Nigeria 2015: Analysis of Election Issues and Future Prospects

Nigeria 2015: analysis of election issues
and future prospects

RESEARCH PAPER 15/02 19 January 2015
This paper looks at the multiple challenges facing Nigeria as it prepares for presidential
and legislative elections on 14 February 2015.
These elections will take place amidst an atmosphere of even greater crisis and
uncertainty than usual. Boko Harams insurgency in the north of the country continues
unabated. Over the last year, President Goodluck Jonathan and the ruling Peoples
Democratic Party have been accused of a complacent and incompetent response to the
insurgency.
These developments, combined with deep divisions within the countrys elite, have
resurrected old fears that the country might break up if the election aftermath is poorly
handled.
However, some observers remain remarkably hopeful about Nigerias future, predicting
that its enormous economic potential is on the verge of being realised at last.
The paper surveys the coming elections and then explores these hopes and fears about
Nigerias future. It goes on to describe Nigerias relationships with the US, UK, EU, China
and India before ending with a detailed country profile of Nigeria.
I sorry sorry o, I sorry for Nigeria song lyric by Femi Kuti
We know our time will come Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala
Jon Lunn and Daniel Harari
Recent Research Papers

14/60
14/61
14/62
14/63
14/64
14/65
14/66
14/67
14/68
Unemployment by Constituency, November 2014

Privatisation
Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill: Committee Stage
Report
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill [Bill 127 of 2014-15]
Economic Indicators, December 2014
Infrastructure Bill [HL] [Bill 124 of 2014-15]
Unemployment by Constituency, December 2014
Serious Crime Bill [Bill 116 of 2014-15]
Mutuals Deferred Shares Bill [HL] [Bill 145 of 2014-15]
12.11.14
18.11.14
17.11.14
Economic Indicators, January 2015
06.01.15
27.11.14
02.12.14
04.12.14
17.12.14
18.12.14
29.12.14
2015
15/01
Research Paper 15/02

Contributing Authors:
Rob Page, sections 3.1-3.3 and 4.4

Louisa Brooke-Holland, section 4.7
Ben Smith, section 4.11
Matthew Ward, sections 2.2, 3.1-3.3 and 4.5
This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary

duties and is not intended to address the specific circumstances of any particular individual.
It should not be relied upon as being up to date; the law or policies may have changed since
it was last updated; and it should not be relied upon as legal or professional advice or as a
substitute for it. A suitably qualified professional should be consulted if specific advice or
information is required.
This information is provided subject to our general terms and conditions which are available
online or may be provided on request in hard copy. Authors are available to discuss the
content of this briefing with Members and their staff, but not with the general public.
We welcome comments on our papers; these should be e-mailed to papers@parliament.uk.
ISSN 1368-8456
Contents
1
Summary
Nigerian elections 2015: an update
1.1
Outcome of the 2011 elections
Map of the presidential election result
Build up to 2015 elections
2013: Jonathan on the back foot
2014: the PDP and APC trade blows
December 2014: the PDP and APC Conventions
Aspects of the 2015 election campaign
1.2
1.3
10
Jonathans record in office
10
An incumbency factor?
12
A second-round?
12
Will the APC be allowed to win?
12
Future prospects
13
2.1
Can Nigeria hold together?
13
2015: the nightmare scenario
13
Understanding Nigerias current political settlement
14
The 2014 National Conference: an opportunity for reform?
17
Prospects for a better political settlement
19
Conclusion
22
Is Nigeria an emerging economic giant?
23
Member of the MINT club
23
Current economic situation uncertain
24
The need to become less dependent on the oil sector
24
Young population expanding rapidly presents opportunity for growth
26
High poverty levels and poor education skills present barriers
26
Poor business environment and infrastructure hinders growth prospects
27
Conclusion
30
2.2
Will President Jonathan win again?
Nigerias foreign relations
30
3.1
US-Nigeria relations
30
Overview
30
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
Security
30
Trade
32
Aid
33
UK-Nigeria relations
33
Overview
33
Security
34
Trade
35
Aid
36
EU-Nigeria relations
37
Overview
37
Security
38
Trade
38
Aid
39
China-Nigeria relations
39
Overview
39
Strategic Partnership
40
Trade
40
Facets of the relationship
41
India-Nigeria relations
41
Overview
41
Trade
42
42
Nigeria: country profile
44
4.1
History
44
4.2
The people of Nigeria
45
Population, ethnicity and language
45
Violence and insecurity
45
Public and private realms
45
Religion
46
Rising fundamentalisms
46
Human rights
47
Brutality and corruption
47
Impunity the norm
47
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
Positive developments since 1999
48
Ethnic and religious violence since 1999
48
Insurgency and terrorism in the Niger Delta and north-east
48
Police abuses
50
Homophobia
50
Election violence
50
Human development
51
Progress against MDG indicators: positives
51
Performance against MDG indicators: negatives
51
Spatial disparities
53
Economic profile
53
Background
53
Largest economy in Africa is more diverse than previously thought
54
Non-oil sectors behind growth in 2013 and 2014
55
Trade crucially dependent on oil exports
55
Fall in oil price dampens near-term economic outlook
57
Political profile
59
Constitution
59
Government
59
Parliament
60
Judiciary and legal systems
60
Main political parties
61
Political leaders
62
The Nigerian military
65
Overview
65
Equipment
65
Combating Boko Haram
66
Rise of vigilante groups
66
International support
67
Niger Delta and piracy
67
Armed militant groups
68
Boko Haram
68
Ansaru
71
4.9
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
71
The Nigerian diaspora
72
Size, location and character
72
Remittances
73
Nigerian government policies
73
A new unity?
74
The Nigerian diaspora in the UK and US
75
4.10 Membership of international and regional organisations
75
The United Nations (UN)
75
The African Union (AU)
76
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
76
The Commonwealth
77
The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)
77
Other organisations
77
4.11 Selected treaty ratifications
78
Select bibliography and web sources
81
5.1
Books
81
5.2
Journals, articles and reports
81
5.3
Web sources
83
Official sources
83
Statistics and economic indicators
84
Other sources
84
i Nkonni
Birn
Maradi
N I G E R
Wurno
SOKOTO
Gusau
KEBBI
Koko
Yelwa
Kainj
Reservoir
Kontagora
Zaria
BAUCHI
un
NIGER
Minna
Kisi
Bida
m
Qu
Ilorin
OYO
Oyo
Abeokuta
Ikeja
ONDO
La
Auchi
Benin City Asaba
DELTA
Yenagoa
er
BAYELSA
el
Map No. 4228 Rev. 1 UNITED NATIONS

August 2014
Lau
Pala
CHAD
Bnou
Yola
Jalingo
Lr
Garoua
Numan
NASARAWA
Ganye
ta
TARABA
Ibi
Ankpa
NIGERIA
Tungo
Kontcha
Bali
ENUGU
Enugu
Abakaliki
Owerri
Port
Harcourt
Ngaoundr
Takum
Ikom
Bamenda
CROSS
RIVER
Uyo
Gembu
Lake
Bamendjing
National capital
State capital
Town, village
Major airport
International boundary
State boundary
Highway
Main road
Railroad
Banyo
am
Mb
Foumban
Umuahia
Aba
Abong
Nkambe
Ogoja
Awka EBONYI
A
IMO ABIA
Gboko
Katsina Ala
Oturkpo
RIVERS
Nig
The boundaries and names shown and the designations

used on this map do not imply official endorsement or
acceptance by the United Nations.
s
O n it
Sapele
Warri
Gu l f o f G uinea
Guider
Bafoussam
Yoko
CAMEROON
Nikongsamba
Calabar
AKWA
IBOM
Oron
B i ght of B i af ra
a
nag
Sa0
50
100
150
C.A.R.
Big h t o f Beni n
Mubi
Makurdi
BR
go
Amper
Kwolla
BENUE
EDO
Ore
LAGOS
PortoNovo
Gombi
ADAMAWA
Wukari
ANA M
Ilaro OGUN
Cotonou
Owo
Ondo
Maroua
GOMBE
PLATEAU
KOGI
Ado-Ekiti
Akure
OSUN
Bohicon
Lokoja
Osogbo EKITI
Ife
Mokolo
Biliri
Benue
Ni g e r
Iwo
Ibadan
Limani
Mora
Lafia
Ogbomosho
Iseyin
Backi
Biu
Gombe
Abuja
FEDERAL
Baro CAPITAL
TERRITORY
ds Bama
Chibok
Kanfanchan
Badeggi
Shaki
Ye
Bajoga
a Jos
Pankshin
Nige
r
Dikwa
Damboa
Bauchi
Parakou
KWARA
Maiduguri
Damaturu
Azare
N'Djamena
BORNO
YOBE
Kaduna
Kajama
Potiskum
KADUNA
Lake Chad
na
Ga
Kari
Ndali
Koma
KANO
Funtua
Sabon Benin
Gwari
Wawa
Hadejia
ia
Dutse
Ka
BENIN
Wudil
Dan
Gulbi
de j
JIGAWA
Kano
to
ko
ZAMFARA
Gulbin Ka
Kandi
Ha
So
er
ig
Zamfara
Gummi
Kamba
Gaya
Gumel
KATSINA
Damasak
Komadug u
Nguru
Katsina
Kaura
Namoda
Birnin
Kebbi
Magaria
Baga
er
ot
So
Daura
Sokoto
Bol
Diffa
ug
Dosso
CHAD
Bosso
am
Illela
Gon
go
l
NIGERIA
Gour
Goure
Zinder
200 km
Kumba
0
Buea
50
100 mi
Douala
Department of Field Support
Cartographic Section
RESEARCH PAPER 15/02
Summary
Nigeria Africas most populous country by far, with a population of 177 million people and
now its biggest economy provokes wildly divergent assessments of its prospects. This
paper explores that stark disjuncture as the country gears up for crucial presidential,
legislative and state-level elections in February 2015.
In these elections, incumbent president Goodluck Jonathan, representing the ruling Peoples
Democratic Party (PDP), will again face the man he defeated in 2011, Muhammadu Buhari,
representing the All Progressives Congress (APC).
2011 presidential election: north-south alternation breaks down
Until the 2011 elections, the PDP, which has won all the presidential and National Assembly
elections held since Nigerias return to civilian rule in 1999, operated an informal zoning
arrangement, under which the presidency would alternate every two terms between southern
and northern representatives of the party.
Jonathan, a Christian southerner, unexpectedly became president in 2010, following the
death in office of Umaru YarAdua, a Muslim northerner, before he had completed his first
term. Jonathans decision to stand in 2011 alienated many northerners in the PDP who felt
that it should be the norths turn again.
The breakdown of the PDPs informal zoning arrangement in 2011 did not in the end greatly
damage Jonathans prospects. He won a convincing victory. But there are those who argue
that by overturning the zoning arrangement, he seriously destabilised the countrys ruling
elite and inadvertently created space for Boko Harams insurgency in the north to flourish.
2015 elections: the stakes are high
Jonathans decision to stand for a second term in 2015 has provoked further controversy but
the PDP has rallied around him, turning the nomination process into a coronation.
The APC, which is a coming together of four opposition parties, represents the biggest threat
that the PDP has faced to its dominance. The APC has strong constituencies of support in
both the north and the south-west. However, the PDP remains a formidable electoral
machine and enjoys the advantages of incumbency.
There is grave concern that meaningful elections will not be possible in the three northeastern states (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa) where a state of emergency is currently in force
due to Boko Harams insurgency. This could damage the APCs chances.
Some observers forecast that the presidential election will go to a second round for the first
time since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999.
Both parties have been careful to select balanced tickets, in which a Muslim candidate is
complemented by a Christian candidate, but many fear that, whoever wins eventually, there
could be unprecedented levels of violence in the election aftermath.
Could Nigeria fall apart?
There has been no shortage of predictions since independence in 1960 that the country is
going to hell in a handcart. Only once have the direst predictions proven accurate the
Biafran civil war between 1967 and 1970.
The crucial question is whether the underlying political settlement that has helped to hold the
country together since then is sufficiently robust to ensure that the centre holds in 2015 and
beyond.
Nigerian national identity has no automatic privilege over ethnic, religious or regional
identities. The country has been held together primarily by the ability and willingness of
different parts of Nigerias elite to agree deals on the distribution of power and resources. All
parties to these deals have sought to avoid a winner-takes-all politics, in which the defeated
are left with next to nothing.
This elite deal-making has been sustained by a political economy of patronage which
became deeply entrenched following the start of oil production in the 1970s.
Many northerners currently feel politically and economically marginalised. Other Nigerians,
most notably those from the oil-rich Niger Delta, retain strong memories of the norths
previous dominance, particularly during successive periods of military rule. With the boot now
on the other foot, it is unclear how far the norths grievances will be accommodated.
A National Conference was held in 2014 to discuss Nigerias future direction. President
Jonathan has promised to implement its recommendations, which include formalising the
north-south zoning arrangement that has fallen into disuse since 2011. Only time will tell if
this promise is honoured.
Nigeria: an emerging economic giant?
Stabilising the existing political settlement in Nigeria, in which patronage has been the
animating force, might be considered an undesirable objective if as most analysts believe
it has held back economic development.
There has been plenty of debate amongst academics and policy-makers about whether
Nigeria is capable of making a transition towards forms of government which promote greater
(and more inclusive) economic development. Inevitably, verdicts vary. While pessimists are
probably in the majority, there are a significant number of optimists too.
Optimists about Nigerias longer-term economic prospects tend to focus on potential for
growth inherent in a rising population and the emergence of fast-growing industries such as
telecommunications.
Jim ONeill, the Goldman Sachs economist who coined the term BRICS at the beginning of
the 2000s to describe a group of emerging economies (Brazil, Russia, India, China and
South Africa) that were set to grow rapidly, has gone so far as to include Nigeria in the next
generation of emerging economies the MINTs (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey).
ONeill believes that Nigeria could be one of the top 15 largest economies in the world by
2050. Nigeria was the worlds 23rd largest economy in 2013, so on the face of it this looks
achievable.
However, deep structural challenges remain, such as the Nigerian economys dependence
on oil, high poverty levels and the nations poor infrastructure. Optimists about Nigerias
economic future acknowledge that successfully tackling these structural impediments is
essential if the countrys undoubted potential is to be fulfilled.
Boko Haram: symptom or cause of crisis?

Boko Harams vicious brand of Islamist terrorism is more a powerful symptom of Nigerias
current crisis than one of its root causes. But it is playing a role in deepening that crisis today
to the point where it could become life-threatening for the country.
Over the last year, President Goodluck Jonathan and the ruling Peoples Democratic Party
have been accused of a complacent and incompetent response to the insurgency.
However, most analysts agree that, if Boko Haram is defeated militarily an outcome far
from guaranteed, given the parlous state of the countrys security forces and their own poor
human rights record without being accompanied by appropriate structural political and
economic reforms, Nigerias underlying problems will almost certainly re-emerge before too
long, whether in a similar or new guise.
What influence do Western countries have?
Western powers such as the US, UK and EU have relatively limited leverage over Nigeria.
The countrys large size and economic weight reduce their influence. Nigeria is not
dependent on foreign aid in the way many of its African neighbours are. The US, UK and EU
are cautious about becoming closely involved in supporting Nigerias counter-insurgency
efforts given the poor human rights record of its security forces.
Despite increasing engagement, the same relative lack of influence over Nigeria affects
rising powers such as China and India too.
However, all of these powers are acutely aware of the strategic importance of Nigeria in
Africa and beyond: Nigerias fate matters enormously to the wider world.
Nigerian elections 2015: an update
1.1
Outcome of the 2011 elections
Presidential and legislative elections were held in April 2011.

Goodluck Jonathan, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, won a decisive victory
in the 2011 presidential election. He won 59.6% of the vote in the first round, meaning that
no run-off was needed. He also won majorities of the vote in 23 out of the countrys 36 states
and the Federal Capital Territory.1
The Congress for Progressive Changes (CPC) candidate Muhammadu Buhari won 32.3% of
the vote, gaining majorities in 12 states. The candidate of the Action Congress of Nigeria
(ACN), Nuhu Ribadu, won 5.5% of the vote and gained a majority in one state.
Map of the presidential election result
The map below provides a geographical illustration of the 2011 presidential election result:
Source: US Congressional Research Service
In the elections for the federal National Assembly, the PDP also prevailed, winning a majority
of 205 out of 360 seats in the lower house, the House of Representatives. In the upper
house, the Senate, the party won 73 out of 109 seats.
1
Under the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, the Federal Capital Territory is not defined as
one of Nigerias states, but the provisions of the Constitution are deemed to apply to it as if were one of the
states of the Federation (see Chapter VIII, Part 1, Clause 299).
Goodluck Jonathans victory was decisive but it was also highly controversial.
Until the 2011 elections, the PDP, which has won all the presidential and National Assembly
elections held since Nigerias return to civilian rule in 1999, operated an informal zoning
arrangement, under which the presidency would alternate every two terms between southern
and northern representatives of the party.
Jonathan is a southerner. He had been vice-president under President Umaru YarAdua, a
northerner who had won the presidency for the PDP in 2007. YarAdua had succeeded
another southerner, President Olusegun Obasanjo, who served two terms in office between
1999 and 2007. When YarAdua died in office during his first term in 2010, Jonathan took
over as president, as provided for under the 1999 Nigerian Constitution.
However, many northerners in the PDP viewed him strictly as a temporary figure and
asserted that it should be the norths turn to hold the presidency again in 2011. Goodluck
Jonathans decision to stand in the 2011 presidential election having originally said that he
would not aroused much consternation.
The breakdown of the PDPs informal zoning arrangement in 2011 did not in the end greatly
damage Jonathans personal prospects. The northern political elite was divided amongst
itself, enabling Jonathan to build alliances with some of its members. He also deployed the
power and resources that come with being an incumbent to great effect. Jonathans success
in doing so was illustrated by the fact that he won the popular vote in the presidential election
in a number of states where the PDP failed to win the vote for state governor.
Nonetheless, the map above shows that the country emerged from the election extremely
polarised between north and south. Despite the fact that the 2011 elections were a significant
improvement upon the 2007 elections in terms of administrative credibility and fairness, there
was a major outbreak of violence in several northern states immediately after the result of the
presidential election was announced. It was the worst post-election violence for decades.
Supporters of Muhammadu Buhari and the CPC alleged that the PDP had rigged the vote.
Buhari called for an end to the violence but it went on for three days, during which at least
800 people were killed and up to 65,000 people displaced. Some of the violence had
religious and ethnic elements to it.2
The CPC launched a legal challenge against the election result but it was unsuccessful. As
the dust settled, the political scene looked superficially unchanged. But many underlying
political tensions had been exacerbated by the 2011 elections. US Ambassador to Nigeria
John Campbell subsequently expressed fears for Nigerias future security and stability if its
fractured elite consensus could not be repaired ahead of the 2015 elections.3
1.2
Build up to 2015 elections
After Jonathans 2011 victory, speculation began to mount that he would stand for a second
term in 2015.4 Northerners in the PDP talked about putting forward a candidate from the
north for the partys internal election process. Opponents argued that a second term would
mean Jonathan would in practice serve more than two terms, in violation of the Constitution,
given that he first took up the reins on an acting basis in 2010. But the Supreme Court ruled
2
3
4
L. Ploch, Nigeria: Current issues and US policy, Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2013, pp5-6
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxv
J. Paden, Midterm challenges in Nigeria: Elections, parties and regional conflict, United States Institute for
Peace, special report 334, May 2013, p3
that the circumstances in which he became president could not be counted towards a term in
office and that Jonathan was therefore eligible to stand in 2015.5
2013: Jonathan on the back foot
During 2013, the odds against a Jonathan second term appeared to lengthen. He was
starting to look like a liability in the eyes of growing numbers within his party. Boko Harams
armed insurgency in the north was intensifying by the month.6 His administration appeared to
lack dynamism and commitment in response. Even more worrying for him, the PDP was
facing an unprecedented challenge from opposition parties. Four parties with support-bases
ranging across both north and south, including the CPC and the CAN, combined forces to
establish the All Progressives Congress (APC).
Then, towards the end of the year, six PDP state governors defected to the APC, along with
about one-third of the PDPs members of both houses of the National Assembly, leaving the
PDP without a majority in the lower house for the first time since 1999. To make matters
worse, a letter from former President Obasanjo to Jonathan was leaked, in which Obasanjo
warned that the country was in danger of breaking up if Jonathan stood again.7 By the end of
the year, some commentators were openly speculating that Jonathan might be close to
throwing in the towel.
2014: the PDP and APC trade blows
However, during the first half of 2014 President Jonathan and his supporters had some
success in stemming the adverse political tide. The PDP was able to prevent any more highlevel defections and even managed to contrive some defections in the other direction. In
August 2014 it pulled off a major political coup by persuading the prominent politician and
anti-corruption campaigner Nuhu Ribadu to abandon the APC, which was by now
experiencing growing internal divisions of its own, for the PDP.8
Another indicator that the PDP still had plenty of life in it came in June 2014, when it
mounted a successful electoral challenge to a prominent APC governor in Ekiti state in the
south-west of the country, Kayode Fayemi. The PDP threw vast sums of money at the
campaign, delivering victory to its candidate.9 The PDP also sponsored several attempts to
impeach sitting APC governors. Jonathans close advisors urged him not to withdraw from
the race.10 Some of Jonathans more militant youthful supporters in the Niger Delta
threatened to take up arms if he was not anointed the PDP candidate.
However, in August 2014 the APC was able to steady the ship in another of its strongholds in
the south-west, Osun state, where it saw off the PDP in elections for state governor. In late
October it was boosted further by the defection to its ranks from the PDP of the speaker of
the House of Representatives, Aminu Tambuwal.11 The PDP subsequently sought
unsuccessfully to remove him as speaker and a subsequent attempt to enter the National
Assembly led to scuffles within the building, with the police firing tear-gas into its main
lobby.12
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
This ruling is being appealed. Some claim that when Jonathan changed his mind and decided to stand for the
presidency in 2011, he also promised to only serve for one term. Such an undertaking at the time may have
helped to stay the hand of some northerners in the PDP who were opposed to his candidacy. However, he
has never publicly confirmed that he made such a promise.
See sections 4.3, 4.7 and 4.8 of this paper.
Obasanjos letter to Jonathan: Before it is too late, This Day Live, 23 December 2013
Oil, the political lubricant, Africa Confidential, 29 August 2014
Ekiti, the shape of things to come, Africa Confidential, 27 June 2014
Jonathan faces the north, Africa Confidential, 13 June 2014
Speaker defects to the opposition, The Herald, 29 October 2014
Nigerian opposition warns against speakers arrest, Agence France Presse, 22 November 2014
While the positions of Jonathan and the PDP had certainly strengthened, it was not certain
that he would win the partys presidential primary if there was a contest at the National
Convention scheduled for December 2014.13 However, in September, the need to do so was
dramatically circumvented when the partys National Executive Committee (NEC) adopted
Jonathan as its sole candidate. The NEC also endorsed all other current PDP post-holders
being allowed to stand again uncontested. With Boko Harams vicious armed insurgency now
at unprecedented levels, the APC criticised the PDPs approach as deeply undemocratic and
complacent. Jonathan formally declared his candidacy in November 2014.14
December 2014: the PDP and APC Conventions
The 11 December 2014 PDP National Convention was a coronation. Jonathan was duly
elected its presidential candidate, with his current vice-president, Namadi Sambo, once again
his running mate. The PDP had opted for the same Christian-Muslim balanced ticket that
had brought it victory in 2011.
Few expected that the APCs presidential primaries would be a similar coronation and so it
proved. In late September 2014, Atiku Abubakar, the former military leader who had
overseen the transition to civilian rule in 1999, announced that he was putting himself
forward to be the APCs presidential candidate.15
This early announcement was viewed as an attempt to destabilise Buharis own campaign.
As a Muslim, Abubakars prospects of securing the vice-presidential berth under Buhari were
limited. Some speculated that Abubakar, who has major oil business interests, may have put
himself forward to represent those who feared Buharis hostility to official corruption. In
October, Buhari confirmed he would stand, calling on the party to rally around him as its
consensus candidate in the same way the PDP had around Jonathan.16 But this was always
an unlikely prospect.
The APCs National Convention also took place on 11 December 2014. There were five
candidates for the presidential nomination. In the end Buhari won easily, with Abubakar
coming a distant second.17 Attention quickly turned to Buharis selection of a running mate.
After a week or so of internal horse-trading, Buhari selected lawyer and academic Yemi
Osinbajo. A relative newcomer to frontline politics, Osinbajo had two principal virtues as
Buharis choice. He is a Christian from the south-west, so ensuring that the APC also has a
balanced ticket in the forthcoming presidential election; and he is very close to Bola Tinubu,
who is widely reported to have only reluctantly accepted that, for a range of reasons
including the fact that he is a Muslim he could not take the role himself.18
Aspects of the 2015 election campaign19
The 2015 election campaign has been characterised more by low politics than by highminded pledges on policy. PDP leaders have persistently suggested that the APC is a proSharia law Muslim party which is in not-so-secret sympathy with Boko Haram. This
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Jonathan faces the north, Africa Confidential, 13 June 2014

