets
have been fired into Israel, all from Gaza, resulting in one fatality.44
The barrier has potential security benefits that go beyond its direct
impact on terrorism. In a long-term, low-intensity conflict, the
psychological endurance and social cohesiveness of the civilian population
are crucial to preventing demoralisation and defeat. A democratic society
with an army based on the nation-in-arms model, can only sustain
morale if there is a consensus on the legitimacy of a policy that puts the
lives of its citizens in danger.45 This consensus can only be sustainable if
the construction of the barrier is quickly followed by withdrawal from
outlying settlements. So far in the current round of violence, Israeli

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 65

morale has remained high because it is founded on the common belief

that that the Barak government agreed to wide-ranging concessions,
which the Palestinians rejected in word and deed. Were Israeli forces to
remain in the Occupied Territories indefinitely, however, a significant
Israeli minority would question the legitimacy of this
policy, while a larger group would lack the motivation
to risk their lives in the military.46
Some Israeli opponents of unilateral disengagement
worry that it will be interpreted by Palestinian militants
as further evidence after Israels unilateral
withdrawal from southern Lebanon that violence
works. This may be true, but is probably unavoidable,
and the converse proposition that continued use of
military force against Palestinian terrorism can be made
more effective does not look plausible. The use of
force has only increased motivation for terrorist
attacks. In any event, an Israel that after unilateral
withdrawal from many outlying settlements can be more easily
defended will be in a better position over time to limit the strategic
dividends of terrorism. Moreover, Israeli deterrence in the interstate arena
is unlikely to be affected. Israel remains the strongest power in the region,
and has the backing of the United States.

Use of force
has only
increased
motivation for
terrorist
attacks

Economic harm to Palestine?

The barrier rules out a return to the Oslo model of economic integration.
As noted above, however, the World Bank has argued that a nondiscriminatory trade policy is a better model for long-term Palestinian
economic progress. The barrier should facilitate such trade through five
planned terminals for the transfer of goods. Still, such a policy, based on
significantly reducing the number of Palestinians working in Israel,
would be painful. The pain can be mitigated if necessary by allowing
some Palestinian workers to enter Israel through the nine planned
crossing points. The existence of more organised crossing points should
simplify the identification of threats, thereby easing the path of workers
into Israel.
In principle then, the security barrier need not cause significant
economic damage to the Palestinians. In practice, however, the
construction of the barrier has already damaged the Palestinian economy,
primarily as a result of its route deviating from the Green Line. According
to the World Bank and the Israeli Human Rights association Btselem, the
first section of the barrier could negatively affect the daily lives of 200,000
Palestinians.47 Most of the land used for the barrier was requisitioned from

66 Jonathan Rynhold

Palestinians.48 Thousands of Palestinians have been separated from their

agricultural land in the most important agricultural region in the West
Bank. The barrier has also impaired access to education and health services
for some Palestinians, particularly those living in
enclaves created by the fence. Israeli promises to
construct numerous passageways to ease these
problems are as yet unfulfilled.
This problem is not insuperable. For example, 41
agricultural gates have been constructed to allow
access to Palestinian farmers separated from their land
along the first section of the barrier. These have
proved cumbersome to operate and thus problematic.
In addition, in January 2004, a number of alternatives
to the barrier route were decided, which will lower
the humanitarian cost of the barrier to the Palestinians. More changes of
this sort are required, and are under consideration.49 Furthermore, to
compensate for the loss of work opportunities inside Israel, industrial
zones are being set up next to the barrier, on the model of the Karni
industrial zone by the Gaza fence, which has continued operating
throughout the violence.50
Another possibility is that Palestinians located on the Israeli side of the
barrier could be granted a special temporary residency status, which
would give them access to health, education and social benefits in Israel,
as enjoyed by Palestinian residents of Jerusalem. Given the cost of such a
measure, outside pressure might need to be brought to bear for this to
occur. International aid raised to ease the effects of the barriers could be
used to provide transport solutions, such as road improvements. Such
measures would lighten the burden of the barrier on the Palestinians, but
only routing it very much closer to the Green Line could remove the
burden altogether.

