Beruflich Dokumente
Kultur Dokumente
Governance
Corporate Governance Practices of
Commercial Banks in Bangladesh
Acknowledgement
At the very beginning, we would like to express my deep gratitude to almighty Allah
for giving us the strength to finish the report within the schedule time. We required
enormous time and attention in every step of it. However, it gives us a true feeling of
creation and helps me to understand my ability of work. For fear of sounding like a
vote of thanks speech, we would like to take the opportunity, to thank all of those
marvelous people who have contributed to this report. Of course, some very special
people cannot go without mentioning. At first, we express thank my heartiest
gratitude to our Course Teacher Mr. Md. Miraj Hossen, Assistant Professor, Dept. of
Management Studies, Jagannath University for his kind cooperation in preparing this
report. We are also indebted to all of respondents and for giving time and advice to
know and learn all activities of the bank and prepare this report. During the
preparation of the report. We have come to the very supportive touch of different
individuals (respondents &seniors) and friends, who lend their ideas, time and caring
guidance to amplify the reports contents. We must say that without their help it
would be very hard for us to prepare such report. We are thankful to them with all of
our feelings.
ii
Synopsis
Corporate Governance ensures to bring transparency, accountability and
professionalism in the management system of a corporate body that enhances the
credibility and acceptability to the shareholders, employees, potential investors,
customers, lenders, governments and all other stakeholders. Corporate governance
(CG) is a set of principles, which should be incorporated into every part of the
organization. Financial institutions like banks have a significant role to play in the
economy of any country. Banking sector should follow the Corporate Governance
codes for Bangladesh. Since Banks deal in public money, public confidence is of
outmost importance in this Industry. So, this paper has tried to evaluate the present
scenario of Corporate Governance practices by the commercial banks in Bangladesh.
The study has been conducted to attain some objectives. The primary objective of the
study is to evaluate the practices of Corporate Governance codes by the Commercial
Banks in Bangladesh. In this study, both the primary and secondary data were used.
The primary data relating to problems involved in Corporate Governance practice and
suggestions to remove the same were collected from 50 randomly selected
respondents of banks on the basis of a questionnaire and scheduling method. Among
them we selected Directors of the Board, executive officers etc as the internal part of
management and the stakeholders (like customers) as the external group. The
secondary data were collected through an extensive literature survey on the subject. In
order to do the study, we focus the major issues like shareholders rights and
disclosure of information, disclosure and transparency, effectiveness of Board of
directors etc. Four (4) hypotheses have been developed in order to identify whether
the commercial banks are complying corporate governance issues or not. And making
the study convenient an assumption was made using subjective probability technique
that 70% or more of commercial banks of Bangladesh are maintaining 90% or more
CG codes for Bangladesh (Alam, K, 2011). Only 33% of the major issue like
disclosure and transparency has met the assumption. In contrast the major issues of
CG codes namely shareholders rights and disclosure of information, board of
directors effectiveness are not properly exercised by the commercial banks. In this
survey, we have also found some embezzlement of commercial banks (Sonali Bank,
Agrani Bank, Bank Asia etc) in recent years. We found that this embezzlement
occurred only for not practicing good corporate governance. We have also identified
some major problems in Corporate Governance practices in the Banking Industry of
the country. The prospect of Corporate Governance practice is bright in Banking
Industry in the country as reported by the respondents if problems are removed by the
concerned management of the Banks as well as Bangladesh Bank management as the
guardian of commercial Banks. Consequently the study recommends some
approaches that are well thought out for the practice of corporate governance codes by
the private commercial banks of Bangladesh.
Table of Content
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Particulars
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Title page
Acknowledgement
Letter of Transmittal
Group List
Synopsis
CHAPTER ONE- INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background of the Study
1.2 Objectives of the study
1.2.1 Primary Objective
1.2.2 Secondary Objectives
1.3 Methodology
1.3.1 Sources of Data
1.3.2 Target Population
1.3.3 Sampling Method
1.3.4 Questionnaire Development
1.3.5 Research Method
1.3.6 Measuring Instruments
1.3.7 Data Analysis Method
1.4 Limitation
1.5 Hypothesis Development
1.5.1 Hypothesis
1.5.2 Assumption
1.6 Literature Review
CHAPTER TWO- HISTORY OF BANKING
2.1 Short History of Banking
2.2 Lists of commercial banks
2.2.1 State-owned commercial banks
2.2.2 Private commercial banks
2.2.3 Islamic Commercial Banks
2.2.4 Foreign commercial banks
2.3 Brief description of some commercial banks:
2.3.1 Pubali Bank
2.3.2 National Bank Ltd.
2.3.3 Dutch-Bangla Bank Ltd.
2.3.4 IBBL
CHAPTER THREE- HISTORY OF BANKING
3.1 Definition of Corporate Governance
3.2 Principles
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CHAPTER FOUR- FINDINGS & DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 41 - 45
4.1 Findings
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4.2 Problems
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4.3 Conclusion
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4.4 Recommendation
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Closing Part
Reference
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Appendix
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Questionnaire
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List of Respondent
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List of Table
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ACRONYMS
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ACRONYMS
ARCG
AGM
BEI
BIS
BOD
CEO
ABBREVIATION
Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance
Annual General Meeting
Bangladesh Enterprise Institute
Bank Of International Settlement
Board Of Directors
Chief Executive Officer
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CG
CSR
CSE
DSE
MIS
RAFT
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RJSC
SEC
Corporate Governance
Corporate Social Responsibility
Chittagong Stock Exchange
Dhaka Stock Exchange
Management Information System
Responsibility, Accountability, Fairness,
Transparency
Registrar of Joint Stock Company
Securities Exchange Commission
List of Tables
Index
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Particulars
Table 3.8 (i): Shareholders rights and Disclosure of information
Table 3.8 (ii): Disclosure and transparency
Table 3.8 (iii): Effectiveness of the Board of directors
Table a: Position of the Respondents in the Bank
Table b: Age distribution of the Respondents
Table c: Gender of the Respondents
Table d: Ownership type of the Bank
Table e: Ownership and control structure of the company
Table f: Relation between CEO and the founder or the largest
shareholders
Table g: Shareholders participation in voting at the shareholders
meeting
Table h: Adequate information on the agenda items of the
shareholders meeting
Table i: Adequate time for asking questions and lacing issues at
the shareholders meeting
Table j: Director Candidates disclose before the shareholders
meeting
Table k: Minority shareholders nominate candidate at the
shareholders meeting or prior to the meeting
Table l: Director Candidates proposed by the management fail to
be elected at the shareholders meeting
Table m: Information Discloser of the Company
Table n: Discloser of the information
Table o: Timely and informative disclosures
Table p: CEO as Board Chairman
Table q: Review of CEOs compensation
Table r: Stock option for the CEO
Table s: prevalence of the practices
Table t: Board have the following committee
Table u: Miscellaneous I (Queries table 2)
Table v: Miscellaneous II (Queries table 1)
Table w: Responsible for resent scenario of Banking Sector
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List of Charts
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Particulars
Figure: 3.7 (a): Position of the Respondent
Figure: 3.7 (b): Age Distribution of the Respondent
Figure: 3.7 (c): Gender of the Respondent
Figure: 3.7 (d): Ownership type of the Bank
Figure: 3.7 (e): Ownership and Control Structure
Figure: 3.7 (f): Relation between CEO and the founder or the
largest shareholder
Figure: 3.7 (g): Shareholders participation on Voting at
shareholders meeting
Figure: 3.7 (h): Adequate information on agenda items of the
shareholders
Figure: 3.7 (i): Adequate time for asking question at the
shareholders meeting
Figure: 3.7 (j): Role of shareholders in nominating candidates and
electing outside directors of the Bank
Figure: 3.7 (k): Failed to elect director candidates at shareholders
meeting
Figure: 3.7 (l): Disclosure if information regarding Directors
selling and buying shares in Bank
Figure: 3.7 (m): Disclosure if information regarding Audit report
of the company
Figure: 3.7 (n): Disclosure if information regarding background of
the directors
Figure: 3.7 (o): Disclosure if information regarding remuneration
of the directors
Figure: 3.7 (p): Disclosure if information regarding policies of
Risk Management
Figure: 3.7 (q): Disclosure if information regarding significant
changes in ownership
Figure: 3.7 (r): Timely and informative Disclosure
Figure: 3.7 (s): CEO serves as Board Chairman
Figure: 3.7 (t): Review of CEOs compensation
Figure: 3.7 (u): Stock option for the CEO
Figure: 3.7 (v): Prevalence of the practices
Figure: 3.7 (w): Board committees.