After the bombing, Jonathan declares, Africa Confidential, 21 November 2014
Atiku declares for president on APC platform, Nigerian Guardian, 24 September 2014
Buhari seeks consensus candidate for APC, Daily Independent, 5 October 2014
Muhammadu Buhari to contest Nigeria election for APC, BBC News Online, 11 December 2014
Osinbajos relatively low profile may explain why several different spellings of his name are in circulation. B.
Awoyemi, Making a case for Pastor (Prof) Yemi Oshibajo to be chosen as the APC VP candidate,
saharareporters.com, 15 December 2014
Continuing Boko Haram attacks during this period are covered in sections 4.3 and 4.8 of this paper.
potentially combustible allegation was vociferously denied by the APC, which countered with
accusations of PDP incompetence and complacency in dealing with Boko Haram.20
Muhammadu Buhari has been clear in his condemnation of Boko Haram, which carried out a
suicide attack against his convoy in July 2014. Buhari survived. In November 2014, an email
emerged, purportedly from Muhammed Abubakar Shekau, claiming that President Jonathan
was in cahoots with Boko Haram. It was swiftly dismissed as a fake.21
Another PDP line of attack on Buhari has been to question his democratic credentials. The
party has contrasted his past as a former military leader with President Jonathans
experience as a tested and trusted democrat, who emerged in the aftermath of the
countrys return to civilian rule in 1999.22
The large-scale sale of Western oil company assets to Nigerian counterparts in the summer
of 2014 was viewed by some as indicating that the electoral campaign was about to begin in
earnest the divide between state and party expenditure, blurred at the best of times,
becomes extremely fuzzy when elections approach. The APC has its own oil company links.
Both the PDP and the APC have thrown enormous amounts of money at the campaign.23 A
significant proportion has been raised from their own candidates, who have been charged
eye-watering fees to obtain nomination forms.24 Standing for office is far beyond the means
of ordinary Nigerians.25
The security forces, which some claim are often closely linked with the ruling party in many
parts of the country, are already struggling to maintain order. Rival politicians have as in
previous elections again been recruiting private armed youth militias from the vast pool of
Nigerias unemployed.
From October 2014 onwards, armed attacks, including abductions, by members of such
groups began to rise.26 In early January 2015, the APC accused gunmen with links to the
PDP of shooting at supporters travelling to an election rally in Bori, Rivers state.27 A few days
later, the PDP alleged that APC supporters had set fire to one of President Jonathans
campaign vehicles in the city of Jos.28 There are reports that this time around politicians are
also using young internet warriors to attack rivals online, often deliberately peddling
misinformation and using inflammatory language.29
There have been increasing examples of leading politicians making highly inflammatory
speeches in the run-up to the elections. For example, the PDP governor of Katsina state,
Ibrahim Shema, called his opponents cockroaches of politics in a speech.30 The veteran
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
Amnesty International alleged in May 2014 that the army had had four hours notice of a Boko Haram attack
but took no steps to counter it. Nigerian authorities failed to act warnings about Boko Haram raid on school,
Amnesty International, 9 May 2014
A. Noakes, Nigerias Boko Haram ceasefire deal: too good to be true?, African Arguments, 22 October 2014
Buharill bring back dictatorship Muazu, The Sun (Nigeria), 21 December 2014
Nigerian elections swayed by deep pockets, The Star (South Africa), 10 November 2014
J. MacEbong, Campaign finance reform needed to make political office affordable for all, African Arguments,
7 January 2015
Armed attacks likely to escalate in 2015, heightening death and kidnap risks to expatriates in southern
Nigeria, Janes Intelligence Weekly, 29 October 2014; Deadly return of political thugs, Daily Trust, 25
October 2014
Shooting of APC supporters in Rivers, APC press release, 7 January 2015
Presidency condemns burning of Jonathans campaign bus, This Day, 12 January 2015
Letter from Africa: Nigerias internet warriors, BBC News Online, 23 September 2014
EU, US urge Nigerians to ensure peaceful elections, Leadership, 22 November 2014
Ijaw politician, Edwin Clark, a leading supporter of President Jonathan, suggested that the
APC would be willing to kill the president in order to gain power in 2015.31
In late November 2014, the Nigerian State Security Service raided the APCs Lagos office,
reportedly destroying computers and documents in the process, as part of an investigation
into claims that the APC was illegally cloning voters cards. The APC likened the raid to the
1974 US Watergate burglary.32
On 14 January 2015, at a ceremony in Abuja attended by former UN Secretary-General Kofi
Annan and former Commonwealth Secretary-General Chief Emeka Anyaoku, Jonathan and
Buhari were joined by 12 other less-fancied presidential candidates in signing a pledge to
ensure that the coming elections are violence-free. 33
The APC has warned that it will not recognise the outcome of the elections if they are rigged
but will instead form a parallel government.34
Trying to hold the ring between the main protagonists is the Independent National Electoral
Commission (INEC). Every election cycle in Nigeria since 1999 has been characterised by a
level of fraud and violence, but in 2011 the INEC was widely praised under its chairman
Attahiru Jega, for doing a good job in difficult circumstances.
2015 is proving, if anything, even more challenging for INEC. The International Crisis Group
warned in November 2014 that election preparations this time around were suffering from a
deficient legal framework and a growing lack of confidence in INEC. It pointed to the failure of
the National Assembly to pass amendments to the 2010 Electoral Act including one which
would create an Election Offences Tribunal to punish those who commit or sponsor violence
in the run-up to the elections and INECs slowness in producing a credible voter register.35
The Commission has reportedly been trying to do its job with inadequate funding.36 With less
than a month to go until the elections, millions of voting cards have not yet been distributed.37
INEC announced in mid-January 2015 that 68.8 million people had registered to vote and 38
million biometric permanent voter cards had been distributed.
Last but not least, INEC will have a role to play in deciding whether security conditions in the
north-east are good enough to allow the elections to take place there next month; it has said
that, while it has no plans to postpone them, it will take guidance on this from the security
agencies.38
1.3
Will President Jonathan win again?
To win, President Jonathan needs to obtain over 50% of the vote and at least 25% of the
vote in two-thirds (24) of Nigerias states and the Federal Capital Territory.
Jonathans record in office
When President Jonathan took office in 2011, he promised a Transformation Agenda for
Nigeria. What is his record in office?
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
Edwin Clark, mind your utterances, Sunday Trust, 7 December 2014

Nigerias opposition APC implicates ruling party in office raid, Voice of America News, 24 November 2014
Jonathan, Buhari, 12 others sign undertaking on violence free elections, Vanguard, 14 January 2015
We will not recognise outcome of any rigged elections APC, Leadership, 21 November 2014
International Crisis Group (ICG), Nigerias dangerous 2015 elections: limiting the violence, 21 November
2014, pp i-iv
Political storm warning, Africa Confidential, 19 December 2014
Nigeria on edge, Washington Post, 7 January 2015
We wont postpone Feb polls INEC, Vanguard, 7 January 2015
10
On the positive side:
Nigeria has consistently averaged over 7% real annual GDP growth under his watch.
This has led some to view the country as an emerging economic giant (see section
2.2).
The restive Niger Delta has been relatively peaceful. He has continued to support the
Niger Delta Development Commission, created in 2000, but also announced in April
2014 a Presidential Initiative for the North East, which is intended to promote
development in that conflict-affected area.
He has not engaged in any frontal attacks on the formal institutions of democracy and
in some cases such as INEC and the National Human Rights Commission backed
strengthening them.
He has signed Freedom of Information and National Health Bills into law and created
a Sovereign Wealth Fund.39 He also has significant infrastructural achievements to
his name.
In 2014 he commissioned a National Conference to come up with proposals to

transform Nigeria for the better in future (see section 2.1).
Nigerias Ebola outbreak was handled effectively.
On the negative side:
39
40
Nigerias domestic security situation has dramatically deteriorated, with the state until
recently appearing relatively unconcerned about it.
The Governments response to the kidnapping by Boko Haram in April 2014 of 270
schoolgirls in Chibok, Borno state, was widely criticised for its complacency similar
accusations have been made since then.40
The security forces continue to commit serious human rights abuses. Corruption
remains pervasive.
The Sovereign Wealth Fund mentioned above is yet to start operating effectively.
Promised reforms for example, opening up the petroleum and power sectors to
private ownership and investment have proceeded slowly, if at all.
Progress towards meeting the Millennium Development Goals has been patchy.
Nigeria remains a major importer of refined fuel and the country still suffers from
chronic fuel and power shortages. A 2012 attempt to end the subsidy on fuel was
partially reversed following large-scale street protests.
Y. Soneye, Nigeria needs to check into oil rehab now, African Arguments, 4 November 2014; Passing the
National Health Bill a giant leap forward, This Day, 23 December 2014. The National Health Bill guarantees
free basic health care provision for all children under five, pregnant women, the elderly and people living with
disabilities. This is intended to reinforce a National Health Insurance Scheme that to date has not really been
effective.
There is considerable doubt in some minds as to whether the remaining girls who were unable to escape
shortly after the abduction will ever be freed. Boko Haram claims that all of them have converted to Islam and
most have been compelled to marry. J. Zenn, Boko Haram: recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking in the
Lake Chad region, CTC Sentinel, 31 October 2014
11
In recent months, the countrys foreign reserves have been depleted by an only
partially successful attempt to prop up the Nigerian Naira as global oil prices have
slumped.
President Jonathan and other senior officials have failed publicly to declare their
assets, as required under Nigerian law, thereby preventing the country from
becoming a member of the 2011 Open Government Partnership, which was
established to provide an international platform for domestic reformers committed to
making their governments more open, accountable, and responsive to citizens.41
While outsiders might expect President Jonathans track-record to be electorally vulnerable,

most observers assess that he is the favourite to win, provided that he can sustain broad
enough elite backing through the effective deployment of the patronage and resources at his
disposal. This is far from guaranteed.
An incumbency factor?
President Jonathan enjoys the advantages of incumbency. Moreover the PDP has managed,
more or less, to maintain its unity and discipline in the run-up to the presidential election. He
can expect strong backing from voters in the south-south and south-east but needs to
neutralise the APCs apparent initial advantage in most of the north and in the south-west. As
in 2011, Jonathan has already had a measure of success in dividing elite opinion in the
north, with several leading figures there coming out in support of his re-election.42
Writing in October 2014, two scholars sought to assess the effect that party incumbency at
state level might have on the presidential vote. On this basis, assuming that the election is
broadly comparable in terms of fairness to 2011, they said that the most likely scenario is
that Jonathan will win a majority of the vote in the first round but will not manage to obtain
25% of the vote in two-thirds of Nigerias states, so taking the country into a second-round
run-off for the first time since the return to civilian rule in 1999.43
A second-round?
A run-off is a real possibility. It would be new and hazardous territory for Nigeria. Might an
elite deal to be struck to ensure that the country is not seriously destabilised by it?
Some claim that there was a secret pact in 2011 between Bola Tinubu, then of the ACN,
and the PDP, whereby the latter would let the ACN have a free run in the state governorship
polls in the south-west in return for ACN supporters backing Jonathan in the presidential
election.44 There is no way of knowing if this happened or not.
In any event, at present both the PDP and APC appear to be in a winner takes all frame of
mind.
Will the APC be allowed to win?
While some of the sheen may have come off the APCs brand during 2014, it remains a
formidable opponent. Its National Convention in December 2014 went better than many
expected and it must be hopeful that Nigerias economic problems in recent months might
damage the chances of President Jonathan and the PDP. In early January 2015, Jim ONeill,
the former chairman of Goldman Sachs Asset Management and a well-known Nigeria
41
42
43
44
Open Government Partnership. Jonathans secret assets deny Nigeria membership of global anti-corruption
body, Premium Times, 5 October 2013.
How strong is northern opposition to Jonathan?, Daily Independent, 28 October 2014
Z. Usman and O Owen, Incumbency and opportunity: forecasting Nigerias 2015 elections, African
Arguments, 29 October 2014
12
watcher, even suggested that world financial markets might react positively to an APC
victory.45
Victory in both the presidential and legislative elections demands that the party wins well in
the north-east, north-west and south-west.46 In more normal times, it might feel pretty
confident of achieving this. However, the poor security situation in the north-eastern states of
Yobe, Borno and Adamawa states could, if it suppresses the turn-out as it currently seems
likely to undermine the prospects of the APC.47 There are 1.5 million Internally Displaced
People in the north-east and it is unclear how many will be able to vote.48
The APC claims that the PDP is intent on sabotaging the polls in those states and alleges
that, for this reason, the PDP has an interest in ensuring that the security situation remains
poor.49 The PDP repudiates such allegations and argues that the APC may resort to its own
dirty tricks if the result goes against it.
Boko Haram has declared that it will seek to sabotage the elections. There is no sign of its
armed attacks abating as the presidential and National Assembly elections on 14 February
draw closer.50 Indeed, they are intensifying. For example, in recent weeks, Boko Haram has
attacked and seized control of the border town of Baga in Borno state, where a new
multinational task force involving troops from Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger has
established its official headquarters. Their forces did not put up a fight and hundreds of
civilians in the town and surrounding areas were killed by the group.51
Future prospects
2.1
Can Nigeria hold together?
2015: the nightmare scenario

In the short-term, there is a real risk that Nigeria will be further destabilised by the
forthcoming elections.
The worst-case scenario is that President Jonathans re-election leads to violence in the
north on a scale significantly greater than that witnessed in 2011, which was itself the worst
for decades. John Campbell argues that Jonathans decision to stand in 2011 has provided
the space for Boko Haram to flourish.52
If powerful sections of the northern elite decide to throw their support behind post-election
violence, large parts of the region could become completely ungovernable (arguably, Borno
state already is). Given that Boko Harams position is much stronger in the north than it was
in 2011, the region could then be engulfed by a fatal combination of political, religious and
ethnic violence. With the Christian population in the north now a substantial minority, it could
be a prime target.
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
ONeill says Jonathan election loss may be Nigeria positive, Bloomberg, 9 January 2015
After the bombing, Jonathan declares, Africa Confidential, 21 November 2014
At December 2014, there were an estimated 740,000 Internally Displaced Persons across these states. INEC
expresses concern over 740,000 IDPs, Leadership, 2 December 2014
Political storm warning, Africa Confidential, 19 December 2014
2014, p14
Nigeria must brace for surge in Boko Haram attacks, analysts say, dpa-AFX International ProFeed, 19
December 2014
Boko Haram seizes army base in Nigeria town of Baga, BBC News Online, 4 January 2015; Boko Haram
crisis: Nigerias Baga town hit by new assault, BBC News Online, 8 January 2015
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxxiv
13
A deepening political and social breakdown of this kind in the north might well prompt militant
groups in the south to mobilise in response, above all in the Niger Delta, where security
deteriorated again during the second half of 2014. This southern mobilisation could also be
triggered by a Jonathan defeat which could in turn prompt a counter-mobilisation in the
north. In truth, there are no safe options.
As its efforts to combat Boko Haram have illustrated, the army has lost much of its
effectiveness since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999; it could struggle to contain the
situation. Indeed, it could, as it has often done in the past, add fuel to the flames through
heavy-handed interventions on the ground.
To compound matters, oil prices have been falling significantly since mid-2014, forcing a
currency devaluation and downward revisions of the countrys economic growth rate. A
continued depletion of oil revenues, along with heavy expenditure of state funds arising from
an expensive election contest, could trigger a parallel economic crisis.53
Avoiding the worst
What resources and capabilities do Nigerians possess that can help them avoid this
nightmare scenario? In truth, more than enough. One immediate ground for hope is that both
of the main parties have selected balanced north/south, Christian/Muslim tickets for the
presidential contest. The defeated party might, as in the past, decide to pursue its grievances
about the conduct or outcome of the elections through the courts.
There have been no shortage of predictions since independence that Nigeria is about to go
to hell in a handcart. Only once have the direst predictions proven accurate the Nigerian
civil war between 1967 and 1970, which was fundamentally a revolt against northern
dominance led by political leaders from the Igbo ethnic group in the east of the country, for
which an independent Biafra was the only solution. A cohesive Nigerian army waged a brutal
but successful military campaign to defeat the Biafran army.
Many have often argued that this near-death experience for Nigeria inoculated the country
against relapsing into civil war. There may be something in this. As John Campbell has put it:
Nigerians have mastered the art of dancing on the precipice without falling over.54 However,
it is now over forty years ago since the defeat of Biafra and memories can fade.
Understanding Nigerias current political settlement
Let us assume that Nigeria comes through the forthcoming elections in one piece. What are
the countrys medium- to long-term prospects of holding together? According to some
analysts, a crucial factor to consider is whether the current political settlement, which has
(just about) held the country together since 1970, will continue to do so.55
Colonial inheritances
Many historians have told the story of how under British colonial rule, the main component
parts of what formally became Nigeria in 1914 in fact were never more than loosely stitched
53
54
55
Y. Soneye, Nigeria needs to check into oil rehab now, African Arguments, 4 November 2014. See also
sections 2.2 and 4.5 of this paper.
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013) , pxv
The concept of Political settlement used in this section of the paper has been defined by its author, the
academic Mushtaq Khan, as the combination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also
sustainable in terms of economic and political viability. Khan, Political Settlements and the Governance of
Growth-Enhancing Institutions, School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, July 2010. The
value of the concept has been questioned by other scholars. For example, see Mick Moore, What on earth is
a Political Settlement?, IDS Governance and Development Blog, University of Sussex, 19 September 2012.
For a cautiously positive assessment, see Bjorn Dressel and Sinclair Dinnen, Political settlements: old wine
in new bottles?, Development Policy Centre, Policy Brief No. 9, February 2014
14
together. Almost up until the last colonial moment, southern, northern and eastern Nigeria
were administered largely separately. British colonial power tended to favour the northern
elite over those of other regions. Nigerias anti-colonial movement was weak and divided
compared with many of its counterparts elsewhere on the continent.
All this means that today, most Nigerians sense of Nigerian-ness can be somewhat
flickering and intermittent. There are many genuine instances of widespread patriotic pride
for example, whenever the national football team, the Super Eagles, takes the field but
Nigerian national identity has no automatic privilege over ethnic, religious or regional
identities.
John Campbell claims that federal institutions that in the past have been a source of national
pride, including the army and the civil service, are now in decline 56 He also points out that
ordinary Nigerians distance themselves from government as much as they can.57
The political settlement that emerged post-independence and which was more-or-less
restored after the traumatic interruption of 1966-70 largely reflected these realities.
Elite deal-making
Although Nigerias political settlement has evolved over time in all sorts of ways, it has also
had some fairly stable features up to now.
Perhaps the most important feature has been the ability and willingness of different parts of
Nigerias elite to make deals about the distribution of power and resources.
Since independence in 1960, Nigerias elite has mainly coalesced politically around political
binaries such as Muslim/Christian, north/south, Hausa-Fulani/Yoruba-Igbo, not to mention
military/civilian, with other social groups either attaching themselves to the coalitions which
form or remaining aloof.58
Alex de Waal has suggested that political life in countries such as Nigeria is a patrimonial
marketplace, which operates according to socio-culturally determined rules.59 There has
been a shared if sometimes grudging acceptance across the groupings that made up
Nigerias elite that a winner-takes-all politics, in which defeated parties are left with next to
nothing while the victorious enjoy a virtual monopoly over state power and resources, would
be disastrous for the country.
The elite deals reached have often lasted one or more electoral cycles while simultaneously
being subject to almost permanent (re)negotiation and adaptation.60 Different parts of the
elite have at points been ascendant (although, overall, the northern groups enjoyed the
better of things during the first 40 years of independence) and therefore able to secure
advantageous deals, but other groups with significant leverage have usually not been left
empty-handed (although claiming that they have is a common negotiating ploy).
56
57
58
59
60
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxvii
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p41
This typology, while justified in the context of an overview of this kind, is inevitably a simplification of much
more complex social and political realities.
A. de Waal, Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace, International Affairs, 85:
1 (2009), p99
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pxiv
15
The political economy of patronage

Elite deal-making in Nigeria has been sustained by broader patronage systems which have
durable constituencies of support amongst ordinary Nigerians, who are also sometimes its
beneficiaries, or clients.61
While highly asymmetrical in terms of the power relations involved, patronage can and does
involve reciprocity and is often viewed as legitimate by many Nigerians.62 For the poor,
patronage networks can be a vital means of survival. 63
Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare have written: While Nigerians are general socially
supportive of anti-corruption efforts, many are politically or economically connected to the
corruption complex, directly or indirectly.64
But the biggest beneficiaries are the Big Men or Ogas, as they are known in Nigeria at
the top.65 There is an uneasy and fluid hierarchy within the ranks of the Ogas, who can be
found across the military, political and business spheres.66 The countrys president may be at
the top of the hierarchy, but not necessarily.
Campbell describes some of the ground rules that have regulated relationships amongst the
Ogas:
there should be no presidents for life;
money accumulated in office cannot be reclaimed;
Ogas should never kill each other, although their clients are fair game.67
state and local levels of government may be more attractive spheres in which to
operate because levels of accountability and transparency there are even weaker
than at the federal level.68
Political and economic marginalisation

Many northerners currently feel politically and economically marginalised.
The political settlement in Nigeria has been gravely tested by events since the death in 2010
of President Umaru YarAdua and the violation, in the eyes of many northerners, of the
informal zoning arrangement, whereby a two-term southern PDP president should be
succeeded by a two-term PDP president from the north.
Zone-by-zone data analysis of projects approved by the Federal Government in 2014
produces the following striking figures:
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
south-south: Naira 639.3 billion
The patronage system expanded and became more entrenched following the start of oil production in the
1970s.
P. Chabal, Africa. The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London and Durban, 2009), pp92-3
W. Adebanwi and E. Obadare, When corruption fights back: democracy and elite interest in Nigerias anticorruption war, Journal of Modern African Studies, June 2011, p195
Oga is Yoruba for Master.
Campbell claims that, under President Obasanjo (1999-2007), the political system was dominated by only a
few hundred bigmen. John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p25
16
south-west: N256 billion
Federal Capital Territory: N193 billion
south-east: N111.3 billion
north-central:N101 billion
north-west: N62.2 billion
north-east: N23.8 billion69
Kate Meagher has provided further analysis of the economic dimensions of this
marginalisation:
The pressures of restructuring and globalization that have made Nigeria so attractive to
global investors have exacerbated rather than eased long-standing patterns of regional
inequality [] In the post-independence period, economic opportunity in the
educationally disadvantaged northern states was dominated by agriculture and formal
sector employment, both of which have declined dramatically over the past few
decades. Pressures of high population growth, recurrent drought and a lack of
investment in small-scale farming have undermined the agricultural economy,
haemorrhaging youth into the urban centres. At the same time, the Norths urban
economy has been gutted by deindustrialization and reduction in public employment
[] Unemployment in the northern states is three times the levels in the south-west of
the country. Poverty levels in the north are 40% higher than those in the southwest. 70
Today, Nigeria is an extremely politically polarised country. At the top echelons of power, a
group of advisors many of them, like President Jonathan, members of the Ijaw ethnic group
and with roots in the Niger Delta is currently entrenched in Aso Rock, the presidential
residence in Abuja.71
This group of advisors has powerful memories of the time when northerners held sway at the
federal level, particularly during successive periods of military rule, benefiting (as these
advisors see it) disproportionately from oil revenues generated in the Niger Delta. Many other
leading figures from other ethnic groups most notably, Igbos who recall the Nigerian civil
war and its aftermath share this view. With the boot apparently now on the other foot, it is
unclear how far those around President Jonathan are willing to address northern
marginalisation today.
The 2014 National Conference: an opportunity for reform?
President Jonathan has supported the establishment of a nationwide conference of
delegates from all over the country, known as the National Conference, to discuss all
aspects of the countrys future direction.72 It began work in March 2014 and submitted its final
report to the president in August.73
69
70
71
72
73
President Jonathan comes from the south-south. N1.6 Trillion Govt Contracts for 2014 - Niger Delta Gets
Lion's Share, Daily Trust, 31 December 2014
K. Meagher, MINTs and mayhem: in Nigeria the risks are the only things that trickle down,
africanarguments.org, 22 May 2014
The Ijaw are the fourth largest ethnic group in Nigeria, comprising an estimated 10% of the population. The
three biggest are the Hausa-Fulani (29%), Yoruba (21%) and Igbo (18%). See also section 4.2 of this paper.
For a full list of the 492 delegates, see: Govt names 492 delegates to proposed National Conference full
list, Premium Times, 6 March 2014
Key National Conference recommendations you need to know, Premium Times, 21 August 2014
17
Inevitably, some have viewed Jonathans support for the National Conference through the
prism of his own political ambitions, suspecting that he was using it to pave the way for a
second term in office.
Recommendations
Among its recommendations were:
The creation of 19 new states, which would bring the total number to 55 (plus the
Federal Capital Territory);
There has been a steady expansion in the number of states in Nigeria since
independence. Each phase has tended to create new minorities and grievances.
Some wonder whether a process designed to improve the legitimacy and
effectiveness of government across the Federation ultimately leads to balkanisation
the break-up of the country.74 But with the genie out of the bottle, it may now be an
unstoppable process which the National Conference felt unable to resist.
There should be further consideration of the percentage of revenue generated by oil

