Being and Knowledge:

A Connoisseur's Guide to
Republic VA76eff.
Chase B. Wrenn

Introduction

At the end of Republic V, Plato's Socrates argues that lovers of sights and
sounds have no legitimate claims to knowledge; they have mere opinion
at best. Only philosophers those who believe in the beautiful itself
over and above the many beautiful things (for example) can have
knowledge. Famously, the argument turns on the claims that the domain
of knowledge is 'what is/ while ignorance is set over 'what is not' and
opinion is set over 'what is and is not' (476e-7a, 478c-e) Socrates applies
those claims in showing that knowledge and opinion are different powers (477c-8d) and that what lovers of sights and sounds concern themselves with (the many beautiful things, for example) both 'are' and 'are
not' (478e-9e). Lovers of sights and sounds, then, can have opinions, but
they cannot have knowledge (479e-80).
'To be' is carrying a lot of weight in these passages. Its interpretation
makes a difference both to the evaluation of the argument, and to the
assessment of Plato's view of knowledge in the Republic.1 In this paper,

For example, R.E. Allen reads 'what is' as 'what exists', and claims that this
argument 'contains one of the first statements in European philosophy of the
doctrine of degrees of being and reality' (Allen 1961:325). Gail Fine reads 'what is'
as 'what is true' and denies that Plato is committed to such a doctrine (Fine 1990).
Julia Annas agrees with Allen that Plato is committed to a doctrine of degrees of

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88 Chase B. Wrenn

I argue for a 'veridical' interpretation of 'to be' in Republic 476e ff. On

such an interpretation, 'to be' is glossed, roughly, as 'to be so'. Thus,
when Socrates claims that knowledge is set over what is, we are to
interpret him as claiming that knowledge is set over what is so. A merely
veridical reading of 'to be' runs into difficulties, however, because it
involves only the distinction between truth and falsehood. I offer an
amendment to the veridical reading according to which Socrates is
concerned not only with distinguishing truth from falsehood, but also
with distinguishing reality from appearances. That is, Socrates is also
concerned with distinguishing what is (or is not) so independently of
how things seem from what is (or is not) so depending on how things
seem.
Another difficulty in 476e ff. comes from Plato's use of the ambiguous
Greek preposition, 'epi', which I gloss here as 'set over'. It is unclear what
it means for knowledge or opinion to be 'set over' something. Some
commentators believe that Plato analyzes knowledge in terms of its
contents (Fine 1990, Reeve 1988). If they are right, then 'set over' is
probably best rendered as 'about'. Other commentators believe that the
analysis proceeds in terms of the objects of knowledge (Allen 1961,
Benitez 1996). If they are right, then it is probably best to construe being
'set over' a kind of thing as being a process that takes things of that kind
as inputs. In Sections 3 and 4,1 apply the veridical interpretation of 'to
be' in a way that clarifies somewhat the notion of being 'set over'
something, but I persist in using the vague English expression for three
reasons. First, 'epi' is ambiguous in Greek, and it cannot be properly
disambigue ted without using the Stoic concept of a proposition. That
concept is unavailable to Plato, and it is necessary for the purpose of
distinguishing what a cognitive process is about from what its operands
are.2 Second, my aim is to develop a reading of 'to be' that is neutral with

reality, but she does so on the basis of a reading different from his (Annas 1981). A
reading similar to Armas's leads C.D.C. Reeve to attribute a reliabilitist epistemology reminiscent of Alvin Goldman (1979) to Plato (Reeve 1988).
2 With the appeal to propositions, the distinction works in this way. The contents of
knowledge or opinion are their meanings, i.e. propositional contents, and they
belong to the realm of Fregean sense. The objects of knowledge or opinion are the
entities or states of affairs that impress themselves on the mind and generate the
states of knowing or opining. They belong to the realm of reference. Construed in
this way, the contents/objects controversy is a dispute over whether Plato offers an

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Being and Knowledge 89

regard to the content/objects controversy, and so it does not require

disambiguation of 'epi'. 'What is', in my view, means 'what is so', and
what is so could be either facts (objects) or propositions (contents). Third,
presupposing an interpretation of 'epi' might beg the question for or
against some particular interpretation of 'to be', and I do not wish to beg
the question. I am confident that the arguments below do not turn on
any equivocation.
My case for the veridical interpretation has three stages. In the first
stage (Section 2, below) I argue that Socrates must use premises in 476e
ff. that the lovers of sights and sounds would accept. Not to do so would
undermine the plausibility of the Republic's main thesis: that it is better
to be just than to be unjust. The second stage involves showing that only
the veridical interpretation of 'to be' is compatible with this requirement.
I survey the possible interpretations in Section 3, and I find that all other
interpretations involve attributing premises to Socrates that the lovers
and sights and sounds would reject. The final phase, in Section 4, is the
application of the veridical interpretation of 'to be' to the rest of Socrates'
argument at the end of Book V. I argue that my version of the veridical
interpretation is at least as good as any other in handling the difficult
'powers argument' of 477c-478d and the 'argument from opposites' at
478e-479e.