Figure: 3.7 (x): Miscellaneous I
Figure: 3.7 (y): Miscellaneous II
Figure: 3.7 (z): Responsible for current scenario of Banking Sector
Figure 3.8 (a): Shareholders rights and Disclosure of information
Figure 3.8 (b): Disclosure and transparency
Figure 3.8 (c): Effectiveness of the Board of directors
Figure 3.8 (d): Summary of the Hypothesis
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Chapter: One
Introductory Issues
Background of the study
Objectives
Methodology
Limitations
Hypothesis Development
Literature Review
1.1
Corporate governance is the set of processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions
affecting the way a corporation is directed, administered or controlled. It can be defined
as a combination of fairness, precision, accountability and sustainability of corporate
behavior. It is a key factor to achieve the improved performance of an organization. It
is a fundamental element to safeguard the interests of shareholders and stakeholders.
For continuous and sustainable growth of an organization, there is no alternative to
effective Corporate Governance.
The positive effect of corporate governance on commercial banking sectors ultimately
is a strengthened economy, and hence good corporate governance is a tool for socioeconomic development.
Commercial Banks are critically important for industrial expansion, the Corporate
Governance (CG) of firms, and capital allocation. When banks efficiently mobilize and
allocate funds, this lowers the cost of capital to firms, boosts capital formation, and
stimulates productivity growth. Thus, the functioning of banks has ramifications for the
operations of firms and the prosperity of nations.
Effective Corporate Governance practices are essential to achieving and maintaining
public trust and confidence in the banking system, which are critical to the proper
functioning of the banking sector and economy as a whole.
As we know banking sector has been performing an essential role in strengthening any
economy. Poor Corporate Governance may contribute to bank failures, which can pose
significant public costs and consequences due to their potential impact on any
applicable deposit insurance systems and the possibility of broader macroeconomic
implications, such as contagion risk and impact on payment systems. In addition, poor
Corporate Governance can lead markets to lose confidence in the ability of a bank to
properly manage its assets and liabilities, including deposits, which could in turn trigger
a bank run or liquidity crisis.
1.2
1.3
Methodology
The following are the bases that have been followed to conduct the study:
1.3.1
Sources of Data
i.
Primary Source
Primary data have been collected through conducting questionnaire and
scheduling method.
ii.
Secondary Source
Secondary data have been collected from different journals, books,
banks websites and banks annual report.
2|Page
1.4
Limitation
There were some limitations of the study among which non availability of data was the
most, especially for the non-listed companies. Another limitation was least amount of
disclosure regarding Corporate Governance. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
activities of the banks were very limited, as well as the disclosure regarding CSR.
Non availability of data
Least amount of disclosure regarding Corporate Governance
The sample size was relatively small as compared to the total population.
Absence of credible data and relevant information on the real CG concerns in
Bangladesh.
Comprehensive access to information was a difficult task because of time
limitation.
Unwillingness to provide confidential information especially by state owned
commercial bank.
Unawareness of customers about the CG practice in their respective banks.
3|Page
1.5.2 Assumption
An assumption has been taken to conduct the survey that 70% or more
of the commercial banks in Bangladesh are satisfying with 90% or more issues
of the corporate governance codes. Conformity of corporate governance codes
for each issue is determined when 70% or more banks have satisfied with that
assumption. The probability has been taken based on subjective probability
technique.
5|Page
Chapter: Two
2.1
The banking system at independence (1971) consisted of two branch offices of the
former State Bank of Pakistan and 17 large commercial banks, two of which were
controlled by Bangladeshi interests and three by foreigners other than west Pakistanis.
There were 14 smaller commercial banks. Virtually all banking services were
concentrated in urban areas. The newly independent government immediately
designated the Dhaka branch of the State Bank of Pakistan as the central bank and
renamed it Bangladesh Bank. The bank was responsible for regulating currency,
controlling credit and monetary policy, and administering exchange control and the
foreign exchange reserves. The Bangladesh government initially nationalized the entire
domestic banking system and proceeded to reorganize and rename the various banks.
Foreign-owned banks were permitted to continue doing business in Bangladesh.
2.2
2.2.1
2.2.2
2.2.3
2.2.4
1972 this Bank was nationalized as per policy of the Government and renamed as Pubali
Bank. Subsequently due to changed circumstances this Bank was denationalized in the
year 1983 as a private bank and renamed as Pubali Bank Limited. The Government of
the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh handed over all assets and liabilities of the then
Pubali Bank to the Pubali Bank Limited. Since then Pubali Bank Limited has been
rendering all sorts of Commercial Banking services as the largest bank in private sector
through its branch network all over the country.
2.3.2 National Bank Ltd.
National Bank Limited has been licensed by the Government of Bangladesh as a
Scheduled commercial bank in the private sector in pursuance of the policy of
liberalization of banking and financial services and facilities in Bangladesh. In view of
the above, the Bank within a period of 25 years of its operation achieved a remarkable
success and met up capital adequacy requirement of Bangladesh Bank.