The barrier
has already
damaged the
Palestinian
economy

Deadly friction
Reducing friction in a systematic way requires maximum disengagement
between Israelis and Palestinians. At the same time, there must be
provision for everyday activities to continue on each side of the barrier.51
The route of the barrier, how it is managed and the fate of settlements
will determine whether the barrier reduces or worsens this friction.
So far, the barrier has increased friction by making Palestinians daily
lives more difficult. These problems can be somewhat mitigated. More
problematic are the main secondary fences that border some Palestinian
villages on both sides and the smaller enclaves. Quite apart from their
high costs in human-rights terms, the supposed security benefits of

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 67

secondary fences are outweighed by the increased resentment that they

will cause, which can only increase motivation for violence. They should
be abandoned and replaced with mobile forces.
Similar problems are likely in the Jerusalem area, where the proposed
route of the barrier will place about 200,000 Palestinians on the Israeli side
of the barrier, while about 35,000 Palestinian residents of Jerusalem will be
outside the barrier.52 Until now, Palestinian Jerusalemites were rarely
involved in violence, but this could change if their freedom of movement is
restricted. Adjusting the barrier to run more or less along the ethnic
dividing line inside Jerusalem, as originally suggested by Israels National
Security Council, would significantly improve this situation.
Deciding on an optimum route for the barrier is a fraught process.
The negative impact on the everyday lives of Palestinians could be
minimised by routing the barrier along the Green Line, but the physical
and political reality of the settlements would create an alternative source
of friction. So long as some settlements remain, securing access to them
requires the continued stationing of Israeli forces in Palestinian areas, a
cause of resentment and violence. In permanent status negotiations, the
parties aimed to minimise this problem through a formula that included
the maximum number of settlers in the minimum amount of territory
containing as few Palestinians as possible. Maps produced during those
talks presented a scenario in which 6580% of the settlers were gathered
into small blocs that took up 46% of the West Bank.
With the exception of Jerusalem, the barrier generally follows the
same formula, though it is less territorially generous to the Palestinians.
While it does not officially mandate withdrawal from settlements outside
its perimeter, the barrier makes eventual withdrawal from many of these
places inevitable. The inclusion of blocs within the barriers perimeter
will make the physical distance of journeys for Palestinians within the
West Bank longer, but journey time should be reduced, as many
roadblocks and checkpoints will be dismantled.53 The costs of this policy
to the Palestinians could be reduced further if the US applied pressure to
adjust the route of the fence so as to avoid enclaves and make the
settlement blocs smaller. In the case of Ariel, the IDF put forward an
option that reduced the size of the bloc significantly while still retaining a
majority of the settlers from the area.54

Israels political interests

The construction of a barrier cannot logically serve Israels own politicaldemographic interests unless it involves an Israeli withdrawal from many
settlements. The route is also important in terms of maximising the
number of Israelis and minimising the number of Palestinians on the

68 Jonathan Rynhold

Israeli side of the barrier. To date, the barrier has put about 3,500
Palestinians on the Israeli side of the barrier. If one includes the
secondary fences, then around 70,000 Palestinians are on the wrong side
of the line. An additional 200,000 Palestinians will also be on the Israeli
side, because the barrier will place East Jerusalem within its confines. If
the barrier became a de facto border, then the current path would
undermine Israels political-demographic interests as understood by the
vast majority of Israelis. The only way to resolve this situation would be
to remove the secondary fences and alter the path of the barrier to divide
Jerusalem more closely along ethnic lines as proposed in the December
2000 Clinton Parameters for a Permanent Status Agreement.
Construction of the barrier also carries political costs for the
government, in terms of international pressure against it. The UN has
declared that its route is a violation of international law. The
International Court of Justice in The Hague is also due to deliberate on
the matter. Some members of the Israeli Cabinet fear that the likely
negative judgment will strengthen trends towards Israels international
isolation and might serve as a basis for future sanctions.55 Conversely,
right-wing elements in the government and the settler lobby are
demanding that the barrier be routed deeper inside the West Bank. In
the absence of a major change on the Palestinian side and given
overwhelming domestic support for the barrier, international pressure is
likely to remain ineffective, unless that pressure comes from the US.56