The Rhetorical Setting of 476e ff. and

the Dialectical Requirement

Following Fine (1990), I call the requirement that Socrates argue on

grounds acceptable to the lovers of sights and sounds the 'dialectical
requirement'. The context of Book V's final argument provides reasons
why the requirement is in place at 476e ff. Socrates has been trying to put
off answering objections to the practical possibility of the ideal city
because he sees such objections as 'the greatest wave of criticism' against
his proposal (472a, 473c) and because his answer to them is 'paradoxical'
(472a, 473e). His paradoxical answer is that the ideal city is possible, at

mtensional or an extensional analysis of knowledge. Without recourse to propositions, Plato does not have the means to distinguish intensional from extensional
analyses.
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90 Chase B. Wrenn

least approximately, provided that it could actually be brought about

that 'political power and philosophy entirely coincide' (473c-d). He
distinguishes philosophers from lovers of sights and sounds (whom I
call 'connoisseurs') and argues (474c-6d) that only philosophers can have
knowledge. Connoisseurs must settle for mere opinion because, unlike
philosophers, they do not believe (for example) in the beautiful itself as
something over and above the many beautiful things.
After drawing that conclusion at 476d, however, Socrates immediately sees a difficulty that must be overcome. He points out the difficulty
at 476d-e, in the transition to the final argument of Book V:
[S]3 What if the person who has opinion but not knowledge [that is, the
connoisseur] is angry with us and disputes the truth of what we are
saying? Is there some way to console him and persuade him gently,
while hiding from him that he isn't in his right mind?
[G] There must be.
[S] Consider, then, what we'll say to him. Won't we question him like
this? First, we'll tell him that nobody begrudges him any knowledge
he may have and that we'd be delighted to discover that he knows
something.

It is no idle question to wonder what to do if the connoisseurs become

angry and dispute the truth of what Socrates is saying. We should keep
in mind that the philosophers' claim to exclusive political power in the
approximately ideal city is based on their exclusive claim to knowledge,
including knowledge of how best to rule. The non-philosophers, however, outnumber the philosophers (494a), and Glaucon warns Socrates
early on that 'a great many people ... will cast off their cloaks and,
stripped for action, make a determined rush at [him], ready to do terrible
things' (473e-4a) upon hearing his claim that philosophers should hold
the monopoly on political power. At issue is whether the approximately
ideal city is really possible, and not just an abstraction that could never
be implemented. If approximating the ideal city is to be possible on earth,
then the philosophers must be able to overcome the non-philosophers'

Where necessary, I distinguish the speakers in a passage by using '[S]' for Socrates
and '[G]' for Glaucon. All English translations are taken from the Grube and Reeve
version in Cooper (1997).

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Being and Knowledge 91

challenge. They must be able to persuade and console those who think
that they have knowledge when they really have mere opinion. Otherwise, the non-philosophers will not allow the philosophers to rule.
Arguments that only philosophers would accept, such as that of 474c-6d,
are not up to the task.4 The philosophers need a way of responding to
the connoisseurs in their own terms. If Socrates cannot provide such a
way, then the philosophers will have no way of turning back the connoisseurs' angry rush. The philosophers would thus be overpowered
and unable to make philosophy and ruling entirely coincide. Consequently, they would not be able to approximate the ideal city on earth.
The impossibility of such a city renders implausible the Republic's
main thesis: that it is better for a person to be just than to be unjust.
Suppose that it is impossible for an actual person to be appreciably just.
We know that injustice is within the scope of ordinary human capacities.
Because it is not better to do what is impossible than to do what is
possible, it would follow that it is not better to be just than to be unjust.
If the impossibility of the approximately ideal city suggests the impossibility of personal justice, then, it also suggests the falsity of the Republic's most central claim.
The impossibility of approximating the ideal city does suggest the
impossibility of personal justice, and that is why Socrates sees objections
to the possibility of the ideal city as the 'greatest wave' of criticism (472a,
473c). From 368e on, the analogy of the soul to a city informs the
Republic's structure. In the ideal city, each class knows and acquiesces in
its place, does its own work, and is ruled by the philosophical class
(428a-34d). In the just soul, each part knows and acquiesces in its place,
does its own work, and is ruled by the rational part (441c-4e). To claim
that the ideal city cannot be approximated is to claim that the philosophical class will be unable to acquire significant political power with the
approval of the city's other classes. There are four main ways in which
tha t might happen (see Books VIII and IX), and four corresponding kinds
of souls not ruled by their rational parts. If the philosophical class cannot
gain political power, then the analogy suggests that the rational part of
the soul cannot gain psychic power. Because personal justice requires

The argument of 474c-6d presupposes the existence of the beautiful itself over and
above the many beautiful things, but the connoisseurs (by definition) do not believe
in the beautiful itself.
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92 Chase B. Wrenn

rulership by the rational part of the soul, the earthly impossibility of

philosophical rulership in the city indicates the earthly impossibility of
personal justice. That would mean that it is not better to be just than to
be unjust.
Apart from the city/soul analogy, Socrates' characterization of his
response as 'paradoxical' seems to connect the possibility of the approximately ideal city to the possibility of the approximately just person. The
paradox that Socrates has in mind could be a chicken-or-egg or bootstrapping problem.5 Personal justice requires philosophy because it
requires that the soul be ruled by its rational part and philosophers are
those whose souls are so ruled. The extent to which a person can actualize his philosophical nature, however, depends on the existence of the
right kind of social order, with the most complete actualization taking
place in the ideal city (496a-7b). Anticipating this result of Book VI,
Socrates sees that there is a bootstrapping problem in the claim that
approximating the just city requires philosopher-rulers. The best philosophers must be raised in the best cities, but the best cities require
philosophers in order to be best. The lesson here is the same as that of
496a-7b: Justice requires philosophy, and philosophy requires the city.
If approximating the ideal city is impossible, then it is very unlikely that
people will be able to approximate the ideal of personal justice.6 For
Socrates to argue successfully that personal justice is better than personal
injustice, he must show that the approximately ideal city is itself possible.
To do that, however, he must be able to turn back the angry rush of
connoisseurs who will oppose rule by the philosophical class.