National Bank Limited established as the first private sector Bank fully owned by
Bangladeshi entrepreneurs. NBL was the first domestic bank to establish agency
arrangement with the world famous Western Union in order to facilitate quick and safe
remittance of the valuable foreign exchanges earned by the expatriate Bangladeshi
nationals. NBL was also the first among domestic banks to introduce international
Master Card in Bangladesh.
2.3.3 Dutch-Bangla Bank Ltd.
Dutch-Bangla Bank Limited (DBBL) is Bangladeshs most innovative and
technologically advanced bank. DBBL stands to give the most innovative and
affordable banking products to Bangladesh. Amongst banks, DBBL is the largest donor
in to social causes in Bangladesh. It stands as one of the largest private donors involved
in improving the country. DBBL is proud to be associated with helping Bangladesh as
well as being a leader in the countrys banking sector
Dutch-Bangla Bank believes in its uncompromising commitment to fulfill its customer
needs and satisfaction and to become their first choice in banking. Taking cue from its
pool esteemed clientele, Dutch-Bangla Bank intends to pave the way for a new era in
banking that upholds and epitomizes its vaunted marques Your Trusted Partner
DBBL was the first bank in Bangladesh to be fully automated. The Electronic-Banking
Division was established in 2002 to undertake rapid automation and bring modern
banking services into this field. Full automation was completed in 2003 and hereby
introduced plastic money to the Bangladeshi masses. DBBL had pursued the mass
automation in Banking as a CSR activity and never intended profitability from this
sector.
2.3.4 IBBL
Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited is a Joint Venture Public Limited Company engaged
in commercial banking business based on Islamic Shari'ah with 63.09% foreign
shareholding having largest branch network ( total 293 Branches) among the private
sector Banks in Bangladesh. It was established on the 13th March 1983 as the first
Islamic Bank in the South East Asia.
It is listed with Dhaka Stock Exchange Ltd. and Chittagong Stock Exchange Ltd.
Authorized Capital of the Bank is Tk. 20,000.00 Million and Paid-up Capital is Tk.
16,099.90 million having 33,686 shareholders as on 30th September 2014.
8|Page
Chapter: Three
Theoretical Issues
Definition of CG
Principles of CG
Pre-requisites for CG practice
CG Guidelines for Banking Sector
Present states of CG in BD
Limitations
Result/ Findings
Hypothesis testing
3.1
Corporate Governance (CG) is probably the widest control mechanism used for
efficient utilization of corporate resources. It can be defined as an organizational
control devise, which is a hybrid of internal and external control mechanisms
with a view to achieving efficient utilization of corporate resources. It is a network
among various corporate players such as shareholders, managers, employees,
leaders, governments, suppliers and consumers for increasing the value of the
firm. Different authors view the meaning of corporate governance differently. For
example:
One school of thoughts describes corporate governance as a system by which
companies are directed and controlled (Cadbury and Greenbury Report, 1992).
That the fundamental concern of corporate governance is to ensure the
conditions whereby a firms directors and mangers are held accountable,
ensure better and effective protection to all stakeholders.
The World Bank define that the framework of corporate governance should be
based on four pillars such as Responsibility, Accountability, Fairness and
Transparency (RAFT).
There are some variables on which the corporate governance framework
established. Those are Responsibility, Accountability, Fairness and Transparency.
Corporate governance from the view point of commercial banks:
Effective corporate governance practices are essential to achieving and maintaining the
public trust and confidence in the banking system, as a result they are critical to the
proper functioning of the banking sector and economy as a whole. However, little
attention has being given to corporate governance of banking sector especially in
developing economies.
According to Hambrick et al. (2008), not only do the constituents of banking
sector stand to gain or lose due the quality and nature of corporate governance
therein, but the entire national systems can be propelled or stymied as well. The
health of the economy is closely related to the soundness of its banking sector
(Katrodia, 2012).
Handley-Schachler et al. (2007) posited that banks require different and more
extensive corporate governance arrangements.
Arun and Turner (2004) also argued that the unique nature of the bank both in
the developed or developing world requires a broad view of corporate
governance to be adopted for banks.
According to Bank for International Settlements (2010) effective corporate
governance practices are essential to achieving and maintaining the public trust
and confidence in the banking system, hence critical to the proper functioning
of the banking sector and economy as a whole.
9|Page
3.2
Principles
Key elements of good corporate governance principles include honesty, trust and
integrity, openness, performance orientation, responsibility and accountability, mutual
respect, and commitment to the organization.
Of importance is how directors and management develop a model of governance that
aligns the values of the corporate participants and then evaluate this model periodically
for its effectiveness. In particular, senior executives should conduct themselves
honestly and ethically, especially concerning actual or apparent conflicts of interest,
and disclosure in financial reports.
Commonly accepted principles of corporate governance include:
i.
Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders: Organizations should
respect the rights of shareholders and help shareholders to exercise those
rights. They can help shareholders exercise their rights by effectively
communicating information that is understandable and accessible and
encouraging shareholders to participate in general meetings.
ii.
iii.
Role and responsibilities of the board: The board needs a range of skills
and understanding to be able to deal with various business issues and have
the ability to review and challenge management performance. It needs to be
of sufficient size and have an appropriate level of commitment to fulfill its
responsibilities and duties. There are issues about the appropriate mix of
executive and non-executive directors.
iv.
code of conduct for their directors and executives that promotes ethical and
responsible decision making. It is important to understand, though, that
reliance by a company on the integrity and ethics of individuals is bound to
eventual failure. Because of this, many organizations establish Compliance
and Ethics Programs to minimize the risk that the firm steps outside of
ethical and legal boundaries.
v.
3.3
The some special nature of banks makes their corporate governance more complex
because:
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3.4
Banks in developing countries are faced with high risk of sharking as a result of heavy
government ownership, lack of prudential regulation, weak legal protection and
presence of special interest groups (Arun, T.G. and J. Turner (2003), However, there is
an argument that active role by regulators may cause problems as well, as regulators
may not have a convincing or sufficient motivation to monitor the banks as they do not
have much at stake in case of bank failures. Recently, the financial markets of
developing economies have experienced rapid changes due to the growth of wider range
of financial products. As a result of this, banks have been involved with high risk
activities such as trading in financial markets and different off balance sheet activities
more than ever before (Greuning, H. and S. Bratanovic (2003),) which necessitate an
added emphasis on quality of corporate governance of banks in developing economies.
Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance (ARCG) Task force developed the Policy
Brief on Corporate Governance of Banks in Asia (June 2006). The main issues and
priorities for reforms in CG of banks in Asia that were identified are:
Actually the principle legal instrument for enforcing governance in Bangladesh is the
Companies Act 1994 which is administered by Registrar of Joint Stock Company
(RJSC) and the Ministry of Commerce. SEC is concerned with publicly limited
companies only, the number of which is very insignificant. Close monitoring of leading
companies is a disincentive for going public as there is a perception that this will create
and raise unnecessary difficulties for companies to supply information as and when
requested.
i.
Corporate Governance in the Financial Institutions (FIs) as bank
The need for a competent financial sector is important to stimulate and support
economic growth through efficient resource allocation. Good CG practices are essential
to the effectiveness, competitiveness and safety and soundness of financial institutions.
ii.
Streamlining the Guidelines with the Code of Corporate Governance
A Code of CG has been published by BEI can be streamlined to reduce duplication and
resources to comply with CG requirements for the FIs.
iii. Protection of depositors
Given the special nature of banking institutions, a broad view of CG where regulation
of banking activities is required to protect depositors. In developed economies,
protection of depositors in a deregulated environment is typically provided by a system
of prudential regulation, but in developing economies such protection is undermined by
the lack of well-trained supervisors, inadequate disclosure requirements, the cost of
raising bank capital and the presence of distributional cartels.
iv.
Improvements in prudential regulation
Liberalization policies need to be gradual, and should be dependent upon improvements
in prudential regulation. Bangladesh needs to expend resources enhancing the quality
of their financial reporting systems, as well as the quantity and quality of bank
supervisors. 50 Given that bank capital plays such an important role in prudential
regulatory systems, it is necessary to improve investor protection laws, increase
financial disclosure and impose fiduciary duties upon bank directors so that banks can
raise the equity capital required for regulator y purposes. A further reason as to why
13 | P a g e
this policy needs implemented is the growing recognition that the CG of banks has an
important role to play in assisting supervisory institutions to perform their tasks,
allowing supervisors to have a working relationship with bank management, rather than
adversarial one.
v.
Political determinants of Corporate Governance
CG of financial institutions, particularly banking sector, in Bangladesh is severely
affected by political considerations. Given the trend towards privatization of
government-owned banks in Bangladesh, there is a need for the managers of such banks
to be granted autonomy and be gradually introduced to the CG practices of the private
sector prior to divestment.
vi.
Role of the shareholders
Where there has only been partial divestment and government have not relinquished
any control to other shareholders, it may prove very difficult to divest further ownership
stakes unless CG is strengthened
3.5
Present State of CB in BD
3.5.1
Agrani Bank, a state-owned commercial bank, was found involved in showing inflated
profit through window-dressed accounting during the year 2012. According to the
inspection report, Agrani Bank showed an operating profit of Tk 1314.61 crore for the
year 2012, ended December 31, producing fictitious accounts. The bank has incurred a
net loss of Tk 1185.06 crore instead of the profit.
The bank did not abide by the central banks set provisioning guidelines and
keep the required provisioning amount of Tk 1719.66 crore against its all
account during the year 2012.
The profit was calculated without keeping required provisioning against its
classified loan, investment and provisioning against the central banks
prescribed rate, added the report.
That means, the bank has a net shortfall of Tk 1672.11 crore provisioning
against its classified loan during the year.
According to Bangladesh Bank, loans of Tk 31,500 crore have so far been written off
as of March 2014.
The banks are taking opportunity of writing off bad loans as a ploy to cover up their
corruptions and mismanagements. The state-owned four commercial banks are ahead
in writing off bad loans. According to Bangladesh Bank data, four state-owned banks
have written off loans of Tk 15,228 crore until March 2014 since 2002.Of the amount,
the share of Sonali Bank stood at Tk 5,850 crore, Agrani Bank Tk 5,011 crore, Janata
Bank Tk 3,348 crore and Ruplai Bank Tk 1,019 crore. Twenty-seven of the 39 private
banks waived bad loans of Tk 12,517 crore and four state-owned specialised banks
waived Tk 3, 261 crore.
The failure of Sonali Bank, Ruposhi Bangla Branch to prevent the fraudulent
misappropriation of Tk. 3,607 crores by Hallmark Group (Tk. 2,668 crores) and others
is the biggest scandal in the banking industry.
In recent times, several such frauds
i.
ii.
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3.6
Limitations
Why any of these corporate governance mechanisms could not prevent or detect the
massive amount of fund embezzlement?
The prospect of political influence and collusion between top management and
branch level employees cannot be completely ruled out.
The current board, albeit constituted in conformity with the corporate
governance guidelines issued by the Bangladesh Bank, is largely dominated by
political appointees.
Political appointments to boards of state-owned commercial banks are not
uncommon in Bangladesh, and given the socio-political context of the country,
the incorporation of politically linked directors are perhaps understandable.
These directors, although in charge of a very substantial amount of public fund,
would not possibly devote the amount of time they otherwise would have, had
there been personal stakes involved.
The absence of protection for whistleblowers appears to be a fundamental
problem for the smooth functioning of the audit committees in Bangladesh. A
corruption of this extent is likely to involve a large number of persons, and it is
likely that at least one person (if not more) in the chain would be worried and
disgusted about this. If the bank could ensure protection and anonymity of this
person, he or she could have approached the audit committee and reported the
matter to it. However, with no whistleblower protection in place, it is unlikely
that this would happen.
The role of the auditors in this entire scam remains mysterious.
The central bank should also investigate why the external and internal auditors
who regularly audited the bank failed to perform their responsibilities.
Overall, the Sonali Bank case demonstrates that despite having all the corporate
governance mechanisms as suggested by the corporate governance guidelines issued by
the Bangladesh Bank, it was possible to misappropriate a significant amount of public
money.
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3.7
Position
25
20
15
22
10
15
10
Age
55-65
Age
45-55
35-45
25-35
0
10
15
20
25
30
35
Here the numbers of respondent are 47. Among 47 respondent 66% age lies in
25-35, 17% in 35-45, 15% in 45-55, and 2% in 55-65.
17 | P a g e
Gender
12
Male
Female
38
Ownership type
0
12
Pubilc/ State- Owned
38
Private
Others
Among the 50 respondents 24% are form public/state-owned bank and 76% are
private banks.
18 | P a g e
22
16
A
0
10
15
20
25
42
5
Found Himself
2
Founder's
Family Member
1
Professional
Manager
Others
Figure: 3.7 (f): Relation between CEO and the founder or the largest shareholder
19 | P a g e
Participation on Voting
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0 1
Voting by mail
44
2
Anybody can proxy
1
Others
Presence Requires
Here the respondents are 48. Among 48 respondents 2% said that Voting by
mail is allowed, 4% said anyone can serve as a proxy, 92% told Presence
requires for voting and Other option is ticked by 2%.
