American Oriental Society

Strategies of Interpretation: akara's Commentary on Bhadrayakopaniad
Author(s): Jacqueline Suthren Hirst

Source: Journal of the American Oriental Society, Vol. 116, No. 1 (Jan. - Mar., 1996), pp. 5875
Published by: American Oriental Society
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STRATEGIESOF INTERPRETATION:
SAMKARA'S COMMENTARYON BRHADARANYAKOPANISAD
SUTHREN
HIRST
JACQUELINE
UNIVERSITY
OFMANCHESTER
Its importance to Samkara can be indicated in various

ways. With the Chdndogyopanisad,the Brhadaranyaka
is the upanisad Samkaracites most frequently.4Like the
Brahmasutrabhdsya,the commentaryon the Brhadaranyakopanisad provides ample opportunityfor Samkarato
warm to his main themes: the oneness of the Self and
Brahman,the world of name and form, the sufficiency of
knowledge alone for release. It also contains extended
argumentsagainst key opponents that are less constricted
than in his commentary on the Brahmasutra, whose
own agenda of refutations and whose vrttikara shape
Samkara's approach.5The earlier commentator on the
Brhadaranyakopanisad,whom Anandagiri identifies as
Bhartrprapafica,is simply another opponent to be challenged, rather than a predecessor to be followed where
possible. This is one of several good reasons for thinking the Brhaddranyakopanisadbhasyato be a mature
commentary6and hence anotherjustification for studying it in some detail. In addition, it is one of the two
upanisadbhasyason which Suresvara,a direct disciple of
Samkara's,wrote a major varttika. Samkara'sown tradi-
1. INTRODUCTION
THE AIM OF THIS ARTICLEis to explore Samkara's theo-
logical method with reference to one of his greatest, yet

little studied, commentaries.1I shall try to demonstrate
the close link that exists between certain of Samkara's
exegetical strategies and the hermeneutics of his whole
theological system. In other words, I shall develop the
claim that, for Samkara, scripture is the source of both
theological content and method and that there is a close
interrelationbetween the two.2
In order to establish this, I shall focus on three major
themes: firstly, the place of sravana, manana and nididhydsana (hearing scripture, reflection, and contemplation) as a Vedantin method; secondly, and linked with
this, the relation between scripture and reason; thirdly,
and again based on the foregoing, the refutation of opponents, taking the Buddhists as my example. I shall try
to show that not only are these issues clearly addressed
in the Brhaddranyakopanisadbhdsya,but that they are
central to the Advaitin enterprise, as Samkara sees it.
Before turning to these issues, I shall briefly justify my
choice of commentary and indicate its place amongst
Samkara'sworks and the wider Advaitin tradition.
4 See SengakuMayeda1979:42-44. Mayedaarguesthatthe

Brhadaranyakais even more importantthan the Chdndogyafor
Samkara.
1.1 Choice of Commentary
5 Cf.
Ingalls1954:295.
6 E.g., the clarity and assurance of the introduction; greater

freedom from the constraintsof the earlier commentator;a clear
but complex handling of the relation between scriptural texts
and reason; the sophisticated use of Buddhist terminology and
arguments against the Buddhists. These will be discussed later
in the article. They do not require commitment to a particular
thesis on Samkara'sdevelopment, e.g., Hacker 1968, which sees
BUBh as mature or Vetter 1979, which ignores BUBh. They do
tend to count against Biardeau 1959, which sees it as an early
work. They are compatible with Halbfass' rejection of a rigid
development approachto the texts in favor of one which seeks
to understandtheir larger context, especially in relation to the
issue of "reason" (yukti) and "revelation" (sruti) (1991: 144
et passim).
The Brhaddranyakopanisadis a very importanttext,

both in the upanisadic corpus and in Samkara's own
writings, yet there has been little explicit study of its
Bhdsya, compared with, say, that on the Brahmasutra.3
1 An earlier draft of this article was given at the 17th Symposium on Indian Religions, Wolfson College, Oxford, in April
1992. Translations, unless otherwise stated, are my own.
2 See also Suthren Hirst 1990.
3 The essays on Samkara in Halbfass 1983 and 1991 are a
notable exception. HeidrunBrucknerexamines material similar
to this article but misinterpretsthe place of reason in Samkara.
See Brickner 1979.
58

59
HIRST:Samkara's Commentary on Brhadaranyakopanisad

SUTHREN
tion, then, from the earliest times, has regarded it as an

important work. Finally, it contains numerous, clearly
articulatedcomments by Samkara,both on the method of
the upanisad as he sees it and on his own method in
explaining what the text means. It thus provides vital material for understandingSamkara'stheological method.
The Brhaddranyakopanisad
is, however, also impor-
tant in the wider Advaitin tradition. From 2.4.5 and its

parallel 4.5.6 is derived the triple method of hearing,
reflecting, and meditating, long regarded as the basis of
Advaitin, or even Vedantin,practice. Thus, for example,
Dasgupta writes of the person qualified for Vedantic
instruction:7
[He]shouldtryto understand
correctlythe truepurport
of the Upanisads(calledsravana),andby argumentsin
favourof thepurportof theUpanisadsto strengthenhis
convictionas statedin the Upanisads(called manana)
and then by nididhyasana
(meditation)which includes
all theYogaprocessesof concentration,
tryto realizethe
truthas one. (Dasgupta1922, 1:490)
This threefold process has become almost synonymous
with Advaitin method. As early as Mandana Misra, an
opponent is using the triple phrase to indicate the
Advaitin way of inculcating knowledge (though he
believes it to lack efficacy).8 In his fifteenth-century
Essence of the Vedanta, "one of the best and most widely
read introductory books in Sanskrit for the study of

Vedanta" Sadananda lists sravana, manana, and nididh-
yasana as necessary preparations for realization.9 A
7 I.e., the one possessing

betweenthe eternalandthe transient
(i) discrimination
(ii) distastefor the enjoymentsof the worldof samsara
(whichDasguptasplitsin two)
(iii) controlover the senses
(iv) desirefor liberation
These are basedon BSBh1.1.1. Notice how Samkara's
introductionto theBUBhintimateshowmeditationmayhelpin such
preparation.
8 MandanaMisra,Brahmasiddhi
1.13,quotedby KarlPotter
(1981:354). Theopponent'sargumentis thatsravana,manana,
andnididhyasana
arebasedon difference,whichis unrealin the
Advaitin'sview. Theirmeansof knowledgeis thereforeunreal
andcannotyielda realresult,liberation.Mandana's
responseis
very like thatused by Samkarain responseto a similarchallenge in BSBh2.1.14.
9 Vedantasara 181: evambhatasvasvarapacaitanyasdksatkaraparyantarm
ravanamanananididhydsanasamddhyanusthdnasyopeksitatvdtte 'pi pradarsyante. Note that Sadananda
contemporary swami of the RamakrishnaMission employs the method innovatively as the foundation of his
practice, giving this as one of several reasons for the
importance of the Brhaddranyaka commentary in his
view. 10
It is clear that one reason for the method's centrality

is precisely its perceived scriptural sanction. This is not
just a matter of excerpting it from the two verses mentioned above. When Radhakrishnanmakes a (somewhat
artificial) link between the structureof the three kandas
of the Brhaddranyakopanisad
and this scheme (1953:
147), this is no invention of his. Anandagiri's commentary already promotes such a view. Bhartrprapaica,
before Samkara, found the scheme presented within the
upanisad in 2.4-2.5. The method is seen to be embedded in the form of the text itself. For this reason, we
shall begin our investigation of Samkara'scommentary
by examining his own treatment of sravana, manana,
and nididhyasana. This will sharpen our understanding
of his rather different perception of the text's structure
and methods and will lead into our consideration of the
relation of scripture and reason.
2.
SRAVANA, MANANA, AND NIDIDHYASANA
As soon as we turn to Samkara's commentary, it

becomes apparentthat he is at odds with the view just
outlined above. In the introductionto BUBh 2.5 we find
Samkarastating quite clearly: "Therefore,in our opinion,
the allocating of separate sections to hearing, reflection,
and meditation is meaningless."1 The man regarded as
the arch-commentatorof the Vedantaseems to be slighting its central method, this terse comment apparently
ignored by succeeding generations!
In this section of the paper, I wish to argue that there
are three overriding reasons why Samkara is unwilling
to follow the construction of the text proposed by "others."12These are: his understandingof the way scripture
adds samadhito the list. In practice,the subjectis never as

tidy as commentators
mightlike it to be!
Theassessmentof the Veddntasdra's
is thatof the
importance
of Nikhilananda's
publisher
Englishtranslation.
10SwamiTripuranandaji,
Ramakrishna
Mission,BourneEnd,
Bucks, England, in conversation before a Religious Studies
Seminar held in the Divinity School, University of Cambridge,
5 November 1993.
11 Madhavananda 1975: 263. tasmat prthakprakaranavibhdgo 'narthaka ity asmadabhiprayah sravanamanananididhyasandnam iti.
12 BUBh
2.5, intro.: anyair vydkhyatam... iti.

60
Journal of the American Oriental Society 116.1 (1996)
functions as a unity; his fundamentaldistinction between

action and knowledge; and his insistence that sabda as a
pramana demands close attentionto the particularitiesof
text and context. All of these are groundedin his understandingof scripturalcontent and methods. We shall look
at each briefly in turn and then see how these affect his
understandingof the triple method.
Samkara perceives the unity of scripture, its ekavdkyatd,to be grounded in the very oneness of the Self.
This is made most clear in a verse from the Upadesasahasri, with its nice play on words:
The wise know that (Veda) to be a single passage
becauseit is concernedwiththe sole endof realization.
Fortheonenessof theSelf is to beknownbydiscovering
of the passage.13
the purport/meaning/goal
It follows that any methods the Veda recommends for
understandingnon-dualityare simultaneouslyfocused on
and culminate in that single non-dual subject. We shall
see how this principle affects both the way Samkarainterpretsthe upanisad'sencouragementthat the Self is "to
be heard,reflected on and meditatedon" and his rejection
of Bhartrprapafca'sallocation of separatesections of the
upanisad for each task.
Within the unity of the Veda, Samkaradoes, though,
recognize one fundamentaldivision of texts. This relates
to his sharp distinction between action and knowledge
and results in the categorization of sruti texts into a section on action and a section on knowledge (karmakanda,
jninakainda).'4 The former is concerned with dharma, the
13 Upad P 17.9:
jninaikarthaparatvat tam vaikyamekam tato viduh I
ekatvam hy dtmanojneyam vakyarthapratipattitahII
Theonenessof the Self is boththegoal andthereferentof the

whole Vedicpassage.
14 Jagadananda'snote to his translationof Upad P 17.9 indi-
catesthatthe unityof the Vedicpassageis to be understoodas