Palestinian interests
The main threat posed by the barrier to Palestinian political interests is
that it will become the de facto border. The inclusion of parts of the
West Bank within the perimeter of the barrier threatens to limit the size
of any future Palestinian state, calling into question its viability.
The barrier route approved by the Israeli government does not
prevent the coming into being of a viable, territorially contiguous
Palestinian state with temporary borders, as envisaged in the Road Map.
Certainly its route makes that contiguity very awkward, but technical
solutions can make it workable. The current route is actually closer to the
territorial settlement agreed to by the left-wing Israeli government in the
200001 Permanent Status negotiations than to the territorial settlements
previously proposed by Sharon and Netanyahu.57 Removing the
secondary fences and making the settlement blocs smaller would
improve the Palestinian position further, but even if Ariel ends up inside
the barrier, it need not block a contiguous Palestinian state from coming
into being. The Ariel bloc was included on the Israeli side of the line in
the 1995 Yossi BeilinAbu Mazen peace plan and appeared again on the

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 69

maps accepted as a basis for negotiations by the Palestinians at the 2001

Taba talks.58 Since then, in the unofficial Geneva Plan, part of the Beit
Aryeh area that is to be contained inside a secondary fence would
actually be annexed to Israel. 59
The barrier works to the Palestinians advantage in one significant
way: it dramatically enhances the probability of an Israeli withdrawal
from tens of isolated settlements left outside the barrier. The most
obvious candidates for withdrawal are situated mainly in the central
areas of the West Bank, where the defence of settlements has severely
inhibited Palestinian freedom of movement. It is estimated that the
annual operating costs of the barrier will be $225 million and that 40 IDF
companies 5,000 soldiers will man it. As a result, without withdrawal
from outlying settlements, manpower and financial resources will be
extremely stretched.60 The barrier will further contribute to the
psychological disengagement of Israelis from the settlements, thereby
easing eventual withdrawal.
Overall, the security, economic and demographic implications of the
barrier all point to withdrawal from the outlying settlements. Sharon
seems to understand this, which is why he has began to speak about
unilateral withdrawal from settlements and redeploying troops to the
Israeli side of the fence. Indeed, the fact that a right-wing government is
constructing the barrier has dramatically lowered the political price of
eventual withdrawal. This is especially valuable as these settlements are
populated by the most ideologically motivated settlers who are most
likely to resist removal. All Israeli governments have had great difficulty
in confronting the settler lobby. Indeed, it is worth recalling that during
the Oslo process of 1993-2000, the number of settlers actually doubled.61
But will the barrier as critics fear constitute the future border
between Israel and Palestine? In terms of international law, the situation
will remain the same whatever Israel does on the ground. Thirty years of
settlement could not alter the fact that permanent status negotiations
were based on the 1967 borders, as will be a future agreement,
regardless of the security barrier. The cost of moving the barrier need
not be an obstacle to a peace agreement either. The 197981 removal of
Israeli airfields and defences from Sinai, which cost much more than the
barrier, was not an obstacle to a full Israeli withdrawal in the peace
treaty with Egypt. Moreover, if the Palestinians began to implement the
security reform mandated by the Road Map, it is likely that the route of
the barrier would be changed or its construction halted altogether. On
the other hand, the longer it takes to return to negotiations, the more
integrated settlements on the Israeli side of the barrier will become and
the more difficult it will become to abandon them later on.

70 Jonathan Rynhold

The barrier is criticised on the grounds that it will ruin any chance of
a return to fruitful negotiations. This argument would be far more
persuasive if fruitful negotiations were actually on the horizon. It is
indeed possible, as former Israeli Labor leader Amram Mitzna argued in
the 2003 election, that construction of the barrier might spur the
Palestinians to act decisively against terror and re-enter negotiations
sooner rather than later. In addition, if the barrier succeeds in
significantly reducing terrorism within the Green Line, it will lower the
sense of threat felt by Israelis. This in turn will increase their readiness to
make concessions in negotiations.62 On the Palestinian side, the inability
to carry out successful attacks against Israeli civilians inside the Green
Line could strengthen the position of Palestinian moderates.