This is not the only possible interpretation here. Eugenio Benitez (1996) contends
that the paradox comes from the fact that philosophers must be compelled to rule.
Furthermore, the Greek word Socrates uses ('paradoxen') applies to what is genuinely paradoxical, 'unbelievable' in the sense of an unbelievably talented athlete, or
just unpopular. It is thus plausible that the claim is 'paradoxical' on many dimensions, and that that helps to explain Socrates' reluctance to answer this wave of
criticism.
It is unlikely, but not entirely impossible. Socrates escapes the bootstrapping
problem by allowing for the existence of persons with philosophical natures outside
the approximately ideal city (496a ff.) Although these people will be more philosophical than others (and therefore more just), the (approximately) full realization
of their philosophical nature requires the nurture
of the approximately ideal city.
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Being and Knowledge 93

To overcome the connoisseurs' opposition, Socrates must argue from

premises that they already accept. Turning them back by force is not an
option because the connoisseurs vastly outnumber the philosophers
(494a). Without resort to force, the only alternative is genuinely persuasive argumentation, and genuinely persuasive argumentation will not
resort to tactics of tricking or shaming the audience into assent.7 The
argument at 476e ff. is a sample of legitimate, persuasive argumentation
meant to defuse the connoisseurs' opposition to philosophical rule. It is
not meant to persuade us, the enlightened readers of the Republic, that
the connoisseurs have opinion but not knowledge. That argument is at
474c-6d. This argument is an example of how the connoisseurs could be
persuaded that they do not know what they think they know.8
Even a legitimately persuasive argument starting from what the
connoisseurs accept is not enough. Socrates must start from true beliefs
of the connoisseurs as well. If he exploits their false beliefs, then they
might cease to be persuaded when their errors are corrected. That could
lead to another angry rush of connoisseurs who are now better informed
and perhaps harder to persuade than the first wave. A better
strategy would be to use premises that the philosophers and the connoisseurs can agree on and not to risk the stability of the approximately ideal
city.
To apply the dialectical requirement to 476e ff., we must determine
who the 'lovers of sights and sounds,' i.e. the connoisseurs, are and what
they believe. Both philosophers and connoisseurs are 'lovers of learning/
but connoisseurs learn by attending festivals, seeing sights, and listening

Socrates sometimes uses such tactics in the dialogues, as in Protagoras 333a-6b or in

Corgias. In this case, however, such a strategy would not turn back the rush of
connoisseurs once and for all, and thus it would render the approximately ideal city
unstable. Rhetorical tricks and shame do not garner lasting agreement. Additionally, one could argue that the ideal city must be moderate, and that moderation
requires a level of genuine agreement which rhetorical tricks are unable to produce.
See Protagoras 333b-e for evidence of emptiness of ashamed assent.
I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on whether it is more important for
the argument to persuade us or to persuade the connoisseurs. Of course, the Republic
as a whole is meant to persuade us that it is better to be just than to be unjust. To do
so, however, it must also persuade us that it is possible to be just. Unless we can be
persuaded that there is a way to win over the connoisseurs, however, we cannot be
persuaded that personal justice is possible. To win them over requires that both we
and the connoisseurs be persuaded that only philosophers
can have knowledge.
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94 Chase B. Wrenn

to choruses (475c-d).9 Unlike philosophers, connoisseurs 'would never

willingly attend a serious discussion' (475d).10 They study T^autina!
sounds, colors, shapes, and everything fashioned out of them, but their
thought is unable to see and embrace the beautiful itself (476b). Connoisseurs cannot attend to the beautiful itself because they do not believe
in it. Instead, they believe only in sensible beautiful things (476c).
There are two ways in which someone might believe only in sensible
beautiful things, and this ambiguity might affect the interpretation of the
'argument from opposites' at 478e-9c (see below, Section 4). On one
interpretation, the connoisseurs are strict nominalists who hold that
there are particular, sensible beautiful objects but not a single, intelligible
Form in which all and only those objects participate.11 On the other hand,
the connoisseurs might not be strict nominalists, but instead believe that
there are many different sensible ways or modes of being beautiful. Their
belief in the many beautiful things is the belief that many different
sensible properties can be beautiful, a nice shape or a harmonious tone,
for example.12
There is a third possible interpretation, however. Perhaps some connoisseurs are nominalists and others are not. It is not important what the

9 This passage supports Gosling's (1960) characterization of the connoisseurs as the

sort of person whose 'learning is culled, for instance, from attendance at festivals ...;
but they do not attend merely to fill in time, like the Saturday cinema queues; they
would more likely be found at the Cannes Festival, studying the art.' I prefer the
word 'connoisseur' to the more standard 'sight-lover' or 'lover of sights and sounds'
(see Allen [1961], Annas [1981], Benitez [1996], Fine [1990], Gosling [1960], Reeve
[1988], and just about any other writer on this passage); 'connoisseur' seems better
to convey that these are people who have a prima facie claim to know something,
rather than people who just like to be entertained. Plato's own words, however, are
more literally rendered in the standard way.
10 It is not clear what Glaucon has in mind here as 'a serious discussion'. I assume that
connoisseurs might enjoy a merely intellectual discussion (see Protagoras and Republic I), but they would become bored once the discussion became philosophical.
Cephalus, for example, seems to have plenty to say in Republic I until the discussion
moves to the topic of justice in itself (331b-c). He then makes a lame excuse and
leaves at the first opportunity (331d).
11 Both R.E. Allen (1961) and Eugenio Benitez (1996) take this line. The coincidence of
a nominalistic reading of Tjeautiful things' and a reading of 'to be' as 'to exist' in
476e-7a is accidental for neither Allen nor Benitez.
12 Gosling (1960) and Reeve (1988) take this line.