embracing both karmakandaandjianakannda(1941: 193). This
insofaras
as preparatory
is achievedby regardingkarmakanda
withits owngoals.Itsmeditationscan
it leadsto dissatisfaction
also be regardedas a methodof mentalpurification.
However,
is viewedin its ownright,its goals and
insofaras karmakdnda
methods,while entirelyproperto a worldof ends andmeans,
are not to be confusedwith those of thejinnakanda.This is
madeveryclearin BSBh1.1.1whereSamkarais emphaticthat
fortheenquiryintoBrahmanareto
thenecessaryprerequisites
andpurdo witha renunciatory
attitude,not the understanding
suit of dharma.
world of ends and means, the preserve of the Purvamimamsakas. The latter seeks Brahman,transcendingends
and means, the field of Vedanta (or Uttaramimm.sa).
They do not neatly correspond with what have been
regardedas different genres of Vedic texts. It is the content of a text which determines whether it counts as karmakdnda or jninakn.da.
The Brhaddranyaka contains
instances of both, at least in Samkara'sreckoning. This

is one reason why Samkara would reject the kdnda
scheme suggested by Anandagiri and Radhakrishnan.It
is quite clear that the sixth adhyaya's rather precise instructionsfor ensuring male issue relate to (ritual) action,
means and ends, not to meditation on the one Self
(nididhyd-sana). Similarly, in the opening section, meditating on the horse sacrifice functions for Samkaraas a
way of inculcating dissatisfaction with the world of ends
and means. It is hence merely preparatoryto knowledge
of the Self. While this shows that the distinction between
karmakanda and jidnakdnda is not always as sharp as the
demands of polemic require,this preparatorymeditation

does not constitute direct hearing of the Self and so
kanda 1 cannot be described as sravana (of the Self)
without ambiguity.
More importantly,this fundamentaldistinction stresses
that ritual action creates its own results, whereas knowledge is of that which alreadyexists. There can be no way
in which the Self to be known is dependenton the knowing of the seeker. Hence it cannot be enjoined, since what
is enjoined is dependent on whether the agent actually
follows or ignores the injunction. Rather,the Self is simply to be known as such.'5 It is this view, which is quite
unnegotiable,that leads to ambiguityin Samkara'sunderstanding of nididhyasana and his tendency to ignore it
where possible, as we shall see below.
The same assumption (that knowledge cannot be enjoined) also underlies the way he reads BU 2.4.5, the
particularattention he pays to the grammaticalstructure
of its key phrase and the way he relates it to its wider
upanisadic context. This is fully in accordance with his
principle that the language of sruti is to be examined
minutely in determining its sense, since it is as sabda
that it is a valid means of knowledge, pramana. This
is, of course, a principle derived from Pfrvamimamsa
exegesis, but it is applied in the light of his Advaitin
presuppositions, indicated above. It constitutes the third
reason why Samkararejects the interpretationsof "others" and justifies the need for the detailed analysis of
text, to which we now proceed.
"5 BSBh 1. 1.4.

SUTHREN
2.1 Brhadaranyakopanisadbhasya2.4-2.5
The immediate context of Samkara'svigorous repudiation, cited above, is a suggestion, apparentlyby Bhartrprapafica,that the text of the story of Yajfiavalkya and
Maitreyi be split up. The earlier commentator suggests
the following:
2.4.1-2.4.6 (opening of the story and instruction
on the Self to be realized) is for sravana.
(ii) 2.4.7-2.4.14 (from the illustration of the drum to
the end of that pada) is for manana
(iii) 2.5 (which, comparing various things with honey,
shows them to be identical in their true naturewith
the Self) is enjoined for nididhydsana.16
(i)
This is what Samkararejects. He is not objecting, as such,

to the attemptto find differentemphases in differentparts
of the text. He seems to accept an alternative scheme,
which he describes just before Bhartrprapanca'sview.'7
Rather,he dislikes the implication that there is a need for
nididhydsanato be enjoined separatelyfrom sravana and
manana. This is his reason:
61
Since the focus of nididhyasana is the Self which is to

be known, a separate injunction (such as Bhartrprapafca
suggests is given in 2.5) is pointless. To be precise, it is
anarthaka, without purpose and without referent, for the
Self, by definition, cannot be enjoined. This cannot then
be a correct way of construing the passage. An alternative must be found. Samkaramakes two suggestions for
the function of 2.5. Both rely on his preference for the
pairing of scriptureand reason over the triple method of
hearing, reflection, and contemplation and will be considered furtherbelow. For the moment, though, we turn
to his detailed exegesis of 2.4.5 to see how he applies the
third principle we have indicated in the light of the
other two.
First, I give the crucial part of the upanisadtext itself,
in which Yfijnavalkya teaches his wife Maitreyi about
the Self:
Indeed,mydearMaitreyi,theSelf shouldbe seen,heard
of, reflectedon andmeditatedon. Indeed,my dear,by
the
seeing,by hearing,by reflection,by understanding,
Self is to be knownas all this [i.e., everythingin the
manifested world]. (BU 2.4.5)
In any case, with respectto reasoning,thatwhichis to

be reflectedon (mantavyam)
is to be in accordancewith
whatis laid downin scripturaltradition;andnididhydsana is to be performedas reasoningis, the thought
contentbeing determinedby bothreasoningand scripturaltradition.So a separateinjunctionfornididhydsana
wouldbe pointless.18
Here we can clearly see Samkara applying the first two
principles indicated above. Firstly, there is a single subject (the Self), which is laid down by the scriptureto be
heard and which is to be reflected on by reasoning processes. It must also be the focus of nididhydsana, whose
content is that very Self determinedby scriptureand reason. There is unity of method and subject. Having established that the focus of nididhyasana is that which is
thus determined, Samkara applies the second principle.
16 BUBh
2.5, intro.: anyair vydkhyatama dundubhidrstantac

chrotavydrthamdgamavacanam prda madhubrdhmandnmantavydrtham upapattipradarsanenamadhubrahmanenatu nididhydsanavidhir ucyata iti.
17 See further below.
18 sarvathdpi tu yathdgamendvadhdritamtarkatas tathaiva
mantavyam.yathd tarkatomatasya tarkagamdbhydmniscitasya
tathd eva nididhyasanam kriyata iti prtharnididhyasanavidhir
anarthaka eva.
The Sanskrit reads:

dtmd vd are drastavyah srotavyo mantavyo
nididhydsitavyo maitreyi
atma vd are darSanena sravanena matya vijidnenedam
sarvam viditam.
A close look at its wording shows that there is no formalized triple scheme either in this text or in 4.5.6. In the
first line cited, there are four parallel words: drastavyah

(is to be seen), srotavyah (is to be heard), mantavyah (is
to be reflected on), and nididhydsitavyah(is to be meditated on). In the second line, related nouns or participles
occur and there is some variation of vocabulary. Vijadnena (2.4.5) / vijnate (4.5.6) ('by understanding/once
understood') appears in fourth place, so that Suresvara,
commenting on this verse, equates nididhyasana (meditation) with vijndna (understanding).19
While the text does not seem to demand it, Samkara
reads the (presumably well-known) threefold scheme
into the first line cited above from 2.4.5. In the following
translation, words from the upanisad itself are in double
quotes to distinguish them from Samkara'sglosses:
19Samkaradoes not wish to do this,becausehe understands

to be anactionandthereforedifferent
meditation/contemplation
in kindfromunderstanding/knowledge,
as we shallsee below.

62

Therefore"the Self, indeed,my dear, is to be seen/
realized"-is worthyof realization,is to be brought
forwardas theobjectof realization."Itis to be heard"tradition(acdrfirst,accordingto a teacherandscriptural
yata dgamatas ca). Next, "it is to be reflected on"-
accordingto reasoning(tarkatah).Then20"it is to be
meditatedon"-contemplatedunswervingly/with
certainty.Forthusthis [Self] is realizedby going through
the methodsof hearing,reflecting,and constantmeditation (sravanamanananididhydsanasddhanair
nirvarti-
taih).Truerealization
concerningtheoneness(ekatva)of
Brahmanis establishedwhenthese [three]forma unity
alone.21
(ekatva),not otherwise,by hearing[scripture]
At first sight, this is a straightforwardendorsement of
the triple method, underpinnedby the first principle that
unity of scriptural method is grounded in the unity of
Brahmanor Self. It seems to say quite categorically that
all three aspects of the method are required; hearing
scripture on its own is insufficient. This, however, is
problematic in the light of a clear statement given in the
Brahmasutrabhdsyathat, for some, hearing the phrase
tat tvam asi once will suffice for realization to dawn. For
others, repetition of the sentence and extended reflection
on its meaning will be required(4.1.2). Nididhyasana is
not overtly mentioned in the comment on this suitra.
This makes us look again at the context of Samkara's
remarkin BUBh 2.4.5. It seems to me that he is preparing for his rejection of Bhartrprapanca'sscheme, given
at the beginning of the next brahmana,by indicating that
the text of 2.4.5 involves hearing and reflecting and
meditating (not just hearing) and that therefore a separate section and injunction on meditation later (i.e., in
2.5) will not be necessary, indeed, will be pointless. The
principle of unity of method grounded in unity of Brahman is thus emphasized, at least in part, to exclude an
injunctive, ritualist reading of the text.
This is particularly important in view of the grammatical forms used in the first line of the text cited
above. The gerundive -tavya implies that there is something to be done, which should be done, which ought to
be done. The Self is to be realized (drastavya), is to be
20 Or,
perhaps,"as a consequenceof this."
21 tasmad "dtma vi are drastavyo" darsandrho darsanavisayam apadayitavyah. "srotavyah" purvam dcaryata agamatas ca. pascii "mantavyas"tarkatah.tato "nididhydsitavyo"
niscayena dhydtavyah. evam hy asau drsto bhavati sravanamanananididhyasanasadhanairnirvartitaihyadaikatvam etany
upagatani tadd samyagdarsanam brahmaikatvavisayamprasidati nanyatha sravanamatrena.
heard (srotavya), is to be reflected on (mantavya), is to

be meditated on (nididhyasitavya). The opponent in the
Brahmasutrabhdsya,who suggests that all of these have
the force of injunctions (things which should be done),
seems to have grammar on his side. Samkara cannot
afford to concede this point, however. To accept that
drastavya has the force of an injunction would entail the
possibility of enjoining the knowledge which simply is
identity with the Self. And that cannot be enjoined,
because it would make the Self dependent on human
decision and activity. Samkara,then, makes it clear that
the purpose of verses like BU 2.4.5 is not to give injunctions about seeing and hearing the Self. Rather, it is to
direct attention away from ordinary activity to that Self
which is to be realized.22
This is also the way Samkara's commentary on BU
2.4.5 is to be read. On the face of it, Samkara seems
straightforwardlyto endorse the triple method by recognizing a sequence of practices (first, next, then, going
through), all of which are needed and which together
lead to realization. However, nirvartita, the word which,
following Madhavananda,has been translated above as
'going through,'strictly means 'set aside.' The implication is quite clear. Whether or not there is anything sequential intended by the word, its purpose is to indicate
that all methods are left behind once true understanding
occurs. It is this samyagdarsana, true understandingof
the Self, the one to be realized, which is the real focus
of this passage.23Or, to put it another way, the emphasis is finally on darsana (realization), rather than on
sravana, manana, and nididhyasana.
Nonetheless,
it is
throughtheir working together or unity (ekatva) that the

oneness (ekatva) of the Self is understood. Principle
numberone (the ground of scripturalunity) is respected
in a way which emphasizes the importance of principle
two (the distinction between injunction and knowledge).
These two in turn influence the way principle number
three (detailed attention to textual structure) is applied.
2.2 Nididhyasana
It is at this point that we must examine more closely

Samkara'sconcept of nididhyasana, for it is surrounded
22 BSBh 3.2.21:
drastavyddisabddapi paravidyadhikdrapathitas tattvabhimukhikaranapradhanana tattvavabodhavidhipradhand bhavanti.