ADEQUATE INFORMATION ON
AGENDA ITEMS OF THE
SHAREHOLD ERS
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
33
16
0
Strongly
Agree
Agree
No Opinion
0
Disagree
1
Strongly
Disagree
20 | P a g e
AGREE
35
STRONGLY AGREE
10
Figure: 3.7 (i): Adequate time for asking question at the shareholders meeting
Here respondent s are 46, among them 22% strongly agree that adequate time is given
for asking question, 76% agree, and 2% gave no opinion about this term.
Role of Shareholders
26
19
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
23
22
Yes
Director candidates discloser
No
Candites nomination by minority shareholders
Figure: 3.7 (j): Role of shareholders in nominating candidates and electing outside
directors of the Bank
Here respondents are 45, from them 49% respondents said yes about the director
candidates discloser before the shareholders meeting, and 51% said no about
the fact.
Here respondents are 45, form them 57% said positivity about the minority
shareholders role, and 43% said that minority shareholder cant play their role.
21 | P a g e
35
12
2
SOMETIMES
RARELY
UNTHINKABLE
12
10
10
10
0
WEBPAGE
ANNUAL REPORT
REPORT TO
REGULATORY
AGENCY
NO
Figure: 3.7 (l): Disclosure if information regarding Directors selling and buying
shares in Bank
22 | P a g e
13
15
Annual Report
25
Webpage
0
10
15
20
25
Figure: 3.7 (m): Disclosure if information regarding Audit report of the comany
19%
0%
Webpage
45%
Annual Report
Report to Regulatory Agency
No
36%
23 | P a g e
ANNUAL REPORT
REPORT TO
REGULATORY
AGENCY
NO
13, 28%
26, 57%
Annual Report
Report to Regulatory Agency
No
24 | P a g e
S I G N I F I C A N T C H A N G E S I N O W N E RSH IP
No
13
Annual Report
13
11
Webpage
0
10
12
14
35
Timely
and
informative
disclosure
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Yes
No
Semi-Annual Reports
28
16
Quarterly Financial
Statement
33
10
9, 20%
Yes
No
36, 80%
26
10
5
Rarely
Never
0
Yes
Sometines
26 | P a g e
None
17
Some
Substantially
0
10
15
20
25
21
20
21
20
15
15
10
a
11
11
9
5
0
0
Often
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
27 | P a g e
Board Committee
3
35
d
4
19
20
9
Others
No
27
Yes
14
29
3
3
a
0
39
10
20
30
40
28 | P a g e
Miscellaneous I
50
34
32
34
29
24
19
20
10
40
37
40
30
44
43
40
15
32
5
0
01
66
Yes
65
1
No
Others
29 | P a g e
Miscellaneous II
NEVER
0
3
3
RARELY
Education or training
opportunities
17
SOMETIMES
15
21
ALWAYS
27
0
10
15
20
25
30
Here the respondents are also 45. Among them 46% said that they always
provide education and training opportunities for directors beyond that is
mandatory, 38% said that they provide it sometimes, 7% said that they provide
it rarely, and 9% said that they never provide it.
Here the respondents are 45. Among them 60% respondent said that the external
auditor conducts a proper review of work always, 33% said that they do
sometimes, 7% said they do rarely, and 0% said they do never.
3, 6%
Weak Selection of BoD
Influence of Govt and
Political Party
36, 72%
Here respondents are 50, from them 6% said that weak selection of the BoD is
responsible for the present scenario of Banking sector, 72% said that influence
of the governmental body and political parties is responsible for the present
scenario of Banking sector, and 22% said that non-compliance of roles and
regulation is responsible for the present scenario of Banking sector.
30 | P a g e
3.8
Testing Hypothesis
On the issue of shareholders rights and disclosure, the study investigated several key
issues: i) the practice of voting in the Annual General Meeting of the companies, ii)
disclosure of information in terms of knowing the agenda, iii) lead time to analyze
information, iv) information on equity of major shareholders, v) practice of nomination
and disclosure of director candidates in the meeting, vi) rights of the minority
shareholders in nominating candidates. To understand shareholders rights the study
used several proxy variables like a) length of the meeting, and b) attendance in the
meetings. Duration of the meetings indicates whether shareholders are given
opportunities to debate on issues related to their interest or not. Similarly, higher
attendance of the meeting indicates presence of a pluralistic environment in the decision
making process
Table 3.8 (i): Shareholders rights and Disclosure of information
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
Yes
33
35
22
26
35
No
16
10
23
19
12
32%
22%
24%
51%
66%
76%
72%
49%
a. Adequate
information on
agenda
43%
57%
b. Adequate time
c. Disclosing
d. Nomination of e. Failed to elect
for questions and candidates before
candidates by director candidates
placing issues
meeting
minority
at the shareholders
shareholders
meeting
Yes
No
31 | P a g e
ii.
Mathematical Analysis
Step 1:
Null Hypothesis:
H0 = the state of affairs of Shareholder Rights and Disclosure of Information is
meeting the CG codes in the commercial banks.
Alternative Hypothesis:
H1 = the state of affairs of Shareholder Rights and Disclosure of Information is
not meeting the CG codes in the commercial banks.
Step 2:
Level of Significance,
= 5%
Step 3:
Here,
Z = Z test (as our sample size is 50 so we use Z test)
x = total conformed attributes
n = total attributes
p = conformance probability of population
= standard deviation
=
Step 4:
H0 is accepted if, H0 -1.96 <Z <1.96
H0 is rejected if, H0 Z< -1.96 or Z>1.96
Since the test is two tailed, critical region is divided into two sides, so for =0.05
we will get above region by observing normal table.
A Two tailed test
0.05
=
= 0.025
2
2
Table value of Z= 1.96. It is the corresponding value of 0.475 = (0.5-0.25)
Step 5:
Calculated value of,
=
2 4.5
0.67
2.5
0.67
= 3.73
= 3.73 < 1.96
32 | P a g e
Here,
Total Attributes, n = 5
Total conformed Attributes, x = 2
Conformance Provability in the population, p = 0.90
Nonconformance provability in the population, q = 0.10
Thus attributes population mean, () = np = np = 50.90 = 4.5
Standard Deviation, () = = 4.5 0.10 = 0.67
Since the calculated value of Z lies in the rejection region, so H0 is not accepted at 5%
level of significance.
Conclusion:
So, it can be concluded that the CG codes on shareholders rights and disclosure
information are not maintained properly by the 70% or more commercial banks of
Bangladesh.
The resulting data with conformity and non-conformity level on this issue is given in
the following table and graph
Table 3.8 (ii): Disclosure and transparency
a. Remuneration of the directors
b. Policies of risk management
c. Significant changes in ownership
d. Disclose semiannual reports
e. Disclose quartly financial statement
Yes
35
46
37
28
33
No
5
0
4
16
10
33 | P a g e
12.5%
10%
36%
87.5%
100%
90%
64%
a.