Whither disengagement?
There is a fair amount of scepticism regarding Ariel Sharons intentions.
Some argue that he will construct the eastern fence, dismantle just a
handful of settlements, annex some consensus settlements and try to
implement his old plan for creating Palestinian cantons on just half of the
West Bank. Others believe that Sharon actually supports the more
extensive plan for unilateral withdrawal put forward by Deputy Prime
Minster Ehud Olmert: moving tens of thousands of settlers and drawing
the dividing line inside Jerusalem, while retaining the major settlement
blocks and the Jordan valley. 63 If Sharon moved to dismantle settlements,
the Labor party would not allow the Israeli right to bring down the
government.64 On balance, it seems more likely that Sharon will adopt the
second course, although he is likely to dismantle only a few settlements
to begin with. Sharon has promised that any unilateral measures will be
co-ordinated with the US, and Washington is adamantly opposed to the
eastern fence.65 In any case, for the reasons argued above, it seems that
construction of the fence makes a more extensive withdrawal virtually
inevitable whatever Sharons initial preferences.
These two versions of unilateral disengagement would entail radically
different consequences. Implementation of the first version would cause a
serious rupture in USIsraeli relations and an escalation of the conflict with
the Palestinians. The Palestinians, having seen the castrated state on offer,
might abandon their pursuit of a two state solution and revert to the one
state solution that is Israels nightmare.66 Given that Israels borders under
this scheme would be extremely long and difficult to defend, and that they
would include within them over 250,000 Palestinians, both the strategic and
the demographic logic of the original disengagement plan would be
severely compromised. On the other hand, the closer the implementation
to the original Barak plan, the better the chances that the plan will have

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 71

positive results and contribute to conflict management. Olmerts ideas

sound similar to Baraks. There are, to be sure, some notable differences:
Olmert views his plan as a way of ensuring a better border than the 1967
lines and he expects it to end the prospect of negotiations for twenty
years.67 Barak and his allies emphasise the importance of leaving the door
open to negotiations. To this end, many of them have stated that
permanent status agreement will be based on the 1967 borders with
agreed changes.68 An Israeli declaration regarding the governments
willingness to make greater compromises in a permanent status agreement
would greatly assist the whole process, by easing Palestinian fears
regarding Israels ultimate intentions. However, this is a declaration that
Sharon almost certainly will not make.
The fence in its current format is a mixed bag. It is not an absolute
disaster, but neither does it form a solid basis for conflict management.
On balance, it is good for security, but it is not the security panacea the
Israeli public believes it to be. In economic and social terms it is good for
Israel but very bad for the Palestinians. In terms of reducing friction, the
picture is likely to be mixed; the same is true of its political ramifications.
Its most important benefit is that it makes the evacuation of many
settlements inevitable. Its most negative element is the separation of
Arab East Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank. If the fence were to
be extended to the Jordan valley, the mixed bag would become a
disastrous package, sure to aggravate the conflict. So far, however, the
eastern fence is not under construction.
Most of the fences negative political ramifications could be avoided if
fruitful negotiations were to commence soon. In concept, there is a
contradiction between Road Map diplomacy and the barrier, but in
practical terms it is possible to give the Road Map a chance and at the
same time pursue the option of unilateral disengagement. Given that
Sharon has stated that Israel will unilaterally withdraw from settlements
if the Road Map collapses, the government might as well make a virtue
out of necessity by making a bold offer to dismantle many settlements in
return for genuine fulfilment by the Palestinians of the first part of the
Road Map. Labor would certainly support such a proposal.
In the likely event of the Road Maps failure, it makes sense to try to
develop the potential for effective conflict management inherent in the
barrier. As a unilateral initiative, the barrier inevitably will conform more
to Israeli interests than to Palestinian interests. But with a number of
significant changes it can be implemented in a way that will improve the
overall security situation and reduce friction, while keeping open the
possibility of negotiating a Permanent Status agreement in the future. In
this regard, three forces have the potential to push unilateral