23 It is also the focus of the extended discussion of BU 4.5.6
which occurs in BSBh 1.4.19f. Samkara,following the BS, gives
the views of various teachers, but the point at issue is "the Self
to be known"-drastavyah, not Srotavyah, etc.


SUTHREN
by ambiguity. We shall see that this tension is related

to the distinction Samkara draws between action and
knowledge (and hence with principle two above) and
also to the way in which he believes knowledge to arise
on the basis of sabda (principle three). The tension is
neatly indicated in the difficulty of translatingthe term
adequatelyand of relating it to other similar terms, when
own use is less than fixed or precise. To exSaamkara's
pose the problem, we shall examine these difficulties of
translationand location, consider briefly three recent attempts to solve the puzzle and then link the results of
these investigations with our exploration of scriptureas
the ground for Samkara'sown methods.
So far, I have translatednididhydsana by 'meditation',
following the usage of Dasgupta and others. In BUBh
2.4.5, Samkara, as we saw, glosses nididhyasitavyah as
niscayena dhyatavyah. Madhavananda renders this as
'should be... steadfastly meditated upon'. We could

also suggest thatthe Self is 'to be contemplatedunswervingly' or, with just slightly different emphasis, 'to be
contemplated with certainty'. This perhaps shifts attention from the contemplator's own concentrated mental
action to the certainly determined content of that which
is contemplated, namely, the oneness of the Self. This
seems to be behind Alston's comment, when, in translating Satchidanandendraon this subject, he remarks:
as "susOnecanhardlyavoidtranslating
"nididhyasana"
tainedmeditation."But the authorshows that for Sri
Safkara and Suresvara the term had other meanings.
(Satchidanandendra1989: 137)
The advantage of accepting our last suggestion (and the

one apparently,though not clearly, implied by Alston) is
that it simultaneously allows us to affirm
i) that knowledge of the Self arises on the basis
of scripture and reason (not through an individual's decision to meditate steadfastly-a form of
action) and
ii) that that one unchanging unaffected Self is the
sole focus of hearing (scripture), reflecting (by
reason), and contemplating (that whose knowledge is certainly established by the former twoin accordance with principle number one above).
However, this actually only raises the question of the nature of nididhydsanamore sharply.What need is there for
such contemplationif the certainandunsublatableknowledge of the Self has alreadyarisen?Is such contemplation,
then, actually to be identified with true understanding,
as Suresvara himself quite clearly does? Or is it to be
understoodas a means with some other function, such as
63
the removal of obstacles caused by past actions still coming to fruition till the momentumof this last life ceases?
It is such questions that have led several recent writers
to discuss meditation and/or the triple method in Samkara's thought. However, before examining their positions, it is importantto realize that these are all questions
which Samkara himself explicitly raises, sometimes in
the voice of an opponent, in both the BUBh and the BSBh.
They are posed when Samkarais actually discussing BU
2.4.5,24but also in other contexts where 'meditating'and
'knowing' are intimately connected in the text.25It seems
importantto stress that it is not just the literary context
that is significant in these discussions but the socioreligious context of Samkara'sday. The triple method's
application was known but was being debated and it was
a burning issue whether liberation was to be achieved by
the performanceof scripturallyenjoined duties (including meditation on Brahman) or solely through scripturally generated knowledge. In other words, the nature of
scripture as a pramana was centrally at issue and, concomitantly, the nature of human responsibility and the
religious path.
The easy answer on nididhyasana, and its place in the
triple method, would be to see it as a kind of focused
meditation through which arises a new and special
understanding of the Self, which goes beyond the
knowledge gained throughthe Vedic sentences, removes
avidyd and is therefore liberating.26It thus has a clear
function, method, and object, from which it is easily
distinguished. It is a means to an end. This, however,
is precisely the view of the Purvamimamsa-influenced
opponent in BUBh 1.4.7, who, discussing meditation
(updsana), quotes 2.4.5: the Self "is to be realized,
heard, reflected on, and meditated on," in support of his
case.27 Samkara'scategorical rejection of this case has
once again to do with his refusal to make the Self and
24
E.g., BSBh 4.1.1-4.1.2.

E.g., BUBh 1.4.7; cf. BUBh 4.4.22.
26 As
Dasgupta's summary implies and as later Advaitins
argued. Cf., e.g., Vacaspati Misra on BSBh 1.1.4: "Hence, after
one has comprehendedthat the human self is the supreme self,
through knowledge of the natureof hearing texts like "you are
that" [Chdndogya Upanisad 6.8.7], and confirmed this by reasoning based thereon,thereresults intuition of Brahmanthrough
the contemplation [otherwise known as focused apprehension
(bhdvant)] of that [truth] practised at length and unintermittently ..." (quoted in Clooney 1993: 128).
27 BUBh 1.4.7, p. 661 para. 2: apare varnayanti updsanendtmavisayam visistam vijnanantarambhavayet, tenatmdjnayate,
avidyanivartakamca tad eva, nttmavisayam vedavdkyajanitatm
25

64
meditation or knowledge of it the subject of an original

injunction (apurvavidhi),28 that is, something which
would be unknown apart from this scripturalinjunction
and compliance with it. Where knowledge of the Self is
concerned, no action is necessary, for all action is based
on the misconceptions of the superimposed conventional world and its desires, which are removed when
knowledge arises.
Samkaradoes, however, have to account for the text
cited by the opponent, which seems directly to enjoin
the true understandingwhich follows (ordinary? scriptural?) understanding (vijiiya prajiidm kurvita, BU
4.4.21).29 It is here that he acknowledges that scripture
gives a restriction (niyama), that is, stipulates that one
already known alternative is to be adopted. Earlier,
Samkara had emphasized that knowledge of the Self
destroys its opposite, false notions and their painful
defects. However, here he concedes that, like an arrow
in flight, speech, mind, and body are still impelled by
the results of former actions, even after the rise of
knowledge. This results in two claims on the knower's
mind. The restrictive text directs "the train of remembrance" to knowledge of the Self (BUBh 1.4.7).
It is on such passages that Jonathan Bader draws
when he interprets nididhydsana as a mental technique
designed to remove incorrect ideas and establish a constant memory of the knowledge of the Self (1990: 6580). He also links it with the method of parisamkhydna
(meditation) recommended in Upadesasdhasri G3. Like
Halbfass, Bader argues that Samkara does not understand parisamkhydnaas "'meditation' in the sense of a
result-oriented mental action,"30but rather as a way of
excluding false identifications from the Self. Bader then
sees this as an aspect of reflection which, "at first analytical, gradually develops into a meditation consisting
solely in a discriminative insight" (1990: 80). This transforms meditation in Samkara'sVedanta "from a way of
action to a way of knowledge" (ibid.).
Another recent discussion of Samkara's attitude to
the triple method is given by the Advaitin scholar,
Satchidanandendra,writing originally in Sanskrit,in and
vijiinam iti. etasminn arthe vacanany api "vijndya prajinam

kurvita" (4.4.21) "drastavayah srotavyo mantavyo nididhydsitavyah" (2.4.5)... ityadini; cf. previous paragraph.
28 See his rejection of the Purvamimamsakacase and its use
of BU 2.4.5 in BSBh 1.1.4.
29 See also Samkara'scommentaryad loc. and a furtherreference to this passage at the end of section 4 discussing Samkara's
repudiationof the Buddhists.
30 Halbfass' formulation. See Halbfass 1980: 45.
for the tradition. Like Bader, Satchidanandendraacknowledges the looseness with which Samkara uses
terms like vidyd (knowledge, or very particularmeditation for results), upasana (meditation for particularresults or contemplation on the Self), nididhydsana. The
same vocabulary is used differently in different places
(frequently determined by sruti's own context, a point
which is not stressed by either Bader or Satchidanandendra). However, in the context of the triple method
and BU 2.4.5, Satchidanandendraunderstandsnididhydsana as "sustained attention to previously attained right
knowledge" (1989: 372). Bader's view is thus close to
this modem Advaitin thinker's.
In presenting the issue as they do, both writers hold
onto the two points we linked above: that knowledge
arises throughscriptureand reason and thatthe sole focus
of hearing, reflecting, and contemplating is the one Self.
They also clearly envisage contemplation as a means,
even though it succeeds right knowledge, since it removes any remaining obstacles to that knowledge. This
view of contemplation as a means is in accordance with
BUBh 2.4.5, where hearing, reflecting, and contemplating are together described as means (sddhana) to be transcended. It also tallies with BSBh 4.1.1, where all three
are indicated to be repeatable mental events (pratyaya)
which are transcendedin realization (darsana).
It is here that a third writer, AnantanandRambachan,
gives a ratherdifferent account of nididhydsana in Samkara. His majorconcern is to give a credible explanation
of what knowledge of Brahman might be. In this, he
strongly emphasizes, as I have done, Samkara's sharp
distinction between knowledge and action (including
meditative mental action). As a consequence, he also
sharplydistinguishes between nididhyasanaand updsana
(notwithstanding Samkara'sown inconsistencies of vocabulary). He defines nididhydsana as "the contemplation of an object, already conclusively known from a
valid pramana, as it really is" (1991: 112). So far, he
agrees with my contention that knowledge, for Samkara,
arises on the basis of scripture, that is, through hearing
and reflecting on its meaning. He also seems to agree
with Bader in saying that nididhydsana is a "continuous
fixing of attention on knowledge already gained" (1991:
112), so that brahmajiina is "not displaced by age-old
tendencies and inclinations" (1991: 111). However, after
rightly distinguishing nididhyasanahere from some kind
of meditative mental action dependent on the meditator's
will and fulfillment of injunction, Rambachan then directly equates nididhyasana with valid knowledge, with
brahmajndna.As we have seen, this is the line taken by
Suresvara, at least partly on textual grounds. However,
Samkara quite clearly distinguishes the three means
(sddhana) from the realization that surpasses all means