Remuneration
of the directors
b. Policies of
risk
management
c. Significant
changes in
ownership
Yes
d. Disclose
semiannual
reports
23%
77%
e. Disclose
quartly financial
statement
No
Mathematical Analysis
Step 1:
Null Hypothesis:
H0 = the state of affairs for Disclosure and Transparency is being met the CG
codes by the commercial banks.
Alternative Hypothesis:
H1 = the state of affairs for Disclosure and Transparency is not being met the CG
codes by the commercial banks.
Step 2:
Level of Significance,
= 5%
Step 3:
Here,
Z = Z test
x = total conformed attributes
n = total attributes
p = conformance probability of population
= standard deviation
=
Step 4:
H0 is accepted if H0 if -1.96 <Z <1.96
H0 is rejected if H0 Z< -1.96 or Z>1.96
Since the test is two tailed, critical region is divided into two sides, so for =0.05
we will get above region by observing normal table.
34 | P a g e
0.05
=
= 0.025
2
2
Table value of Z= 1.96. It is the corresponding value of 0.475 = (0.5-0.25)
Step 5:
Calculated value of,
4 4.5
=
0.67
0.5
=
0.67
= 0.75
= 1.96 < 0.75 < 1.96
Here,
Total Attributes, n = 5
Total conformed Attributes, x = 4
Conformance Provability in the population, p = 0.90
Nonconformance provability in the population, q = 0.10
Thus attributes population mean, () = np = np = 50.90 = 4.5
Standard Deviation, () = = 4.5 0.10 = 0.67
35 | P a g e
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
No
36
12
24
15
8
12
3
14
9
19
7
28%
34%
8%
27%
33%
17%
25%
49%
53%
80%
81%
72%
66%
92%
73%
67%
83%
75%
47%
51%
20%
Yes
No
36 | P a g e
ii.
Mathematical Analysis
Step 1:
Null Hypothesis:
H0 = The state of affairs of Effectiveness of the Board of directors is meeting
the CG codes in the commercial banks.
Alternative Hypothesis:
H1 = The state of affairs of Effectiveness of the Board of directors is not meeting
the CG codes in the commercial banks.
Step 2:
Level of Significance, = 5% or 0.05.
Step 3:
=
Here,
Z = Z test
x = total conformed attributes
n = total attributes
p = conformance probability of population
= standard deviation
Step 4:
H0 is accepted if, -1.96 <Z <1.96
H0 is rejected if, Z< -1.96 or Z>1.96
Since the test is two tailed, critical region is divided into two sides. So for =0.05 we
will get above region by observing normal table.
A Two tailed test
0.05
=
= 0.025
2
2
Table value of Z= 1.96. It is the corresponding value of 0.475 = (0.5-0.25)
Step 5:
Calculated value of,
6 9.9
=
0.99
3.9
=
0.99
= 3.94
= 3.94 < 1.96
37 | P a g e
Here,
Total Attributes, n = 11
Total conformed Attributes, x = 6
Conformance Provability in the population, p = 0.90
Nonconformance provability in the population, q = 0.10
Thus attributes population mean, () = np = np = 110.90 = 9.9
Standard Deviation, () = = 9.9 0.10 = 0.99
Since the calculated value of Z lies in the rejection region, so H0 is not accepted at 5%
level of significance.
Conclusion:
So, it can be concluded that the CG codes on Effectiveness of the Board of directors are
not maintained properly by the 70% or more commercial banks of Bangladesh.
There are three broad issues in CG codes for banks covered by our hypothesis. And
those issues cover several important aspects which are the yardstick or guidelines for
the banks. This study has tried to reveal the actual scenario of CG practice by the
commercial banks based on an assumption. Only 33% of major CG codes have been
met by doing hypothesis test.
38 | P a g e
Hypothesis Result
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
a. Shareholders Rights and
disclosure of information
Dont Meet
ii.
Mathematical Analysis
Step 1:
Null Hypothesis:
H0 = The CG codes are practiced by the commercial banks in Bangladesh as
per the assumption.
Alternative Hypothesis:
H1 = The CG codes are not practiced by the commercial banks in Bangladesh
as per the assumption.
Step 2:
Level of Significance, = 5% or 0.05.
Step 3:
=
Here,
Z = Z test
x = Total conformed attributes
n = Total attributes
p = Conformance probability of population
= Standard deviation
39 | P a g e
Step 4:
H0 is accepted if, -1.96 <Z <1.96
H0 is rejected if, Z< -1.96 or Z>1.96
Since the test is two tailed, critical region is divided into two sides. So for =0.05 we
will get above region by observing normal table.
A Two tailed test
0.05
=
= 0.025
2
2
Table value of Z= 1.96. It is the corresponding value of 0.475 = (0.5-0.25)
Step 5:
Calculated value of,
=
1 2.7
0.52
0.7
0.52
= 3.27
= 3.27 < 1.96
Here,
Total Attributes, n = 3
Total conformed Attributes, x = 1
Conformance Provability in the population, p = 0.90
Nonconformance provability in the population, q = 0.10
Thus attributes population mean, () = np = np = 30.90 = 2.7
Standard Deviation, () = = 2.7 0.10 = 0.52
Since the calculated value of Z lies in the rejection region, so H0 is not accepted at 5%
level of significance.
Conclusion:
So, it can be concluded that the CG codes are not practiced according to the expectation
by the commercial banks of Bangladesh.
40 | P a g e
Chapter: Four
Major Findings
Findings
Problems
Conclusion
Recomandation
4.1
Findings
We know that, commercial banking sector plays an important role for the economic
development in Bangladesh. We have done the survey of the respondents of commercial
banks on CG practices in Bangladesh. Using different types of questions, we have tried
to find out the practice of CG to their respective organizations.
In the survey we have given more emphasize of the question answers. Because these
answers are the main key points to find out whether the commercial banks in
Bangladesh do practice CG or not.
Shareholders Rights and Disclosure of information
The CG codes on Shareholders Rights and Disclosure of Information are not
practiced by the 70% or more commercial banks of Bangladesh. This is one of the
major issues to ensure good governance in banking sector.
We have found it on the basis of following information:
Most of the respondents provide adequate time for asking question and placing
issues at the shareholders meeting it meets the standard level 70%
Directors candidates are failed to be elected at the shareholders meetings and
it meets our standard level.
More than average numbers of respondents agree that minority shareholders can
nominate candidates at the shareholders meeting or prior to the meeting and
Shareholders are provided with adequate information on agenda items but does
not meet standard level.
In the case of disclosure of director candidates before the shareholders meeting,
both positive and negative reactions have come out from the respondents about
their respective banks.
Disclosure and Transparency
The hypothesis result shows that the CG codes of disclosure and transparency are
maintained by the 70% or more commercial banks of Bangladesh. In this issue it has
been found that the directors information is disclosed properly.