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Being and Knowledge 95

connoisseurs take the sensible to be; all that matters is that their minds
do not move beyond the sensible to the intelligible. Treating the connoisseurs as strict nominalists provides a natural reading, but there is textual
evidence that at least some connoisseurs pay close attention to the
features in virtue of which particular objects are beautiful. For example,
at 474d-5a Socrates gives a litany of 'terms and excuses' that a connoisseur of young boys will use to explain the beauty of a particular boy.
Although the connoisseur does not account for a boy's beauty by appeal
the beautiful itself, each boy is beautiful for a reason; he has some
sensible property that makes him beautiful. This suggests that nominalistic connoisseurs are not Socrates' only target. My interpretation of the
'argument from opposites' at 478e ff. will work whether or not any
connoisseurs actually are nominalists.
The connoisseurs are genuine lovers of learning, not just pleasureseeking epicures out for a good time. They might appear to be experts
in their fields, for they are able to tell good plays from bad, for example,
and to say something about what makes the good ones good or the bad
ones bad. As Gosling (1960:120) puts it, they seem to 'know what they
are about.' This might make them appear to have the knowledge required
to run a city well, even though they neither believe in nor have access to
the beautiful (or the just) itself, over and above the many beautiful (or
just) things. To overturn their claim to political power, and to turn back
their angry rush, Socrates must argue from premises that such people
already accept.

The Early Premises: 'What is'

Socrates begins his case against the connoisseurs with the following
short argument (476e-7a):
(1) He who knows knows something rather than nothing.
(2) What he who knows knows is something that is rather than
something that is not}3
(3) Therefore, what is completely is completely knowable and what
is in no way is in every way unknowable.

13 Like A. Bloom (1991), I here italicize the relevant

instances of 'to be' and 'not to be'.
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96 Chase B. Wrenn

There are two related puzzles in this passage. The first is how best to
interpret 'to be' in such claims as 'he who knows knows something that
is', and the solution of this puzzle guides the interpretation of the rest of
Republic V. The second puzzle pertains to the inference from (1) and (2)
to (3). On the face of it (pending an interpretation of 'to be'), the argument
does not follow. In keeping with the dialectical requirement, then, we
must interpret this passage in such a way that the connoisseurs are likely
to accept the premises and in such a way that the inference plausibly
follows.14
There are several senses of 'to be' that might apply here. One is the
existential sense, which involves glossing 'to be' as 'to exist'.15 Such an
interpretation, however, also involves violating the dialectical requirement. The connoisseurs would not accept the premises on an existential
reading of 'to be'. As Annas (1981:196-7) points out, they would probably
reject (2), interpreted existentially, and claim to know some things that
in fact do not exist. Despite her death many years in the past, the connoisseurs might claim to know that Helen was beautiful. They might also
claim to know at least one thing about the beautiful itselfnamely, that
it does not exist. The existential reading requires, however, that the
connoisseurs give up such knowledge claims in accepting (2).
Also, for the inference from (1) and (2) to follow or even for (3) to
make sense it apparently must be assumed that there are degrees of
being. Some things are completely, and others are in no way. Socrates has
no trouble getting agreement that opinion is set over what is intermediate between being and not being (478d). On an existential reading of 'to
be', these claims involve the notion of degrees of existence. There is no
good reason, however, to suppose that the connoisseurs would agree
that there are degrees of existence. Nominalistic and non-nominalistic
connoisseurs alike would be far more likely to believe that some things
exist and others do not than to admit of an ontologically suspicious
middle ground. If we read 'to be' existentially, the connoisseurs must
either posit such a middle ground or deny that there is such a thing as

14 The text of 476e-7a is unclear as to whether Socrates infers (3) from (1) and (2) or
instead infers Glaucon's acceptance of (3) from his acceptance of (1) and (2). This
detail makes little difference, however, because the best grounds for inferring
Glaucon's agreement come from endorsing the inference of (3) from (1) and (2).
15 Allen (1961) and Benitez (1996) favor this reading.
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Being and Knowledge 97

opinion when they agree that opinion is set over what is 'intermediate'
(478c-d). It is implausible that the connoisseurs would do either, so we
should give up the existential reading.
A promising alternative is the predicative reading of 'to be'. Such a
reading treats 'to be' as a copula, and thus treats sentences like 'Knowledge is set over what is' as elliptical. They can be completed by adding
some predicate, F, so that 'Knowledge is set over what is' glosses as
'Knowledge is set over what is-F'.16 There are two different versions of
the predicative reading, but there are some difficulties that both versions
have in common. It is not clear what the relevant predicates are with
which we should complete the elliptical sentences. There may be some
particular predicates that Socrates has in mind (perhaps Tjeautiful'), or
it could be that we should understand 'is-F' schematically, with 'F'
replaceable by any of a number of predicates that satisfy some further
(perhaps null) set of conditions. We might gain some clarity here by
looking forward to the argument from opposites (478e ff.), but that
argument comes too late. By 478, the connoisseurs have already agreed
to the key premises involving 'to be', and it is not reasonable to expect
them to agree to those premises before the meaning of 'to be' in them has
been clarified.17
The simplest version of the predicative reading is what I call straight
predication. On this interpretation, the 'F' in 'is-F' is replaceable by such
predicates as l>eautifur, 'double', or 'just' (see 479a ff.). This reading
runs into difficulties of its own. It is unrealistic to suppose that the
connoisseurs do not think that they have 'negative knowledge' of some
sort. But if we read 'what is' as 'what is beautiful' (for example) and 'what
is not' as 'what is not beautiful', we have to read 'What is in no way is in
every way unknowable' as 'What is beautiful in no way is in every way
unknowable'. Charity dictates that we restrict the ways of knowing in
the range of 'every' so that the most plausible interpretation is that one
cannot know anything about the beauty of something that is in no way