SUTHREN
and mental events, which Rambachan's final position

seems to ignore.
Here, though, is the crux of the matter.While the enlightened person is still living, knowledge takes the
form of mental modifications (vrtti) or mental events
(pratyaya) (Thibaut's"mental acts" is confusing here) or
a "stream of remembrance"(BUBh 1.4.7), all of which
are part of the multiple world that is to be transcended.31
Their content is that oneness of the Self that transcends
all duality. Yet even in describing the Self as the "content of knowledge," we maintain the very subject-object
duality which true realization discards.32It is this paradox that Rambachan seeks to address.
It seems to me that Samkara'sposition on nididhydsana, though complex and ambiguous, is explicable in
the following terms. He is quite clear that it is of a different naturefrom those meditations which are the result
of the meditator's will and which identify two different entities in accordance with a scriptural injunction.
However, because the texts themselves are not consistent, he cannot and does not wish to draw a neat line by
confining updsana to such a process and nididhyasana
to contemplation of the Self. Perhaps because of the
danger of confusion between two types of mental event,
Samkarais very reticent in talking of nididhydsana, except where his sources require it.
Samkara is also committed to the position that liberation in this life (jivanmukti, which is brahmajndna)is
possible. He constantly challenges opponents to deny
the evidence of their eyes that fear, delusion, hatred are
overcome, that people are liberated, through the pramdna of scripture.The tenet that Advaitin realization is
unsublatable (and arises only on the basis of scripture)
is therefore fundamental to him. However, he is also an
experienced teacher. He knows that, for some, the effect
of past karmic results will threatena fragile understanding. Orientation towards the one Self must be maintained. In this sense, contemplation follows realization.
Such a subsidiary practice concentrating the train of
remembrance on the one Self to combat the effects of
past karman is seen to be grounded in scripture (BUBh
1.4.7, referringto 4.4.21). Its natureseems to be the constant keeping in mind of that to which one is devoted,
which is how Samkaradescribes the repeatable activity
of upasana or nididhydsana in BSBh 4.1.1.33 As a means,
31 As Rambachan
has alreadypointedout (1991: 110).
32
Ramanuja,of course, holds that this is inevitable and why

the Advaitin view is incoherent (see Sri Bhdsya 1.1.1).
33 api copasanam nididhyasanam cety antarnitavrttigunaiva
kriyabhidhiyate. tathdhi loke gurum upaste rdjdnam updste iti
ca yas tdtparyena gurvadin anuvartate sa evam ucyate. tatha
65
like the others, it culminates or has its end in realization,34 a statement which is incompatible with what I
have just argued only if chronological and logical senses
of a culminating means are confused.
Samkarathe teacher also knows that the learning process itself is, for most, a long and arduousone of engagement with the text. In BSBh 4.1.1, Samkara maintained
against the opponent that hearing, reflecting, and contemplating are all repeatable mental events (pratyaya).35
In the continuation of the discussion in 4.1.2, Samkara
subtly changes the framework.He considers the specific
case of tat tvam asi ("thou art that"). Because the
teaching is given nine times in ChU 6, it is clear that
scripture itself sanctions repetition, at least for those
whose understandingis obstructedby "ignorance, doubt
and misconception."For them, "repetitionof scriptureand
reasoning [note no reference to a third factor] has the
purpose of helping them to discriminate the meanings
or referents of the words (tat and tvam)."36He explicates
this furtherby referringto the need progressively to discard false superimpositions by successive avadhdnas:37
Thibaut translates 'act(s) of attention', Gambhirananda
'attempt(s)at comprehension'.Perhaps,though, Samkara
implies that the gradual process of discarding superimpositions upon the Self is in some sense a contemplative
one. This process is a crucial part of the whole way in
which key scripturalsentences are properly to be understood. However, it must be stressed that this is part and
parcel of the vital reflective process, not a set of prescriptions for subsequent meditative practice, conformity to
which will generate a set result.
A furthercomment on what is involved in understanding scriptural sentences may make this clear. Samkara,
in common with the classical Sanskritic tradition of the
time, makes no distinction between the meaning of a
word and that to which it refers. The artha of the word
dhydyati prositanathd patim iti ya nirantarasmarand patim

prati sotkantha saivam abhidhiyate.
34 Ibid. darsanaparyavasitatvdd esdm.
3evam prpte brumah-pratyayavrttih kartavyd. kutah?
asakrd upades't "Srotavyo mantavyo nididhydsitavyah" (BU
2.4.5, 4.5.6) ity evamjdtiyakohy asakrd upadeSahpratyaydvrttim sacayati. .. darsanaparyavasdnani hi sravanddiny dvartyamdndni drstarthdni bhavanti.
36 BSBh 4.1.2: ... paddrthavivekaprayojanah sdstrayuktyabhyasah.
37 BSBh 4.1.2: yadyapi ca pratipattavya atmd niramsas
tathapy adhydCropitamtasmin bahvamSatvam dehendriyatatraikenavadhanenaekam
manobuddhivisayavedanddilaksanam
amsam apohatyaparendparam iti yujyate tatra kramavati
pratipattih.

66
is its referent. The artha of tvam is Thou, the pure Self.

But on that pure Self, we superimpose false identifications, of body, senses, mind, and so on. It is these false
identifications which have to be removed to understand
the artha of the word tvam. What we might describe as
a purely intellectual comprehension of the sentence is
not really an understandingof its artha at all.
To put it another way, the process of gradually stripping away superimpositions is integral to the way scripture functions as a pramana.38 If this is a contemplative
process, Samkara in no way belittles it, for it is at the
heart of his teaching enterprise, precisely because scripture makes it so.39What he does wish to avoid is a view
that a pupil can hear the words of scripture, intellectually reflect on their meaning and then take the content of
that hearing and reflecting as a set of norms for meditation which will necessarily produce the required result, for this would be precisely to confuse the nature
of knowledge with that of action. This is why Bader,
Satchidanandendra,and Rambachan are all correct in
indicating that hearing and reflection are sufficient for
knowledge to arise. A separatemeditative action changing or deepening the nature of that knowledge is incompatible with Samkara's understanding of sruti. I
am arguing, however, that a process of stripping away
superimpositions, incorporated into the understanding
gained through scripture and reflection, is integral to
Samkara'smethod and fully consonant with his views
on the ekatva of scripturalcontent and method.
Samkaraseems to accept two contemplative facets to
the process of realization: the first is an integral part of
the means of scripture and reflection which lead to
realization; the second is an ancillary practice following
realization, but nevertheless still a means, in that it
prevents effects of past karmanfrom occluding it. These
two are continuous in that they both involve focusing
and focused attention on the one Self. They are both
grounded in scripture, not least in BU 2.4.5, but
Samkaradoes not openly advocate the triple method, for
the reasons we have seen. Rather, he often uses BU
2.4.5 to deconstruct some contemporary interpretations
of it: by rejecting a four-injunctions view (BSBh 1.1.4),
38 See, in this context, his

exegesis of tat tvam asi in BSBh
4.1.2.
39 The BU is a key source for Samkara's understanding of
superimpositionand its removal. See SuthrenHirst 1990: 139f.
It is to a BUBh passage (4.4.25) that Satchidanandendraturns
for Samkara'sexplanation of the "method of superimposition
and elimination" (GBh 13.13) which he considers the true
"method of Vedanta"espoused by Samkara (1989: 41).
by distinguishing repeatable pratyayas from the final

realization (BSBh 4.1.1, BUBh 2.4.5), by refocusing on
scripture and reason/reflection (BSBh 1.1.4, 4.1.2).
We can therefore conclude this section by agreeing
with Halbfass that "in general, the scheme of gravana,
mananaand nididhyasanadoes not play a very significant
part in Samkara'swritings" (1983: 54). We can understand why this is so in terms of Samkara'sprinciples of
scriptural unity, differentiation of knowledge from action, and careful attention to the detailed working of
sabda as a pramana.40 From all this it has become quite
apparentthat of more importancein assessing Samkara's
own method is the duo of scripture and reasoning, the
subject of frequent comments in the Brhadaranyakoto which we now turn.
panisadbhasya,
3.
SCRIPTURE AND REASONING
Whereas Samkaradid not like Bhartrprapanca'sdivision of the Brhaddranyakopanisad
text based on BU
2.4.5, it is to the same verse that he appeals in making

his own interpretation of the upanisad's key structure
and method. In his introduction to the third adhyaya,
Samkara explains that this kanda deals with the same
subject as the previous one (importantin view of the discussion above). But whereas the preceding section was
concerned with scripturalteaching (agama), the present
one is concerned with argument (upapatti). The combination is a powerful one:
For scriptural teaching and rational argument acting
together to illuminate the oneness of the Self are able to
show it clearly, like a bael fruit on the palm of one's hand.
For it is said, "It is to be heard, it is to be reflected on."41
Here, he deliberately selects only these two verbs from
BU 2.4.5 to support his own view on the importance of
scripture and reason acting together. He uses the same
strategy in BSBh 1.1.2 where he is discussing the same
subject at the outset of this commentary on the Vedanta
quest. There Samkara makes the crucial point that the
40 Some scholars,
including Hacker (1949: 8) and Mayeda
(1979: xiii), equate the three chapters of the prose part of the
Upadesasahasri with sravana, manana, and nididhyasana, respectively. Given the above, this may be a sign that their arrangement in that order (though not necessarily their content)
comes from a later hand than Samkara's.
41 BUBh 3.1, intro.: agamopapatti hy atmaikatvaprakdsandya pravrtte saknutah karatalagatabilvam iva darsayitum.
srotavyo mantavya iti hy uktam.

SUTHREN
sole pramana for understanding Brahman is scripture,

whose meaning has to be ascertained by (rational) discussion. Inference in itself is not such a means of
knowledge for Brahman. However, it can be used to
help in this process, so long as it does not contradict the
Vedfnta passages. Samkara feels that he is justified in
taking this view precisely because sruti itself indicates
that human reflection can aid scripture. He quotes "it is
to be heard, it is to be reflected on" and "the person who
has a teacher attains knowledge" to support his point.42
Having established that this principle of the cooperation of scriptureand reason is fundamentalto Samkara's
approach and is seen to be grounded in scripture'sown
teaching, we now returnto the Brhaddranyakopanisadbhdsya to see how Samkara applies the principle in his
exegesis here. According to the introduction to 3.1, the
discussion between Ajatasatru and Gargya on the nature of Brahmanand Yijfiavalkya's teaching to Maitreyi
on the natureof the Self in adhyaya 2 is mainly agama,
scriptureteaching. This will be tested by argument(upapatti) in adhyaya 3, where Yajniavalkyaspars with King
Janaka'sscholars and proves his understandingof Brahman to be superior. By implication, the repetition of the
Maitreyl story in adhyaya 4 will have a similar function.
While upapatti is used here by Samkara in a general
sense for the processes of disputation leading to a conclusion, anumdna, the word used in BSBh 1.1.2, may
have a more precise technical sense. Careful scrutiny
of Samkara's commentary in BUBh 3-4 shows that
Samkara finds anumdna at work here as well.
42 BSBh 1.1.2: vakyarthavicdranadhyavasananirvrttd hi
brahmdvagatir ndnumdnddipramdnantaranirvrttd.satsu tu
veddntavakyesujagato janmddikdranavadisutadarthagrahanadr.dhyaydnumdnam api veddntavdkydvirodhi pramdnam
bhavan na nivaryate, srutyaiva ca sahdyatvena tarkasydbhyupetatvat. tathdhi "srotavyo mantavyah" iti srutih (BU
2.4.5) "pandito medhavi gandhdran evopasampadyetaivam
evehdcaryavdn puruso veda" (Ch U 6.14.2) iti ca purusabuddhisdhdyyamdtmano darsayati. (For understandingBrahmanis
broughtaboutby determiningthe sense of the (Vedanta)passagesby discussionandnot by othermeansof knowledgelike