72 Jonathan Rynhold

disengagement in the right direction. First, Sharon will need the support
of the Labor Party to implement any unilateral withdrawal. Second,
Israeli public opinion needs to be made aware of the fact that the
barriers current route threatens to undermine the demographic and
security logic they support. Finally, against this
backdrop and with Sharon committing himself to coordinating measures with Washington, the US has a
good chance of seriously influencing matters as well.
In any event, the barrier is being built.
Consequently, the key is to maximise its benefits and
minimise its costs. The best way to achieve this is by
de-emphasising political considerations related to
settlements, focusing instead on the underlying
strategic logic of the original concept of unilateral
disengagement proposed by Ehud Barak and his
associates.
It has been reported that some significant steps are
due to be taken in this vein. For example, in January 2004 it was decided
to alter the route near Qalkilya and Tulkarm.69 In addition, the secondary
fence around Baka al- Sharkiya is to be removed, and the depth barriers
planned for the northern section of the barrier are now unlikely to be
built.70 Meanwhile, the other secondary fences are to be built only after
the main fence closer to the Green Line is completed. Even then, these
secondary fences are to remain open unless there is a major security alert.
These changes, which will cost over a million dollars to implement, are a
result of both US pressure and pragmatic operational considerations.71
While such moves represent a step in the right direction, more needs to
be done. More enclaves should be removed and mobile forces should
replace secondary fences, as envisaged in Baraks original disengagement
plan.72 While an Israeli withdrawal from Arab East Jerusalem is not going
to happen soon, disengagement from infrastructure there could
commence more quickly.
The security barrier is hardly an optimal strategy for resolving the
IsraeliPalestinian conflict. It will impose significant costs, particularly on
the Palestinians. If an eastern fence is constructed, it will serve to further
aggravate the conflict. However, if implemented wisely, the barrier could
turn out to be the best means available for managing a deadly conflict.

Sharon will
need Labor
support to
implement
unilateral
withdrawal

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 73

Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Professor
Gerald Steinberg, Dr Shlomo Shpiro and
the anonymous reviewers for their helpful
insights and comments.

Notes
1

Yossi Beilin, A Guide for a Wounded Dove

(Tel Aviv: Yediot Achronot, 2001),
pp.126, 255; Rob Malley & Hussein
Agha, Camp David: Tragedy of Errors
New York Review of Books, 9 August 2001.
Text of Road Map can be found at
http://www.mideastweb.org/
quartetrm3.htm.
Amir Oren, The cease-fire may have
ended, but its not over, Haaretz,
2 August 2003.
57 Terror Attacks Thwarted JulyAugust 2003, IDF Spokesperson,
10 September 2003, www.idf.il
The CIA sees a stalemate continuing
until 2020. www.cia.gov/nic/
PDF_GIF_2020_Support/
2003_12_08_papers/
dec8_middleeast.doc
Israel Palestine Center for Research &
Information Project Report April 2001,
www.ipcri.org; PSR (Palestinian Center
for Policy & Survey Research) Poll, July
2003, www.pcpsr.org/survey/polls/
2003/refugees june03.html
Asher Arian, Security Threatened
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press 1995), p. 23; The Peace Index,
August 2003, Tami Steinmetz Centre
for Peace, Tel Aviv University
www.tau.ac.il/peace/index.htm
Michael Hirsh, The Lost Peace Plan
Newsweek, 25 September 2000 p. 46.
Details of the Geneva Plan can be
found at http://www.heskem.org.il/
index_en.asp
Joint IsraeliPalestinian attempts to
generate widespread public support for
compromises on these issues do not
appear to be succeeding . See the

10

11

12
13

14

15

NusseibehAyalon initiative:
www.mifkad.org.il/eng; Khaled Abu
Toameh, Dozens deny signing
Nusseibeh ad on right of return,
Jerusalem Post, 10 June 2003. Only 19
27% of Palestinians support the Geneva
Plan. Support is lowest regarding the
clauses relating to refugees, see Poll no.
118, 22 December 2003, Palestinian
Centre For Public Opinion (PCPO) and
Poll no. 10 December 2003, Centre for
Policy and Survey Research (PSR),
pcpsr.org/survey/polls/2003/
p10b.html.
Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinian
refugees in Lebanon, Middle East
Policy, 2001, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 94105.
As Donald Horowitz, a leading expert
on ethnic conflict has suggested, while
elites can do much to moderate ethnic
conflict, the bottom line is always
what the wider public are willing to
accept in their name. Donald
Horowitz, Community Conflict: Policy
and Possibilities (Coleraine: Centre for
the Study of Conflict, University of
Ulster, 1990).
PSR July 2003 poll; Max Abrahms,
The Right of Return Debate
Revisited, Middle East Intelligence
Bulletin, AugustSeptember 2003, vol.
5, no. 8-9.
Ibid.
Ron Pundak, From Oslo To Taba:
What Went Wrong, Survival, vol. 43,
no. 3, Autumn 2001, pp. 3145.
Figures taken from World Bank
website, http://
www.worldbank.org/data/
countrydata/countrydata.html; http:/
/lnweb18.worldbank.org/mna/
mena.nsf/0/
F192A5DA7D266F048525694700278825?
OpenDocument; http://
www.worldbank.org/html/schools/
regions/mena/israel.htm
Dan Schueftan Disengagement (Tel
Aviv: Zamora-Bitan, 1999) [Hebrew]
pp. 97, 103106, 126128.