and mining that should be returned from the Federation Account to the state where
the economic activity is based;
Known as the derivation principle, this originated primarily in attempts to address
grievances in the Niger Delta about the fact that its people benefited little from the oil
being produced in the area. A percentage of 13% was agreed in 1994-95 and it was
proposed in 2005 that it be increased to 17%. This increase was never implemented.
Northern representatives have tended to oppose an increase in the percentage on
the grounds that the region will lose out. The National Conference passed the buck
on this issue, asking the Government to set up a technical committee to consider the
issue further.
Presidential power should rotate between the north and south and among the six
geo-political zones and governorships should rotate between the three Senatorial
districts within each state;
The National Conference has proposed that the informal zoning arrangement on the
presidency, which appears to many to have collapsed, should be restored and
formalised. It did not specify what implications, if any, this should have for President
Jonathans candidacy in 2015.
Other proposals included requiring the President in future to pick a Vice-President from the
National Assembly, making Representatives and Senators serve on a part-time basis, the
elimination of immunity from prosecution of public office-holders where a criminal charge has
been laid, and the introduction of special courts to speed up the prosecution of corruption
cases. An attempt by northern delegates to scrap the Nigeria Delta Development
Commission and the Niger Delta Affairs Ministry was unsuccessful.75
The ghosts of conferences past
President Jonathan has promised that the recommendations of the National Conference will
be implemented, setting up a ministerial committee to look at what the next steps should be.
74
75
2014, p4
18
But his attention is currently elsewhere, so little is likely to happen in response to the
recommendations until the 2015 elections are over.
Sceptics note that Nigeria has seen several such initiatives in the past (2004 and 1994-95)
whose recommendations were honoured more in the breach than the observance. A minority
has long argued that Nigeria needs a sovereign national conference directly elected by the
people, rather than top-down affairs of the kind preferred over the years by Nigerias elite.
How far this latest National Conference ultimately plays a part in reforming or stabilising
Nigerias rickety political settlement remains to be seen. There are many who would contend
that too great a focus on piece-meal reform is ultimately undesirable. According to them, if
Nigeria is to achieve long-term stability and prosperity for the majority of its citizens, the
fundamental rules of the game must change.
Prospects for a better political settlement
Nigeria: a neo-patrimonial state?
The academic Atul Kohli would probably take this view. He contrasts neo-patrimonial states
which have a record of poor economic performance in many developing countries,
particularly in sub-Saharan Africa with developmental states in other parts of the world,
whose economic records have been much better.
Kohli identifies Nigeria as a classic neo-patrimonial state. Here is his definition of the term:
These states are labelled here as neo-patrimonial because, despite the faade of a
modern state, public office holders tend to treat public resources as their personal
patrimony. These are therefore not really modern rational-legal states. Whether
organised as a nominal democracy or as a dictatorship, state-led development under
the auspices of neo-patrimonial states has often resulted in disaster, mainly because
both public goods and capacities to pursue specific tasks in these states have
repeatedly been undermined by personal and narrow group interests. Of the cases
analysed in this study, Nigeria best exemplifies this ideal-typical tendency.76
Kohli locates the origins of Nigerias neo-patrimonialism in the pre-colonial and colonial
periods before turning to the post-independence era. Kohli asserts that it was not so much
that efforts after 1960 to promote economic development failed, but that they were never
really made.77 When it came in the 1970s, the oil boom created an illusion of economic
dynamism.
What would Nigeria be like if it was a developmental state? There are many competing
definitions of the term. Thandika Mkandawire says that it is one whose ideological
underpinnings are developmental and one that seriously attempts to deploy its administrative
and political resources to the task of economic development.78
A developmental-patrimonial regime in Nigeria?
Can Nigeria move beyond neo-patrimonialism?
76
77
78
A. Kohli, State-Directed Development. Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery
(Cambridge, 2006), p9
A. Kohli, State-Directed Development. Political Power and Industrialization in the Global Periphery
T. Mkandawire, Thinking about developmental states in Africa, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25, 2001,
p291. This definition is more modest than many of the other definitions, which Mkandawire unrealistically
portray the developmental state as some kind of omnipotent and omniscient leviathan that always gets what it
wants.
19
There is no state on the planet that has eradicated patronage and corruption. Given this, the
real question is whether the Nigerian state has the potential and capacity to become much
more developmental in its orientation.
While Nigeria currently faces many formidable challenges, there is no reason to believe that
this is impossible in future. Mkandawire has argued:
[] neither Africas post-colonial history nor the actual practice engaged in by
successful developmental states rule out the possibility of African developmental
states capable of playing a more dynamic role than hitherto.79
A group of researchers based at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI) has recently
identified several hybrid developmental-patrimonial regimes in contemporary sub-Saharan
Africa most notably, Rwanda and Ethiopia.
One of the ODI researchers, David Booth has described some of the most important factors
that have helped to create these regimes. However, he also issues a warning that
democratic forms of governance can hinder rather than help.
In both cases, long-term vision is accompanied by strong leadership and at least some
degree of institutionalised political competition. Whatever ones view on these kinds of
exceptions, the big question today is whether democratic politics can deliver a
sufficient level of elite consensus on the fundamentals for economic transformation to
occur. The risk is that African democracies will get locked into political short-termism to
such an extent that the transition from economic growth to economic transformation is
delayed indefinitely. There is no more important challenge on the horizon than this.80
Booth and his colleagues have looked at the conditions under which such a transformation
has been possible in East and (to a lesser extent) Southeast Asia since 1945. Without
expecting sub-Saharan Africa to imitate parts of the world with different histories and
cultures, they ask themselves whether there are elements of this experience that could be
transposed. They do not believe that there are insuperable obstacles. Booth goes on to say:
The key requirement for establishing a national vision and shared sense of purpose is
that ruling elites are relieved of pressures to respond to short-term political exigencies
and acquire an incentive to look to the long-term. This happened in a number of
countries, first in Northeast Asia, and later in Southeast Asia, as a result of national
crises or threats, often including large amounts of violence. 81
So, could a hybrid developmental-patrimonial regime emerge in Nigeria? For all its
problems, the countrys annual economic growth rates are good and there are large pockets
of political and economic dynamism, albeit mainly concentrated in the south-west. The
recently-retired governor of Lagos state, Babatunde Fashola, is widely credited for doing
much to promote economic growth there (continuing the work of his predecessor, Bola
Tinubu). There are undoubtedly a significant number of genuine reformers within the federal
79
80
81
T. Mkandawire, Thinking about developmental states in Africa, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 25, 2001,
p289
D. Booth, No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa, in Commonwealth
Good Governance 2011/12 (London, 2011), pp34-5 (hard copy available from the House of Commons
Library). A longer summary of the conclusions of the ODIs Africa Power and Politics Programme can be found
in D. Booth and D.Cammack, Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective Action Problems
(London, 2013)
D. Booth, No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa, Commonwealth
Good Governance 2011/12, p34
20
and state governments and within the civil service, despite its many weaknesses.82 And
Nigeria is surely experiencing a national crisis at the moment which could act as a catalyst
for change.
However, Booth laments that what he hopes for has rarely happened in sub-Saharan
Africa.83 Writing in 2011, he did not rate Nigerias chances highly. Viewing Nigeria as a
winner-takes-all democracy, he argues that:
Under current arrangements, all of the contenders and their supporters face a
significant risk of being completely excluded from the spoils of office under the next
government. As a consequence, none of them can afford to suspend or moderate their
pursuit of short-term gains.
[] The question that really needs to be posed is what, if any, variant of power-sharing
or compacted democracy would be capable of liberating all contenders from the
compulsion to sacrifice long-term national interests for short-term partial interests.84
Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that this is their view, Booth and company are also highly
sceptical of the value of most aid programmes, which they believe miss the main point.85
Whether Nigeria today is a winner-take-all-democracy is open to question. Earlier, we
suggested that its political culture has not, as a rule, been zero-sum in the past. But it is true
that Nigerias political culture strongly encourages short-termism and corruption.
The developmental-patrimonial concept deployed by Booth and his colleagues will not
convince everybody. Some may wonder whether it adds much to our understanding.
However, the explicitly hybrid character of the concept does have the virtue of challenging
the either/or terms that is, specific African states are either inherently neo-patrimonial or
inherently developmental in which the debate has often been conducted.
One commentator has also criticised Booths rather lazy dismissal of both democracy and
citizen action.86 In addition, many activists and donors are unlikely to view with much
enthusiasm his argument that some types of corruption can, in the right context, promote
economic growth.87
Few would argue that Nigeria has experienced too much of the wrong type of corruption.
Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare have argued that the return to civilian rule since
1999 has coincided with unprecedented corruption: Indeed, instead of being eroded,
existing networks of patronage and clientilism have consolidated, even expanded.88 They
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
Nigerian service: Dan Rogger on public vices, hidden virtues and silent voices in the civil service, Gateway
for Africa Blog, 11 June 2014
D. Booth, No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa, p34
D. Booth, No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa, p35
D. Booth, No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa, p35. However, since
then Booth has written on a more hopeful note about an effective UK-funded programme operating across ten
of Nigerias states called the State Accountability and Voice Initiative (SAVI), which he describes as an
example of politically smart, locally led development. See his article of the same title in African Arguments on
23 October 2014
D. Green, Africa Power and Politics a great new research programme, with lots to argue with, From
Poverty to Power blog, 15 April 2011
It is widely accepted that the countries which led the East Asian economic miracle during the 1970s and
1980s (Taiwan, South Korea) were anything but corruption-free during this period of rapid development. For
further discussion of corruption in developing countries, including when it is productive, see the work of
Mushtaq Khan such as this article co-authored with Hazel Grey, Good governance and growth in Africa:
what can we learn from Tanzania?, in V. Padayachee ed., The Political Economy of Africa (London, 2010)
W. Adebanwi and E. Obadare, When corruption fights back: democracy and elite interest in Nigerias anticorruption war, Journal of Modern African Studies, June 2011, p187
21
have also asserted that corruption has killed off three previous attempts to democratise
Nigeria.89
Are we asking the right questions?
Some observers go so far as to wonder whether the value of all such existing policy
prescriptions is fatally undermined by the fact that they have a shared origin in teleological
theories of development. Patrick Chabal, claims that:
Theories of development, whatever their guise, made two clear assumptions: the first
was that there is a path to (economic and political) development, which all countries
follow, if in different ways; the second was that Africa is merely behind on that path but
that it will eventually catch up.90
De Waal broadly endorses this perspective, asserting that [] states can function in a
different way indefinitely, albeit with less desirable outcomes for most of their citizens.91
While acknowledging just how hard it can be to avoid the Western gaze, Chabal advocates
instead trying to write about the Africa that stands before our eyes and to do so without
recourse to a given political theory.92
To follow Chabal on Nigeria would require us to view it through an entirely different set of
political lenses entirely to those that have featured in this discussion. In a recent book,
Chabal preferred to take as his point of departure the politics of being, belonging, believing,
partaking, striving, surviving and suffering.93
While Chabal has issued an intriguing injunction that could lead to policy prescriptions that
chime better with the lived experience and everyday struggles of ordinary Nigerians, it does
require busy policy-makers to make substantial changes to their habitual frameworks of
reference. Critics might respond that he is asking the impossible not least, because it is
beyond the capability of human beings born in specific societies at a particular time and
place to operate without recourse to a given political theory.94
Conclusion
So, to end where most commentators begin on Nigeria with Boko Haram. Its brand of
Islamist terrorism is an extremely potent symptom of Nigerias current crisis, rather than one
of its causes. It is playing a major role in deepening that crisis today to the point where it
could become life-threatening for Nigeria; but most analysts agree that, if Boko Haram is
defeated militarily an outcome far from guaranteed without being accompanied by
appropriate structural reforms, the countrys underlying pathologies will almost certainly reemerge before too long, whether in a similar or different guise.
What might replace Nigeria should it break up? Inevitably, the picture is hazy. The creation of
new countries might take place around the three main regions that currently comprise Nigeria
the south, north and east. An optimist might even hope for a loose Nigerian confederation
89
90
91
92
93
94
W. Adebanwi and E. Obadare, When corruption fights back: democracy and elite interest in Nigerias anticorruption war, Journal of Modern African Studies, June 2011, p187. However, Mushtaq Khan and others go
so far as to ask whether Nigerias main problem is premature democratisation, rather than rampant corruption.
They argue that, historically, democratisation has followed economic transformation and it is unrealistic to
expect the process to work the other way around.
P. Chabal, Africa. The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London and Durban, 2009), p4
A. de Waal, Mission without end? Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace, International Affairs, 85:
1 (2009), p101
P. Chabal, Africa. The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London and Durban, 2009), pp17, 173
These are the chapter headings used in Chabals 2009 book.
P. Chabal, Africa. The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London and Durban, 2009), pp17, 173
22
or Commonwealth, but is far from clear that it could work, given that the south would be
much wealthier and better-resourced than the north and east.
The creation of three new states out of what was once Nigeria would not guarantee stability:
past experience of state formation in sub-Saharan Africa suggests each of the new
governments would likely soon be faced with internal challenges to their authority and
legitimacy.
For now, committed separatists are a small minority within Nigeria. They tend to focus on the
independence of their group or region without thinking much about how the fractured pieces
might relate to each other in future. But while those who want Nigeria to stay together may
take heart from these facts, once again experience from other parts of the world shows how
quickly this can change.
The US National Intelligence Council stated in a March 2005 report: Nigerias leaders are
locked in a bad marriage they all dislike but dare not leave. 95 Writing eight years later, John
Campbell argued that the break-up of Nigeria remained unlikely. However, he added that it
was on a distinctly downward trajectory:
A more realistic alternative is that federal authority will continue to decline, while power
will gravitate to the state governments. The danger is not the emergence of an
independent Biafra or a Nigerian version of South Sudan with defined boundaries.
Rather it is of national fragmentation in the context of hollowed-out or irrelevant federal
institutions with the prospect of localised ethnic and religious conflict dominated by
warlords.96
Of course, the situation has deteriorated markedly since 2013. Nigeria certainly can hold
together, but in current circumstances it is flirting with disaster. The danger of the country
breaking up is certainly greater than it has been since 1970.
But perhaps this conclusion is an unwarranted counsel of despair there are some
commentators today who are remarkably upbeat about Nigerias future. They are not so sure
that the kinds of political impediments discussed here are necessarily inimical to rapid
growth, placing less emphasis on the need for structural reforms and more on the massive
potential of Nigerias factor endowments potential which is beginning at last to be
realised.97 Next we review the credentials of such arguments.
2.2
Is Nigeria an emerging economic giant?
Optimists about Nigerias longer-term economic prospects tend to focus on its favourable
demographics and the emergence of fast-growing industries such as telecommunications
and media. However, deep structural challenges remain, such as the economys
dependence on oil, high poverty levels and the nations poor infrastructure. The extent to
which Nigerias economic potential is fulfilled depends significantly on how successfully
Nigeria is able to tackle these structural impediments.
Member of the MINT club
Ever since the success of the acronym BRICS created at the beginning of the 2000s to
describe the large fast-growing economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
economists and investment managers have been attempting to come up with another
collection of emerging economies containing large populations with bright prospects that can
95
96
97
Talking it over, Africa Confidential, 8 July 2005

Defined by Businessdictionary.com as the amount of labor, land, money and entrepreneurship that could be
exploited for manufacturing within a country.
23
be combined to form a catchy acronym or phrase. The most recent of these to gain
significant traction is the MINT countries (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria and Turkey).98 Jim
ONeill, the Goldman Sachs economist who coined the term BRICs, has been prominent in
drawing attention to the MINTs.99
Mr ONeill believes that Nigeria could be one of the top 15 largest economies in the world
by 2050.100 Others also see massive potential in the Nigerian economy in forthcoming
decades. In its 2011 report The World in 2050, PwC, the consultancy, projected Nigeria to
become the 13th largest economy by 2050.101 More recently, McKinsey, another consultancy,
in its July 2014 report Nigerias renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest
economy estimated that Nigeria could potentially achieve growth of 7% per year up to 2030,
which would make it a top-20 economy, bigger than the Netherlands.102 Nigeria was the
worlds 23rd largest economy in 2013.103
Current economic situation uncertain
Nigeria is Africas largest economy and has experienced fast growth over the past 15 years.
A large proportion of the population has not seen the benefits of this growth, with high rates
of poverty, particularly in rural areas. Recently revised data show the economy to be larger
and more diversified than previously thought, with fast-growing industries such as
manufacturing and telecommunications driving growth. Nevertheless, the oil and gas sector
remains crucially important, accounting for almost 95% of exports and up to 75% of
government revenue. The steep fall in the oil price since mid-2014 has therefore hurt the
economy, with the local currency depreciating meaning that imports are more expensive, the
government has to cut its expenditure and growth forecasts have been lowered.104
Annual GDP growth (%)
Oil price (Brent crude)
IMF data and forecasts (Oct '14)
US$ per barrel, daily data
12
10
IMF forecasts
(Oct'14)
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Jan '14
'05 '06 '07 '08 '09 '10 '11 '12 '13 '14 '15 '16 '17 '18 '19
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook Database Oct'14
Apr '14
Jul '14
Oct '14
Jan '15
Source: FT
The need to become less dependent on the oil sector

Recent developments only serve to highlight the need for the Nigerian economy to become
less beholden to oil. Indeed the governments 2015 budget plan makes clear the need to
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
The MINT acronym originated in a strategic plan from the Japanese company Panasonic in 2010. They used
the term MINTS + B to denote Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey, Saudi Arabia and the Balkans, parts of
the world where growth in sales could be achieved. In May 2011, Fidelity, the large investment company,
highlighted the MINT economies in an effort to find markets with strong long-term potential gains for investors.
In 2014 Jim ONeill made a BBC radio series looking at each of the countries, including Nigeria, that form the
MINTs.
Jim ONeill, Nigeria may be one of the top 15 economies by 2050, Business Report, 9 April 2014
PWC, The World in 2050, 2011
McKinsey Global Institute, Nigerias renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy, July
2014, p.2
Using market exchange rate. Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2014 database
For more on recent developments in the economy, see section 4.5 of this paper.
24
become a non-oil economy, a goal reiterated by President Jonathan recently.105 This will
require better management of the public finances, a broadening of the tax base and more
inclusive growth.
Fast-growing sectors such as telecommunications and media will be part of this
diversification and the populations embrace of entrepreneurialism, together with the
projected rapid growth in the working-age population, create opportunities for strong growth.
In its report, McKinsey argues that there is potential for rapid growth in the non-oil sector
over the next 15 years.106 It believes potential growth in manufacturing, retail and wholesale
trade, and infrastructure sectors will outpace that of agriculture and oil, creating a more
diverse economy. This is based on assumptions that Nigeria takes advantage of its potential
by increasing the productivity of the workforce, and that government is effective in
addressing some of the economys key structural barriers to growth such as weak
infrastructure, high levels of corruption, poor education levels and an unproductive
agricultural sector.
The governments long-term strategy for structural reforms is reflected in its 2020 Vision and
Transformation Agenda plans. These are aimed at boosting the countrys productivity and
competitiveness and making growth more inclusive by diversifying the economy away from
oil.107
Oil and gas sector
While the need to become less dependent on oil is clear, the oil and gas sector will remain
an important part of the economy. Oil reserves are the second largest in Africa at an
estimated 37 billion barrels and revenues from production will continue to provide muchneeded revenue to government.108
As such, improving the performance of a sector that has been struggling in recent years is an
important component of delivering a stronger economy.
Reducing disruptions to supply form a key part of this agenda. Between 100,000-500,000
barrels of oil per day (up to 20-25% of potential production) are lost due to ageing
infrastructure, poor maintenance and theft from pipelines. An estimated $11 billion in
revenues was lost due to oil theft from 2009 to 2011.109
For these reasons, oil production in recent years has fallen short of what was expected,
leading to budget shortfalls. The need for investment in the sector, which generally comes
from international oil companies is therefore clear.
However, security risks in the form of pipeline vandalism, as well as activities of militants in
the Niger Delta region, have dampened the appetite to invest. Uncertainty with regard to the
regulatory climate is another factor behind the absence of investment and exploration
activities.
The Petroleum Industry Bill was initially proposed in 2008 in order to improve transparency in
the state-run oil company and introduce new fiscal terms to govern the sector. The bill has
105
106
107
108
109
Nigerias Jonathan Sees Stable Economy, Strong Naira in 2015 , Bloomberg, 1 January 2015
2014, pp.37-8
IMF, Nigeria: 2013 article IV consultation - staff report, April 2014, p.18
US Energy Information Agency, Nigeria country report, December 2013
US Energy Information Agency, Nigeria country report, December 2013
25
still not been passed and this uncertainty has deterred international oil companies from
investment projects.
With the right reforms, McKinsey estimates that production could increase from 2.4 million
barrels per day to more than 3 million in 2030, helping to provide an additional $35 billion a
year to GDP by 2030.110
Young population expanding rapidly presents opportunity for growth
With a population of around 177 million, Nigeria is already Africas most populous country.
Rapid growth is expecting to continue with the UN projecting the population to climb to
440 million in 2050 (this would be 10% above the projected US population of 400 million).111
Demographics are also favourable with the working-age population (those aged 15-64)
projected to rise from 85 million in 2010 to 260 million in 2050.
Nigerian and US population projections to 2050

Every five years to 2050
500
400
US
300
200
Nigeria
100
0
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
Source: UN, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision
2040
2045
2050
This could help boost growth in a number of ways.112 A rising population boosts demand for
goods and services in the economy creating more businesses, expanding existing ones and
creating the potential for economies of scale to develop (thereby lowering production costs).
The rise in the working-age population also provides a larger potential pool of workers for
businesses. The sheer size of the country and the large number of potential new customers
also makes it attractive to foreign investors. Population growth is also likely to lead to greater
urbanisation, which is closely associated with economic development and improved
standards of living.113 Large urban areas have been shown to boost innovation and allow
firms to service larger numbers of people more cheaply.
High poverty levels and poor education skills present barriers
Poverty
Strong population and economic growth over the past 15 years has not translated into lower
poverty levels, which have remained high and stagnant since the 1980s. The World Bank
estimates that 62% of the population in 2010 lived on less than $1.25 a day, the same as in
2004 and 1992.114 Poverty rates are higher in rural areas than urban areas and much higher
in remote areas of the north than in the relatively prosperous coastal cities such as Lagos.
This GDP estimate includes natural gas production. Source: McKinsey Global Institute, Nigerias renewal:
Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy, July 2014, p.53
111 UN, World Population Prospects: The 2012 Revision
112 McKinsey Global Institute, Nigerias renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy July
2014, p.32
113 World Bank blog Africa Can End Poverty, Can rapid population growth be good for economic development?,
15 April 2010
114 World Bank, World Development Indicators [accessed 9 January 2015]
110
26
Common factors behind poverty across the nation include the lack of an overall social
protection safety net and poor infrastructure (discuused in more detail below).115
The higher levels of rural poverty are often associated with low productivity in the agriculture
sector, which as the dominant employer, has suffered from underinvestment and failed to
move beyond a subsistence level. Nigerian farms yield less than comparable countries and
small farmholders generally lack knowledge of farming best practice, meaning productivity in
the sector is poor. In addition, a growing population has also reduced plot sizes and a poor
infrastructure limits the ability to sell crops to market.
The government launched its Agricultural Transformation Action Plan in 2011, a series of
market-oriented reforms designed to: boost the efficiency of the sector; make it more
profitable; and move it up the value chain of agricultural products.116
Urbanisation has not raised income levels as quickly as it has in other fast-growing
developing nations. A huge number of Nigerians work informally, mostly in very small
enterprises. Such informal small companies are unlikely to have access to capital, innovate
and expand. Profits are also less likely to remain in the business, reducing the chances for
expansion. A lack of formal employees on contracts in large businesses also reduces
productivity, as workers are less likely to be given training and acquire new skills. A survey of
businesses found that 63% of new jobs created in the first three quarters of 2014 were in the
informal sector.117 Urban areas also suffer from a relatively high cost of living resulting from a
limited housing stock (especially in Lagos), high transport costs and high food prices (due to
poor productivity in the agricultural sector).
Education levels
Skill levels of the workforce in Nigeria are generally seen as poor, with plenty of room for
improvement. The World Economic Forums Global Competitiveness Index ranks Nigeria as
124 out of 144 countries in terms of higher education and training.118 More fundamentally, 35
million adults cannot read or write and UNESCO found that 10 million children aged between
6 and 17 are not in school.119 Boko Harams targeting of schools in the north of the country
presents substantial additional barriers to expanding educational attainment there. These
shortfalls in human capital restrict economic productivity and therefore wages.
With a rising young population, the labour market will need to be able to absorb millions of
new entrants in the decades to come. Therefore in order to maximize both the countrys
growth potential and reduce poverty rates it is crucial that education levels of the current and
future workforce are raised.
Poor business environment and infrastructure hinders growth prospects
Potential for stronger private sector
Nigeria is a strongly entrepreneurial society, with the 2013 Global Entrepreneurial Monitor
reporting that 40% of those of working age were involved in setting up their own business in
the past three-and-a-half years, the highest proportion of the 70 countries surveyed. In
addition, 81% of those aged 18-64 agree that most people in Nigeria consider starting a
business a desirable career choice ninth highest of the 65 countries in the survey (the UK
115
116
117
118
119
Much of information in this section is from McKinsey Global Institute, Nigerias renewal: Delivering inclusive
growth in Africa's largest economy, July 2014, pp.16-25
Looney, Robert E.. Economy (Nigeria), in Europa World online. London, Routledge. House of Commons.
Retrieved 08 January 2015 from http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng.ec
National Bureau of Statistics, Selected Tables from Job Creation and Employment Survey 3rd Quarters 2014,
November 2014
World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index 20142015
African Development Bank, Nigeria Economic Outlook 2014, p.12 and McKinsey report, p36
27
figure was 54%).120 This suggests the country is well placed to build a strong and successful
private sector that can take advantage of new technologies and to exploit expanding markets
both at home and abroad.
The vast commercial area centred around Lagos in the south-west already contributes an
important share of the countrys economic activity, but has the potential to become more
productive and take advantage of its location on the coast that is favourable for trade,
tourism and industry.121
Poor business environment
To be able to fully capitalise on these positive foundations, the countrys current poor
business environment needs to improve.
At present, weaknesses in business regulations are holding back the private sector. These
include poor regulations in tax administration, the enforcement of contracts and difficulties in
starting a business. Measures of international competitiveness reveal the extent of the
problem. The World Banks Doing Business rankings put Nigeria 170th out of 189 countries
for ease of doing business in 2014, just above Zimbabwe (171st) but below Cameroon
(158th), Ghana (70th) and South Africa (43rd).122 Nigeria does especially poorly in terms of
businesses getting electricity (ranking 187th out of 189 countries), registering property (185th)
and paying taxes (179th). Businesses, particularly smaller ones, have difficulty getting access
to finance and those that can agree loans face very high rates of interest.123
Nigerian rankings in World Bank Doing Business report

Out of 189 countries
Topics
2015
rank
Change
from 2014*
Overall
170
up
Starting a Business
Dealing with Construction Permits
Getting Electricity
Registering Property
Getting Credit
Protecting Minority Investors
Paying Taxes
Trading Across Borders
Enforcing Contracts
Resolving Insolvency
129
171
187
185
52
62
179
159
140
131
up
down
down
9
3
1
0
73
1
2
0
1
2
up
down
down
down
down
Note: *up mea ns Ni geri a i mproved i ts ra nk

Source: Worl d Ba nk, Doing Business 2015
120
121
122
123
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 2013, January 2014 and McKinsey Global Institute, Nigerias renewal:
Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest economy, July 2014, p.32
2014, p.31
World Bank, Ease of Doing Business (2014) in Nigeria
IMF, Nigeria: 2013 article IV consultation - staff report, April 2014
28
The World Economic Forum in its Global Competitiveness Report, ranked Nigeria 127th out of
144 countries in 2014/15, below Cameroon (116th), Ghana (111th), and South Africa (56th).124
Nigeria does particularly poorly on the quality of public institutions (132nd) and infrastructure
(134th).
Corruption, as well as the perception of corruption, hinders growth in Nigeria by creating
additional costs (in the form of bribes) for firms, distorts the market, leads to the misuse of
public funds and deters foreign investment. Transparency International ranks Nigeria as
equal 136th out of 175 countries in its Corruptions Perceptions Index of public institutions in
2014, below Ghana (61st), South Africa (67th) and the Ivory Coast (115th).125
Political and security instability presents an additional problem for businesses, particularly for
businesses operating in conflict areas of the country. The threat of violence and terrorism
may lead to companies investing in security, creating an additional cost to doing business.
These concerns make the country less attractive to foreign investors. Political instability also
creates uncertainty, with some fears over the potential impact of the Presidential election
Weak infrastructure
Nigerias poor infrastructure is a major obstacle to growth and will continue to be so unless
significant investment is made. The World Economic Forum in its Global Competitiveness
Report ranked Nigeria 134th out of 144 countries for its overall infrastructure in 2014/15.126
The quality of the transport network is weak, with severe congestion in city centres like
Lagos, unpaved roads in many areas and high rates of road accidents. The rail network is
patchy with limited coverage. There is no deep-water port (though two are being built) and
Lagoss ports are beset with congestion.127 This makes it difficult for businesses to maintain
reliable supply chains and raises their transportation costs.128
Electricity supply is poor and extremely unreliable. Demand far exceeds supply, meaning
there are frequent power cuts. Lack of maintenance leads to loss of power in transit of up to
30%, and power stations only generate about 4GW of electricity, one tenth that of the
capacity in South Africa.129 Most businesses buy their own generators, adding to production
costs. The World Banks Doing Business report ranks Nigeria as the third worst in the world
in providing business with electricity, only above Bangladesh and Madagascar.130 The
government in 2013 privatised the generation and distribution of power (it retained
transmission) in the hope of improving efficiency in the sector.131
The government also introduced a 30-year National Integrated Infrastructure Master Plan
(NIIMP) in 2013 to try and address the weakness in the nations infrastructure. It aims to
accelerate and coordinate projects and raise the stock of Nigerias infrastructure from 2025% of GDP to 70% by 2043.132 Funding will be provided, almost equally in the first five
years, by the public and private sectors. The plan estimates that Nigeria requires over $3
trillion to deliver the quality of infrastructure desired in the plan. 133 Given the cutbacks in the
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index 20142015

Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2014
World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index 20142015 Nigeria
Looney, Robert E., Economy (Nigeria), in Europa World online. London, Routledge. House of Commons.
Africa's testing ground; Business in Nigeria, The Economist, 23 August 2014
Ibid., and McKinsey Global Institute, Nigerias renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest
economy, July 2014, p.45
World Bank, Ease of Doing Business (2014) rankings
African Development Bank, Nigeria Economic Outlook 2014, p.9
African Development Bank, Nigeria Economic Outlook 2014, p.9 and National Planning Commission, NIIMP:
Planning Commission Engages States to Establish Infrastructure Delivery Units
National Planning Commission, Bridging Nigerias infrastructural gaps through NIIMP, September 2014
29
governments budget as a result of falling oil revenues, it remains to be seen how much
funding the plan will actually receive.
Conclusion
In order for the optimistic scenarios of Nigerias economy to be achieved, a large number of
significant barriers to growth need to be overcome. These include a poor business
environment, high poverty, corruption, poor infrastructure (especially electricity supply), low
skill levels of workers, security concerns and over-dependence on the oil sector for
government revenues and exports.
As numerous and significant as these challenges are, rapid population growth, good
demographics, an entrepreneurial culture, ample natural resources, favourable geographic
location and fast-growing non-oil sectors present a real opportunity for Nigeria to improve the
living standards of its vast population and, as some anticipate, become one of the worlds
largest 15 economies by 2050.
Nigerias foreign relations
3.1
US-Nigeria relations
Overview
The US views Nigeria as a key power in Africa and a valued strategic partner. This
perspective first took hold in the 1970s, when Nigeria emerged as an oil power.
While relations were often strained during periods of military rule in Nigeria, they have
generally been much more positive since the countrys return to civilian rule in 1999 but this
does not mean that they have become straightforward.
Levels of oil imports to the US from Nigeria have begun to decline a trend which looks set
to continue.134 In July 2014, Nigeria exported no crude oil to the US for the first time since
1973.135
The main framework for bilateral dialogue and co-operation today is provided by the USNigeria Binational Commission, which was established in 2010. Five working groups meet
regularly, covering: good governance, transparency and integrity; energy and investment;
regional security; Niger Delta; and agriculture and food security.136
John Campbell writes: Unfortunately, the United States and other outsiders have little
leverage over the Jonathan government. He notes that Nigeria is not reliant on US aid and
that American capacity to influence its policies or actions is further limited by the countrys
large size and economic weight.137
In early January 2015, the US Ambassador to Nigeria, James Entwistle, said: I am not
worried in the least that Nigeria is going to disintegrate in 2015.138
Security
The two countries co-operate on counter-terrorism. Nigeria is eligible for assistance under
the US Governments Global Security Contingency Fund. The US has designated a number
134
135
136
137
138
T. Ogunlesi, The ebb and flow of US-Nigeria relations, blog, 14 August 2014
Nigeria stops oil exports to US as shale effect cuts demand, Financial Times, 3 October 2014
US-Nigeria Binational Commission
J. Campbell, US policy to counter Nigerias Boko Haram, Council on Foreign Relations, November 2014, p4
No signs of Nigeria likely to fall apart in 2015 US, Daily Independent, 8 January 2015
30
of individuals linked to Boko Haram as global terrorists, including its leader, Muhammed
Abubakar Shekau, and has designated Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation.
Nigeria is a participant in the US-sponsored Trans Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership.
However, Nigerian officials and sections of public opinion are sometimes sensitive about
outside interference in the countrys internal affairs and across the region, particularly with
regard to corruption, human rights and security issues.139
While not overtly hostile to it, Nigeria has viewed the establishment of the US Africa
Command (AFRICOM) with a certain mistrust, opposing proposals to establish a
headquarters within Africa.140
On the US side, concerns about human rights abuses committed by the Nigerian security
forces and rampant official corruption has prevented fuller co-operation.141 The Leahy Law,
first passed by Congress in 1997, prohibits assistance to any foreign security forces which
are implicated in gross violations of human rights.
More broadly, US Department of Defense officials have called Nigeria an extremely
challenging partner to work with and slow to adapt with new strategies, new doctrines, and
new tactics.142
The international furore surrounding the kidnapping by Boko Haram of an estimated 270
schoolgirls from the town of Chibok in Borno state in April 2014 has led to heightened
counterterrorism co-operation.
AFRICOM personnel were part of a Department of State-led interagency coordination and
assessment cell set up in response to this kidnapping to identify any assistance and
resources required by the Nigerian government to locate and recover the missing girls.
Joint efforts to promote a civilian-centred approach to security were also stepped up, as
was work to create a counter-Improvised Explosive Device capability and strengthen the
intelligence capability of the Nigerian security forces.
The US is providing commercial satellite data and intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance support to Nigerias military.
The US is also assisting regional efforts to enhance border security along Nigeria's borders
with Chad, Niger and Cameroon.143
In May 2014, the US deployed about 80 military personnel to Chad, where they support the
operation of drones based in the capital, Ndjamena, over northern Nigeria and neighbouring
countries.
Co-operation continues to have its limits. In late April 2014, US experts began working with
Nigeria's newly created counterterrorism-focused ranger battalion. However, in December
2014, the US confirmed that this effort had been terminated early by the Nigerian
Government.
139
140
141
142
143
L. Ploch, Nigeria: Current issues and US policy, Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2013
W. O. Alli, The role of Nigeria in regional security policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja, 2012, p80
L. Ploch Blanchard, Nigerias Boko Haram: Frequently asked questions, Congressional Research Service,
10 June 2014
Testimony of Alice Friend, Department of Defense Principal Director for African Affairs, to the Senate
Subcommittee on African Affairs, 15 May 2014
DOD Sends UAV, 80 Airmen to Help Nigerian Search, American Forces Press Service, 22 May 2014
31
Although no public reason for the termination was given, some claimed that it came in
response to a US refusal to sell lethal military equipment to Nigeria.144 The US has refuted
recent claims that it has introduced an arms embargo against Nigeria.145
Trade
Nigeria has run a goods trade surplus with the US every year between 1995 and 2013. 146
The US has been Nigerias single largest goods export market every year since 1995. Levels
of Nigerian goods exports to the United States peaked at $125 billion in 2011, though this
has fallen sharply in subsequent years, reaching $103 billion in 2013. This fall is due to a
reduction in oil exports, owing to increases in American shale oil production.
Nigerian Goods Trade with USA, 1995 - 2013

40,000
Value of trade ($ millions)
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
Exports
10,000
Imports
5,000
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
Year
Between 2011 and 2013 the value of Nigerian oil exports to the US fell from $34.5 billion to
$13.7 billion. In July 2014, Nigeria did not export any oil to the US for the first time since
records began in 1973.147 In spite of this, oil and natural gas still comprise the vast majority of
Nigerian goods exports to the US, making up 98% of total goods exports in 2013.
In 2013, the US was Nigerias second largest source of goods imports, after China. Nigerias
largest goods imports from the US were manufactured goods, machinery and transport
equipment.
In 2000, the US and Nigeria signed the United States-Nigeria Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement (TIFA). This agreement sought to provide regular, high-level
dialogue on enhancing U.S.-Nigeria economic ties and improving co-ordination on
multilateral and bilateral trade and investment issues.148 In March 2014, the TIFA Council
144
145
146
147
148
Nigeria ends US mission to counter Boko Haram, Defense News, 1 December 2014
No arms embargo on Nigeria: US, The Nation, 9 January 2015
Trade data from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database
Javier Blas, Victim of shale revolution, Nigeria stops exporting oil to US, Financial Times, 2 October 2014
Office of the United States Trade Representative, U.S. and Nigeria Conclude Meeting under Trade and
Investment Framework Agreement, 3 December 2012
32
held its 8th meeting, led by U.S. Trade Representative Michael B. G. Froman and Nigerian
Minister of Industry, Trade and Investment, Dr. Olusegun O. Aganga.149
Aid
Although unlike many other countries in sub-Saharan Africa Nigeria is not heavily reliant
on foreign aid, the US is Nigerias largest single bilateral aid donor. In total, the US allocated
$419.1m in net Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to Nigeria in 2012 (the most recent
year for which full data is available). Of that total, the US Agency for International
Development (USAID) spent $238.2m on the following sectors:
Health - $173m (of which nearly two-thirds went on HIV/AIDs relief)

Democracy and Governance - $23.6m
Economic Development - $11.7m, of which over three-quarters went on agriculture)
Education and Social Services - $9.3m
Environment - $1.3m
Programme Management - $19.3m150
In the Niger Delta, USAID is working with Chevron on a $50m programme to improve
agricultural development and governance capacity. In the north, most of USAIDs work is
focused on Bauchi and Sokoto states.151
The most striking characteristic of USAIDs work in Nigeria in 2012 was its overwhelming
focus on the health sector: 79% of its total bilateral aid was spent on health. USAID spent
relatively little by comparison with the UKs Department for International Development (DFID
see below) on areas such as governance, economic development or education.
3.2
UK-Nigeria relations
Overview
Like the US, the UK views Nigeria as a key strategic partner in Africa but has longstanding
concerns about the countrys governance and security. For its part, while Nigeria
acknowledges the importance of the bilateral relationship today, official attitudes do
sometimes echo a certain level of underlying public mistrust of the former colonial power and
its motives.152
The UK has identified seven priorities for its strategic partnership with Nigeria. They are:
collaborating with Nigeria on science and innovation

supporting development in Nigeria
supporting British nationals in Nigeria
strengthening UK relations with Nigeria to support mutual prosperity
strengthening democracy, independent institutions and more effective governance in
Nigeria
working with Nigeria to beat national and international security threats
working on bilateral foreign policy goals with Nigeria153
An issue which has sometimes complicated UK-Nigeria relations has been criticism of the
Anglo-Dutch oil company Shell by international and local campaigners. Criticisms have
149
150
151
152
153
Office of the United States Trade Representative, United States and Nigeria Hold 8th Trade and Investment
Framework Agreement Meeting, March 2014
USAID: Nigeria
L. Ploch, Nigeria: Current issues and US policy, Congressional Research Service, 24 April 2013
F. Aribisala, Is Britain Nigerias evil stepmother?, Nigeria Development and Finance Forum, 13 January 2014
UK and Nigeria, UK Government website
33
ranged from Shells alleged implication in human rights abuses committed by the Nigerian
security forces to its failure to prevent or adequately compensate local communities for oil
spills in the Niger Delta. In January 2015, Shell agreed a 55 million settlement with
residents of the Bodo community in the Niger Delta for two oil spills in 2008 and 2009. This is
said to be the first deal of its kind in Nigeria.154
Security
Nigeria-UK co-operation to combat security threats has had by far the highest public and
media profile recently. Such cooperation has often not gone entirely smoothly.
The British Government has had reservations about aspects of Nigerias policy on
counterterrorism based mainly on the poor human rights record of its security forces. It has
been correspondingly cautious about the assistance it has offered. To the reported frustration
of the Nigerian Government, in the past this has limited the scope of UK involvement in
military training programmes for forces deployed on counterinsurgency operations.155
However, as with the US, the kidnapping of about 270 schoolgirls by Boko Haram in April
2014 led to assistance being stepped up. In the immediate aftermath, the UK Government
sent three teams of advisors in Nigeria, including experts in counter-terrorism, hostage
negotiation and victim support, assisted by an RAF Sentinel reconnaissance aircraft from 5
(Army Cooperation) Squadron that was based in Ghana. The Sentinel aircraft appears to
have been withdrawn since then.156
At a regional security conference in London in June 2014, measures to increase British
involvement in training Nigerian security forces deployed on counterinsurgency operations
were announced. The then Foreign Secretary William Hague said:
We will increase our work with the Nigerian Government to strengthen its capacity to
deal with Boko Haram. This will mean significantly expanding the training and tactical
assistance that the UK provides to the Nigerian Armed Forces. This will include helping
to train units deployed on counter insurgency operations against Boko Haram in North
East Nigeria. We will also provide further assistance to regional security and
intelligence cooperation.
We also want to make sure that Boko Haram does not succeed in its twisted mission to
deny education to girls, so together with the US, we will boost our education
programmes to draw a million more boys and girls into education in Northern Nigeria.
We will be increasing our support for girls education to help better protect those who
are most vulnerable.
And through our Department for International Development, we will do even more to
help Nigeria and the region deliver development and prosperity, ensuring that basic
services and infrastructure are provided to those communities most at risk. 157
In August 2014 three Tornado GR4 from 2 (Army Cooperation) Squadron were sent to the
region. They were based at the French airbase at N'Djamena, Chad. The Tornados provided
154
155
156
157
Shell agrees $84m deal over Niger Delta oil spill, BBC News Online, 7 January 2015
Foreign Affairs Committee, The UKs response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa, HC 86,
7th Report, Session 2013-14, 21 March 2014, Vol. 1, paras 58-63
HC Deb 12 January 2015 c606
Foreign Secretary announces UK support following ministerial on Boko Haram, FCO press release, 12 June
2014
34
intelligence, surveillance, targeting, acquisition and reconnaissance capabilities. They appear

to have been withdrawn since then.158
The Daily Telegraph reported in November 2014 that the UK was considering sending
additional trainers to Nigeria following a request from the Nigerian Government.159 However,
there have been no official statements announcing any additional training provision, which
makes it unlikely that it has been provided.
The UK Government has recently expressed concern that military equipment given by
Western countries to the Nigerian army has gone missing and that money donated to
purchase such equipment has been misappropriated.160 It has made it clear that no British
troops will be deployed on the ground in Nigeria in anything other than a training capacity.161
The UK has long had a small, permanent British Military Advisory and Training Team
(BMATT) based in Nigeria, which provides military training and advice. Members of the
Nigerian armed forces attend UK training establishments.
The UK helped to establish the Joint Maritime Security Training Centre in Lagos in 2010 as
part of the UKs efforts to assist Nigeria in combating maritime piracy. HMS Portland, a Type
23 frigate, visited Lagos in March 2014. Sailors and Royal Marines conducted training with
Nigerian sailors
Trade
Nigeria ran a goods trade deficit with the UK between 1995 and 2010 and has run a surplus
since then. 162
Nigerian Goods Exports with the UK, 1995 - 2013
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
Imports
1,000
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
Year
158
159
160
161
162

Britain plans more military trainers to help Nigeria fight Boko Haram, Daily Telegraph, 28 November 2014. It
is unclear whether this request was prompted by the fact that Nigeria had asked the US to terminate training
its new counter-terrorism focused ranger battalion (see section 3.1 of this paper).
35
Nigerian goods exports to the UK doubled between 2007 and 2008 from $0.6 billion to $1.4
billion, before increasing further between 2010 and 2011 from $1.2 billion to $4 billion. Goods
export values have remained above $4 billion ever since, peaking in 2012. These increases
have been due to increased levels of oil exports. In 2013, the UK was Nigerias 8 th largest
export market. Oil and natural gas made up 85% of Nigerian exports to the UK.
The UK was Nigerias single largest source of imported goods between 1999 and 2001,
before being overtaken by the US and subsequently China. Nigerian goods imports from the
UK peaked at $2.8 billion in 2008 and have fluctuated in subsequent years. In 2013, Nigeria
imported $2.2 billion worth of British goods, 4% of total imports. Nigerias largest goods
imports from the UK were manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment.163
Aid
DFIDs programmes are strongly focused on northern states in Nigeria. DFIDs top priorities
in Nigeria are:
providing more people with better services, including education, healthcare and access
to safe water and sanitation
helping Nigeria use its oil revenues to improve the lives of its citizens
help establish an enabling governance environment for tackling corruption and
enhancing transparency and accountability164
The UK is Nigerias second biggest bilateral aid donor. DFID expenditure during 2013/14 was
266.2m.165 During the present financial year (2014/15), DFID plans to spend 275m in
Nigeria in the following sectors:
Health - 94.4m
Wealth creation - 65.1m
Governance and security - 53.6m
Education - 44.3m
Poverty, hunger & vulnerability - 16.2m
Climate change - 1.5m166
During 2014, the DFID-funded State Accountability and Voice (SAVI programme), which
operates across ten of Nigerias states, received positive reviews as an exemplar of
politically smart, locally led development.167
DFID does not currently allow UK funds to go through Nigerian government structures.
DFIDs 2011-15 Operational Plan says:
DFID will continue to avoid putting any UK funds through government systems
because of concerns about fiduciary risk, and avoiding the substitution of Nigerian
resources with UK aid.168
In 2013, DFID published an Anti-Corruption Strategy for Nigeria.169
163
164
165
166
167
168
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database

DFID, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, p71
DFID, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, p71
DFID Nigeria, Operational Plan 2011-2015: updated June 2013. Expenditure on Nigeria is set to increase
further in 2015/16 and 2016/17. See also the Nigeria entry on DFIDs Development Tracker website.
D. Booth, Towards politically smart, locally led development in Africa, African Arguments, 23 October 2014
DFID Nigeria, Operational Plan 2011-2015: updated June 2013
36
3.3
EU-Nigeria relations
Overview
EU relations with Nigeria are framed by the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, a treaty signed by EU
Member States and the members of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of
States, which includes Nigeria.170 Relations are also shaped by the EU-Africa Strategic
Partnership which was agreed in 2007.171 An EU-West Africa Economic Partnership
Agreement which will govern trade relations with Nigeria was signed in July 2014 but is not
yet in force.172
In 2009, an enhanced framework for political dialogue and cooperation, called the NigeriaEU Joint Way Forward, was agreed. It says:
The purpose of the Joint Way Forward is to take the Nigeria-EU political dialogue and
cooperation to a new level.
The Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward will be guided by the fundamental principles of
ownership and joint responsibility, respect for human rights, good governance,
democratic principles and the rule of law. Both parties are committed to advancing
these values globally.
Nigeria and the EU consider each other as natural and strong partners. Nigeria and the
EU share common values and ideals, both believing in peace and security, equality,
democracy and tolerance as ways of developing prosperous and generous societies.
It is important to strengthen economic cooperation between the parties and stimulate
the development of bonds between private industrial, commercial and financial actors.
A strong private sector economy acting in partnership with a sound public
administration is essential to achieve sustainable development.
The Parties during this process will take into due account their common concern for the
environment and in particular, climate change as phenomena with an overall impact on
security and development issues. Energy security is linked to these concerns. The
impact of climate change in Europe and Africa and the role of technology innovation to
reduce the adverse effects are of highest importance to Nigeria and the EU.
The Parties, in line with their common values, recognise the importance of promoting
democracy and rule of law and of developing a human rights dimension in their
dialogue touching upon a number of issues of mutual concern.
A key element of the Joint Way Forward is the common commitment to regional
cooperation and integration. The EU fully supports Nigerias commitment to working
with ECOWAS and the AU. Both Parties agree that the Joint Way Forward shall be
supportive of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy by including several of the strategic priority
areas and developing over time the remaining areas after common agreement.173
Since 2009, there have been five Nigeria-EU Ministerial Dialogues. The most recent took
place in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria, in November 2014.174
There will be an EU Observer Mission in Nigeria monitoring the February 2015 elections.
169
170
171
172
173
174
DFID, Anti-Corruption Strategy for Nigeria, January 2013

Europa Cotonou Agreement
AfricaEU Partnership
European Commission, TradeWest Africa
The Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward, 9 June 2009
Nigeria: EU partners Nigeria on elections, security, Daily Independent, 28 November 2014
37
Security
The EU has provided funds over recent years to Nigeria for counterinsurgency initiatives,
although it has shared wider concerns about the human rights record of Nigerias security
forces. EU priorities on security have moved from the Niger Delta to the north of the country.
The EU has expressed grave concern about the deteriorating security situation in the north of
Nigeria and has condemned Boko Harams attacks, including the kidnapping of the
schoolgirls in Chibok.
In May 2014 it listed Boko Haram as a terrorist organisation.175 In July it added Ansaru to the
list, as well as Boko Harams leader, Muhammed Abubakar Shekau.
In May 2014 the EU announced a new 9.9m counterterrorism package through its
Instrument for Stability.176 The UK Government has called for Nigeria to be eligible for funds
under the EU Strategy for Security and Development in the Sahel, to which it has given
financial support, but it appears so far without success.177
Trade
Nigeria has run a goods trade surplus with the EU in all but four years between 1995 and
2013. 178
Nigerian Goods Trade with the EU, 1995 - 2013

45,000
40,000
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
Imports
10,000
5,000
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
Year
Nigerian goods exports to the EU have increased dramatically in recent years, jumping from
$19 billion in 2010 to $40 billion in 2012, before falling slightly to $35 billion in 2013. This is
due to increased levels of oil exports, which jumped from $13.7 billion in 2010 to $33.9 billion
in 2012. In 2013, Nigerias largest export markets within the EU were Spain, the Netherlands,
175
176
177
178
The EU designates Boko Haram a terrorist organisation, EU press release, 2 June 2014
J. Barna, Insecurity in context: The rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, European Parliament Policy Department
Note 2014/113, July 2014, pp21-2
Supplementary written evidence by FCO Minister of State Mark Simmonds to the Foreign Affairs Committees
inquiry The UKs response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa, December 2013
38
Germany, France, the UK and Italy, with oil and natural gas making up 92% of total Nigerian
goods exports to the EU.
Nigerian goods imports from the EU peaked at $17.5 billion in 2008, before falling slightly in
subsequent years, reaching $14 billion in 2013. Nigerias largest goods imports from the EU
were manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment. In 2013, Nigerias largest
sources of imports within the EU were France, the UK, the Netherlands, Germany and
Belgium.
The basis for Nigerian trade with the EU is the 2000 Cotonou Agreement, also known as the
ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. This covers Nigeria and 78 other developing countries in
Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific. It was last revised in 2010.
In 2009 Nigeria and the EU signed the Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward, which sets out
detailed plans for intensified dialogue and cooperation, including assistance with trade and
promoting the diversification of the Nigerian economy.179
Nigeria is also one of 16 countries negotiating the West African Economic Partnership
Agreement with the EU, described by former EU Trade Commissioner De Gucht as a
privileged economic partnership with West Africa that will be a foundation of long-term
growth and future prosperity in a region that is so close to Europe.180 The European
Commission have described the terms of the deal as providing West African firms with
conditions that are more advantageous than those that apply to European exports to
Africa.181
Aid
Whilst the European Commissions overall programme is smaller than those of the UK or the
US, it is still a major aid donor. Most of the European Unions aid to Nigeria is delivered
through the European Development Fund (EDF), which operates in multi-year cycles. Under
the 10th EDF (2008 to 2013), 580m was allocated for Nigeria, targeting three priority areas:
governance and human rights; peace and security; and trade and regional integration.182
The Country Strategy Paper for the 11th EDF (2014 to 2020) was finalised in June 2014.183
Programmable resources for the period have been set at 512m. Most of the funds are
scheduled to go to three sectors: health, nutrition and resilience (240m); sustainable energy
and access to electricity (150m); and rule of law, governance and democracy (90m).184 The
decision to focus on these sectors marks a significant shift in priorities.
The EU's humanitarian office ECHO is supporting food security and nutritional
programmes in northern Nigeria, as well as assisting victims of violence.
3.4
China-Nigeria relations
Overview
China-Nigeria relations got off to a slow start after independence. Although China never
officially recognised Biafra during the Nigerian civil war (1967-70), its stance was supportive.
Nigeria only recognised the Peoples Republic of China in 1971.
179
180
181
182
183
184
European Commission, Nigeria-EU Ministerial Troika Meeting, 9 June 2009

European Commission, West African leaders back Economic Partnership Agreement with EU 11 July 2014
European Commission, West African leaders back Economic Partnership Agreement with EU 11 July 2014
EU-Nigeria Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008-2013
EU External Action, Nigeria
EU-Nigeria National Indicative Programme 2014-2020
39
While relations improved a great

bigger trading partner for Nigeria
began to change thereafter and
Century as China has actively
resources.185
deal in the decades that followed, Taiwan remained a

than the mainland well into the 1980s. However, things
economic ties have grown phenomenally in the 21st
trawled sub-Saharan Africa for much-needed natural
By 2011, Chinese Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria since the beginning of the millennium
was estimated at $7 billion.186 Military cooperation has also grown. However, Nigeria is not a
large oil exporter to China.187 In terms of development aid to Nigeria, China remains a minor
player.188
Strategic Partnership
Relations between the two countries were close during the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo
(1999-2007). In 2005, China and Nigeria upgraded the relationship to a Strategic
Partnership. This emerged in the context of a broader China-Africa New Strategic
Partnership. The institutional framework for this broader partnership is the Forum on ChinaAfrica Cooperation, a ministerial-level summit that was established in 2000.189
Trade
Nigeria has run a goods trade deficit with China every year between 1995 and 2013. 190
Nigerian Goods Trade with China, 1995 - 2013