inference.Butin the case of theVedantapassageson thecause
of theoriginationof theworldandso forth,inferenceis notdeniedas a meansof knowledgeforstrengthening
theascertaining
of their meaning, insofar as it does not contradict the Vedanta
passages. Because reason is even allowed by scriptureas a support to it. So the scripture says, "It is to be heard, it is to be
reflected on,"and "A learned wise person may reach the country
of the Gandharas;just so here the person who has a teacher
attains knowledge" shows the help of human reflection with
respect to the Self.)
67
Anumana (inference), according to different schools,

has either three or five members. The shorter form consists of (i) a thesis (pratijnd) or statement of the case;
(ii) a reason (hetu) for holding this view; and (iii) an
example (d.rstdnta or uddharana) supporting the reason.
The longer form adds (iv) the application (upanaya),
showing that the reason and example apply to the thesis;
and (v) the conclusion (nigamana), restating the thesis,
now established. The standard five-limbed Nyaya example is given in the attached note.43
Samkara uses both forms. In BU 2.5, he actually
quotes from the Nydyasutras, the foundation text of the
logicians, to indicate that "the restatement of a thesis
after stating the reason is the conclusion" (NS 1.1.39).
This is significant since, here, he is proposing a possible
structure to the upanisad's argument, before stating
Bhartrprapafica'srejected alternative. He is also resetting the Nyaya use of inference, since he takes it that,
for Vedanta, its key theses (and therefore also its restatements/conclusions) are scriptural. He is indicating quite
clearly that upanisadic structure is to be understood in
terms of an underlying pattern of inferential argument
which weaves together scripture and reflection, rather
than as a triple movement completed by meditative
injunction. The inferential structure Samkara has in
mind may be constructed as follows:
"All this is just the Self" (Ch U 7.25.2),44
because the Self is the one genus, the Self is
the one source and the Self is the one place of
dissolution (BU 2.4.7-9, 2.4.10, 2.4.11-14),
as in everyday experience things which are
just
(iii)
mutually helpful come from a single cause (BU
2.5, Honey Section).45
(i)
(ii)
43
(i) This mountain is fire-possessing,

(ii) because it is smoke-possessing.
(iii) Whatever is smoke-possessing is fire-possessing like
a kitchen, unlike a lake.
(iv) This mountain, since it possesses smoke, possesses
fire.
(v) This mountain is fire-possessing. (after Potter 1977:
180).
44 Note that this comes from the Chandogya Upanisad, not
the Brhaddranyaka. This is an example of the thesis which is
found "throughoutthe Vedanta."See below.
45 E.g., BU 2.5.1: "This earth is (like) honey [i.e., helpful]
to all beings, and all beings are (like) honey to this earth. (The
same with) the shining immortal being who is in the earth, and
the shining, immortal being in the body. (These four) are but
this Self..."
(Madhavananda's translation with Samkara's
comment in mind).

68
(iv) So the world, which consists of earth and so on,

which are mutually helpful, must come from a
single cause (BU 2.5).46
(v)
Therefore "All this is just the Self" (BU 2.5)47
Samkara explains that the Honey Section either gives

the example (iii) and the application (iv) or it states the
conclusion (v), since it is largely concerned with scriptural teaching (dgama)-that is, rather than with reasoning, which he here associates with (ii). The latter
proposal fits better with his own preferred divisions
given in the introduction to BU 3.1, where adhyaya 2 is
said to be largely (though not exclusively) concerned
with scripturalteaching.
It is clear from this that Samkararegards it as legitimate to look for inferential structures in the upanisad
text itself. It is as a consequence of this that the Vedantin
commentator is justified in using such inferences himself, provided the thesis to be established is scriptural.48
In the following examples from the Brhadaranyakopanisadbhdsya, I shall seek to demonstrate how this
works. First, though, we note that the general principle
we are discussing is laid down in the Brahmasutrabhdsya, too.
This is made clear in BSBh 2.3.6. Here, Samkara indicates that the paradigm type of thesis for Vedantin
46
E.g.,BU 2.5.1"Thisis theSelf ... thisis all."Thispassage
can either be taken as example and application or as the conclusion. Here is Samkara'sexposition of the argumentin full:
tatra ca tarka uktadtmaivedamsarvam iti pratijnatasya [thesis]
hetuvacanam [reason] dtmaikasamanyatvam dtmaikodbhavatvam atmaikapralayatvam ca. tatrdyamrhetur asiddha ity
dsarikyata atmaikasamdnyodbhavapralayakhyas tadasankanivrttyarthametad brahmanamarabhyate.
yasmdt parasparopakaryopakarakabhitam jagat sarvam
prthivyddi. yac ca loke parasparopakaryopakdrakabhitamtad
ekakdranapirvakam ekasdmanyatmaikam ekapralayam ca
drstam. tasmad idam api prthivyddilaksanamjagatparasparopakiropakarakatvattathdbhutambhavitumarhati. esa hy artho
'sminbrahmaneprakdayate[exampleand application].
athava (alternatively)dtmaivedam sarvam iti pratijiatasydthetumuktvapunaragamapradhanenamamotpattisthitilayatvam
dhubrahmanenapratijintasyarthasya nigamanam [conclusion]
kriyate. tathahi naiydyikair uktam "hetvapadesat pratijayadh
punarvacanamnigamanam"iti.
is immortality, this is Brahman,
47 E.g., BU 2.5.1 "...This
this is all," taken by Samkara as applying the example of the
earth, etc., to the original thesis.
48 I have argued this at greater length: see Suthren Hirst
1990.
anumana is that used in the argumentabove: "Indeed all

this is just the Self." Such pratijias on non-difference
are found throughout scripture (prativedantam) and
Samkaragives various examples before spelling out an
argument related to them. (Since there is only one reality, by knowing that reality, all is known.) Significantly, they include BU 4.5.6, "All this is indeed known,
my dear, when the Self is seen, heard, reflected on and
understood."49
Anumana can function at this crucial general level,
which unites scripturaltexts aroundthe universalpratijnia
and thus helps to establish the unitary meaning of scripture, because it is sanctioned by scripture at the local
level. A good example is provided in the section of the
Brhaddranyakopanisadwhich Samkara has categorized
as concerned with argument.BU 4.3 explores the three
states of waking, dreaming,and deep sleep and the Self's
relation to these. A three-memberargumentcan be constructedat the end of 4.3.17 as follows:
"For this infinite Being is unattached"(4.3.16),
because it moves in the three states (argued
through 4.3),
(iii) "like a great fish" (4.3.18).50
(i)
(ii)
When Samkararefers to the great fish which can swim

around freely from bank to bank as a drstanta, he is
using the term in the formal sense of the third member
of an argument. It establishes the pratijna stated two
verses before. Such an argument helps to confirm the
nature of the Self taught earlier in the upanisad, showing that it is unaffected by the world of name and form,
including the three states of consciousness, which is
superimposed on it.
While here Samkara is pointing out the upanisad's
method of using inference, elsewhere he uses inferential
arguments of his own. These are legitimate insofar as
they are based on scriptural practice. In BU 3.5.1, he
argues against an opponent who holds that the Self must
be affected by the contradictory attributes that it possesses. For example, the Self is said both to have hunger
and to be beyond it. Samkara replies, using the opponent's rejected statement as his pratijid:
49 This indirectly supports my argument that Samkara prefers to read BU 2.4.5 and 4.5.6 in terms of these patterns of
scriptureand reflection ratherthan in terms of the triple method,
whose third member may be misinterpreted.
50 BUBh 4.3.17. Note that Samkarauses the wordsadhita ('established') frequently, indicating the context of a formal argument. The paragraphends: tam vistarena pratipadya kevalam
drstantamatramavisistam "tad" vaksamity arabhyate . . .

SUTHREN
HIRST:Samkara's Commentary on Brhadfranyakopanisad
It is not true that the Self possesses contradictory attributesand is adversely affected by them,
(ii) because such attributes are only superimposed,
(iii) like a snake, silver, and blue are superimposed
on a rope, mother-of-pearl, and the sky.51
(i)
We imagine that the sky is blue when really it is clear.

We see a snake where there is only a rope. So we imagine
that attributes like having hunger or not having hunger
belong to the Self, when really it is we who falsely
attribute aspects of the body and mind to the Self. Just
as the rope does not become a snake because I happen
to mistake it for one, so the Self does not become
affected by attributes which we falsely superimpose.
This is the first of three related arguments. The final one takes a scriptural statement once more for its
pratijad:
"It [the Self] is not affected by the misery of the
world" (Ka U 2.2.11),
(ii) because it is not touched by qualities which are
only attributedto it,
(iii) like the blueness and concavity of the sky.52
(i)
From passages like these, we can see clearly how scripture and reason are related for Samkara. Scripture
demonstrates the method of arguing-inference using
examples. It provides statements which are to be used as
theses to be established. It gives examples which clinch
the case. But when one is arguing that case, the case of
non-duality, one does not have to use scriptural assertions and examples for the method to remain scriptural.
So Samkarais careful to avoid quoting from sruti when
he is arguing against an opponent who does not recognize its authority-for example, a Buddhist. Yet his own
employment of anumana remains scriptural, not freestanding (which is necessarily vitiated),53since its case
51 BUBh 3.5.1: [thesis] nanu katham ekasyaivatmano 'sandyddyatitatvam tadvattvam ceti viruddhadharmasamavayitvam
iti na ... [reason]ndmarapavikarakaryakaranalaksanasamghahi samsdritvamity
topadhibhedasamparkajanitabhrdntimatram
asakrd avocdma. [example] yathd rajjusuktikigaganddayah
sarparajatamalind bhavanti parddhydropitadharmaviisitah
svatah kevald eva rajjuguktikdgaganadayah.
52 BUBh 3.5.1: [example] avivekibhis talamalavad iva gaganam gamyamdnameva talamale atyeti paramdrthatas tabhydm
asamsrstasvabhavatvat. [reason] tatha madhair aSanayapipasddimad brahma gamyamanam api ksudito 'hampipdsito 'ham
iti te atyety eva paramarthatas tabhyamasamsrstasvabhdvatvdt
[thesis] "na lipyate lokaduhkhena bdhyah" (KA U 2.2.11) iti
sruteh.
53 See BSBh 2.1.11.
69
and its method stem from sruti. With this is mind, we

turn finally to Samkara'streatment of his opponents in
the Brhaddranyakopanisadbhasya,
choosing as our ex-
ample the Buddhists.