16 Reeve (1988) and Armas (1981) adopt this approach. Kahn (1981) adopts a complicated account combining elements of the predicative reading with elements of the
veridical reading.
17 One might attempt to use 476b-d to evade this problem, but there is only one
predicate, ', used in that passage. One can construct any theory from a
single data point, and the discussion there does not rule a predicative interpretation
in or out.
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98 Chase B. Wrenn

beautiful. As long as we assume that the connoisseurs believe themselves

to have negative knowledge, however, they would disagree. They might
claim to know of some especially ugly thing that it is in no way beautiful.
They would thus know something of this ugly thing's beauty. For the
connoisseurs to agree to (2) would involve their giving up any claims to
negative knowledge, which it is not reasonable to suppose they would
do so early in the argument.18
The second form of the predicative reading, definitional predication,
might appear more promising. On this reading, 'what is' is treated not
so much as 'what is-F as 'what F is' or 'what it is to be F'. Such a reading
might seem to gain support from 476b-d and from the Socratic obsession
with questions of the form 'What is F?'. Nevertheless, it does not work.
Like the existential reading, the definitional predication reading of 'to be'
is binary. While it might make sense to talk about what beauty is, and it
might make sense to talk about what beauty is not, there is no way to
make sense of the notion of something intermediate between what beauty
is and what it is not. Particular beautiful things, or ways of being
beautiful, are not intermediate between what beauty is and what beauty
is not. Rather, they simply are not what beauty is.19 They fall readily into
the category of 'what is in no way' on the definitional predication
reading. But Socrates and the connoisseurs agree (eventually) that the
connoisseurs' views of the many beautifuls are opinions, not ignorance,
and opinion is set over what is intermediate, not over what is in no way.
Even if it were not nonsense to talk about 'degrees' of being what
something is (perhaps by pointing to better and worse definitions), the
fact that Socrates and the connoisseurs agree that the many beautifuls

18 One might respond to this objection by saying that the connoisseurs would agree
that something that is in no way F is also in no way knowable as F. The problem
with this reply is that to know something as F is just to know that it is F. The objection,
then, does not allow for a distinction between knowing something as F (a predicative
reading) and knowing that its being F is so (a veridical reading). If the objection
works, then, it works by backing off from what makes the predicative reading a
predicative reading, and so fails to give that reading much support.
19 Recall Socrates' assessment of Euthyphro's claim (Euthyphro 5d-6e) that piety is
prosecuting wrongdoers, whoever they may be. He does not say that prosecuting
wrongdoers is and is not what piety is, or that it is intermediate between what piety
is and what piety is not. Rather, he points out that prosecuting wrongdoers is
altogether the wrong sort of thing to be what piety is.

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Being and Knowledge 99

are intermediate is enough to make it unlikely that 'to be' is to be read

definitionally here.
Having dispensed with the existential and predicative readings of 'to
be', then, the only remaining option is a veridical reading.20 On this
reading, we gloss 'what is' as, roughly, 'what is so', and 'what is not' as
'what is not so'. As Annas (1981: 197) points out, this reading does
seriously risk falling to the same sort of objection that felled the existential and definitional predicative interpretations. It makes no sense to
speak of degrees of truth, and it would appear that the veridical reading
would involve us (and the connoisseurs!) in just such talk.
This is a serious warning. However we work out the veridical reading,
we should do it in a way that does not involve saying that some things
are truer or falser than others.21 There is a veridical interpretation of 'to
be' that does not run afoul of this problem, however. Kahn (1981) discusses, in addition to the veridical sense of the verb 'to be' in Greek, a
veridical nuance or value that the verb sometimes carries:
Even where syntax is unambiguous, a copula use of the verb may bear
a veridical value, that is to say, it may serve to call attention to the truth
claim that is implicit in each declarative sentence. This function of the
verb ... is not so clearly defined a notion as the veridical construction.
It is unmistakable in those cases where a use of ["to be"] is naturally
translated as "is true", "is so", or "is the case"; but these are typically
not copula constructions. In the copula use a veridical nuance emerges
whenever there is any contrast between being so and seeming so,
between being really such-and-such and being only called such-andsuch or believed to be such-and-such. (1981:105-6)

Taking the veridical nuance into account, Kahn develops a version of the
predicative reading such that 'to be' means 'really (and not just apparently) to be F'. There is much to recommend such a reading, but it suffers