16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
Year
Nigerian goods exports to China have been increasing steadily in recent years, from $0.2
billion in 2006 to $1.6 billion in 2013, though they peaked at $1.7 billion in 2011. The vast
majority of Nigerian exports to China are oil and natural gas, which made up 72% of exports
in 2013.
185
186
187
188
189
190
D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012), pp301-2
D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012), pp303
China US Energy Information Administration [last updated February 2014]
D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012), pp304; J.
Campbell, Whos in charge, China or Nigeria?, globalpost.com, 7 June 2010
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
40
China has been Nigerias largest source of imported goods every year since 2006,
overtaking the US. Import values peaked in 2013 when Nigeria imported $14 billion of
Chinese goods, a quarter of total imports. The vast majority of imported Chinese goods were
manufactured goods, machinery and transport equipment. In 2006, during Chinese President
Hu Jintaos visit to Nigeria, China secured four oil drilling licenses in exchange for a $4 billion
investment in oil and infrastructure projects in Nigeria.191
For its part, Chinas relative agnosticism about governance and human rights is attractive to
Nigeria. However, predictions that Nigeria and other African countries might seriously
downgrade relations with Western countries and institutions in favour of China have so far
proven wrong.
The contemporary China-Nigeria relationship is not without its tensions. As cheap Chinese
imports flood Nigeria, critics have accused China of just being another neo-colonial power.
Major economic projects involving Chinese state companies have often been announced
only to fall through, including in the oil sector.
President Obasanjo introduced an oil for infrastructure approach to relations with China,
under which Nigeria awarded Chinese energy companies oil blocs in return for Chinesefinanced and built infrastructure projects, but his successor, President Umaru YarAdua
abandoned this approach, instead encouraging Chinese companies to access Nigerias oil
resources by buying stakes in existing companies.192
The number of Chinese living in Nigeria was recently estimated at 70,000. The arrival of
Chinese traders and low-cost Chinese goods has led to allegations that domestic
manufacturing and trade are being undermined. For example, Nigerias textile industry is now
under severe pressure; Chinese businesses have illegally copied Nigerian designs and then
sold them under fake labels back in Nigeria, as well as in other parts of the world. 193 There
are an estimated 12,000 Nigerians resident in China.194
3.5
India-Nigeria relations
Overview
India and Nigeria have long had cordial relations. They have shared history and values
around decolonisation and were subsequently both members of the Non-Aligned Movement.
Today both countries are primarily motivated by the concrete benefits of economic
cooperation. Nigeria is Indias most important trade partner in Africa and India is Nigerias
second largest trading partner.195
However, there is also an element of competition with China underpinning Indias growing
interest in building ties with important African countries such as Nigeria. This element of
rivalry potentially gives Nigeria greater room for manoeuvre in conducting its relations with
these two rising economic powers.196
191
192
193
194
195
196
China and Nigeria agree oil deal, BBC News Online, 26 April 2006
G. Mthembu-Salter, Elephants, ants and superpowers: Nigerias relations with China, South African Institute
of International Affairs, September 2009, pp7-9
D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012), pp304-5
Nigerians in China rely on Chinese ladies for survival envoy, Newswatch Times, 18 May 2014
India-Nigeria relations, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, January 2014
S. Naidu, India stepping up the ante in African relations, Pambazuka News, 25 March 2010
41
India has provided assistance in the fields of defence and education since independence.
Indian IT companies have set up franchises in Nigeria and these have provided training
opportunities for local students.197
Trade
Nigeria has run a goods trade surplus with India every year between 1995 and 2013.198
Nigerian Goods Exports Trade with India, 1995 - 2013

16,000
14,000
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
Imports
2,000
2013
2012
2011
2010
2009
2008
2007
2006
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
Year
Nigerian goods exports to India have increased dramatically over the last decade, from $1
billion in 2005 to $12 billion in 2013, though they peaked at $14 billion in 2011.
The vast majority of Nigerian exports to India are oil and natural gas, which made up 98% of
exports in 2013. India has become the largest importer of Nigerian crude oil. In 2013, Nigeria
made up about 8% of Indias oil imports.199
Indian goods imports to Nigeria have increased over the last decade, from $0.7 billion in
2005 to $3.1 billion in 2013, though they peaked at $3.5 billion in 2012.
Both India and Nigeria are signatories to the Global System of Trade Preferences among
Developing Countries (GSTP), signed in 1988 and operation since 1989.200 This agreement
aims to foster trade between developing countries within the framework of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development.
As with China, initiatives between Indias oil companies and their Nigerian counterparts have
not always gone smoothly, sometimes falling victim to the vagaries of Nigerian politics.
197
198
199
200
P. Vasudevan, The changing nature of Nigeria-India relations, Chatham House Programme Paper AFP
2010/02, December 2010, pp4-6
India US Energy Information Administration [last updated June 2014]
Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries
42
In 2007 the two countries signed the Abuja Declaration on Strategic Partnership, which
committed both countries to expand ties in trade, investment and consular relations.201
More broadly, Nigeria participates in the India-Africa Forum Summits (IAFS).202 The IAFS
draw their agenda from the first summit, which produced the 2008 Delhi Declaration and the
second, which agreed the Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation.203 The third
such summit was due to take place in December 2014 but it was postponed until 2015
following the Ebola outbreak in West Africa.
In 2012 the India-Africa Business Council was also established, with the Nigerian
businessman Aliko Dangote one of its co-chairs.204
The Indian community in Nigeria has been estimated at 35,000, with 25,000 of them Indian
Nationals but other reports suggest that the real number may be significantly higher than
that. The community is well-established and relatively affluent.205
About 50,000 Nigerians live in India. There were protests by Nigerian expatriates in Goa in
late 2013, following the murder of one of their number, leading to dozens of arrests; the
police there had been investigating suspected Nigerian links to drug gangs. The incident
aroused strong feelings back in Nigeria.206
201
202
203
204
205
206
Nigeria-India: A key partnership, lecture by HE Nonye Rajis-Okpara, Nigerian High Commissioner to

Singapore at the National University of Singapore, 21 March 2013
See the website for the India-Africa Forum Summit 2011
New Delhi Declaration, 9 April 2008; Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, 25 May 2011. See
also the website for the Africa-India Forum Summit 2011
J. Lal, India Africa Forum Summits: Engagements and outcomes, Indian Council of World Affairs, 20
November 2013
India-Nigeria relations, Indian Ministry of External Affairs, January 2014
Murder sparks India-Nigeria diplomatic storm, Al Jazeera, 10 November 2013
43
Nigeria: country profile
4.1
History
Early History
5000 BC
Archaeological evidence suggests that there was human habitation in the region at this time.
Circa 800 BC
The Jos Plateau is settled by the Nok a Neolithic and iron age organised society.
Circa 800 AD
Kanem-Bornu and the Songhai Empires emerge. The age of city-states, kingdoms and empires in the
region begins.
The ruling elite of the Kanem-Bornu Empire converts to Islam.
The Kingdom of Benin and Oyo, a Yoruba state, emerge.
First European contact.
The Songhai Empire is conquered by Sultan of Morocco.
Britain and other European states become heavily involved in trans-Atlantic slave trade.
The Sokoto Caliphate is formed in the north of what is today Nigeria.
Lagos is annexed by Britain, marking a first step towards formal colonisation.
The Royal Niger Company is given responsibility for the British sphere of influence.
Late 11thCent.
1200-1300
1472
1591
1700s
1809
1861
1885-6
Colonial Period
1893
1900-3
1914
1922
1947
1954
1959-60
1963
1966
1967
1970
1975-6
1979
1983
Post-independence
1985
1993
1995
1998
1999
2000
2003
2007
2009
2009-10
2011
2011-14
The Ibadan Empire is defeated by Britain; The Yoruba agree to a British Protectorate. The British Niger
Coast Protectorate is established.
The Igbo people are conquered and the Sokoto Caliphate falls. The Royal Niger Company has its
charter revoked. The British establish a Protectorate of Southern Nigeria and a Protectorate of Northern
Nigeria. Frederick Lugard is appointed High Commissioner in the Northern Protectorate, where he
establishes a system of indirect rule through traditional leaders.
Abeokuta, the last independent polity, is conquered by Britain. The Protectorates of Northern and
Southern Nigeria are unified.
Part of the German colony of Kamerun is added to Nigeria under a League of Nations mandate.
A Federal Constitution based on extensive autonomy for the three regions north, south and east
comes into force. It represents an attempt to accommodate ethnic and religious tensions between the
regions.
The Federation becomes self-governing.
Elections to a bicameral federal parliament are held. On 1 October 1960, Nigeria gains its
independence under northern Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa.
Nigeria becomes a Republic.
Major-General Johnson Aguiyi Ironsi, an Igbo, leads a military coup in January. Prime Minister Balewa
is assassinated. The federal system is abolished. In August, a counter-coup is successfully carried out
by Lieutenant-General Yakubu Gowon. Ironsi is assassinated. A federal system is reintroduced.
Three states in the east of the country secede as the Republic of Biafra, provoking civil war.
Biafra surrenders and is reintegrated into Nigeria.
Gowon is overthrown and replaced by Brigadier Murtala Mohammed. Following his assassination in
1976, Mohammed is in turn replaced by Lieutenant-General Olusegun Obasanjo.
Obasanjo returns Nigeria to civilian rule under a presidential system. Shehu Shagari is elected.
Shagari is re-elected amidst claims of fraud. In December, Major-General Muhammed Buhari seizes
power in another military coup.
General Ibrahim Babangida seizes power from Buhari.
A return to civilian rule is aborted when General Sani Abacha seizes power following the annulment of
preliminary results indicating that Moshood Abiola had won the presidential election.
Execution of Ogoni campaigner and writer Ken Saro-Wiwa. EU imposes sanctions against Nigeria and
the Commonwealth suspends the countrys membership.
Abacha dies and is succeeded by Major-General Abdulsalami Abubakar. Abiola dies in custody.
Olusegun Obasanjo, a southerner and the candidate of the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP), is elected
civilian president. Membership of the Commonwealth is restored and international sanctions lifted.
Several northern states adopt Sharia law amidst rising ethnic and religious violence in different parts of
the country.
Obasanjo is re-elected. His second term is also marked by ethnic and religious violence as well as lowlevel insurgency in the Niger Delta, the heartland of Nigerias oil industry.
PDP candidate and northerner Umaru Musa YarAdua is elected president in deeply flawed elections.
Radical Islamist movement Boko Haram launches a campaign of violence in northeast Nigeria. The
security forces respond with their own operations. Boko Harams leader Mohamed Yusuf dies in police
custody. An amnesty programme helps to calm the situation in the Niger Delta.
President Yar-Adua falls ill and is incapacitated, provoking a constitutional crisis. Southerner VicePresident Goodluck Jonathan takes over, first in an acting role, and then as his permanent
replacement.
Having initially said that he would not stand in the presidential election, Goodluck Jonathan does so and
is elected.
Boko Haram escalates its campaign of violence. President Jonathan declares a state of emergency in
three northern states: Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. Ethnic and religious violence continues in the
middle belt of the country. Jim ONeill declares that Nigeria could become an emerging economic
giant.
44
4.2
The people of Nigeria
Population, ethnicity and language

Recent estimates put Nigerias population at around 177 million.207 The 2006 census
produced a figure of 140 million.208 It is Africas most populous country and the eighth most
populous country in the world.
It is a youthful country; about 62.5% of the population is 24 or under.209 It is a country that is
rapidly urbanising; about 50% of the population now lives in towns or cities. The south of
Nigeria is much more heavily populated than the north. Lagos, the countrys economic
capital, has a population of over 11 million and has been described as one of the worlds
mega-cities.210
Nigeria is also Africas most ethnically diverse country. There are at least 250 ethnic groups.
Most are small in number. The largest groups are: Hausa-Fulani at an estimated 29% of the
population, Yoruba at 21%, Igbo (also described as Ibo) at 18%, Ijaw at 10%, Kanuri at 4%,
Ibibio at 3.5%, and Tiv at 2.5%. There are over 500 indigenous languages. English is the
official language.211
Violence and insecurity
Daily life for many ordinary Nigerians over the last 50 years has been characterised by
violence and insecurity. Hundreds of thousands of civilians died in the 1967-1970 civil war,
when Igbo political leaders declared the creation of the independent state of Biafra in the
east of the country. The Nigerian army ultimately defeated the Biafran army, forcibly reuniting
the country.
In significant parts of the country since then, there has been increasingly intense competition
between groups for scarce resources such as water and land. Tensions have also tended to
be particularly high where levels of inward migration are significant. In the multi-ethnic,
religiously diverse states at the intersection of the Middle Belt and the north of the country,
conflict between settlers and indigenes has triggered violence.212
Many Nigerians have, at particular points in the past, felt themselves to be politically and
economically marginalised. Today, it is the people of the north who make this claim.
Previously, the Igbo and the people of the Niger Delta have done so.
Public and private realms
The people of Nigeria live in a country where the distinction between the public and the
private realms is often neither clear nor well-established. Public power and resources have
tended to be viewed as the patrimony of personal and narrow group interests.213
Public/private is just one of several distinctions which might seem natural to Westerners but
which many ordinary Nigerians would view as highly blurred.
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
See the Nigeria entry of the CIA World Factbook [all links in this paper last accessed 14 January 2015]
National Population Commission of Nigeria
Nigeria entry of the CIA World Factbook
M. Basedau, J. Vullers and P. Korner, What drives inter-religious violence? Lessons from Nigeria, Cote
dIvoire and Tanzania, Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, 36:10, 2013, p866
Atul Kohli, State-directed Development. Political Power and Industrialisation in the Global Periphery
45
Other blurred distinctions are those between formal/informal and visible/invisible. Indeed,
many ordinary Nigerians are likely to believe that greater power and influence is to be found
in the informal and invisible realms.
With regard to formal/informal, many ordinary Nigerians distinguish between official
institutions such as the government, where power is ostensibly exercised, and elite networks
often operating behind the scenes where power is in practice mainly to be found.
With regard to visible/invisible, many ordinary Nigerians distinguish between the observable
physical world, in which people live and function on a day-to-day basis, and the spiritual
world, which is widely viewed as underpinning and shaping it.214
Religion
The vast majority of the people of Nigeria are highly religious. The two main religions are
Islam and Christianity. Muslims constitute about 50% of the population and Christians about
40%.215 Christianity is believed to be growing more quickly than Islam.
Marshall says that Nigeria has been the site of Pentecostalisms greatest explosion on the
African continent, with adherents now numbering tens of millions. She describes
Pentecostalism as the single most important sociocultural force in southern Nigeria today.216
An estimated 10% of Nigerians are animists that is, they adhere to indigenous belief
systems. But a lot of Muslims and Christians also accommodate animist beliefs in their lives.
Many Muslims and some Christians (despite the official disapproval of church leaders)
practice polygamy.217
The north of the country is usually characterised as predominantly Muslim and the south as
predominantly Christian. This is an over-simplification. It is estimated that 40% of northerners
are now Christian.218 Many Muslims live in the south of the country. Nonetheless, large
numbers of Nigerians do seem to view religious and regional (not to mention ethnic)
identities as overlapping significantly.
Rising fundamentalisms
The impact and role of religion in Nigerian society has been going through significant
changes in recent decades. According to Ruth Marshall, in recent decades both Islam and
Christianity have seen the rise of fundamentalist political spiritualities.219
Marshall argues that these reflect new responses to the everyday struggles for survival and
dignity of ordinary Nigerians in a context of mounting social and political crisis; however,
because they are mutually exclusive, they deepen socio-political cleavages and act as a
spur to rising levels of violence.220
214
215
216
217
218
219
220
For a fuller discussion, see: Patrick Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London, 2009);
Achille Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Oakland, 2001)
The main umbrella groups are the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and the Christian Association
of Nigeria.
Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities. The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago, 2009), p2
Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities. The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago, 2009)
Ruth Marshall, Political Spiritualities. The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago, 2009), p215
46
At the same time, there are many examples of peaceful co-existence (including inter-faith
marriages). In the south-west of the country, peaceful coexistence has been described as the
norm.221.
The impact of Islamic terrorist groups most notably, Boko Haram in northern Nigeria has
been extensively charted in the Western media, although the longer-term historical origins of
radical Islam more widely tend to be overlooked.222
Originating in northern universities in the 1980s and influenced by Salafist beliefs originating
in the Arabian Gulf, militant Islamists have challenged the majority Sufi tradition promoted by
traditional elites in northern Nigeria, who they believe have failed to defend Islam or the
political power of the north.223
In 2000, 12 states within Nigeria fully or partially adopted Sharia law for criminal offences,
although implementation in practice has varied significantly.224 Yet, Campbell claims that
Sufism is still the majority tradition in the north.225
4.3
Human rights226
Nigerias record on the protection of human rights since independence in 1960 has been
poor. Numerous commentators and academics have argued that the authoritarian legacy of
British colonialism is crucial in understanding why this has been so.227
Brutality and corruption
The police and army have characteristically displayed high levels of brutality and corruption.
A series of military coups were accompanied by the suspension of those parts of the
Constitution which guaranteed basic rights. During these periods, many hundreds of political
critics, journalists and civil society activists were harassed and detained; some paid with their
lives.
The treatment of detainees and prisoners by the authorities has often been harsh, with many
instances of torture or ill-treatment documented. The scale and extent of abuses has tended
to reduce under civilian governments but by much less than many might have hoped.
Elections have almost invariably been flawed and accompanied by significant levels of
violence.
Impunity the norm
For the politically powerful and for state operatives, impunity has been the norm, whether in
connection with abuse of power or allegations of large-scale corruption.228
Since the 1970s, elites have become heavily involved in what Nigerians call bunkering in
essence, the theft of Nigerias oil production.229 While the judicial system has never been
221
222
223
224
225
226
227
228
Boko Haram is discussed in more depth in sections 2.1 and 4.8 of this paper.
Salafism is a fundamentalist Sunni religious movement which originated in the 18 th Century.
Economic and social rights are also covered in section 4.4 of this paper.
See, for example: M. Mamdani, Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism
(Princeton, 1996); A. Jauhari, Colonial and post-colonial human rights violations in Nigeria, International
Journal of Humanities and Social Science, May 2011
See, for example: Welcome to hell fire. Torture and other ill-treatment in Nigeria, Amnesty International, 18
September 2014
47
entirely captured by the executive branch and has at times exhibited some independence, it
has often failed to uphold the rule of law, whether due to political pressure or its own
inadequacies.230
On the positive side, Nigerias print (and, more recently, some broadcast) media has always
been remarkably vibrant, if often also partisan, and there has been an abundance of
courageous civil society activists trying to hold the authorities to account in hazardous
circumstances.
Positive developments since 1999
The human rights situation has improved in some respects since the country returned to
civilian rule in 1999 under President Olusegun Obasanjo. For example, the independence
and effectiveness of the judiciary has increased, although there are concerns about
corruption within its ranks, as overall has that of statutory oversight bodies such as the
National Human Rights Commission, the Independent Electoral Commission and the
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission.231
The influence of the army over politics has also reduced, although retired military figures
retain considerable power and influence.
Ethnic and religious violence since 1999
In other respects the human rights situation has arguably stagnated or deteriorated since
1999. There are an estimated 3.3 million internally displaced people in Nigeria.232 In the
states of the Middle Belt, many hundreds of thousands have died in regular outbreaks of
ethnic and religious violence over the last decade or so, often at the hands of private militias
and armed groups.233 For example, Nassarawa state has been severely affected by such
violence in recent years.234 It is often claimed that these entities are backed by rival
politicians.
Insurgency and terrorism in the Niger Delta and north-east
The Niger Delta and north-east Nigeria have both been heavily affected by armed
insurgencies and terrorism over the last decade or so, with the situation in the latter part of
the country reaching crisis proportions since 2010 as a result of attacks by the Islamic
terrorist group Boko Haram. An amnesty programme has calmed the situation in the Niger
Delta in recent years but the region remains volatile.
Figures on the scale of civilian fatalities at the hands of Boko Haram are difficult to verify.
Below is a chart produced by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project which
shows a strongly upward trend in the number of civilian deaths at the hands of Boko Haram
since late 2010.235
229
230
231
232
233
234
235
Oil bunkering in Nigeria: 7% of Nigerian crude oil stolen daily, World Oil News Centre, 28 February 2012
A Olowofoyeku, The Beleaguered Fortress: Reflections of the Independence of Nigeria's Judiciary, Journal
of African Law, Spring 1989
J. Nwokeoma, The judiciarys redemptive role in Nigerias democracy, Peace and Collaborative
Development Network, 7 November 2007; National Human Rights Commission; Independent National
Electoral Commission; Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
Electoral body to release voting plan on IDPs, Pan African News Agency, 5 January 2015
This violence is sometimes described as communal violence.
I. Hassan, Why are the stakes so high for the 2015 elections?, African Arguments, 16 December 2014
The chart was taken from the BBC News Online website on 15 January 2015. See: Boko Haram crisis: why it
is hard to know the truth in Nigeria, 13 January 2015
48
The figure most commonly cited for the number of people who have died in Nigeria during
2014 as a result of attacks by Boko Haram has been over 2,000 people.236 However,
according to the Nigeria Security Tracker website, that figure is likely to have been much
higher.
Nigeria Security Tracker estimates that in 2014 over 10,000 people died from violence linked
to Boko Harams activities across the three north-eastern states where a state of emergency
currently operates (Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states), with about 80% of that total occurring
in Borno state. Although a significant proportion of those who died during 2014 did so at the
hands of state actors and allied vigilante groups (see below), Boko Haram is identified by the
website as by some distance the largest single identifiable perpetrator.237
The Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project says that 3,428 civilians were killed by
Boko Haram in north-east Nigeria during 2014.238 The UK Government says that over 4,000
people were killed by the group in the course of the year.239
About 1.5 million people in the north-east have also been displaced by the violence.240 In
November 2014, there were over 50,000 Internally Displaced People in Maiduguri, the capital
of Borno state, alone.241
Boko Haram has attacked schools, forcing many in the three states worst-affected to close
The Nigerian authorities have been heavily criticised for their ineffective response to the
kidnapping of schoolchildren by Boko Haram; an estimated 219 of the 270 schoolgirls
kidnapped by the group in April 2014 in the small town of Chibok, Borno state, remain in
captivity.
236
237
238
239
240
241
Human Rights Watch, Nigeria: Boko Haram kills 2,053 civilians in six months, 15 July 2014
Nigeria Security Tracker [figures at 2 January 2015]
Armed Conflict Location and Data Event Project, Trend 3: violence against civilians in 2014
Thousands of people displaced by conflict in north-eastern Nigeria have taken refuge in Maiduguri, ICRC
update, 6 November 2014
49
Boko Haram has attacked churches and mosques. In November 2014, over 100 people died
following explosions at the Central Mosque in Kano.
Meanwhile, the army has killed many hundreds of people in retaliatory operations, with
Amnesty International asserting that it is implicated in war crimes and Human Rights Watch
describing it as almost as evil as Boko Haram itself.242
In November 2014 there were media reports that 18 men accused of being members of Boko
Haram and taken into custody in the town of Potiskum by soldiers had been found dead
several hours later.243 A few days later, a suicide bomber killed at least 47 school children
attending an assembly in the same town.244
The most notorious part of the security forces has been the Joint Task Force, which brings
together the military, the police and the security services. Although it was disbanded in 2013,
many of its commanders and units remained in place.
Civilian vigilante groups, set up in part due to the failure of the security forces to provide
much protection to ordinary Nigerians from Boko Haram attacks, have also been responsible
for serious abuses.245
Police abuses
The police have been accused of killing thousands each year.246 Amnesty International
recently claimed that torture and other ill-treatment are routine practices in criminal
investigations across Nigeria, including for the purpose of extracting confessions.247 The
human rights group alleges that many police stations have torture chambers and some
have an officer unofficially known as O/C Torture.
Levels of torture and ill-treatment by the police have reportedly increased dramatically in the
north in recent years.248
Homophobia
Homophobia is dominant across all levels of Nigerian society.249 Homosexual acts are illegal
in Nigeria. In January 2014, President Jonathan signed a law which further increased the
criminal penalties for homosexuality.250
Election violence
The 2007 presidential and legislative elections were described by one writer as an electionlike event, reflecting widespread concerns about fraud and low-level violence. The 2011
elections were then followed by the worst outbreak of post-electoral violence since the civil
war.251 As the 2015 elections draw closer, levels of election-related violence are again on the
increase.
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
Amnesty International, Q&A: Nigerias military implicated in war crimes, 5 August 2014; Human Rights
Watch, How do you beat Boko Haram with an army that is almost as evil?, 14 May 2014
Boko Haram suspects found dead after arrest by Nigerian army, BBC News Online, 6 November 2014
Nigeria school assembly in Potiskum hit by blast, BBC News Online, 10 November 2014
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, p415
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), ppxviii
Welcome to hell fire. Torture and other ill-treatment in Nigeria, Amnesty International, 18 September 2014,
The Nigerian police has contested Amnesty Internationals claims. See: Nigeria Police Force refutes Amnesty
International report, says torture is prohibited, Vanguard, 18 September 2014
Welcome to hell fire. Torture and other ill-treatment in Nigeria, Amnesty International, 18 September 2014
Nigeria's president signs law imposing up to 14 years' jail for gay relationships, Guardian, 13 January 2014
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), ppxv and 99
50
4.4
Human development
In public discourse around human development in Nigeria, optimism is often in short supply.
Whenever the question of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) comes up, discussion
tends to focus on the many challenges which Nigeria faces, and the perceived lack of
progress made.
Nigeria was ranked 152nd out of 187 countries on the Human Development Index in 2013, an
improvement of one place on its 2008 ranking.252
Progress against MDG indicators: positives
However, there has been considerable progress against a number of the MDG indicators.253
Those showing the most marked progress are indicators 1.9 (level of undernourishment), 4.1
and 4.2 (under-five mortality rate and infant mortality rate respectively), and 5.1 (maternal
mortality ratio). The proportion of the population suffering from undernourishment has fallen
from 21.3% in 1991 to 6.4% in 2013 (though progress has levelled off somewhat since
2005).
Over the same period, the under-five mortality rate fell from 212.8 to 117.4 per 1,000 live
births, whilst the infant mortality rate fell from 126.1 to 74.3 per 1,000 live births. The
maternal mortality ratio has seen particularly dramatic progress, falling from to 1200 to 560
per 100,000 live births between 1990 and 2013.
A number of other indicators have also shown significant, if more limited, progress. The
proportion of the population using an improved drinking water source increased from 46% in
1990 to 64% in 2012, whilst the gender parity index in primary level enrolment has increased
from 0.79 in 1990 to 0.92 in 2010.
The proportion of 15-49 year olds living with HIV, meanwhile, peaked at 3.7% between 2003
and 2006 and has now begun to decline.
Performance against MDG indicators: negatives
However, the progress made will in many cases not be sufficient for Nigeria to meet the
MDGs. The chart below, which appears in DFIDs Annual Report for 2013-14, assesses
progress against key MDG indicators (one indicator for each of the first seven MDGs).
Nigeria is off-track for all of them. In four cases out of seven the rating is the worst red
while three get an amber rating.254
252
253
254
UNDP, "Table 2: Human Development Index trends, 1980-2013". The Human Development Index takes
account of Gross National Income (GNI), life expectancy and levels of education
It should be emphasised at the outset that there are significant data integrity issues. For some targets, data is
available up to and including 2013; for many others, data from recent years is not yet available. For other
targets, the number of data points in the series is very few. For example, we know that the literacy rate of 1524 year olds fell from 71.2% in 1991 to 66.4% in 2008, but we know very little about what precisely happened
in between those dates: the only intermediate data point is for 2003, when the rate stood at 69.0%. For some
of the MDG indicators, such as the proportion of own-account and contributing family workers in total
employment, there is no data at all, whilst for other targets the datas incoherencies are such that it is of little
use. As another example, there are three sets of data for the tuberculosis prevalence rate (the lower bound,
mid-point and upper bound), none of which bear much resemblance to each other. In 2012, the lower
bound, mid-point and upper bound respectively were 25, 161 and 420 per 100,000 population. Given such
wide divergences it is difficult to have any confidence in the data.
Department for International Development, Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14, 15 July 2014, HC 11,
Session 2014-15, p71. A red rating does not necessarily mean there has been no progress (it may simply
mean that progress has been very slow), whilst an amber rating means that progress is insufficiently quick to
meet the MDG target by 2015.
51
In some cases, Nigerias performance against MDG indicators has regressed in recent years.
The total net enrolment ratio in primary education fell back from 71.3% to 65.7% between
2007 and 2010.255 The proportion of the population living on less than $1.25 (PPP) per day
has increased, from 61.9% in 1992 to 68% in 2010. Levels of poverty have been rising
across the whole country.256
The literacy rate amongst 15-24 year olds has decreased, from 71.2% in 1991 to 66.4% in
2008, whilst the percentage of the population using an improved sanitation facility fell from
37% in 1990 to 28% in 2012.257
In a recent report, the international NGO ONE criticised the Government of Nigeria for its
insufficient spending on the health sector. If the Government were to meet its commitment
under the 2001 Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious
Diseases258 which is to commit 15% of total government expenditure to health -- ONE
argued that much greater progress towards meeting health-related goals would be made:
With Nigeria partially on track for health-related goals such as child mortality and
maternal mortality, fulfilling its health spending commitment through effective and
accountable programming is now more strategically important than ever enabling it to
build on gradual progress thus far, accelerate its implementation and sprint towards the
MDG finish line in 2015. If current spending levels (budget allocations as a share of
total budget) were carried forward, Nigeria is projected to have a cumulative Abuja
commitment deficit of $22.5 billion between 2013 and 2015. In other words, if Nigeria
met its Abuja commitment to spend 15% of its total budget on health in 2013, 2014 and
2015, there would be an additional $22.5 billion available for key investments in
health.259
However, Nigerias health system was praised for its effective handling of the Ebola outbreak
during the second half of 2014.260
255
256
257
258
259
260
Admittedly this came after an increase from 62.8% to 71.3% between 1999 and 2007.
P. Rogers, Nigeria: the generic context of the Boko Haram violence, Oxford Research Group, 1 April 2012
Thus whilst the percentage of the population using an improved water source has increased, the same cannot
be said for the percentage of the population using an improved sanitation facility.
Abuja Declaration on HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and other Related Infectious Diseases
ONE, "The 2013 data report", 22 July 2013, pp. 30 & 35
How Nigeria defeated Ebola, Guardian, 31 October 2014
52
Spatial disparities
It is also important to note that progress has been far from uniform across the country.
While the proportion of the population using an improved drinking water source has grown
considerably, closer inspection reveals great disparity between urban and rural areas.
In 1990, the respective proportions were 78% in urban areas and 28% in rural areas,
whereas in 2012 the respective percentages were 79% in urban areas and 49% in rural
areas. Almost all of the progress achieved since 1990 has been in rural areas (albeit starting
from a very low base). The situation in urban areas is essentially unchanged since 1990.
Moreover, there are great disparities in progress between the north and south of the country.
In terms of average under-five mortality rates across Nigerias six geographical zones, the
worst performing are the north-east and north-west, where the average under-five mortality
rates are 160 and 185 per 1,000 live births respectively. The best performing are the southwest and south-south, with 90 and 91 per 1,000 live births respectively.261
But it is not simply a north-south divide: the south-east zone performs much worse (131 per
1,000 live births) than the north-central zone (100 per 1,000 live births), which includes the
capital, Abuja.262
4.5
Economic profile
Strong growth in recent years has been driven by the non-oil sector, with particularly strong
expansions seen in the manufacturing and telecommunications sectors.
The oil and gas sector, however, remains crucially important as it accounts for 95% of the
countrys exports and up to 75% of the governments revenue.
The sharp drop in the price of oil (down by more than half from mid-2014 to the beginning of
2015) has led to growth forecasts for 2015 being lowered, budget cuts implemented and a
weakening currency.
Background
Oil was first produced in the 1950s (prior to independence) and became the economys
dominant industry during the 1970s.
Public spending was closely tied to the oil price and thus rose sharply in the mid- to late1970s. Fiscal mismanagement and corruption during the boom years led to a fiscal crisis in
the 1980s when the price of oil fell.263 As a result, Nigerias development was halted. Debt
began to pile up, the currency was devalued and inflation soared.264 GDP per capita, one
measure of the standard of living, fell and didnt recover for a generation until the 2000s.
261
National Population Commission, ICF International; Nigeria: Demographic and Health Survey 2013, June
2014, p120
262 National Population Commission, ICF International; Nigeria: Demographic and Health Survey 2013, June
2014, p120
263 Looney, Robert E.. Economy (Nigeria), in Europa World online. London, Routledge. House of Commons.
264 IMF Finance & Development magazine vol 45, no. 4, Point of View: Nigeria's Shot at Redemption, Dec 2008
53
Oil price in real terms (2013 prices)
Real GDP per capita
US$ per barrel, annual data
Index where 1960 level = 100
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1960
200
150
100
50
1970
1980
1990
2000
0
1960
2010
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014
1970
1980
1990
2000
2010
Source: World Bank
Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, Nigerias economy has performed better overall,
aided by oil and gas exports, improved fiscal stability (for example the creation of the Excess
Crude Account, a fund that provides a cushion during oil price volatility) and a debt-relief
agreement with the Paris Club group of rich Western creditor nations in 2005.
Annual GDP growth since 1999 has averaged around 9%, compared with an average of 6%
for Sub-Saharan Africa.265 Despite the improved economic performance overall, growth has
not been inclusive. Poverty levels remain high and have barely changed since the 1980s.
The World Bank estimates that 82% of the population in 2010 lived on less than $2 a day,
only slightly lower than in 2004 (83%) and higher than in 1986 (77%).266
Annual GDP growth (%), 1980-2014