4.
ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE BUDDHISTS
There are several passages in the Brhadiranyakopanisadbhdsya where Samkara dismisses various Buddhist views: on the natureof consciousness (1.4.7, 2.1.15),
the natureof causation (1.2.1, 2.1.10), the teaching of no
Self (2.3.6), rebirth(3.2.13), and liberation as mere cessation (3.2.14).54 In 4.3.7, he refutes Buddhist views at
length. In the following, I shall look at this long refutation, but shall also suggest that Samkara's vocabulary
indicates an undercurrentin the commentarythat asserts
the supremacy of the Advaitin position at a more subtle
level as well.
Given the scope of this article, it is not possible to
discuss in detail the many important and wider issues
concerning Samkara's relationship with the Buddhists
he criticized: the accuracy of his knowledge of their
arguments, the particular targets of his criticism, the
originality of his case, the charge of crypto-Buddhism
recurrently levelled against him.55Rather, what I shall
try to indicate are the various ways in which Samkara
sees his arguments against the Buddhists to be both
scripturallybased, yet appropriateto opponents who do
not accept Vedic authority.
In the Brhaddranyakopanisadbhdsya,
the chief Bud-
dhist opponent, especially in 4.3.7, is the Vijinanavadin,

whose views may well be based on Samkara's understanding of Dharmakirti.56Also addressed are those who
54 1.4.7rejectsthe view of consciousnessas beingbothsubject andobject;2.1.15 is againstthe Yogacaraview of "mere

consciousness";2.1.10 includesa snideremarkthatit is only
with Buddhist philosophy that something turns into something
else; 2.3.6 rejects the view that there is no Self beyond the impressions; 3.2.13 rejects the Buddhist view of rebirth; 4.4.6
states that liberation is not mere cessation, probably rejecting
Samkara'sversion of a Buddhist view.
55
See, for example, Ingalls 1954; Whaling 1979; Nakamura
1976: 75-78; Vetter 1979; Alston 1989: 251-60; Isayeva 1993:
11-16, 52-62, 145-98; Ram Prasad 1993.
56 There is a general consensus that Samkara was familiar
with the teachings of Dharmakirti(c. 650 C.E.),a logician in the
school of Diinaga, and that it is against such teachings
combined with those of the Yogacarathat his criticisms of Vijnfinavada are made. See Ingalls 1954; Vetter 1979: 100, who
claims Samkara was familiar with Dharmakirtipartly because

70
hold that the external world exists (Samkara's characterization of the Sarvastivadins). The Sunyavadins or
Madhyamikas are simply dismissed, as in BSBh 2.2.31.
This is, at least in part, because their dialectical method
denies that any pramana (including inference) can establish a final position. There is then, in Samkara'sview,
no common basis for discussion available. With the
Vijianavadin and Sarvastivadin that common basis is
providedby anumdnaand broaderpatternsof reasoning,
patterns which, for Samkara, are implicitly, if not explicitly, grounded in scripture. Samkara'smotive in criticizing them is clear and surfaces frequently in the way
he summarizes the consequences of his arguments. It is
to show that the Buddhist path is grossly misleading and
to set his pupils' feet firmly on the Vedic path to the
highest good (sreyomarga)-for which read, Advaitin
realization.57
I do not propose to look at Samkara's arguments
in 4.3.7 in detail, but rather to sketch their broad outline and then, once more, to analyze Samkara'smethod.
In this, Ingalls' investigation of Samkara's arguments
against the Buddhists in the Brahmasitrabhdsya will be
of help. Ingalls noted that only two of the arguments
seemed to be original, namely, Samkara's argument
about identity and memory, which challenges the hypothesis of momentariness, and his argument about the
need for a permanentwitness of cognitions (1954: 303).
In BUBh 4.3.7, these are precisely the themes which
form the framework for the whole discussion, though
treated in the reverse order. They are prompted by the
upanisad'sreference to the Self as "the light within the
heart" (hrdy antarjyotih). Note that this verse falls in a
section which Samkaradesignates as mainly concerned
with reasoning. Of course, unlike the Brahmasutra, the
upanisaddoes not argue against specific Buddhist opponents nor commit Samkara to follow earlier interpretations. This means that he is able to make quite close
connections between his two key themes of the witness
and the nature of identity. Subsumed within the first
theme on the need for a witness is a section addressing
Upad P 18.142 quotes his Pramanaviniscaya 2.354. Mayeda
(1979: 200, n.101), followed by Halbfass (1983: 83, n. 180), argues that this is an interpolation. Both still accept that Samkara
was aware of Dharmakirti'steaching. The problem is complicated by the fact that the Pramanaviniscaya is no longer extant
in Sanskritand has to be reconstructedfrom the Tibetan.
On the Sautrantikainfluence on Difinaga and his school, see
Frauwallner 1959: 126.
57 BUBh 4.3.7: sarvd etah
kalpand buddhivijidndvabhasakasya vyatiriktasydtmajyotiso'pahnavddasya sreyomdrgasya
pratipaksabhiit vaidikasya.
those Buddhists who say that there is an external object

or that an external world exists (bahyo 'rtho 'sti). Otherwise, he addresses the Vijnianavadin. This seems to
show quite clearly that Samkara was convinced of the
combined power of these two arguments to undermine
all Buddhist positions, enabling him to incorporateother
minor arguments under their wing.
Initially, Samkara'scommentary on 4.3.7 follows the
standardpatternof an extended gloss explaining the text
itself. This includes quotations from various brahmanas,
other upanisads, and the Bhagavadgita. However, once
the first Buddhist objection is introduced, there is no
furtherreference to sruti or smrti texts, either by quotation or allusion. Samkara tackles the opponent apparently on his own terms, those of formal argument. His
remarkson method here are entirely centered aroundthe
logical implications of his case. We shall examine two
key aspects of his method: first, its appeal to the formal
steps of argument as outlined above; and, second,
Samkara'sclever and subtle play with language, including the Buddhists' own terms, to underline the absurdity
of the Buddhist case as he sees it. With each aspect, we
shall note how it is implicitly grounded in scripture.
As in the argument on the Self being the single
source of all that exists, which was laid out above, it is
possible to reconstruct the members of formal arguments in BUBh 4.3.7. Here is an example from the section where Samkarais trying to establish the need for a
permanent Self to witness cognitions. The opponent
rejoins that this would lead to an infinite regress, since
there would be a further need for a witness to be conscious of this Self and so on. Samkara's pratijia is
essentially a reformulation of the opponent's rejected
position:
It is not always the case that if b reveals a, c is
needed to reveal b (and hence that there is an
infinite regress),
(ii) because different situations are seen to exist
(vaicitryadarsandt),
(iii) as in the following examples: to see a jar (via
the eye) the perceiving self requires the additional means of a lamp for light; to see a lamp
(via the eye) no additional means is needed.
(iv) So no general rule can be deduced.
(v) Therefore it is not the case that there is an
infinite regress, if the Self, b, is held to reveal the
(i)
contents of consciousness
(vijnana), a.58
58 BUBh 4.3.7:
(i) vijiinnasya vyatiriktagrahyatve karandntardpeksayam
anavastheti cet. na [referring to opponent's contention about

SUTHREN
Samkaraconcludes that the existence of the light of the

Self separatefrom cognitions is thereby established (siddha), that is, by the logic of the argument.59
This is not one of his strongeressays of reasoning. At
least in moder terms, his example rests on an equivocation between the lamp as lamp and the lamp as source
of light. The steps, however, are clear and the following points may be made. The firsthas to do with the valid
means of knowledge (pramdna). The reason (ii) in the
above argumentis, at least purportedly,based on senseperception; difference is observed (darsanat). For Samkara, where knowledge of the conventional world is
concerned, pratyaksa as a pramdna takes priority over
inference (anumdna). He emphasizes this point in the
section on identity.When you see a woman after a while,
you recognize that her hair and nails are similar, though
not identical, to the hair and nails she displayed on the
previous occasion. By contrast, when you see most objects, like jars, after an interval, you recognize them as
the identical objects you saw before. Thus the hair and
nails example cannot be used to support the Vijfinavadin's argumentthatobjects are constructionsfrom a series
infinite regress]. niyamabhavat[because there is no such restriction]. na hi sarvdtriyam niyamo bhavati [for this restriction
does not universally apply].
(ii) vaicitryadarsandt[becausedifferencesare seen to exist].
(iii) ghatas tdvatsvdtmavyatiriktendtmand
grhyate tatrapradipddir aloko grahyagrahakavyatiriktamkaranam[inasmuchas
a jar is perceived by the self by means which are different from
itself, for a light source such as a lamp is a cause which is separate from what is cognized and from the cognizer] ... ghatavac
caksur grahyatve 'pi pradipasya caksuh pradipavyatirekena
na bdhyam dlokasthaniyam kimcit karandntaramapeksate [although the lamp is like the jar inasmuch as it is perceived by the
eye, the eye depends on no external source of light (unlike the
case of the jar), no other cause at all separate from the lamp].
(iv) tasmdn naiva niyantum sakyate yatra yatra vyatiriktagrahakagrahyatvamtatra tatra karandntaramsydd eveti [therefore it is certainly not possible to make a restriction which says
that wherever the object of cognition is perceived by a separate
cognizer there should be a separate cause].
(v) tasmddvijndnasyavyatiriktagrahakagrahyatvena karanadvdrdnavasthdndpi grahakadvdrd kadacid apy upapddayiturn akyate [therefore,if consciousness is the object of cognition
of a cognizer separatefrom that object, it is not possible to maintain that there will be an infinite regress in any case, caused
either because anothercause is needed or because it is a cognizer
itself].
59 Ibid.: tasmdd siddham vijidnavyatiriktam dtmajyotir antaram iti.
71
of similar moments (comparable with the growing hair

and nails) and have no permanentidentity. In Samkara's
view, this is making inference (anumana) about objects
contradict normal sense-perception (pratyaksa) of objects. A fallacy is thus involved.60Samkara,of course,
takes a common-sense view of perceptionhere, precisely
the position the Buddhist tries to deconstruct.
The prime role of example (drstanta) in inference is
clear from the foregoing. It is a frequent charge against
the Buddhist that his argument lacks a proper drstanta.
Since objects like pots are not self-illuminating, Samkara maintains in another place, the Buddhist has no
example to support the argument that cognitions are
self-illuminating. Samkaradisallows the example of the
lamp, which he himself uses as an example of a light
source in the five-member argumentwe just considered,
on the grounds that the lamp needs consciousness in turn
to illumine it. This is obviously unhelpful, since Samkara makes the very assumption which the Buddhist argument rejects. There are other instances where Samkara
cites the lack of example as the reason for the failure of
the Buddhist'scase more successfully. The point is, however, that, at least in Samkara'spresentation, he and his
opponent meet on equal grounds accepting that the
drstanta can be the crux of an argument.61
This is where Samkara plays what seems to be his
trump card. Where he is content to take a pragmatic
view of sense-experience, the Buddhist is trying to reanalyze it. Yet the Buddhist continues to use the distinctions of empirical experience as a source of examples.
He speaks of dream as like waking consciousness,
thereby implying that there are grounds for differentiating the two. The grounds, says Samkara, are the existence of a cognizer who is other than that which is
cognized, moving somewhat swiftly from an argument
directed to establishing the existence of external objects
to one establishing a separate cognizer. The Buddhist
cannot deny the existence of this cognizer, on the basis
of his own language use, because no argument exists
(nydaybhdvdt)which can accomplish such a denial.62It
60 Ibid.:
pratyaksena hi pratyabhijniyamdne vastuni tad eveti
na cdnyatvam anumdtum yuktam pratyaksavirodhe lingasya
dbhasatvopapatteh.
61 Cf. the opponent'scharge that Samkarahas no example for
his contention that there is a light beyond vijidna, ibid.: ...
tasmdn nasti bdhyo 'rtho ghatapradipadir vijinnamdtram eva
tu sarvam. tatra yad uktam vijiinasya vyatiriktavabhdsyatvdd
vijnanavyatiriktam asti jyotir antaram ghatdder iveti tan
mithyd. sarvasya vijndnamdtratvedrstdntabhdvdt.
62 Ibid.: na tu tan nivartayitum sakyate. tannivartakanydydbhavdt.