20 To the extent that the 'identity interpretation' (treating 'is' as 'is identical to') is a
serious option, it is a species of the predicative interpretation.
21 Fine (1991) attempts to get around the 'degrees of truth' problem by reconstructing
the argument in terms of sets of propositions. Doing so, however, is anachronistic,
and anachronism is not allowed if we take the dialectical requirement as a serious
interpretive constraint. The connoisseurs cannot agree to something that has not yet
been conceived.
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100 Chase B. Wrenn

the characteristic weakness of any predicative reading of 'to be' in 476e

ff.: there is no good way to determine which predicates are eligible to be
replacements for the schematic 'F. Despite the problems facing Kahn's
predicative account, it is suggestive of a possibly fruitful veridical account.
If we combine the veridical interpretation of 'to be' with an appreciation
for the veridical nuance, then we can piece together a two-dimensional
veridical interpretation that succeeds, I think, in making sense of Socrates' argument at 476e ff.
The veridical nuance allows an ordinary truth claim to be made more
emphatically. Merely to say that something is with the veridical sense
leaves it open whether or not it is so independently of how things seem.
To say that it is with both the veridical sense and the veridical nuance
however, is to say that it is so independently of how things seem. There
are thus two distinctions at play. The first is the ordinary distinction
between what is so and what is not so. The second is the distinction
between what is (or is not) so independently o/how things seem and what
is (or is not) so depending on how things seem. I propose to use both these
distinctions in working out the veridical interpretation of 'to be'. Socrates
distinguishes not only what is from what is not, but he also makes the
more emphatic distinction between what is completely and what is in no
way. The language of 477a indicates that these four categories are
intensionally distinct from one another. In the general category of what
is, there is a subcategory consisting of what is completely. What is in no
way constitutes a subcategory of what is not. One can thus take what is
completely to be what is so independently of how things seem. It is what
is with 'is' carrying both the veridical sense and the veridical nuance.
'What is not completely' is thus ambiguous. On the one hand, it indicates
what completely is not, i.e. what is in no way. This is what, independently
of how things seem, is not so. On the other hand, something might not
be completely because the matter of whether it is or is not depends in
some way on how things seem. The categories of what is and is not thus
break down as follows:
1. What is
l.a. What is so independently of how things seem, 'what is
completely'
l.b. What is so at least partly in virtue of how things seem
2. What is not
2.a. What is not so independently of how things seem, 'what
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Being and Knowledge 101

2.b. What is not so at least partly in virtue of how things seem

Knowledge in general is set over what is. Complete or unqualified
knowledge, however, is set over only category l.a. Similarly, ignorance
is set over what is not, but absolute ignorance is set over only category 2.a.
Socrates and Glaucon agree (477a) that if anything both is and is not (that
is, if anything falls into both category 1 and category 2), then it is
intermediate between what 'purely is' (l.a.) and what 'in no way is' (2.a.).
Whatever is intermediate, then, must fall both into category 1 .b. and into
category 2.b. It will have to seem to be so and also seem not to be so,
depending how you look at it.
This approach avoids the degrees of truth problem. Neither Socrates
nor the connoisseurs are committed to the absurd doctrine that truth
comes in degrees. Beyond the distinction between truth and falsehood,
they are committed only to a distinction between what is so independently of how things seem and what is so at least partly in virtue of
how things seem. The connoisseurs have no reason to disagree with such
a distinction between reality and appearances.
This, then, is how I read 476e-7a. Speaking on behalf of the connoisseurs, Glaucon first agrees with Socrates that whenever someone knows,
he knows something rather than nothing. The thing that the person
knows is something that is so (category 1). The inference from (1) and (2)
to (3) occurs when Socrates and Glaucon note that whatever is so
independently of how things seem (l.a.) is knowable without qualification.22 Furthermore, whatever is not so independently of how things
seem (2.a.), is not knowable at all. The inference is valid because, although knowledge is set over what is, only what is so independently of
how things seem (category l.a.) cannot also fall into category 2. Intermediate between what is really so and what is really not so (l.a. and 2.a.),

22 Although Socrates and Glaucon agree that whatever is is completely knowable

(apparently on the basis of [1] and [2]), they should agree only that whatever is
completely is completely knowable if knowable at all, i.e. that whatever is completely knowable is completely. This is a problem for Socrates and Glaucon on any
interpretation, and so I do not attempt to correct the error here. As things stand,
Plato is apparently committed to the view that knowability is criterial for truth or
reality, and that human knowers have cognitive access, in principle, to all the facts.
From this point, it is easy to make the move to an anti-realist verificationism
(certainly an un-Platonic position!) according to which truth itself amounts to
knowability, and the limits of human reason set
the limits of what there is.
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102 Chase B. Wrenn

we find things that fall into both category 1 and category 2. Because
something in category l.a. cannot be in category 2, and something in
category 2.a. cannot be in category 1, anything intermediate between
what purely is and what is in no way would have to fall into both
category l.b. and category 2.b. These are things that seem one way and
also seem another way; they are so if viewed from one perspective and
they are not so if viewed from another.
If this version of the veridical interpretation is to work, however, it
must also hold up in two other important parts of Socrates' argument
against the connoisseurs. The first is the 'powers argument' at 477c ff.,
in which Socrates attempts to show that opinion is intermediate between
knowledge and ignorance. The second is the 'argument from opposites'
at 478a ff., in which he argues that the many beautifuls (for example) are
intermediate between being and not being, and thus objects of opinion but
not knowledge. I rum to these arguments in the following section.

The Powers Argument and the Argument

from Opposites

The structure of the powers argument (477c-8d) is as follows. First,

Socrates proposes a criterion for individuating powers and establishes
that knowledge and opinion are both powers (477c-e). Applying that
criterion of individuation (and assuming that knowledge, opinion, and
ignorance are different powers), he argues that opinion is set over
something different from what knowledge and ignorance are respectively set over. Because opinion is 'darker than knowledge but clearer
than ignorance' (478d), the conclusion is that opinion is intermediate
between ignorance and knowledge and is set over what is intermediate
between what is completely and what is in no way.
The most troublesome part of Socrates' argument is his criterion of
individuation for powers:
A power has neither color nor shape nor any other feature of the sort
that many other things have and that I use to distinguish those things
from one another. In the case of a power, I use only what it is set over
and what it does, and by reference to these I call each the power it is:
What is set over the same things and does the same I call the same
power; what is set over something different and does something different I call a different one. (477c-d)
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Being and Knowledge 103