74 Jonathan Rynhold
16

17

18

19

20

21
22

23

24

25

26

27

Long Term Policy Options for the

Palestinian Economy (The World Bank:
July 2002). Nigel Roberts, From the
drawing board, Haaretz, 21 July 2003.
Martin Indyk, A Trusteeship for
Palestine?, Foreign Affairs, May/June
2003, vol. 82 no. 3; Dana Allin and
Steven Simon, The Moral Psychology
of US Support for Israel, Survival,
vol. 45, no. 3, Autumn 2003; Nomi Bar
Yaacov, New Imperatives for Israeli
Palestinian Peace, Survival, vol. 45,
no. 2, Summer 2003.
Jonathan Rynhold, Barak, the Israeli
Left and the Oslo Process, Israel
Studies Forum, vol. 19. no. 1, Fall 2003.
Author interview with Ehud Barak,
9 February 2003.
Author interviews with Ehud Barak,
Gilad Sher, and other members of the
Barak team; Gilad Sher and Uri Sagi,
Policy Paper (Jerusalem: Van Leer
Institute, 2002); Ben Kaspit ,Mitznas
Road Map, in Maariv - Shabbat
Supplement 20 December 2002, pp. 4
5 [Hebrew].
Sher & Sagi, Policy Paper.
Amit Ben-Aroya, Sharon: The
Separation Fence is a Populist Idea,
Haaretz, 12 April 2002.
Asher Arian, Public Opinion on National
Security (Tel Aviv: Jaffe Centre for
Strategic Studies 2001, 2002, 2003); The
Peace Index May 2001, February,
March and May 2002, July 2003; polls
conducted by Israel Radio, Another
Matter, 10 December 2003 http://
bet.iba.org.il and Yediot Achronot,
12 December 2003.
Mazal Mualem, Smart fence, stupid
politics, Haaretz, 30 August 2003
Zeev Schiff, Lose-lose situation,
Haaretz 7 August 2003.
Uzi Benziman, When the bubbles
burst, Haaretz, 23 May 2003.
Herb Keinon, PM details
disengagement plan, Jerusalem Post,
19 December 2003; Mazal Mualem, I
make the decisions, PM tells Likud

28

29
30

31

32
33

34

35

36

37

38

39

40
41

42

43

convention, Haaretz ,6 January 2004.

Yoel Marcus, PMs pullout plan: 20
settlements to go within a year or
two, Haaretz, 3 February 2004.
Jerusalem Post, 24 June 2002, p. 1.
Arieh OSullivan, Sharon includes
Arab villages in Jerusalem plan,
Jerusalem Post, 30 January 2002; Aluf
Benn, Defense Ministry wants fence
deeper in West Bank, Haaretz,
23 March 2003.
Meron Rappaport, A Wall in the
Heart, Yediot Achronot, 23 May 2003.
Rappaport, A Wall in the Heart.
On Palestinian opposition to the
barrier see, The Apartheid Wall
www.pengon.org; Undermining Peace:
Israels Unilateral Segregation Plans
www.arij.org/paleye/SegregationWall/Section%207.pdf
Glenn Kessler, Bush Criticizes Israeli
Fence, Washington Post, 26 July 2003,
p. A16; James Bennett, Israel
Reportedly Willing to Delay Portions
of Barrier, New York Times, 8 August
2003.
The Seam Zone, Israel Ministry of
Defence, http://
www.seamzone.mod.gov.il/
Pages/ENG/default.htm
The Separation Barrier,
www.btselem.org
Amir Rapaport, The Fence, Maariv,
24 October 2003.
Uzi Benziman, Weight of the
evidence, Haaretz 26 August 2003.
Since September 2000, Israeli Arabs
were, for the first time, active in
terrorist squads that caused the death
of 60 Israelis. Schiff, Lose-lose
situation.
Ibid.
The Seam Zone, Israel Ministry of
Defence. See note 35.
Amos Harel, The fence flaws,
Haaretz, 7 October 2003
On these issues see, Saul Cohen, The
Geopolitics of Israels Border Question
(Boulder: Westview & Jaffe Centre for