IMF data (2014 is an IMF estimate)
25
20
15
10
5
0
-5
-10
-15
1980
'84
'88
'92
'96
'00
'04
'08
'12
Largest economy in Africa is more diverse than previously thought

In 2014, the National Bureau of Statistics released new GDP data which revised up
estimates of GDP in 2013 by 89% (from $290 billion to $509 billion), making Nigeria Africas
largest economy (overtaking South Africa). The old data was based on how the economy
looked in 1990 and did not take account of its changing structure since then. The new figures
are based on the shape of the economy in 2010 and give greater weight to fast-growing
sectors such as telecommunications, banks and the Nollywood film industry.267
The new figures present a changed picture of the importance of different industries to the
economy. The share of GDP accounted for by the agriculture and oil and gas sectors is now
lower than previously estimated, while the manufacturing and services sectors contribute a
higher share (see table below). Under the old data, agriculture and oil and gas accounted for
70% of GDP; the new data puts this at 38%. Meanwhile, manufacturing is now estimated to
account for over 7% of GDP compared to 2% before and telecommunications is up from less
than 1% to over 8% of GDP.
265
IMF, World Economic Outlook October 2014 database

World Bank, World Development Indicators [accessed 9 January 2015]
267 National Bureau of Statistics and Step change; Nigerias GDP, The Economist, 12 April 2014
266
54
Importance of sectors under old and new GDP data, 2012

% of total GDP
Old data New data
Agriculture
Oil and gas
Manufacturing
Telecommunications
Finance & insurance
Real estate
Films, music, TV
33.1
37.0
1.9
0.8
1.6
4.5
-
22.1
15.8
7.4
8.3
2.8
7.7
2.0
Change
-11.0
-21.2
+5.5
+7.5
+1.2
+3.2
+2.0
Source: Worl d Ba nk, Ni geri a economi c report, Jul y 2014
Non-oil sectors behind growth in 2013 and 2014

Growth in recent years has been more diverse than was thought under the old estimates.268
In 2013, growth was 22% in the manufacturing sector, 9% in the services sector but only 3%
in agriculture.269 Overall non-oil GDP growth in 2013 was 8.4% but a 13% fall in oil and gas
output (due to supply disruptions) reined in GDP growth to 5.5%, though this was still higher
than the 4.2% recorded in 2012 and 5.3% in 2011.
In 2014, non-oil GDP continued to drive growth (even before the fall in the oil price).270
Growth in the first three quarters of the year averaged 6.3% compared with the previous
year. The non-oil sector averaged growth of 7.5% over this period. In Q3 2014 growth was
underpinned by strength in crop production, the textile, apparel and footwear,
telecommunications, and real estate sectors.
Trade crucially dependent on oil exports
In 2013, Nigeria exported $103 billion worth of goods and imported $56 billion, resulting in a
positive trade balance of $47 billion.271 Levels of Nigerian goods exports reached an all-time
high in 2011 at $125 billion, though export levels fell in 2012 and 2013. Nigerian goods
imports also reached an all-time high of $56 billion in 2011, before falling in 2012 and
subsequently returning to a similar level in 2013.
In 2013 Nigerias five largest export markets were the US, India, Brazil, Spain and the
Netherlands; the UK was Nigerias eighth largest export market.
The US has been Nigerias single largest export market every year since 1995. While the US
was Nigerias single largest export market in 2013, buying $14 billion worth of Nigeria goods,
this has fallen dramatically from a high of $35 billion in 2011. This fall is due a sharp
reduction in oil exports, owing to increases in American shale oil production.
94% of Nigerias exports were made up of oil and natural gas. Nigeria also exported small
amounts of cocoa, rubber and leather.
268
World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report, July 2014

Central Bank of Nigeria, Statistics database real sector statistics, GDP statistics
270 National Bureau of Statistics, GDP Report Q3 - 2014, November 2014
271 All trade data in this section come from United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
database
269
55
Nigerian goods exports by destination, 2013 ($ millions)

United States
India
Brazil
Spain
Netherlands
Germany
France
United Kingdom
South Africa
Japan
Value of exports
14,272
12,504
9,440
7,274
6,672
4,856
4,824
4,773
4,108
3,157
% of total
14%
12%
9%
7%
6%
5%
5%
5%
4%
3%
Source: UNCTAD
Nigerian exports by product group 2013
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels
Food and live animals
Manufactured goods
Machinery and transport equipment
Total
Value ($ millions)
96,283
1,922
1,615
1,238
928
102,959
Source: UNCTAD
In 2013, Nigerias five largest sources of imports were China, the US, India, France and the
UK. Over a quarter of Nigerias imports came from China; these were chiefly machinery,
transport equipment and manufactured goods. China has been Nigerias largest source of
imported goods every year since 2006, when it overtook the US.
Nigerias largest group of product imports was machinery and transport equipment, including
motor vehicles, telecommunications equipment and electric power machinery. Other
significant imports included wheat, fish and rice.
Nigerian goods imports by destination, 2013 ($ millions)
China
United States
India
France
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Germany
Republic of Korea
Belgium
South Africa
Value of exports
14,292
7,585
3,101
2,339
2,283
2,270
2,013
1,864
1,670
1,472
Source: UNCTAD
56
% of total
26%
14%
6%
4%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
Nigerian imports by product group, 2013

Product
Machinery and transport equipment
Manufactured goods
Food and live animals
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials
Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.
Total
Value ($ millions)
20,926
9,293
7,941
6,567
6,009
55,993
Source: UNCTAD
Fall in oil price dampens near-term economic outlook

Despite the new data showing the oil and gas sector accounting for a lower proportion of
GDP, it still remains crucially important to the economy. Nigeria produces over 2 million
barrels of oil per day, making it the largest producer in Africa and 12th biggest in the world.272
The oil and gas sector make up almost 95% of the countrys exports; it is the source of 90%
of foreign exchange earnings and in recent years has contributed up to 75% of the
governments revenue (though this has been on a downward trend). The steep fall of over
50% in oil prices since mid-2014 therefore has large and important ramifications for the
countrys economic stability.
Oil price (Brent crude)

US$ per barrel, daily data
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
Jan '14
Apr '14
Jul '14
Oct '14
Jan '15
Source: FT
As a result of reduced revenues from oil, the governments 2015 budget plans include an 8%
reduction in expenditure.273 Most of the cuts are planned to come from a sharp reduction in
capital expenditure, while recurrent expenditure such as personnel costs rises.274 The
budget also includes a cut to the GDP growth forecast for 2015 from 6.4% to 5.5%.275 These
plans are based on a reference price for oil of $65 still well above the price as of 9 January
2015 of around $50.
Despite the existence of the Excess Crude Account (ECA), a fund designed to provide a
buffer to state finances in times of volatile oil price movements, and the creation of a
Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) in 2012, fiscal buffers are limited. Even while oil prices
remained above $100 per barrel the combined balance of the ECA and SWF fell from $11
billion at the end of 2012 to just $3 billion at the end of 2013 due to lower than expected oil
272
BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2014

PwC, Nigerias 2015 budget: fiscal and macro analyses, December 2014
274 Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, Minister of Finance, An overview of the 2015 budget proposal: A transition budget,
17 December 2014 and Budget Office, An analysis of the 2015 FGN Budget, 17 December 2014
275 Nigeria forced to revise budget as oil prices remain low, BBC News, 17 December 2014
273
57
revenue resulting from oil theft and production loses.276 Reserves rose in the first half of 2014
but remain insufficient to cover any substantial or persistent shortfall in the public finances.
The fall in the oil price has also led to pressure on the countrys currency. The central bank
devalued the nairas target rate by 8% against the dollar from N155 to N168 in late
November 2014 after losing billions of dollars in foreign exchange reserves defending the
currency.277 The market rate is even lower at N184 as of 12 January 2015 and there are
serious concerns that further decline may be on the cards unless oil prices recover.
The central bank also raised interest rates in November 2014 for the first time in three years
from 12% to 13% in order to defend the currency (by making it more attractive to invest in
Nigeria).278 The decline in the value of the naira makes importing goods from abroad more
expensive. As Nigeria imports 80% of what it consumes, this is likely to push inflation up from
its current rate of around 8%.279
It is clear therefore that the short-term outlook for the Nigerian economy is precarious, with
the lower oil price translating into budgetary pressures, rising import costs, and investor
uncertainty. In many ways, Nigerias longer-term economic prospects look positive but
many challenges, such as poor infrastructure and a weak business environment remain.280
Below is a table setting out key economic statistics and forecasts for Nigeria over the period
2011 to 2019.
Economic statistics and forecasts
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
IMF forecasts (Oct. 2014)

GDP growth
%
4.9
4.3
5.4
7.0
7.3
7.2
7.1
6.9
6.9
2,612
2,835
3,082
3,416
3,677
3,824
3,970
4,080
4,167
10.8
12.2
8.5
8.3
8.7
8.2
7.5
7.0
7.0
Current account balance

% GDP
3.0
4.4
4.0
3.7
2.2
1.7
1.6
1.3
1.1
17.7
14.3
11.0
10.6
10.4
10.3
9.5
9.1
8.8
Public sector budget balance

% GDP
0.5
0.4
-2.3
-1.7
-2.2
-1.9
-2.6
-2.8
-3.2
164.8
169.3
173.9
178.7
183.6
188.7
193.9
199.2
GDP per capita

$ (mark et exch. rates)
Inflation
% (annual average)
Government revenue
% GDP
Population
millions
160.3
Source: IMF, World Economic Outlook database, October 2014
276
IMF, Nigeria: 2013 article IV consultation - staff report, April 2014, p.5
Nigeria's naira touches record low after official devaluation, Reuters, 26 November 2014
278 Well below par; The Nigerian economy, The Economist, 29 November 2014
279 Nigerias economic pain may not decide election, Reuters, 14 December 2014
280 These issues are explored in depth in section 2.2 of this paper. The country also faces major political
challenges, which are discussed in section 2.1.
277
58
4.6
Political profile
Constitution
Nigerias Constitution was promulgated in May 1999 in the context of the countrys return to
civilian rule and democracy after 16 years of authoritarian military rule.281
It is Nigerias fourth constitution since independence from Britain in 1960. The previous
Constitutions were agreed in 1960, 1966 and 1979. Large parts of all three were regularly
suspended due to a series of military coups.
In the 1979 Constitution, Nigeria moved from a British-style political system based on cabinet
government and headed by a prime minister to a system that more closely resembled the US
political system, with a president at the head of government. The 1999 Constitution
embodied the same choice.
All four post-independence constitutions have endorsed the principle of federalism.
While the 1999 Constitution has strong supporters, some analysts argue that further revision
is needed.282 During 2014, a government-sponsored National Conference was held the
fourth of its kind since independence. It submitted a report to President Goodluck Jonathan
in August, which included a range of proposals for constitutional reform, including some
changes to Nigerias presidential form of government. These proposals are still being
considered.283
Government
According to Europa World Plus:
The executive powers of the Federation are vested in the President, who is the Head
of State, the Chief Executive of the Federation and the Commander-in-Chief of the
Armed Forces of the Federation. The President is elected for a term of four years and
must receive not less than one-quarter of the votes cast at the election in at least twothirds of the States in the Federation and the Federal Capital Territory.
The President nominates a candidate as his associate from the same political party to
occupy the office of Vice-President. The Ministers of the Government of the Federation
are nominated by the President, subject to confirmation by the Senate. Federal
executive bodies include the Council of State, which advises the President in the
exercise of his powers. 284
In many minds, since 1999 there has been an informal arrangement in place within the ruling
PDP that provides for the rotation of the federal presidency between southerners and
northerners, known for short as zoning. But this is not explicitly provided for in either the
current Constitution or the law.
Nigerians today divide the country into six geographic zones: north-west, north-east, northcentral, south-west, south-east and south-south.
281
282
283
284
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999

I. Ayua and D.C.J. Dakas, The Federal Republic of Nigeria, International Association of Centers of Federal
Studies, n.d
Key National Conference recommendations you need to know, Premium Times, 21 August 2014. See also
section 2.1 of this paper.
Europa World online, London, Routledge. House of Commons. Retrieved 01 July 2014 from
http://www.europaworld.com/entry/ng
59
Apart from the Federal Capital Territory, there are currently 36 states within the Federation.
Europa World Plus says:
The executive powers of a State are vested in the Governor of that State, who is
elected for a four-year term and must receive not less than one-quarter of votes cast in
at least two-thirds of all local government areas in the state.285
Both the federal president and state governors can hold office for a maximum of two terms.
Under the 1999 Constitution, the Federal Capital Territory does not have its own elected
governor. The Federal President performs the role.
There are also 774 directly elected local government councils across the 36 states.286
Parliament
The National Assembly is comprised of a lower house, the 360-member House of
Representatives, and an upper house, the 109-member Senate. Members of both houses
are elected for a four-year term.
Legislation can originate in either house but must be approved by a two-thirds majority in the
house where it originates before it can be sent to the other house for approval. The bill is
subsequently presented for presidential assent. If that is refused, the bill returns to both
houses and can become law without presidential assent if it gains a two-thirds majority in
both houses.
A substantial number of the bills introduced in the National Assembly have failed to become
law or have become stuck within the legislative process and taken a long time to pass.
Each of the 36 states has its own House of Assembly. They have between 24 and 40
members, depending on how many seats a state has been allocated in the federal House of
Representatives.
Under the 1999 Constitution, the Federal Capital Territory does not have its own elected
House of Assembly. The National Assembly performs the role.287
Judiciary and legal systems
Under the 1999 Constitution, the following courts are provided for:
At the federal level Supreme Court; Court of Appeal; High Court; Sharia Court of Appeal;
Customary Court of Appeal.
At the state level High Court; Sharia Court of Appeal; Customary Court of Appeal.288
Chief Judges are nominated on the recommendation of a National Judicial Council.289
As the names of the courts described above suggest, across Nigeria, three legal systems
operate, often in parallel: the common law, which is derived from English law, as introduced
285
286
287
288
289
The Federal Capital Territory has its own High Court, Sharia Court of Appeal and Customary Court of Appeal.
60
during the colonial period; customary law, which is derived from the principles and practices
implemented by Nigerias myriad ethnic groups; and Sharia law, which applies to Nigerias
Muslims.
Since Nigeria returned to civilian rule in 1999, 12 state governments in northern Nigeria have
fully or partially introduced Sharia law for criminal offences.290 While Sharia Courts in these
states have continued as before mainly to address property, matrimonial and inheritance
disputes, in the period since 1999 they have also dealt with cases relating to criminal acts
and public morality. Their procedures and punishments have been forcefully criticised by
local and international human rights groups.291
Main political parties
There are two main political parties contesting for office at present:
The Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)
The PDP emerged at the time of Nigerias transition to civilian rule following the death of the
military dictator General Sani Abacha in 1998. It became the vehicle for a diverse range of
politicians and retired military figures who had been opposed to Abacha.
The PDP rallied around the candidacy of Olusegun Obasanjo and he and the party won
decisive victories in the 1999 presidential and National Assembly elections. Since then the
party has won a clean sweep of elections in 2003, 2007 and 2011. Since 1999, it is the only
party that has come anywhere near to representing all parts of the country, although it is still
relatively weak in the north and has never come close to monopolising power at all levels of
government.292
The PDP has always been more oriented towards patronage politics than constructing an
ideological programme for government.293 It has accommodated reformers but they have
often ultimately found themselves out of favour. At various times including in recent years
it has seemed possible that factional rivalries might destroy the party. However, bolstered by
the benefits of political incumbency, to date it has hung together and remains a formidable
electoral machine. The party could yet deliver a second presidential election victory in
February 2015 for its candidate, President Goodluck Jonathan.
The All Progressives Congress (APC)
The APC is the latest combination of forces opposed to the PDP and hoping to end its grip
on power. Established in 2013, its factions mainly consist of the legacy parties that have
come together in search of victory in the 2015 elections.
The Congress for Progressive Change (CPC) is the party of ex-military leader Muhammadu
Buhari, who has unsuccessfully contested the last three presidential elections. It is
overwhelmingly a party of the north.
Buhari formerly led the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), another northern party, but he left
it after the party accepted the 2007 election result. The party has since re-joined the
opposition ranks but has it lost support since Buharis departure.
290
291
292
293
Zamfara, Kaduna, Sokoto, Kano, Bauchi, Katsina, Kebbi, Jigawa, Borno, Yobe, Niger and Gombe states.
For example, see: Political Sharia? Human rights and Islamic law in northern Nigeria, Human Rights Watch,
September 2014
Jibrin. Ibrahim, The Dynamics of Competitive Party Politics, in Jibrin Ibrahim, Musa Abutudu, and Kelechi C.
Iwuamadi, eds., Elections and the Management of Diversity in Nigeria (African Governance Report III, 2011)
J. Liebowitz and J. Ibrahim, A capacity assessment of Nigerian political parties, UNDP, January 2013
61
The Action Congress of Nigeria (ACN) is a predominantly southwestern party. Its leading
figures have been Bola Tinubu, former governor of Lagos state, and until August 2014 (see
below), Nuhu Ribadu, who contested the 2011 presidential election for the party.
A faction of another party, the All Progressives Grand Alliance, has also joined the APC.294
All of these parties have formed governments at state-level. The main planks of the APC are
anti-corruption, job creation and the restoration of internal peace and security.295 However,
sceptics allege that not much distinguishes it ideologically from the PDP. 296 Muhammadu
Buhari will be its candidate in the February 2015 presidential contest.
Political leaders
Dr Goodluck Ebele Jonathan President
Born in 1957 in the oil-rich Niger Delta in the south of Nigeria, Goodluck Jonathan is a
Christian from the Ijaw ethnic group. He is close to Ayodele Oritsejafor, a Pentecostal priest
who is president of the Christian Association of Nigeria.297 Jonathan went into politics as a
member of the PDP in the late 1990s and became governor of Bayelsa state in 2005.
A supporter of former president Olusegun Obasanjo, in 2007 he was picked as the partys
vice-presidential candidate. The death in office of northerner President Umaru Yar-Adua in
2010, led to him becoming President. Having originally said that he would not do so, he
stood successfully as the PDPs presidential candidate in the 2011 elections and is standing
again in 2015.
Many northerners believe that by standing in 2011, he tore up the informal zoning
arrangement established since 1999, in which northerners and southerners alternate holding
the presidency.298 He may not have a particularly dynamic reputation as a leader and has
been viewed by many as an accidental president, but powerful interests are aligned behind
him.299
Namadi Sambo Vice President
Born in 1952, Namadi Sambo was elected as the PDP governor of Kaduna state in 2007. In
2011 he was selected by Jonathan as his running mate. Because he came from the north
and was a Muslim, he was viewed as helping to create a balanced ticket.
A supporter of former military president Ibrahim Babangida, he is not viewed as having a
strong personal power base and there was speculation that he might not be Jonathans
running mate in 2015.300 However, in the end, he was retained. In 2012 his family home was
attacked by Boko Haram.
David Mark
Born in 1948 in the mid-eastern Benue state, David Mark is yet another ex-military man in
politics. He is a member of the PDP and has been the President of the Senate since 2007,
which makes him the third most senior member of the current government.
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
J. Liebowitz and J. Ibrahim, A capacity assessment of Nigerian political parties, UNDP, January 2013
Nigerias opposition: a united front, Economist, 2 August 2013
Policies, what policies?, Africa Confidential, 21 November 2014
2014, p5
Profile: Nigerias Goodluck Jonathan, BBC News Online, 11 September 2013. The President has a presence
on Facebook and Twitter.
Jury still out on record of accidental president, Financial Times, 22 November 2011
Profile: Namadi Sambo, Nigerias new vice-president, BBC News Online, 18 May 2010
62
A loyal backer of both Ibrahim Babangida and Olusegun Obasanjo when they were
president, there has been speculation that he might run for president himself at some point in
the future, but currently he appears satisfied with his current role, which he hopes to return to
after the elections.301
Nuhu Ribadu
Born in 1960 in the eastern Adamawa state, Nuhu Ribadu came to prominence after he was
appointed chair of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in 2003 by
former president Olusegun Obasanjo. He held the post until 2007 when he was suspended.
He was subsequently replaced.
During his tenure as chair of the EFCC he launched a series of high-profile anti-corruption
legal cases against powerful political figures, although critics accused him of failing to target
close allies of President Obasanjo. He briefly went into exile but returned to stand as the
ACNs presidential candidate in the 2011 elections.
He subsequently became a senior figure in the APC but in August 2014 defected back to the
PDP, his original political home.302 He is the PDPs candidate for the governorship of
Adamawa state in the February 2015 elections.
Muhammadu Buhari
Born in 1942, Muhammadu Buhari is a northerner from Katsina state who forged a career in
the army. He became president after a military coup in December 1993. In 1995 he was
forced from office by a rival army faction led by Ibrahim Babangida. His time in power is
remembered for human rights abuses but also for a strong stance against corruption.
Buhari has unsuccessfully stood for the presidency as a civilian three times and will do so
again in 2015 as the candidate of the APC. He has never accepted the legitimacy of his
defeat in the 2007 elections.
Known as a devout Muslim and for his personal probity, he has considerable grassroots
support in the north but has powerful enemies within Nigerias elite, where political victories
are still won or lost.303
Yemi Osinbajo
Born in Lagos in 1957 and a relative newcomer to frontline politics, Yemi Osinbajo has been
selected by Muhammadu Buhari as his vice-presidential running mate for the 2015
elections.304 A pastor of the Redeemed Christian Church of God in Lagos, his selection by
Buhari seems in large part designed to ensure that the APC has a balanced ticket in the
forthcoming elections.
Both a lawyer and academic by profession, he served as Attorney-General of Lagos state
during the governorship of Bola Tinubu.
Bola Tinubu
Born in Lagos in 1952, Bola Tinubu was elected governor of Lagos state in 1999 on behalf of
the Alliance for Democracy, which became the dominant force within the ACN when it was
301
302
303
304
Whos who: Colonel David Mark President of the Senate, Africa Confidential, n.d.; Jonathan faces the
north, Africa Confidential, 13 June 2014
Nigerias Nuhu Ribadu in profile, BBC News Online, 25 March 2014
Nigerias Muhammadu Buhari in profile, BBC News Online, 18 April 2011
His low profile may explain why several different spellings of his name are in circulation. B. Awoyemi, Making
a case for Pastor (Prof) Yemi Oshibajo to be chosen as the APC VP candidate, saharareporters.com, 15
December 2014
63
formed in 2006, serving two terms in office until 2007. He is viewed as having been a
dynamic governor who got things done during his eight-year tenure.
Tinubu was a powerful godfather to the ACN, and has continued this role with the APC. He
is widely believed to retain presidential or vice-presidential ambitions but has so far had to
content himself with the role of kingmaker. He has a wide-range of business interests.305
Lamido Sanusi
Born in 1961, Lamido Sanusi is a member of the Fulani royal family, whose court is based in
Kano. A banker and Islamic scholar, he came to prominence in 2009 when President Umaru
YarAdua appointed him as governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria. He rapidly acquired a
reputation as a reformer and critic of official corruption, including in the petroleum industry. In
late 2013, he alleged that US$50 billion worth of oil revenue (later reduced to $20 billion) had
disappeared between January 2012 and July 2013.306 President Goodluck Jonathan
suspended Sanusi from his post in February 2014 amid counter-allegations of graft against
him.
The dispute has been largely overtaken by Sanusis unexpected crowning as the 14th Emir of
Kano in June 2014, which involved by-passing the son of his predecessor. He has taken the
title Muhammad Sanusi II.307 Sanusi has joined the ranks of those traditional rulers in Nigeria
who are able to use their position to exert a degree of public influence.308 Since then,
relations with President Jonathan appear to have improved.
Edwin Clark
Born in 1932 in Nigerias south-south, Edwin Clark is a close advisor to President Goodluck
Jonathan. Briefly Minister of Information when Yakubu Jack Gowon was military ruler (196675) and a former member of the Senate, today he is chairman of the Delta State Elders
Forum. He is viewed as a strong (and sometimes controversial) defender of Ijaw the fourth
largest ethnic group in Nigeria interests.309
Others
Ex-presidents Ibrahim Babangida (1985-93) and Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007)
continue to exercise much influence behind the scenes. They remain (not always loyal)
godfathers of the PDPs extended family. Theophilius Danjuma is another important actor
in PDP politics.
An influential political figure who defected from the PDP is Atiku Abubakar. Formerly vicepresident under Obasanjo, he fell out with him during their second term in office and ended
up unsuccessfully contesting the presidential election in 2007 as the candidate of the ACN.
He is now a senior figure within the APC, losing out on the partys 2015 presidential election
nomination to Muhammadu Buhari.
Also prominent within the APC are the governors of Kano state, Lagos state and Rivers
state, Rabiu Kwankwaso, Babatunde Fashola and Rotimi Amaechi. A recent recruit from
the PDP is Aminu Tambuwal, the speaker of the House of Representatives.
305
306
307
308
309
Whos who: Mr Bola Ahmed Tinubu, Africa Confidential, n.d.