With Glaucon's agreement that knowledge and opinion are different

powers (477b), Socrates applies this criterion to establish that opinion is
set over something different and does something different from knowledge.
Socrates' criterion, however, is insufficient to support the inference. It
is logically possible for powers to be set over different things but to do
the same thing, or for them to be set over the same things but do different
things.23 The criterion does not address these possibilities. It does not
specify whether such powers would be the same or different. What
Socrates has provided are conditions sufficient for the identity or diversity
of powers, but he has not given necessary and sufficient conditions. Lacking
necessary and sufficient conditions, merely knowing that two powers
differ is not enough to legitimate the inference that they both are set over
different things and do different things. For the distinctness of the powers
of knowledge and opinion to imply mat they are set over different things,
however, requires that inference, and Socrates and Glaucon make it at
478a. It would thus appear that Socrates' argument is in trouble.
There are a number of ways of approaching this problem, but my
point is that, to the extent that this is a real problem, it is not a problem
whose existence undermines the plausibility of the veridical interpretation. First, the interpretation can lessen (if not remove) the trouble that
Socrates is in here. Glaucon has already granted that opinion is the power
in virtue of which we opine and that knowledge is the (distinct) power
in virtue of which we know (477b, 477d-e). The connoisseurs are likely
to agree that knowing and opining differ, even before Socrates introduces his criterion of individuation, because it is reasonable to expect
that they would want to distinguish what they do (knowing) from what
the untutored masses do (opining).
Given that the distinction between what knowledge does and what
opinion does has been granted even before the powers argument begins,
one can ask whether it is reasonable to suppose that knowledge and
opinion are therefore set over different things. In the special case of
knowledge and opinion, the inference is reasonable. This is because
knowledge and opinion do not need disjoint domains to be set over
different things; overlap is permissible so long as there is something over

23 This purely logical point does not depend on any particular interpretation of the
ambiguous expression 'set over' ('epi').
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104 Chase B. Wrenn

which one is set but not the other.24 In this case, it will turn out that
knowledge is set over the whole of category 1 (with complete knowledge
restricted to category l.a.)/ while opinion is set over a part of category 1,
as well as a part of category 2.
Suppose that knowledge and opinion were set over exactly the same
things. Because knowing is set over 'what is [so] to know it as it is
[independently of how things seem]' (477b), this means that opinion
must be set over what is so to opine it as it is independently of how things
seem. Then, however, there would be no difference between knowing
and opining. In each case one comes to believe what is so independently
of how things seem. Opining, like knowing, would be infallible. But
opinion is fallible, and knowledge is not (477e). The difference in what
opinion does and what knowledge does in part depends on there being
a difference in what they are each set over.
Although this approach provides a plausible reconstruction of the
inference from the distinctness of knowledge and opinion to the distinctness of their domains, it does not follow very closely the way that
Socrates and Glaucon actually argue in the text. Glaucon says plainly at
478a-b, '[I]f a different power is set over something different, and opinion and knowledge are different powers, then the knowable and the
opinable cannot be the same.' He is invoking Socrates' criterion of
individuation of powers in its general form, and he is not appealing to
the special relationship between opining and knowing.25
Another possibility is to grant that Socrates has made a mistake. Even
charity has its limits, and the inference from the difference of the powers
to the difference of both their domains and what they do is drawn
unequivocally at 478a-b. Even if we try to interpret Socrates' words at
477d as merely claiming that different (mental) powers are always set
over different things and always do different things, then we face the
difficulty of determining why merely doing the same or merely being set
over the same things would be sufficient for their identity (as in that case

24 Fine (1990: 91) makes essentially the same point.

25 This fact about the text also poses a problem for Annas (1981) and Fine (1990). Each
of them attempts to make the inference reasonable in terms of her interpretation of
'to be', and each of them appeals to special characteristics of the relationship of
knowing to opining. In particular, they neglect the fact that, as Socrates and Glaucon
apply the criterion, it is perfectly general and distinguishes knowledge from opinion
as well as hearing from seeing (477c).
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Being and Knowledge 105

it would). My version of the veridical interpretation gives us reason to

think that the mistake, if it is a mistake, is harmless in this case, but it
does not make the mistake go away.26 It seems unlikely, however, that
there is any other interpretation of 'to be' that would resolve the problem.
It is Socrates and Glaucon's uses of 'same' and 'different', not 'to be' that
are problematic.
With it settled that knowledge and opinion are set over different
things, the argument of 478b-e proceeds fairly (but not entirely) unproblematically to the conclusion that opinion is set over what is intermediate between what is completely and what is in no way. This sets the
stage for the argument from opposites (478e ff.), in which Socrates argues
that the 'many beautiful things,' 'the many just things,' 'the many pious
things,' 'the many doubles/ and 'the many bigs and smalls and lights
and heavies' all 'participate in opposites' and therefore both are (category
1) and are not (category 2). Because opinion, but not knowledge, is set
over what is so as well as what is not so, the many beautiful things (inter
alia) are what opinion and not knowledge is set over. The challenge for
my version of the veridical reading of 'to be' is to make sense of this
argument, and in particular of its claims to the effect that the many
beautifuls (for example) both are and are not.
I remain agnostic as to whether there are any purely nominalistic
connoisseurs. My inclination is to say that there are some, and that
Socrates is being systematically ambiguous in using expressions like 'the
many beautifuls.' One reason for this is that, on the veridical interpreta-