72
is not just that the argument has failed in this case, but
that Buddhist language use in the end militates against
the success of any argument which tries to demonstrate
the non-existence of the difference of objects from consciousness (and one another) on the basis of examples
from a differenced world.63
We can see even from the few indications just given
that Samkara'smethod of employing formal argument
against the Buddhists presses every aspect of its form.64
However, as we saw in the previous section, that form,
properly understood, is upanisadically derived. Similarly grounded is Samkara'slanguage, some subtleties
of which we now examine.
In seeking to demonstratethe internal incoherence of
the Buddhist view, Saamkaracontends that the teaching
on svasamvedana criticized above is incompatible with
other Buddhisttenets such as impermanence,"suffering,"
emptiness, and there being no Self. To establish this, he
argues as follows. Since the propernature(svabhdvya)of
cognition (vijidna) is simply pure awareness and manifestation (svacchavabodhavabhdsamatra)(on the Buddhist's own admission, using the Buddhist's own terms)
and since no other witness exists, multiple mental constructions of that cognition, such as impermanence, are
(logically) improper (-anekakalpandnupapattih).65The
word aneka suggests that these constructions are improper because they are multiple (whereas vijiana, in
63 We are
usually conscious of objects, ratherthan of cogni-
tions of objects. Yet we can distinguish between objects and

cognitions of objects, as when we rememberthat we have seen
something but are unable to rememberprecisely what it is. This
suggests that objects and particular cognitions of objects are
different, both from one another and from the permanent witnessing consciousness (pure awareness, cognition [singular]),
which has (changing) cognitions of (different) objects.
64 At the seminar at which this paper was originally given,
ChakravarthiRam Prasad pointed out that I might have given
the impression that Samkara'sarguments on this topic were all
ineffective. This was not my intention. For further consideration of the issue, see Ram Prasad 1993.
65 BUBh 4.3.7: sarvasya ca svasamvedyavijidnamdtratvevijnanasya ca svacchdvabodhavabhasamatrasvabhdvydbhyupagamdt taddarsinas ca anyasyabhdve 'nityaduhkhasunyandtmatvadyanekakalpandnupapattih. Madhavananda translates
svacchavabodhavabhdsamdtrasvdbhdvyaas "by nature but the
reflection of pellucid knowledge." Alston (1989: 297) gives
"the natureof pure awareness and light as its essence." Madhavananda must be closer. Avabhasa is surely a technical term
here for cognition appearing as if it has form yet does not
really. See Matilal 1986: 187, quoting Vasubandhu using
avabhdsana.
Samkara'sview, is single) and they are different in nature from pure awareness. Thus, though his criticism is
overtly directed at the self-contradictory nature of the
Buddhist's own position, his vocabulary signals clearly
the upanisadic Advaitin correction necessary. The critical difference between Samkara'sown Advaitin position
on empirical multiplicity and the Buddhist's is, in his
view, his acceptance of a permanentSelf on which such
difference can be superimposed, thus not compromising the nature of the pure Self, which is prajiinaghana (BU 4.5.13)-the proper way of characterizing
consciousness.
Even more subtle is the way Samkara reworks technical Buddhist vocabulary to undermine his opponent's
case and establish his own. Three examples follow,
each drawing on terms principally associated with the
Madhyamaka tradition, though Samkara does not confine their usage to his brief rebuffs of that school. It
seems to me not incidental that he chooses Madhyamaka terms here and that he shows how their correct
use is upanisadically grounded. As Shlomo Biderman
observes, Samkara is emotionally closest to the Madhyamikas (1978: 405-13). His teaching on ultimate and
conventional truth bears strong resemblance to theirs.
His adamant denial that ultimate reality can be characterized in any way can easily be given a Madhyamaka
reading. His very vocabulary on the constructed nature
of the conventional world has a similar range to theirs.
He may engage in no long discussion with them for
both overtly epistemological and covertly psychological reasons, but it is inaccurate to suggest that he simply avoids the issue. In the following, I shall try to
show the subtle ways he approaches it in the Brhadaranyakopanisadbhdsya.
The method of prasanga or reductio ad absurdumwas
particularly characteristic of the Madhyamikas, though
others used it as well. Samkara not only employs this
method himself but adopts forms of the verb praVsanj
to indicate the damaging corollaries of Buddhist positions as he sees them. Thus he compares the Buddhist
who claims to be able to recognize similarity in the
absence of a permanentsubject with a blind person who
discourses on the differences between colors and expatiates on what they are like. In this case,
everything including the composing of scriptureby the
omniscient one [i.e., the Buddha] would be reduced to
the absurdity(prasajyeta) of a tradition of blind people
and this is not desired [by Buddhists].66
66
BUBh 4.3.7: sarvam andhaparamparetiprasajyeta sarvajnasdstrapranayanadi na caitad isyate.

SUTHREN
HIRST:
Samkara's Commentary on Brhadaranyakopanisad
Note the irony in his use of a standardterm for the Buddha, sarvajna, 'the omniscient one'.
It is not only his comparison which suggests the metaphor of a tradition of the (spiritually) blind. The phrase
occurs again later, in connection with another term
with which Samkara plays: sunya, 'void' or 'empty', in
Madhyamakaapplying to the nature of reality. Samkara
argues that, if there is no external object to defile pure
consciousness, the whole idea of defilement and purification is understood to be "simply a tradition of the
blind, which is devoid of valid means of knowledge
(pramanaasnyeti)."67
Rather than accepting that gsnyatd
describes how things really are (empty of inherent

existence), Samkara implies that the Buddhist position
is vacuous because it does not use the accepted means
of knowledge properly. It is surely no accident that
Samkarauses the word sunya here. A comparison of his
vocabulary in other works shows that he generally
chooses this particularadjective or related words (rather
than, for example, varjita or nirasta) in contexts where
he considers the opponent's means and/or goal to be
void, because entailing the absence of a permanent
Self.68 This suggests a conscious and ironic use in this
case, too. Moreover, the tradition of the blind (andhaparampard) is implicitly contrasted with "those who
67 Ibid.: tasmad
anityasamsargena malimatvam tadvisud-
dhis ca vijiinasyetiyam kalpandndhaparamparaivapramdnasunyety avagamyate.

68 E.g., BSBh 3.2.2, Upad P 18.62.
In BSBh,Samkara's
use of iunyaandrelatedtermsis very infrequent,limited to referenceto the Sunyavada(Madhyamaka) school (2.3.31) or to cases where the view of an
opponent(Buddhist:1.1.1, 3.2.2, or Naiyayika:2.2.41, 2.3.7)
entailsthe absenceof a permanentSelf, in his view. 3.2.2 is a
discussionof neti neti (BU 2.3.7). It emphasizesthatwhatis
deniedof Brahmanis simplyall pluralityof forms,not Brahman itself, which wouldinvolve sunyavddaprasanga.
In this
context,this is probablya referenceto Buddhistattitudesto
conventionalandultimatetruth.
In UpadP, metreseemsto dictatethe choice of asnyaas
muchas irony(cf. 14.22and 14.23).However,18.62says that
the Vedawhich is pramdnawouldnot consentto gatisunya.
Thisis in replyto Materialistswho assertthatthereis no Self
andbeforea long argumentwithBuddhists.Alstontranslates:
"TheVeda .. does not speakin insolubleriddles";Mayeda:
"doesnot makeany useless [words]".Samkarasurelyexploits
the doublemeaningof asnyaandhintfromgati thathe is talking abouta pathof liberationto affirmthatthe authorityof the
Vedasis not vacuousnordoes it teachthe absenceof Self. A
similar double entendreseems to lie behind the usage in
BUBh 4.3.7.
know the (true) tradition" (sampraddyavidah),
73
who
through story and scripture teach the proper liberating

nature of the supreme Self (BUBh 2.1.20). Buddhist
teaching lines go back to the multiple and confusing
teachings of the Buddha. By contrast, the upanisad's
own lines of teachers (dcdryaparampard)are grounded
in the "self-born brahman,"whether interpretedas ultimate reality or the eternal Veda (BUBh 2.6.3, 6.5.3).
My final linguistic example comes in Samkara's
treatment of the famous neti neti passage in BU 2.3.6
and is a little more contentious. Without doubt, this
passage is at the heart of Samkara'sinterpretationof the
upanisad. He argues that all terms, including vijndnam
dnandam brahma ("Brahman is consciousness, bliss,"
2.11.28) and the words brahman and dtman themselves,
are superimposed on Brahman's true nature. In itself,
this is beyond the purchase of all language, which is
necessarily based on differentiations of various kinds.
When absolutely all limiting adjuncts have been denied
of Brahman,then comes the realization, "I am Brahman,
the Truthof truth, like a block of salt, homogeneous, a
mass of consciousness, without inside or outside."69It
is, of course, a realization which is beyond even this
scriptural allusion and metaphor. As Samkara puts it,
"understanding (pra-jnd) becomes fixed on the Self
alone." While constancy, in both its senses, is clearly
intimated, the key question is what Samkara means by
prajnd here-which Madhavanandatranslates as "intellect," indicating a mental faculty.
This is certainly a sense prajna carries (cf. Upad P
14.33), but it can also indicate final realization (cf. prajnana, which refers to the natureof Brahmanas pureconsciousness, cf. BU 4.5.13).70 In BUBh 2.3.6, there is
almost certainly an allusion to the prajnd of BU 4.4.21,
which comes through scripture and teacher and upanisadically groundedrenunciation,calmness, self-restraint,
sense control, endurance, and concentration-but is
different from them (BUBh 4.4.21; also discussed in
69 BUBh 2.3.6: adhydropitandmarupakarmadvarenabrahma
nirdiSyate vijnanamdnandam brahma vijidnaghana eva brahmdtmety evamadisabdaih ... yadd tu sarvadikkalddivividisd
nivartitd sydt sarvopadhinirakaranadvdrenatadd saindhavaghanavad ekarasam prajfidnaghanam anantaram abdhyam
satyasya satyam aham brahmdsmiti sarvato nivartate vividisdtmany evdvasthita prajii bhavati (cf. 2.4.12, 1.4.10, as well
as 2.3.6).
70 The ambiguitycan be seen in the differenttranslations
of Upad G 1.43 (Jagadananda,

Mayeda,Alston, following
Ramatirtha's
gloss, buddhi,all give "intellect")and Upad P
14.33 (Jaganananda
Alston
"intellect,"Mayeda"knowledge,"
"intuition").