Western oil companies have also been accused of complicity in corrupt oil deals in Nigeria. Nigeria/Italy:
follow the money, Africa Confidential, 24 October 2014
Letter from Africa: Will Emir Lamido Sanusi ruffle feathers?, BBC News Online, 25 June 2014
Another powerful traditional ruler is the Sultan of Sokoto.
Whos who: Edwin Clark, Africa Confidential
64
Finally, there is Aliko Dangote, Africas richest man. Born in 1957 in Kano state to an
affluent family, he has made his billions through cement, sugar and flour and is now moving
into the oil business.310
While he avoids overtly partisan politics and places much emphasis on philanthropic
interventions through his private foundation, Dangote has made contributions to political
projects, including the presidential campaigns of former President Obasanjo and, after his
retirement, Obasanjos presidential library for which the Dangote Group reportedly received
valuable government concessions in return.311
4.7
The Nigerian military
Overview
Nigeria has, on paper, the best-funded and best-equipped forces in West Africa.312 It has the
largest armed forces in West Africa, numbering 80,000, of whom 62,000 are in the Army and
10,000 in the Air Force.313 It is one of Africas leading peacekeeping nations. In the last
twenty years Nigeria has deployed troops to Liberia, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Mali
and Somalia.314
Nigerias prime security concerns are internal: combating Boko Haram in the north; piracy in
the Gulf of Guinea and instability in the Niger Delta. However, defence experts point to a lack
of effective counter-insurgency and intelligence-gathering capabilities and a lack of
equipment suited for counter-insurgency.
Equipment
While the Nigerian military has a wide array of equipment, including tanks, fighter jets and
naval vessels, it is unclear how much is operational. Questions abound about the
serviceability of equipment.
The Military Balance 2014 notes that on paper, it maintains the broadest spectrum of
capabilities in the region, but in reality much of its equipment is unfit to be deployed for
prolonged periods of time.315 This reflects the view of the Foreign Affairs select committee,
which in a recent report on West Africa was told that much of the Air Force fleet is not
currently operational.316 Many of the Navys vessels are deemed to be in poor condition.317
What equipment Nigeria has tends to be better suited to state-on-state warfare than counterinsurgency, according to The Military Balance, although defence experts note recent efforts
to improve this situation with programmes to refit and repair current equipment, and to
purchase equipment more suited to counter-insurgency for example, new attack
helicopters.
Piracy and oil theft in the Niger Delta and Gulf of Guinea has also prompted the procurement
of new inshore and offshore patrol vessels, including a former US Coast Guard cutter and
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
In April 2014, Forbes estimated Dangotes net worth at US $24.4 billion.

Whos who: Mr Aliko Dangote, Africa Confidential; S. Allison, Cementing Africas future, Good Governance
Africa, 1 June 2014; for the work of his foundation, see the Dangote Groups touching lives webpage.
Nigeria was among the top 10 contributors of troops to multilateral peace operations in terms of numbers of
troops (excluding ISAF in Afghanistan) in 2013, according to SIPRI Yearbook 2014, figure 3.3
Foreign Affairs Committee, The UK's response to extremism and instability in North and West Africa, 21 March
2014, HC 86-I 2013-14, para 57
Nigerian Armed Forces, Defence Web, 7 October 2013
65
two new offshore patrol vessels from China. The government has approved the acquisition of
new fighter aircraft.
Combating Boko Haram
President Jonathan overhauled his military high command in early 2014. He sacked his Chief
of Defence Staff and the chiefs of Army staff and Navy staff. He promoted the chief of Air
Force Staff, Air Marshal Alex Sabundu Badeh, to Chief of Defence Staff. Reports at the time
suggested that in-fighting between the chiefs in the conduct of operations against Boko
Haram prompted the sweeping changes.318 By the end of 2014, the army was claiming a
number of successes against Boko Haram, particularly in Adamawa state.319 However, it
continued to experience serious reverses too most notably, losing the border town of Baga
in Borno state in early January 2015 (see below).
The Government set up an Army-led Joint Task Force under Operation Restore Order in the
north-east in 2011. It brought together the military, state security services and the police. The
Joint Task Force was replaced in mid-2013 with a newly formed Army division, based in
Maiduguri in Borno state. The 7th Division numbers around 8,000 troops and draws on
elements of 1st Mechanised Brigade, 21st Armoured Brigade and 23rd Armoured Brigade. It
reports to the chief of Army staff.320 However, it was claimed that many of the commanders
and units operating under the 7th Division appeared to be the same people as under the Joint
Task Force.321
Islamist militants have directly targeted members of the armed forces. Militants attacked the
air force base in Maiduguri in December 2013, destroying two attack helicopters. A daylight
assault on Giwa barracks in the same city in March 2014 resulted in hundreds of detained
individuals being released.
Human rights organisations have documented serious human rights violations by soldiers in
the immediate aftermath of the attack.322 Nigerian troops are reported to suffer low morale,
and American officials have suggested that some of them have been afraid to engage.323
Amid concerns about desertion, the Nigerian defence spokesman cautioned troops against
mutiny in August 2014.324 A number of soldiers are currently being court-martialled for
mutiny; at least 60 death sentences were handed out in December 2014 for serious offences
by military personnel.325
Rise of vigilante groups
Local vigilante groups to combat Boko Haram emerged in the middle of 2013 in the northeastern states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa. They have become known as the Civilian Joint
Task Force.
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
Nigeria; why Jonathan sacked Ibrahim, Ihejirika, Ezeoba, all Africa, 17 January 2014
Why Nigeria holds back in Boko Haram fight, Premium Times,
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2014, p415, 451
Many media sources continue to use the term Joint Task Force. US State Department, Nigeria Human
Rights Report 2013, p3
For further details, see sections 4.3 and 4.7 of this paper.
Testimony of Department of Defence Principal Director for African Affairs Alice Friend, Senate Subcommittee
on African Affairs, #BringBackOurGirls: Addressing the Threat of Boko Haram, May 15, 2014. US policy
towards Boko Haram is explored further in a Congressional Research Service report, Nigerias Boko Haram:
Frequently Asked Questions, 10 June 2014, R435558
Nigerian security forces deployed in north-eastern states likely to desert, raising risk of further Boko Haram
expansion, IHS Global Insight, 18 August 2014
Why army holds back in Boko Haram fight, Premium Times, 31 December 2014; Nigeria sentences another
four soldiers to death, Anadolu Agency, 25 December 2014
66
Although unconnected to the military, local and state authorities are training and using the
Civilian Joint Task Force to provide security: maintaining checkpoints and providing
intelligence to the security services.
Borno state government is using members of the Civilian Joint Task Force to provide security
at public schools, while the Adamawa state government announced plans in mid-November
2014 to train 10,000 people to join the Civilian Joint Task Force and assist security forces in
the fight against Boko Haram.326
International support
The UK hosted a conference on tackling Boko Haram in June 2014, attended by Nigeria,
Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Benin and the US, France, Canada, the UN, the EU and African
Union. The UK, US and France agreed to provide tactical training and advice to Nigerian
forces engaged in the fight against Boko Haram.
At the conference, Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger agreed to deploy a 2,800 strong
(each contributing 700 troops) multinational task force, centred on the Lake Chad area, to
combat Boko Haram. However, what this amounted to in practice has never been clear. In
January 2015, Boko Haram attacked and seized control of the border town of Baga, the town
where the multinational task force had its notional headquarters.327 Government forces did
not put up a fight and hundreds of civilians in the town and surrounding areas were killed by
the group. The future of the force is now in question, although this major set-back could also
provoke more concerted action.328 Chad and Cameroon have been cooperating more closely
in recent days, with a significant Chadian force being despatched to Cameroon. There is also
talk of the African Union becoming directly involved, as it has been in Somalia.329
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Benin also agreed in June 2014 to set up a Regional
Intelligence Fusion Unit to enable them to share intelligence on Boko Haram. The UK, US
and France undertook to ensure that it is operationalised quickly and to provide technical
expertise to support the unit.330
Niger Delta and piracy
Another Joint Task Force, set up in 2006, is responsible for combating piracy and oil theft in
the Niger Delta. Operation Pulo Shield consists of members of the army, navy and police.
The Joint Task Forces mandate is to stop illegal oil bunkering (oil theft), protect oil and gas
facilities and installations and secure the environment. In 2013 the naval component killed 82
pirates and conducted 1,025 anti-oil bunkering patrols, while the army component destroyed
1,951 illegal oil refineries, over 69,000 pieces of oil bunkering equipment, over 1,800 surface
tanks and 82 tanker trucks. The Joint Task Force arrested 1,857 people suspected of
stealing crude oil.331
Piracy in the Gulf of Guinea continues to pose a problem for seafarers. The International
Maritime Bureau reports that pirates are often well armed and violent. Vessels along the
326
327
328
329
330
331
Nigerias vigilantes take on Boko Haram, BBC News, 24 July 2013; Nigerian vigilantes aim to rout Boko
Haram, Al Jazeera, 31 May 2014; Further examples of local and state use of the Civilian Joint Task Force
can be found on Information Nigeria
Boko Haram seizes army base in Nigeria town of Baga, BBC News Online, 4 January 2015
Boko Haram crisis: African Union to discuss multinational force, BBC News Online, 16 January 2015
Foreign Secretary announces UK support following Ministerial on Boko Haram, Foreign and Commonwealth
Office, 12 June 2014
Nigeria destroys 1,951 illegal oil refineries, arrests 1,857 in 2013, Defence Web, 17 January 2014
67
coast, rivers, ports and anchorages have been targeted. However the Bureau also says that
the number of reported incidents dropped noticeably to 13 in the first nine months of 2014
compared with 29 in the same period in 2013.332
4.8
Armed militant groups
Boko Haram
Overview
Since 2010, the Islamic terrorist group called Boko Haram has become by far the biggest
threat to Nigerias internal security. Meaning Western Education is forbidden, Boko Harams
formal name is Jamaat ahl al-sunna li-l dawa wal-jihad, which translates as People
Committed to the Propagation of the Prophets Teachings and Jihad.
Estimates of the membership of the group range widely, with some arguing it may be as high
as 50,000.333. But there is uncertainty over how far it is really a single organisation, rather
than a loose coalition of affiliated groups.334 A senior Nigerian official has described it as a
franchise.335
Its base has always been north-east Nigeria in particular, Borno state. However, while most
of its armed attacks have taken place in the north-east of the country, it has undertaken
operations elsewhere too including Kano, Jos and the capital, Abuja.
Some observers claim that Boko Haram has links to other jihadi armed groups inspired by alQaida in the wider West African region and beyond. While this may be so, the majority view
is that its agendas are predominantly driven by local grievances rather than by global jihad.336
It appears that a substantial number of Boko Harams leaders and members come from the
Kanuri ethnic group and that there may be a civil war dimension to the phenomenon. Kanuri
commoners have reportedly gravitated towards the group in significant numbers,
disaffected by a Kanuri oligarchy which has lost much of its legitimacy in the course of the
economic crisis that has affected the north-east.337
Origins and growth since 2010
Boko Haram first emerged in the late 1990s as a small Salafist sect under the leadership of a
preacher called Mohammed Yusuf.338 Initially it was known as the Yusufiyya. It drew on the
resonance of older jihadi movements going back as far as the establishment of the Sokoto
Caliphate by Usman dan Fodio in the early 1800s.339
Until 2009 its activities were peaceful. However, after members were prevented by the police
from attending a funeral in Borno state, leading to violent confrontation, Boko Haram
launched an uprising. The security forces responded equally violently, killing hundreds of
332
333
334
335
336
337
338
339
EU Naval Force, IMO warn of continued, although diminished, piracy threat, Defence Web, 28 November
2014
J. Zenn, Boko Haram: recruitment, financing, and arms trafficking in the Lake Chad region, CTC Sentinel, 31
October 2014
E. Donnelly, Nigerias child catchers, The World Today, June/July 2014
R. Pantucci, The franchising of Boko Haram, RUSI Newsbrief, 19 May 2014
M. Smith, Boko Haram is no global terror group, Guardian, 14 May 2014
M. Baca, The tragedy of Borno state: local dimensions of Boko Harams insurgency, African Arguments, 19
December 2014
Salafists believe that Muslim societies must be purified of modern values and systems and returned to those
that reputedly applied during early Islam.
R. Pantucci and M. Cadoux-Hudson, Nigerias opaque Jihad: Insurgency in Africas richest nation, RUSI
Analysis, 16 May 2014
68
suspected members of the group. Mohammed Yusuf was captured and died in police
custody.
For a brief interlude it appeared as if Boko Haram had collapsed. This turned out to be
incorrect. In 2010 it re-emerged under a new leader, Muhammed Abubakar Shekau. Shekau
had broken away from Yusuf for a period and been one of the leaders of the Nigerian
Taliban, but later the two reconciled.340
Under Shekaus leadership, large-scale violent attacks have become its preferred tactic
more often than not against civilians, although politicians and the military have also been
targeted.341 Thousands have died as a result of Boko Harams attacks and three states in the
north Borno, Yobe and Adamawa have been placed in a state of emergency.342 According
to one politician, by early 2015 at least 70% of the north of Borno state had fallen to Boko
Haram.343
Tactics evolve
Kidnappings have become increasingly common. The main goal is usually to trade them in
exchange for money or the release of wives and children of group members taken into
custody by the Nigerian authorities. The most notorious case in point was the kidnapping of
270 school girls in Chibok, Borno state, in April 2014. Another major kidnapping took place in
Gumsuri, a village 20 kilometres away from Chibok, in December 2014. This time 185
people, including women and children, were kidnapped.344
In recent months, Boko Haram has started to engage the security forces much more directly
and seek to expand its control over territory. It has held a number of towns for considerable
periods. For a period in late 2014, there were fears that the capital of Borno state, Maiduguri,
might fall to Boko Haram, but this risk subsequently receded.345
The group has also begun to carry out suicide bombings, some of them involving children of
both sexes.346 A ten-year old was reportedly involved in a series of attacks involving three
female suicide bombers in January 2015.347
There have been reports of rank-and-file soldiers deserting to Boko Haram or leaking
information to the group.348
Over the last year, Boko Haram has also clashed on numerous occasions with soldiers on
the Cameroon side of the border, seeking to control border towns in order to facilitate
weapon supply lines and secure its rear-bases, signalling that it is now a threat to the wider
Lake Chad region.349 Boko Haram has also carried out kidnappings in Cameroon. Cameroon
has undertaken ground operations against the group and conducted some air strikes against
it. But there are concerns that excesses committed by the Cameroon Army in the context of
340
341
342
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
Boko Haram, Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism (posted 21 July 2014)
E. Donnelly, Nigerias child catchers, The World Today, June/July 2014
See also section 4.3 of this paper.
Boko Haram: army repels attack in Borno state, BBC News Online, 14 January 2015
Nigeria must brace for surge in Boko Haram attacks, analysts say, dpa-AFX International ProFeed, 19
December 2014
Special report: North-east Nigeria on the brink, Nigeria Security Network, 2 September 2014; Military arrests
soldiers for being moles for Boko Haram, Vanguard, 14 October 2014
R. Pantucci and M. Cadoux-Hudson, Nigerias opaque Jihad: Insurgency in Africas richest nation, RUSI
Analysis, 16 May 2014
Boko Haram crisis: Nigerian archbishop accuses West, BBC News Online, 12 January 2015
What now after Nigerias Boko Haram ceasefire fiasco?, BBC News Online, 3 November 2014
October 2014
69
its counter-insurgency operations could strengthen Boko Harams position amongst the local
population on that side of the border.350
Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad and Niger have established a multinational military task force to
combat Boko Haram in the region. However, in January 2015, Boko Haram attacked and
seized control of the border town of Baga, the town where the multinational task force had its
official headquarters.351 The force did not put up a fight and hundreds of civilians in the town
and surrounding areas were killed by the group.352 At the time of writing, Baga reportedly
remains in the hands of Boko Haram.
Ideology and motivations
Boko Haram has announced the creation of an Islamic Caliphate.353 Some believe that it
may be looking to recreate the KanemBorno Caliphate, whose heyday was a thousand
years or so ago.354
This strongly suggests that the group is now taking inspiration from the self-declared Islamic
State in Syria and Iraq. But there is little hard evidence as yet of direct links with the Islamic
State. In November 2014, a suicide bomber killed at least 23 people in a procession of Shia
Muslims in Yobe state, suggesting to some that Boko Haram and its affiliates may be
becoming more sectarian in approach.355
While Boko Harams tactics have changed dramatically over the last five years or so, there
are important ideological continuities between the group as it operated under Mohammed
Yusuf and under his successor.
For Yusuf, the main impulse behind Boko Haram was to cleanse the north of un-Islamic
ideas and practices that for him originated in British colonialism and which the post-colonial
Nigerian state had perpetuated. Western education was viewed as symbolising this
impurity. It called for the establishment of an Islamic state under Sharia Law in Nigeria. The
traditional Muslim leadership in Nigeria, which had retained considerable influence under a
colonial system of indirect rule, is viewed by the group as corrupt and illegitimate.
Muhammed Abubakar Shekaus agenda is broadly similar to that of his predecessor,
although exponentially more violent.
However, it is not clear how far its members are motivated mainly by ideology. Boko Harams
most immediate demand today is the release of all its detained members by the Nigerian
authorities. As with so many armed insurgencies, the reasons for becoming involved can be
many and varied: for example, involvement may be primarily a way of seeking revenge for
real or perceived injustices by the security forces; or it may simply be a means of survival in a
region that is suffering a deep-rooted economic crisis and chronic insecurity.
350
351
352
353
354
355
Boko Harams large-scale attacks in Cameroon indicate protracted campaign of violence and severe kidnap
and death risks, IHS Global Insight, 29 December 2014
Boko Haram seizes army base in Nigeria town of Baga, BBC News Online, 4 January 2015
Nigerian town seized by Boko Haram part of Caliphate: leader, news.yahoo.com, 24 August 2014
October 2014
Suicide bomber kills 20 Shia Muslims in Nigeria, telegraph.co.uk, 3 November 2014
70
There are rumours and allegations that behind the scenes the group has powerful political
sponsors and links to criminal networks, but these have proven difficult to corroborate.356
Negotiations
In recent years there have been periods when the Nigerian authorities have sought to hold
negotiations with representatives of Boko Haram. However, it is often unclear who Boko
Haram representatives really represent.
In 2013 there were talks with Momammed Marwan, who claimed to be second-in-command
to Shekau. Some observers questioned the extent to which this was true and the
negotiations eventually foundered. 357 In October 2014, the authorities announced that a
ceasefire, brokered by Chad, had been agreed with Boko Haram and that the 219 schoolgirls
kidnapped in Chibok in April and still in its custody would soon be released. However, it all
proved too good to be true and Boko Haram attacks continued unabated.358 Indeed, Boko
Haram forces briefly took Chibok before being forced back.
There have also been claims that there is more than one Muhammed Abubakar Shekau his
death has been announced on more than one occasion.359 These episodes highlight the
difficulty in finding the right people to negotiate with in the event of future peace initiatives.
Ansaru
In January 2012, a group called Jama'atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis Sudan (Vanguards for
the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa known for short as Ansaru) announced that it had
split from Boko Haram. Its leader is reported to be Khalid al-Barnawi.360
Information about this group is relatively limited and not always reliable. Some believe that
Ansaru has separated from Boko Haram over ideology, with the former much more
interested in global jihad in practice meaning co-operation with Al-Qaida in the Islamic
Maghreb, the main jihadi group in the West African Sahel.
However, others believe that its differences with Boko Haram are mainly derived from
feelings that the latter is overly-dominated by the Kanuri ethnic group. Ansaru, by this
interpretation, has been viewed as a vehicle for the rival Fulani ethnic group. Today, there is
considerable uncertainty about whether Ansaru is still a separate group, or whether it has
again become a franchise of Boko Haram.361
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta
The Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) has been the most active
and best known of the armed groups operating in the oil-rich region in southeast Nigeria.
Described as a loose coalition of militant groups, factions, and cults, it first emerged in
2005.362 Its leaders included Jomo Gbomo, General Tompolo and Henry Okah. Today, its
356
357
358
359
360
361
362
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), pp132, 136. A Nigerian Senator, a former
Borno state governor and an ex-Chief of Army Staff have been accused by various sources of being sponsors
of Boko Haram. See: How terror twists the vote, Africa Confidential, 12 September 2014; Australian
negotiator insists Modo Sheriff Ihejirika sponsor Boko Haram, exonerates Buhari, el-Rufai, Sahara Reporters,
31 August 2014; In search of Dr Stephen Davis, Daily Trust, 11 September 2014
A. Noakes, Nigerias Boko Haram ceasefire deal: too good to be true?, African Arguments, 22 October 2014
The many deaths of Abubakar Shekau, Africa in the News, Royal African Society, 3 October 2014
Boko Haram, Janes World Insurgency and Terrorism (posted 21 July 2014)
R. Pantucci, The franchising of Boko Haram, RUSI Newsbrief, 19 May 2014; Boko Haram, Janes World
Insurgency and Terrorism (posted 21 July 2014)
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (posted
16 July 2014)
71
main leader appears to be Jomo Gbomo. Its core programme has centred on securing
compensation for communities affected by environmental degradation in the Niger Delta and
a higher share of oil revenues for the region, as well as the release of detained leaders.
Campbell asserts that the vast majority of the estimated 33 million residents of the Delta
have benefited little from the oil production in the region.363
At times it has also called for the withdrawal of Nigerian security personnel and oil
companies from the region. According to Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Centre:
MEND waged a damaging guerrilla campaign against the Nigerian security services
and foreign companies - primarily multi-national energy companies - operating in the
Niger Delta, in pursuit of a greater share of oil and gas revenues. Although MEND's
populist credentials were eroded as members become associated with corrupt
politicians and kidnapping for profit, the organisation established itself as a severe
security threat in the Niger Delta and the greatest militant expression of popular
disaffection with the government and international corporations. 364
In 2009 most of MENDs leaders agreed to participate in a government-sponsored amnesty

programme and declared a ceasefire. Although some MEND commanders returned to armed
attacks in 2010 and there were further operations in its name during 2013 and 2014, levels of
violence in the Niger Delta reduced significantly following the amnesty.
As Boko Harams attacks have escalated, there have also been threats by MEND to
undertake actions in defence of Christianity, although none have so far occurred. While
levels of violence are still relatively low in the region, observers say that they have risen
during 2014 and there remains a significant risk that they could escalate still further if
differences between northern and southern parts of Nigerias political elite spiral out of
control in the course of the 2015 presidential and legislative elections. In early January 2015,
MEND publicly endorsed the presidential bid of the APCs Muhammadu Buhari.365
4.9
The Nigerian diaspora
Size, location and character