Israels Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours? 75

44

45

46

47

48

49

50

51

Strategic Studies, 1986), especially the

map on p. 112.
Schiff, Lose-lose situation. Technical
experts do not see much scope for
improving the missile. Still, Qassims in
the West Bank would put most Israeli
population centres within its 15km
range. This threat can be countered
by operations against launching sites
and infrastructure, and by the closed
military zones near the barrier. Ina
Friedman, Junk Rocket, Potential
Threat, Jerusalem Report, 22
September 2003, pp. 1217.
Kober, Western Democracies in LowIntensity Conflict.
There are signs already that Israeli
morale is eroding and that the
legitimacy of the occupation is being
questioned. A few members of elite
army units have publicly refused to
serve in the Territories. Lily Galili,
Generals Back Unilateral Withdrawal,
Haaretz 18 February 2001.
www.reliefweb.int/hic-opt/docs/
HEPG/Wallreport.pdf; Yehezkel Lein,
Behind The Barrier (Jerusalem:
BTselem, April 2003).
Palestinian sources claim that the first
section of the barrier put 10,100
hectares of Palestinian territory on
the Israeli side. Amira Hass, IDF
redefines Palestinians west of the
fence, 14 October 2003.
Compensation was offered by Israel,
but was rejected by Palestinians for
fear of legitimising Israeli actions.
Zeev Schiff, Fence route is moved,
scrapping 2 enclaves, Haaretz, 30
December 2003; Amos Harel, IDF
moving sections of separation fence
westward, Haaretz 9 January 2004;
Aluf Benn and Gideon Alon, PM
admits fence harms Palestinians
Haaretz, 19 January 2004.
Amos Harel, Easing rules in
territories will focus on creating jobs,
Haaretz 2 November 2003.
See Chaim Kaufman, Possible and

52

53

54

55

56

57

58

59
60

61

62

63

64

65

Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Wars,

International Security, vol. 20, no. 4,
Spring 1996.
The Jerusalem Separation Fence,
www.btselem.org
See the comments of senior Israeli
defence officials cited in Benn, U.S.
expert to review Israeli security fence
demands.
See the map presented in Leslie
Susser, Rethinking the Fence,
Jerusalem Report, 8 September 2003,
pp. 1618
Herb Keinon, Lapid: Fence recalls
apartheid, Jerusalem Post, 5 January
2004
However, 71% of the Israeli public are
prepared to support the barrier even
in the face of US opposition. The Peace
Index, July 2003.
See the maps of Sharon, Netanyahu,
Beilin-Abu Mazen and Taba at the
Foundation for Middle East Peace
website, www.fmep.org
Ibid.; The Morontinos Non-Paper,
Journal of Palestine Studies vol. 31, no.
3, 2002, p. 82; Hirsh, Lost Peace Plan.
www.heskem.org.il
For a more detailed discussion see The
Movement for Unilateral Disengagement
website, www.hipardut.org.il/
Index_e.asp
Figures from the Interior Ministry and
the Central Bureau of Statistics, Special
supplement on the settlements,
Haaretz, 26 September 2003.
Analysis of Israeli public opinion
suggests that threat perception is the
most important determinant of the
publics orientation to the peace
process. Arian, Security Threatened,
pp. 2729, 19394.
Interview with Ehud Olmert Yediot
Achronot, 5 December 2003.
Gil Hoffman, Sharon plan aims to
minimize confrontation with
Palestinians, Jerusalem Post,
12 December 2003
Ibid.

76 Jonathan Rynhold
66

67

68
69

Qureia: Israels unilateral moves are

pushing us toward a one-state
solution, Reuters, 9 January 2004.
Olmert: tens of thousands will be
moved, Jerusalem Post, 22 December
2003.
Gilad Sher and Uri Sagi, Policy Paper.
Zeev Schiff, Fence route is moved,
scrapping 2 enclaves ; Amos Harel,
IDF moving sections of separation
fence westward.

70

71

72

Author interview with Netzah

Mashiah, Defence Ministry official
responsible for the construction of the
barrier, 28 October 2003.
Zeev Schiff, Fence route is moved,
scrapping 2 enclaves; Amos Harel,
IDF moving sections of separation
fence westward.
Aluf Benn, No irreversible steps in
Baraks unilateral separation plan,
Haaretz, 15 January 2001.