74
BUBh 1.4.7). I suggest, then, that, in BUBh 2.3.6, prajii

is clearly intended to intimate the realization of the true
natureof Brahman,a realization which in Advaitin terms
finally transcendsthe differentiationof the psychophysical organism.71I suggest furtherthat Samkaraalso uses
the term here subtly to indicate the truthof the Advaitin
realization by contrast with the false prajnii of the Buddhist, a wisdom which denies the Self (not just the label
atman) and is a function merely of a mental process.
Whereas Buddhist negations terminate in a void, Samkaramay be suggesting, Advaitin negations culminate in
the supremeBrahman,the Truthof truth.72Perhapsat the
heartof his commentary,while affirmingscripturalrealization at its deepest, Samkarais quietly repudiatingthe
world-view which is so similar to, yet the very antithesis
of, his own.
5.
Certainlyprajia is said to be "fixed on" the Self, implying
"intellect."
Howdifference
andhencejustifyingMadhavananda's
ever, we are back here to the problemRambachansoughtto
tackle in identifying nididhydsana with brahmajiina: how to
speakof thefinalrealizationin coherentmentaltermsapplicable

in this life.
72
Saikarawithdrawsultimatelyfrom the open arenaof

philosophicaldebate, which the philosophersof the
in particular,Kumarila,hadenteredso
Purvamimamsa,
resolutely.(1991:36)
CONCLUSION
It is possible to read Samkara'sstrategies of interpretation in the Brhaddranyakopanisadbhasyaas an expression of his mature views on the relation between
71
scriptureand reason. This two-fold distinction was shown

to be importantin the first part of the paper, which discussed Sanmkara's
reflections on and applications of the
upanisad'smethod, as he saw it. I have also intimatedthat
it underlies his treatmentof the Buddhists, which at one
level seems only concerned with reason, but at another
is fundamentally rooted in scripture. It must challenge
the (Western-influencedand anachronistic) approach to
Samkara which sees him as "a philosopher not a mere
theologian,"73using texts only as pretexts in orderto conform with the expectations of his day. Perhapsnot all will
wish to go as far as Halbfass when he states that, with his
radical commitment to Vedic revelation,
Cf. his opening of Upad P 18, a chapter in which discus-
that
sions with Buddhistsfeaturelarge:"If the understanding
I amever-free,the only reality,couldnot arise,whatwouldbe
the pointof scripture's
teachingthatzealouslylike a mother?"
Nonetheless, close study of this major commentary

shows clearly the primacy of scripture for Samkara.
However, this does not mean that rigorous reflection is
rejected in favor of an uncritical espousal of texts as selfevident, nor that it is replaced by some kind of ethereal
experience which despises rationality. Rather, precisely
because it is sanctioned and employed by the compassionate scripture itself, scripturally grounded reflection
is an essential part of the saving path to liberation. But
in the realization of the nityasuddhabuddhamuktaSelf,
both scripture and reason are transcended.
73 Brooks1968: 17.
REFERENCES
PRIMARYSOURCESIN SANSKRITWITHABBREVIATIONS
BUBh
Brhadairanyakopanisat, Anandagiritlkasamvalitasadmkarabhasyasameta.1902. AnandasramaSanskrit
Press.
Series,no. 1. Poona:Anandasrama
BSBh
Brahmasutram, Sdikarabhdsyopetam. 1990. Delhi:
MotilalBanarsidass.
Ch U
Chdndogyopanisat in Ten Principal Upanisads with
Sadkarabhisya.1987.Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass.
Ka U
Kathopanisat in Ten Principal Upanisads with Sad-
karabhasya.1987.Delhi:MotilalBanarsidass.
Upad G Upadesasahasri, Gadyabandha,in Sankara's Upade-
sasahasrl.1973. Criticallyeditedwith introduction

andindicesby SengakuMayeda.Tokyo:The HokuseidoPress.
Upad P Upadesasahasri, Padyabandha(as above)

CITEDOR DISCUSSED
TRANSLATIONS
Alston, A. J. 1990. The Thousand Teachings(Upadesa Sdhasri)

of Sri Samkaracarya. London: Shanti Sadan.
Hacker, Paul. 1949. Upadesasdhasri von Meister Shankara,aus
dem Sanskrit ubersetzt und erliutert. Bonn: Rohrscheid
Verlag.
Hume, R. E. 1931. The Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Translated from the Sanskrit with an Outline of the Philosophy
of the Upanishads. Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press. [2nd ed.
rev.; rpt., 1971.]
Jagadananda. 1961. A Thousand Teachings-in Two PartsProse and Poetry-of Sri Sankaraichirya.3rd ed. Madras:
Sri RamakrishnaMath.

SUTHREN
Madhavananda. 1975. The Brhadaranyaka Upanisad with the

Commentaryof Sankardcarya. 5th ed. Calcutta: Advaita
Ashrama.
Mayeda, Sengaku. 1979. A Thousand Teachings: The UpadeSasdhasri of Sankara, Translated with an Introduction
and Notes. Tokyo: Univ. of Tokyo Press.
Nikhilananda. 1974. Vedantasdraor the Essence of Vedantaof
Sadananda Yogindra.6th ed. Calcutta:Advaita Ashrama.
Radhakrishnan,S. 1953. The Principal Upanisads, Edited with
Introduction,Text,Translationand Notes. London: George
Allen & Unwin.
SECONDARYSOURCES
Alston, A. J. 1989. Samkara on Rival Views. London: Shanti

Sadan.
Bader, Jonathan. 1990. Meditation in Saikara's Vedanta.Delhi:
Aditya Prakashan.
Biardeau, Madeleine. 1959. "Quelques r6flexions sur l'apophatisme de Safkara." Indo-lranian Journal 3:81 - 101.
Biderman, Shlomo. 1978. "Safikaraand the Buddhists." Journal of Indian Philosophy 6:405-13.
Brooks, R. W. 1968. "The Rope and the Snake: An Investigation of the Concept of Adhyasa (Superimposition) in
Advaita Vedanta."Ph.D. diss., Univ. of Minnesota.
Brickner, Heidrun. 1979. ZumBeweisverfahrenSamkaras:Eine
Untersuchung der Form and Funktion von drstantas im
Brhadaranyakopanisadbhdsyaund im Chdndogyopanisadbhasya des Samkara Bhagavatpdda. Berlin: Dietrich
Reimer.
Clooney, Francis X. 1993. Theology after Vedanta:An Experiment in Comparative Theology. Albany: State University
of New York Press.
Dasgupta, Surendranath. 1922. A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. 1. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass. Reprint 1988.
Frauwallner, E. 1959. "Dignaga, sein Werk und sein Entwicklung." Wiener Zeitschrift fir die Kunde Sid- und OstAsiens 3:83-164.
Hacker, Paul. 1968. "Sankarader Yogin und Safikarader Advaitin: Einige Beobachtungen." WienerZeitschriftfiir die
Kunde Sud- und Ost-Asiens 12-13:119-48.
75
Halbfass, Wilhelm. 1980. Review of Sengaku Mayeda,A Thousand Teachings: The Upadesasdhasri of Sankara. Journal
of the American Oriental Society 100:43-45.
.1983. Studies in Kumarila and Sankara. Studien zur
Indologie und Iranistik,Monographie 9. Reinbek: Dr Inge
Wezler.
.1991. Traditionand Reflection: Explorations in Indian
Thought. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press.
Ingalls, Daniel H. H. 1954. "Samkara'sArguments against the
Buddhists." Philosophy East and West 3:291-306.
Isayeva, Natalia. 1993. Shankara and Indian Philosophy. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press.
Matilal, Bimal K. 1986. Perception: An Essay on Classical
Indian Theories of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Nakamura,Hajime. 1976. A History of Early VedantaPhilosophy. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Potter, Karl, ed. 1977. The Traditionof Nyaya-Vaisesika up to
Gargesa. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 2.
New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
1981. Advaita Vedantaup to Samkaraand His Pupils.
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, vol. 3. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press.
Rambachan, Anantanand. 1991. Accomplishing the Accomplished: The Vedas as a Source of Valid Knowledge of
Sahkara. Monographs of the Society for Asian and
Comparative Philosophy, no. 10. Honolulu: Univ. of
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Ram Prasad, Chakravarthi. 1993. "Dreams and Reality: The
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SatchidanandendraSarasvati. 1989. The Method of the Vedanta:
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Suthren Hirst, J. G. 1990. "The Place of Teaching Techniques
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Strategies of Interpretation: akara's Commentary on Bhadrayakopaniad

Author(s): Jacqueline Suthren Hirst

This content downloaded from 185.44.79.40 on Sun, 15 Jun 2014 04:10:00 AM

Its importance to Samkara can be indicated in various

THE AIM OF THIS ARTICLEis to explore Samkara's theo-

logical method with reference to one of his greatest, yet

4 See SengakuMayeda1979:42-44. Mayedaarguesthatthe

1.1 Choice of Commentary

6 E.g., the clarity and assurance of the introduction; greater

The Brhaddranyakopanisadis a very importanttext,

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HIRST:Samkara's Commentary on Brhadaranyakopanisad

tion, then, from the earliest times, has regarded it as an

is, however, also impor-

tant in the wider Advaitin tradition. From 2.4.5 and its

read introductory books in Sanskrit for the study of

yasana as necessary preparations for realization.9 A

7 I.e., the one possessing

It is clear that one reason for the method's centrality

and this scheme (1953:

SRAVANA, MANANA, AND NIDIDHYASANA

As soon as we turn to Samkara's commentary, it

adds samadhito the list. In practice,the subjectis never as

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 116.1 (1996)

functions as a unity; his fundamentaldistinction between

Theonenessof the Self is boththegoal andthereferentof the

catesthatthe unityof the Vedicpassageis to be understoodas

The Brhaddranyaka contains

instances of both, at least in Samkara'sreckoning. This

demands of polemic require,this preparatorymeditation

"5 BSBh 1. 1.4.

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This is what Samkararejects. He is not objecting, as such,

Since the focus of nididhyasana is the Self which is to

In any case, with respectto reasoning,thatwhichis to

2.5, intro.: anyair vydkhyatama dundubhidrstantac

The Sanskrit reads:

first line cited, there are four parallel words: drastavyah

19Samkaradoes not wish to do this,becausehe understands

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 116.1 (1996)

heard (srotavya), is to be reflected on (mantavya), is to

throughtheir working together or unity (ekatva) that the

It is at this point that we must examine more closely

drastavyddisabddapi paravidyadhikdrapathitas tattvabhimukhikaranapradhanana tattvavabodhavidhipradhand bhavanti.

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HIRST:Samkara's Commentary on Brhadaranyakopanisad

by ambiguity. We shall see that this tension is related

'should be... steadfastly meditated upon'. We could

The advantage of accepting our last suggestion (and the

E.g., BSBh 4.1.1-4.1.2.

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 116.1 (1996)

meditation or knowledge of it the subject of an original

vijiinam iti. etasminn arthe vacanany api "vijndya prajinam

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HIRST:Samkara's Commentary on Brhadaranyakopanisad

and mental events, which Rambachan's final position

Ramanuja,of course, holds that this is inevitable and why

dhydyati prositanathd patim iti ya nirantarasmarand patim

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Journal of the American Oriental Society 116.1 (1996)