Although there is general agreement that the Nigerian diaspora is large and spread far and
wide, there is no single authoritative source on its size or location. Estimates of its total size
vary from just over 1 million to 20 million people.366
It is often claimed that the largest concentrations of people of Nigerian heritage are to be
found in the North America and Europe, although this has also been challenged, with one
commentator estimating that 75% of the diaspora is based in other African countries, Asia
and the Middle East. However, he argues that these emigrants are less educated and more
likely to lose contact with their homeland.367
363
364
365
366
367
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), p65-6
Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), Janes Terrorism and Insurgency Centre (posted
16 July 2014)
MEND endorses Buharis presidential bid, This Day, 7 January 2015
B. Mberu and R. Pongou, Nigeria: multiple forms of mobility in Africas demographic giant,
migrationpolicy.org, 30 June 2010
Chukwuma Soludo, Is Nigeria losing her 17 million diaspora?, This Day Live, 4 February 2013
72
While there is certainly a significant element of brain drain to North America and Europe (in
2007 the estimated migration rate of Nigerians with tertiary education was 36%), migration
from Nigeria has been primarily driven by poverty and, to a lesser extent, conflict.368
Nigerians are well represented amongst the African migrants involved in clandestine, risky
movements towards Europe, including by sea. For example, the Nigerian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs reported in 2008 that there were at least 59,000 Nigerians without valid travelling
documents in North Africa, trying to get to Western Europe. Nigeria is also an important
centre for human trafficking of women and children to other countries.369
A focus on patterns of migration since independence should also not obscure the fact that
there was large-scale forced migration between 1400 and 1900 as a result of the slave trade.
One estimate puts the number of people enslaved and transported from what is now Nigeria
at around two million.370
Remittances
Figures for the scale of remittances to Nigeria from todays diaspora are also uncertain,
although it is clear that the country is the largest recipient of remittances in sub-Saharan
Africa.371 The World Bank has reportedly estimated that Nigeria received about US $21 billion
in remittances in 2012 about 10% of its Gross National Product. The majority of this sum
was remitted from the US and the UK.372
It is reasonable to assume that remittances currently play the same important role in helping
to sustain many households as they do in other African countries, although concerns have
been expressed that the level of support may tail off as family connections weaken over
successive generations.373 The south-east and south-west of Nigeria are reported to benefit
particularly strongly from remittance inflows from North America and Europe.374 Smaller sums
make their way to northern Nigeria from the Gulf States.375
Nigerian government policies
The Nigerian authorities have established a range of policies and institutions in order to
maintain and strengthen ties with the diaspora.
In 2001 the Nigerians in the Diaspora Organization was established. It now has branches
across North America and Europe. In 2003 the Nigerian National Volunteer Service was also
created in order to promote diaspora involvement in the countrys development efforts and,
as far as possible, reverse the brain drain.
In 2002, the law was also changed to allow Nigerians abroad to hold dual citizenship. More
recently, President Goodluck Jonathan has proposed establishing a Diaspora Commission
368
369
370
371
372
373
374
375
S. Akinrinade and O. Ogen, Historicising the Nigerian diaspora: Nigerian migrants and homeland relations,
Turkish Journal of Politics, Winter 2011
73
within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs; a bill to this is end was tabled in the National Assembly
in 2010 but it is yet to become law.376
The Federal Government approved a Diaspora Bond worth US$100-300 million, to be
issued by the end of 2014, with a view to encouraging members of the diaspora to invest in
the country.377 However, the Bond does not appear to have been issued at the time of writing.
The House of Representatives, the lower house of the National Assembly, has set up a
Committee on Diaspora Affairs.378
Since 2007, 25 July has been marked as National Diaspora Day. However, these initiatives
have been criticised as at best ad hoc and pedestrian.379
It has also been claimed that diaspora engagement in the economic and political life of the
country has been held back by the way in which public authorities across Nigeria have
traditionally taken steps to privilege the rights of indigenes that is, those whose ancestors
came from a particular area over those of settlers or strangers.380 There have been calls
to amend the Constitution to outlaw discrimination against non-indigenes.381
In addition, there are calls for Nigerians abroad to be given the vote in elections. However,
although President Goodluck Jonathan has indicated his support for the idea in principle, the
Independent National Election Commission has ruled it out for the 2015 elections.382
A new unity?
The differing socio-economic origins and motivations of Nigerians migrating abroad since
1960 as highlighted earlier are, of course, further overlaid by ethnic, religious and
regional differences.
All of these factors provide valuable social networks for migrants but they render it
problematic to talk about a homogenous diaspora and inevitably they have an impact on
official efforts to mobilise it for development purposes.383
However, there are signs that advances in new technology have the potential to create new,
broader-based links around a national identity. On example is Nigerian Web Radio, a 24hour online radio station. Satellite and cable television stations aimed at the diaspora have
also been springing up.384
376
377
378
379
380
381
382
383
384
A Diaspora Commission?, Nigerian Tribune, 15 July 2014

Nigeria: diaspora bond in the offing, Business Report (South Africa), 1 July 2014
House of Representatives Committee on Diaspora Affairs
This is widely known as the state of origin policy. See: R. Chikwem, Lifting the veil of ignorance: The issue of
discrimination, ethnicity and national integration in Nigeria, n.d.; Chukwuma Soludo, Is Nigeria losing her 17
million diaspora?, This Day Live, 4 February 2013
State of residence should replace state of origin Atedo Peterside, Premium Times, 16 May 2014
Diaspora voting: still a long wait for Nigerians abroad, New Telegraph. 6 April 2014
74
The Nigerian diaspora in the UK and US

The size of the Nigerian diaspora in the UK was estimated at around 150,000 in 2009, with
approximately two-thirds living in London.385 This made Nigeria the ninth-largest source
country for migration into the UK.
In 2013, the Office of National Statistics (ONS) estimated that there were 181,000 people
living in the UK who were born in Nigeria, and 106,000 Nigerian nationals in the country.386
Workers of Nigerian origin are strongly represented in the public sector, with health and
social care a particularly significant sphere of employment.387
If the UK connection is based on obvious historical and personal ties, the primary attraction
of the US has been its reputation as a place of opportunity. The diaspora in the US has been
estimated at 150 250,000.388 Houston, Texas, is the most popular city of residence for
Nigerians in the US.389 John Campbell writes:
It has been a successful immigrant community characterized by entrepreneurship,
strong family ties and an emphasis on education. Socially, it is generally conservative
and evangelical or even Pentecostal in outlook.390
4.10
Membership of international and regional organisations
The United Nations (UN)

Nigeria became a member of the UN following independence in 1960. It has been an active
participant in UN peacekeeping and peace support operations, beginning with the
deployment of military personnel to Congo between 1960 and 1964. Other countries in which
it has participated in peace operations include Lebanon, Chad, Angola, Namibia, Cambodia,
Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Sudan (Darfur).
As at July 2014, Nigeria was providing 2,977 military and police personnel to UN operations
the seventh largest contribution.391 Nigeria was also active at the UN in promoting
decolonisation. Nigeria chaired the UNs Anti-Apartheid Committee between 1970 and 1994.
Since 1992 Nigeria has campaigned for a permanent seat on the Security Council. 392 Nigeria
was elected to the Security Council as a non-permanent member for 2014-15.
Nigeria accepted the 2002 decision of the International Court of Justice in favour of
Cameroon over the sovereignty of the oil-rich Bakassi peninsula.393
Since May 2014, the UN has designated Boko Haram and Ansaru (see above) as terrorist
organisations, and Boko Harams leader Muhammed Abubakar Shekau as a terrorist
individual.394
385
386
387
388
389
390
391
392
393
394
ONS, Population by Country of Birth & Nationality, 2013
www.migrationpolicy.org 30 June 2010
www.nigeriadiaspora.com
John Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013), ppxx
Ranking of military and police contributions to UN operations, UN website, 31 July 2014
South Africa and Egypt have lodged rival claims for a permanent African seat on the Council.
Focus on Nigerias response to ICJ ruling on the Bakassi Peninsula, IRIN News, 15 October 2002
The Al-Qaida sanctions list [accessed 9 September 2014]
75
The African Union (AU)

Nigeria was a founder member of the Organisation of African Union when it was established
in 1963, and of its successor, the AU, which was created in 2002. It is one of five African
member states that currently makes a significant contribution to AU funding. It has been
represented for much of the subsequent period on the AUs Peace and Security Commission
and has played a major role in the construction of what is called the African Peace and
Security Architecture, which is due to include an African Standby Force by the end of 2015.
Nigerian political leaders and diplomats have often been involved in AU-led mediation efforts.
Nigeria has also been prominent in efforts to promote regional economic development and
integration, including through the New Partnership for Economic Development (NEPAD).395
However, Nigeria has at times found itself at loggerheads with other countries seeking a
leading role in the AU most notably South Africa.
Nigeria unsuccessfully opposed the election of South African cabinet minister Dr Nkosazana
Dlamini-Zuma, as the new Chair of the African Union Commission in 2012.396 More recently,
Nigeria has also found itself in disagreement with South Africa over proposals to establish a
smaller, rapid reaction force (known as the African Capacity for Immediate Response to
Crises [ACIRC]) in addition to the agreed African Standby Force. South Africa favours the
proposal and a decision to go ahead was taken by the AU in January 2014.397
Deep tensions remain between the two countries as they continue to jostle for primacy within
the AU.398
In mid-January 2015, there was talk of the AU becoming involved in coordinating efforts to
combat Boko Haram, as it has been in Somalia.399
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
Nigeria was a founder member of ECOWAS on its establishment in 1975. Its headquarters
are in Abuja, the capital of Nigeria.
Nigerias relative demographic and economic power has meant that it has always been a
powerful player within the organisation. Only Cote dIvoire has come close in terms of
influence. However, at times there has also been considerable mistrust of Nigeria on the part
of some of the other member states.400
Over time, the mandate of ECOWAS has expanded well beyond sub-regional economic
matters to include the maintenance of peace and security in the neighbourhood. Nigeria has
led the way in this regard. It was central to the ECOWAS response to the outbreak of civil
war in Liberia in 1990. The ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) that was
established to bring the internal conflict there to an end was in practice a Nigerian force. It
also operated in neighbouring Sierra Leone during that countrys internal conflict. This
experience overturned the previously dominant principle within the organisation of nonintervention in the internal affairs of member states.
No doubt motivated by its own history, over the last decade or so Nigeria has also been a
strong exponent of the ECOWAS policy of zero tolerance of military coups.
395
396
397
398
399
400
Ambassadors O. Oshiru and O. George, Nigeria and the OAU/AU: A fifty years journey, May 2013
African Union: Dlamini-Zuma takes charge, Africa Confidential, 20 July 2012
African Union: South Africas volunteer force, Africa Confidential, 7 February 2014
Clash of the titans, Africa Confidential, 24 October 2014
W. O. Alli, The role of Nigeria in regional security policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja, 2012, pp13-15, 77
76
Overall, Nigeria is less predominant within the organisation than it was during the 1990s. Its
leadership in driving economic integration forward across the sub-region has been weaker
than on peace and security issues. For example, efforts to create monetary union across the
sub-region are decades behind schedule.401
However, Nigerias reputation on peace and security issues has also begun to suffer as a
result of its apparent failure to address its own growing internal threats. But the decline in its
influence within ECOWAS should not be exaggerated. Nigeria continues to be the cornerstone of ECOWAS military capabilities, providing its standby force.402
In mid-January 2015, there was talk of ECOWAS becoming more involved in coordinating
efforts to combat Boko Haram.403
The Commonwealth
Nigeria joined the Commonwealth immediately following independence in 1960. It was
actively involved in decolonisation issues within the organisation and campaigned forthrightly
for a strong stance against the Apartheid system in South Africa until 1994.
However, between 1995 and 1999 its own membership of the organisation was suspended
during the military rule of General Sani Abacha.
Between 1990 and 2000 a Nigerian, Chief Emeka Anyaoku, was the Commonwealth
Secretary-General.
The African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States (ACP)
The ACP Group was established in 1975. It comprises 79 African, Caribbean and Pacific
states, including Nigeria, all of whom are (with the sole exception of Cuba) signatories to the
Cotonou Agreement with the European Community (now the European Union).
According to the ACP Groups website, its main goals include the sustainable development
of its member states and their gradual integration into the global economy and the
establishment and consolidation of peace and stability in a free and democratic society.404
Other organisations
Nigeria is also a member of the following international organisations:
401
402
403
404
405
World Trade Organisation (joined at its establishment in 1995)
Non-Aligned Movement (joined in 1964)
Organisation of Petroleum-producing Countries (joined in 1971)405
Group of 77 (joined in 1964)
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (joined in 1986)
Monetary integration: Regional leaders set the benchmarks for a single currency, Oxford Research Group,
2011
W. O. Alli, The role of Nigeria in regional security policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja, 2012, p31
ACP Group website
Nigerias Minister of Petroleum, Mrs Diezani Alison-Madueke, was elected president of OPEC in November
2014.
77
4.11
Selected treaty ratifications

Signed/
Declared
Treaty
Ratified/Acceded/
Succeeded
Geneva Conventions
Convention (1) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field. 12 August 1949
..
Acceded
20/06/1961
Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the

Wounded and Sick in Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at
Sea. 12 August 1949
..
Acceded
20/06/1961
Acceded
20/06/1961
Acceded
20/06/1961
..
Acceded
10/10/1988
..
Acceded
10/10/1988
..
..
..
07/10/1961
..
..
30/04/1998
..
..
Convention (III) relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 12

August 1949
..
Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War. 12 August 1949
..
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International
Armed Conflicts (Protocol I). 8 June 1977
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of NonInternational Armed Conflicts (Protocol II). 8 June 1977
1949, and relating to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive
Emblem (Protocol III). 8 June 1977
UN Charter and the International Court of Justice

Declarations of Acceptance of the Obligations contained in the
Charter of the United Nations
Declaration recognizing as Compulsory the Jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice
Human Rights
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide. 9 December 1948
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination. 7 March 1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 16 December
1966
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 16 December 1966
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
16 December 1966
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women. 18 December 1979
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 10 December 1984
Convention on the Rights of the Child. 20 November 1989
Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty.
15 December 1989
78
..
Acceded
27/07/2009
..
Acceded
29/10/1993
..
Acceded
29/07/1993
..
..
..
Acceded
29/07/1993
23/04/1984
Ratified
13/06/1985
28/07/1988
26/01/1990
Ratified
Ratified
28/06/2001
19/04/1991
..
..
..
..
Signed/
Declared
Ratified/Acceded/
Succeeded
Optional Protocol the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms

of Discrimination against Women. 6 October 1999
08/09/2000
Ratified
22/11/2004
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on

the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.
25 May 2000
08/09/2000
Ratified
27/09/2010
08/09/2000
Ratified
25/09/2012
Acceded
27/07/2009
30/03/2007
Ratified
24/09/2010
30/12/2007
Ratified
24/09/2010
..
Acceded
27/07/2009
..
..
..
..
..
..
Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed

Conflict. 25 May 2000
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. 18
December 2002
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. 13
December 2006
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of Persons
with Disabilities. 13 December 2006
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from
Enforced Disappearance. 20 December 2006
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights. 10 December 2008
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
a Communications Procedure. 19 December 2011
..
Disarmament and Nuclear Non-Proliferation

Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. 1 July 1968
01/07/1968
African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. 11 April 1996
11/04/1996
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Ani-Personnel Mines and on their
Destruction. 18 September 1997
..
Convention on Cluster Munitions. 30 May 2008
12/06/2009
Arms Trade Treaty. 2 April 2013
..
Ratified
Ratified
Acceded
..
Acceded
14/10/1968
20/04/2000
27/09/2001
..
12/08/2013
Refugees
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees. 28 July 1951
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees. 31 January 1967
..
..
Acceded
Acceded
23/10/1967
02/05/1968
International Trade and Development

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 30 October
1947
18/11/1960
..
..
13/06/1992
Ratified
29/08/1994
31/10/1994
Ratified
08/07/1997
Acceded
10/12/2004
Environment
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. New
York. 9 May 1992
United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in those
Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification,
Particularly in Africa. 17 June 1994
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework on Climate
Change. 11 December 1997
79
..
Signed/
Declared
Penal Matters
Slavery Convention, signed at Geneva on 25 September 1926 and

amended by the Protocol. 7 December 1953
..
International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages. 17
December 1979
..
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings. 15 December 1997
..
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 17 July 1998
01/06/2000
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism. 9 December 1999
01/06/2000
United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized
Crime. 15 November 2000
13/12/2000
Ratified/Acceded/
Succeeded
Succd.
26/06/1961
Acceded
24/09/2013
Acceded
Ratified
24/09/2013
27/09/2001
Ratified
16/06/2003
Ratified
28/06/2001
09/12/2003
Ratified
14/12/2004
10/09/1969
Ratified
23/05/1986
13/07/1999
Ratified
23/07/2001
Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community. 3 June 1991

African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. 1 July 1991
OAU Convention on the Preventing and Combating of Terrorism,
1 July 1999
03/06/1991
31/08/1982
Ratified
Ratified
31/12/1991
22/06/1983
26/04/2002
Ratified
28/04/2002
Constitutive Act of the African Union, 7 November 2000

OAU Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption. 1 July
2003
African Charter on Elections, Democracy and Governance. 30
January 2007
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human
Rights. 1 July 2008
African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of
Internally Displaced Persons in Africa. 23 October 2009
Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). 1975; revised 24 July 1993
ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression. 22 April 1978
08/09/2000
Ratified
29/03/2001
16/12/2003
Ratified
26/09/2006
02/07/2007
Ratified
01/12/2011
22/12/2008
..
23/10/2009
Ratified
17/04/2012
24/07/1993
22/04/1978
Ratified
Ratified
01/07/1994
17/05/1979
ECOWAS Protocol on Mutual Assistance in Defence. 29 May 1981
29/05/1981
Ratified
18/04/1988
20/12/1999
..
..
21/12/2001
..
..
15/12/2000
Ratified
United Nations Convention against Corruption. 31 October 2003
Regional
OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee
Problems in Africa. 10 September 1969
African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 1 July
1990
ECOWAS Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict

Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and
Security. 20 December 1999
ECOWAS Supplementary Protocol on Democracy and Good
Governance. 21 December 2001
The Agreement of the West African Monetary Zone. 15 December
2000 [not yet launched]
..
23/08/2002
Main sources: The UN Treaty Collection:

https://treaties.un.org/pages/Treaties.aspx?id=18&subid=A&lang=en
The African Union Treaties webpage: http://www.au.int/en/treaties
The Economic Community of West African States Protocols webpage:
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/?id=protocole&lang=en
ECOWAS Annual Report 2012: http://events.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/2012-AnnualReport_Annexes_English_final.pdf
80
Select bibliography and web sources
5.1
Books
D. Booth and D. Cammack, Governance for Development in Africa: Solving Collective Action
Problems (London, 2013)
J. Campbell, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (New York, 2013)
P. Chabal, Africa: The Politics of Suffering and Smiling (London, 2009)
A. Kohli, State-directed Development. Political Power and Industrialisation in the Global
Periphery (Cambridge, 2006)
M. Mamdani, Citizen and subject: Contemporary Africa and the legacy of late colonialism
(Princeton, 1996)
R. Marshall, Political Spiritualities. The Pentecostal Revolution in Nigeria (Chicago, 2009)
A. Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Oakland, 2001)
V. Padayachee ed., The Political Economy of Africa (London, 2010)
D. Shinn and J. Eisenman, China and Africa. A Century of Engagement (Philadelphia, 2012)
5.2
Journals, articles and reports
African Development Bank, Nigeria Economic Outlook 2014

S. Akinrinade and O. Ogen, Historicising the Nigerian diaspora: Nigerian migrants and
homeland relations, Turkish Journal of Politics, Winter 2011
W. O. Alli, The role of Nigeria in regional security policy, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Abuja,
2012
Amnesty International, Welcome to hell fire. Torture and other ill-treatment in Nigeria, 18
September 2014
M. Baca, The tragedy of Borno state: local dimensions of Boko Harams insurgency, African
Arguments, 19 December 2014
J. Barna, Insecurity in context: The rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria, European Parliament
Policy Department Note 2014/113, July 2014
L. Ploch Blanchard, Nigerias Boko Haram: Frequently asked questions, Congressional
Research Service, 10 June 2014
D. Booth, No time for complacency. Getting governance right for development in Africa, in
Commonwealth Good Governance 2011/12 (London, 2011)
D. Booth, Towards politically smart, locally led development in Africa, African Arguments,
23 October 2014
J. Campbell, US policy to counter Nigerias Boko Haram, Council on Foreign Relations,
November 2014
81
R. Chikwem, Lifting the veil of ignorance: The issue of discrimination, ethnicity and national
integration in Nigeria, n.d.
C. Cummings, Nigeria: what to do when wealth doesnt mean development, whydev.org, 9
December 2014
B. Dressel and S. Dinnen, Political settlements: old wine in new bottles?, Development
Policy Centre, Policy Brief No. 9, February 2014
Foreign Affairs Committee, The UKs response to extremism and instability in North and
West Africa, HC 86, 7th Report, Session 2013-14, 21 March 2014, 2 Vols
Human Rights Watch, Political Sharia? Human rights and Islamic law in northern Nigeria,
September 2014
Human Rights Watch, Those Terrible Weeks in Their Camp: Boko Haram Violence against
Women and Girls in Northeast Nigeria, October 2014
International Crisis Group, Nigerias dangerous 2015 elections: limiting the violence,
November 2014
A. Jauhari, Colonial and post-colonial human rights violations in Nigeria, International
Journal of Humanities and Social Science, May 2011
M. Khan, Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions,
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, July 2010
J. Lal, India Africa Forum Summits: Engagements and outcomes, Indian Council of World
Affairs, 20 November 2013
J. Liebowitz and J. Ibrahim, A capacity assessment of Nigerian political parties, UNDP,
January 2013
McKinsey Global Institute, Nigerias renewal: Delivering inclusive growth in Africa's largest
economy, July 2014
K. Meagher, MINTs and mayhem: in Nigeria the risks are the only things that trickle down,
africanarguments.org, 22 May 2014
S. Naidu, India stepping up the ante in African relations, Pambazuka News, 25 March 2010
J. Nwokeoma, The judiciarys redemptive role in Nigerias democracy, Peace and
Collaborative Development Network, 7 November 2007
A Olowofoyeku, The Beleaguered Fortress: Reflections of the Independence of Nigeria's
Judiciary, Journal of African Law, Spring 1989
Ambassadors O. Oshiru and O. George, Nigeria and the OAU/AU: A fifty years journey,
May 2013
J. Paden, Midterm challenges in Nigeria: Elections, parties and regional conflict, United
States Institute for Peace, special report 334, May 2013
82
L. Ploch, Nigeria: Current issues and US policy, Congressional Research Service, 24 April
2013
R. Pantucci and M. Cadoux-Hudson, Nigerias opaque Jihad: Insurgency in Africas richest
nation, RUSI Analysis, 16 May 2014
N. Rajis-Okpara, Nigeria-India: A key partnership, lecture by the Nigerian High
Commissioner to Singapore at the National University of Singapore, 21 March 2013
Z. Usman and O Owen, Incumbency and opportunity: forecasting Nigerias 2015 elections,
African Arguments, 29 October 2014
P. Vasudevan, The changing nature of Nigeria-India relations, Chatham House Programme
Paper AFP 2010/02, December 2010
World Bank, Nigeria Economic Report, July 2014
World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Index 20142015 Nigeria
5.3
Web sources
Official sources
National Human Rights Commission
Independent National Electoral Commission
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission
House of Representatives Committee on Diaspora Affairs
IMF: Article IV Country Assessments
World Bank
ECOWAS
ACP Group
US-Nigeria Binational Commission
USAID: Nigeria
China, US Energy Information Administration
UK and Nigeria, UK Government website
Foreign Secretary announces UK support following ministerial on Boko Haram, FCO press
release, 12 June 2014
DFIDs Annual Report and Accounts 2013-14
83
DFID Nigeria, Operational Plan 2011-2015

DFID Development Tracker website.
DFID, Anti-Corruption Strategy for Nigeria, 2013
Cotonou Agreement
AfricaEU Partnership
European Commission, TradeWest Africa
The Nigeria-EU Joint Way Forward, 2009
EU-Nigeria Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2008-2013
EU External Action, Nigeria
EU-Nigeria National Indicative Programme 2014-2020
Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
India-Africa Forum Summit 2011
New Delhi Declaration, 2008
Africa-India Framework for Enhanced Cooperation, 2011
Statistics and economic indicators

IMF World Economic Outlook database
World Bank: World Development Indicators
UNCTADstat (foreign direct investment and trade)
UN COMTRADE (trade)
Other sources
Europa World Plus (available through the Parliamentary Intranet)
CIA World Factbook
Amnesty International
Human Rights Watch
International Crisis Group
84

Nigeria 2015: Analysis of Election Issues and Future Prospects

Hochgeladen von

Dokumentinformationen

Originalbeschreibung:

Originaltitel

Copyright

Verfügbare Formate

Dieses Dokument teilen

Dokument teilen oder einbetten

Freigabeoptionen

Stufen Sie dieses Dokument als nützlich ein?

Sind diese Inhalte unangemessen?

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Nigeria 2015: Analysis of Election Issues and Future Prospects

Hochgeladen von

Copyright:

Verfügbare Formate

Nigeria 2015: analysis of election issues

and future prospects

Jon Lunn and Daniel Harari

Recent Research Papers

Unemployment by Constituency, November 2014

Economic Indicators, January 2015

Research Paper 15/02

Rob Page, sections 3.1-3.3 and 4.4

This information is provided to Members of Parliament in support of their parliamentary

Nigerian elections 2015: an update

Outcome of the 2011 elections

Map of the presidential election result

Build up to 2015 elections

2013: Jonathan on the back foot

2014: the PDP and APC trade blows

December 2014: the PDP and APC Conventions

Aspects of the 2015 election campaign

Jonathans record in office

Will the APC be allowed to win?

Can Nigeria hold together?

2015: the nightmare scenario

Understanding Nigerias current political settlement

The 2014 National Conference: an opportunity for reform?

Prospects for a better political settlement

Is Nigeria an emerging economic giant?

Member of the MINT club

Current economic situation uncertain

The need to become less dependent on the oil sector

Young population expanding rapidly presents opportunity for growth

High poverty levels and poor education skills present barriers

Poor business environment and infrastructure hinders growth prospects

Will President Jonathan win again?

Nigerias foreign relations

Facets of the relationship

Facets of the relationship

Nigeria: country profile

The people of Nigeria

Population, ethnicity and language

Violence and insecurity

Public and private realms

Brutality and corruption

Impunity the norm

Positive developments since 1999

Ethnic and religious violence since 1999

Insurgency and terrorism in the Niger Delta and north-east

Progress against MDG indicators: positives

Performance against MDG indicators: negatives

Largest economy in Africa is more diverse than previously thought

Non-oil sectors behind growth in 2013 and 2014

Trade crucially dependent on oil exports

Fall in oil price dampens near-term economic outlook

Judiciary and legal systems

Main political parties

The Nigerian military

Combating Boko Haram

Rise of vigilante groups

Niger Delta and piracy

Armed militant groups

Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta

The Nigerian diaspora

Size, location and character

Nigerian government policies