Company disclose the following information through web page
42 | P a g e
4.1
Problems
Where shareholders have a substantial voting right and controlling power will
sometimes create autocratic decision. They do not set any specific procedures
for the appointment and ensure the appropriate responsibilities of the board
members.
In the interest of greater transparency and accountability, a board discloses the
committees it has established but their mandates and their composition
(including members who are considered to be independent) are not disclosed
properly.
Banks have board committees but some committees do not maintain appropriate
records (e. g meeting minutes or summary of matters reviewed and decisions
taken) of their deliberations and decisions.
Although every bank has an audit committee, some of the banks have lacking
of sufficient independent non-executive directors in the composition.
Some respondents said that their respective banks do not provide education or
training opportunities beyond mandatory.
Government and political parties pressure banks to do many works that may go
against the rules of the CG.
Sometimes the wrong member selection in the audit committee by BOD causes
bad CG practice.
Normally, state owned banks have lack of punishment system.
Some banks cannot comply with rules and regulations.
Other Problems:
Banks want to give loan but at a higher rate, it reduces their loan giving
opportunity. For that when they reduce their rate, depositors dont want to
deposit money in fear of embezzlement. For example: Sonali Bank, Bismillah
group etc.
Supervision has not been done on the basis of any formally binding rule.
Sometimes bank corrupted officers help to give loan falsifying representatives
data.
Most of the banks calculated profits without keeping required provisioning
against its classified loan, investment and provisioning against the central
banks prescribed rate.
4.2
Conclusion
regulations, and even the best legal standards do not ensure success. This is because it
is the attitude and actions of human beings; honesty and sense of responsibility of all
stakeholders of the bank are necessary. Governance particularly in the banking sector
should ensure the care of the well-being of all its stakeholders. This corporate fairness
and accountability must be symmetric as disclosure and transparency. As it is nowadays
emphasized, there is also no doubt that the basic elements of the improved governance
of the financial market should be ethics and CG (EC, 2010).
The study was to evaluate the practices of Corporate Governance codes by the
Commercial Banks of Bangladesh. The broad issues like shareholders rights and
disclosure of information, disclosure and transparency, effectiveness of BOD are the
main yardstick to assess the practice of CG codes. But adoption of this code is far away
still now. Because of this stakeholders and shareholders are deprived from their real
benefits. It indicates poor corporate governance practice in Bangladesh.
The banking sector of Bangladesh is becoming stronger day by day and it is playing a
pivotal role in the volatile economy of this country to become Bangladesh one of the
growing economies of the world in near future. So to be more effective and to put more
contribution for the betterment of Bangladesh, the banking sector should follow the CG
codes properly to bring the authenticity in its operations and to bring the faith of the
stakeholders as well as the people of Bangladesh.
4.1
Recommendations
The scale irregularities found in banks and financial markets that led to the financial
crisis have brought up the need for in-depth analysis of all aspects of their operation, in
particular the efficiency of corporate governance. The result was an indication of a
number of shortcomings; sometimes they resulted from inadequacy or insufficiency of
the provisions, other times from human imperfections. The analysis of main failures of
corporate governance in banks suggests that in order to repair and strengthen the
system:
Banks ought to reduce their risk exposure significantly, build a stronger capital
base; banks should concentrate on typical banking activities and reduce the scale
of other operations (especially investment activities); the good standards of
balance-sheet adequacy (ALM) should be restored.
The current level of financialization is excessive and potentially dangerous for
the whole economy; special attention should be paid to systemic risk:
systemically important banks ought to have more strict capital requirements
(additional capital buffer);
The capital and contractual relationships between financial institutions should
be monitored and if the linkages would become too strong and/or concentrated,
supervisors should be allowed to interfere in these relationships.
Bank directors (both: executive and non-executive) should bear personal
responsibility for banks activities and risk.
Banks executives remuneration should be linked to performance and risk
exposure; there should be an obligation to use part of their salary deferred: a)
not to motivate to generate short-term profits and increase the risk and b)
make the bonuses contingent on long-term sustainable outcomes.
44 | P a g e
45 | P a g e
Closing Part
Reference
Appendix
Reference
Alam, K (2011), Evaluation of Corporate Governance Practices by the Banking Sector of
Bangladesh, A Research Study Report, Available at SOMBA Seminar Library, Khulna
University, Khulna, pp. 3.
Arun, T.G. and J. Turner (2003), Corporate Governance of Banks in Developing Economies:
Concepts and Issues, Corporate Governance: An International Review, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp.
371-377.
Cadbury Committee, (1992), "Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance", Gee Publishing, London, U.K.
Clarke, R. (1988), Remarks in Comptroller of the Currency News Release, No. NR885,Washington DC.
Douglas A. Lind, William G. Marchal, Statistical Techniques in Business and Economics,
Fourteenth Edition, pp. 146-147.
Fama,E. and M. Jensen (1983), Separation of Ownership and Control, Journal of Law and
Economics, Vol. 26, pp.301-325.
Gupta, S. P. and M. P. Gupta (2006-2007), Business Statistics, New Edition, Sultan Chand &
Sons, New Delhi,
India, p. 506.
Greuning, H. and S. Bratanovic (2003), Analyzing and Managing Banking Risk: A Framework
for Assessing
Corporate Governance and Financial Risk, World Bank, Washington DC.
Jensen, M.C. and Meckling, W.H. (1976), Theory of the Firm Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership
Structure, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 3 No. 4, pp. 305-360.
Kocourek, P. F, (2003), Corporate Governance: Hard Facts about Soft Behaviors, Strategy &
Business, Issue 30, First Quarter.
Link: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exim_Bank_%28Bangladesh%29
Link: http://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijebo.20140203.12.pdf
46 | P a g e
Link:
http://www.academia.edu/8484524/Corporate_Governance_Practices_in_Commercial_
Banking_Sector_of_Malawi_Evidence_from_Annual_Reports
Link: http://www.assignmentpoint.com/business/thesis-report-on-corporate-governance-and-inprivate-banking-sector.html
http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/aboutus/regulationguideline/prudregsep2011.pdf
March 23, 2013 | Filed under: Banking,Economy | Posted by: Jahangir(Published in New Age on
Sunday, 30 November 2014.)
Mamtaz and Yusuf, (2005), Corporate Governance: Bangladesh Perspective, The Cost and
Management, Vol. 33 No. 6 November-December 2005, pp. 18-26. 48 ShantaKar and
Mithunsarker: Corporate Governance Practices in Private Commercial Banks-A Study on
Khulna City
Principles of corporate governance, OECD, 2004, OECD publications service, France
W.G. Zikmund, (2010-2011), Business Research Method, Eighth Edition, pp. 395-396
47 | P a g e
Appendix
Questionnaire Survey on
Corporate Governance Practices in Commercial Banks of Bangladesh
2. Position:
Board of Director
Managing Director
Director
Manager (Deputy General Manager/ Assistant General Manager/ Manager/ Others
(Please Mention: )
Executive
Others .