26 I here say 'harmless' in that it does not lead Socrates to draw a false conclusion.
However, it is far from harmless so far as the overall project of the Republic goes. If
this inference does not work, then the argument Socrates offers to persuade the
connoisseurs does not go through, and that could have disastrous consequences. It
could render the approximately ideal city, and thus personal justice, impossible.
I think the problem can be solved, but I do not have an argument for my favored
solution. Eric Brown has suggested to me, for example, that perhaps 'same' and
'different' are being used as contraries rather than contradictories in this passage.
On that interpretation, powers that are purely the same do the same things with
regard to the same things, and powers that are purely different do different things
with regard to different domains. Powers that do different things with regard to the
same domain, or the same thing with regard to different domains, would then be
in one sense the same as one another and in another sense different. Whether one
agrees with this interpretation or not (I do), it does show that the problem in me
powers argument derives from the ways that 'same' and 'different' are used, not
from the use of 'to be'. It is 'to be' that I am concerned
with in this paper.
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106 Chase B. Wrenn

hon, one can make sense of this passage either way. Assume first that
Socrates is arguing against those who believe in the many beautiful
things (but not the beautiful itself) in the sense of believing only in the
many beautiful objects. That is, assume that he is arguing against nominalists. The key point is that he frames the relevant contrasts in terms of
how things appear.
"My dear fellow," we'll say, "of all the many beautiful things, is there
one that will not also appear ugly? Or is there one of those just things
that will not also appear unjust? Or one of those pious things that will
not also appear impious?" (478e-9a)
What about the many doubles? Do they appear any the less halves than
doubles? (479b)
So, with the many bigs and smalls and lights and heavies, is any of them
any more the thing someone says it is than its opposite? (479b, my
emphasis)

The cognitive faculties of nominalistic connoisseurs are directed at

particular objects. They might judge it true that something is beautiful,
just, double, or pious, but they can do so only on the bases of how things
seem to be and of common opinion as to whether that thing is beautiful
or just or pious or double. They can appeal only to sensible beauty, and
not to the intelligible Form of Beauty itself. Thus, they must also recognize that whatever seems beautiful also seems ugly, and similarly for what
seems just or pious or double.27 If all there is to beauty is seeming
beautiful, then all the beautiful objects are also ugly objects. That they
are beautiful is not so independently of how things are, but rather it in
part depends on how things seem to be. That is why Socrates and Glaucon
agree that 'according to the conventions of the majority of people about
beauty and the others, they are rolling around as intermediate between
what is not and what purely is.' A particular beautiful thing 'participates
in opposites' and falls into both categories 1 .b. and 2.b. Its being beautiful

27 The double, being a mathematical matter, might appear to raise special difficulties
of its own for these appeals to how things seem to be. For discussion of a platonistic
(but perhaps not Platonic) view of things seeming mathematically different while
in fact being grounded in a single, objective, mathematical truth, see C.B. Wrenn
(1998).
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Being and Knowledge 107

both is and is not because it might or might not be beautiful, depending

on how one looks at it.
With regard to non-nominalistic connoisseurs, the argument works in
much the same way. Rather than contending that the many beautiful
objects (etc.) also appear to be ugly, Socrates contends that the many
sensible ways of being beautiful are also ways of being ugly. He gives an
example of precisely that at 474d-e, where he notes that sallowness is
sometimes a feature in virtue of which someone is beautiful, and sometimes a feature in virtue of which someone is ugly. Once he gets agreement that the sensible features in virtue of which something is beautiful
or just or pious are also features in virtue of which something is ugly or
unjust or impious, the conclusion is the same. Without appeal to the
beautiful itself, our account of beauty can point only to features that can
contribute to a thing's ugliness. The beauty of a sallow complexion is a
conventional matter of how one looks at it. To say that sallowness is
beautiful is to say something that is so at least in part depending on how
things seem. It falls into category 1 .b. and category 2.b.; it both is and is not.
The rest of the argument follows because the connoisseurs claim to
have knowledge while denying that there is any such thing as the beautiful itself. That is why they cannot be taken to study or contemplate
beauty itself, but only to form judgments about beautiful objects or
properties. Socrates has won their agreement that knowledge is set over
what is (with complete knowledge attaching only to what is completely),
and that opinion is set over what is and is not. Because the judgments of
the connoisseurs are dependent on how things seem to be, and in
particular on sensible objects and properties, their judgments pertain to
what is and is not. This conclusion also follows from premises that the
connoisseurs must accept. Thus, the connoisseurs must admit that, in
concerning themselves with what is and is not, they are exercising only
the power of opinion. They must also admit that philosophers, who
attend to the beautiful itself rather than to beautiful things, are concerned
with what is so independently of what seems to be the case. They are in
the business of knowing, while the connoisseurs must admit to being
only in the business of opining.28

28 This paper has benefitted tremendously from helpful comments and criticisms from
Eric Brown, A.M.C. Casiday, Josefa Toribio, Richard Watson, and an anonymous
referee for Apeiron.

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108 Chase B. Wrenn

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Cooper, J.M. ed. 1997 Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis, : Hackett Publishing Company.
Fine, G. 1990. 'Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-V1I'. In S. Everson, ed., Companions to
Ancient Thought l Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press.
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Reeve, C.D.C. 1988. Philosopher-kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Wrenn, C.B. 1998. 'Explaining Mathematical Objectivity'. MS. Presented to the Southern
Society for Philosophy and Psychology on 9 April 1998, New Orleans, LA.

Department of Philosophy
Campus Box 1073
Washington University in St. Louis
One Brookings Drive
St. Louis, MO 63130
U.S.A.
chase@twinearth.wustl.edu

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