3. Age:
4. Sex:
Personal Address:
Contact no.: Email:
48 | P a g e
3. How do you describe the ownership and the control structure of the company?
a) The largest shareholder has a substantial voting right and effectively controls the
company ( You can express share percentage if you want) or ( say over 30%- 40%
including that of companies he/she control)
b) Two or more large shareholders collectively control the company
c) Ownership is fairly disseminated with no controlling shareholder, and shareholder
doesnt directly control the management
d) Others ( Please explain your answer in one sentence)
4. What relation does the CEO have the founder or the largest shareholder?
a) Founder himself
b) Founders Family Member
c) Professional Manager
d) Other ( Please explain your answer in one sentence)
Strongly
Agree
Agree
No
Opinion
Disagree
Strongly
Disagree
B. Can minority shareholders (holding more than a certain level of shares) nominate
candidates at the shareholders meeting or prior to the meeting (to have the company
disseminate relevant information)
C. Would it be possible for the director candidates proposed by the management of your
company to fail to be elected at the shareholders meeting?
50 | P a g e
Web
Page
Queries
Significant Changes in
Ownership
Annual
Report
Report to
Regulatory
Agency
No
Queries
Yes
No
51 | P a g e
Queries
Often Sometimes
a.
b.
Independent Directors
participating actively in board
discussions
c.
Rarely
Never
Queries
a.
Audit Committee
b.
Nomination Committee
c.
d.
Yes
No
Others
52 | P a g e
e.
G. Miscellaneous
SL.
Queries
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
Yes
No
Others
53 | P a g e
SL.
Queries
a.
b.
Always
Sometimes
Rarely
Never
Present scenario of banking sector is a matter of concern. Form the following which is
mostly responsible Weak selection if the BOD (Board of Directors)
Influence of governmental body and political parties
Non- compliance of rules and regulations
THANK YOU
54 | P a g e
List of Respondents
Sl
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Name
Md. Riaz Uddin
Mohammad Obaidul Hoque
Sumon Halder
Md. Zahidul Islam
Md. Azizur Rahman
Mousumi Talukder
Md. Shamimur Rahman
Mohammad Kamal
Soyon Chowdhury
Shoel Barua
Sazzad Hossain
Midhat Ara
Sanjay Das
Fatima Lia
Monika Rahman
Md. Ruiaz Uddin
Adnan Mahmud
Mahmud Hadiuzzaman
Zahidul Islam
Sahjadi Akter
Shafiqur Rahman
Md. Jasim Uddin
AKM Sydur Rahman
Rehena Dewan
ABM Arfanuzzaman
Torsa Atia Sultana
MD. Rumon Mahmud
Nipa Akter
Md. Shahriar Iqbal
Mrs. Kaniz Fatema
Mr. Saifur Rahman
Munira Yasmin
Md. Rezaul Karim
Md. Lutfur Rahman
Md. Abdul Alim
Afroza Sultana
Md. Abdul Hai
Rajesh Kumar Shaha
Abul Kalam Azad
Md. Asif Iqbal
Designation
Manager
Executive Officer
Senior Officer
Principal Officer
Executive Officer
Officer
Executive
Officer
Executive Officer
Executive Officer
Executive Officer
Vice President
Executive Officer
Customer
Customer
Assistant Manager
Executive
Junior Asistent VP
Senior Officer
Senior Officer
Assistant Manger
Senior Officer
Senior Manager
Manager
Senior Officer
Assistant Officer
Cash Officer
Customer
TAO
Executive
Other
Executive
Asst. GM
Senior Officer
Executive
Executive
Manager
Other
Executive
Executive
Organization
Janata bank
Jamuna Bank
IBBL
Meghna Bank
DBBL
Bank Asia Ltd
Janata Bank
Jamuna Bank Ltd
Pubali Bank
Sonali Bank
IBBL
SIBL
IFIC
Sonali Bank
Bank Asia
FSBL
IBBL
SIBL
NCC Bank
Rupali bank
City Bank Ltd
IBBL
City Bank
NCC Bank
IBBl
IBBL
IBBL
Sonali Bank
Contact info.
riazuddin@gmail.com
obaidulhoque@gmail.com
01678715236
azizurrahman66@yahoo.com
talukderbut@gmail.com
letter2rahman@gmail.com
01673762362
01675838375
01794078090
01672979673
01678715235
01713271199
01716759672
sydur.rahman@citybank.com
01911624387
01717798230
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
Mehnaz Akter
Sultana Begum
Kazi Md. Tareq
Md. Tazuddin Mollah
Golam Mohiuddin
Kazi Ahasan Habib
Sultan Ahamed
Md. Shafiqul Islam
Hasan Masud
Ayesha Hamid
Customer
Executive
Executive
Manager
Manager
A.V.P
Executive
Officer
Manager
Officer
NCC
IBBL
SIBL
IBBL
Janata Bank Ltd.
IFIC
Janata Bank Ltd.
DBBL
IBBL
IFIC
01713229835
01812998953
List of Tables
Table a: Position of the Respondents in the Bank
Board of Director
1
Managing Director
2
Director
0
Manager
10
Executive
22
Others
15
Total
50
Table b: Age distribution of the Respondents
25-35
31
35-45
8
45-55
7
55-65
1
Total
47
Table c: Gender of the Respondents
Male
38
Female
12
Total
50
Table d: Ownership type of the Bank
Public/ State- Owned
12
Private
38
Others
0
Total
50
56 | P a g e
5
2
42
1
50
Table f: Relation between CEO and the founder or the largest shareholders
Found Himself
5
Founders Family Member
2
Professional manager
42
Others
1
Total
50
Table i: Adequate time for asking questions and lacing issues at the shareholders meeting
Strongly Agree
Agree
No Opinion Disagree Strongly Disagree
10
35
1
0
0
Table k: Minority shareholders nominate candidate at the shareholders meeting or prior to the meeting
Yes No Total
26
19
45
57 | P a g e
Table l: Director Candidates proposed by the management fail to be elected at the shareholders meeting
Sometimes Rarely Unthinkable Total
12
35
2
49
Webpage
12
25
26
10
26
11
Annual
Report
10
15
21
9
13
13
Report to
Regulatory
Agency
10
13
11
16
7
13
No
8
0
0
5
0
4
total
40
53
58
40
46
41
58 | P a g e
Rarely
Never
11
Others
3
2
4
6
3
Others
2
1
5
2
1
3
6
6
5
1
Rarely
Never
59 | P a g e
60 | P a g e